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Neal Shover & Andrew Hochstetler - Choosing White Collar Crimes
Neal Shover & Andrew Hochstetler - Choosing White Collar Crimes
For more than three decades, rational-choice theory has reigned as the
dominant approach both for interpreting crime and as underpinning for
crime-control programs. Although it has been applied to an array of street
crimes, white-collar crime and those who commit it have thus far received
less attention. Choosing White-Collar Crime is a systematic application of
rational-choice theory to problems of explaining and controlling white-
collar crime. It distinguishes ordinary and upperworld white-collar crime
and presents reasons for believing that both have increased substantially
in recent decades. Reasons for the increase include the growing supply
of white-collar lure and noncredible oversight. Choosing White-Collar Crime
also examines the generative world of white-collar criminals, their decision
making, and their criminal careers. The book concludes with reasons for
believing that problems of white-collar crime will continue unchecked in
the increasingly global economy and calls for strengthened citizen move-
ments to rein in the increases.
Edited by
Alfred Blumstein, H. John Heinz School of Public Policy and Management,
Carnegie Mellon University, and David Farrington, Institute of Criminology,
University of Cambridge
Neal Shover
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Andy Hochstetler
Iowa State University
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
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Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s
for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
For Riley Marie Shover
n.s.
a.h.
Contents
1 White-Collar Crime 1
2 Lure 27
References 175
Index 205
ix
List of Figures and Tables
figures
tables
xi
Preface
xiii
xiv preface
xvii
xviii acknowledgments
White-Collar Crime
1
2 choosing white-collar crime
The call for tough action has been extended to the problem of curbing
white-collar crime also:
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
CRIMINALS OR CRIMES ?
As with all forms of white-collar crime, many crimes of fraud are not
serious, but others are enormously harmful to countless victims. There
is surprisingly little systematic knowledge of those who commit it, but
an increasing proportion of fraud is committed apparently by per-
sons for whom it is a significant part of their income (e.g., Weisburd,
Waring, and Chayet, 2001; Jackson, 1994; Shover, Coffey, and Sanders,
2004).
The rough days of labor by blue-collar [men and women] are writ-
ten in the MRIs, CAT scans, and X rays they’re forced to sit still for
in pain-filled retirement – like models posing for the medical arts.
Their wrecked insides tell the stories of bricks and blocks lifted, holes
dug, and punishment absorbed. If your rough hands and stooped
walk don’t give you away, your ruined bones and tissue surely will.
(Lubrano, 2004:115)
confident their conduct and the reasons for it can be grasped ade-
quately only through sophisticated and arcane interpretation beyond
the capability of lay persons and prosecutors.
Privilege and respectability are not dichotomous variables, and it
would be foolish to pretend they are. The members of any population –
this is true particularly of large and demographically heterogeneous
nation-states – can be arrayed on a continuum from the poorest and
least reputable to the wealthiest and most respectable citizens. The
expanse is extremely wide, encompassing minority single mothers
with annual incomes of less than $10,000, attorneys, medical doc-
tors with well-stocked investment accounts, and presidents of Fortune
500 corporations whose annual “compensation package” may exceed
$100 million. The demographic characteristics and crimes of white-
collar criminals, particularly when crime-based definitions are used,
present an equally expansive range of backgrounds, occupations, and
incomes. The challenge for explanations of white-collar crime is to
account for variation in diverse offenders and offenses. Supporters of
rational choice theory believe it does so.
Davis Pipe
Evans Creek traverses Sullivan County, Tennessee, and eventually dis-
charges into the Holston River, the principal source of drinking water
for Kingsport, Tennessee. Davis Pipe, an industrial plating firm, is
located on the banks of Evans Creek. The company manufactures
and fabricates stainless steel, alloy pipes, and fittings, but these pro-
cesses generate “spent pickle liquor” (SPL), a hazardous waste that
contains lead, nickel, chromium, and acids. Environmental law and
regulations require that SPL be stored in holding tanks and disposed
of properly. Davis Pipe used another method: it periodically pumped
the toxic waste directly into Evans Creek. When large fish kills resulted,
a concerned employee of the company notified the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Tennessee Department of Environment
white-collar crime 15
the most callous disregard for safety and health, particularly since
locked fire exits are so fundamentally contrary to basic common sense
safety principles. . . . [Y]ou don’t need to lock a door from the outside
to maintain security. For a few dollars cost, an inside push bar lock
would have provided security and safety. For a few dollars cost. We all
went through fire drills in our elementary and high schools. Everyone
in this room is aware that you don’t block egress through fire exits.
(U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 1991a:139)
Along with the rise of consulting came a new focus on the bottom line.
Accountants hired to audit a company’s books were also expected
to help persuade their clients to use the firm’s consultants as well.
By the 1990s, there were few firms willing to quit an account on
principle. . . . [T]here was simply too much money at stake. Not sur-
prisingly, accounting standards eroded, and accounting fraud mush-
roomed. . . . The pressure to generate fees was intense, and so was the
pressure to hold on to clients. (McLean and Elkind, 2004:144–45)
catastrophic fall for a firm that once was a trusted member of the “Big
Five” accounting firms with offices throughout the world.
that he was innocent and had refused to “plead guilty to things I did
not do” (Memphis Flyer, 1998:3).
former. They also shed revealing light on the nature of oversight and
media coverage of white-collar crime.
There is much about David Lanier and his conduct that is found
repeatedly among white-collar criminals. What is striking particularly
is the brazenness of his crimes – he assaulted victims in his judicial
office – and the arrogance of his taken-for-granted belief that he would
never be called to account. Like many white-collar criminals, Lanier
was able to commit crime over an extended period of time before
knowledge of it came to official attention. His refusal to acknowledge
guilt is characteristic of white-collar criminals.
The criminal actions of managers at Davis Pipe show how uncon-
cerned they were by oversight. They used notification of an impending
state inspection as cue to speed up their toxic dumping. Employees did
as they were told, which overrode any reluctance they may have had.
Company managers must have operated under the assumption that
employees would not turn in their bosses or notify authorities. No one
imagined that of FBI investigators, water testers and other technicians
would be ready or mobilized.
The catastrophe at Imperial Food Products and the attention it
received brought to light a travesty of self-regulation and regulatory
oversight by the state. Records maintained by North Carolina’s occu-
pational safety and health regulatory agency showed that although
chicken processing is a high-hazard industry, the plant had not been
inspected in eleven years (Aulette and Michalowski, 1993). The Impe-
rial Food Products case also reveals much about the larger political-
economic context of the tragedy. Other investigators (Wright, Cullen,
and Blankenship, 1995) used it to examine media reporting on white-
collar crimes. Their research shows that newspaper reporting changed
over the months between occurrence of the fire and eventual dispo-
sition of the criminal charges. Initially it was interpreted as a regula-
tory failure, and only later was it labeled and reported as crime. By
that time, however, reports had been reduced in size significantly and
appeared in obscure locations in newspapers. Shirley Harwood and
Dennis Sullivan were not sophisticated money launderers, but their
criminal actions required investigators to expend considerable time
and resources. Their motives are not unusual, and the conclusion to
their case was predictable.
24 choosing white-collar crime
that led to its downfall were between some of the most powerful
companies in the world, and charges were brought against execu-
tives at the highest levels. The crimes resulted from long-standing
practices.
The Imperial Food Products deaths, the Davis Pipe dumping, and
the crimes of David Lanier are more difficult to categorize. All rep-
resent abuse of power, but probably none of the defendants could
reasonably be called “upperworld.” Many people possess the status
it would take to commit similar crimes. Sexual harassment occurs in
many offices, and extortion or abuse by supervisors probably is not
uncommon. Chaining building exits shows blatant disregard for the
law, but serious violations of workplace safety standards occur routinely
in places where work is dangerous and oversight remote.
Using commonsense understandings of organizational size, neither
Davis Pipe nor Imperial Food Products had significant resources but
neither was a large or powerful company. When crime was discovered,
individuals central to criminal decision making were identified easily
onsite. They were not in New York, London, or Tokyo, they could
not plausibly deny participation, and the details of their criminal acts
could be understood readily by a jury of ordinary citizens. Upperworld
crime is complex by contrast, and it typically permits pretense of moral
cleanliness and physical distance from victims.
The crimes of David Lanier and Apple Tree Mortgage are ordinary
in their simplicity. The crimes of Arthur Andersen LLP illustrate some
of the difficulties of identifying and prosecuting culpable individuals
in high positions in large organizations. Prosecutors must consider
the economic fallout that could result from bringing charges against
a major corporation. The enemies they will make also merit consid-
eration. The Andersen case shows how resolute officials can be when
economic markets and investor confidence are harmed by criminal
acts.
Upperworld crime is the research focus for many who investigate
crimes of privilege, but the perpetrators of ordinary white-collar crime
by contrast include many middle class citizens. They make up a “broad
band of offending above the floor of crime usually associated with
street crime with its base in an underclass, yet below, in some sense,
the quintessential white-collar crime and criminals that usually receive
26 choosing white-collar crime
Lure
27
28 choosing white-collar crime
TRENDS
In the century that has passed since Ross (1907) described how grow-
ing social and economic interdependence permits exploitation of
lure 29
State Largesse
The decades following World War II saw the emergence or the expan-
sion of state policies and corporate practices with enormous signif-
icance for white-collar crime. These include a fundamental shift in
the states’s public welfare functions, which had the effect of expand-
ing programs and subsidies for citizens across the income spectrum.
In constant dollars, the federal outlay for entitlement programs of
all kinds increased more than 1,900 percent between 1945 and 1995
(from $75 billion to $1.5 trillion) (U.S. Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare, 1959; Social Security Administration, 1999). As
a result, by 1992, 51.7 percent of American families received some
form of federal payments. Their benefits range from social security,
Medicare, and military retirement benefits to agricultural subsidies
and student loans (Samuelson, 1995). In 2002 alone, U.S. corpora-
tions received $125 billion in government subsidies (Citizen’s for Tax
Justice, 2003).
Federal health care initiatives have given pharmaceutical firms, hos-
pitals, and doctors access to large sums of federal money. To the
surprise of few, Medicare has been designated a high-risk program
for fraud and abuse (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000). Testi-
mony before a Senate subcommittee in 1976 suggested that the sys-
tem was “so bad that it virtually invites” crime (U.S. Congress, Senate,
1976:81). Of the $164 billion in Medicare fee-for-service payments
in 1999, an estimated $13.4 billion was paid improperly for reasons
ranging from inadvertent errors to fraud and abuse (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2000). In addition to physician fraud, much of the
money is lost to fraud by health care facilities and nursing homes that
30 choosing white-collar crime
bill for services they do not provide. The schemes show endless vari-
ety. Revco Pharmacies, for example, was caught by the state of Ohio
doctoring and resubmitting claims that previously were rejected. The
firm hired personnel to assign new identification numbers to them,
and the scheme came to light only after state employees discovered
nonsequential and improbable numbers in claims submitted for reim-
bursement (Vaughan, 1983).
There is lure in the city and countryside alike. The Federal Crop
Insurance Program (FCIP) is a major source of risk protection for
farmers. It provides financial protection against crop losses from
drought, flood, and other natural disasters. Corporate farmers and
hobbyists are eligible for a variety of risk protection programs and
subsidies. FCIP also protects insured farmers against both inability
to plant and excessive loss of crop quality due to weather or other
circumstances. In most cases, insurance covers loss of yield exceed-
ing a deductible amount, but newer FCIP products also cover loss in
yield value due to falling market prices during the insurance period.
