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Kieran McKeown Auth. Marxist Political Economy and Marxist Urban Sociology A Review and Elaboration of Recent Developments
Kieran McKeown Auth. Marxist Political Economy and Marxist Urban Sociology A Review and Elaboration of Recent Developments
URBAN SOCIOLOGY
Marxist Political
EconoInY and Marxist
Urban Sociology
Kieran McKeown
Social Research Centre
National Institute/or Higher Education
Limerick, Ireland
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-18569-6 ISBN 978-1-349-18567-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18567-2
Acknowledgements xv
General Introduction XVll
vii
viii Contents
Notes 231
Bibliography 253
Name Index 274
Subject Index 277
List of Tables and Figures
TABLES
4.1 Marx's 'Definition I' of productive and unproductive labour 73
4.2 Marx's 'Definition II' of productive and unproductive labour 75
6.1 Castells's concept of the urban system 103
6.2 The sub-elements in Castells's urban system 104
6.3 Castells's typology of urban actors 106
6.4 Castells's typology of practices and their effects 110
6.5 Castells's typology of industrial establishments 117
6.6 The index of differentiation for 23 renewal areas in Paris on
selected variables 119
6.7 Correlations between the areal size of renewal operations and
selected variables in Paris 120
6.8 Some characteristics of Dunkirk and the Nord Region
according to Castells 128
6.9 Castell's description of the fractions of the capitalist class and
their interests in Dunkirk 130
6.10 Castells's description of the fractions of the working class and
their interests in Dunkirk 131
6.11 Castells's typology of urban protests in Paris, 1968-1973 137
7.1 Lojkine's analysis of different types of rent in different urban
situations 156
8.1 The constraints and conflicts generated in the process of
private property development: sources of constraints on actors
in the development process 202
8.2 A typology of consumption goods 216
8.3 A typology of the reactions of residents to a negative
consumption good in their area 224
Tables in Notes
xiii
XIV List of Tables and Figures
FIGURES
Figures in Notes
KIERAN McKEOWN
xv
General Introduction
Marxist urban sociology, though a relatively recent development, is
currently a major school within urban sociology (see Lebas, 1982, for a
comprehensive bibliography of the literature constituting this school).
The school emerged in the late 1960s largely as a result of growing
academic disenchantment with the prevailing approaches to urban
sociology. The new approach - sometimes referred to as 'the political
economy approach' (Harloe, 1979, p. 5; Lebas, 1981, p. xi; 1982, p. 20)-
is now entering its second decade and this is an appropriate time to
evaluate it. This book focuses upon the writings of Manuel Castells and
Jean Lojkine, who have made centrally important contributions to this
new body of literature while at the same time representing different
approaches within it. Thus their work represents, to some extent, both
the unity and the diversity of the new school.
Manuel Castells and Jean Lojkine are sociologists whose writing has
attempted to apply a Marxist perspective to the analysis of urban areas.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s their writings have generated
considerable and growing interest within the social sciences generally. I
In the present study their writings will be analysed and discussed in
detail. Their work will be located in their respective traditions of
Marxism and evaluated from the point of view of Marx's political
economy. Having identified inadequacies in their understanding and
application of Marx's political economy, the book will attempt to
provide an alternative to the approach of Castells and Lojkine. This will
be done by redefining the field of urban sociology in terms of three basic
processes, namely, the process by which urban (that is, built-up) areas
are produced, the process by which they are used for the production of
commodities and the process by which they are used for final consump-
tion. These three processes will be analysed using a constrained-actor
model of society. This results in an analysis of urban processes which,
although it is not strictly Marxist, nevertheless maintains the Marxian
emphasis upon the role of interests and conflicts in social interaction.
The critique of the work of Castells and Lojkine which is presented in
this book is made from a particular point of view based upon the premise
that the validity of a Marxist analysis of urban areas is ultimately
dependent upon the validity of Marxism itself. Since, in turn, the validity
of Marxism is dependent upon Marxist political economy, the critique
of Castells and Lojkine will focus upon the major issues of political
xvii
XVlll General Introduction
3
4 Marxian Political Economy
process, then the entire exercise would be pointless from the capitalist's
point of view. Thus the pursuit of profit is the underlying rationale of all
capitalist production.
Marx's problem is to explain the origin and nature of this surplus in a
way which is consistent with the proposition that all commodities
exchange in proportion to their value. His explanation is that the surplus
arising in production is due to the commodity labour power which he
regarded as a 'special commodity' (Marx, 1974a, p. 164). The special
quality oflabour power derives from the fact that its use value can create
a quantity of value which is greater than its exchange value (in contrast
to every other commodity whose use value can only create a quantity of
value which is equal to its exchange value). Marx explained this special
quality of labour power in the following way: the capitalist purchases
labour power at its value and then proceeds to consume its use value by
putting it to work (in the same way as he/she will consume the use value
of the means of production by putting them to work). If the capitalist is
to make a profit from the purchase of labour power he/she must ensure
that the value of the output created is greater than the exchange value of
that labour power. Marx emphasised that capitalists will always ensure,
through various forms of coercion, that the value created by the use
value oflabour power will always be greater than its exchange value. It is
this difference between what Marx terms 'the value oflabour power and
the value which that labour power creates' (ibid., p. 188) which is the
origin of profit. The size of the profit, in turn, is determined by the
productivity of labour and by the length and intensity of the working
day.
This is the theroretical core of Marx's theory of exploitation. This
theory highlights two important points about capitalist exploitation.
The first is that capitalists receive an unearned income, that is, a profit
which is based solely upon their ownership of the means of production,
in contrast to workers whose income has to be earned through work.
The second point is that the income which the capitalist receives consists
in the surplus labour which the worker is obliged to perform over and
above that which is necessary to produce the wage. Thus, in his theory of
exploitation, Marx was not content to point out simply that workers
earned their share of society's wealth while capitalists did not, but in
addition, that the capitalists' share was nothing less than the surplus
labour of the workers.
This basic conceptual framework is then elaborated by introducing
the concepts of constant capital (C), variable capital (V) and surplus
6 Marxian Political Economy
This ratio is a measure of the quantity of surplus value produced per unit
oflabour power. It can be raised by increasing 'absolute surplus value'
(that is, by increasing the length and intensity of the working day:
increasing the numerator) or by increasing 'relative surplus value' (that
Marx's Labour Theory of Value 7
~=!L
Vi Vj
The analysis up to this point has centred around the concepts of the
value of a commodity and the surplus value generated in the course of
producing that commodity. Marx regarded this analysis as a fundamen-
tal prerequisite to the explanation of profit and prices in capitalist
society. This is indicated implicitly in the layout of Capital (broadly
speaking from values and surplus value in Volume I to prices and profit
in Volume III) and explicitly by the following quotation: 'If you cannot
explain profit upon this supposition (that is, that on average, com-
modities are sold at their real values and that profits are derived from
selling them at their values) then you cannot explain it at all' (Marx,
1975, p.42; see also 1974c, pp.43, 157).
The logic of this dualism in his economic analysis (between value and
surplus value on the one hand and price and profit on the other) required
Marx to show that there was, in fact, a systematic and quantifiable
relationship between these two levels of reality.6 To this end he
attempted to transform value and surplus value into price and profit,
thereby proving that the latter were derived from, and determined by,
the former. His attempt to do this gave rise to the transformation
problem.
8 Marxian Political Economy
then: ri1rj1r
then: Ci + Vi + Si is not proportional to (Ci + i) (I + r)
Marx's Labour Theory of Value 9
r = __
Si_
Ci + Vi
10 Marxian Political Economy
I
i=l
Si
S
r = =---
n
c+ V
I + I
i=! Ci
i=! Vi
but
The reason for this is that those commodities which are produced in
sectors with a low organic composition of capital (low C;/Vi) will have
prices which are less than their value (since they produce more surplus
value than they receive as profit), while those commodities which are
produced in sectors with a high organic composition of capital (high C;/
Vi) will have prices which are greater than their value (since they produce
less surplus value than they receive as profit).
Marx argued that the inequalities between values and prices would
'balance out one another' (Marx, 1974c, p. 157) and 'compensate one
another' (ibid, p. 161) in the sense that the aggregate value of all
commodities would equal the aggregate price of all commodities, even
though the value and price of each individual commodity would be
unequal.
This proposition can be written, following the above notation, as
follows:
n
I (Ci+Vi+S i )
i= I
but
Ci + Vi + Si =1= (C i + Vi) (l + r)
12 Marxian Political Economy
Each of these three price coefficients, together with the rate of profit,
provide all of the necessary requirements for rewriting the above value
equations as price equations. These price equations can be written as
follows:
Sector I (Capital Goods): c\x + VIY + r(c\x + VIY) = c\x + C2X + C3X
Sector II (Wage goods): C2X + V2Y + r(c2x + V2Y) = V\Y + V2Y + Y3.Y
Sector III (Luxury Goods): C3X + V3.Y + r(c3x + V3.Y) = S\z + S2Z + sJZ
In these equations, the price coefficients (x, y, z) and the rate of profit
(r) have been introduced in order to make it formally possible to derive
the price system from the value system. However, x, y, z, and rare
unknowns in the sense that they have been added to the known datum
(C\C2C3V\V2V3S\S2S3) and can only be specified by being expressed in terms
of the known data. To do this by simultaneous equations it is necessary
that the number of unknowns equal the number of equations. In this
case there are only three equations, but four unknowns (x,y,z,r).
Bortkiewicz solved this problem by assuming that the value of the
output of Sector III was equal to its price so that its price coefficient was
equal to one (z = I). In this way the number of equations is equal to the
number of unknowns. From these equations it is possible to derive
formulas which specify the three unknowns (x,y,r) in terms of the other
known quantities (C\C2C3V\V2V3S\S2S3) which can then be inserted into the
three-sector model (Sweezy, 1942, pp. 116-120; Bortkiewitz, 1973,
pp. 202-4; Howard and King, 1975, pp.166-7).
There are two important implications which follow from Bort-
kiewicz's solution to the transformation problem. The first concerns the
degree of arbitrariness involved in that solution and the second concerns
the determination of the rate of profit. Each of these will now be
discussed respectively.
Bortkiewicz's solution demonstrates that it is possible to derive prices
and profit from values and surplus value. However, as has been seen, this
solution required one arbitrary assumption to ensure that the transfor-
med prices are absolute prices. Bortkiewicz assumed that the value of the
output of Sector III was equal to its price (that is, z = I). Since Sector III
is entirely devoted to producing the luxury good, gold, and since its
output is equal to the total quantity of surplus value produced in the
economy, it follows that total surplus value (200) is equal to total profit
(200). The important point to note about this assumption is that it does
not 'prove' that total surplus value must necessarily be equal to total
profit (as Marx believed) since this equality is only arrived at by
assuming it.
16 Marxian Political Economy
The problem with Marx's formula (and his underlying argument) can
be seen from a re-examination of the precise way in which the general
rate of profit is formed in capitalist society and the way in which this, in
turn, is enforced through the competitive process.
In any model of a competitive capitalist economy, the rate of profit
will be uniform in every sector and will be equal to the ratio of net output
to total inputs (all valued in price terms). It follows, therefore, that in the
above three-sector model, the rate of profit in each sector will be the
same (r, = r2 = r3) and will be defined as:
Marx's Labour Theory of Value 17
(C\X + V\Y)
(C2X + V2Y)
(C3 X + V3Y)
Marx seems to have inferred from the fact that since profit is produced
in each sector that, therefore, each sector must play the same role in
determining the general rate of profit. That this is not so can be seen by
inspecting the inputs and outputs of each sector and the way in which
they affect the rate of profit.
The level of net output in any sector, assuming a given state of
technology, will be determined by the level of inputs. It follows therefore
that the determinants of the general rate of profit must be found among
the inputs (c\x + v,y; C2X + V2Y; C3X + V3Y). More specifically, the rate of
profit which will prevail in every sector of the economy will be
determined by those inputs which enter into each and every sector since
any change in the price of these inputs will affect the rate of profit in
every sector in the same way. Conversely, if an input does not enter into
every sector then any change in its price would not affect the rate of
profit in every sector; it could not therefore be regarded as a determinant
of the general rate of profit.
An inspection of the inputs in the above three-sector model reveals
that all of the inputs are produced in Sectors I and II; there are no inputs
which are produced in Sector III. It is thus possible to affirm
categorically that Sector III has no effect upon the general rate of profit
since its output does not enter as an input into any other sector (not even
itself). The rate of profit is therefore established outside this sector and
imposed upon it through the competitive process. This fact alone
provides adequate proof that Marx's formula for the rate of profit must
be wrong since it includes the inputs and outputs of this sector in its
calculation when in fact they should be excluded (see Morishima and
Catephores, 1978, pp. 161-2). More generally, the rate of profit in a
competitive capitalist economy is determined by those inputs which
enter directly and indirectly into the production of every other
commodity. In the terminology of Sraffa, it is determined by 'basic'
commodities (as opposed to 'non-basic' commodities) because 'basics
18 Marxian Political Economy
Figure 1.1 The relationships between physical, value and price quantities
Arrows (a) and (b) indicate that both value quantities and price
quantities can only be derived from physical quantities. Arrow (c) shows
that price quantities can be derived from value quantities if Bortkie-
wicz's transformation procedure is used (see section 1.5 above) even
though, as has been seen (ibid.), there is no systematic relationship
between values and prices, or between surplus value and profit. Arrow
(b) shows the most direct way of explaining prices and profit and, for the
reasons just cited, it is also the best way.
These are the main features of the Sraffian approach. As has been
seen, this approach is concerned with the sames issues as Marx. The
Marx's Labour Theory of Value 23
1.7 CONCLUSION
2.0 INTRODUCTION
24
Marxian Crisis Theory 25
2.1.1 Introduction
Marx regarded his 'law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall'
(Marx, 1974c, Chapter 13) as the most importance source of crisis in
capitalism. This is evidenced by his assertion, in the Grundrisse, that 'this
is in every respect the most important law of modem political economy,
and the most essential for understanding the most difficult relations. It is
the most important law from the historical standpoint' (Marx, 1973,
p.748).
It is not surprising that Marx should take this view given that the
Marxian Crisis Theory 27
Marx's law of the falling rate of profit begins from the assumption that
in the capitalist system of production there will be a predominant ten-
dency for capitalists to continually introduce labour-savingjcapital-
using technical innovations in order to increase productivity, profit,
and, ultimately, capital accumulation. Marx based this assumption on
two related claims. First, he claimed that technical change would result
in an increase in the mass of the means of production (that is, machines,
buildings and so on) relative to the mass (or size) of the labour force.
Marx expressed this by saying that the technical composition of capital
would rise. Second, he claimed that this would, in turn, result in a more
or less corresponding increase in the value of the means of production
(that is, constant capital) relative to the aggregate value oflabour power
(that is, variable capital). Marx expressed this by saying that the organic
(or value) composition of capital would rise.
Marx then argued that as the value composition of capital tended to
28 Marxian Political Economy
rise the rate of profit would tend to fall, irrespective of whether the rate
of exploitation remained 'the same' (Marx 1974c, pp. 212,213) or was
'rising' (ibid, p. 213). The logic of Marx's argument was that, since all
surplus value (and hence profit) could only be derived from living labour
(that is, variable capital), the latter's relative decline vis-a-vis dead
labour (that is, constant capital) implied that surplus value (and hence
profit) must also ultimately decline.
Marx realised, indeed insisted, that although the predominant
tendency would be for the rate of profit to fall as capitalism developed,
there were a number of 'counteracting influences' (Marx, I 974c,
Chapter 14) which could diminish or even halt (albeit temporarily) the
decline in the rate of profit. These tendencies and counter-tendencies can
be seen more clearly in the light of an examination of Marx's formula for
the rate of profit. Marx defined the rate of profit (r) as:
S
r =---
c+ V
where S = total surplus value; C = total constant capital and V = total
variable capital. Marx's formula can be rewritten as:
s
V
r =---
1+ C
V
From this expression, it is apparent that the rate of profit (r) will only fall
if the organic composition of capital (C / V) increases at a faster rate than
the rate of surplus value (S/ V). In other words Marx's law of the falling
rate of profit can be formally stated in the following way: there will be a
tendency within capitalism for the organic composition of capital to rise
at a faster rate than the rate of exploitation such that the net effect, in the
long run, is to reduce the rate of profit (Howard and King, 1976, p. 37).6
This net effect is assumed to be both necessary and inevitable even
though it may encounter certain 'counteracting influences' which may
cause the organic composition of capital to fall (for example, produc-
tivity increases, foreign trade) or cause the rate of exploitation to rise (for
example, a reduction in real wages, an increase in the length and
intensity of the working day, foreign trade, relative overpopulation) or
both.
In assessing the validity of this law, it is necessary to consider two
issues. The first issue is whether there are any circumstances in which a
Marxian Crisis Theory 29
This fact can be illustrated by inspecting the formula for the maximum
rate of profit (in value terms). If the rate of profit is at a maximum, this
means that wages must be zero and the entire output of direct labour
must count as surplus. Thus the maximum rate of profit may be defined
as:
r =--
s+ V
max C+V
The analysis so far has discussed the law of the falling rate of profit
within the parameters set down by Marx. In other words, it has focused
on whether the decisions and actions of capitalists in relation to
technical innovation would be such as to raise the organic composition
of capital and the rate of exploitation in such a way as to lead ultimately
to a fall in the rate of profit. On the basis of this analysis it has been
shown that technical change affects the organic composition of capital
and the rate of exploitation simultaneously, and that the net effect of this
technical change cannot be ascertained a priori (see Bortkiewicz, 1952,
p. 47.) There is, however, a further piece of analysis which also shows
Marx's law to be invalid. This analysis is usually referred to as 'Okishio's
theorem' (Okishio, 1961, though the argument has also been attributed
to Samuelson; see Howard and King 1975, p. 232, fn 31).
