IOSCOPD151
IOSCOPD151
25 SEPTEMBER 2003
Credit rating agencies (CRAs, or ratings agencies) issue opinions on the future creditworthiness
of a particular company, security or obligation as of a given date. These opinions tend to be
relied upon by investors, lenders, and others, and, accordingly, CRAs can have an effect on
securities markets in a variety of ways. Credit ratings can affect issuers’ access to capital,
influence the structure of financial transactions, and determine the types of investments
fiduciaries and others can make. Some regulators use the ratings issued by CRAs for various
regulatory purposes.
Given the influence CRA opinions can have on securities markets, the activities of CRAs are of
interest to investors, lenders, issuers and securities regulators alike. The core objectives of
securities regulation, as described by IOSCO’s “Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation,” are protecting investors, ensuring that securities markets are fair, efficient, and
transparent, and reducing systemic risk. In offering informed, independent analyses and
opinions, CRAs contribute to achieving these objectives.
Rating agencies that the market recognizes as credible and reliable can play a valuable role in
global securities markets. Consequently, the Technical Committee has concluded that a set of
IOSCO principles regarding the activities of CRAs would be a useful tool for securities
regulators, ratings agencies and others wishing to improve how CRAs operate and how the
opinions CRAs assign are used by market participants. As CRAs are regulated and operate
differently in different jurisdictions, the following principles do not lay out a “one-size-fits-all”
approach, but state high-level objectives for which ratings agencies, regulators, issuers and other
market participants should strive in order to improve investor protection and the fairness,
efficiency and transparency of the securities markets and reduce systemic risk.
The manner in which these principles are given effect will depend upon local market
circumstances and each jurisdiction’s legal system. In some cases, the principles may be best
implemented through internal mechanisms at the CRA and promoted by borrowers, lenders and
other market participants. Depending on the circumstances, the principles could be given effect
through regulatory requirements. As a result, mechanisms for implementing the principles may
take the form of any combination of:
Government regulation;
The Technical Committee proposes to await future consideration of these alternatives in the
major jurisdictions and take account of preferences of other sector supervisors before considering
its preferred method of implementation. The Technical Committee proposes to review these
developments within 18 months.
1. CRAs should endeavor to issue opinions that help reduce the asymmetry of information
among borrowers, lenders and other market participants.
1.1. CRAs should adopt and implement written procedures and methodologies to ensure that
the opinions they issue are based on a fair and thorough analysis of all relevant
information available to the CRA, and that CRA analysts perform their duties with
integrity. CRA rating methodologies should be rigorous, systematic, and CRA ratings
should be subject to some form of validation based on historical experience.
1.2. CRAs should monitor on an ongoing basis and regularly update an analysis and rating
once a rating is issued whenever new information becomes available that causes the
rating agency to revise or terminate its opinion.
1.4. CRAs should have sufficient resources to carry out high-quality credit assessments.
They should have sufficient personnel to properly assess the entities they rate, seek out
information they need in order to make an assessment, and analyze all the information
relevant to their decision-making processes.
1.5. Analysts employed by ratings agencies should use the methodologies established by the
CRA and be professional, competent, and of high integrity.
2. CRA ratings decisions should be independent and free from political or economic
pressures and from conflicts of interest arising due to the CRA’s ownership structure,
business or financial activities, or the financial interests of the CRA’s employees. CRAs
should, as far as possible, avoid activities, procedures or relationships that may
compromise or appear to compromise the independence and objectivity of the credit rating
operations.
2.1. CRAs should adopt written internal procedures and mechanisms to (1) identify, and (2)
eliminate, or manage and disclose, as appropriate, any actual or potential conflicts of
interest that may influence the opinions and analyses CRAs make or the judgment and
analyses of the individuals the CRAs employ who have an influence on ratings decisions.
CRAs are encouraged to disclose such conflict avoidance and management measures.
2.2. The credit rating a CRA assigns to an issuer should not be affected by the existence of or
potential for a business relationship between the CRA (or its affiliates) and the issuer or
any other party.
2.3. CRAs and CRA staff should not engage in any securities or derivatives trading
presenting inherent conflicts of interest with the CRAs ratings activities.
2.4. Reporting lines for CRA staff and their compensation arrangements should be structured
to eliminate or effectively manage actual and potential conflicts of interest. A CRA
analyst should not be compensated or evaluated on the basis of the amount of revenue
that a CRA derives from issuers that the analyst rates or with which the analyst
regularly interacts.
2.5. The determination of a credit rating should be influenced only by factors relevant to the
credit assessment.
2.6. CRAs should disclose the nature of the compensation arrangement that exists with an
issuer that the CRA rates.
3. CRAs should make disclosure and transparency an objective in their ratings activities.
3.1. CRAs should distribute in a timely manner their ratings decisions regarding publicly
issued fixed-income securities or issuers of publicly traded fixed-income securities.
3.2. CRAs should disclose to the public, on a non-selective basis, any rating regarding
publicly issued fixed income securities as well as any subsequent decisions to
discontinue such a rating if the rating is based in whole or in part on material non-
public information.
3.3. CRAs should publish sufficient information about their procedures and methodologies so
that outside parties can understand how a rating was arrived at by the CRA. This
information should include (but not be limited to) the meaning of each rating category
and the definition of default and the time horizon the CRA used when making a rating
decision.
3.4. CRAs should publish sufficient information about the historical default rates of CRA
rating categories and whether the default rates of these categories have changed over
time, so that interested parties can understand the historical performance of each
category and if and how ratings categories have changed.
4.1. CRAs should adopt procedures and mechanisms to protect the non-public nature of
information shared with them by issuers under the terms of a confidentiality agreement
or otherwise under a mutual understanding that the information is shared confidentially.
4.2. CRAs should use non-public information only for purposes related to their rating
activities or otherwise in accordance with their confidentiality agreements with the
issuer.