The crop insurance program is administered by private insurance
companies that compensate insured farmers for losses during the
crop year. Federal agencies set the terms, conditions, and costs of the
insurance and subsidize the program by reinsuring participating com-
panies. Taxpayers subsidize about half of producers’ insurance pre-
miums. The FCIP provided about $37 billion in protection and
$2.8 billion in subsidies in 2001 (Wall Street Journal, 2003). From 1995
to 2002, the median payment for all farms was approximately $1,000
per year, but 1,290 farm operations each received in excess of $1 mil-
lion. Seventy-one percent of subsidies went to 10 percent of recipi-
ents, most of which were large farms (Environmental Working Group,
2003).
There is great potential for abuse in the FCIP. In the simplest
schemes, fields are insured against failure and the harvest from them is
recorded as the product of another field owned by claimants or some-
one beholden to them. Farmers then collect indemnities for the field
that “failed.” While purchasers of commodities are meticulous about
weights and moisture content, it is significant that crop insurance pay-
outs often operate on the honor system and crop yield estimates (Wall
Street Journal, 2003).
lure 31
3000000
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Figure 2.1. The World Insurance Market: Direct Premiums Written (in U.S.
Millions), 1992–2002. Source: Insurance Information Institute, 2003.
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 0
Figure 2.2. Total Consumer Credit Outstanding Per Capita (1980$), United
States, 1945–2000. Source: U.S. Federal Reserve, 2004a; 2004b.
with $133 million in unpaid medical claims (Tillman, 1998). State offi-
cials had great difficulty combating these bogus plans, because they
mirror the organization and operation of legitimate companies. Some
now operate from off-shore (Tillman, 2002).
The white-collar lure produced by developments in insurance prob-
ably is exceeded several times over by the explosive growth of con-
sumer credit. In 1980, total household liabilities for consumer credit
were $350 million, and by 2004 they totaled $1.9 trillion (U.S. Federal
Reserve Board, 2004a; 2004b). Fifty-million credit cards are issued
annually in the United States, and members of the average household
owe $7,000 in credit card debt (Buffalo News, 2004). On completing
a baccalaureate degree, the typical graduate owes $16,000 in student
loans and $2,000 in credit card debt (American Council on Educa-
tion, 2001). Figure 2.2 shows changes in use of consumer credit in the
United States after World War II. It shows that since 1980 the growth in
lure 35
50
40
30
20
10
0
1938 1962 1970 1977 1983 1989 1992 1995 1999 2002
Figure 2.3. Percent of U.S. Households Invested in Taxable Equities by Year.
Note: Includes mutual funds and direct stock ownership. Sources: Investment
Company Institute, 1999, 2002; U.S. Federal Reserve 1962, 1970, 1977, 1983,
1989, 1992, 1995; Strunk and Cantril, 1951.
Technology
Postindustrial nations have witnessed fundamental changes in com-
munications technology and the dynamics of economic relationships
(Adler, 1992; Lash and Urry, 1994). Widespread use of telecommu-
nications and electronic financial transactions presage a depersonal-
ized, cashless economy (Tickell, 1996). Electronic financial transfers
among banks and businesses, automatic teller machines, and home
banking increasingly are used around the globe. Through use of high-
speed data networks, telephone lines, and satellites, funds and business
accounts can be manipulated instantaneously over great distances.
This development coincided with and hastened the emergence of
“finance capitalism,” a form of productive enterprise distinguished not
by the manufacture of goods or services but instead by production of
profit through the manipulation of financial accounts and derivatives
trading (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 1997a). Finance capitalism is
the production of wealth through speculative transactions, all made
possible by computer.
The computer changed everything. It made information storage,
retrieval, and communication effortless, fast, and widely available in
worlds where formerly they were cumbersome and time consuming.
Ten percent of households in the United States owned personal com-
puters in 1984, but this increased to half in 2000. In households with
incomes of $75,000 or more, computers are as commonplace as toast-
ers, and most also have Internet access (Sacramento Business Journal,
2001). Computers facilitate crime against individuals and organiza-
tions alike. Theft from organizations, for example,
increased in the last decade. “More and more governments have been
inviting private firms to compete for contracts to provide services once
restricted to public sources. This practice, also known as competi-
tive sourcing, has been embraced as an effective policy tool for driv-
ing change in organizations, improving performance and restraining
costs” (McMahon, Moore, and Segal, 2003:5). The Federal Acitivities
Inventory Reform Act was passed in 1998 and requires U.S. govern-
ment agencies to identify commercial activities and open them to
competition from private contractors. In fiscal year 2003, agencies
studied the benefits of contracting for services provided by 17,596
full-time equivalent employees and determined in eleven percent of
662 assessments that outsourcing was the appropriate route (Office of
Management and Budget, 2004). Privatization has been pronounced
particularly at the state level (Boardman, Laurin, and Vining, 2003).
The changing functions and declining size of the nuclear family
over the past half-century is accompanied by emergence of specialized
institutions that perform functions once performed at home or by the
state. The living situations of elderly widows are illustrative. At the start
of World War II, 18 percent of elderly women lived alone, 59 percent
lived with adult children, and 3.7 percent lived in group quarters. By
1990, 62 percent lived alone, 20 percent lived with adult children,
and 10 percent lived in group quarters (McGarry and Schoeni, 2000).
The result is the nursing home industry. Care-giving services are pro-
vided on a contractual basis by private companies paid by the family
or state. There are more than 16,000 nursing homes in the United
States with 1.8 million beds and an occupancy rate exceeding 80 per-
cent (U.S. Center for Disease Control, 2003). About 53 percent of
U.S. nursing homes are for-profit operations, and nearly half are run
by companies with two or more facilities (U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 2002). Child care and the nursing-home indus-
try are examples also of the rapid growth of new institutions that care
for family members. There are more than 100,000 childcare facilities
in the United States. Kindercare and other corporate preschool firms
now watch more than 100,000 children daily.
Cost-cutting is key for companies that provide nursing home and
child care. Their low-ranking employees are paid much less than state
employees who perform comparable work. Operating procedures that
lure 43
Globalization
Globalization designates the increasing number and complexity of
political-economic relationships that cross national borders. Eco-
nomic indicators make clear that it is on the march (Baca, Garbe, and
Weiss, 2000; Brahmbhatt, 1998; Brooks and Del Negro, 2002; Cavaglia,
Brightman, and Aked, 2000; Forbes and Chinn, 2003). Increasingly,
when nations fail to curb emergent forms of white-collar crime the
effects ripple throughout the world. This happens, for example, when
unrestrained business and trading practices cause international catas-
trophes. Albania’s economy was brought to its knees in 1997 by a
widespread investment fraud that caused a run on banks and frus-
trated foreign investors trying to stabilize its economy (Washington Post,
1997a).
The expanding and diversifying international financial sector
arguably will be the most significant source of globalization in the
future. Measures of foreign direct investment (FDI) surpassed $700 bil-
lion in 2002 (United Nations, 2004). While some of the connec-
tions and contracts between capitalists throughout the world occur
through face-to-face meetings and government liaisons, most occur
via telephone and trading computers. Modern communications allow
investors to react instantly, to partner with people they will never
meet, and to exploit changing state policies and market fluctuation.
Between 1982 and 1987, there was a “remarkably sudden globaliza-
tion of securities markets; in the U.S., foreign securities transactions
increased ten-fold” (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000:153). In 2002,
seventy foreign companies entered U.S. public markets for the first
time, and the stock of 1,300 foreign companies now trade there
(United Nations, 2004). Wealth in all its forms moves across borders at
an unprecedented pace, and national economies are connected in the
process. Transnational corporations (TNCs) are major actors in fur-
thering political and economic globalization. Their power is increas-
ing. Of the fifty largest economies in the world, fourteen are TNCs
46 choosing white-collar crime
51
52 choosing white-collar crime
more likely than peers who lack these distinctions to weigh exploitation
of lure. Research into the lives of street criminals has shown that some
go about their daily activities alert to and searching for criminal oppor-
tunities while others pay little attention to these unless they encounter
something that piques their interest (Shover, 1996). The same is true
of white-collar criminals (Weisburd et al., 2001).
The supply of predisposed organizations and tempted individuals
varies temporally and spatially even as the pool from which it winnows
grows larger. Reiss and Tonry (1993:1) point out that “[p]erhaps the
most striking revolution of the twentieth century was the rapid expan-
sion of the population of organizations.” In the United States, the
number grew fivefold between 1917 and 1969, and in the past three
decades alone it tripled (Coleman, 1982; Internal Revenue Service,
2003). As a result, “the population of profit, not-for-profit, and gov-
ernmental organizations in the United States rivals in number the pop-
ulation of individuals” (Reiss and Tonry, 1993:1). As for individuals,
the proportion of the U.S. workforce reporting white-collar employ-
ment increased from 18 percent in 1900 to more than 60 percent in
2003 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975; U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2003). There appears to be no shortage of potential recruits
to white-collar crime.
The backgrounds and characteristics of those who step forward to
take their place in the ranks differ conspicuously from what is typical of
street criminals. Indisputably, they are more advantaged by material
circumstances and respectability. The full extent of their advantage
is obscured substantially when crime-based definitions of white-collar
crime are used, because this approach inevitably counts as white-collar
criminals many of modest circumstance (Weisburd et al., 1991). Demo-
graphically, a minority are nearly indistinguishable from street offend-
ers, and a surprisingly high proportion of those convicted of crimes of
deception are unemployed when they offend (Daly, 1989).
That said, white-collar crime, regardless of how it is defined, gener-
ally is not committed by working-class citizens. Middle-class parental
homes are characteristic of a substantial proportion of its perpetra-
tors. In one sample, 15 percent came from families that had trouble
providing necessities, but the same was true of 25 percent of street
offenders (Benson, 2002; Forst and Rhodes, 1980). In the larger
the predisposed and tempted 53
table 3.1. Characteristics of individuals sentenced for federal street crimes and
white-collar crimes, United States, 1995–2002
Street White-Collar
Characteristic offendersa offendersb
Race (percent African American and Hispanic) 48.5 32.3
Gender (percent male) 92.8 72.7
Education
Less than high school 38.6 17.1
High school graduate 39.7 28.7
Some college 18.4 30.2
College graduate 2.8 19.5
Age
Under 21 10.4 1.6
21–30 41.8 24.6
31–40 29.1 29.4
41–50 15.7 25.0
50+ 7.2 20.5
Average age 31.8 44.2
Average Number of Cases Annually 2,600 8,205
a Includes defendants convicted of murder, manslaughter, assault, robbery, burglary,
and auto theft.
b Includes defendants convicted of fraud, embezzlement, bribery, tax offenses, antitrust
1988 and 1989 show that 90.7 percent are closely held companies; only
8.2 percent are publicly traded firms. Less than 1 percent of sentenced
organizations are nonprofit (U.S. Sentencing Commission, n.d.). In
the United States, organizational defendants are prosecuted generally
for fraud and antitrust offenses; these offenses account for 57.2 percent
of the total. Environmental offenses comprise 9.3 percent. “The typical
case [of convicted organizational crime] is a fraud that involves a loss of
approximately $30,000” (U.S. Sentencing Commission, n.d.:3). What
has been learned about organizational noncompliance from studies in
both the United States and other nations suggests that smaller firms
are more likely than larger ones to be singled out for investigation
and prosecution (Shover, Clelland, and Lynxwiler, 1986; Grabosky and
Braithwaite, 1986). This appears to be true of organizational criminals
sentenced in U.S. district courts. This does not mean that they are more
likely than larger ones to commit crime.