The basic argument is that no rational calculating capitalist would
ever knowingly introduce a technical innovation which would cause a
fall in the rate of profit; if, due to unforeseen and unintended
consequences, a new technique reduced the rate of profit, capitalists
would, ceteris paribus, revert to the previous technique. The reasons for
this can be illustrated as follows.
For any given technique of production, there is an inverse relation
between the real wage rate and the rate of profit. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.1 (adapted from Steedman, 1977, pp. 127-8; see also Howard
and King, 1975, pp. 208-9).
The line AB shows the different possible combinations of the rate of
profit and the real wage rate for that technique (Technique I). If an
additional technique (Technique II) is introduced, it too can be
described by its own particular combination of wage and profit rates
represented by the line CD.
The capitalist confronted with any two techniques will have to decide
which is the most profitable at any given wage rate. In this example, it
can be seen that ifthe real wage rate is below w* then Technique I will be
chosen, while if it is above w*; Technique II will be chosen. If the real
wage is equal to w* then the capitalist will be indifferent as to which
technique he adopts since both are equiprofitable at that point.
If technical innovation occurs again in this economy, then at least
some part of the line describing this new technique (Technique III) must
lie to the right of the wage-profit frontier (AED). This is because, for it to
be an innovation, the attainable rate of profit must be higher, for at least
34 Marxian Political Economy
Technique I
c
Technique II
certain real wage rates, than the rate of profit attainable by the preceding
techniques (Techniques I and II). If the line describing this new
technique is GKH then it can be seen that, at any wage below w**, the
new technique (Technique III) will be more profitable than any of the
previous ones, and will therefore, ceteris paribus, be adopted. In other
words, the new Technique III will be more profitable, at any point on the
line GK, for any wage level below w**. If, however, the real wage should
rise above w** then the capitalist will find that this new technique
becomes unprofitable (by comparison with the rates of profit attainable
using Technique II) and he/she will revert to the older Technique II (on
the line CP). The more general point is that no technique will ever be
adopted, if and once it is known that its effect is to reduce the rate of
profit. It is perhaps ironic that Marx should have made precisely this
argument in Capital, Vol. III, Chapter 15 where he discusses the falling
rate of profit. He writes: 'No capitalist ever voluntarily introduces a new
method of production, no matter how much more productive it may be,
Marxian Crisis Theory 35
and how much it may increase the rate of surplus value, so long as it
reduces the rate of profit' (Marx, 1974c, p.264). However, he sub-
sequently rejected this argument - wrongly - on the ground that the
aggregate effect of innovations was to increase the organic composition
of capital, thereby causing, ceteris paribus, the rate of profit to fall. For
all of the preceding reasons, there is no justification for assuming that
technical innovation will lead to a fall in the rate of profit.
2.1.6 Conclusion
The analysis in this section has shown that there is no 'law' by which it is
either necessary or inevitable for the rate of profit to fall in the course of
capitalist development, as Marx claimed. This is not to deny that such a
fall is a possibility; it simply denies that it is inevitable.
This result is not particularly novel, having already been established
and repeated by numerous writers (see notably, Bortkiewicz, 1952,
pp. 37-50; Steedman, 1972, 1975a, pp. 79-80; 1977, Chapter 9; Hodg-
son, 1974a, 1975; Howard and King, 1975, pp. 203-9; Roemer, 1977,
1978b, 1979, 1981, Chapter 5; Weisskopf, 1979; Van Parijs, 1980; Harris,
1983). However, it is a result which has not yet made an impact on the
recent French Marxist urban sociology of Manuel Castells (see Chapter
6) or Jean Lojkine (see Chapter 7) for whom Marx's law of the falling
rate of profit has considerable importance, particularly in the explana-
tion of collective consumption (see sections 6.2, 7.2 and subsection
7.3.2).
2.2.1 Introduction
realise the profit for which they were originally produced. The second
reason is that overproduction and underconsumption are the effects of
this realisation crisis (rather than the cause) in the same way that they are
the effects of the (alleged) tendency of the rate of profit to fall (see
subsection 2.1.1).
It should be emphasised that the term overproduction, as used by
Marx, refers to the production of a quantity of commodities in excess of
the quantity which can be sold at the going price of production, that is, in
excess of effective demand (see Marx, 1974b, pp. 414-15). 'It is not a
question' Marx emphasises, 'of absolute overproduction - overproduc-
tion as such in relation to absolute need or desire to possess com-
modities' (Marx, 1969, pp. 506,527; see also 1974c, pp. 255-7). Thus it
is perfectly possible (given this terminology) for a crisis of overproduc-
tion to coexist with a famine in a given capitalist country. A similar
reasoning also applies to Marx's use of the term 'overpopulation' (see
section 2.3.3).
Realisation crises are essentially cyclical (that is, short-run) in nature.
As Marx insisted in this context: 'Permanent crises do not exist' (Marx,
1969, p.497).
The major difficulty with any attempt to outline Marx's theory of
realisation crisis is, as numerous writers and critics have pointed out,
that Marx never systematically worked out his theory (Sweezy, 1942,
pp. 133-4; Howard and King, 1975, pp.21O-11, 1976, p.33; Alcaly,
1978, p. 17; Morishima and Catephores, 1978, p. 118,fn1O; Elster, 1985,
pp.154, 161; for a contrary view see Sowell, 1976,pp. 56-7). The present
section is, therefore, an attempt to present a systematic and coherent
account of Marx's theory of realisation crisis. The analysis begins,
following Marx, by indicating those factors which make a realisation
crisis possible (subsection 2.2.2). This is followed by an analysis of the
four proximate causes of realisation crises; the absence of macroecon-
omic planning (subsection 2.2.3), technical innovation (subsection
2.2.4), variable weather conditions (subsection 2.2.5), and scarcity of
labour (subsection 2.2.6).8 Each of these will now be discussed
respectively.
Every realisation crisis expresses itself in the fact that the act of sale is
separated, in time and space, from the act of purchase. 'If purchase and
sale coincided', Marx affirms, 'the possibility of crisis would under the
assumptions made, disappear' (Marx, 1969, p. 508). This separation of
Marxian Crisis Theory 37
or
M -+ C + V -+ If] -+ C + V + S -+ Ml
where:
M = the amount of money which the capitalist owns at the
beginning of the production process;
CLP
MP = the commodities oflabour power and means of production
purchased by the capitalist at the beginning ofthe produc-
tion process;
C+ V = constant capital plus variable capital;
If] = the production process;
C1 = the new commodity;
C + V + S = constant capital plus variable capital plus surplus value;
Ml = the money which the capitalist receives from the sale ofthe
new commodity;
Ml = M + 6. M = S.
The possibility of a realisation crisis exists in this case if the capitalist is
unable to sell C1 (and hence realise profit) or if, having sold C 1 (for Ml)
(s)he cannot purchase the same quantity of commodities as formerly
(C}Xp) at the same price, and hence cannot reinvest his/her money at the
same rate of profit. In this case, sale and purchase 'become separated'
(ibid., p. 514), 'get bogged down' (ibid., p. 494) and are 'falling asunder'
(ibid., p. 510).
Having established that the possibility of a realisation crisis is
contained in the form of commodity exchange (thereby refuting Say's
law (ibid., p. 493)), Marx immediately emphasises that 'the factors
38 Marxian Political Economy
which turn this possibility of crisis into an actual crisis are not contained
in this form itself: it only implies that the framework for a crisis exists'
(ibid., p. 509). It is now necessary to look at the second part of Marx's
analysis which identifies some of the factors by which this 'possibility
can develop into actuality' (ibid., p. 512).
It is possible, following Marx, to identify at least four proximate
causes of a realisation crisis. 8 These four causes are the absence of
macroeconomic planning, technical innovation, variable weather condi-
tions and scarcity of labour.
Each of these situations can give rise to a crisis of overproduction and
underconsumption. The processes by which this occurs, in each case, will
now be examined respectively.
In the case of Sector II, its output (Y2) must be such as to ensure that the
input requirements of both sectors for consumption goods (VI ,SI, V2,S2)
are satisfied. If this occurs then:
Y 2 = VI + SI + V2 + S2·
These two conditions, taken together, imply that simple reproduction is
only possible if the quantity of consumption goods required by Sector I
(VI + SI) is equal to the quantity of means of production required by
Sector II (C2 ). In other words, the equilibrium condition for simple
reproduction is:
(see Marx, 1974b, Chapter 20)
It is now possible, using this model, to specify one reason why a
realisation crisis is possible within capitalism. This reason derives from
the fact that the output produced by each of the two sectors in this model
is the result of independent and uncoordinated decisions by a large
number of capitalists. The question therefore arises (as Marx rhetorical-
ly put it): 'How is it possible to achieve the necessary balance and
interdependence of the various spheres of production, their dimensions
40 Marxian Political Economy
sold and, by corollary, that produced by the old technology will not
(since the former is cheaper than the latter and is equal to the entire
demand). There is thus an overproduction of commodities and, by
implication, an overproduction of fixed capital (that is, the old
technology). The consequence of this is that the production capacity of
those producing with the old technology is useless.
There are two main consequences of this technical innovation: the
first is that it will result in workers being laid off which will lead to a
decline in the demand for wage goods, leading, in turn, to overcapacity
and overproduction in this sector; second, it will result in a fall in
demand for the output of those sectors which produced the old
technology and in those sectors which produced inputs for this sector,
and so on. These departments will have a similar effect on yet other
sectors whose output they consume. The extent to which a partial crisis
in one sector can develop to a general crisis throughout the economy
depends, as has already been seen, upon the size of the overproduction in
the first place and on the extent to which other sectors are highly
interdependent with it.
2.2.7 Conclusion
2.3.1 Introduction
reasons. The first is that there is some empirical evidence which suggests
that this form of crisis is particularly operative in some contemporary
capitalist countries (ibid.). The second reason is to consider whether this
fact can be incorporated into Marx's framework of analysis without
altering some of the basic elements of that framework.
The present section critically examines Marx's theory of wages as
outlined in Capital, Vol. I, Chapters 6, 19 and 25 (Marx, 1974a) and in
Value, Price and Profit (Marx, 1975). The analysis begins by pointing
out some of the important differences between a commodity and labour
power (subsection 2.3.2). The most important difference is that the
mechanism which regulates the production, and hence the value, of
labour power is the industrial reserve army. The nature of this
mechanism is discussed in subsection 2.3.3, followed by a discussion of
its effect upon the long-term trend in real wages in subsection 2.3.4. The
role of the trade unions within this framework will then be considered in
subsection 2.3.5. The over-all conclusion of this section is that Marx's
theory of wages cannot adequately deal with the possibility that real
wages may rise as a result of trade union power and threaten
profitability. It is suggested that a bargaining power theory of wages
might offer a more realistic (if theoretically less determinate) explana-
tion of wages.
Marx insisted, unlike the classicals, that labour power was a commodity
like any other and that its value (that is, the wage) was determined in the
same way as any other commodity (Marx, 1974a, Chapter 6,
pp.164-72; Chapter 19, pp.501-7; 1975, Section 5, pp.50-3). His
argument was developed as follows. The value of any commodity is
determined by the quantity of socially necessary abstract labour
required to produce it (that is, the labour required under the prevailing
technical and social conditions of production) (see section 1.1). The
value of labour power - also a commodity - is similarly determined by
the quantity of socially necessary labour required to produce it and is
equal to a given quantity of wage goods. These wage goods are necessary
to 'produce, develop, maintain and perpetuate' (Marx, 1975, p. 46) the
worker's labour power. They are 'the means of subsistence necessary for
the maintenance of the labourer' (Marx, 1974a, p. 167).
However, on closer inspection, the value of labour power is not
determined in exactly the same way as the value of any other commodity.
It differs in at least two respects. On the one hand the production process
Marxian Crisis Theory 49
pp. 56-7; Lange, 1968, pp. 82-4). It is now necessary to explore more
thoroughly the nature of the mechanism which regulates the production
and value of labour power.
where Marx defined net output (albeit without using that term) as that
which remains after deductions have been made for 'the value of the raw
materials and other means of production used upon it' (Marx, 1975,
p. 60). Net output, he continues, is the 'fund from which both he (the
worker) and the capitalist have to draw their respective shares or
dividends, the only value to be divided into wages and profits' (ibid.,
p.60).
There is consequently an inverse relation between wages and profit for
a given level of net output which can be graphically illustrated as follows:
Net output
A
DI------~
o Wages c 8
Net output
Net output
D~------''''''-
o Wages c 8
Net output
Figure 2.3 Marx's view ofthe effect of an increase in net output upon the shares
of profits and wages
The role of trade unions, according to Marx, was to prevent wages from
falling below their minimum, subsistence, level. It is in this context that
Marx states that 'trade unions work well as centres of resistance against
the encroachments of capital' (Marx, 1975, p.78). On the same page
Marx describes such struggles over wages as merely 'retarding the
downward movement, but not changing its direction' (ibid).
Marx's view of the role of trade unions was probably an accurate
reflection of their role and strength at the time when he was writing.
Moreover, the crucial role which the reserve army of unemployed played
in his explanation of wages precluded him from attributing any
fundamental importance to trade unions. However, trade unions have
now achieved considerably more power than in Marx's time and it
appears that, in at least some capitalist countries (notably in the UK and
in the US) the share of wages in net output has been increasing. These
facts, based upon the researches of Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972)14 in the
UK, Boddy and Crotty (1975)15 and Weisskopf(l979)16 in the US, and
Hill (1979) and Heap (1980)17 in OECD countries, raise a number of
54 Marxian Political Economy
2.3.6 Conclusion
2.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has focused upon the three basic theories of crisis that are
contained in Marx's writings. Although other theories of crisis have
Marxian Crisis Theory 55
3.0 INTRODUCTION
56
Marx's Theory of Rent 57
in the sense that it arises only on land which produces a special type of
commodity, that is, a commodity which can only be produced on one
unique plot (or set of plots) of land and whose output cannot be
increased above a fixed upper limit.
Profit
Output Corn
Wages
(i)
Type of Land
is adopted, 6 and if it is assumed that the second plot is less fertile than the
first (and is designated as type (ii) land), then the production conditions
of corn on type (ii) land can be written, using the above notation, as
follows:
Pf<ii) = P'j A l1 (ii) + PT A 21 (ii) + ... 1"; Anl(ii) + mal(ii) (1 + r(ii»·
since the capitalists producing on type (ii) land would be willing to pay a
rent for the lease of type (i) land up to the point where the rate of profit
on both types ofland is the same. This rent is equal to differential rent I.
In this way differential rent I emerges on type (i) land independently of
whoever owns the land (see Marx, 1974c, p. 647; see also Benetti, 1976,
p. 12). 8 Thus, the final outcome of extending production from type (i) to
type (ii) land can be written in terms of two equations:
P%) = P'{' A11(i) + Pi A 21 (i) + ... P':: An1(i) + mal(i) (1 + r) +
DRI(i)
P~ii) = P'{' All(ii) + Pi A 21 (ii) + ... P';: An1(ii) + mal(ii) (1 + r)
Differentia I rent I {
--------~----------,
I
Profit {
~---------+-----------;
ll------t--------j
Output
Com
W.~
(i) (ij)
Type of Land
Figure 3.2 The relationship between output, type of land and rent
differential rent I and II despite its implicit presence in his work (see
notably Ricardo, 1970, Chapter 2).
differential rent \I {
r--------4--------~
Prof;, 1
Output Com 1 f-----+-----1
w,~ lL...--_--'---_.....L.--_
(i) {ii}
Technique
Figure 3.3 The relationship between output, technique of production and rent
Monopoly rent I (for which Marx used the term 'absolute rent')" arises
when the owners ofland form a cartel and impose a rent on the use of all
land, irrespective of quality, which is necessary for the production of any
non-substitutable basic or non-basic commodity. Thus monopoly rent I
acts like a tax on land which is imposed by landowners, and which falls,
given the preceding assumptions (notably constant real wages), on
capitalists.
There are two basic conditions necessary for the existence of
monopoly rent I. The first is that the landowners who impose it must
form a cartel and the second is that this cartel must have ownership of all
the land necessary for the production of at least one non-substitutable
commodity. The importance of the first condition derives from the fact
that iflandowners do not form a cartel and fix the amount of monopoly
rent I, then some landowners may not impose the rent at all while others
may impose it at different rates. If this were to occur then it is possible,
with more intensive production on the non-monopoly rent I plots, that
monopoly rent I may not be effectively imposed at all. The second
condition is important because if the cartel does not have ownership of
all the land essential to the production of at least one non-substitutable
commodity, then capitalists will cultivate that land which is owned
outside the cartel, thereby avoiding monopoly rent I. Thus both of these
Marx's Theory of Rent 65
Differential rent I 1
Monopoly rent I
~~~LL~~LLLL~~~
Profit
Com j~---r------i
W,," 1 L......--_~-----'-_
(i) (ii)
Type of Land
3.5 CONCLUSION
The analysis in the preceding sections has illustrated how the price of
land is determined under four different sets of conditions, thereby giving
rise to four different types of rent. The basic insight conveyed by this
analysis is that the price of land - which is 'nothing but the capitalized
and therefore anticipated rent' (Marx, 1974c, p. 808; see also Keiper, et
al., 1961) - is an income which landowners receive from capitalists for
the use of land (assuming that wages are constant and that neither
workers nor capitalists own land).
