RemRev Certiorari To Expropriation
RemRev Certiorari To Expropriation
In the case at bench, apart from the bare allegation of petitioner, there is nothing in the records In this regard, A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC promulgated by the Court on September 4, 2001 provides
of the case, much less the challenged decision and order which would indicate that indeed that a petition for rehabilitation is considered a special proceeding given that it seeks to establish
public respondent NLRC committed any grave abuse of discretion. the status of a party or a particular fact. Accordingly, the period of appeal provided in paragraph
However, on MR, it reversed itself and granted the petition, reinstating the LAs decision. Balba 19 (b) of the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 for
appealed to the SC, alleging that the special proceedings shall apply. Under said paragraph 19 (b), the period of appeal shall be thirty
(30) days, a record of appeal being required.
CA should not have delved into factual issues in order to resolve allegations of grave abuse of
discretion as a ground for the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition. However, it should be noted that the Court issued A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on September 14, 2004,
clarifying the proper mode of appeal in cases involving corporate rehabilitation and intra-
2. New Frontier Sugar Corp v RTC of Iloilo GR 165001 (January 31, 2007) corporate controversies. It is provided therein that all decisions and final orders in cases falling
D: petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure
Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. The RTC issued an Omnibus Order dated January Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealed to the
13, 2003, a final order since it terminated the proceedings and dismissed the case before the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to be filed within fifteen (15)
trial court; it leaves nothing more to be done. As such, petitioners recourse is to file an appeal days from notice of the decision or final order of the RTC.
from the Omnibus Order.
In any event, as previously stated, since what petitioner filed was a petition for certiorari under unlawful detainer case and archiving it. The suspension of the unlawful detainer case has
Rule 65 of the Rules, the CA rightly dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Orders. apparently been lifted and the case has been decided. There is thus no more need for the Court
to decide the present petition on the merits.
3. Camutin v Sps Potente GR 181642 (January 29, 2009)
D: In the case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the Municipl Trial Courts 4. Bugarin v Palisoc GR 157985 (December 2, 2005)
(MTCs) Orders cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy since sustaining the MTCs orders that the D: Ejectment case. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the
proceedings in the ejectment case be indefinitely suspended and archived subject to its revival latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence.
upon resolution of the civil case OF PARTITION filed with the RTC would unnecessarily and o A judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to
unfairly delay the unlawful detainer case, a result contrary to the rules objective of speedy a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically ministerial.
disposition of cases. The defendant (Bugarin) may stay it only by: (1) perfecting an appeal; (2) filing a
supersedeas bond; and (3) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
F: In a Petition for Review, petitioners assail the order of the RTC dismissing the special civil compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the
case before them. appeal.
Petitioners were the registered owners of parcels of land in Cavite. They reside
abroad and discovered, upon coming back to the Phils, that the house and Once the RTC decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory, without prejudice
warehouse of respondents were erected on their lots to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
Respondents agreed to pay petitioners monthly rentals and and they agreed that the
should the properties be sold, respondents would have the right of first refusal, and However, Bugarin failed to file a petition for review. Bugarin received on March 12, 2003 the
should respondents be unable to purchase the properties, they would peacefully RTC decision denying their MR. They had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before
vacate the premises. the CA. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003.
Respondents failed to pay the agreed rentals. Neither were they able to purchase the
lots. Consequently, petitioners sold a portion of the lots to a third party who had it
fenced FACTS:
The buyer filed a complaint for partition before RTC. o A complaint for ejectment was filed before the MeTC by Palisoc et al. (Palisoc)
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents before the against Bugarin et al. (Bugarin).