GENERATIVE WORLDS
is script, map and guide. [It] tells us how to talk, how to dress, how
to hold ourselves, how to eat, and how to socialize. It affects who
we marry; where we live; the friends we choose; the jobs we have;
the vacations we take; the books we read; the movies we see; the
restaurants we pick; how we decide to buy houses, carpets, furniture,
the predisposed and tempted 57
and cars; where our kids are educated; what we tell our children at
the dinner table (conversations about the Middle East, for example,
versus the continuing sagas of the broken vacuum cleaner or the
half-wit neighbor). (Lubrano, 2004:5)
In the factories I’ve worked in, if you talk down to another worker
you can expect to be “punched out.” The basic operating proce-
dure of academia and graduate school . . . are based on competiti-
ive game playing, which in working-class setting would make you an
outcast. . . . In my previous work environments this type of behavior
had specific names: “brown nosing,” “kissing ass,” and so on. . . . The
modus operandi among middle-class careerists is based on competi-
tion. (Langston, 1993:66–7)
Fortune is not generous to most who must make their way in the
working-class world, but they generally do not blame others for this.
Instead, what has been said about chemical factory workers is true for
nearly all of them:
[T]hese workers typically believe that their position in the class struc-
ture is of their own doing. They are factory workers because they want
to be or, if they do not want to be, because “they missed the boat.”
They “had their chances.” If they regret their position they tend to
blame not their class origins but themselves. (Halle, 1984:169)
or debate clubs nor did they take classes that encouraged search for
arcane meanings and complex interpretations. As adults, the condi-
tions of their work do not facilitate or require development of these
cultural skills. Work days are filled with the need for physical action,
immediate responses, and outcomes that are judged by others either as
satisfactory or lacking. Their crimes share many of these qualities and
seem not to permit or require from investigators a complex search
for the facts and their meaning. Twenty-year-old males arrested on
the street carrying electronic equipment and a pry bar only blocks
from where residents were burglarized readily invite the interpretation
and label perpetrator. Reflecting on his younger years, the songwriter
and singer Merle Haggard rejects the possibility that his upbringing
was responsible for his later imprisonment. He concludes instead that
“leaves only me to blame” (Haggard, 1968). There are millions like
him.
As adults, the products of middle-class households generally do work
that is morally and physically cleaner than work done by those lower
in the class hierarchy. For many, employment is interesting and cre-
ative, and they are permitted considerable self-direction. Many occupy
offices, access to which is restricted by secretaries or other subalterns.
Personal assistants maintain their appointment calenders and smooth
out problems in the work day, while the inconveniences and unpleas-
antries of life beyond the office are managed by paying others to take
care of them. Middle-class adults generally do not return home at the
end of the day with mud, grease, cotton dust, or toxic chemicals on
their clothing, and they and their superiors prefer not to know very
much about those who do. Nor do they want to know how the dirty
work is going, just so long as it is going. This is one reason elite citi-
zens do not show up at local police stations unaccompanied by media
representatives simply to talk with officers and to let them know how
much their work is appreciated.
Their backgrounds provide to middle-class children who later
become white-collar criminals experiences sharply different in many
ways from what is commonplace in poor and working-class house-
holds. Consider the amount of space available to family members and
accommodative patterns produced by what statisticians call a high rate
of “density.” “It is one of the distinguishing marks of . . . working-class
family life that there’s not enough room in the house either for the
the predisposed and tempted 61
people who live in it or the things they collect as they pursue their
lives” (Rubin, 1994:17). Family members as a result must accommo-
date to the wishes and schedules of others in matters as mundane as
the nightly bathtub queue. Middle-class homes are spacious, families
are small, and space generally is close at hand for those who want to
be alone. Children typically have private bedrooms. Throughout the
homes of working-class families, empty space is public space, which
makes for both a reduced sense of personal privacy and inability to
get away easily to indulge the brain or emotions. In marked contrast
to their living arrangements, middle-class homes “don’t have a bed in
the living room” (Bragg, 1997:98).
Other benefits of a materially secure and respectable upbringing
are not nearly as apparent, but they are consequential for children
reared in these circumstances. The focus here are benefits and per-
spectives that are acquired gradually in the routine conversations and
dynamics of family life. Lareau (2002:773) describes the child-rearing
practices of middle-class parents as “concerted cultivation.” In contrast
to working-class parents, who see the lives of their children “unfold-
ing,” middle-class parents make a “deliberate and sustained effort to
stimulate children’s development and to cultivate their cognitive and
social skills.” They attempt to foster children’s talents through orga-
nized activities and extensive reasoning. Children reared in these fam-
ilies have little time for self-directed leisure pursuits and the benefits
these bring. They are exposed to and given opportunity to engage in
a range of leisure and educational activities.
Consider the implications for child development and leisure activ-
ities of having an assured and adequate income for family coffers.
It makes it possible for parents to pay for the not insubstantial costs
of their children’s leisure and educational experiences. The leisure
activities of working-class youth are played out in geographically more
restricted and less expensive terrain. Their parents have neither the
fiscal nor cultural resources to provide for their children the kind of
support that is commonplace in middle-class households. This limits
their children’s participation in both school and extracurricular activ-
ities (Lareau, 2003).
Middle-class children are encouraged verbally and included in con-
versation with their parents and other adults. Parents often defer to
them, and middle-class children witness parental juggling of family
62 choosing white-collar crime
schedules around them and their activities. Lareau suggests that this
and other aspects of middle-class child rearing produce a sense of
entitlement in middle-class children, one that may find expression
throughout life. They have little knowledge of drudgery and subordi-
nate status save perhaps for temporary employment as youth.
Products of child rearing in which communication is predominantly
implicit, working-class citizens are attuned and pay attention to exter-
nal qualities of behavior. In middle-class child rearing communica-
tion is explicit, and much of it is devoted to unraveling the intentions
behind puzzling or deviant actions. Children learn to look for and
consider what is behind untoward conduct and to pay less attention to
its formal status. The reasons for punishment or correction must be
explained defensibly. Privileged citizens are more likely to view norms
not as absolutes but as situationally applicable, and infraction, which is
seen as a product of internal dynamics that explain if not justify it, is a
matter for discussion and negotiation. It can be a protracted process.
Middle-class children learn early that arguable lack of intent mitigates
a wide array of misconduct, and they gain experience evading moral
and legal responsibility for their unpleasant actions. It is a lesson they
learn well. Many convicted white-collar criminals have little experience
as penitents.
The culture and ethos of worlds from which privileged offenders
are drawn and live is reproduced and reinforced in their employment
worlds (Kohn, 1977). Law is viewed with disdain or challenge, and
when they violate it they have little difficulty fashioning and bringing
to bear linguistic constructions that excuse or explain their actions. In
part because they generally view their circumstances as exceptional,
middle-class citizens generate, elaborate, and employ complex inter-
pretations of their motives. Casual familiarity with the defenses of
white-collar criminals shows how imaginative they can be at disputing
criminal intent. Consider the case of William Aramony, former presi-
dent of United Way of America (New York Times, 1995). Federal prose-
cutors in New York alleged that Aramony fraudulently diverted for his
own use nearly $2 million of the charity’s money. The stolen funds were
used to pay for vacations, chauffeurs, luxury apartments, and exotic
vacations for the defendant and his teenage girlfriend. Other monies
were given to a friend who operated a charitable company, and large
the predisposed and tempted 63
Competition
Competitiveness is striving or vying with others for profit, prize, or
position. It is a sense of rivalry. Lareau (2002; 2003) observed that
middle-class children often develop and experience a sense of com-
petitiveness with their siblings. As with their overall style of child rear-
ing, middle-class parents believe competition is a positive experience
and one they try to provide for their children (Lareau, 2003:60–1).
They monitor the progress of their children regularly and precisely
so they will develop skills needed to thrive in the middle- or upper-
class workforce. They push them to compete and excel. In countless
ways, middle-class children are sent the message that their parents
and others expect them to succeed. They expect life to offer reward-
ing opportunities. This is less common and salient in working-class
homes.
In cultures of competition individuals are driven to strive for suc-
cess, whether this be fortune, fame, or respect, and they worry cease-
lessly about conditions that might stand in their way. Locales and time
periods vary in how powerfully and pervasively an ethos of competi-
tiveness dominates interpersonal relationships and individual actions.
64 choosing white-collar crime
I sold the first person I ever talked to on the phone. And it was just
like that first shot of heroin, you know. I’m not a heroin addict. . . . I’ve
only done heroin a couple of times. But it was amazing. It was like, “I
can’t believe I just did this!” It was incredible. It was never about the
money after that. . . . Yeah, it was about the money initially, but when
I realized that I could do this everyday, it was no longer about the
money. It was about the competition, you know. I wanted to be the
the predisposed and tempted 65
best salesman, and I want to make the most money that day. (Shover,
Coffey, and Hobbs, 2003:497).
To those of us who raced along the Wall Street treadmill of the 80s,
money assumed a mystical aura. Once you achieved a modest level
of success, once you knew that you had your mortgage and your car
payment covered, once you had a full belly, money simply became the
way you gauged your level of success, compared to those about you. . . .
[M]oney became the points on the scoreboard. (Levine, 1991:390)
This suggests that not all who emerge as winners from competitive
struggle will find relief in victory. Once achieved they know only inse-
curity over hanging on to what they have gained. For others, successful
competition only kindles desire for more of the same:
[A]t each new level of my career, I had pushed my goals higher. When
I was an associate, I wanted to be a vice president. When I became a
vice president, I wanted to be a senior vice president. . . . When I was
earning $20,000 a year, I thought, I can make $100,000. . . . When I
was making a $1 million, I thought I can make $3 million. There was
always somebody one rung higher on the ladder, and I could never
66 choosing white-collar crime
Arrogance
Arrogance and an air of imperiousness occasionally are seen in the con-
duct of street criminals; the swaggering gun-wielding figure is encoun-
tered in real life often enough to reacquaint us with this fact. But
arrogance is a more likely springboard for crime in places and on
the part of offenders who do not live so close to the material edge.
The inhabitants of materially secure and respectable worlds are accus-
tomed to being superordinates; they give orders, and others move to
their dictates. Their views are solicited and taken seriously by people
who count. They are waited on. Many of them have known success
and emerged as winners from competitive struggle. All do not han-
dle it well, however; the self-important, arrogant white-collar offender
is a recurring figure in chronicles of white-collar crime. The face
of arrogance is inescapable, for example, in decisions by powerful
and wealthy public figures to award lucrative noncompetitive con-
tracts to friends and associates. The chief executive officer of Enron
Corporation reportedly referred to a persistent questioning accoun-
tant in a public meeting as an “asshole” (Cruver, 2002:54; Swartz,
2003:265). Such public lapses of respectability are uncommon for elite
the predisposed and tempted 67
[My wife] and I were becoming more and more in demand. I was
successful enough that people were laughing at my stories. Even my
brother-in-law invested with the kid brother who was taking the world
by storm down there in Atlanta. . . .
[M]y mother-in-law claimed I was a genius. I secretly admired her
discernment. My office had to be enlarged to house a person of my
intelligence, kindness, and shrinking humility. Class A personalities
asked for my opinion about things. (Lawson, 1992:67)
He and others like him may come to believe that “they [don’t] have
to follow the rules because they made them” (Swartz, 2003:302).
