Consti Cases 1
Consti Cases 1
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perias & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent
judge from trying Civil Case No. 779M of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Rizal.
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in
Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the
following projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay,
Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
company. The company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the
company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because "A
request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to
defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this
allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.]
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I.
Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of
the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive
an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval
Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded
to third parties. In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued
the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins
and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy.
The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work
on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint
and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts
and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States
of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or
any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result
is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor
Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)
The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when
he said in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: " A
distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the
sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non- governmental acts (Rollo, p.
20.) However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's considered
opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is
certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or
character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the ruling in
the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with
approval, viz.:
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the
following reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff brought suit
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of money on
account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant
and over the subject matter of the action. The court granted the motion on the
grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its
consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to this Court for
review.
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity
from suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an
imperative authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to
the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function
of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of
a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs.
Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment
buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. The
plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term
of the leases had expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the
apartments shall have been vacated.
The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to
dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction in the part of the court. The Municipal Court
of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance,
the plaintiffs went to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition,
this Court said:
In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the
contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its
consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not
for jure gestionis.
Separate Opinions
The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M in
the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein.
In the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America (104 Phil. 593), where the
contract entered into between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the defendant
(U.S. Government) involved stevedoring and labor services within the Subic Bay
area, this Court further stated that inasmuch as ". . . the United States
Government. through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with
appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay
area, a U.S. Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our
courts for any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the
contract."
When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in
the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived
the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the
ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of
entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).
Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of
its contractual obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the
award for the project by the United States government, through its agency at
Subic Bay should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may
have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-
suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen, as in the instant case,
helpless and without redress in his own country for violation of his rights
committed by the agents of the foreign government professing to act in its name.
Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion in Syquia
vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312, 325:
Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity
in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation.
Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from
transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or
facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air or ground forces-because the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly executed contract and of
seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation
committed by agents of the United States government, always, looms large,
thereby hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual
monopoly in our own country by United States contractors of contracts for
services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the
Philippines.
The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties cannot be
over emphasized. Whether the parties are nations or private individuals, it is to
be reasonably assumed and expected that the undertakings in the
contract will be complied with in good faith.
One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful nation, like
the United States of America, can always overwhelm small and weak nations.
The declaration in the United Nations Charter that its member states are equal
and sovereign, becomes hollow and meaningless because big nations wielding
economic and military superiority impose upon and dictate to small nations,
subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus, more often than not,
when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small nations, the American
governmental agencies or its citizens invoke principles of international law for
their own benefit.
In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval authorities
at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the other, was
honored more in the breach than in the compliance The opinion of the majority
will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations.
American authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for that matter,
dealing with the citizens of this country, can conveniently seek protective cover
under the majority opinion. The result is disastrous to the Philippines.
The doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Amigable vs. Cuenca, L-
26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360; Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance,
L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464).
Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non-suability, the United States
government, through its naval authorities at Subic Bay, should be held amenable
to lawsuits in our country like any other juristic person.
The invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in accord with
paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
March 14, 1947, which states that "in the exercise of the above-mentioned rights,
powers and authority, the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will
not be used unreasonably. . ." (Emphasis supplied).
Nor is such posture of the petitioners herein in harmony with the amendment
dated May 27, 1968 to the aforesaid RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which
recognizes "the need to promote and maintain sound employment practices
which will assure equality of treatment of all employees ... and continuing
favorable employer-employee relations ..." and "(B)elieving that an agreement
will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic institutions
cherished by both Governments, ... the United States Government agrees to
accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in the Bases, thus (1) the U.S.
Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing
Filipino citizens, etc." (Par. 1, Art. I of the Amendment of May 27, 1968).
Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from suit express
fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the aforesaid amendment of May 2 7, 1968
which directs that " contractors and concessionaires performing work for the U.S.
Armed Forces shall be required by their contract or concession agreements to
comply with all applicable Philippine labor laws and regulations, " even though
paragraph 2 thereof affirms that "nothing in this Agreement shall imply any waiver
by either of the two Governments of such immunity under international law."
The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1 of the joint
statement of President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United States
dated May 4, 1978 that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine sovereignty
extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the command of a
Philippine Base Commander," which is supposed to underscore the joint
Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President Ford of December 7,
1975, under which "they affirm that sovereign equality, territorial integrity and
political independence of all States are fundamental principles which both
countries scrupulously respect; and that "they confirm that mutual respect for the
dignity of each nation shall characterize their friendship as well as the alliance
between their two countries. "
The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers,
duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and American Base
Commanders that "in the performance of their duties, the Philippine Base
Commander and the American Base Commander shall be guided by full respect
for Philippine sovereignty on the one hand and the assurance of unhampered
U.S. military operations on the other hand and that "they shall promote
cooperation understanding and harmonious relations within the Base and with
the general public in the proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2 & par. 3 of the Annex
covered by the exchange of notes, January 7, 1979, between Ambassador
Richard W. Murphy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, Emphasis
supplied).
Separate Opinions
The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M in
the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein.
In the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America (104 Phil. 593), where the
contract entered into between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the defendant
(U.S. Government) involved stevedoring and labor services within the Subic Bay
area, this Court further stated that inasmuch as ". . . the United States
Government. through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with
appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay
area, a U.S. Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our
courts for any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the
contract."
When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in
the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived
the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the
ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of
entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).
Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of
its contractual obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the
award for the project by the United States government, through its agency at
Subic Bay should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may
have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-
suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen, as in the instant case,
helpless and without redress in his own country for violation of his rights
committed by the agents of the foreign government professing to act in its name.
Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion in Syquia
vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312, 325:
Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity
in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation.
Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from
transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or
facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air or ground forces-because the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly executed contract and of
seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation
committed by agents of the United States government, always, looms large,
thereby hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual
monopoly in our own country by United States contractors of contracts for
services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the
Philippines.
The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties cannot be
over emphasized. Whether the parties are nations or private individuals, it is to
be reasonably assumed and expected that the undertakings in the
contract will be complied with in good faith.
One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful nation, like
the United States of America, can always overwhelm small and weak nations.
The declaration in the United Nations Charter that its member states are equal
and sovereign, becomes hollow and meaningless because big nations wielding
economic and military superiority impose upon and dictate to small nations,
subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus, more often than not,
when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small nations, the American
governmental agencies or its citizens invoke principles of international law for
their own benefit.
In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval authorities
at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the other, was
honored more in the breach than in the compliance The opinion of the majority
will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations.
American authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for that matter,
dealing with the citizens of this country, can conveniently seek protective cover
under the majority opinion. The result is disastrous to the Philippines.
The doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Amigable vs. Cuenca, L-
26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360; Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance,
L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464).
Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non-suability, the United States
government, through its naval authorities at Subic Bay, should be held amenable
to lawsuits in our country like any other juristic person.
The invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in accord with
paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
March 14, 1947, which states that "in the exercise of the above-mentioned rights,
powers and authority, the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will
not be used unreasonably. . ." (Emphasis supplied).
Nor is such posture of the petitioners herein in harmony with the amendment
dated May 27, 1968 to the aforesaid RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which
recognizes "the need to promote and maintain sound employment practices
which will assure equality of treatment of all employees ... and continuing
favorable employer-employee relations ..." and "(B)elieving that an agreement
will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic institutions
cherished by both Governments, ... the United States Government agrees to
accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in the Bases, thus (1) the U.S.
Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing
Filipino citizens, etc." (Par. 1, Art. I of the Amendment of May 27, 1968).
Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from suit express
fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the aforesaid amendment of May 2 7, 1968
which directs that " contractors and concessionaires performing work for the U.S.
Armed Forces shall be required by their contract or concession agreements to
comply with all applicable Philippine labor laws and regulations, " even though
paragraph 2 thereof affirms that "nothing in this Agreement shall imply any waiver
by either of the two Governments of such immunity under international law."
The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1 of the joint
statement of President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United States
dated May 4, 1978 that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine sovereignty
extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the command of a
Philippine Base Commander," which is supposed to underscore the joint
Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President Ford of December 7,
1975, under which "they affirm that sovereign equality, territorial integrity and
political independence of all States are fundamental principles which both
countries scrupulously respect; and that "they confirm that mutual respect for the
dignity of each nation shall characterize their friendship as well as the alliance
between their two countries. "
The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers,
duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and American Base
Commanders that "in the performance of their duties, the Philippine Base
Commander and the American Base Commander shall be guided by full respect
for Philippine sovereignty on the one hand and the assurance of unhampered
U.S. military operations on the other hand and that "they shall promote
cooperation understanding and harmonious relations within the Base and with
the general public in the proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2 & par. 3 of the Annex
covered by the exchange of notes, January 7, 1979, between Ambassador
Richard W. Murphy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, Emphasis
supplied).
EN BANC
- versus -
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
and THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
- versus -
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of
Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)
DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year
of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.
Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection
and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following
grounds:
Issues
Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO
420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President.Second, petitioners
claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the
uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home
Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth;
(8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index
fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like
moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal
identification by government entities, and even by the private sector. Any one
who applies for or renews a drivers license provides to the LTO all these 14
specific data.
Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data
for their ID systems, either expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions of
these government entities. Under their existing ID systems, some government
entities collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At present, the
data collected and recorded by government entities are disparate, and the IDs
they issue are dissimilar.
In the case of the Supreme Court,[9] the IDs that the Court issues to all its
employees, including the Justices, contain 15 specific data, namely: (1) Name;
(2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5) ID Number; (6) Height; (7)
Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right
Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14)
Name and Address of Person to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15)
Signature. If we consider that the picture in the ID can generally also show the
sex of the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services.[11] The
adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus,
in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for
imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation.Private employers routinely
issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also routinely issue
ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to
their members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to insure the proper
identification of a person as an employee, student, or member of a club. These
ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a privilege, are
voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee, student or
member of a club.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not
compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government
entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards
as part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that
presently issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own
name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data
specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and
the common reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure
integrity and reliability of identification.
This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive
department should undertake cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations,
insure compatibility of equipment and systems, and provide user-friendly service
to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are day-to-day
functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the Supreme
Court has its own ID system for employees of the Court and all first and second
level courts. The Court is even trying to unify its ID system with those of the
appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of
government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since petitioners
do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain against the
unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID
system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card
itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card
system under EO 420 will even require less data collected, stored and revealed
than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind,
nature and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under
EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data
mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in
their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the
Supreme Courts ID shows.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems
by government entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory national
ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium,
Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal.Other countries which do not have national
ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the
Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other
public services.[12] Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the
countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only
sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes.
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the
personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly
confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly
confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples
right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly
confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public
concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the
ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with EO 420 but actually
supports the validity EO 420.
Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York
State in Whalen, the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine
government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less personal. In fact, the
14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems, unlike
the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking
prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the
constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to privacy.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to
privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of
EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and
exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres[18] is not
authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the
assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was
annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. As then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his
concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, The voting is decisive only on the need for
appropriate legislation, and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted by
this Court.
SO ORDERED.