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Pagkatipunan Vs IAC
Pagkatipunan Vs IAC
Facts:
Jose Velasquez, Sr. died intestate in 1961. Petitioner is his surviving spouse, and the other
13 petitioners are their children. Private respondents are the descendants of the deceased
with his first wife Victorina Real who died in 1920. After Victorinas death in 1920, no
dissolution of the first conjugal property has been made. Neither had there been any
liquidation of the second conjugal partnership after Velasquez death in 1961.
Numerous donations inter vivos were made by Jose Velasquez, Sr. in favor of some of his
compulsory heirs including, among others, donation in favor of Guillermo in 1953 [403k
sq. mtrs.], donation in favor of Jose Velasquez, Jr. In 1926 [450k sq. mtrs.], donation in
favor of Amelia and Canuta [11k sq. mtrs.]. In 1969, respondents filed a complaint for
accion reivindicatoria, annulment of deeds of sale, and partition against petitioners. The
court found that the real controversy however was the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership properties in his two marriages.
In 1980, the RTC, without determining the gross value of the conjugal properties of the 1st
marriage and without undertaking collation of the donations inter vivos, ruled that the
deceased had already disposed of and exhausted his share in the conjugal partnership [1st
marriage], so that the heirs have nothing more to inherit, and that whatever remaining
portion of the conjugal property appertained only to the private respondents as heirs of
the deceased Victorina. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the distribution among the heirs, without undertaking the collation of
donations inter vivos of the donor, is defective. [YES]
Ruling:
CA Decision is Set Aside.
After a careful review of the records and the arguments presented by both parties, the
Court finds that both the trial court and the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
failed to consider some basic principles observed in the law on succession. Such an
oversight renders the appealed decision defective and hard to sustain.
It is a basic rule that before any conclusion about the legal share due to the heirs may be
reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. In the assailed decision, the
respondent court affirmed the trial courts ruling, that Jose Velasquez, Sr. had already
disposed of and exhausted his corresponding share in the conjugal partnership owned by
him and Victorina Real, so that his heirs have nothing more to inherit from him, and that
accordingly, whatever remaining portion of the conjugal property must necessarily
appertain only to the private respondents as heirs of the deceased Victorina Real. Clearly,
the trial court failed to consider among others, the following provisions of the Civil Code:
"ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include
those imposed in the will.
"To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the
testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them."
"ART. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from
the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition."
It is undeniable that numerous donations inter vivos were made by Jose Velasquez, Sr. in
favor of some of his compulsory heirs. They include among others, the donation made in
favor of Guillermo Velasquez on February 26, 1953, consisting of 403,000 square meters
(Items 5 and 6); the donation made in 1926 in favor of Jose Velasquez, Jr., consisting of
450,000 square meters (Item No. 18); the donation in favor of Amelia Velasquez (Item
No. 27), and the donation in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan, consisting of 11,000 square
meters (part of Item No. 29) (Commissioners Report, Rollo, pp. 355-360).
It appears that there was no determination whatsoever of the gross value of the conjugal
properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Obviously it is impossible to
determine the conjugal share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. from the said property relationship.
Likewise, no collation of the donations he executed during his lifetime was undertaken by
the trial court. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to ascertain whether or not such
donations trenched on the heirs legitime so that the same may be considered subject to
reduction for being inofficious.
Article 909 of the Civil Code provides:
"Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which the
testator could have disposed by his last will.
"Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be
reduced according to the rules established by this Code."
With the avowed specific provisions of the aforesaid laws respecting collation, which are
ruled controlling even in intestate succession, this Court finds that the lower courts
ruling adjudicating the remaining portion of the conjugal estate to the private respondents
is purely speculative and conjectural.
"From the evidence adduced by the parties during the hearing before this Court and
before the Commissioners, these properties were acquired on November 19, 1918 by the
spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victoria Real from Estanislao Balasoto (Exh. H-5,
Commissioner). Said property was originally declared for taxation purposes in the names
of said spouses. (Exh. H-Commissioner). On March 4, 1967, defendant Canuta
Pagkatipunan sold the same property to the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena
Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-1-Commissioner). The vendee Magdalena Pagkatipunan is the
sister of the defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan. Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843
(Exh. H-2-Commissioner) was issued in the names of the spouses Moises Santos and
Magdalena Pagkatipunan resold (sic) the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-
3-Commissioner). Thereafter, tax declaration covering said property was issued in the
name of Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exhibit H-4-Commissioner). During the pendency of this
suit, this property was subdivided and assigned by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her
children, the defendants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo,
Napoleon, Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Julio, Victoria and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez.
Said defendants-children of Canuta Pagkatipunan caused the issuance of free patent titles
in their favor covering the subdivided lots conveyed to them respectively by their mother
(Exh. 2, 2-A to 2-L).
"It is evident that the parcels of land under Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Canuta
Pagkatipunan had no right to alienate the same. Her conveyance of the same property to
her brother-in-law and sister is fictitious or simulated. Ten (10) days after she executed
her sale, the same property was resold to her by the vendees. She utilized said
conveyance and reconveyance only for the purpose of securing a tax declaration in her
name over said property. Her subsequent subdivision of said lot and transfer of the
subdivided lots to each of their children further show her fraudulent intent to deprive the
plaintiffs of their rightful shares in the disputed property." (Rollo, pp. 606-607)
Despite the several pleadings filed by the petitioners in this Court, they did not rebut the
foregoing findings of the trial court but merely held on to their argument that since Free
Patent Titles Nos. P-2000 to P-2012 were already issued in their names, their title thereto
is indefeasible and incontrovertible. This is a misplaced argument.
The fact that they had succeeded in securing title over the said parcels of land does not
warrant the reversal of the trial courts ruling that the above mentioned sales and
assignments were sham and fictitious. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title
binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is
fraudulent and the person in whose name the land is registered thus holds it as a mere
trustee, the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property within
a period of ten years (Pajarillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72908, August
11, 1969, 176 SCRA 340).
Since petitioners asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the said parcels of land but
acted in fraud of the private respondents, the former may be held to act as trustees for the
benefit of the latter, pursuant to the provision of Article 1456 of the Civil Code:
"ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes."
But while the trial court has the authority to order the reconveyance of the questioned
titles, We cannot agree that the reconveyance should be made in favor of the private
respondents. The reason is that it is still unproven whether or not the private respondents
are the only ones entitled to the conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victoria
Real. It is to be noted that as the lawful heirs of Jose Velasquez, Sr. the herein petitioners
are also entitled to participate in his conjugal share. To reconvey said property in favor of
the private respondents alone would not only be improper but will also make the situation
more complicated. There are still things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs
can be properly adjudicated.
Relative to the last assignment of error, We find the ruling made by the respondent
appellate court proper and in accord with law insofar as it adjudicated the one-half (1/2)
portion of the house and lot situated at West Avenue, Quezon City, as belonging to the
petitioners to the extent of their respective proportional contributions, and the other half
to the conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan. We must
modify it, however, as it readily partitioned the conjugal share of Jose Velasques, Sr. (1/2
of the conjugal property or 1/4 of the entire house and lot) to his 18 heirs.
As already said, no conclusion as to the legal share due to the compulsory heirs can be
reached in this case without (1) determining first the net value of the estate of Jose
Velasquez, Sr.; (2) collating all the donations inter vivos in favor of some of the heirs; and
(3) ascertaining the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
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