Arrogance probably is less common among ordinary white-collar
criminals, chiefly because many are employed in occupations that do
not provide the requisite material, organizational, and dramaturgical
supports. It can find expression in disdain or indifference for legal
restrictions and their creators. The idea that the state reserves the
right to intervene in their work environments and restrain their deci-
sion making is accepted conditionally. Further, the presumption that
they should exercise due diligence and responsible concern for details
expected of ordinary citizens is rejected. Asked to explain his crimes,
a former corporate CEO and convicted inside trader replied:
I think I was arrogant enough at the time to believe that I could cut
corners. Not care about details that were going on and not think
about consequences. [But] one of my great faults is – I refused to
deal with everyday details that people have to deal with to make sure
that mistakes aren’t made. And I think, in that way, there may have
been arrogance where I didn’t have to deal with details – that these
details were meant for other people, not for me. (Waksal, 2003:7)
Entitlement
Cultures of entitlement cause actors in a range of circumstances to
believe that benefits of some kind are due them and that questioning
or disruption of delivery is illegitimate. Behn and Sperduto (1979:55)
point out that this ethic is not a “conscious creed that prescribes per-
sonal or political conduct [but one that] . . . applies in specific situa-
tions, as a . . . constraint on . . . behavior.” Lareau (2003) observed that
middle-class children question and contest authority. They dispute and
refute correction routinely. The children she observed were quick to
offer advice to authority figures and to make special requests. They
readily passed judgment and already had a sense that their efforts and
accomplishments made them special. The investigators noted also that
when privileges were denied, middle-class children badgered their par-
ents until they were provided. These children acquired and operated
with a sense of entitlement.
In a ground-breaking study of fraud among medical doctors, a
team of investigators from the University of California interviewed
sixty Medicare/Medicaid and American Medical Association officials,
forty-two physicians convicted of medical scams, and a control group
of thirty-two physicians with no record of criminal conviction ( Jesilow
et al., 1993). They also examined the cases of 358 medical workers sus-
pended from Medicare/Medicaid between 1977 and 1982. The inves-
tigators found that among conditions that facilitate Medicaid fraud by
physicians is their belief that insensitive external forces are interfering
with their just desserts. In other words, felonious physicians believe
they are entitled to pursue wealth without external restraint. What is
instructive about this finding is confirmation that an ethos of entitle-
ment can become so pervasive among occupational practitioners or
organizational managers that it becomes taken for granted, and erodes
individual willingness to comply with law.
The professions do not stand alone. The owners and managers of
commercial establishments believe they contribute importantly to civic
life and to community welfare generally by providing employment to
citizens. They often point to the wealth returned to government by
taxes of one kind or another paid by them and their workforce. Many
donate time and money to civic organizations and causes. Professional
persons, whether physicians, attorneys, or engineers, point to their
the predisposed and tempted 69
with leniency the offenders it ensnares, inevitably the belief grows that
the odds of paying more than minor penalty are slim. The rate of
white-collar crime rises accordingly. When the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) sent clear messages in the mid-1990s that it was becom-
ing a kinder, gentler agency, revenue collections decreased. An IRS
commissioner observed:
76
self-restraint and oversight 77
Leaving aside all the scandals [of recent years], the ethics at many
companies remain dismal. . . . A large survey of corporate employees
in 2000 by KPMG found that half of the respondents had observed
violations of the law or company standards during the previous year,
and many reported that these violations were quite serious (Callahan,
2004:283).
78 choosing white-collar crime
PRIVATE OVERSIGHT
Civil Action
Private parties harmed by what they believe are criminal actions of
others can pursue civil remedies individually or as a class. Class-action
law suits usually are filed by a large number of parties who believe they
have been harmed by another. They make it possible for parties who
otherwise could not afford litigation to pool their resources, form a
class, and pursue redress. Class-action suits originate in all areas of
commercial life including building and construction products, stocks
and securities, drug and medical products, and motor vehicle prod-
ucts. On April 19, 2004, Microsoft Corporation settled a class-action
antitrust lawsuit brought by Minnesota customers who alleged that the
company overcharged them for products. The settlement ended a jury
trial that was expected to last several more weeks and to cost the com-
pany $1.5 billion (Washington Post, 2004b). Microsoft previously settled
similar suits in nine states and Washington, D.C. In many class-action
suits, the cost of litigation exceeds the eventual settlement or court
award.
Whistleblowers
Whistleblowers are employees of legitimate organizations who divulge
to outsiders knowledge or suspicions of wrongdoing in the workplace.
The identity of whistleblowers becomes known, but informants gen-
erally remain anonymous. Recall that the crimes of Davis Pipe and its
managers, which were described in chapter 1, came to light because
of an informant. In one of the best known cases of whistleblowing,
an employee of a federal contractor made available to congressional
representatives and the media copies of secret Pentagon studies of the
Vietnam war (Ellsberg, 2002).
80 choosing white-collar crime
on her show. The case was tried before a jury in Amarillo, Texas, and
ended with a verdict that Ms. Winfrey’s comments were protected by
free-speech guarantees and did not harm the beef industry in any case.
Like Oprah Winfrey, the targets of retaliatory actions usually prevail,
but the financial and emotional costs of resisting SLAPP litigation can
be staggering.
The powerful can retaliate in other ways as well. On March 5, 1999,
a Miami, Florida, jury awarded $37 million to the family of a twelve-
year-old girl who was killed in a traffic accident after Florida Power
& Light Co. (FPL) turned off the electric power to a traffic light in
Pinecrest, Florida. The company subsequently filed multiple requests
with the trial court to set aside the verdict. Investigators hired by the
company contacted the jury foreman a month later and, according to
the girl’s parents, offered to pay him to help determine whether the
jury acted improperly in reaching its verdict. Post-trial contact with
jurors is a felony and violation of Florida’s ethics rules for lawyers
when it is done with intent to tamper with a verdict. FPL admitted its
investigators contacted the juror, but it denied doing so in hopes of
overturning the jury award. It also denied offering money to the juror.
It was learned subsequently that a second juror also was contacted by
FPL investigators. That juror had admonished the company after the
verdict was announced by turning to its lawyers in the courtroom and
saying, “Shame on you.” The judge in the case had warned FPL at the
end of the trial not to interview jurors (Miami Daily Business Review,
1999).
Nearly two decades of experience with policies for encouraging
whistleblowers, informants, and other private actions as mechanisms
for promoting white-collar accountability leaves unanswered questions
of efficacy. The toll on those who come forward can be profound,
however. Whistleblowers frequently are targets of retaliatory actions
by their employers or professional peers. These commonly include
demotion or termination of employment; transfer to monotonous,
unpleasant, or dangerous work assignments; and threats of physical
harm (Glazer and Glazer, 1989). Retaliation is most likely and most
severe when the reported conduct is systematic and significant, par-
ticularly if it is part of the organization’s profit accumulation process
(Rothschild and Miethe, 1999). The privileged generally combat the
82 choosing white-collar crime
STATE OVERSIGHT
Autonomy Struggles
It is tempting to think of criminalization and decriminalization as
processes with dichotomous outcomes, but the results can be sub-
stantially more complex than this. State actions imposing on citizens
more restrictive requirements typically contain diverse provisions; the
enabling legislation for some regulatory agencies is lengthy and may
include specific and detailed requirements. Each can be the focus
of dissension, political conflict and extended negotiation (Skrzycki,
2003). Some provisions impose new restrictions on those to whom
they apply, but other provisions may be kinder; when powerful par-
ties lose on one front they sometimes gain concessions and victory
elsewhere. The state, for example, may provide additional lure as a
calculated effort to reduce opposition to new control initiatives or to
assuage powerful losers in criminalization battles. In this way what priv-
ileged interests lose in reduced autonomy they are compensated for
in access to additional state largesse.
As a powerful and high-status occupational group, physicians resist
restrictions on how they practice and the fees they charge. They have
become more accommodating to demands for oversight in recent
years as abuses have led to decreasing respect for their work. Enact-
ment of Medicaid and Medicare in the United States was accompanied
by legislative concern not to antagonize them. Legislators were
(1) register public accounting firms; (2) establish standards for all mat-
ters relating to preparation of audit reports; (3) conduct inspections of
accounting firms; and (4) enforce compliance with the act. This poten-
tially is a significant increase of oversight. Friederichs (2004:224) sug-
gests that one reason for passage of the act was “the firestorm of public
anger over the corporate scandals of 2001–2003.” Outcomes of this
type in response to angry public opinion are uncommon, and they gen-
erally occur only when larger economic and political conditions do not
present obstacles. Economic conditions are powerful constraints not
only on the odds of success by criminalization movements but also on
their emergence. It is notable that privileged citizens and organiza-
tions may have lost substantially in the corporate accounting scandals
of recent years. More important, they created uncertainty in financial
markets and thereby made investment decision making riskier. The
cynical might see passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a preemptive
strike by political elites to head off possible demands by citizens for
more profound and wide-ranging action. The act adds redundancy to
oversight that would not have been necessary if credible oversight had
been in place.
Even at historically opportune times the struggle over new over-
sight goes on within the assumptions, logic, and constraints of
large, privately controlled and increasingly transnational corporations
(Garland, 2001). The level of and trends in corporate profits are crit-
ical determinants of the reception afforded reformers; the likelihood
they will be successful increases during economic good times and
decreases dramatically during recessionary periods. Timing is every-
thing. A bill before the Oregon legislature would have given the state’s
Public Utility Commission (PUC) authority to impose fines on tele-
phone service providers who engage in fraudulent practices. Other
states have found this to be successful combating fraud by these firms.
The Oregon PUC commissioner noted, however, that “the telephone
utilities really don’t want the PUC to have that authority, and they
seem to have found a comfortable ear in the legislature” (Associated
Press, 2003a:1). Typical of many perhaps, one legislator said “I just
have a general rule that I’m not going to put additional rules on busi-
nesses because of the poor economy that we have” (Associated Press,
self-restraint and oversight 87
2003b:1). When times are good and profits are up, it is more difficult
to resist new oversight on grounds of cost.
When it does take notice of and creates new oversight the state can
choose from a range of options, from revocation of professional license
to civil penalties and, ultimately, to criminal prosecution. Unlike rob-
bers and cocaine users, the privileged and their representatives play an
active part in crafting the laws and regulatory standards that circum-
scribe their conduct. The importance of accommodating and gaining
acquiescence from representatives of commerce and finance is taken
for granted, and the need to avoid action that could harm business con-
fidence is a paramount concern. These are some reasons why statutes
that represent weak or symbolic threats to harmful conduct may be fol-
lowed by administrative bureaucracies unwilling or unable to mount
serious efforts against white-collar criminals (Calavita, 1983).
Behind the conflict over specific criminalization and decriminaliza-
tion efforts, the larger struggle is over autonomy, freedom from market
forces, and access to state largesse. Privileged individuals and groups
want always to conduct their affairs autonomously and to draw from
public coffers doing so. They push to sustain or strengthen their right
to be free of oversight, first on grounds they are honorable, honest, and
deserving and second, with claims that opposition would be unreason-
able, anticompetitive, and prohibitively costly. Trade and professional
organizations invariably charge that practices dangerous or harmful
to others are attributable to a few bad apples and that most individuals
or firms are exemplary citizens.
Less than a decade later, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the USSC again was
directed and increased penalties for designated white-collar crimes.
After years of use, the status of federal sentencing guidelines is unclear,
however. In January 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that they
violate the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by allowing
judicial rather than jury factfinding as the basis for sentencing.
90 choosing white-collar crime
Street White-collar
Penalty type and characteristic* crimes* crimes*
Monetary Penalties
Average number sentenced annually with 1533 7550
monetary penalties
Mean monetary penalty $131,326 $230,935
Percent sentenced with fines 6.4 16.3
Percent sentenced with restitution 51.4 50.3
Percent sentenced with fines and restitution 3.5 6.1
Probation/Imprisonment
Average number annually sentenced to 2,579.4 10,690.5
imprisonment or probation
Percent sentenced to probation 6.5 42.7
Percent sentenced to prison 93.4 57.2
Mean sentence length (months) 79.1 10.6
* Includes murder, manslaughter, assault, robbery, burglary, and auto theft.
