Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Mason v. CA
Mason v. CA
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision, dated May 12, 2000, of
[1]
the Court of Appeals and its resolution dated August 25, 2000 in CA-
[2]
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, in Civil Case No. 98-
1567 and directed said court to conduct further proceedings on the
complaint for rescission of lease contract.
The antecedent facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
Petitioners spouses Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of
land located along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue in Pasay City. On
March 30, 1993, petitioners and private respondent Columbus
Philippines Bus Corporation (hereafter Columbus) entered into a lease
contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building worth
ten million pesos (P10,000,000) at the end of the third year of the
lease. Because private respondent failed to comply with this stipulation,
the petitioners on November 13, 1998, filed a complaint for rescission of
contract with damages against private respondent before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
1567. Summons was served upon private respondent through a
certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons
described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return
described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly
authorized to receive legal processes.
Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive
pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondent
in default. The motion was granted and petitioners were allowed to
present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the case was submitted for
decision.
On April 22, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision
whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorof
theplaintiffsandagainstdefendantdeclaringthecontractofleaserescinded,
terminatedandcancelled,andorderingdefendant:
1.TopayplaintiffstheamountofP10Millionwhichisthevalueofthe
buildingwhichdefendantfailedtoconstructontheleasedproperties,asandby
way[of]actualdamages;
2.TopayplaintiffstheamountofP63,862.57beginningNovember1998until
defendantandthesublesseevacatetheleasedpropertybywayofreasonable
compensationfortheuseoftheproperties;
3.andallotherpersonsandentitiesclaimingrightsunderit,tosurrender
possessiontoplaintiffsandtovacatetheleasedpremises;
4.topayplaintiffstheamountofP300,000.00asandbywayofmoral
damages;
5.topayplaintiffstheamountofP100,000.00asandbywayofexemplary
damages;
6.topayplaintiffsattorneysfeesintheamountofP100,000.00;and
7.topaythecostofsuit.
SOORDERED. [4]
That decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day,
private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default, which was
opposed by petitioners. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial
court on May 26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default, thus:
ItappearingthatthedecisionrenderedbythisCourtonApril27,1999became
finalandexecutoryonMay12,1999,defendantsMotiontoLiftOrderof
DefaultisherebyDENIED.Concomitantthereto,plaintiffsMotionfor
ExecutionisherebyGRANTED.
TheOrderofthisCourtonMay21,1999allowingthepartiestofiletheir
respectivememorandawithinten(10)daysfromMay21,1999ishereby
revokedandsetaside,sincetheincidentscanberesolvedbasedontherecords.
WHEREFORE,letawritofexecutionissuetoenforceandimplementthefinal
andexecutorydecisionrenderedbythisCourtonApril27,1999.
SOORDERED. [5]
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED;thedecisioninCivilCaseNo.98
1567andalltheproceedingstherein,includingtheorderofdefaultandwritof
execution,areSETASIDE.ThecourtaquoisORDEREDtorequirepetitioner
tofileitsanswerandthereaftertoconductfurtherappropriateproceedingswith
reasonabledispatch.
SOORDERED. [6]
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred when it denied
private respondents motion to lift order of default. The appellate court
pointed out that private respondent was not properly served with
summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that service
[7]
On the first issue, petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly specifies the persons
authorized to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical entity,
said provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial
compliance rule. Petitioners cite Millenium Industrial Commercial
Corporation v. Tan, and maintain that this Court, by referring
[9]
to E.B Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito, effectively ruled
[10]
Thedesignationofpersonsorofficerswhoareauthorizedtoacceptsummons
foradomesticcorporationorpartnershipisnowlimitedandmoreclearly
specifiedinSection11,Rule14ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.Therule
nowstatesgeneralmanagerinsteadofonlymanager;corporatesecretary
insteadofsecretary;andtreasurerinsteadofcashier.Thephraseagent,orany
ofitsdirectorsisconspicuouslydeletedinthenewrule.
[14]
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires filing of the motion after
notice but before judgment. Also, the motion was (a) not under oath; (b)
did not show the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect that
caused private respondents failure to answer; and (c) did not show
private respondents meritorious defense.
Private respondent, in turn, argues that since service upon it was
invalid, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Hence, all the
subsequent proceedings in the trial court are null and void, including the
order of default. This renders the second issue now moot and
academic.
We find merit in private respondents submissions. Since we have
ruled that service of summons upon private respondent through its filing
clerk cannot be considered valid, it necessarily follows therefore that
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City did not acquire jurisdiction over
private respondent. Consequently, all the subsequent proceedings
[18]
held before it, including the order of default, are null and void. As
[19]
private respondent points out, the second issue has become moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The questioned
decision, as well as the resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54649 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.