Rigoberto Osiris Sorto-Orellana, A078 971 293 (BIA Nov. 16, 2017)
Rigoberto Osiris Sorto-Orellana, A078 971 293 (BIA Nov. 16, 2017)
Department of Justice
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Kelly, Edward F.
Grant, Edward R.
Adkins-Blanch, Charles K.
Userteam: Docket
Cite as: Rigoberto Osiris Sorto-Orellana, A078 971 293 (BIA Nov. 16, 2017)
'
NOV 1 6 2017
In re: Rigoberto Osiris SORTO-ORELLANA
APPEAL
APPLICATION: Reopening
The respondent, a native and citizen of El Salvador, appealed from the Immigration Judge's
decision dated March 7, 2017, denying his February 27, 2017, motion to reopen and rescind the
Immigration Judge's in absentia order of removal entered on June 13, 2002. The Department of
Homeland Security (OHS) did not file a response to the appeal. The appeal will be sustained.
We review the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the
Immigration Judge under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review
all other issues, including issues of law, discretion, or judgment, under a de novo standard.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii).
The Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent had received proper notice of his
hearing. She found the hearing notice was sent to the last known address the respondent had
provided in 2001, after personal service ofthe Notice to Appear (NTA), yet the respondent did not
appear for his hearing. The Immigration Judge also noted that the respondent did not contact the
court in the intervening years (IJ at 2). On appeal, the respondent argues that he did not receive
notice ofthe hearing held on June 13, 2002 and should not be charged with receiving it (Resp. Br.
at 6). The respondent was a minor when he was released from OHS custody and he argues that
the address he provided contained "c/o Marta F. Orellana," that the notice ofhearing did not reflect
this part of his address, and that he did not receive the notice ofhearing held in 2002 (Respondent
Br. at 8-10). The respondent argues further that he actually received mail that was properly
addressed c/o his mother, within the relevant time frame (Respondent's Br. at 9).
The record reflects that the respondent's contentions about the address on his notice ofhearing
are correct. In addition, the respondent's motion included signed affidavits in which he and his
mother attest that they never received notice of the June 13, 2002, hearing (Respondent's Motion
to Reopen at Exhibits A-B). Additionally, the evidence does not reflect that the respondent
Cite as: Rigoberto Osiris Sorto-Orellana, A078 971 293 (BIA Nov. 16, 2017)
A078 971 293
- . ,
. ..,
deliberately absconded or made himself unreachable. Rather, he contacted the OHS repeatedly
subsequent to the hearing in absentia to obtain employment authorization between 2004 and 2010,
and thereafter he also applied for Temporary Protected Status (Respondent's Motion to Reopen at
Exhibits C-F). Finally, upon learning of the in absentia order, the respondent promptly consulted
counsel and filed a motion to reopen the in absentia order of removal. In these circumstances, on
balance, we conclude that the respondent's motion succeeded in rebutting the presumption of
ORDER: The appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge's decision is vacated. The order
of removal entered in absentia, on June 13, 2002, is rescinded.
FURTIIBR ORDER: The record is remanded for to the Immigration Judge for further
proceedings and the entry of a new decision consistent with the foregoing opinion.
Cite as: Rigoberto Osiris Sorto-Orellana, A078 971 293 (BIA Nov. 16, 2017)
( (
¥
/
!,11'
\
�TTACHED IS A COPY OF THE DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE. THIS DECISION
IS FINAL UNLESS AN APPEAL IS FILED WITH THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE MAILING OF THIS WRITTEN DECISION.
SEE THE ENCLOSED FORMS ANO INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROPERLY PREPARING YOUR APPEAL.
YOUR NOTICE OF APPEAL, ATTACHED DOCUMENTS, AND FEE OR FEE WAIVER REQUEST
MUST BE MAILED TO: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
FALLS CHURCH, VA 22041
,�� 7-� �j .\
IMMIGRATION COURT
606 SOUTH OLIVE ST.
CO�=� . A,_J
E CA
-
,. (' '· �
FF
CC:
. .. .!.