MTC o The MeTC declared Palisoc as the rightful possessors and ordered Bugarin to vacate
MTC issued an order/writ of execution where it noted the pendency of the the premises and pay Palisoc et al. the rentals.
civil case before the RTC and the existence of an amicable settlement to o Bugarin appealed to the RTC while Palisoc moved for execution pending appeal.
await first the resolution of the RTC on the said pending civil case. o The RTC denied the appeal and affirmed the MeTC decision. Bugarin filed an MR
MTC ordered that the proceedings in the ejectment case be indefinitely with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. The RTC denied the MR and
suspended and archived subject to its revival upon resolution of the civil granted Palisocs motion for execution for failure of Bugarin to post a supersedeas
case. bond or to pay the back rentals. This decision was received by Bugarin on March 12,
MTC also denied petitioners MR. 2003. A writ of execution pending appeal was issued.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 w/ the RTC.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the petition for certiorari is a Bugarin filed a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution. Palisoc filed a Motion to
prohibited pleading. Issue a Special Order of Demolition since Bugarin refused to vacate the premises. The RTC
deferred action on the motions to allow Bugarin to exhaust legal remedies available to them.
I: W/N the petition for certiorari should prosper? Bugarin filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer Implementation of Writ of Execution and
Opposition to Motion to Issue Special Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 of RA
H: The petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic. 7279[1] was not complied with.
Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, Palisoc filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition. The
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While a petition for certiorari is RTC declared the decision denying Bugarins appeal final and executory, and remanded
not allowed against any interlocutory order issued by the court in the unlawful detainer or the records of the case to the MeTC without acting on the motions. Bugarin filed a Petition for
ejectment case, in the case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA on April 10, 2003. Bugarin contended that the RTC
MTC's Orders cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. On the committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the MeTC
contrary, sustaining the MTC's orders would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
unlawful detainer case, a result contrary to the rules' objective of speedy disposition of
cases. Petitioners could also not appeal from the orders of the MTC because these only The MeTC eventually issued the Special Order of Demolition.
ordered the indefinite suspension and archiving of the case. The case was not resolved
on the merits so there is actually no decision from which petitioners can appeal. Thus, ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC properly ordered the demolition.
the RTC could have validly ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on
the ground that it is a prohibited pleading. Bugarins position:
(1) The MeTCs orders violated the mandatory requirements of RA 7279 since there was no 30-
However, the MTC's revival of the unlawful detainer case and its subsequent dismissal thereof day notice prior to the date of eviction or demolition and there had been no consultation on the
on the grounds aforestated have rendered the resolution of the present Petition for Review matter of resettlement.
superfluous and unnecessary. In their Petition for Review, petitioners seek the nullification of the (2) There was neither relocation nor financial assistance given.
RTC's orders and the subsequent recall of the MTC's orders suspending the proceedings in the (3) The orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of the law.
FACTS:
Palisocs position: Lalican was charged for the illegal possession of lumber.
(1) RA 7279 is not applicable. There was no proof that Bugarin et al. are registered as eligible He argues that the law only contemplates illegal possession of timber, and not of
socialized housing program beneficiaries. lumber, in accordance with Sec. 68 PD 705. He moves for the quashal of Information
(2) Even if RA 7279 was applicable, the required notices under the law had already been since it was a nonexistent crime, or that it did not constitute an offense.
complied with. Bugarin were already notified on March 7, 2003 of an impending demolition, Lower court ruled in favor of Lalican and ordered the quashal of the Information. The
when the writ of execution was served. prosecution filed an MR.
Pending the resolution of the MR, the presiding judge inhibited himself from taking
HELD: YES, the MeTC orders were properly issued. cognizance of the case. When the case was assigned to another branch, the new
judge set aside the quashal Order.
A judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition arguing that the lower court
possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically ministerial. The defendant committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside
(Bugarin) may stay it only by: (1) perfecting an appeal; (2) filing a supersedeas bond; and (3) the quashal Order.
making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy
of the property during the pendency of the appeal. ISSUE (in relation to the topic): Whether the lower court committed GAD
Once the RTC decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory, without prejudice HELD: No
to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
RATIO: There is no grave abuse of discretion in this case. Certiorari may be issued only where it
However, Bugarin failed to file a petition for review. Bugarin received on March 12, 2003 the is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of
RTC decision denying their MR. They had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
the CA. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003. contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
DOCTRINE! The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits in the whimsical exercise of power.
instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the
judgment is: (1) its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the exercise of power in Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the court lacked or exceeded its
excess thereof; (3) or GADLEJ. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. Where the court has jurisdiction over the
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the certiorari is that there should be no case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of
appeal. law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors
of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges findings and
Bugarins petition for certiorari before the CA was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of conclusions.
appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. Thus, the filing of the petition Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. The
for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and executory. recourse is to proceed to trial, and in case of conviction, appeal. The denial of a motion to quash
is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a
The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case to the MeTC. The MeTC cannot be faulted petition for certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
for issuing the order to enforce the RTC judgment. The orders also did not violate RA 7279. alternative or successive. AN interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only
Under the said law, eviction or demolition may be allowed when there is a court order for eviction when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
and demolition, as in the case at bar. Moreover, nothing is shown on record that Bugarin et al. discretion.
are underprivileged and homeless citizens as defined in RA 7279. The procedure for the
execution of the eviction or demolition order under RA 7279 is not applicable. 6. Sps Nische v Equitable-PCI Bank GR 167434 (February 19, 2007)
D: GR: Before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
Lastly, the order of demolition had already been executed. Bugarin had already vacated the area petitioner is mandated to file of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order, and the
and Palisoc now possess the properties free from all occupants, as evidenced by the sheriffs subsequent denial of the court a quo;
turn-over of possession. Thus, the instant case before us has indeed become moot and XPNs:
academic. (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
Here, Order of the trial court granting petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction
5. Lalicon v Vergara 276 S 518 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction and thus a
D: Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied.The nullity. If the trial court issues a writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence of proof of a
unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, the writ is a nullity.
fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his
motion to quash the information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently F:
defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a Bank as creditor-mortgagee filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of 2 real estate
plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in mortgage contracts executed by Sps. Nisce.
his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom Sheriff set the sale at public auction on Jan. 14 or on Jan. 30 in case the former date
in the manner authorized by law. Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an set did not push through
information is denied. Sps. Nisce filed a complaint for nullity of suretyship agreement. They pointed out that
the petition for foreclosure filed by the bank included the alleged obligation of
Natividad (the wife) as surety for a loan of Vista Norte Trading Corp., a company concerns and activities relating to money lending issues. It was incorporated on July 9,
owned by their son. 2010, and a month later, it filed this petition, joined by its founder and president,
They alleged that since they were creditors and debtors to each other there should be Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen.
an offset by legal compensation. To justify their skipping the hierarchy of courts and going directly to this Court to
Sps. Nisce filed a petition for a writ of preliminary and prohibitory injunction. secure a writ of certiorari, petitioners contend that the transcendental importance of
RTC granted spouses plea for a writ of preliminary injunction to solve first the issue of their Petition can readily be seen in the issues raised therein, to wit:
setting off. a) Whether under R.A. No. 265 and/or P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB had the
Bank, instead of filing an MR, assailed the RTC decision via petition for certiorari (Rule statutory or constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of
65) interest for all kinds of credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods
or credit beyond the limits prescribed in the Usury Law;
I: W/N RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it assailed the order? Yes b) If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB
W/N filing of MR is condition sine qua non to the filing of certiorari under Rule 65? Circular No. 905, which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended
GR: Yes. BUT in this case, No. Act No. 2655 as regards usurious interest rates;
c) Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce
H: The Petition in the Court of Appeals Not Premature CB Circular No. 905.
The general rule is that before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Issue: Is Certiorari proper?
the petitioner is mandated to comply with a condition precedent: the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order, and the subsequent denial of the court a quo. It must be Held: No. The petition must fail.
stressed that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be filed only as a last The Petition is procedurally infirm. The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for
resort. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is intended to afford the public respondent an certiorari, as well as to grant due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
opportunity to correct any actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and court.
factual issues. However, the rule is subject to the following recognized exceptions: A petition for certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same
must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) be brushed aside as mere technicality.