** Includes larceny, fraud, embezzlement, bribery, tax offenses, antitrust offenses,
and food and drug violations.
Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics (1997–
2004).
91
92 choosing white-collar crime
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
‘ZZZZ Best Files for Bankruptcy’ was the radio announcer’s lead
story . . . I was glad the July Fourth weekend had ended. Usually I
enjoyed the summer holiday, but not this time. Too many things
had gone wrong. . . . I knew it wouldn’t be long before the company
went under. Before I resigned, I took out almost $700,000. I gave my
attorney a generous retainer, hired a private investigator to work on
my defense, and earmarked the balance for discreet business invest-
ments that I hoped would provide me with enough money to live on.
(Minkow, 1995:181)
Jeffrey Skilling, the former CEO of Enron who played a major role in
its downfall, reportedly put away $23 million to pay attorneys to defend
him against criminal charges (McLean and Elkind, 2004).
Few ordinary white-collar criminals and no upperworld ones spend
time in jail (Irwin, 1985). Following arrest, the latter and their attor-
neys remain in close contact with investigatory officials, and they plan
96 choosing white-collar crime
initiated against eleven, six were indicted, five were convicted, and
three received prison sentences. In other words, diversionary, admin-
istrative, and civil actions are the norm. Analysis of all federal actions
initiated or completed in 1975 and 1976 against 477 of the largest
U.S. manufacturing firms showed that by the time the dust had settled,
75.8 percent received no penalties, 21 percent received civil fines, and
2.4 percent received criminal penalties (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).
Monetary penalties may be less than the profits gained from violation
(Etzioni, 1993). The state’s failure to respond decisively to massive
crime in the savings and loan industry in the 1980s meant that large
numbers of S&L officials managed to avoid criminal penalties entirely
(Black, 2005; Calavita et al., 1997b). Rational-choice theory highlights
the need for certain and severe penalties for white-collar crime, but
criminal penalties are neither probable nor unusually severe.
Regulation
The bulk of output from criminalization campaigns are rules that carry
minimal civil penalties for most forms of white-collar noncompliance;
the body of statute law that organizations and citizens are expected
to meet is small when compared with the volume of regulatory rules
that confronts them. At all levels of government a host of regulatory
agencies and personnel are empowered by legislative bodies to pro-
mulgate and enforce standards of safe, fair, and reasonable conduct.
Established more than a century ago as the earliest federal regula-
tory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission has been joined
by scores of others, from the familiar U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the less familiar
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM). The
administrative departments of state and local government generally
parallel this array of federal agencies.
Economic regulation, which predominated until the 1970s, is focused
on problems of finance, market relationships, and integrity in trade,
but the final decades of the last century witnessed the extension of
state regulatory oversight into areas that previously were discretionary
for corporate interests. The newer social regulation “affects the condi-
tions under which goods and services are produced and the physical
characteristics of products that are manufactured. [It] . . . also extends
self-restraint and oversight 99
It may be all but impossible for civil servants to monitor derivatives trad-
ing and similar complex transactions. Here and elsewhere the respon-
sibilities of regulators and the challenges they face have increased in
the face of the former’s decreasing numbers.
Figure 4.2 shows the number of social and economic regulatory per-
sonnel (per 100 tax-filing corporations) for the years 1975–2000. As
can be seen, in 1975 there were approximately four federal regulators
for every 100 corporations, but by 2000 this declined to just over two.
Figure 4.2 also shows the decrease occurred for both economic and
100 choosing white-collar crime
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Figure 4.2. Number of Social and Economic Regulators Per 100 Tax-Filing
Corporations, United States, 1975–2000. Sources: Dudley and Warren, 2003;
Internal Revenue Service, 2003.
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
fraud and alerting them that they would be visited by inspectors soon
to look into their reporting. In 2001 projected pay-outs to them plum-
meted. When opportunities for fraud are abundant and offenders have
been able to exploit them with impunity, the compliance payoff from
a threatening letter is impressive.
Civil Prosecution
When prosecutors cannot identify culpable individuals, collect suffi-
cient evidence, or reasonably assume they will prevail at trial, they opt
for the less onerous standard of proof required in civil proceedings. If
authorities prevail, courts can impose substantial awards against indi-
viduals or organizations. The most powerful weapon in the civil arsenal
of prosecutors is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
statute (RICO). Enacted by Congress in 1970, RICO was aimed at orga-
nized crime groups, but it has been used against organizational white-
collar criminals. Use of RICO has been controversial, with supporters
and opponents equally aroused, and opposition has caused tighter
restrictions on its use; from a high of 972 cases brought in 1991, case
filings under RICO have declined. There were 743 cases in 2003, but
few target large or powerful defendants (U.S. District Courts, 2003).
In September 2004, U.S. prosecutors in New York began a RICO civil
jury trial of the nation’s largest tobacco firms, accusing them of engag-
ing in a fifty-year conspiracy to misrepresent the addictive nature of
cigarettes. Prosecutors are seeking to force the firms to disgorge $280
billion they accuse them of earning through fraud. Other objectives
are forcing public disclosure of company research on smoking and a
ban on marketing to children. The trial is expected to last six months
(New York Times, 2004).
Civil litigation reports published by the SEC for the two-week period
December 1, 2003, through December 15, 2003, show there were sev-
enteen cases of alleged fraud, five cases of insider trading or market
manipulation, and two cases of failure to comply with court orders
stemming from previous criminal violations. This confirms what media
reporting suggests: civil actions frequently disguise serious criminal
conduct. Actions taken against mining companies are illustrative. Fed-
eral worker safety regulations require mines to maintain coal dust
levels in mines below two milligrams/cubic meter of air. To monitor
104 choosing white-collar crime
the level of coal dust, air samples are taken by filters encased in
collection devices at various locations in the mine. The filters must
be changed periodically, and used ones must be sent to the U.S. Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Discovery of high levels
of coal dust can lead to the mine’s shutdown. According to MSHA,
in 1991 mine operators were vacuuming the filters or spraying them
before use with a household dust-reducing product to keep them from
accumulating dense layers of coal dust. MSHA received 4,710 faked
samples from 847 coal mines across the United States, or 40 percent
of the mines it is charged with sampling. In response, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor imposed on 500 mining companies a total of $5 million
in civil penalties for tampering with safety testing equipment (New York
Times, 1991b).
Szockyj and Geis (2002) examined the cases of 452 persons charged
by the federal government with insider trading during the 1980s. The
subjects overwhelmingly were charged civilly in proceedings in which
they neither admitted nor denied their guilt and thereby avoided
the stigma of criminal conviction. Generally they were required
to disgorge their illegally acquired gains and were fined the same
amount. The investigators conclude that “[u]ndoubtedly, the diffi-
culty of proving violations beyond a reasonable doubt, the prospect
of financial recovery of losses, and the very considerable skills of
the defense bar involved in handling white-collar crimes . . . pressed
prosecutors to file civil actions” (Szockyj and Geis, 2002:284). On
December 31, 2004, Minnesota’s attorney general sued credit card
issuer Capital One Financial Corporation, accusing it of defrauding
consumers by falsely advertising low and fixed interest rates. The
complaint alleged that Capital One nearly quadruples the rate it
charges cardholders who trigger a “penalty” rate by paying their bill
a day late or otherwise defaulting; cardholders who received an ini-
tial 4.99 percent interest rate but later defaulted saw their rate sky-
rocket to 19.8 percent. The lawsuit said Capital One’s marketing vio-
lates state laws against false advertising, consumer fraud, and deceptive
trade practices. Minnesota is seeking restitution for cardholders, civil
penalties, disgorgement of profits, and an injunction barring further
wrongdoing. Monetary penalties and other civil sanctions are justi-
fied for their potential deterrent effect; they should spur business
self-restraint and oversight 105
OFF-SHORE OVERSIGHT
that Indian courts had sole jurisdiction over all civil litigation resulting
from the disaster. Observers speculated that company lawyers believed
they would receive favorable treatment and less costly judgments
from Indian courts. The case was settled for $470 million in 1989, a
sum that included payments of approximately $1,000 per claimant.
The settlement also stipulated that Carbide would be immune from
all pending litigation and that criminal charges against officers of the
company would be dropped. The Indian Supreme Court subsequently
ruled that criminal charges should stand, and seventeen years after
the tragedy extradition papers were served on Warren Anderson,
an officer of the company and fugitive from India. The request was
rejected on technical grounds. An urgent problem brought on by
development of the global economy is determining which laws and
regulations will be used as standards for individual and organizational
behavior. Few answers are found in international law and agreements.
Increasingly, international agreements and institutions provide
rules and oversight as nations struggle to control TNCs and respond
to their crimes (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). This movement high-
lights a pattern of permissiveness that rational-choice theory predicts
will swell the ranks of white-collar criminals. Although the signato-
ries to international trade agreements typically pledge to adopt and
enforce in their home countries elementary regulations for environ-
mental protection, worker rights, and product safety, police and pros-
ecutors in jurisdictions lack the budget, expertise, and other resources
to pursue these cases. As oversight becomes more distant geographi-
cally, its efficacy becomes less certain, and the gap between standards
and compliance grows.
In the absence of credible oversight, tax incentives, loans, trade
incentives, and other lures offered by transnational agreements and
governing organizations easily become criminal opportunity. By deny-
ing freedom of association to labor organizations, companies gain an
advantage over competitors in nations where workers are free to orga-
nize (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004). In the face of these practices
other nations generally do little more than request an end to them.
NAFTA nations are expected to enforce their labor laws and also abide
by the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. NAFTA
enforcement officials are much more likely to penalize for violation of
108 choosing white-collar crime
trade restriction than for other socially harmful and illegal practices
(Eisner, 2000). This fuels the claims of critics that human rights and
environmental protections in trade agreements are toothless.
The substance of international agreements for trade and lending are
often called into question for undermining oversight. Some provisions,
for example, prevent national governments from mounting criminal-
ization campaigns by defining them as protectionist measures (Mayne
and Le Quesnel, 1999; Sjoberg, Gill, and Williams, 2001; Wilkinson
and Hughes, 2000). For example, Canada proposed regulations to
prevent Phillip Morris from labeling cigarettes “light” or “mild” for
fear the labels mislead consumers into thinking these cigarettes are
safe. Phillip Morris claimed that the move would be a violation of
NAFTA’s chapter 11, which permits firms to sue signatory governments
if their investment rights are violated. The company also cited WTO
agreements that require nations to use the least trade restrictive means
to accomplish regulatory objectives (Mokhiber and Weissman, 2002).
Global oversight develops in dozens of forms and a complex array of
institutions. It relies on criminal prosecution primarily in the nations
where crimes originate. Nations, however, are reluctant to grant other
nations and international bodies the right to define and pursue global
oversight on their soil. Thus far, international cooperation has pushed
farthest in efforts to control international organized crime and war
crimes. These are areas where most nations can come to agreement.
“All the while, avoidable harms (often of equivalent or greater magni-
tude) by transnational corporations are ignored” (Gilbert and Russell,
2002:233).
chapter five
Decision Making
109
110 choosing white-collar crime
For nearly three decades investigators have explored how street crimi-
nals estimate the costs and benefits of crime and how they make crimi-
nal decisions. A great deal is known about their daily rounds, the
contexts wherein they make criminal decisions and the dynamics of
the process. A variety of methodologies have been used to examine
these matters, but ethnographic studies unquestionably have shed the
most revealing light. Most, for example, show that thieves are rational
when it comes to choosing targets that offer security and the surest
returns.