( (
I. Procedural History
On January 3 1, 2002, the Court granted Respondent's motion to change venue from
Harlingen, Texas to Los Angeles, California. IJ Decision (Jan. 3 1, 2002). On April 1, 2002,
Court staff served a Notice of Hearing (NOH) by mail to Respondent's address of record. See
NOH (Apr. 1, 2002); Form EOIR-33. R espondent failed to appear at his June 13, 2002 hearing.
(
See IJ Decision (June 13, 2002).Based on evidence that is clear, convincing and unequivocal,
the Court ordered Respondent removed, in absentia, to El Salvador on June 13, 2002. Id.
?
Respondent submitted the pending motion to reop�n on February 27, 2 17, r�questing
�
that the Court reopen his proceeding based on lack of notice. ee Respo�dent .s M?t1on t?
Reopen. In addition, Respondent requested a stay of removal m connection with his motion to
reopen. Id.
The Court may rescind an in absentia removal order upon a motion to reopen if the
applicant demonstrates that he did not receive proper notice of the proceedings. INA
§ 240(b)(5)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). Written notice ofscheduled
proceedings must be given to the applicant in person or, if personal service is not practical, sent
by mail to counsel of record or the applicant at the most recent address provided to the Attorney
General. See INA§ 239(a)(l), (2). Notice to counsel ofrecord constitutes notice to the
applicant. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26(c)(2); see also Matter ofBarocio,.19 I&N Dec. 255, 259 (BIA
1985).
In cases where the NOH is sent through regular mail, a presumption of delivery exists,
but it is a lesser presumption than the presumption applied to correspondence sent by certified
mail. See Sembiring v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Salta v. INS, 314
F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to rebut this presumption, a respondent must submit
sufficient evidence to support his claim that he did not receive notice. See Matter of M-R-A- , 24
I&N Dec. 665, 674 (BIA 2008) (holding that all relevant evidence submitted to overcome the
weaker presumption of delivery must be considered); Salta, 314 F.3d at 1079 (noting that a
sworn affidavit may be sufficient evidence where a respondent initiated a proceeding to obtain a
benefit, appeared at an earlier hearing, and had no motive to avoid the hearing).
2
( (
In the pending motion, Respondent asserts that he was only recently made aware of the
Court's removal order dated June 13, 2002. Respondent's Motion to Reopen at l . Respondent
submitted an affidavit from his mother Marta Orellana, in addition to his own affidavit, stating
neither had received notice of a hearing. Id. at Tabs A-B. The Court notes that Marta Orellana
stated in her affidavit that, "authorities told me to watch the mail for a hearing notice advising
me of when Rigoberto would have to return to immigration court." Yet, Respondent, nor his
The Court served Respondent with the NOH at the most recent address provided to the
Court on April l, 2002. See Notice of Hearing (Apr. l , 2002). In fact, Respondent provided the
same Lynwood, California address in all correspondences with the Court since his release,
including Respondent's Notice to EOIR, Form 1-830; Order of Release on Recognizance, Form
I-220A; and Change of Address, Form EOIR-33. Written notice of scheduled proceedings to
Respondent's most recent address satisfies the INA's notice requirements. See INA§ 239(a)( l),
(2). Furthermore, Respondent has not submitted sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of
delivery. See Salta, 314 F.3d at 1079; M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. at 674. Thus, the Court finds that
Respondent received legally sufficient notice of his June 13, 2002 hearing. Id.
The Court also provided notice of Respondent's removal order by regular mail on June
13, 2002. See IJ Decision (June 13, 2002). That order was sent to Respondent's most recent
address on file with the Court. Thus, the Court finds that Respondent received legally sufficient
notice of the Court's order. See fNA § 239(c).
Given the foregoing, the Court denies Respondent's motion to reopen based on lack of
notice. Accordingly, the Court enters the following order:
3
·
i
. ·�
,.I
ORDER
DATE: .._
;;
· +-T_.... } �7./-
I
) /_7
-L
__
D.lf& ,�M�
� Sttgrav�
Immigration Judge