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and As provided in Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in judicial or quasi-
the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the judicial functions.17 Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by discretion of a judicial nature.18The CB-MB (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive
the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity functions with respect to the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit
for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the institutions, and branches and agencies thereof.
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No.
law or public interest is 905 was done in the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case.
involved.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/feb2007/167434.htm - _ftn56
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the The Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 categorically provides that the general manager shall
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state serve at the pleasure of the Board of Directors.
that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer. SEC. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the board, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general
18. Magtibay v Garcia (January 25, 1983) manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall serve
D: A writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public at the pleasure of the board.
officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise judgment in
reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District
and not that of the court. to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him under
Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768.
Facts:
Petitioner was relieved from being cadet colonel and as battalion commander of the lst The case of Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. delineated the nature
BCT of the U.P. Cadet Corps. He was also excluded from the roll of the graduating of an appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power in this wise:
class of the ROTC Advance Course for failing a subject. An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power is in essence temporary
This is an appeal from the order of a CFI dismissing Ps petition for mandamus. in nature. It is co-extensive with the desire of the Board of Directors. Hence, when the
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in refusing to review the actuations of Lt. Board opts to replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal but only an
Col. Santiago Q. Garcia, commandant of the University of the Philippines ROTC as to expiration of term and in an expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice, due
matters affecting the regulation and supervision of the U.P. ROTC Corps of Cadets. hearing or sufficient grounds before the incumbent can be separated from office. The
Issue: Whether the courts may review the exercise of discretion of a public officer on matters in protection afforded by Section 7.04 of the Code of By-Laws on Removal Of Officers
which it is his duty to act? and Employees, therefore, cannot be claimed by petitioner.
Held: No, SEE Doctrine.
In fine, the appointment of petitioner and his consequent termination are clearly within the wide
19. Paloma v Mora 470 S 711 arena of discretion which the legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which in this case
D: Removed GM of Palompon, Leyte is the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Here, considering that the
Mandamus lies to compel the performance when refused of a ministerial duty but not to compel petitioner is at loggerheads with the Board, the formers services obviously ceased to be
the performance of a discretionary duty. An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing pleasurable to the latter. The Board of Directors of a Water District may abridge the term of the
power is in essence temporary in nature. It is co-extensive with the desire of the Board of General Manager thereof the moment the latters services cease to be convivial to the former.
Directors. Hence, when the Board opts to replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal Put another way, he is at the mercy of the appointing powers since his appointment can be
but only an expiration of term and in an expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice, due terminated at any time for any cause and following Orcullo there is no need of prior notice or due
hearing or sufficient grounds before the incumbent can be separated from office. The protection hearing before the incumbent can be separated from office. Hence, petitioner is treading on
afforded by Section 7.04 of the Code of By-Laws on Removal Of Officers and Employees, shaky grounds with his intransigent posture that he was removed sans cause and due process.
therefore, cannot be claimed by petitioner.
Here, Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water 20. Quarto v Ombudsman GR 169042 (October 5, 2011)
District to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him D:
under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768. Facts:
President Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised
F: Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of
Petitioner Nilo Paloma was appointed General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province,
District by its Board of Directors in 1993. the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their
His services were subsequently terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 8-95, which respective sitios.
was passed by respondents as Chairman and members of the Board of the
Palompon, Leyte Water District. Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed
The Board, in the same Resolution, designated respondent Valentino Sevilla as through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its
Officer-in-Charge. Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959.
Pained by his termination, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for
preliminary injunction with damages before the RTC to contest his dismissal with the Later, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial
prayer to be restored to the position of General Manager. Court in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition
sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local
I: W/N mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the
to reinstate the General Manager thereof? duties and functions of their respective offices. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v.
Auditor General, the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a
H: NO. Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the declared a member of the House of Representatives. So, the SC still has jurisdiction over
officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties Reyes.
and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or
the Municipality of San Narciso. duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. As the facts
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether
affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of
the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it Members of the House of Representatives, respectively.
(petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R.
municipality; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality No. 207264 affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053
was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory
through the Solicitor General. resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of
Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for
Issue: whether or not the petition for quo warranto is proper the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and
Held: beyond dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise." When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is
reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be
brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor QUO WARRANTO
General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, 22. Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez 239 SCRA 11
under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of D: When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to
another person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other direct proceeding. It is commenced by
commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he the Sol-Gen. If commenced by a person, it is only when he claims to be entitled to a public
claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
another." While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so
named only the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision must be timely
however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to raised.
exist and to act in that capacity. o Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on
20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that
the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the
21. Velasco v Belmonte GR 211140 (January 12, 2016) executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality of
D: A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly
or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period
Here, the decision of the COMELEC to appoint P as the representative is final. Hence, , Speaker can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether or not to administer the imperativeness, must aquo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a
oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.
Representatives, respectively.
Facts:
Facts: o President Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised
This is a petition for mandamus filed under Rule 65 by Petitioner Velasco against Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal
Speaker Belmonte to administer the proper oath in his favor so he can assume the district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of
position of representative of Marinduque. the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora
This is because the COMELEC had already ruled that he, Lord Allan Jay Velasco, is and Tala along with their respective sitios.
proclaimed the winning candidate for the position because the his rival Reyess COC o Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President
was canceled by the COMELEC due to citizenship and residency requirements even and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San
before Reyes proclamation as winner. Hence, as second-placer the COMELEC Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959.
declared Velasco as representative of Marinduque. o Later, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the
Respondent Reyes contends that the SC does not have jurisdiction over the Regional Trial Court in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of
mandamus proceeding because as the declared winner of the election, the matter has San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353
already been elevated to the HRET. Also, that mandamus may not be used to compel and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be
Speaker Belmonte to administer the oath, because the Respondents (being members permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their
of the HR) have discretion to administer the oath or not. respective offices. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the
Issue: Is R correct? petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act,
was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the
Held: No. The nullification of her COC came before her proclamation. Hence, she was never constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued,
the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral.
exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to o They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments
the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso. which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of
o In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way Article VII of the Constitution.
of affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner
municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of I: Whether or not petitioner had standing to file this case?
Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from H: No
questioning the creation of the new municipality; and that, considering the petition to R: The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of
be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of
action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor Governor of the Bangko Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196[1967]). Such a special
General. civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be
entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another.
Issue: whether or not the petition for quo warranto is proper It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold
the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing
Held: No, but the court nonetheless tackled the merits of the case. When the inquiry is incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery.
focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses. Hence, there is no
proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of need to resolve the question of whether the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and
the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined. However, for the information of all
directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain concerned, we call attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale: Congress cannot by law
circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
"entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." While
the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the 24. Lota v CA 2 S 715
officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation D:
of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that Where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office,quo warranto is the proper remedy
capacity. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 36 Phil. 491). But, where the respondent, without claiming
any right to an office, excludes the petitioner therefrom, the remedy is
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 mandamus, not quo warranto.
August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the Any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action of quo
municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. warranto without the intervention of the Solicitor-General or the Fiscal (Navarro vs.
Gimenez, 10 Phil. 226; Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra), and only the person who is in
Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unlawful possession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to that office may be
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case made parties in order to determine their respective rights thereto in the same action.
hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least
attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de Facts
factomunicipal corporation. 1. Moises Sangalang was the cementery caretaker from 1951 until he was extended a new
appointment by
At the present time, all doubts on the de jurestanding of the municipality must be dispelled. the Local Health Officer.
Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of 2. Flaviano Lota, then mayor of Taal appointed Jose Sangalang as cemetery caretaker, thus
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Muni-cipality of San Andres has been taking
considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the Moises place.
province of Quezon. 3.Moises filed a complaint against Mayor Lota, Jose and the municipal treasurer.
4.The CFI of Batangas rendered in favor of Moises.