The price of any plot of land is thus conceptually decomposable into
its various rental components (that is, differential rent I and II,
monopoly rent I and II) some of which may be zero. Thus differential
rent I exists when the output per unit of input on a plot ofland is greater
than the output per unit of input on those plots which yield no rent. In
Marx's Theory of Rent 69
70
Marx's Theory of Productive/Unproductive Labour 71
capital (or the value of its own labour power) but in addition produces
surplus value for the capitalist. . . only that wage-labour is produc-
tive which produces capital' (Marx, 1969, p. 152).
Productive Unproductive
Productive Unproductive
4.3 CONCLUSION
The analysis in this chapter has argued that Marx's second definition of
productive and unproductive labour ought to be rejected and that his
first definition ought to be retained. It has also argued that the first
definition ought to be modified to allow for the possibility that certain
forms of state expenditure (for example, expenditure on infrastructure,
education, health, social welfare, and so on) may have a positive effect
Marx's Theory of Productive/Unproductive Labour 77
The works of Manuel Castells and Jean Lojkine are written within
different Marxist traditions and it is necessary to understand these
traditions in order to assess their work. Castells's work - at least that
written prior to 1983 (see Castells, 1983a, pp. 289-336) - is located
within the Althusserian framework, while that of Lojkine is located
within the framework of state monopoly capitalism (although in one
place Castells attempts to combine elements of both frameworks - see
Castells and Godard, 1974). Each of these frameworks will be briefly
outlined as they impinge upon the work of Castells and Lojkine
respectively.
81
82 French Marxist Urban Sociology
5.3 CONCLUSION
89
90 French Marxist Urban Sociology
6.1.1 Introduction
Castells's critique (with the exception of Castells, 1977a, Parts I and II)
begins from the proposition that any science must possess one of two
criteria if it is to be truly scientific. It must have either a 'specific
Marxist Urban Sociology of Castells 91
6.1.3 Urbanism
Spatial characteristics of
urban areas
(e.g. size, density,
heterogeneity)
Mode of production
or (C)
industrialisation
Cultural characteristics
of urban areas
(e.g. urbanism)
Figure 6.1 The detenninants of urban culture according to Castells and Wirth
6.1.4 Urbanisation
Urbanisation refers, inter alia, to the process by which urban areas grow
and to the resulting spatial structure of those areas. Castells is
particularly critical of two themes that have been part of the conven-
tional approach to the study of urbanisation: the concentric zone model
of Burgess and the concept of 'overurbanization' (see Castells, 1970a;
1970b; 1976a, pp. 40-41; 1977a, Chapter 3, pp. 39-63). His criticism of
both these themes is that they treat urbanisation as if it were a uniform,
unilinear and universal process.
The assumption that urbanisation follows an inevitable and universal
pattern is typified, according to Castells, by the work of Burgess who
depicts all urban growth by a series of concentric zones and explains
them as the outcome of ecological processes: competition, concentra-
tion, centralization, segregation, invasion and succession. Castells's
criticism of Burgess and this 'school' is that it treats 'as a universal
feature a social process which is found only under particular conditions'
(Castells, 1976a, p.40). Castells is also critical of the concept of
'overurbanization' which has been developed for the purpose of
understanding the process of urbanisation in 'dependent' societies (see
Castells, 1970a, pp. 1168-90; 1971a; 1977a, pp. 43-63). His criticism,
which is not original (see Sovani, 1964), is that if urbanisation and
industrialisation have occurred simultaneously in advanced capitalist
society, this does not imply that the pattern must be either universal or
inevitable. Indeed an historical investigation of dependent societies
would reveal why the process of urbanisation is likely to be systematical-
Marxist Urban Sociology of Castells 95
6.1.5 Conclusion
6.2.1 Introduction
section. The first concerns the way in which he arrives at this definition
of an urban area (discussed in subsection 6.2.2) while the second
concerns his analysis of the role and function of collective consumption
in capitalist society (discussed in subsection 6.2.3). Before proceeding to
an examination of these topics, however, it may be useful to first clarify
the meaning of the term collective consumption as it is used by Castells.
The term 'collective consumption' - which is frequently used inter-
changeably with 'collective means of consumption' (Castells, 1978a,
p. 42) and 'means of collective consumption' (Castells, 1977c, p. 64) - is
defined by Castells as follows: 'We class as "collective means of
consumption" expenditure on education and culture, social welfare,
transport, housing and urbanization' (Castells, 1978a, p.42). On the
basis of this definition and from the way in which he uses the term in
various other places (Castells and Godard, 1974, pp.228-9; 1976b,
p.295; 1977a,pp.451,460; 1977b,p.64; 1978a,pp.41-2; 1981b,pp.8,
9; 1983b, p.9) it is reasonable to infer that, for Castells, the term
collective consumption refers to the state provision of the 'indirect
salary' (Castells, 1975a, p. 175). In other words, collective consumption
refers to that part of the real wage which is paid, indirectly (by the state)
to the worker in contrast to that part which is paid directly (by the
employer). Thus the workers' wage contains at least two elements: the
element paid by the employer and the element paid by the state. There
may also be a third element if workers receive goods and services from
voluntary welfare organisations (though Castells does not consider this
possibility). This definition of collective consumption is quite straight-
forward and can be easily handled within the conventional Marxian
framework (as will be seen in subsection 6.2.3).
On the basis of these clarifications, it is now possible to proceed to an
examination of the way in which the concept of collective consumption
is used in Castells's urban sociology.
Castells claims that an urban area - 'the urban', 'urban space' and
'urban unit' (Castells, 1977a, pp.234-5) being synonyms of same -
should be defined as an area of collective consumption since this
definition would allow the entire urban question to be investigated in a
'theoretical way' (ibid., p. 236). The procedure by which he arrives at this
definition can be summarised in terms of four separate propositions, as
follows:
Marxist Urban Sociology of Castells 97
section 2.2). Such a crisis will express itself in the existence of unsold
stocks of finished commodities (beyond what is normal to ensure a
steady flow of same) as well as the underutilisation of the economy's
capacity (that is, every firm will not be using its productive potential to
the full). In such a situation state expenditure can have the effect of
increasing the level of aggregate demand, thereby allowing firms to
realise the profits which are crystallised in their existing stocks of unsold
commodities and to increase their output up to the level of full capacity.
If, however, a particular capitalist economy is already at full capacity
(that is, every firm is producing the maximum possible output), then an
increase in state expenditure on (for example) collective consumption
would simply lead, at least in the short term, to inflation.
This seems to be the unstated argument behind Castells's claim about
the relationship between collective consumption and realisation crises.
In the light of these remarks, therefore, it is possible to outline more
formally the precise empirical conditions which would have to be
satisfied if Castells's claim were to be tested and proven correct. There
are three such conditions:
(a) that there is a realisation crisis in at least one capitalist country
which expresses itself in the existence of unsold stocks of com-
modities and the underutilisation of productive capacity;
(b) that this realisation crisis preceded in time, the introduction of, or a
major increase in, collective consumption;
(c) that the realisation crisis in the country in question was solved by the
introduction of or the increase in, collective consumption.
It is possible that the rapid growth in collective consumption in the
1930s and 1940s operated in this way, though whether this continues to
be the case is an interesting empirical question which Castells does not
discuss.
The third explanation claims that the growth of collective consump-
tion is a response to 'the growing power of the workers' movement'
(Castells, 1975a, p. 176). At the theoretical level, this claim emphasises
the respective bargaining power of workers vis-a-vis capitalists and the
state in the determination of wages. In this sense it effectively and
correctly involves a rejection of Marx's theory of subsistence wages (see
section 2.3). At the empirical level, Castells presents no evidence to
support his claim. The relevant evidence in this case would have to show
that the genesis of collective consumption was the outcome of the
growing bargaining power of workers. It would also have to show that
variations over time and place in the quality and quantity of collective
Marxist Urban Sociology of Castells WI
6.2.4 Conclusion
not achieve the other purpose for which Castells intended it, namely an
extension of the Marxian framework to incorporate the analysis of
urban areas. The basis of the Marxian framework resides ultimately in
Marx's political economy, particularly as elaborated in the three
volumes of Capital (Marx, 1974a, 1974b, 1974c) and any elaboration of
the Marxian framework should probably start from, or be directly
104 French Marxist Urban Sociology
6.5.1 Introduction
Theoretical structural
combination Example of a 'concrete' actor
6.5.4 Conclusion
This section has shown that Castells's concept of urban planning does
not provide a useful framework for the analysis of this type of state
intervention. There are three reasons for this. The first is that Castells
treats urban planning as synonymous with all forms of state intervention
so that its particular features (such as zoning development control, state
Marxist Urban Sociology of Castells 109
property development, and so on) are lost from view. Secondly, the
concept of urban actors (as defined by Castells) seems to be useless from
the point of view of understanding urban planning. Thirdly, the analysis
of the causes of, and constraints upon, urban planning was seen to
contain a number of errors at the level of political economy. Despite
these defects, however, Castells's subsequent analysis of urban planning
in Dunkirk (Castells and Godard, 1974) contains a number of very
useful insights on the political and ideological effects of urban planning,
largely because it does not rely upon the type of analysis developed in
this section (see subsection 6.7.6).
6.6.1 Introduction
Practices Effect
the 'true source of change and innovation in the city' (l972d, p.14)
because they produce 'a qualitatively new effect on the social structure'
(1976c, p.151). This qualitatively new effect must involve radical
changes in either the capitalist relations of property and real appropria-
tion, or in the system of authority (ibid.).
As regards the second characteristic of an urban social movement
Castells emphasises that 'one of my central hypotheses ... is that there
is no qualitative transformation of the urban structure that is not
produced by an articulation of the urban movements with other
movements, in particular (in our societies) with the working class
movement and with the political class struggle' (l977a, p. 453). Thus, for
Castells, the linking and fusion of different movements is the crucial
catalyst for producing radical change in a capitalist society.
Two issues arise in relation to this definition. The first is that it may be
difficult to apply empirically since the criteria for identifying 'true' and
'radical' change are not made clear. Castells states that radical change
must involve, inter alia, a change in the property relation in a capitalist
society. However, the rights of private property (that is, the property
relation) in a capitalist society can be, and are, changed in a wide variety
of ways through state regulations relating to the use of land, the
pollution of the air, the construction of buildings, and so on, as well as
regulations relating to the price, quality, safety, marketing, and so on, of
commodities. The point is that all of these regulations involve changes in
the property relation within capitalism (because they reduce the rights of
private property) though they may not necessarily be regarded by
Castells or others as 'radical'. In other words, 'true', 'radical' change is
Marxist Urban Sociology of Castells 111
truly urban social movement will produce both urban effects as well as
political effects.
This is the essence of Castells's approach to the study of urban social
movements. Apart from the taxonomic character of the concepts of the
urban system and urban actors which are unlikely to be of any use in the
understanding of urban social movements, Castells's methodological
rules for empirical research are, by contrast, likely to prove useful. The
above outline of Castells's framework, in the form of methodological
rules, has the advantage of showing how that framework might be
applied in empirical research.
There is, however, one important element missing from Castells's
conceptual analysis, namely, the spatial dimension. Many protest
movements in urban areas are locality-based and arise because the
residents in an area are all equally affected by a particular issue (for
example, inadequate public transport, crime, redevelopment, and so
on). In other words the spatial sphere of influence of many issues is likely
to be limited to specific geographical areas so that only the inhabitants of
that area are directly and immediately affected by it. This fact (which is
conceptualised more formally in section 8.8) is a crucial element in
explaining the size of the social base affected by a particular issue and,
depending upon the level of mobilisation, the resulting social force. In
addition it may explain why many protest movements in urban areas are
issue-specific and are unconcerned with broader political issues. It
would thus seem that a more rigorous analysis of the spatial dimension
would considerably strengthen and deepen Castells's analysis. In
addition, it would offer the possibility of developing a more explicitly
spatial dimension to Marxian political economy, a step which has not
yet been undertaken.
6.6.4 Conclusion
The analysis in this section has shown that while Castells's definition of
an urban social movement is seriously deficient, his methodological
rules for the study of the latter have some merit. Castells's analysis
could, however, be improved by introducing a spatial dimension and by
incorporating this within the framework of Marxian political economy.
As is demonstrated in Chapter 8, this offers a real possibility for
developing a Marxist analysis of urban protest. It is now necessary to
examine how Castells applies this framework in empirical research.
114 French Marxist Urban Sociology
6.7.1 Introduction
July 1963 (Touraine, et aI., 1967, p. 375; Castells, 1977a, p. 137). The
basic purpose of this research was simple: to show that different types of
industrial establishment were located in different parts of the Paris
region. The methodological procedure adopted for this purpose in-
volved classifying industrial establishments into nine different types,
and classifying the communes of Paris into three different types of area
and examining the frequency distribution of each type of industrial
establishment in each type of area. (Touraine, et al. (1967, p. 376) refer
to these industrial establishments as the independent variable, and the
areas of location as the dependent variable, although this is evidently a
misuse of terms since there is no causal connection between these two
variables.)
The criterion according to which industrial establishments are
classified into different types is autonomy: 'technical' autonomy and
'economic' autonomy (Touraine, et al., 1967, pp. 373ft). According to
Castells there are three types of 'technical' autonomy:
Al A2 A3
BI B2 B3
CI C2 C3
Type cr. which refers to areas of high density, close to the centre of the
Paris agglomeration.
Type J3 which refers to areas where there is a strong concentration of
transportation networks.
Type 'Y which refers to areas of high social status.
(Touraine, et aI., 1967, pp. 384-5; Castells, 1977a; pp. 139-40).
The basic hypothesis of the study was that industrial establishments AI,
B3 and C3 would tend to locate in areas cr., J3 and'Y respectively. A number
of other subsidiary hypotheses were also put forward for each of the
other types of industrial establishments (see Touraine, et al., 1967,
pp. 384-5; Castells, 1977a, pp. 140-41). The basic rationale for these
hypotheses was that firms which were highly dependent upon a
centralised market (AI) would tend to locate in the centre (cr.), while
firms which were concerned with access to locationally fixed inputs
(B2) would tend to locate in areas with a strong concentration of
transportation networks (/3) and, finally, firms concerned with research
118 French Marxist Urban Sociology
and development (C3) would tend to locate in prestigious areas (y) (for
example, the southern and western suburbs). The date showing the
frequency distributions of each type of industrial establishments in each
type of area is broadly consistent with these hypotheses (see Touraine et
al., 1967, pp. 394-402; Castells, 1977a, p.43). The same result is also
revealed more simply and straightforwardly by the maps showing the
location of the different types of industrial establishments (Touraine et
al., 1967, pp. 367-83, 388-93).
This was Castells's first piece of published research and predates his
subsequent Marxist writings. In the light of the research that has since
been carried out on industrial location in the 1970s and early 1980s (see
section 8.7), Castells's failure to distinguish between industrial establish-
ments which are branch plants of multiplant firms and those which are
uniplant firms now appears as a striking and serious limitation. The
research is now of little theoretical or practical interest essentially
because the relationship between different types of firms and their
corresponding location behaviour is poorly formulated (possibly be-
cause the form of the research was more influenced by data availability
than by theoretical considerations).
Variable Index
Proportion of Algerians in the population + 1.20
Proportion of upper management and liberal professions - 0.57
Dwellings without water +0.36
Proportion of semi-skilled and unskilled workers +0.50
Overcrowding in the dwellings + 0.47
Dwellings without WC +0.31
Proportion of foreigners -0.30
Proportion of persons over 65 - 0.19
Rate of women's activity -0.13
Proportion of craftsmen and tradesmen +0.04
Proportion of persons under 19 +0.02
Rate of activity of the population +0.06
Sources: Godard, et al., 1973, p. 26, Table 6; Castells, 1977a, p. 308, Table 54. (It
is noteworthy that there is considerable discrepancy in the indexes contained
in each of these tables even though both are based upon the same research. It is
assumed that the first table (Godard, et al., 1973, p.26, Table 6) is the correct
one.)
Castells interprets this table as follows: 'They [that is, the renewal
areas] are sectors in which housing has deteriorated, of course, but they
are also sectors strongly marked by the presence of immigrant and
120 French Marxist Urban Sociology
Source: Godard, et ai., 1973, p. 27, Table 7; Castells, 1977a, p. 309, Table 54.
(Once again there are considerable discrepancies between these two tables. It is
assumed that the first table is the correct one.)
This research was carried out in 1970 in Paris with the assistance of two
other researchers (F. Lentin and J. Olives) (Castells, 1972d, p. 24, fn 2).
The results were published twice in 1972 (Castells, 1972c, pp. 406-30-
122 French Marxist Urban Sociology
This research, carried out between 1969 and 1971, examined what
Castells regards as 'one of the most important urban struggles of recent
years' (l972d, p. 49). The results of the research were published twice in
1972 (1972d, pp. 49-67 and 1972c, pp. 431-44 - translated to English
and republished in 1977a, pp. 348-60). The information upon which the
research is based comes, Castells states, 'from several sources' (l977a,
p. 348, fn 17). These sources are listed as follows:
personal experience, especially in the Mouvement d'Action Politique
Municipale during my stay in Montreal in 1969; the work of Quebec
students in my urban politics seminars at Montreal University in 1969
and at the University of Paris in 1970 and 1971; long discussions with
Evelyne Dumas, author of a series of articles on this theme in the
Montreal Star; continual exchange of information and ideas with
Ginette Treusdell, a Quebec sociologist who has written a study on
this theme; bulletins, tracts, publications and internal reports of
FRAP and Montreal citizens' committees. (Ibid.; see also Castells,
1972d, pp. 66-7).
