Estrada vs. Badoy
Estrada vs. Badoy
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
6.ID.; ID.; CHARGES OF OPPRESSION AND MISCONDUCT; NOT PROVEN IN CASE AT BAR.
— Oppression is a "misdemeanor committed by a public of cer, who under color of his
of ce, wrongfully in ict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury." It
is an "act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. Upon the other hand, the word
"misconduct" implies wrongful intention. For gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. We nd no evidence to prove complainants'
charges of oppression and misconduct.
13.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCHEDULE OF HEARING; A MATTER NECESSARILY AT THE DISCRETION
OF THE TRIAL JUDGE. — Complainants also assail respondents' act of setting the hearing
at one o'clock in the afternoon. Again, there is nothing irregular in it. The schedule of
hearing is regarded as a matter necessarily at the discretion of the trial judge. As a matter
of fact, a court may even hold night sessions, and a court of review will not interfere unless
it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of the power of the judge and that injustice
has been done. This is because the good of the service demands more toil and less
idleness, and the limitations imposed by law are aimed to cut indolence and not the other
way around.
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14.LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; MUST OBSERVE THE RESPECT DUE TO MAGISTRATES.
— For his part, pursuant to Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Saguisag should have observed the respect due to respondent magistrates for the
maintenance of the court's supreme importance. Upon being ordered to stop arguing
simultaneously with Justice Cuevas, he should have complied and behaved accordingly.
Had he done so, he would not have been ordered to leave the courtroom. Indeed, he failed
to comport himself in a manner required of an officer of the court.
15.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO
COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL; ASSISTANCE OF A PAO LAWYER SATISFIES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT. — Our minds cannot sit easy with regard to the
charge of violation of the accuseds' right to counsel. A PAO lawyer is considered as
independent counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution considering that he is
not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. In People vs. Bacor,
we ruled that the assistance of a PAO lawyer satis es the constitutional requirement of a
competent and independent counsel for the accused.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ , J : p
Judges, like ordinary mortals, are subject to human limitations. At times, the great tides of
perturbing and overwhelming emotions engulf them. Notwithstanding so, they are
expected to be "cerebral men" 1 who can control their confounding emotions and
idiosyncratic inclinations. Otherwise, they will be held answerable for their conduct.
Haled in these two consolidated administrative cases, AM No. 01-12-01-SC and A.M No.
SB-02-10-J, are Sandiganbayan Justices Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Ret.) and Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro.
The facts of A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC may be synthesized as follows:
On November 29, 2001, Justice Badoy, aboard an ambulance, "whisked himself" to the
GMA Broadcast Station in Quezon City for a live interview in the news program Saksi.
There, he announced the loss of a Resolution he penned in connection with the plunder
case against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and others.
The media sarcastically referred to the event as a "staged comedy" 2 or a "television tryst."
3 Leading newspapers contained facetious headlines, such as "Ambulance rushes Badoy —
to TV Station," 4 "What's with Justice Badoy?," 5 and "Unorthodox Behavior — Analyze
Badoy, Erap Lawyers ask SC." 6
Acting on the media reports, this Court directed Justice Badoy to show cause why he
should not be administratively charged with conduct unbecoming a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan. 7
In his compliance, 8 Justice Badoy alleged that three days prior to the incident, he could not
nd his Resolution ordering that former President Estrada be detained at Fort Sto.
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Domingo. So he requested the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct an
investigation, but to no avail. Thus, on November 29, 2001, agitated that someone might
have stolen the Resolution and claimed that he (Justice Badoy) sold it for a fee, he decided
to go to the GMA-7 Broadcast Station and report its loss, in order that the public may
know he is honest. In going there, he chose to ride in an ambulance because he felt very
sick and cold, intending to proceed to a hospital after the interview.