23. Tarrosa v Singson 232 S 553 5. Mayor Lota appealed.He claimed that the trial court erred in not dismissing complaint on the
D: Quo warranto as a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General, or by ground
a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by that the real party in interest, which is the municipality of Lipa was not made party-defendant;
another. Petitioner who did not aver entitlement to the office cannot bring the action for quo and the
warranto. Question of title to an office may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground that appellee was not validly
salary to the person holding office, brought by one not claiming to be entitled to said office. appointed to
the post of municipal cemetery of Taal.
F: 6.CA rendered a decision declaring Moises to continue in the office as cementary caretaker.
o Petitioner, as a taxpayer filed this petition for prohibition against respondent Gabriel 7. Lota contended that the CA erred in holding that the present action is one of quo warranto; in
Singson as Governor of BSP for not having been confirmed by the Commission on not
Appointments. dismissing the action for failure of the Moises to join the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, as
o Section 6, Article II of RA 7653 does require the BSP governor to be confirmed by the party
CoA. In their comment, respondent alleges that Congress exceeded its legislative defendant; and in declaring that respondent Moises Sangalang is entitled to hold, and continue
powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the in the
office of caretaker of the municipal cemetery of that municipality 26. Garces v CA GR 114795 (July 17, 1996)
D: Quo Warranto tests the title claimed by another to ones office. Mandamus on the other hand
Issues: avails to enforce clear legal duties. Here, the actions should be quo warranto not mandamus
1) WON the CA erred in holding the action is one of a quo warranto. because Concepcion continues to occupy Garces position (election registrar of Gatulac, and
2) WON the CA erred in not dismissing the action for failure of the plaintiff to join the exercises functions thereto).
Municipality of Facts:
Taal, Batangas, as party defendant Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac.
She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn,
Held: was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte
1) No. Quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties not Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming
to try disputed titles (38 C.J. 546; 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 office in Gutalac as the same is not vacant.
ed., 200). Hence, where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office,quo warranto is Concepcion continued occupying the Gatulac post.
the proper remedy (Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 36 Phil. 491). But, where the She filed a mandamus case against Empeynado.
respondent, without claiming any right to an office, excludes the petitioner therefrom, RTC dismissed because quo warranto is the proper remedy.
the remedy ismandamus, not quo warranto
2) No. Any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action of quo Issue: Should the action be qw or mandamus?
warranto without the intervention of the Solicitor-General or the Fiscal (Navarro vs.
Gimenez, 10 Phil. 226; Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra), and only the person who is in Held: Quo warranto. Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position
unlawful possession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to that office may be and exercises the corresponding functions therefore, the proper remedy should have been quo
made parties in order to determine their respective rights thereto in the same action. warranto and not mandamus.[26] Quo warranto tests the title to ones office claimed by another
and has as its object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to
25. Calleja v Panday GR 168696 (Feb 28, 2006) quo warranto against a corporation enforce clear legal duties and not to try disputed titles.
D: But here, Court said SC Concepcions transfer was illegal because it is not one of the
Actions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office grounds allowed for transfer as enumerated in EO 17.
in a corporation are no longer cognizable by the SEC. Jurisdiction over these cases
have been transferred to courts of general jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8799. Pursuant 27. Mendoza v Allas GR 131977 (Feb 4, 1999)
to this, the SC designates certain branches of the RTC to be Special Commercial D: A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though
Courts that will try and decide cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. such successor may trace his title to the same source.
Here, the RTC br. 58 is not a special commercial court. It has no authority to try and
decide a case, and at the same time to remand the same to another co-equal court in Facts:
order to cure the defects on jurisdiction. Petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court granting his petition
Facts: for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs
Respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur Intelligence and Investigation Service, and the payment of his back salaries and
for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, benefits.
Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. TC denied execution because the person against whom quo warranto was issued
Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, (Allas) who was usurping Ps position had already been promoted as Deputy
they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Commissioner of Customs. Hence, the quo warranto case cannot be executed against
Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the the new appointee of the Director 3 position (Olores).
incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed
men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents. Issue: May Ollores (new appointee in place of Allas against whom quo warranto was issued be
MTD was filed by the Petitioners based on lack of jurisdiction. subject to the execution of the quo warranto proceeding?