The movements which Castells examined originated in 1963 in
'citizens' committees' which were set up in various parts of Montreal for
the purpose of solving the problems of unemployment and the lack of
124 French Marxist Urban Sociology
Godard, 1974, p. 23) which is the law of the falling rate of profit. The
consequences of this law are twofold: on the one hand it leads to a
growing concentration of capital in huge monopolistic firms in order to
counteract this fall; on the other it leads to increased intervention and
expenditure by the state in order to make necessary but unprofitable
investments (for example, infrastructure). These two consequences of
the falling rate of profit are said to be clearly visible in Dunkirk which
has recently undergone a rapid transformation, as a result of the joint
actions of the monopolies and the state; hence the sub-title of
Monopolville: L'entreprise, L'etat, l'urbain) (The Firm, the State, the
Urban).
Although M onopolville is a serious attempt to show how the town of
Dunkirk is being moulded and transformed by the combined actions of
capitalist firms and the state, it is not, as its theoretical orientation might
suggest, an attempt to show how the actions of capitalist firms and the
state respond to the law of the falling rate of profit. Indeed the actual
rate of profit enjoyed by the various firms in Dunkirk, although possibly
very difficult to obtain in the case of the branch plants of multi-plant
firms, is one piece of information that is conspicuously missing from
Castells's and Godard's book, as is the effect of state expenditure on
these different rates of profit. This fact confirms again (see subsection
6.2.3) that for Castells, the law of the falling rate of profit is a dogma
rather than an explanation and, moreover a dogma which is erroneous
(see section 2.1). The same remark, as will be seen, applies with equal
force to the work of Lojkine (see notably subsection 7.3).
Dunkirk was chosen as one of the 'new poles of industrial develop-
ment' (Castells and Godard, 1974, p.8) under the aegis of the Fifth
(1966- 70) and Sixth (1971- 5) French economic plans. These plans, like
the economic plans of other EEC countries in this period, placed great
emphasis on the necessity of restructuring and revitalising key manufac-
turing industries in order to make them nationally and internationally
competitive. Dunkirk was selected as a coastal growth pole with this aim
in mind for the propulsive iron, steel and petrochemical industry.
The iron and steel industry is the main activity in Dunkirk and is
owned and controlled by Usinor (a French firm first founded in 1948)
who located there in 1960 (Castells and Godard, 1974, p. 10). The other
French steel giant, Wendel-Sidelor, has moved most of its operations to
the coastal site of Fos-sur-Mer and this site has become a growth pole
analogous in many ways to Dunkirk (see Castells and Godard, 1974,
p. 66).) The petrochemical industry in Dunkirk is not as developed as the
iron and steel industry, but the signs are that the French petroleum
128 French Marxist Urban Sociology
Characteristic Score
is one of the most interesting and commendable parts of the entire book,
essentially because it is central to any Marxist analysis. Tables 6.9 and
6.10 give a schematic summary of the main fractions of the capitalist and
working classes and their corresponding interests.
According to Castells, it is the non-monopoly class fractions (notably
those numbered (4a), (5) and (6)) which are most in crisis and he cites as
evidence (albeit without citing the source) the 'fact' that 1000 small and
medium-sized firms disappeared between 1964 and 1968 (see Castells
and Godard, 1974, p.90).
This analysis is one of the most promising parts of Castells's and
Godard's book, though it is not developed as systematically, nor as
exhaustively, as the topic requires. One of the interesting findings to
emerge from this analysis, in view of Castells's references to state
monopoly capitalism, and in view of Lojkine's adherence to this thesis
(see notably section 5.2), is that the central class conflict in Dunkirk does
not seem to be between the monopolies on the one hand and all other
non-monopoly groups (that is, medium and small capital and all
workers) on the other (see Tables 6.9, 6.10).
Three pieces of evidence in particular seems to indicate this:
(a) Certain groups of non-monopoly capitalists (notably subcontrac-
tors, numbered (4a) in Table 6.9) benefit considerably from the
presence of monopolies.
(b) Certain groups of workers (notably skilled workers, numbered (1) in
Table 6.10) also benefit from the presence of monopolies.
(c) All workers benefit from the expansion of monopolistic supermark-
ets through lower prices (see Castells and Godard, 1974, p. 124).
These three cases seem to reveal that an anti-monopoly alliance between
all non-monopoly groups is not an inevitable - nor even a highly
probable - feature of state monopoly capitalism, at least as found in
Dunkirk. (This point, however, is not made by Castells and Godard.)
In addition to identifying the different class fractions, their interests,
and the conflicts between them, Castells and Godard also investigate
the ideology of these different class fractions (Chapter 3, pp. 150- 72).
This analysis is based upon 'various observations' (Castells and Godard,
1974, p. 161) of the daily life of these class fractions and on the 'general
information' (ibid.) which Castells and his collaborators possess of the
Dunkirk agglomeration. On the basis of this evidence Castells identifies
four different ideologies:
(1) The ideology of consumption and the nuclear family.
(2) The ideology of class solidarity and conflict.
Table 6.9 Castells's description ofthe fractions of the capitalist class and
their interests in Dunkirk
Fractions of the capitalist class Interests
(1) The integrated monopoly sector (l) Smooth and efficient system of
for iron and steel. The production production;
of steel, for example, is integrated (b) Reserving space for expansion
with the production of ships, and storage, preferably as close as
boilers, pipes, etc. (see Castells possible to the quays;
and Godard, 1974, pp. 74, 76-9, (c) a rail network within the
85-6, 114-15). industrial-port complex;
(d) no competition for its skilled
labour force
(2) The non-integrated monopoly (a) a deep-water port capable of
sector. The refining of petrol, for taking oil-tankers of 400000 +
example, is currently not tons;
integrated with any other activity (b) storage space close to the quays;
(see Castells and Godard, 1974, (c) Efficient road and rail network
pp. 74, 79-82, 87, 115). for transporting the petrol
throughout France and Europe
(3) Large (monopoly) companies (a) Increase in port traffic;
specialising in port activities - e.g. (b) Increase in the capacity of the
port authority, ship owners, port;
freight owners (see Castells and (c) Efficient road and rail network
Godard, 1974, pp. 75, 82-4, 87) for linking Dunkirk with the rest
of France and Europe
(4) Small and medium enterprises (a) continued development ofthe
specialising in port activities port and the monopolies
(a) subcontractors with strong (b) their existence is threatened by
financial backing (e.g. building the monopolies
companies)
(b) autonomous family
enterprises (Castells and
Godard, 1974, pp. 75, 82-4,
87-8,115)
(5) Agriculture: (a) small farmer Urban expansion is absorbing
(b) large farmer agricultural land and removing a
(c) market gardener number of farmers and market
gardeners off the land. The small
farmer suffers most from the sale of
his land while the larger farmer is
likely to set up an alternative business
either in the building or transport
industry.
(6) Shopkeepers and artisans Their interest is to stay in business but
(particularly in the case of small
shopkeepers) their existence is
threatened by the growth of large
supermarkets.
Source: Castells and Godard (1974).
Marxist Urban Sociology of Castells 131
Table 6.10 Castells's description of the fractions ofthe working class and
their interests in Dunkirk
In Chapter 4 (pp. 173 - 292) Castells and Godard discuss some of the
problems in the 'urban system' which arise in relation to the reproduc-
tion of labour. In this chapter the housing problem is given particular
attention. At the time of writing Castells found a serious housing
shortage in Dunkirk (1974a, pp. 198-212) although the more recent
evidence (see notably Coing, 1977, p. 184) seems to suggest that this has
been reversed and that there is now an 'overproduction' (ibid.) of
houses, to the extent that the 1975 census recorded 6100 houses vacant in
Dunkirk.
Castells and Godard also discuss (pp. 235-59) the transport prob-
lem in Dunkirk and the transport requirements of the various class
fractions and the way in which they are inadequately dealt with in
Dunkirk. This discussion focuses on the demands for improved road
and rail networks and on the inadequacy of the existing, privately-run,
bus service.
The problems of housing and transport are referred to as problems
associated with, respectively, the consumption element and the ex-
change element in the urban system. This type of terminology, derived
from Castells's concept of the urban system, pervades and vitiates
Chapter 4 of M onopolville and is of no real heuristic value. Castells's and
Godard's treatment of the data in this chapter is also rather careless
since the sources of the 'facts' related to housing and transport are rarely
cited.
The third and fourth parts of Chapter 4 (pp. 364-412 and pp. 412-39
respectively) contain an analysis of urban planning and urban protests.
The analysis of urban planning begins by defining the latter as all forms
of state intervention (Castells and Godard, 1974, p.365) though the
subsequent discussion is largely confined to the institutional structures
in France and Dunkirk for urban and regional land use planning.
Castells goes through the history of the production of various planning
documents and it is on the basis of this analysis that he reaches his
conclusion that urban planning serves the function of reconciling,
integrating and regulating the diverse interests in the city within 'the
limits drawn by the structural laws of the dominant mode of production'
(Castells and Godard, 1974, p. 411). Castells and Godard are particularly
emphatic that urban planning never challenges the dominant interests of
the capitalist class (for example, it never challenges, but always
facilitates such monopolies as Usinor).
The analysis of urban planning also highlights, particularly in his later
accounts of this research (1978a, pp. 82-8), the political and ideological
effects of planning. The planning authority, according to Castells, is at
the centre of various conflicting class interests and its role is to produce
Marxist Urban Sociology of Castells 133
action since many families are obliged to live in even worse conditions
such as caravans or disused barracks (ibid., p. 429). The second reason is
that the trade unions and the political parties have not offered their
support and organisational capacities to the development of urban
protests over housing, transport, and so on (ibid., pp. 429-30). In fact,
Castells and Godard found that, in Dunkirk, conflicts in the work place
were never related to conflicts over urban problems (ibid., p.423).
The preceding synopsis has highlighted the main features of the study
of Dunkirk as well as its salient merits and defects. It is now necessary to
briefly summarise.
The principal merit of CastelIs's book is that it attempts to analyse the
urban growth and development of Dunkirk by focusing on the different
class fractions participating in that development and the different (and
often competing) interests which each has in relation to that develop-
ment. It is this approach which is at the heart of any Marxist analysis of
the city. Unfortunately, however, Castells and Godard do not develop
this line of analysis to its fullest extent thereby neglecting some of the
more interesting and complex empirical issues (such as, for example, the
way in which the income of the various class fractions is affected, directly
and indirectly, by the central and local state).
The main defect of this book is its carelessness with respect to the
methodological details of doing research. This was seen to be the case
both with respect to the use of 'official' statistics in the book, the exact
source of which was rarely cited, but more particularly with respect to
the data generated by the authors in the course of the research, most of
which, on the basis of the information contained in this book must be
regarded with some scepticism.
14, 15, 16)' (ibid., p.49). In fact, Tables 13, 14 and 15 refer to the
socioeconomic status of employees in Germany, Switzerland and
France, respectively, while Table 16 is non-existent. (In addition, four
diagrams are cited as evidence but are not published in the article.) An
equally striking disparity occurs in the interpretation of Tables 11 and
12, which claims to show that 'the majority [of immigrants] are
unmarried or 'forced bachelors (See Tables 11 and 12)' (Castells, 1975c,
p. 47). In fact, only Table 11 contains any evidence on the marital status
of immigrants, and this shows that the majority of immigrants in
Germany in 1970 were married, while the majority in France in 1968
were single.
In addition to these two defects there is also an internal inconsistency
in Castells's position. One of the fundamental assumptions made by
Marx (see section 2.3), and seemingly adopted by Castells, is that there is
perfect competition in the labour market. On the basis of this
assumption Castells is able to argue that the wages of immigrant
workers have an effect upon the wages of indigenous workers (l975b,
p. 49). However, if there is not perfect competition in the labour market
because immigrant and indigenous workers operate in 'segmented
labour markets' (see Cain, 1976), then the wages of the former would
have no effect upon the wages of the latter. This could occur if immigrant
workers had different types of jobs from indigenous workers (as Castells
believes: 1975b, p.43); if immigrant workers had lower wages than
indigenous workers (as Castells believes: ibid., pp.49, 50, 54); and if
immigrant workers were non-unionised while indigenous workers were
(as Castells believes: ibid., pp. 53, 59, 60). Under these circumstances,
there would not be a competitive labour market, and the wages of
immigrant workers could be expected to have no effect upon the wages
of indigenous workers. While this does not establish empirically that the
labour markets of Western Europe are competitive or segmented, it does
indicate that Castells's position is inconsistent and confused.
This research therefore is of extremely limited value because Castells
does not provide empirical evidence to support his empirical claims and
even when empirical evidence is provided it is frequently interpreted in
an incorrect way.
This research is based upon a pilot study of nearly 180 different urban
protests in Paris between 1968 and 1973. The results were first published
in 1977 (Castells, 1977b - translated and published in Castells, 1978a,
Chapter 6, pp. 126-51). The period between 1968 and 1973 was chosen
Marxist Urban Sociology of Castells 137
for study because 1968 was 'a significant historical watershed' (Castells,
1978b, p. 129) while 1973 was 'the date of the start of the research'
(ibid.).
Castells explains that the data used in the study was 'obtained by a
systematic analysis of newspapers and weeklies, as well as the pam-
phlets, documents and dossiers of unions and political organizations. In
many cases field work supplemented our information' (ibid.).
The analysis begins with a typology of urban struggle. Castells
distinguishes between economic struggles, political struggles and
ideological struggles in terms of their stake (or issue) and their level of
mobilisation. This typology can be summarised as shown in Table 6.11.
This typology is a rather loose device for differentiating between
different types of protest action, since they are largely interchangeable.
It is possible that a typology which focused upon the spatial dimension
of different struggles (that is, the size of the area and population ·affected
by the issue) might be a more effective device in this case. All struggles
are limited, depending on the issue, to specific geographical areas (for
example, a neighbourhood, an urban area or an entire society) (see
section 8.8). It is quite possible that the types of issues cited by Castells
may vary along this dimension.
There would seem to be three principal results which emerge from
Castells's research.
The first is that a protest is likely to produce a successful economic (or
'urban') effect if it is not related to any political organisation and if it is
not supported by single persons, immigrants or students (Castells,
1978b, p. 137). Castells emphasises the political aspect of this result: 'the
politicization of a struggle does not increase its efficiency at the urban
level' (ibid.). He cites the example of the squatting movement whose
excessive politicisation led to its isolation and ultimate defeat (ibid.,
p.146).
The second result is that a protest is likely to have a successful effect if
138 French Marxist Urban Sociology
it aims to be overtly political and if its social base and social force is
predominantly French and does not include students or immigrants
(ibid., pp. 135-9).
The third result is that a protest is likely to have a successful
ideological effect (that is, challenge the dominant ideology) if it is
concentrated on the housing issue and is supported by a student (rather
than by a family or immigrant) social base (ibid., pp. 139-42). On the
role of students Castells states: 'despite their rather negative effect on the
successful outcome of protest action, [they] reveal themselves to be
ideological agents par excellence' (ibid., p. 140).
Castells emphasises the political implications of these results, par-
ticularly the first one. He states that: 'a protest struggle must be kept
independent of a political struggle in order to obtain positive urban
effects on the one hand and positive political effects on the other' (ibid.,
p. 144). However, while the two types of protest must be kept separate,
they should, he argues, be developed simultaneously. These are the main
themes and results of Castells's research. It is virtually impossible,
however, to evaluate the validity of this research since Castells provides
no information on how the various variables are measured (for example,
the size and characteristics of the social base, the level of mobilisation of
this social base, the effects produced by the resulting social force, and so
on) or on how these variables are intercorrelated. There is no quan-
titative evidence presented to support any of the claims made by Castells
in this research report. Moreover, since nearly 180 different protest
actions were studied, many of which had ceased before the research had
started, it is possible (indeed likely) that accurate and comprehensive
information was not available in every case. Castells provides no
discussion of these issues. For these reasons his research is of extremely
limited value.
6.7.9 Conclusion
6.8 CONCLUSION
Castells's writing, as has been seen, can be divided into three parts: his
critique of conventional urban sociology; his formulation of a 'Marxist'
urban sociology; and his empirical research. It is now necessary to
summarise the main conclusions to emerge from the assessment of his
work.
Castells's critique of conventional urban sociology was seen to be
incisive, cogent and largely correct. His empirical research, by contrast,
was seen to be blemished by a frequently haphazard use of empirical
evidence. As regards his conceptual framework for the analysis of urban
areas, two major sets of problems were identified. The first is the
inadequacy of his definition of urban areas. This definition, which
isolated collective consumption as the distinguishing and 'structuring'
characteristic of urban areas, was seen to be inadequate since it placed
undue emphasis on collective consumption at the expense of other urban
processes. As is argued more fully in Chapter 8, an urban area is,
fundamentally, a spatial concentration of physical structures, that is,
buildings (for example, houses, factories, offices, shops, and so on) and
infrastructure (for example, roads, water, and sewerage services,
schools, hospitals, parks, and so on). Evidently collective consumption
is only one part of this spatial concentration. Moreover, Castells's
attempt to 'explain' collective consumption in terms of Marxian crisis
theory was seen to be wholly inadequate both conceptually and
empirically.
The second set of problems relates to Castells's analysis of urban
planning and urban social movements. The difficulty with this analysis
140 French Marxist Urban Sociology
lies in its reliance upon seemingly useless taxonomies such as the urban
system and urban actor. Moreover, it would seem that the processes of
urban planning and urban protests are in fact part of more general
processes constituting urban areas. As is argued in Chapter 8, urban
areas consist of three basic processes: the process by which the urban
area is produced; the process by which the urban area is used for further
production; and the process by which the urban area is used for final
consumption. From this point of view, urban planning is simply part of
the process by which urban areas are produced while urban protests (or
most of them) are part of the more general process by which urban areas
are used for final consumption (and the conflicts inherent in that
process).