In broad outline, investigators have demonstrated that street offend-
ers generally behave consistent with predictions based on rational-
choice theory. They commit crime with an eye toward maximizing
reward and minimizing risk. Research makes clear, however, that bur-
glars, armed robbers, and other street criminals are anything but care-
ful calculating actors (Bennett and Wright, 1984; Cromwell, Olsen,
and Avary, 1991; Feeney, 1986; Katz, 1988; Shover and Honaker, 1992;
Wright and Decker 1994; 1997). This body of research serves as a
useful starting point for anyone interested in white-collar criminal
decision making whether the results are cast as accident, scandal, or
mistake.
A high proportion of street offenders break the law in the context
of lifestyles that make it seem there is much to gain and little to lose
by doing so (Shover, 1996). Skid-row addicts facing withdrawal may
see great utility in $100 while the shame of stealing or getting caught
seems negligible. Street offenders usually have little more than a hunch
about their chances of apprehension, and in moments of clarity, many
understand that arrest probably awaits if they continue in crime. In
less reflective moments, like those that precede most crimes, they con-
clude that they probably can get away with at least one more offense
(Shover, 1996). Their decisions generally take only an instant and
result from hasty, rudimentary, and imprecise calculation. Interviews
with 113 men convicted of robbery or an offense related to robbery
revealed, for example, that “over half . . . reported no planning at all”
(Feeney and Weir, 1975:105). The criminal ambitions of most are lim-
ited to fulfilling an immediate desire.
112 choosing white-collar crime
At that time I was going through some bad problems with depression
and drinking. I had just quit managing my day-to-day affairs and just
given up on it. In 1988, . . . I figured I would be dead. I was fatalistic
about it. Finally, in 1989, through the intervention of family, friends
and colleagues, I got started on treatment for depression and alcohol;
that was what lead to my problems. I was so depressed. I was sure that
I was going to die, and I didn’t care if I did. I was trying to drink
myself to death. I did not care about the government and did not
think about the trouble I could get in. It totally did not matter to me.
I just plain didn’t care. (Mason, 1999)
114 choosing white-collar crime
Organizational Properties
Organizational properties and dynamics are significant and autono-
mous constraints on the genesis and development of crime
(Needleman and Needleman, 1979; Jamieson, 1994). This is the
principal rationale for distinguishing organizational and individual
white-collar crime. Executive pay structures may increase some crimes.
Seventy-one business firms convicted of accounting violations were
matched with others that did not have criminal convictions (Troy,
Smith, and Gordon, 2003). The CEOs of violator firms on average
held stock options that were three times their salaries, while the CEOs
of nonviolator firms held options equivalent to their salaries. This
suggests that provision of excessive stock options may contribute to
organizational accounting offenses. There are likely to be many such
structural variables that cause particular misdeeds in particular types
of organizations, but there also are variables known to have effects on
crime in diverse organizations.
decision making 119
checking with superiors to make sure the decision was feasible and
approved.
The savings and loan industry in the United States experienced mas-
sive criminal behavior by thrift managers in the 1980s. Estimates of
the total monetary cost of S&L failures range upward to $500 billion.
Between 1988 and 1992, 1,098 criminal prosecutions were brought by
U.S. attorneys in major S&L cases (Calavita et al., 1997a:157). The S&L
failures resulted from “collective embezzlement.” Crimes were com-
mitted by those in control of organizational resources (Black, 2005).
In many, the organization became “a vehicle for committing crime
against itself” (Calavita et al., 1997a). Officers of multiple organiza-
tions gradually formed relationships with each other and with helpful
hands that minimized complexity and routinized criminal decision
making.
“Land flips” were a common type of fraud committed by S&L offi-
cers (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 1997b). Typically, S&L insiders,
land developers, and appraisers conspired to inflate the value of a
parcel of land. An appraiser recruited because of a reputation for
inflating prices would value it in exchange for being contracted on
future deals. The bankers then would pass the land around in sales
from investor to investor raising its supposed value at each incre-
ment. Eventually, someone would go to a bank and borrow against
the value of the land often for a proposed development project. The
project would fail and the loan would be defaulted. In some cases, the
defaulted loans were hidden from bank inspectors by selling them con-
tinuously between institutions. Some participants were close to politi-
cians, which helped forestall regulatory action. The criminal designs of
each participant merged and evolved to become a highly rational and
122 choosing white-collar crime
Doing Deals
Deals are business transactions with negotiable terms. Deals are culti-
vated through social contacts and financial investments. “The social
factors that bind managers to one another, whether in conflict or har-
mony, are the chief source of deals” ( Jackall, 1988:198). The way
deals typically are done in an organization and the industry where
it is located are significant determinants of organizational structure
and norms (Eccles and Crane, 1988). Likewise, the formal arrange-
ment of deals can make the decision to commit crime seem small. For
example, the privileged information gained by key positions in institu-
tional networks and constant jockeying for position among corporate
brokers makes them attentive to opportunities found in insider trades
(Reichman, 1993). The structure of deals in an industry or organiza-
tion play a significant part in the distribution of criminal opportunity.
The process of deal making and communication during it also has
characteristics that potentially make criminal opportunity attractive.
An important part of committing crime is the process of “anaesthetiz-
ing the conscience” with rhetorical and linguistic devices, and these
devices may be shared among members of an organization or profes-
sion (Geis and Salinger, 1998:87). Conversations that precede crime
often contain excuses, frustrations, reasons why crime should be done
or indications that it is normal procedure. Deals are promising settings
for talk that obscures moral components of decisions and that insu-
lates participants from consideration of adverse consequences. They
are competitive.
Deals have a contrived, artificial quality that allows participants
to suspend reservations against aggressively seeking advantages that
affect transactions in other spheres. Deal making is viewed by insiders
as a game in which players manipulate others to desired ends (Hirsch,
1986; Partnoy, 1997:50). Game metaphors capture the maneuvers
and manipulations found in many deals without raising unpleasant
124 choosing white-collar crime
payoff from noncriminal conduct. The key lies in using public pol-
icy to constrain individual decision making so that those who consider
crime do not find it to be a profitable option. Cost-efficient ways that
the state could improve reward for noncriminal conduct among those
who might otherwise consider white-collar crime are difficult to imag-
ine. It is unfathomable to think that reward and additional largesse
could increase compliance by upperworld offenders. Citizens would
not be pleased with the tax burden for this purpose at any rate. The
natural consequences of much white-collar offending are mild by com-
parison to other criminal acts and its inherent dangers do not elicit
panic, nausea or other unpleasant sensations. For these reasons, the
criminal law may hold the greatest promise for intruding on decision
making and introducing corrective thoughts into the calculus of orga-
nizational and individual offenders.
A prominent research design for investigating deterrence of white-
collar crime is to examine the subsequent, short-term effect of
increased sanctions or criminal prosecutions on a specific type of offen-
ding. Block, Nold, and Sidak (1981) investigated antitrust laws and
bread pricing by bakeries. When firms were charged with price fixing
and faced with the possibility of civil suits, the price of their bread
fell. Since then, many places or industries where the state increased
enforcement have been investigated; the change in behavior of the
sanctioned companies or of all firms of the sanctioned type is mea-
sured in these quasi-experiments. For example, inspections and penal-
ties for workplace safety violations reduce injuries in sanctioned firms
(Mendelhoff and Gray, 2005). The jury is still out on whether the accu-
mulated findings provide support for deterrence (Simpson, 2002).
Independent and dependent variables are very different from study to
study. Various controls are utilized and findings are mixed. The state’s
general capacity to influence both street crime and white-collar crime
is difficult to demonstrate empirically using short-term correlations
between specific enforcement and crime.
Nevertheless, variation in threatened aversive consequences is a fun-
damental explanatory variable in the theory of crime as choice (Shover
and Bryant, 1993; Cohen and Simpson, 1997). Given the proven capac-
ity for rational responses to markets, it is not a large leap to the con-
clusion that threatened and actual consequences can reduce rates of
128 choosing white-collar crime
some types of crime. The threat of arrest for domestic violence is more
effective for men with jobs than for the unemployed (Berk et al., 1992;
Pate and Hamilton, 1992). White-collar offenders also should be more
responsive to changes in punishment than street offenders. They may
be more aware of the level of intolerance expressed in the message
of changing enforcement and it may mean more to them. Should
the state decide to send a message into the boardrooms and cubicles
of formal organizations that it is serious about a particular crime, or
crime generally, the stretch is shorter than it is to the backseat of a car
occupied by impoverished and drug addicted youth. A harshly worded
letter to executives can get attention and a series of arrests and jail sen-
tences clarifies the point. Street offenders receive no trade newsletters
and when one of theirs has been imprisoned it is not relevant or shock-
ing. Some in their ranks may pay heed, however, when they read one
of the billboards that says, “you + illegal gun = federal prison,” or “a
gun crime gets you five” that appear in many U.S. cities today. The
message gets across more clearly when all know from local gossip and
nightly news that it is true. Such a serious reminder well-placed can
turn conversations and throw cold water on criminal plans. Those
drafting ethical guidelines and administering educational programs
in corporations could take a lesson.
Research on target hardening and situational crime prevention
shows that few street offenders will choose to offend when the odds
of being caught near certainty, where success requires creativity or
significant effort, and where returns will be insignificant. Accounting
firms that inflate earnings estimates to meet quarterly objectives, gro-
cery clerks who ring employee discounts for friends, and street-corner
drug dealers share a potential for significant painful consequences and
are alike in this: many either ignore or view as unlikely these contin-
gencies. Few clear-headed offenders with anything appreciable to lose
would commit crime if they thought criminal prosecution or long-term
imprisonment were likely consequences. Most are aware that their acts
have the potential for criminal penalties if things go badly, but that is
not the outcome they expect. They hope to avoid penalties by hid-
ing their intent and responsibility. Like street offenders, most white-
collar offenders do not pin their hopes on the number of months pres-
cribed by the sentencing tables for convicted felons but on avoiding
decision making 129
entirely this penalty. Both groups look at the risks of detection opti-
mistically. Yet, the lives and generative worlds of street offender are
different in many respects.
Street offenders continue in crime because they avoid honest eval-
uation of dismal prospects or reach a point where they do not care.
White-collar offenders’ positive thinking can result from the calcula-
tion that punishing their acts is a low priority for the state. Confidence
among white-collar offenders can be the result of accurate evaluation
as well as predisposition with roots in their backgrounds. The paucity
of research on white-collar criminal decision making limits what can
be concluded about the generality of the decision-making process.
Such differences as there are, however, are explicable in the logic of
rational-choice theory. These provide little justification for assuming
that deterrent measures or crime-control strategies now aimed at other
crime would be less effective in white-collar worlds.
chapter six
130
criminal careers and career criminals 131
CAREER BEGINNINGS
employment and years. In the Yale Law School study, the age of onset
for offenders with only one offense on their record is thirty-five, while
for those with more than one offense it is twenty-four (Weisburd et al.,
1991). Another study found that the age of onset for white-collar crimi-
nals was forty-one for first offenders and twenty-seven for those with
prior arrests (Benson, 2002).