RTC dismissed the MTD, but remanded the case to a special commercial RTC
because it lacked jurisdiction. Held: Yes. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari based on Rule 45. though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the
Issue: May the RTC of general jurisdiction remand the case to a Special Commercial court? writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the
person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in,
Held: NO. The RTC br. 58 is not a special commercial court. It has no authority to try and decide or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.
a case, and at the same time to remand the same to another co-equal court in order to cure the In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent
defects on jurisdiction. Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to
The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The
court to order the transfer of respondents petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.
specious because as of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03- SC, which clearly
stated that cases formerly cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of 28. Lokin v Comelec GR 179431-32 (June 22, 2010) partylist nominee change
Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court Facts:
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari
Note:The SC proceeded to try the case despite the wrong remedy (it should have been 65). and mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue
implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of value of such property. The trial court relied on the earlier pronouncements of this Court that the
a party-list nominee not written in the party-list system act determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Thus,
Petitioner was initially a nominee of the Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) valuations made by the executive branch or the legislature are at best initial or preliminary only.
partylist. Prior to elections however CIBAC, through its president, filed a list of
substitution of nominee and removed Petitioner Lokin. CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. It observed that, given their nature, high-powered electric lines
But Lokin won as second nominee (second seat). So, Lokin filed a Petition for traversing respondents property would necessarily diminish -- if not damage entirely -- the value
Certiorari and Mandamus with the SC to install him in his seat. and the use of the affected property; as well as endanger lives and limbs because of the high-
R argued that the SC has no jurisdiction because questions as to the elections, tension current.
returns, and qualifications of winning candidates should be done through the HRET,
not the SC. Moreover, that Loki should raise the question in an election protest or in a ISSUE:
special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for W/N an easement of right of way is considered "taking" of property so as to warrant
certiorari with the SC. expropriation proceedings over the subject property? YES
Issue: Was Ps action of Certiorari and Mandamus proper?
HELD:
D/ HELD: YES. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an SC: The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent
action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking domain. True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and
to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is,
Election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect
contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would
electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to
obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary
Special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of equivalent of the land.
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the
ineligible person from the office, The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably undeveloped, raw agricultural land.
Here, since the object of the action is to install the petitioner in his place. Then Certiorari with But a dominant portion thereof has been reclassified by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Naga
the SC is proper and not an electoral protest or a quo warrant proceeding. as residential.
The Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September
1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the
amount of P4,664,000 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis
Santos. The Santos heirs, opposed and asked to adjust the compensation to conform to the
current zonal value of the land (because its use was converted, and thus changing the appraised
value). RTC ruled in favor of the Republic. Petitioner appealed to the CA.
ISSUE
1. Whether the change in the present use of the expropriated property from what was originally
intended and agreed upon justifies reversion? NO
2. Whether non-payment of just compensation automatically warrant reversion of the
expropriated property back to its owner? NO
HELD
No, changes in the present use do not justify reversion and non-payment of just compensation
does not automatically warrant reversion of the expropriated property to its owner.
RATIO
1. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Petitioner, as the
condemnor and owner of the property, has a right to alter and decide the use of said property.
The limit to this right is only that it be used for public purpose. Plaintiffs are not entitled to
recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to public use. They can only
demand the fair market value of the expropriated property.
The judgment rendered on the expropriation proceedings did not only provide for the payment of
just compensation, but it also adjudged the property condemned in favor of the Republic. The
government has occupied, utilized and for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the
property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as condemnee has
amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the judgment on the expropriation,
thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution.
2. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the
fact that the right of the expropriating authority is not that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to
which the remedy of rescission applies.
In an in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After the condemnation, the
paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title. Thus, by giving notice to all
claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing
better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same
argument could likewise apply against them. Delaying the filing of action to compel payment
against petitioner would militate against them. Consistent with the rule that one should take good
care of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the
finality of the judgment, which resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and
possession of the property.