The more general conclusion of this chapter is that Castells's analysis
is not a significant contribution to the Marxian analysis of urban areas
because it fails in its self-appointed goal 'to extend in the field of the
analysis of space the fundamental concepts of historical materialism'
(Castells, 1977a, p. 125). The ultimate reason for this failure seems to lie
in Castells's adherence to, and elaboration of, the Althusserian fram-
ework. The consequence of this, in turn, is that Castells's analysis is
highly functionalist, in the literal sense that many of his explanations
take the form of identifying the (alleged) functions which particular
actions or activities fulfil (for example, collective consumption or urban
planning), rather than identifying the actual effects of those actions. It is
only by knowing the effects of particular actions that it is possible to
infer their 'functions'. The consequence of Castells's functionalism, in
turn, is that he explicitly (see notably Castells, 1976b, pp. 77-8; 1974b,
p.239; 1981a, pp. 379,380,386) avoids any analysis which would treat
urban processes (such as urban planning or urban social movements) as
the outcome of the conscious and calculated decisions and actions of the
actors in a capitalist society (that is, capitalists, landowners, workers, the
state, and so on). Paradoxically, it is precisely Marx's focus on
individual decisions, each made within a particular set of constraints and
structures, and the collective outcome of those decisions, which is one of
the important methodological features of his political economy.
The need for an analysis of urban areas along Marxist lines thus
remains. An attempt will be made in Chapter 8 to meet that need by
developing an urban sociology which avoids the major errors of
Castells's approach, but which nevertheless retains the Marxian
emphasis upon the role of interest and conflict in social interaction.
However, before proceeding to that task, an assessment will now be
made of Lojkine's attempt to develop a Marxist analysis of urban areas.
7 The Marxist Urban
Sociology of Jean Lojkine
7.0 INTRODUCTION
141
142 French Marxist Urban Sociology
7.2.1 Introduction
The first problem is his claim that the collective means of consump-
tion are not consumed. This proposition seems to contradict the obvious
fact that the services designated by the term collective means of
consumption (such as health, education, transport, and so on) are
actually consumed. It is thus difficult to see the justification for this
claim.
The second problem lies in the claim that the collective means of
consumption perform the function of 'transforming' a fraction of
variable capital into wages. This appears to be misconceived since
variable capital is simply wages by another name. Correspondingly, the
alleged parallelism between the collective means of consumption and the
means of social circulation does not exist since variable capital does not
have to be transformed into wages unlike commodities which have to be
transformed, through the means of social circulation, into money and
vice versa.
The third problem with Lojkine's argument concerns his central
proposition that the collective means of consumption are 'unproduc-
tive'. This proposition is difficult to assess straightforwardly since, as
has been seen in Chapter 4, Marx used the terms productive and
unproductive labour in two different and inconsistent senses (which, for
convenience, were labelled 'Definition I' and 'Definition II'). In
addition, Marx's Definition II was found to be untenable (see notably
section 4.2). Lojkine does not avert to this ambiguity in Marx's usage
though he does appear to use the term in the sense of 'Definition II' so
that it is open to the difficulties identified above. Nevertheless, it is
possible that the collective means of consumption may be unproductive
according to Marx's Definition I. This, however, is an empirical
question which cannot be established a priori but can only be established
by measuring the net effect of the collective means of consumption upon
the rate of profit and hence upon the rate of capital accumulation. Thus
it remains an open question as to whether the collective means of
consumption are in fact 'unproductive'.
The fourth problem concerns the proposition that the collective
means for consumption 'increase the productivity of labour' (Lojkine,
1977a, p. 137). Two issues arise in this context. The first is whether it is
empirically true that the collective means of consumption increase the
productivity of labour. Lojkine provides no evidence to prove that it
does. The second issue is that if the collective means of consumption
increase the productivity of labour then its effect (depending upon the
costs, and hence the taxes, needed to produce it) may be to increase the
output of the capitalist sector and hence, ceteris paribus, the rate of
Marxist Urban Sociology of Lojkine 147
It would seem that the reason why many of the goods designated by
the term 'collective means of consumption' are unprofitable is that the
level of effective demand for them (that is, those able and willing to pay
for them) is too low. This is why education (and to a lesser extent medical
care) can only be produced profitably if they are confined to a relatively
small number of affluent consumers (and, even then, direct and indirect
state subventions are frequently required to make them profitable).
Thus it is only when these goods and services are produced for
consumers who do not, and cannot, constitute an 'effective demand',
that their production becomes unprofitable. This is typically the reason
why the state in most capitalist countries, is unable to produce the
collective means of consumption for a profit: the latter are normally
distributed, not according to ability to pay but according to the state's
definition of need. Thus the collective means of consumption are
unprofitable, not because of some inherent features involved in their
production but because there is a deficiency in the aggregate demand for
them.
7.3 Introduction
affirms that both types of capital (that is, constant capital and expenses
capital) have the same effect of increasing the organic composition of
capital. The third stage is then to deduce that, since urban expenditure
has the effect of increasing the organic composition of capital, it also has
the effect of reducing the rate of profit upon which its growth depends.
As a result, the financing of urban expenditure faces an inexorable limit
as a result of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Each of these stages
of Lojkine's argument will now be critically examined.
The first step of Lojkine's argument attempts to establish that one
element of urban expenditure (that is, the collective means of consump-
tion) is like 'expenses capital' (that is, the means of social circulation) in
that they produce 'zero extra value' (Lojkine, 1976a, p. 131), while the
other element of urban expenditure (that is, the means of material
circulation) are assumed to be 'highly devalorized' (that is, produce little
extra value). He claims that the collective means of consumption are like
the means of social circulation in being 'a deduction from surplus value
already produced' (ibid., p. 130). His argument is that both perform an
'identical social function' (Lojkine, 1977a, p. 133) within capitalism, in
that the means of social circulation perform the function of transform-
ing 'value from the money form to the commodity form' (ibid.), while
the collective means of consumption, as part of variable capital,
perform the functions of transforming 'variable capital into wages and
then into means for the reproduction of labour power' (ibid.). In other
words, the collective means of consumption and the means of social
circulation are designated as 'expenses capital' since they are 'necessary
to the productive utilization of capital ... but do not transmit or add
any value' (Lojkine, 1976a, p. 130).
The first step of Lojkine's argument is misconceived for at least two
reasons: first because it is based upon a false analogy and second, be-
cause it is inconsistent with the value analysis which Lojkine adopts.
Lojkine's analogy is misconceived because, as has already been seen (sub
section 7.2.3), the collective means of consumption do not transform
variable capital into wages, unlike the means of social circulation which
transform commodities into money and vice versa. Variable capital and
wages are simply different expressions for the same thing.
The second difficulty with Lojkine's argument is that the treatment of
the collective means of consumption as expenses capital is inconsistent
with Marx's value analysis which Lojkine adopts. This is because the
collective means of consumption are a fraction of variable capital which
means precisely that they are not a 'deduction from surplus value
already produced' but an outlay of capital for the purpose of producing
152 French Marxist Urban Sociology
agricultural land rent and land prices are equally applicable in the
context of urban land rent and land prices. On the basis of this analysis,
he makes a number of claims about the effect of urban land rent on the
rate of profit, capital accumulation and urban planning which will be
examined below.
Lojkine begins his analysis by affirming that: 'In a given economic
sector, two conditions determine the possibility of property rent being
formed' (ibid., p. 89). These two conditions are:
1. the organic composition of capital in this sector must be below the
social average organic composition of capital;
2. there must be an obstacle, within this sector, to the free circulation of
capital so that the surplus profit generated in this sector (as a
consequence of the low organic composition of capital) will not be
redistributed to other sectors but appropriated by the landowners
within this sector (ibid.).
According to Lojkine: 'Marx proved in Capital that these two conditions
are to be found in the sector of agricultural production' (ibid., p. 89).
On the basis of his definition of rent, Lojkine then considers a number
of urban situations where these two conditions might exist, with a view
to establishing the existence of urban property rent. A number of
different situations are referred to, though seldom is a systematic
analysis developed. Before critically examining one of these situations,
which Lojkine does attempt to analyse, it may be useful to provide a
brief diagrammatic summary of the different situations to which he
alludes. This is done in Table 7.1.
Lojkine analyses one of the situations identified in Table 7.1, namely,
the case of a property developer who leases offices to capitalists for
commercial, financial or administrative use. His basic strategy is to
establish whether his two conditions for the existence of rent are present.
In this light, he attempts to prove that his first condition is present by
arguing that the capital invested in this sector, although unproductive,
nevertheless allows its owner to 'appropriate a more or less large amount
of surplus value (and hence profit)' (Lojkine, 1971, p.91). Lojkine
explains that this is because:
Lojkine argues that the second condition for the existence of urban
property rent is also present because of the existence of an agent who
hinders the free mobility of capital and the equalisation of the rate of
profit. This agent is the 'property builder-developer' (ibid., p. 91) who,
according to Lojkine, 'purchases, develops and equips the urban land
and leases the commercial (or office) premises to capitalist agents'
(ibid.).
Marxist Urban Sociology of Lojkine 157
7.3.5 Conclusion
1. a planning dimension, which refers to the written plans, that is, the
documents which reveal the planning goals being adopted by the
planning authority;
2. an operational dimension, which refers to the financial and judicial
interventions of the state in relation to those plans;
Marxist Urban Sociology of Lojkine 161
'the social movement only has significance by its capacity to oppose the
dominant class and all of its hegemonic system' (Lojkine, 1977a, p. 313).
'the real historical influence of a social movement can only be defined by
the analysis of its relationship to political power' (ibid., p. 320).
'the social movement is defined, in the last resort, by the capacity to
change the socio-economic system in which it is born' (ibid.).
Together these form the 'social force' (ibid., p. 318). It follows from
this that the extent to which a social force can be mobilised is crucially
dependent on the nature of both the social base and the organisation.
Lojkine points out that a social base can vary according to its size and
according to its heterogeneity. It can be either large or small in size and
homogeneous or heterogeneous in class composition. The social
movement which led to the Russian Revolution of 1917 was, according
to Lojkine, clearly a case where the social base was large in size and
heterogeneous in class composition (though this is not the only possible
combination for mobilising a social force). In addition, a social base can
be spread over areas of different size (national, regional, urban or local)
and this too can affect the mobilisation of a social force.
Lojkine makes two important points about organisations. The first is
that a social movement does not occur 'spontaneously' (ibid., p. 321). It
requires an organisation. The second point is that organisations can
vary both with respect to their 'degree of openness' (ibid., p. 318) and
according to whether they exist at a national, regional, urban or local
level.
Lojkine attributes particular significance to the spatial aspect (that is,
national, regional, urban, local) in the mobilisation of a social force. He
argues that a national, as distinct from a regional, urban or local social
movement, implies 'a different relationship to the power of the state
insofar as the latter relies, in the last instance, on the capacity of the
dominant class to maintain the 'national' cohesion of the whole of the
social formation' (ibid., p. 319). Lojkine goes further and argues that
only a national social movement is capable of attacking the political
power of the dominant class (ibid.).
As regards the second dimension (that is, the political stake) Lojkine
states that a social movement is crucially dependent on its 'political
stake' (ibid., p. 319). The precise nature of the political stake involved in
Marxist Urban Sociology of Lojkine 165
7.6.1 Introduction
evidence for this is only sourced and not presented (Lojkine, 1972a,
p. 15, fn I). This process effectively involved the removal of many
industrial installations from Paris to either the suburbs or the provinces
and their replacement by offices which tended to locate to the west of the
traditional centre of Paris (for example, La Defense). These offices are
usually the headquarters of large firms or centres for research and
development and these, in turn, have attracted luxury shops, hotels and
houses.
The main thrust of Lojkine's argument is that the deindustrialisation
of Paris cannot be explained as the outcome of either technological
change (ibid., p. 16) or urban planning (ibid., pp. 18-19). The explana-
tion lies rather in the way in which different firms have responded to the
changing conditions of profitability of the centre of Paris vis-a-vis its
suburbs and the provinces. According to Lojkine, large industrial firms
(such as Renault and Simca) have transferred their various plants from
the centre of Paris and concentrated them in the suburbs or the provinces
because this strategy offers them a number of advantages:
cheaper suburban sites with proximity to the Paris labour and consumer
markets;
avoidance of the high costs of land and congestion in Paris;
a cheaper and more docile labour force;
a reduction in the costs associated with dispersal by concentrating
different production units on one suburban or provincial site (ibid.,
p.17).
In contrast to these large industrial enterprises, for whom relocation
and spatial concentration outside Paris are rational and beneficial
courses of action, medium and small firms have largely been unable to
follow and relocate outside Paris because:
unlike larger industrial firms (which frequently do not require a highly
skilled labour force), medium and small firms frequently depend on a
highly skilled labour force which is not obtainable outside the centre of
Paris;
the costs of moving are often prohibitive;
the grants system for relocating favours the larger rather than the
smaller firms (since the grant is proportional to the number of jobs
created);
they frequently do not have access to new finance (ibid., p. 20).
These factors, together with the fact that many of these medium and
small firms are unable to afford the currently expensive sites in the centre
Marxist Urban Sociology of Lojkine 169
of Paris, has had the consequence that many such firms are disappearing
through voluntary liquidaton or bankruptcy (ibid., p. 20).
Thus the relocation and expansion of large firms coupled with the
disappearance of many medium and small firms suggests the more
general conclusion that there is, as Lojkine puts it, 'a close correlation
between the movement of economic concentration and industrial
decentralization' (ibid., p.20).
Turning to the 'dominated classes' (who include all wage-earners,
shop-keepers, artisans, and so on), the main consequence of the twin
processes of deindustrialisation and tertiarisation is that there is now,
within the Paris region, 'a growing spatial disequilibrium between place
of work and place of residence' (ibid., p. 41). This disequilibrium, which
Lojkine usually refers to as 'urban segregation' (ibid.), expresses itself in
the fact that the centre and neighbouring suburbs of Paris are
increasingly becoming places of employment while residential areas are
being pushed further towards the urban periphery. The major con-
sequence of this is that many workers are required to undergo long,
twice-daily commuting journeys to work. Lojkine cites evidence (ibid.,
pp. 46- 7) which confirms that the daily movement of commuters
between Paris and its suburbs is continuing to grow apace as is inter-
suburban commuting. The consequence of this, in combination with the
inadequate financing of public transport generally, is that the time and
the discomfort of travelling to work have increased considerably in
recent years (ibid., pp. 48-9).
In the second chapter of his book, Lojkine examines various urban
planning policies (particularly those relating to housing and public
transport) which have been pursued between 1945 and 1971, of which,
he claims, the main effect has been urban social segregation. Lojkine
provides a particularly long discussion of public transport policies (ibid.,
pp. 100-135; see also 1974b) the essence of which is that the public
transport system 'reinforces' (Lojkine, 1972a, p. 121) and 'accentuates'
(ibid., p. 92) segregation: it reinforces segregation because the rail
network is 'radiocentric' (ibid., p. 103) in design and, as such, facilitates
long commuting journeys between the centre and the periphery of the
Paris region at the expense of inter-suburban journeys; it accentuates
segregation because the transport system is underfinanced (as a result of
attempting to run it according to the principles of the free market) so
that commuting journeys take longer and are more uncomfortable than
they might otherwise be.
In Chapter 2 Lojkine also discusses three aspects of urban policies
over which there has been some controversy within the state itself (ibid.,
170 French Marxist Urban Sociology
pp. 135-86). The first controversial issue was whether the growth of
Paris should be curtailed or whether it should be allowed to expand.
Lojkine traces the various 'oscillations' (ibid., p. 141) between these two
planning objectives, from the Third Republic (1870-1940) through
various planning documents notably PADOG (1960),3 SDAU (1965)
(1969t and the preparatory documents for the Sixth National Plan
(1971- 5). However Lojkine concludes that this controversy is 'above all
ideological' (Lojkine 1972a, p. 146), essentially because the actual
course of events in such matters as housing, employment, the location of
new offices, the relocation of manufacturing industries, indicates that
the growth of the Paris region (defined according to ZEAT), 5 far from
being curtailed, has in fact grown more rapidly than France as a whole
over the past 20 years.
The second controversial issue was whether the redevelopment and
expansion of the business and commercial centre of Paris should
proceed westwards, or whether it should be concentrated in the centre
and east of Paris. The former approach was crystallised in PADOG
(1960) in its proposal to continue the development of La Defense (to the
north-west of Paris) as the locus of new office expansion (Lojkine,
1972c, p. 149); the latter approach was advocated by the Commissariat
au Plan6 and by SDAU (1965) who advocated the redevelopment of the
centre and east of Paris and a cessation of the development at La Defense
(ibid., pp. 149- 50). The actual course of events, as measured by building
and planning approvals for offices (ibid., pp. 153-8), reveals that the
development at La Defense, and in the western sector generally,
continued apace, which effectively proves, according to Lojkine, that the
state endorses the dominant tendencies of the Paris property and office
market and thereby acts 'as a means for systematizing segregation rather
than as a means of suppressing it' (ibid., p. 166).
The third and final area of debate has been the mode of financing
urban public transport. The main debate has been between those
(notably the Ministry of Finance) who argue that it should be financed
by levying the appropriate and commercially-determined fares on the
users/workers (ibid., p. 183), against those (virtually all of the planning
agencies) who argue that it should be financed, in part at least, by a tax
on employers and property developers. In the event, it is the former
option, which Lojkine describes as 'Malthusian and liberal' (ibid.,
p. 181), which has largely prevailed 'since 1945 even 1930' (ibid., p. 183).
The third chapter of Lojkine's book is an attempt to show how the
actions of the state, particularly as expressed through various planning
agencies and policies, can be understood in one of three ways: as the
Marxist Urban Sociology of Lojkine 171
(sections 7.1 to 7.5) and is one of the basic weaknesses, not only ofthis
research, 8 but of his entire work.