White-collar offenders are advantaged, and their generative worlds
differ profoundly as well. There is less abuse and criminality in their
backgrounds; street offenders are nearly three times more likely to
have a convicted offender in their immediate family while growing
up, and 18 percent were abused or neglected as children as compared
to 6 percent of white-collar offenders (Benson, 2002). The former are
twice as likely to have performed poorly in school (Benson and Kerley,
2001). While many ordinary white-collar offenders have chronic prob-
lems with alcohol or drugs, their numbers proportionately are fewer
than is true of street criminals. Weisburd and colleagues (2001:9–10)
point out that while the run of them “have little in common with
the powerful and wealthy individuals who are often conjured up as
images of the typical white-collar offender,” it is noteworthy also that
“they differ at least as sharply from the lower-class criminals that are
generally thought of when scholars or lay people discuss the crime
problem.” In sum, “one searches in vain for early precursors or early
hints of trouble in the life history of the typical white-collar offender.
For most, . . . [t]heir crimes do not appear . . . to be deeply rooted in a
troubled social background” (Benson and Kerley, 2001:133).
When do they begin, and what distinguishes the onset of crim-
inality by organizations? The absence of research into these mat-
ters is striking. Location in criminogenic industries or locales, weak
oversight, and performance pressure may be critical. This probably
explains why crime is more likely in faltering enterprises ( Jenkins and
Braithwaite, 1993). As Geis and Salinger (1998:94) put it, “it is a bit
surprising that no research of which we are aware has spanned the
life history of one or, better yet, a number of organizations and
the relationships between aspects of its existence and troubles with
the law.” The odds of having “trouble with the law” are nearly impossi-
ble to estimate, but many organizations and privileged individuals do.
134 choosing white-collar crime
These were the roles they were to play in our simulated prison. The
guards were made aware of the potential seriousness and danger of
the situation and their own vulnerability. They made up their own
formal rules for maintaining law, order and respect, and were gen-
erally free to improvise new ones during their eight-hour, three-man
shifts. The prisoners were unexpectedly picked up at their homes by
a city policeman in a squad car, searched, handcuffed, fingerprinted,
booked at the Palo Alto station house, and taken blindfolded to our
jail. There they were stripped, deloused, put into a uniform, given
a number and put into a cell . . . where they expected to live for the
next two weeks. (Zimbardo, 1972:6)
All activities taking place in the mock prison were observed and video
taped. Participants also were tested and interviewed at various points
during the study.
Guards quickly developed exaggerated roles of the kind found in
real prisons, becoming high-handed and tyrannical in the process.
Inmates became docile and showed signs of extreme emotional stress.
Three prisoners had to be released in the first four days because of
“acute situational traumatic reactions,” ranging from hysterical crying
and confused thinking to severe depression. Others begged to end
their participation early. These and other reactions by “guards” and
“prisoners” caused the investigators to terminate the study after only
six days.
criminal careers and career criminals 135
write up my report just as he did each day for street criminals, rapists,
car thieves and narcotics dealers. . . . I would now be in the hands of
GS-7 probation clerks, marshals, prison guards. The loss of control of
my body and life was a sensation I had not fully understood before.
(Colson, 1976:233)
He sat on his bunk and looked around, bewildered. I could tell by the
tortured expression on his fleshy face that this was his worst night-
mare. For him, the world had turned upside down and inside out;
Black people were in the majority, and they ran things; white people
were in the minority. . . . Clearly, he had never dreamed he’d spend
a minute passing through our world. . . . Whites in general caught
hell in jail. . . . White junkies, whose drug dealings had often taken
them to inner-city spots, did well because they’d grown comfortable
138 choosing white-collar crime
around blacks. But that was less the case with those sheltered, smug
whites. . . . They wore their racial fears and prejudices on their sleeves.
(McCall, 1994:155–56)
AFTER PUNISHMENT
must be monitored closely lest they foul up (McCleary, 1992). They are
unlikely to search for signs that they have returned to crime in urine
or erratic behavior, and evidence that they have done so generally is
not found in their pockets or glove boxes during traffic stops. Nor
do their prior criminal convictions make convicted white-collar crim-
inals part of the “usual suspects” who are picked up and questioned
when the police investigate well-publicized crimes. These are reasons
also why white-collar criminals who do recidivate generally remain in
the community longer than street criminals before rearrest or parole
violation (Weisburd et al., 2001).
Upperworld offenders are rarely imprisoned, and for them the
chances of being caught and imprisoned twice are negligible. Their
crimes may be products of ongoing conspiracies that extend over
months or years and result in many discrete criminal acts. Few of
the crimes they commit require physical dexterity and nerve of the
kind needed to rob and assault, and they may be carried out by subal-
terns or hirelings in any case. To hide their crimes and evade punish-
ment upperworld offenders can draw upon supportive networks and
relationships accumulated over years of privilege and organizational
power. Upperworld crime is profitable and rewarding far beyond what
is characteristic of ordinary white-collar criminals, and recidivism rates
for these offenders may exceed comparable rates for street criminals.
Rational-choice theory supports the expectation that offenders who
meet with criminal success while avoiding punishment are unlikely to
terminate transgression soon or voluntarily.
I think most people in filing a false income tax return [know that if ]
you are caught – if it happens to me – its an entirely different situation
from being convicted of a rape. I never felt any [stigma] from family,
from neighbors, from friends, from relatives, from poison pen letters.
Nothing. There has been absolutely no [stigma]. Most people treat
you exactly as if it didn’t happen. They don’t go out of their way to
be solicitous, and they don’t go out of their way to harm you. Some
want no involvement, but never is anybody negative. . . . This has been
my situation. . . . The first thing they give you is condolences and after
that it’s like it never happened.
Many but not all white-collar criminals manage to avoid both the
interpersonal opprobrium that comes with the label criminal and self-
reproach born of realization that they have committed crime.
Like individuals, organizations may suffer reputationally from crim-
inal conviction. Fisse and Braithwaite (1983) examined seventeen
cases of corporate crime by large companies where significant pub-
licity resulted. The publicity was costly to companies in earnings and
sales and, in a minority of cases, reduced stock price. Adverse public-
ity tends to be a brief and less severe problem for large corporations.
They recover quickly. Fisse and Braithwaite (1983:243) conclude that
long-term “financial impacts of any significance” are unlikely. Balanced
criminal careers and career criminals 145
Desistance
Desistance is the label applied to the statistical relationship between
aging and participation in serious crime; as age increases the odds
of recidivism decrease. When applied to individuals the break with
crime is not always clean cut and final. Desistance frequently is gradual,
drawn out over years, and interrupted by occasional relapse, at least
in the short run. Ethnographic and statistical studies have laid bare
the nature and dynamics of offenders’ lives following incarceration.
Successful desistance varies by their readiness to learn from past mis-
takes. In many cases it is preceded by growing belief that continued
criminal participation is not worth the cost (Glaser, 1964; Shover, 1985;
Shover and Thompson, 1992; Maruna, 2001). Desistance is linked also
to indicators of settled and personally rewarding lives as measured
by gainful employment and satisfying marriage, for example (Shover,
1996; Laub and Sampson, 2003).
The desistance concept admittedly is presumptive, particularly when
applied to white-collar criminals. Less is known about their postconvic-
tion experiences, in part because research into these matters presents
significant challenges. Given the fact that white-collar offenders are
more successful than street criminals delaying or avoiding arrest, the
problems of measuring desistance by them are difficult to surmount.
Weisburd and colleagues (2001:36), for example, point out that “we
cannot be certain, except in the case of death, that the final recorded
event on an offender’s criminal history is actually the last crime for
criminal careers and career criminals 147
Political leaders and policy advocates are united in belief that sanc-
tioning by the criminal justice apparatus is an important contingency
that shapes subsequent criminal career trajectories. As they see it, a bit
of punishment surely reduces the odds that apprehended offenders
will choose to commit crime again. It does so in large part because
punishment nurtures development of a more precise metric and cal-
culus of pain (Shover, 1996). By contributing to this rationalization of
decision making, punishment replaces what sometimes is an emotion-
laden and impulsive process with a more informed and prudent one.
To the extent they learn their lesson offenders are less likely to repeat
past mistakes. This is specific deterrence, or the effect of punishment
on those who experience it. In the short term the fact that most who
do so generally recoil is reason to believe its specific deterrent effect
is considerable.
In the Yale study imprisonment neither increased nor decreased
significantly the odds of recidivism when compared with fines or pro-
bation. The investigators note that this is true regardless of “whether
we examine the likelihood, timing, frequency, or type of recidivism”
(Weisburd et al., 2001:113). Beyond this report, however, there is
remarkably little evidence on specific deterrence of white-collar crime.
It is noteworthy, however, that evidence does not “support the oppo-
site argument that . . . imprisonment sanctions will backfire and lead
to more serious future offending” (Weisburd et al., 2001:113). Put
148 choosing white-collar crime
150
beyond the law? 151
the system has lost track of the simple truth that it is supposed to be
fair and to protect those who obey the law while punishing those who
break it. Somewhere along the way, the system began to serve lawyers
and judges and defendants, treating the victim with institutionalized
disinterest. (1982:vi)
[m]any . . . feel their needs have extremely low priority and that, at
best, they are tolerated and then often with ill humor. Their role,
they say, seems much like that of the expectant father in the hos-
pital at delivery time: necessary for things to have gotten underway
in the past but at the moment rather superfluous and mildly both-
ersome. . . . [T]he offender, at least, is regarded by criminal justice
functionaries as a doer, an antagonist, someone to be wary of, . . . The
victim, on the other hand, is part of the background scenery. (Geis,
1976:15)
Persuasion to Virtue
A movement to cooperative oversight of white-collar misconduct
gained momentum in the years before the millennium. It began
with agreement on the priority of avoiding the excesses of traditional
approaches to regulatory oversight that rely on notions of deterrence
(Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Braithwaite, 1983). Programs of respon-
sive regulation legitimize and make available to officials a range of
options when responding to compliance problems (Grabosky, 2001;
Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). Responsive regulation is “respon-
sive to industry structure in that different structures will be conducive
to different degrees and forms of regulation” and “attuned to the
differing motivations of regulated actors” (Ayres and Braithwaite,
1992:4). Regulators are counseled to be knowledgeable about and
take into account the larger contexts and individual meanings of non-
compliance. Under the new regimes, overseers will get to know some-
thing about citizens, industries, and organizations and the problems
158 choosing white-collar crime
their suffering has been used to justify sweeping reforms in the way
offenders are handled (Elias, 1986; Dubber, 2002). There has been
nothing comparable for victims of white-collar crime. Adoption and
use of the concept organizational culture illustrates the complex dynam-
ics and mixed if not skewed messages from scholarship on white-collar
crime.
Organizational Culture
Emergence of the world economic system has resulted in ever larger
numbers of firms conducting business and competing internationally.
As they do so and work to overcome local economic barriers, the con-
cept organizational culture has gained an analytic foothold (Shover and
Hochstetler, 2001). As explanation for a host of corporate behaviors,
it has captured the attention and allegiance of investigators as few
others. The excesses and eventual downfall of Enron, for example,
is attributed in large part to a culture described as one of “excess,”
“what’s in it for me,” “corrosive,” and “kill-or-be-killed” (McLean and
Elkind, 2004:122, 267, 300, 332). Initial explication of the notion of
organizational culture is more than fifty years old ( Jacques, 1951),
but it did not attract attention until nearly three decades later. The
animus for interest in organizational culture is belief that it is a “social
force that controls patterns of organizational behavior by shaping
members’ cognitions and perceptions of meanings and realities” (Ott,
1989:69). Others suggest that it has “a powerful influence throughout
an organization; it effects practically everything – from who gets pro-
moted and what decisions are made, to how employees dress and what
sports they play” (Deal and Kennedy, 1982:4). Those concerned with
crime and misdeeds generally agree that it can “legitimate retreat from
active ethical reflection on specific issues” (Alvesson, 2000:139).