A.M No. SB-02-10-J is set on a different factual milieu, to wit:
Subsequent to the descent of former President Estrada from power, the Of ce of the
Ombudsman led several criminal cases against him, his family, and friends. One of them
is Criminal Case No. 26558 wherein he, his son Jose "Jinggoy" and Atty. Edward Serapio
stand accused for violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law. The case was
raf ed to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of Justice Badoy, as
Chairman, and Justices Teresita Leonardo-De Castro and Ricardo M. Ilarde, now retired, as
members. DCSTAH
On September 13, 2001, after the termination of a series of pre-trial conference between
the parties, the Sandiganbayan furnished them and their counsel with a copy of the Pre-trial
Order for their signatures. The defense panel composed of Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag (lead
counsel), Justice Sera n R. Cuevas, Attys. Jose B. Flaminiano, Felix D. Carao, Jr., Cleofe V.
Verzola, and Delia H. Hermoso, refused to sign it on the grounds that: 1) there is no
provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring them to sign a Pre-trial
Order; 9 2) they were not given ample time to read it; 1 0 and 3) it incorporates a statement
that they admitted the existence of certain exhibits although there was no such admission.
11
The undersigned stated that, with every Justice having 100% load and 100% staff,
with the plunder case (equivalent easily to 500%), the undersigned now had a
load of 600% but with his support staff remaining in the same level. That is why
he asked for additional staff." 3 1 (Italics supplied)
At the outset, it must be stressed that the retirement 3 2 of Justice Badoy from the
Judiciary does not divest this Court of its jurisdiction over these cases. In Perez vs. Abiera,
3 3 this Court ruled:
" . . . . In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the ling of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public
of cial had ceased to be in of ce during the pendency of his case. The Court
retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent of cial innocent of the
charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what
remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public of cial who
resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in of ce? What would
prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and
other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the
pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of
public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of
the judiciary and other of cials under its supervision and control for acts
performed in of ce which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the
interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent of cial merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he
served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation."
On page 20, the last paragraph states: "The defense admitted exhibit "A" up to
exhibit "C-45" and its sub markings as to its existence but not as to the
truth of the content." In the very rst place there never was any admission
made by the defense as even to the existence of the document. And the
sentence also we believe not grammatically appropriate. It should be their
sub markings or as to their existence because this involved several
documents, Your Honors.
AJ DE CASTRO:
That portion may be deleted.
Atty. Flaminiano:
Well, I'm not sure about it. Your Honor. I only pointed that there is a need for us to
go over page by page because we got a copy only after there was an
incident —
xxx xxx xxx
OMB Desierto:
AJ DE CASTRO:
What are those?
OMB Desierto:
After on (1) hour they should be able to determine that. After all Your Honor, I
would like to emphasize the fact that the Joint Stipulation of Facts were
signed — stipulations which we had a week ago were signed by the parties,
by the counsels for the accused. And now, the things that are re ected
here, are found in this Pre-trial Order. If there is any delineation from what
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stipulated then and were signed by the counsels for the defense and also
the prosecution, then we can correct that, but it cannot be possible major
changes will have to be made in the Pre-trial Order since this is only copied
anyway from the Joint Stipulation of Facts. If there are such thing as that
particular sentence which should be objectionable to the defense, the
prosecution is ready to agree to its deletion.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ DE CASTRO:
You know what we did here is simply copy verbatim every document that we
found on record pertaining to the Pre-trial conference. We did not add. We
did not subtract. So, anything that you will state now will simply be
corrections of some clerical errors, that is all. Giving you enough time to go
over." 4 4 (Italics supplied)
On complainants' refusal to sign the Pre-trial Order, Section 2, Rule 118 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "All agreements or admissions made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused." Considering that the Pre-
trial Order contains the recital of the actions taken by the parties, agreements and
admissions, the facts stipulated, and the evidence marked, 4 5 the parties must sign it. A
party who participates in the pre-trial conference and who signs the Joint Stipulation of
Facts is expected to sign the Pre-trial Order. If a party believes that the Pre-trial Order is
not an honest representation of what transpired in the pre-trial conference, then he must
specify his objections thereto and the court may modify it to prevent injustice. This was
what respondents exactly did when complainants pointed out the assailed statement in
the Pre-trial Order.