Lojkine's study of Lyon was carried out between 1970 and 1972 with the
collaboration of two other researchers (Fran~oise Orlic and Catherine
Skoda) and was published in 1974 (Lojkine, 1974a). Lyon, with a
population of just over 1 million in 1976 (see House, 1978, p. 142), is the
second largest city in France (though still nine times smaller than the
largest, Paris), and Lojkine attempts to 'preserve the parallelism'
(Lojkine, 1974a, p. 31) between this study and his previous study of Paris
(see subsection 7.6.2) by confining both studies to the same historical
period (1945 - 72), and also by attempting to analyse urban planning and
development in both cities in terms of its consequences for different
classes and class fractions.
Like his previous study of Paris, Lojkine's study of Lyon is based
upon documentary research. This research draws upon a variety of
materials: planning documents, research reports, reports of parliamen-
tary debates and a variety of books, newspapers and magazines.
Lojkine, however, does not discuss any of the methodological issues
which arose from the use of these data sources.
Lojkine's book is divided into three chapters. The first chapter
(27 pages) is a brief analysis of the expenditure by the various agencies of
the state on the city of Lyon. The second chapter (75 pages) examines
commercial capital, banking capital and industrial capital respectively,
and the way in which each of these class fractions have been changing in
recent years. The third chapter (48 pages) is concerned with the working
class and with the way in which it has been affected by recent urban plans
and policies. Each of these chapters will now be briefly summarised and
assessed.
In the first chapter (ibid., pp. 29-56) Lojkine identifies four different
state bodies, each of which makes a contribution to the total expenditure
of the state in Lyon. These state bodies (listed according to their sphere
of power and influence) are:
The City of Lyon (Ville de Lyon);
The General Council of the Rhone (Conseil General du Rhone);
The Urban Community of Lyon (La Communaute Urbaine de Lyon);
The National Government.
Marxist Urban Sociology of Lojkine 175
involve dealing directly with clients) and, in tum, the separation of these
two functions from those of control and decision-making. This reorgan-
isation has resulted in a highly-decentralised commercial and adminis-
trative operation while at the same time it is highly centralised and
controlled from Paris. The third reason is that Paris is likely to remain
the major control and decision-making centre in the French financial
world because 'the major means of communication and exchange are to
be found in Paris and in Paris only' (ibid., p.97). For these reasons,
according to Lojkine, Lyon is unlikely to supplant the traditional
supremacy of Paris in the financial world.
The final section of Chapter 2 is concerned with industrial capital. The
major fact which Lojkine highlights here, is that large monopolistic
firms are either supplanting small and medium-sized firms (particularly
in the civil engineering field - see Lojkine, 1974a, pp.126-7) or
absorbing them through mergers (as with the merger between Berliet
and Michelin-Citroen - see ibid., pp. 134-6) or through employing them
as sub-contractors (ibid., pp. 102, 132). This growing dominance oflarge
monopolistic firms is, in tum, reflected in the urban and regional plans
of the state which is currently (that is, since 1970 - see ibid., p. 118)
making huge investments in order to provide and service large industrial
estates (over 1000 hectares in size) to attract multinational monopolistic
firms. Lojkine describes this 'subordination of regional political power
to large industrial capital' (ibid., p. 122) as 'a new phenomenon in
France' (ibid.) and is to be found not only in Lyon (where those in
political power are described as 'overtly of the right or camouflaged
under centrist labels' (ibid., p. 1l3) but throughout the entire area of the
'Grand Delta' which has become 'a pole of interest for monopolistic
groups' (ibid., p. 119).
Despite the radical differences in the economic interests of small and
medium industrial capital on the one hand, and monopoly capital on the
other, the Lyon Chamber of Industry and Commerce manages to
maintain a 'political alliance' (ibid., p. l33) between them. This is
exemplified, according to Lojkine, by Satolas airport which was
supported by the Chamber even though it appears to be in the interests
of small and medium, rather than of monopoly, capital (ibid.,
pp. 130-33).
In Chapter 3 (ibid., pp. l37-84) Lojkine looks at the relationship of
urban planning and policy to the working class. His discussion centres
around housing, education and public transport.
As regards housing, Lojkine points out that the strongest spatial
concentration of the working class is in the East and North of Lyon since
178 French Marxist Urban Sociology
7.6.4 Conclusion
7.7 CONCLUSION
An Alternative Approach to
Marxist Urban Sociology
8 From Marxist to Post-
Marxist Urban Sociology
8.0 INTRODUCTION
8.1.1 Introduction
185
186 An Alternative Approach
Lojkine's analysis focuses upon the processes by which urban areas are
used in capitalist production and in final consumption but neglects to
consider the process by which the urban area is itself produced through
property development (see section 7.1). Thus neither Castells nor
Lojkine offers entirely satisfactory definitions of an urban area or of the
field of urban sociology generally.
Castells and Lojkine are totally opposed to the capitalist system in all its
forms and share a common commitment to some form of socialism. It is
this fact, possibly more than any other, which accounts for the style and
content of their writing. It accounts, in particular, for the approach
which they adopt towards urban movements.
Castells and Lojkine both define an urban social movement as being
concerned with 'true' and 'radical' change which will 'open the road to
socialism' (see subsection 6.6.2 and section 7.5). They regard neighbour-
hood and community protests (such as those concerned with the
provision of public transport, schools or housing) as unimportant, both
analytically and politically, as long as they remain within the horizon of
that particular neighbourhood or community. Thus both Castells and
Lojkine are, in principle, interested mainly in movements that have,
actually or potentially, a national and not just a purely local dimension.
This definition was criticised (see subsection 6.6.2 and section 7.5) for
being too narrow, because it excluded from consideration many of the
protest actions which typically occur in urban areas (for example,
protest actions over such issues as rents, repairs to local authority
houses, planning proposals, crime, and so on). Although many of these
movements could scarcely be described as 'radical', they are nevertheless
a vital part of the political interaction that takes place between the local
or central state and the residents in that jurisdiction. Any definition
which wishes to exclude these neighbourhood and community-based
movements from the general category of urban movement is likely to
miss an important part of the politics that take place within urban areas.
From Marxist to Post-Marxist Urban Sociology 191
In his research Castells was unable to find any 'real' urban social
movements (as he would define them) and was obliged, by default, to
focus upon protests over such issues as housing and redevelopment
whose horizons tended to be local rather than national (see notably
subsections 6.7.4, 6.7.5 and 6.7.8).
Given their definition of an urban movement, Castells and Lojkine
place considerable emphasis upon the fusion of struggles over collective
consumption with struggles in the workplace. Indeed, Lojkine has
expressed the belief that movements involving this fusion are likely to be
of growing importance in the coming decades (Lojkine, 1977a, pp. 334ff;
1977b, p. 153). While this may turn out to be the case, it is likely to occur
in spite of, rather than because of, a growth in protests over collective
consumption. This is because the latter tend to be limited to the spatial
confines of a particular externality field (see subsections 8.8.3, 8.8.6 and
8.8.9). In Britain the evidence would seem to disprove Lojkine's
expectation since community movements, according to Saunders, 'are
typically fragmented, localized, limited to a narrow range of concerns,
and politically isolated from broader radical movements' (Saunders,
1980b, p. 551).
Although the concept of urban social movement contained in the
work of CastelIs and Lojkine is excessively narrow, they nevertheless put
forward a useful framework of concepts for the description and analysis
of social movements. They argue that a social movement can best be
understood by identifying: the issue or stake of the movement (that is,
the pro blem affecting, or goal adopted by, a particular group), the social
base (that is, the population affected by the particular problem or issue),
the organisation (that is, the vehicle through which the social base
achieves its goal), the social force (that is, that part of the social base
which is mobilised into action through the organisation and the effect
(that is, the outcome of the action pursued by the social force). These
concepts and the methodological procedure underlying them are likely
to prove useful in characterising and comparing different protest
movements.
8.1.6 Conclusion
This review of the work of Castells and Lojkine suggests that their
attempt to develop a Marxist analysis of urban areas must be regarded,
despite its occasional insights, as having rather limited value. The
evidence supporting this claim was presented systematically and exhaus-
tively in Chapters 6 and 7 and in the preceding subsections of this
192 An Alternative Approach
chapter (8.1.1 to 8.1.5). This evidence suggests that, despite the centrality
of Marxian political economy in their work, they rarely use its concepts
in any methodologically rigorous or creative way. Both tend to use
Marxian concepts in a rather dogmatic and functionalist way. In
consequence, they fail to make some of the modifications and innova-
tions to the Marxian framework which, as will be seen presently (in
section 8.2), seem to be necessary in order to adapt it to the spatial and
often highly localised nature of class and class conflict at the urban level.
Nevertheless, their work is significant because of its role in generating
interest and in helping to define the research agenda for the growing field
of Marxist urban sociology. It is in this context that the subsequent
sections of this chapter (8.2 to 8.9) will attempt to develop a more
empirically-grounded, if less strictly Marxist, analysis of some of the
central issues in this new field of urban sociology.
Marxist political economy, apart from certain obiter dicta about the
separation of town and country (Marx, 1947c, p. 333) is virtually non-
spatial and this immediately creates a problem when applying it to the
urban context. In addition, there is the problem that Marx's analysis of
class and class conflict tends to be at a high level of abstraction,
particularly in Capital, whereas class conflict in urban areas tends to be
more locality-based. Thus, notwithstanding the lack of methodological
rigour with which Castells and Lojkine use Marxist political economy,
the latter itself seems to require some innovations in order to make it
more amenable to the analysis of urban issues (for example, issues such
as the conflicts associated with negative externalities in residential areas
or the conflicts between developers and planners over property develop-
ment).
The analysis developed here derives its basic thrust from the Marxian
emphasis upon the role of interests, both material and ideal, in human
action, and upon the conflicts of interest which usually ensue from the
pursuit of those interests. However, unlike the standard Marxian
approach, where classes are treated as the main actors or agents in
society, the concept of actor will be broadened here to include
individuals, groups and organisations which have a separate and
identifiable interest and which act purposively to pursue that interest. 1
This broader concept of interest reflects the hierarchical levels of
abstraction at which the concept of interest can be treated so that the
From Marxist to Post-Marxist Urban Sociology 193
difficult to define than those of other actors, and can vary within and
between capitalist countries, depending upon such factors as its
organisational structure, the values and attitudes of its incumbents and
the relative power of the various classes and interest groups in that
society. These factors, in turn, are reflected in the law which defines the
scope of state power as well as the manner in which the power can be
exercised.
The third proposition is that actors in advanced capitalist societies
tend to act in an instrumentally rational way and hence to calculate the
efficiency of the means used to attain their self-interest. This, as Weber
observed, is part of the process of 'rationalisation' of western societies
(Weber, 1974, pp. 13-31), an assumption that is also implicit in Marx's
Capital (Marx, 1974a, 1974b, 1974c).
The fourth and final proposition is that the pursuit of self-interest
takes place through interaction with other actors, equally in pursuit of
their self-interest, so that the interests of one actor are typically
constrained and limited by the interests of another. In this way conflicts
of interest arise which are a characteristic feature of capitalist societies.
The relationship between workers and capitalists, so exhaustively
analysed by Marx, is a perfect example of the operation of these
constraints: workers' interest in higher wages (for example) are contin-
ually constrained by capitalists' interest in higher profits and vice versa.
There are, however, many other types of conflict, notably conflicts in the
sphere of final consumption, which were not investigated by Marx. As
will be seen below, these can be adequately analysed within the
framework of the constrained-actor model outlined here.
The analysis below focuses primarily upon the micro-level conflicts
which take place in the urban context (for example, conflicts associated
with property development, or over negative externalities in residential
areas) although it is not intended to exclude consideration of the more
macro-level issues which are central to Marxist analysis generally. In
other words, the analysis here leaves open the question of the connection
between classes and various interest groups such as residents' associa-
tion, environmental lobbies, local planning authorities, landowners,
developers, and so on. Thus, although the approach developed here does
not solve all of the problems identified in the writings of Castells and
Lojkine, it does have the advantage of using concepts that can be
operationalised more easily while aware of the need to subsequently
relate those concepts to more abstract levels of analysis (see Pickvance,
1984, especially pp. 43-7; see also Castells, 1983a and 1983b where the
latter seems to be moving in this direction).
From Marxist to Post-Marxist Urban Sociology 195
incorporates the main issues which are to be found in their work (that is,
collective consumption, industrial location, urban planning, urban
social movements) but also includes a number of other issues (notably
property development and the spatial nature of final consumption)
which are not found in their writings but which are nevertheless an
integral part of the processes taking place within urban areas.
The three processes constitutive of an urban area will now be analysed
using the constrained-actor model. The methodological procedure in
each case will be to identify the various actors involved in each process,
the interests which they are pursuing, and the constraints which they
encounter in trying to achieve them. The analysis begins with an
investigation ofthe process of property development (sections 8.4 to 8.6)
followed by the process by which urban areas are used in production
(section 8.7) and in final consumption (section 8.8).
Finance capital
Construction companies
and allied trades
8.6.1 Introduction
Table 8.1 The constraints and conflicts generated in the process of private property development. Sources of constraint on actors
in the development process
Private Environmental
property State planning Other state and other
developer Landowner authority agencies groups Consumers
Private (1) Compe- (I) Refusal to (1) Restriction on (I) Price (I) Cause The level of
property tition keeps sell land supply ofland controls delay or effective
developer profits in (2) Collective (2) Cost of (2) Taxes on refusal of demand
check action by application profits planning
adjacent (3) Delays permission
landowners(4) Costly (2) Cause
and users conditions amenities
(5) Possible to be
refusal of preserved
permission or
improved
Actors in the Landowners (1) Develop- (I) Land (1) Refusal of (1) Taxation of(I) Prevail The leve1 of
development mentmay values may planning land upon effective
process reduce the be reduced permission to planning demand
value of by adjacent use land in the authority
adjacent uses ofland most to refuse
land and profitable way permission
property (2) 'Planning for the
blight' most
profitable
use
The state (I) Ifprivate (I) Compen- (l) Exclusionary (l) A lack of (I) Resistance (I) Actual and
planning land is sation to zoning and co-ordin- to planning anticipated
authority zoned for landowners fiscal policies ation decisions political
unprofit- (2) Collective can adversely between the which behaviour
able uses, action by affect other planning could cause of the
developers landowners jurisdictions authority harm to the electorate
are unlikely (2) Competition and other envlron- (e.g. voting,
to develop in attracting state ment protests,
it jobs agencies etc.)
IV
ow
204 An Alternative Approach
derives from the fact that the value of urban land and property depends,
not only upon the quality and maintenance of adjacent properties, but
also upon the use to which those adjacent properties are put, as well as
the status of their users. Thus, if there is prejudice against a particular
status group (for example, an ethnic minority), the presence of the latter
in a particular area can, ceteris paribus, have the effect of reducing the
value of adjacent land and property.
The third constraint comes from the state planning authority which
has the right and the power to determine the use to which a landowner
may put his land in an urban area. This effectively means that the state
may inhibit a landowner from using his land in the most profitable way
so that the latter suffers a loss as a result. Additionally the planning
authority may have long-term plans for an area (for example, road
proposals) which may cause land and property values in an area to fall as
soon as the plans become public knowledge. Moreover, they may
continue to fall even if the plans are subsequently withdrawn, as long as
any suspicion remains that the plans may be implemented. This
phenomenon is known as 'planning blight'.
Fourthly, the interest oflandowners may also be constrained by other
agencies of the state. This may take the form ofa central government tax
on land whose value appreciates as a result of planning or development.
In Britain the development land tax operated in this way until its
abolition in 1985 (although in a much weaker form than was originally
envisaged) (see Balchin and Kieve, 1982, pp. 135-8; Cullingworth,
1982, pp. 88-90,97-101).
Fifthly, environmental groups may constrain the interests oflandow-
ners by prevailing upon the planning authority to refuse permission to
landowners to develop their land in a profitable but environmentally
damaging way (for example, housing developments on scenic mountain-
sides).
Finally, the interests of landowners are affected by the level of
effective demand from consumers (that is, consumers of offices,
factories, houses, and so on) and hence by the same factors which affect
the private property developer.
Table 8.1 also reveals the different constraints which affect the interests
of the state planning authority. The first of these comes from the private
property developer and derives from the fact that developers are unlikely
to undertake a property development in an area if it is zoned for uses
206 An Alternative Approach
8.6.5 Summary
This analysis of the three main actors in the development process reveals
the mutually constraining effects which each has upon the other, as well
as the constraints imposed by other actors. Although it is not strictly a
Marxist analysis in the sense that the main actors are not classes, nor are
the actors related to each other as deterministically as in the Marxian
model, the analysis does emphasise the crucial role of conflict in the
property development process and the power of the various actors
involved in that process. In short, the analysis here provides a set of
concepts which can be readily operationalised, thereby overcoming the
disadvantages of some of the more abstract Marxian concepts.
It is now necessary to examine the second process which takes place in
urban areas, namely the process by which the urban area is used in the
production of commodities.
208 An Alternative Approach
8.7.1 Introduction
This area constitutes a labour market area and, over time, the number of
workers in that area can be increased or decreased by migration. 4
It is well established that the size of the labour market area tends to
vary between workers according to their skill, largely because of
differences in their migration behaviour, but also because of differences
in their commuting behaviour. In Britain, for example, the size of the
labour market area tends to be much smaller for unskilled manual
workers than for higher professional, administrative and managerial
workers. This is because the former have lower migration rates than the
latter (see Johnson, Salt and Wood, 1974, pp. 106-7; Evans and Russell,
1980, pp. 212-13; Salt, 1980, p.258). In addition, they also commute
over shorter distances (see Berthoud, 1980, pp.244-8). In short, the
labour market area for unskilled manual workers tends to be less than,
or equal to, the size of the urban area within which they live. By contrast,
the labour market area for professional, managerial and administrative
workers tends to be coterminous with the entire national (and, in some
cases, international) urban system.
It is necessary to explore in more detail the reasons for this difference
in the size of labour market areas by exploring how the interests of
different types of workers vary in relation to migration. 5 For brevity and
simplicity the analysis will be confined to two groups of workers at
opposite ends of the skill spectrum: the unskilled manual worker and the
professional administrative and managerial worker.
The low migration rates of unskilled (and some skilled) manual
workers arises essentially because their material interests are not likely
to be significantly improved by migration. This is so for a number of
reasons. First, because their job is unlikely to have a career structure so
that migration from one area to another would not materially improve
their position. Secondly, competition for jobs is probably greatest in the
unskilled category in all areas, so that migration from one area to
another would not confer any decisive advantage. Alternatively, in the
case of some skilled workers (for example, coal and steel workers) their
skills may be specific to a particular area. Thirdly, the worker may be
living in a local authority house and is likely to encounter great difficulty
in getting a replacement in another area (see Johnson, Salt and Wood,
1974, pp. 1-2; Berthoud, 1980, pp. 248-51; Hughes and McCormick,
1981) - although as Gleave and Palmer (1978) have shown, local
authority tenants display a higher rate of movement within local
authority areas than owner-occupiers, but a lower migration rate
between regions. These are some of the reasons why it may not be in the
material interests of unskilled manual workers in advanced capitalist
societies to migrate. In historical terms, this represents a reversal of the
210 An Alternative Approach
high migration rates of this group in the early stages of the industrial
revolution (Fielding, 1982, p. 28). The net effect of these factors is that
the labour market area of unskilled manual workers tends to be less than
or equal to the size of the urban area within which they live.
Professional, administrative and managerial workers generally have
relatively high migration rates in Britain and Western Europe. However,
as Fielding (1982, p. 28) points out, this was not always the case nor is it
currently the case in the United States (see Johnson, Salt and Wood,
1974, p. 106). The reason for this essentially is that their material
interests can be significantly improved by migration. This is because
migration may be associated with career advancement and salary
increases and the transaction costs of moving house from one area to
another are likely to be small relative to total earnings, particularly when
they are borne by the employer rather than the employee (see Salt, 1980,
pp. 258-60; Fielding, 1982, pp. 26-7). The net effect of these factors is
that professional, administrative and managerial workers have relative-
ly high migration rates with the consequence that their labour market
area tends to be coterminous with the national (and possibly also, the
international) urban system.6
It is now possible, on the basis of this review of the literature, to clarify
the nature of the relationship between an urban area and a labour
market area. This relationship can be conceptualised as a continuum. At
one end of the continuum, the labour market area is coterminous with a
part of the urban area or, in the case of smaller urban areas, with the
entire urban area so that all commuting occurs within that particular
area. This end of the continuum corresponds to the labour market area
of unskilled manual workers. At the other end of the continuum, the
labour market may be spread over a number of urban areas so that
commuting and migration occurs in various directions between each of
the urban areas. This end of the continuum corresponds to the labour
market area of professional, administrative and managerial workers. It
follows that the labour market areas of intermediate skilled workers will
fall between these two extremes, with the size of the labour market area
increasing directly with skill.
This conceptualisation of the relationship between urban areas and
labour market areas can also be reinforced, indirectly, by evidence on
the spatial distribution of unemployment in different skill groups in
Britain in the 1970s (see notably Cheshire, 1979, p.32; Evans and
Russell, 1980, pp. 212 -13; Corkingdale, 1980, p. 185; Richardson, 1980,
pp.214-17; Evans and Richardson, 1981, p.114; Elias and Keogh,
1982, p.11). The evidence shows that the rate of unemployment in
From Marxist to Post-Marxist Urban Sociology 211
The demand for labour by capitalists and the state in an urban area is the
outcome of their past and present decisions to locate there and to employ
the labour living there. In this subsection, the analysis will be confined to
the decisions of firms in order to show how they affect the demand for
labour in different areas.
In broad terms, the decisions of firms as they affect the demand for
labour in an area can be classified in the following way:
1. The decisions of existing firms in an area:
(a) to maintain existing levels of employment;
(b) to expand existing levels of employment through:
(b ' ) the creation of new jobs,
(b") the relocation of jobs from another area;
212 An Alternative Approach
1. the absolute job loss or gain (to the area and the economy) which
would be the outcome of decisions Ib', lc' and Id'; and
2. the locational job loss or gain (to the area but not to the economy)
which would be the outcome of decisions Ib', lc', Id', 2a and 2b.
The value of this approach has been clearly illustrated by the work of
Massey and Meegan (1978). In their study of the decline in manufactur-
ing employment (in the electrical, electronics and aerospace equipment
sectors) between 1966 and 1972 in the cities of London, Manchester,
Merseyside and Birmingham, they found that the majority of job losses
were absolute rather than locational and were due either to closures
(decision Id') or layoffs (decision lc'). This fact, coupled with the failure
of new manufacturing firms to locate in the inner areas of Britain's larger
conurbations (decision 2b), is one ofthe main reasons for the relatively
higher levels of unemployment among manual workers in the 1970s and
1980s in these areas. This result has been replicated by many other
studies of job losses in the manufacturing sector in Britain's major cities
in the period from the mid-1960s to 1980 (see Elias and Keogh, 1982,
pp. 2-7 for a review of the evidence).
The significance of this result is that the private sector demand for
labour in an area is the outcome of a number of different types of
decisions made by firms, each pursuing their interest. However, the
demand for labour in an area can be further understood by investigating
the characteristics of the firms making those decisions. Increasingly the
demand for all types oflabour in the private sector (both manufacturing
and services) is constituted by multiplant, multiproduct and, frequently
multinational firms. According to Healey (1982): 'in 1972 approximate-
From Marxist to Post-Marxist Urban Sociology 213
8.7.4 Summary
This section has attempted to analyse the way in which urban areas are
used in the production of commodities. This was done through the
analysis of the location decisions of firms and the migration and
commuting decisions of workers. These two sets of decisions were
analysed in terms of the concepts of a labour market and a labour
market area.
These decisions (together with those of the state, which were not
examined here) determine not only the amount and type of production
that takes place within a particular urban area; they are also the major
214 An Alternative Approach
8.8.1 Introduction
These rights confer complete or pure private ownership over a good (see
Alchian, 1965, p.819; Cheung, 1978, p.51; see also Demsetz, 1967;
216 An Alternative Approach
excluded from its consumption (see Dales, 1975, p.491; see also Sax,
1971).10 The most distinctive feature of communal consumption goods is
that they are distributed free of charge to those living within accessible
distance from them. It is for this reason that certain types of state
consumption goods (roads, footpaths, streets, parks, and so on) are, in
fact, if not in law, communal consumption goods.
Consumption goods can be either positive or negative according to
whether their consumption has a positive or negative effect upon the
consumer's well-being. Leaving aside those borderline cases where
consumption goods have both positive and negative effects (for
example, alcohol, tobacco, cars, and so on), it is possible to construct a
typology of consumption goods. This is done in Table 8.2.
It is now necessary to examine the spatial dimension of these various
consumption goods.
Effect (i.e.,
cost or
benefit) of
the
consumption
good
miles
Distance from the location
of the consumption good
Figure 8.2 The externality gradient of a negative communal consumption good
Externality field
Effect (i.e.,
cost or benefit)
of the consumption
good
o x x" miles
Distance from the location of the
consumption good
Figure 8.4 The externality gradient of a consumption good with both positive
and negative effects
Figure 8.5 The externality field of a consumption good with both positive and
negative effects
consumption good (1t X (ox'i). It follows from this that if the popula-
tion is evenly distributed in the area, then every unit increase in
the distance over which the consumption good has an effect will result in
a trebling of the area affected and hence a trebling of the number of
people affected by the externality.
Not all consumption goods are unequivocally positive or negative,
however; many have both positive and negative aspects (for example, an
airport, a motorway, a pub, and so on). This is illustrated in Figures 8.4
and 8.5.
220 An Alternative Approach
Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show the case (for example, an airport) where the
negative effects of the consumption good are greatest for those living
closest to its point oflocation (0) and thereafter decline to point x' after
which the effect becomes positive until point x", beyond which there is
no effect whatever.
It is now necessary to show, using this analysis, how the various
elements in the matrix of consumption goods are related and consumed
in the urban context.
8.8.5 Tenure Groups and Changes in the Site Value of Dwelling Units
Silence Protest
In the present context only reactions (l), (2) and (3) will be considered
since option (4) is more appropriate to cases such as political refugees.
The first reaction is resignation and acceptance of the negative
From Marxist to Post-Marxist Urban Sociology 225
consumption good. The second is for some (or all) of the residents to
migrate to another area in order to avoid the negative consumption
good. The third is for residents in the affected area to engage in collective
action to have the negative consumption good reduced or relocated.
Each of these three reactions will now be discussed respectively
(subsections 8.8.7 to 8.8.9).
8.8.7 Resignation
8.8.8 Migration
rented accommodation in other areas (see Cox, 1978, p.99; Cox and
Johnston, 1982, pp. 200-1).
Migration, however, does not have the effect of reducing Or relocating
a negative externality so that the remaining residents as well as the new
immigrant residents will be obliged to bear its full costs. This may still
happen even if they engage in collective action (see Dear and Long, 1978,
pp. 117 -18).
8.8.10 Summary
This chapter has outlined some new directions for Marxist urban
sociology. These directions were based upon the constrained-actor
model which, although not strictly Marxist, nevertheless retains the
Marxian emphasis upon the role of interest andiconflict inhumaminter-
action. The result is a more micro-level analysis than that contained in
the works of Castells and Lojkine, and one which overcomes some of the
difficulties found in their work.
The novelty of the contribution presented in this chapter lies in the
application of the constrained-actor model to the analysis of the three
processes constitutive of an urban area. The first of these is the process
by which urban areas are produced in a capitalist society and the
analysis of this involved a conceptual investigation of the logic of state
and private property development (sections 8.4 to 8.6). This investiga-
tion provided a broader framework of analysis than that found in
Castells and Lojkine where there is no explicit treatment of the process
of private property development and where the treatment of state
property development, via the concept of collective consumption, is far
from satisfactory (sections 6.2 and 7.2). Thus the analysis in those
230 An Alternative Approach
1969 4 1 3.34
1970 3 I 3.27
1971 7 I 3.42
1972 5 0 3.39
1973 5 0 3.41
1974 23 0 3.40
1975 42 I 3.61
1976 22 3 3.68
1977 31 8 3.66
1978 61 4 3.72
1979 80 II 3.90
1980 103 12 4.00
1981 97 12 4.28
1982 92 15 4.42
1983 110 28 3.94
1984 104 14 4.03
Source: Compiled from the Annual Social Science Citation Index for each year
between 1969 and 1984 (see Institute for Scientific Information, 1969-1984).
231
232 Notes
number of different places) but also because Castells's work has been widely
translated into English, Spanish, Portugese, Italian and Danish (see UNESCO
1974-1977). Lojkine's work has not been as widely translated. The second fact
is that there has been a fairly steady increase in interest in both authors,
particulary since the mid-1970s. The third fact is that the number of citations of
Castells's work, with the exception of 1970, has been consistently above the
average of other authors cited in the Social Science Citation Index, while the
number of citations of Lojkine's work has also been above average since 1977.
The writings of both authors are listed in the Bibliography below.
labour which is required to produce one unit of the net output of that
commodity. Morishima remarks that: 'At first sight these may look like
identical definitions, and Marx actually regarded them as synonymous. They
are, however, found to be different views of value, their equivalence being
established only if rigorous proof is provided' (ibid., p. 11). The distinction
between these two definitions will not be pursued here: it will be assumed,
following the convention in these matters, that the first definition is the
correct (if not the only) definition.
5. Marx's assumption about money is, evidently, no longer correct. Money is no
longer a produced commodity (like gold) whose value/price is determined by
its value/price of production. Money now takes the form of pieces of paper
and plastic whose worth is fixed by convention. Marx's assumption that all
money is gold adds an additional complexity to his analysis in the sense that
the money value or money price of a commodity can change, not only as a
result of changes in the production of that commodity but also as a result of
changes in the production of gold.
6. It is sometimes argued that the dualism between values and surplus value on
the one hand, and prices and profit on the other, corresponds not only to two
levels of reality but also to two different historical eras (see, for example,
Meek, 1956, 1976b;Sherman, 1970,p. 278; Marx, 1974c,p.177;Engels, 1974,
pp. 895ft). The argument here is that in the preceding historical era of simple
commodity production commodities were exchanged at their values, whereas
in the contemporary era of capitalist commodity production, commodities
exchange, not in terms of their values, but in terms of prices. Thus, the
argument goes, values are not only theoretically and onto logically prior to
prices, but also historically prior.
Morishima and Catephores (1975; 1976) provide a simple refutation of this
argument by showing that the historical era of simple commodity production
could never have existed. They point out that simple commodity production
involves a society of independent producers who are independent in three
senses: first, there is no ex-ante co-ordination; second, each has individual
ownership over his/her own means of production and third, there is mobility
of producers among jobs. By applying this definition to the historical
evidence they conclude that: 'Simple commodity production has never been
realised in history in its full or pure form, or even in a tolerably approximate
form, because of the lack of mobility of producers among jobs in the pre-
capitalist age' (ibid., p. 315).
7. There is some disagreement over the question of Marx's mathematical
ability. Engels's (1959) view was that Marx was 'well versed in mathematics'
(ibid., p. 19) while Bortkiewicz (1952) refers to the 'scantiness' (ibid., p. 55) of
Marx's knowledge of mathematics. Morishima's (1974a) judgement is
perhaps the most balanced in pointing out that while Capital is not explicitly
mathematical, many passages can be translated into rigorous mathematical
language and that, 'mathematical problems, even new mathematical
problems are concealed in his economics' (ibid., p.6l2).
8. Those who attempt to defend Marx's labour theory of value by separating the
issue of prices from the issue of profit have acquired the label 'fundamental-
234 Notes
ist' in contrast to the label 'neoRicardian' which has been reserved for those
who reject the labour theory of value and adopt the Sraffa approach (see Fine
and Harris, 1976, p. 144). However, the neoRicardian label is misleading
since Sraffa's work demolishes the labour theory of value, held by both Marx
and Ricardo, which claims that prices and profit are regulated exclusively by
the quantities oflabour embodied in commodities (see Hodgson, 1976, p. 20;
1977b, pp.90-92; Roncaglia, 1978, pp. xvi-xix, 131-47; Bhaduri and
Robinson, 1980, p. 104)
9. It should be noted that not all of the arguments relevant to this debate have
been considered here. Possibly the most important argument relates to the
effect of joint production (that is, pure joint production and fixed capital)
upon the transformation of values into prices and surplus value. Steedman
has shown that, when there is joint production, it is possible to have a
capitalist economy where there is, simultaneously, positive profits and
negative surplus value and vice versa (see Hodgson and Steedman, 1975;
Steedman, 1975b and 1977, Chapter 10; however, see also Morishima, 1976
and Steedman, 1976). This is a highly anomalous result and proves that the
labour theory of value breaks down in the case of joint production. Similarly
the existence of a choice of techniques seriously undermines the primacy of
the labour theory of value. This is because the value of a commodity can only
be calculated once the technique of production is known. However, when
there is a choice of techniques, the technique that is actually used will be
determined by capitalists based upon current prices and profit rates. In other
words, prices and the rate of profit must be known before values can be
calculated. In this case, therefore, prices and profit are prior to values rather
than the reverse (see Steedman, 1977, pp. 64-5; Elster, 1985, p. 136).
1. Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972) measured profits (including interest but less stock
appreciation and depreciation) arising from production in the company
sector in the UK. They found that the before-tax share of profits in net
output fell from 25.2 per cent in 1950 to 12.1 per cent in 1970 (ibid., Table
3.2, p. 58), while the before-tax rate of profit fell from 16.5 per cent in 1950
to 9.7 percent in 1970 (ibid., Table 3.3, p. 66). The after-tax rate of profit fell
from 6.7 per cent in 1950 to 4.1 per cent in 1970 (ibid.), Glyn and Sutcliffe
offer the following explanation: 'the decline in the share of profits and the
rate of profit in the U.K. has resulted from the combination of international
competition and wage pressure' (ibid., p. 70).
2. Boddy and Crotty (1975) based their research on a study of the St Louis
Federal Reserve Bank which showed that, in the various expansionary
periods between 1947 and 1972, wages managed to squeeze profits in the
non-financial corporate sector resulting in 'a pronounced decline in the ratio
of profits to wages' (ibid., p. 5). During this period, the percentage ratio of
before-tax net profits (that is, profits less depreciation and net interest) to
gross product fell from 19.4 per cent to 10.6 per cent (ibid.).
Notes 235
12 c
11
10
9
B
8 Population
is
>:
e 7
....0""
6
~
~ 5
Resources
4
2 3 4 5
Years
1. It is for this reason that Sraffa classifies land as a 'non-basic' (Sraffa, 1960,
p. 74). His justification is that since different plots of land are 'employed in
production, but not themselves produced they are the converse of com-
modities which, although produced, are not used in production. They are, in
fact, already included under the wider definition of non-basics' (ibid.). This
implies that land does not affect the rate of profit which seems to be in
contradiction with the fact that if production of a basic commodity is
extended to land of inferior quality then, ceteris paribus, it will cause a
decline in the rate of profit (see section 3.1). There is, however, no
contradiction since Sraffa's distinction between basic and non-basic
commodities applies to commodities being produced at a given point in time
and under given technical and social conditions of production (land being
one such given condition). Once these given conditions change (as occurs,
for example, when production is extended to inferior land), then the
relationships between wages, prices and profits, postulated by Sraffa, also
change (see Roncaglia, 1978, Chapter 3, especially p. 61).