II
We now come to complainants' allegation of oppression and gross misconduct.
Oppression is a "misdemeanor committed by a public of cer, who under color of his
of ce, wrongfully in ict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury." It
is an "act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. 4 6 Upon the other hand, the
word "misconduct" implies wrongful intention. For gross misconduct to exist, the judicial
act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 4 7 We nd no evidence to prove
complainants' charges of oppression and misconduct.
Records show that Atty. Saguisag was asking the court for a copy of the Pre-trial Order so
that he could follow up the court's discussion He did not utter any disrespectful remark
against respondents nor attack their integrity or authority. However, he kept on speaking
simultaneously with Justice Cuevas and refused to yield to the court's repeated order to
stop. Such actuation must have constrained respondents to lose their cool and order the
sheriffs to take him out of the courtroom. At that point, what respondents should have
done was to cite him in direct contempt of court pursuant to Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. 4 8 In Romero vs. Valle, Jr., 4 9 this Court ruled:
"Precisely, judicial of cers are given contempt powers in order that without being
arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent judge could very well have
cited complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by
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banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously walking out of
the courtroom."
It has been consistently stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear
before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. In this regard, Rule
3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should be patient, attentive and
courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others
appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of
mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants."
In Echano vs. Sunga, 5 0 respondent judge, during the course of an argument in his sala, lost
his cool and called the sheriff to take away the arguing attorney. And when the attorney
kept on talking, respondent judge countered, "Submitted, Buntalin kita dian." This Court
admonished him to be more prudent and restrained in his behavior.
For his part, pursuant to Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Saguisag should have observed the respect due to respondent magistrates for the
maintenance of the court's supreme importance. Upon being ordered to stop arguing
simultaneously with Justice Cuevas, he should have complied and behaved accordingly.
Had he done so, he would not have been ordered to leave the courtroom. Indeed, he failed
to comport himself in a manner required of an officer of the court.
III
The setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times a week is in order, not only
because the case is of national concern, but more importantly, because the accused are
presently detained. 5 1 Contrary to complainants' assertions, the continuous trial is in
accordance with the mandate of the law. This Court, in Administrative Circular No. 3-90
dated January 31, 1990, ordered all trial courts to adopt the mandatory continuous trial
system in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 4 dated September 22, 1988 and
Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989. It was adopted precisely to minimize delay in the
processing of cases. This delay was attributed to the common practice of piecemeal trial
wherein cases are set for trial one day at a time and thereafter the hearing is postponed to
another date or dates until all the parties have nished their presentation of evidence. 5 2
Section 2 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
"SEC. 2.Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. — Trial once
commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated.
It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultations with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set
the case for continuous trial on weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the rst day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court." (Italics supplied)
Corollarily, the "consultations" referred to in the foregoing provisions does not necessarily
mean that the court has to secure rst from the prosecution and defense their approval
before it can set the date of hearing. To rule otherwise is to subject our trial system to the
control of the parties and their counsel.
Complainants also assail respondents' act of setting the hearing at one o'clock in the
afternoon. Again, there is nothing irregular in it. The schedule of hearing is regarded as a
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matter necessarily at the discretion of the trial judge. As a matter of fact, a court may even
hold night sessions, and a court of review will not interfere unless it clearly appears that
there has been an abuse of the power of the judge and that injustice has been done. 5 3 This
is because the good of the service demands more toil and less idleness, and the
limitations imposed by law are aimed to cut indolence and not the other way around. 5 4
IV
Our minds cannot sit easy with regard to the charge of violation of the accuseds' right to
counsel. A PAO lawyer is considered as independent counsel within the contemplation of
the Constitution considering that he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor,
counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that
of the accused. In People vs. Bacor, 5 5 we ruled that the assistance of a PAO lawyer
satis es the constitutional requirement of a competent and independent counsel for the
accused.