2. It is possible to construct a typology of land according to its quantity and
quality from which it is possible to deduce the type of situations where rent
will arise if that land is owned by landowners and leased to capitalists for the
production of commodities (see Table N2).
Quantity of land
Scarce Plentiful
Quality of Variable (1) Rent (2) Rent
land Invariable (3) Rent (4) No rent
Notes 239
It can be seen from this typology that rent will arise in all cases irrespective of
the variability in quality «(I) and (3)) and will also arise, even when land is
plentiful (2), as long as there are not unlimited quantities of one particular
type ofland. The only case where no rent will arise is where land is invariable
in quality and plentiful in quantity (4). The typical situation in capitalist
societies is where land is scarce and variable in quality (I), or plentiful but
variable in quality with the supply of each type ofland being limited (2). The
correctness of this typology and its implications will become apparent as the
analysis of rent unfolds in the subsequent sections (3.1 to 3.4).
3. The terms input, output, net input and net output refer throughout to a
quantity of goods 'calculated at the ruling levels of the rate of profits, wages
and prices' (Sraffa, 1960, p. 75).
4. It should be noted that the fertility of any plot of land in a capitalist society
can only be known after it has been used in the production of commodities
and, consequently, its profitability has been established. Thus fertility, far
from being an invariable and inherent property of the land, as Ricardo and
Marx believed, is crucially dependent upon the prevailing profit (and wage)
rates in each capitalist economy (see Sraffa, 1960, p.75; Montani, 1975,
pp. 71-9; Kurz, 1978, pp. 20- 23).
5. In a capitalist system, the scarcity ofland, and hence of corn, could arise in a
situation of simple reproduction (that is, a zero rate of economic growth) if
workers gained an increase in real wages (assuming corn to be the only wage
good) or in a situation of extended reproduction (that is, a positive rate of
economic growth) if further expansion was curtailed because of the scarcity
of corn. Thus, a basic precondition of differential rent I (and, indeed of all
rent) is that land is scarce (see Sraffa, 1960, p. 76) or, more precisely, that
land is perfectly inelastic in supply (see Keiper et al., 1961, pp. 108-10).
6. If the first option is adopted the consequences which follow will depend
upon whether the efficiency of the new technology (as measured by the
output per unit of input) is greater than, less than, or the same as the old
technology. If the new technology is more efficient than the old and if wages
are constant, then the consequence will be a high rate of profit. The effect of
this, in turn, will be that competition between capitalists will reduce the rate
of profit to its level before the technological innovation and the owner ofthe
land will receive a rent. If the new technology is of the same efficiency, then
there will be no change. In other words, the rate of profit will remain the
same and no rent will be paid. If the new technology is less efficient then it
will not be adopted.
7. There are two alternatives to this assumption. The first is that the
commodity being produced is a basic but the wage is variable (both upwards
and downwards) depending on workers' power. If, for example, it is
assumed that workers' are powerless, then the effect of extending produc-
tion from type (i) to type (ii) land will be an increase in the unit price of
production of the commodity leading to a corresponding reduction in real
wages (since the commodity is a basic). This will lead, in turn, to a higher
rate of profit for the capitalist(s) producing on type (i) rather than on type
240 Notes
(ii) land. This will lead, in tum, through competition, to the emergence of
differential rent I on type (i) land since the capitalist(s) producing on type (ii)
land would be willing to pay a rent for the least of type (i) land up to the
point where the rate of profit was the same on both plots. In this case
differential rent I would arise without any reduction in the overall rate of
profit.
The second possible assumption is that the commodity is a non-basic and,
in this case, the effect will be to increase the price of production of the
commodity (because of the higher unit costs of producing on type (ii) land),
thereby giving rise to a higher rate of profit for those capitalists producing
on type (i) land. However, this higher rate of profit will be reduced to that
attainable on type (ii) land since the capitalists producing on type (ii) land
would be willing to pay a rent for the lease of type (i) land up to the point
where the rate of profit on both types of land was the same. In this way
differential rent I emerges on type (i) land, although the rate of profit
throughout the economy will not be affected.
8. The fact that differential rent I arises independently of the existence of the
actual ownership of land (whether the owners be the state, landowners or
capitalists) means that it will exist in any system of production where land is
scarce and where there is more than one technique of production (due either
to the variable quality of the land or to the different combinations of inputs
invested in it). The fundamental difference between differential rent I in a
capitalist economy, and in a centrally planned economy, stems from the way
in which the prices of commodities are determined in these two economies: a
centrally planned economy would not include profit in the capitalist sense
and this would evidently affect prices as well as the size and calculation of
differential rent I. A centrally planned economy could not abolish
differential rent I without also abolishing a price system where each
commodity has a single and uniform price throughout the economy.
One implication of this is that differential rent I is perfectly consistent
with the capitalist economy in the sense that it does not hinder the process of
capital accumulation. Ball argues otherwise, claiming that if capitalists
(notably farmers) owned land rather than leasing it from landowners, that
this would lead to more investment in land and hence to more capital
accumulation. He uses two arguments to support this contention. The first
is that if farmers owned their own land then 'the drive for accumulation by
capitalist farmers would result in additional capital being invested in each
soil type until prices of production had been equalized across all lands under
cultivation' (Ball, 1977, p. 390). This argument implies that those capitalist
farmers who appropriate differential rent I (that is, surplus profits) will
continue to invest until this surplus disappears. No rational calculating
capitalist would undertake such a course of action and there are no
competitive forces obliging him/iher to do so.
Bail's second argument is that when a tenant farmer (as distinct from the
capitalist farmer) pays a differential rent I to a landowner he/she is hindered
from making any additional investment since 'there is no reason why the
landlord should acquiesce to a loss of rent which must ensue if the farmer
were to increase output by additional investment of capital at the expense of
rent' (ibid., p.391). This assertion is dubious for three reasons. First,
Notes 241
12. Marx also believed that this inhibited investment in agriculture although as
Gibson and Esfahani (1983) point out, this depends upon the savings and
investment behaviour of landlords. They write: 'if landlords have the same
savings behaviour as capitalists, it is not at all clear how total investment is
supposed to diminish. If, on the other hand, landlords consume more of
their total income, which historically does seem to have been the case,
investment will fall' (ibid., p.95).
1. The use of the terms 'Definition I' and 'Definition II' to distinguish between
the two different ways in which Marx used this distinction, does not imply
any chronological sequence in his usage nor does it imply that he was even
aware of these different usages.
2. Ibid.
3. Marx uses the terms productive and unproductive in the 'capitalist sense'
(Marx, 1969, p.153). In other words, they are categorisations of labour
from the point of view of capitalist production. He distinguishes this from
the 'absolute sense' (ibid.; ibid., p. 393) of the terms which treats labour as
productive (or unproductive) if it produces (or fails to produce) a use-value.
4. The distinctive feature of the capitalist sector (in contrast to the non-
capitalist sector) is that surplus labour is accumulated as capital (rather than
in some other form). This is clearly revealed by Marx's example of the self-
employed tailor working for a client. He writes
It may be that the quantity of labour performed by the jobbing tailor is
greater than that contained in the price he gets from me . . . This,
however, is all the same as far as I am concerned ... it is in no way a
means to any enrichment, any more than any other way for spending
money for personal consumption is a means of enrichment to me (Marx,
1969, p.402).
In other words, for labour to be productive, it must not only produce
surplus value, but in addition this surplus value must be accumulated by the
capitalist. Marx's argument, it will be apparent, assumes that the self-
employed tailor does not accumulate his own surplus labour as capital. In
this case his labour is unproductive according to 'Definition 1'.
5. By definition, wages can never function as capital since they are wholly
consumed to meet the subsistence requirements of the workers.
6. Marx points out that there are two 'contradictory definitions' of productive
labour in Adam Smith (Marx, 1969, p. 156; see also Dobb, 1973, p. 61). On
the other hand there is the 'correct' definition where Smith defines as
productive all labour which 'produces surplus value for the capitalist'
(Marx, 1969, p. 152). Marx regarded this definition of productive labour as
one of Smith's 'greatest scientific merits' (ibid., p. 157). On the other hand,
there is Smith's 'wrong conception of productive labour' (ibid., p.155)
Notes 243
1. It is controversial on two grounds. The first is that the precise nature and
extent of the continuities and discontinuities between Marx, Hegel and the
classicals, upon which Althusser bases his proof that Marxism is scientific, is
a matter of some controversy between Marxists. In other words, Althusser's
'proof' that Marxism is scientific rests upon a particular interpretation of
Marx which is not shared by all Marxists. The second controversy is that a
theory which serves certain ideological functions may not necessarily be
unscientific, contrary to the AIthusserian view. The distinction between
scientific and non-scientific theories depends ultimately upon the decisions of
scientists, rather than upon the ideological effects of those theories.
2. Others, however, have been less impressed. Elliot (1980, p. 153) has described
it as 'a pretentious and ... a profoundly irritating book', while Glass (1977,
p. 669) has described it as 'a load of humbug'.
3. It should perhaps be emphasised that Castells does not explicitly state that
collective consumption is unprofitable because it requires a high (that is,
higher than average) organic composition of capital. However, this would
seem to be implicit in his argument.
4. All of this assumes that facts matter, yet this is an assumption which may not
be applicable to Castells's discussion of the law ofthe falling rate of profit. He
writes: 'That we are not able to find a long-term secular trend for the organic
composition to increase and the rate of profit to decrease does not contradict
the theory; an intrinsic part of the theory is that reality is the result of
conflicting forces' (Castells, 1980a, p.40).
5. In his original characterisation of the urban system (Castells, 1976b, p. 79;
1976c, p. 154), Castells refers to four elements (P, C, E, A) only. The element
(S) is only included in a later publication (Castells, 1977a, p. 238).
6. In a footnote to his elaboration of the concept of 'urban actors' Castells
claims to reject 'the formalism of universal taxonomies' (Castells, 1969a,
p. 442, fn43) and emphasises the need for 'theoretical relevant variables'
(ibid.) Such evident inconsistency between Castells's claims and his actual
achievements suggests the contemporary relevance of Locke's observation
which seems to apply aptly to all of Castelis's work: 'Vague and insignificant
forms of speech, and abuse oflanguage, have so long passed for mysteries of
science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by
prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of
speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or
those who hear them that they are but the covers of ignorance, and
hinderance to true knowledge' (Locke, 1., 1964, p.58).
7. The title of this article is: 'Theoretical Propositions for an Experimental
Study of Urban Social Movements' (Castells, 1976c). Castells's justification
for using the term 'experimental' is that he assumes 'as constant all elements
not included in a particular analysis' (ibid., p. 172). However, an analysis can
only be experimental if certain variables are controlled and they can only be
Notes 247
l. Lojkine is here implicitly (Lojkine, 1977a, p. 124) and later explicitly (ibid.,
pp. 14S-6) critical of the way in which Castells defines an urban area in terms
of collective consumption, thus limiting it to only one of the general
conditions of production (see section 3.2.2). Lojkine rejects this definition as
'one of the dominant themes of bourgeois ideology' (Lojkine, 1977a, p. 124).
2. Lojkine actually contradicts this claim in one place when he describes the
growth in investment in property (particularly urban property) by monopol-
istic companies as 'an important instrument for warding off, the fall in the
rate of profit in the industrial sectors' (Lojkine, 1977a, p. 287; see also p. 282).
This statement clearly contradicts claim (b) above.
3. The acronym PADOG is an abbreviation of Plan d'amenagement et
d'organisation generale. It was, in 1960, the plan for the organisation and
development of the Paris region whose notable feature was a policy
(ultimately unsuccessful) to contain the growth of Paris.
4. The acronym SDAU is an abbreviation of Schema directeur d'amenagement
et d'urbanisme. It became, in 1965, the successor to PADOG (1960) and was
itself, in tum, revised in 1969 in the light of the 1968 census, as well as in the
light of the notable political events of that year. The most characteristic
feature of SDAU (l96S) was the creation of eight new towns in the Paris
region.
S. The acronym ZEAT is an abbreviation of Zone d'erudes et d'amenagement du
territoire. There are eight such zones in France which were devised under the
Sth National Plan (l971-S) by the Commissariat au Plan for planning
purposes in the context of both France and the EEC.
6. The Commissariat au Plan is a technical body whose function it is to prepare
long and medium-term plans for the central government. It has, to date,
prepared seven national plans.
7. The acronym DAT AR is an abbreviation of Delegation a {'amenagement du
territoire et a {'action regionale. It was set up in 1963 for the purpose of co-
ordinating area and regional plans. Although it is attached to the Ministry of
the Interior, it has no direct powers.
8. This is not the only weakness which has been identified in Lojkine's study of
Paris. Pickvance (l977a, pp.238-4S) has shown, in a painstaking and
thorough critique, that Lojkine's study is also rather weak in its analysis of
the precise relationship between social classes and state policies. The critique
presented here, by contrast, is primarily interested in identifying the extent to
which the theoretical themes developed in Lojkine's urban sociology are also
pursued in his empirical research.
248 Notes
I. The term actor is applied to groups and organisations in the Weberian sense
that the latter are 'the resultants of the particular acts of individual persons'
(Weber, 1968, p. 13). Weber adds: 'When reference is made in a sociological
context to a state, a nation, a corporation, a family, or an army corps, or to
similar collectivities what is meant is ... a certain kind of development of
actual or possible social actions of individual persons' (ibid., p. 14).
2. Buildings and infrastructures are also found in rural areas so that the
essential difference between rural and urban areas seems to lie in the degree
of concentration of property (and hence in the level of spatial interdepen-
dence) rather than in the kind of property per se.
3. The other effect of restricting the supply of suitable land is that it increases
the price ofland and property and hence harms the interests of those wishing
to buy property while benefiting those who already own it. In Marxian
terms, this means that owners of land can appropriate monopoly rent I (in
addition to differential rent I) as a result of zoning restrictions (see sections
3.3 and 3.5).
4. This apparently straightforward definition of a labour market area is
extremely difficult to apply empirically because, as will be illustrated in
more detail below, there are a number of different labour market areas for
each of the different skill types oflabour and the boundaries of each of these
labour market areas tend to be imprecise and overlapping. British research
(see notably Hall et at., 1973; Johnson, Salt and Wood, 1974) has tried to
overcome these difficulties by simply defining labour market areas in terms
of the major commuting patterns within an urban area and have avoided the
problem of imprecise and overlapping boundaries by adopting arbitrary (if
reasonable) statistical conventions.
5. It is perhaps worth emphasising that household movement does not
necessarily involve a change of job (that is, labour migration). In other
words, labour migration is only a subset - and in Britain, possibly only a
relatively small subset (see Johnson, Salt and Wood, 1974, pp.5-6, 69,
113-14) - of total movement. Clark and Onaka (1983, p. 50) in a review of
18 different studies of migration in the US, UK, Canada, and New Zealand,
put forward the following classification of reasons for migration:
6. The correctness of this analysis can also be confirmed, somewhat more
casually, by a perusal of the job advertisements in different newspapers. Job
advertisements for highly skilled, non-manual workers such as professionals
and managers tend to be advertised in national newspapers, while
advertisements for unskilled manual workers are normally only to be found
(if at all) in local newspapers (see Johnson, Salt and Wood, 1974, p.34;
Evans and Russell, 1980, p. 213; Evans and Richardson, 1981, p. 113). This
confirms, from the demand side, that the size of the area in which employers
look for labour varies considerably with the level of skill of the labour being
demanded.
Notes 249
MOVE
/~
Forced Voluntary
Housing
~
ADJUSTMENT
"'- INDUCED
Employment
Space Job change
Quality/design Retirement
Cost
Tenure change
A useful survey of recent research on migration (that is, research since 1975)
is contained in Clark (1982).
Excludable Non-excludable
II. There is a large number of synonyms used for the term 'externality', such as:
spillover effect, external effect, uncontracted effect, neighbourhood effect
and third party effect. It is usually defined in the following way: 'The essence
of externalities, whether in production or consumption, is that their costs or
benefits are not reflected in market prices, and so the decision of the
consumer or firm creating the externalities ... generally does not take its
effect into account' (Bannock, Baxter and Rees, 1972, p. 159). The concept
of externality does not appear in Marx's work. It first appeared in 1890
(seven years after Marx's death) in Alfred Marshall's Principles of
Notes 251
England between 1965 and 1972. The Tiebout model (Tiebout, 1956) was
the first attempt at explaining this type of migration within a neoclassical
economic framework.
16. The usual example of this is the movement of non-whites into a white
neighbourhood where the latter are prejudiced against the former. This
frequently leads to a temporary fall in house prices, during the period of
racial transition, followed by a rapid increase in price due to the
concentration of non-white demand in those particular areas. It is this, inter
alia, which probably explains why 'most researchers have concluded
that blacks do pay more than whites for housing of comparable size and
quality .. .' (Kain and Quigley, 1975, pp. 63-5ff; see also Wilkinson and
Gulliver, 1971, p.33).
17. A recent survey in Norman, Oklahoma, on attitudes to the location of
mental health facilities found that owner-occupiers were more opposed than
tenants to the location of such facilities in their area because of'the potential
impact of the facility on real estate values and resale possibilities' (Smith and
Hanham, 1981, p. 153). This difference in attitude would, ceteris paribus,
make owner-occupiers more likely than tenants to engage in collective
action.
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Bibliography 261
274
Author Index 275
277
278 Subject Index