V
Finally, we nd that Justice Badoy incurred delay in resolving Jinggoy Estrada's motion to
be allowed to administer the oath of his mother, a newly elected Senator. Every judge is
required, at all times, to be alert in his rulings and in the conduct of the business of the
court, so far as he can make it useful to litigants and to the community. Rule 3.05, Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge shall dispose of the court's
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." A judge must cultivate a
capacity for quick decision and habits of indecision must be sedulously overcome.
While we commend Justice Badoy's persistence in searching for precedents that would
help him resolve Jinggoy Estradas' motion to be allowed to administer the oath of of ce
of his mother, nonetheless, he should not have delayed resolving the same. As a result, the
members of his Division failed to vote on his Resolution. He knew very well that the oath
taking was to be held at 2:00 P.M. of June 29, 2001. Even if he had to deny the motion, he
should have consulted his members before 2:00 P.M. so as to give them the opportunity
to consider Jinggoy Estrada's arguments. When he submitted the Resolution to his
members at 4:45 P.M., he rendered their votes inconsequential. Even Justices De Castro
and Ilarde made notes in the same Resolution to the effect that the matter subject of the
Resolution had become moot before it reached them. Justice De Castro stated: "The
matter is now moot and academic;" while Justice Ilarde wrote: "What is there to deny? This
resolution was brought to us only on 4:45 P.M. The matter has been rendered moot and
academic." Clearly, Justice Badoy should be held liable for such delay.
In sum, we find Justice Badoy guilty of the following administrative offenses:
1)conduct unbecoming a Justice for going to GMA-7 Broadcast Station aboard an
ambulance and reporting the loss of a Resolution, classi ed as a light charge under
Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended; 5 6 and
2)undue delay in resolving Jinggoy Estrada's motion to be allowed to administer his
mother's oath of office, a less serious charge under Section 9 of the same Rule. 5 7
Likewise, we nd that both Justice Badoy and Justice De Castro failed to exhibit judicial
temperament. Such conduct deserves admonition.
One last word. The members of the bench and the bar ought to be reminded that the
people expect from them a sense of shared responsibility in the administration of justice
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— a crucial factor in the speedy and fair disposition of cases. Each of them must do his
share for in the last analysis the quality of justice meted out by the courts cannot be higher
than the quality of the lawyers practicing in the courts and of the judges who have been
selected from among them.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Retired), is hereby FINED in the
sum of P13,000 .00 for conduct unbecoming a Justice and for delay in issuing an Order, to
be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro is hereby ADMONISHED to be more tolerant of
counsel's demeanors which do not detract from the dignity and solemnity of the court
proceedings.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents' records with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
Saguisag, a member of the team defending jailed ex-president Joseph Estrada from plunder
charges which Badoy is trying, said the Supreme Court should have a rule of behavior
like Badoy's 'who's drawing attention to himself but keeps shooting himself in the foot.'"
11.Id., at 37—42.
12.Id., at 22.
13.Id.
14.Id., at 23.
15.Id., at 38.
16.Id., at 42—45.
17.Id., at 55.
18.Id., at 66.
19.Complaint, at 2—6.
20.Id., at 10—17.
21.Id., at 17—21.
22.Id., at 21—25.
23.Id., at 22—25.
26.Id., at 9—13.
27.Id., at 14.
28.Comment of Justice Badoy, at 1.
29.Id., at 2.
30.Id.
31.Id., at 4.
38."SC: Shut up, both of you," Standard, November 7, 2001; "Davide steps into Sandiganbayan
row," Malaya, November 7, 2000; "Squabble at the Sandiganbayan" Philippine Star,
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November 7, 2001.
39.Lugue vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165 (1969); Romero vs. Valle, 147 SCRA 197 (1987).
40.Agpalo, Judicial Ethics, 6th Edition, 1997, at 436.
42.Id., at 1001.
51.Circular No. 56—92: Speedy disposition of criminal cases with detention prisoners and with
(WPSB) witness protection security and benefit.
57.Punishable by 1) suspension from of ce without salary and other bene ts for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2) a ne of more than P10,000 .00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. (Section 11 (B) of Rule 140, as amended).