Organizational culture is invoked also to make sense of organiza-
tional crime. Sonnenfeld and Lawrence (1978) indict the “culture
of the business” as an important cause of differential participation
in price-fixing behavior by firms in the folding-box industry dur-
ing the 1970s. They point specifically to “anticompetitive norms”
and suggest that price fixing became a “way of life” in guilty firms
(1978:149). On the basis of interviews with retired corporate man-
agers, Clinard (1983:65) reported that “[a]bout two-thirds . . . felt that
162 choosing white-collar crime
Ross and Sutherland were products of an era in U.S. history and a loca-
tion in the social structure that imbued citizens generally with a view
of government as responsive to popular will. Few today are as sanguine
as they ponder prospects for curbing crimes of privilege through res-
olute state action. Concern begins with fear that endemic dynamics of
the state in the contemporary economy may limit or render ineffec-
tive its responses to white-collar crime. Technology and globalization
have made it possible to conduct complex commercial transactions
almost instantaneously. Old barriers of time and distance have been
obliterated. As a result, state control “is increasingly bypassed by global
flows of capital, goods, services, technology, communication and infor-
mation” (Castells, 2004:303). As seen in policing international drug
trafficking and money laundering the variety, scale, and complexity
of cross border transactions are significant barriers to credible over-
sight (Guehenno, 1995). The technical and administrative capacity
to regulate international trade is within reach of only a few nations.
Maintaining levels of oversight comparable to what they once held
over transactions and production within their borders may be unlikely
if not unattainable in a global economy. Politically and legally defined
territories have less influence in some residents’ daily lives than in the
past (Tillman, 2002).
Diminution of national borders is even greater for those who are
aware of and able to shape global opportunities internationally. Cor-
porate executives, who choose where to locate their facilities, demand
lure and weak oversight. This dynamic is played out across the globe
as they negotiate with political leaders for low taxes, low cost govern-
ment services, free infrastructure, and limited restrictions on their
autonomy. In return they promise jobs.
Domestic industries and business firms do not take lightly the
recruitment of foreign companies with promises of largesse and a
pro-business environment that is not available to them. Nor are they
willing to accept easily that their operations should be regulated and
taxed more stringently than companies that keep parts of their opera-
tions abroad. As the links between national economies strengthen and
expand, so does competition among them and, “because capital is at
166 choosing white-collar crime
once mobile and in short supply, the desire to attract foreign capital
makes it difficult to control a nation’s capital” (Guehenno, 1995:10).
What once was commonplace but largely confined to intranational
dynamics is reproduced on a grander scale around the globe. Trade
ministers and NAFTA negotiators are not alone in making decisions
that balance protection of constituents with unpleasant economic real-
ities. This is the case increasingly where states confront economic
power.
Contemporary interpretations of the state emphasize its function
as a political-economic steering mechanism that operates with some
autonomy. The state and regulatory process are relatively free from
public campaigns and pressures and, in most cases, they service busi-
ness interests without disruption, impermissible levels of corruption,
or controversy. One reason is that state managers see the benefits of
bargaining and cooperation with powerful constituencies for smooth
administrative operations. They often work within narrow confines of
detailed and limited budgets. To be considered legitimate and reason-
able by businesses requires minimal conflict and resistance at every
step (Offe, 1985). They are aware that resistance from industry would
hamstring their efforts and undermine post investment in amicable
working relationships. Political leaders and state managers under-
standably protect interests and agencies close to home (Block, 1977;
1981). Sutherland (1949:249) pointed out that when state agents fail
to criminalize or punish illegal business activities often it is because,
“cultural homogeneity, close personal relationships, and power rela-
tionships protect against critical definitions by government.”
Economic cycles and political dynamics are major constraints on
criminalization and oversight as well. In boom times state managers
are free to respond to political pressures to limit the autonomy of
privileged interests. During periods of prosperity corporations and
business leaders likewise are willing to make concessions and are dis-
inclined to put up stiff resistance to incremental increases in regulatory
standards. The state responds rapidly to scandals that diminish confi-
dence in the economy. Quick enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley can be read
this way. When the faith of investors is shaken by fear that unscrupu-
lous business is placing investments at risk, corrective measures are
required. State managers always must be wary, however, about implying
beyond the law? 167
If we try to make the penalties for crime swifter and more certain, and
it should turn out that deterrence does not work, then we have merely
increased the risks facing persons who are guilty of crimes in any
event. If we fail to increase the certainty and swiftness of penalties, and
it should turn out that deterrence does work, then we have needlessly
168 choosing white-collar crime
case (New York Times, 2003a). Because white-collar criminals are more
rational than their street criminal cousins. They have every reason
to respond to threat with renewed caution and self-restraint. As Geis
(1999:156) notes:
People in high places are much more sensitive to the loss of prestige
associated with being a guest of the government in a state or federal
prison. Therefore, to the extent that they are likely to be treated in
this manner (as evidenced by the fact that others like them are so
treated) they are more likely than street offenders to arrange their
behaviors in accord with the requirements of the criminal law.
fraud, the latter were somewhat more effective than external audits
in this regard. In addition to the need for greater intra-organizational
knowledge and publicity about internal control mechanisms, the crit-
ical but often missing ingredient is unambiguous commitment from
the top.
Sonnenfeld and Lawrence (1978) interviewed a sample of execu-
tives in the forest products industry about their experience with man-
agement methods to control illegal behavior. They conclude that “one
of the consistent and early points that came up was the example set
for the company by the behavior of top management” (Sonnenfeld
and Lawrence, 1978:152). The same findings are reported by Clinard
(1983) based on interviews with sixty-four retired middle-management
executives who formerly were employed by Fortune 500 corporations.
“Signaling behaviors” by upper management are particularly impor-
tant (Baumhart, 1961; Brenner and Molander, 1977, Clinard, 1983;
Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Sonnenfeld and Lawrence, 1978). When
management communicates unequivocal messages to colleagues and
employees about the importance of compliance, the message is not lost
(Braithwaite, 1985). The value and priority they assign to compliance
with the law can permeate the organization and affects the outcome
of countless decisions by subordinates. A corporate manager explains
that “[w]hat is right in the corporation is not what is right in a man’s
home or church. What is right in the corporation is what the guy above
you wants from you. That’s what morality is in the corporation” ( Jackall,
1988:108). Despite questions about the effectiveness of codes of ethics,
the late twentieth century saw their adoption by major corporations
around the world (Wood and Rimmer, 2003). Uncertainty about them
importance as constraint on decision making persists, but their poten-
tial remains unchallenged. Callahan (2004:282 suggests that questions
about their effectiveness will not change “until companies [develop]
the means to integrate ethical values into daily routines.” The princi-
pal obstacle is that “many business leaders just don’t buy the idea that
more integrity means high profits” (Callahan, 2004:284).
It is difficult to assess the potential gains and losses of punish-
ment for offenders. There is reason to suppose, however, that white-
collar offenders may be positioned ideally for learning the lessons of
beyond the law? 173
imprisonment. Prison is painful for them in ways that differ from the
pains of the typical street offender (Braithwaite, 1989). Their ties to
conventional work trajectories are not as fragile and few serve sen-
tences so long that it destroys all they have achieved. Their resources
aid them in navigating the difficulties of reintegration and postrelease
supervision. The point of punishment is not to destroy lives by taking
so much that little can be achieved afterward. That can be justified for
only the most devastating crimes and unscrupulous offenders. But we
are far from reaching that point when it comes to how the fight
against white-collar crime now is waged. There is reason to believe that
many white-collar offenders could be humbled and turned from crime
by experiencing more certain and marginally more severe punish-
ment. Imprisonment should be used more often in the battle against
white-collar predators. If nothing else, it shocks and forces them to con-
front the fact that many people take their crime seriously. Those who
choose to offend deserve to be punished and to have their prospects
diminished by it. More would be turned away from crime if the unpleas-
antness and degradation of the most severe forms of punishment were
communicated credibly throughout the ranks of privileged citizens.
In calling for greater use of harsher sanctions, gratuitous pain is not
the object. Larger numbers of punished white-collar offenders are key,
not draconian increases in severity. Whether or not the contemporary
state is up to the challenge posed by increasing white-collar crime is
uncertain, but a strong effort will be needed to stem the tide. Lure is
changing and increasing, and awareness of it grows as well. The state
meanwhile sends morally limpid and permissive signals about its will-
ingness to fight white-collar crime, and globalization makes oversight
by nation states increasingly difficult. International initiatives fighting
white-collar crime are piecemeal and in their infancy.
The importance of a citizenry mobilized to insist upon greater over-
sight cannot be exagerrated. They must press for more credible and
effective controls on white-collar crime. Kagan and colleagues (2003)
show that oversight works best when it is coupled with active citizen
participation and the presence of stakeholders who pressure firms to
comply. In the absence of this it seems unlikely that they will be forth-
coming. This is an area of public policy where increased attention and
174 choosing white-collar crime
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Index
205
206 index
See also signaling behaviors Near, Janet P., 74, 160, 162
See also codes of ethics and varying Needleman, Carolyn, 118
support Needleman, Martin L., 118
Manza, Jeff, 142 negotiated compliance, See regulation,
Marcus, Alfred, 160 responsive
Maruna, Shadd, 70, 143, 146 Nelken, David 47
Mason, Karen A., 113 neutralizing justifications, 70–71, 72
Mason, Phyllis A., 171, 172 and social class, See social class and
Mathews, M. Cash, 171 rationalization
Matza, David, 72 New York Daily News, 45
May, Peter J., 56 New York Times, 8, 16, 44, 61, 103, 104,
Mayne, Ruth, 108 132, 169
McCall, Nathan, 138 Nold, Frederick Carl, 127
McCleary, Richard, 142 nongovernmental organizations, 78
McDougall, Susan, 49 North American Free Trade Agreement,
McFarland, Bentson H., 153 47, 107
McLean, Bethany, 17, 18, 36, 69, 92, 95,
101, 149, 157, 161 Offe, Claus, 166
Meithe, Terrance D., 81 Office of National Drug Control Policy,
Melbourne Herald Sun, 41 106
Memphis Commercial Appeal, 20, 43 Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
Memphis Flyer, 21 and Enforcement, 98
Mendelhoff, John, 147 official resolve and credibility of
Merck and Company, 102 oversight, 74
Messerschmidt, James W., 160 Olson, James, 111, 126
Miami Daily Business Review, 81 Onellion, Ashton P., 43
Michalowski, Raymond J., 23 organizational culture, 161–164
Microsoft Corporation, 40, 79 Ostrom, Elinor, 110
Miech, Richard A., 55 Ott, Steven J., 161
Miller, James C., 99 Ottawa Citizen, 31, 49
Mills, Michael, 152 oversight, 76
Minkow, Barry, 95 and civil prosecution, 103
Moffit, Terrie E., 55 and class action suits, 79
Mokhiber, Russell, 108 and fines, See fines
Molander, Earl A., 172 off-shore, See globalization
Monsanto Corporation, 105 private, 78–82
Moore, Elizabeth, 53, 171 state, 82–105, 167
Moore, Kevin B., 35 and whistleblowers, 79–82
Morrison, James,
motives, 56 Partnoy, Frank, 99, 123
Moutsatos, Steve S., 71 Passas, Nikos, 47, 49, 109
Murray, Dennis, 40 Pate, Anthony M., 128
Paternoster, Raymond, 76–83
Nadler, Richard, 35 Pearce, Frank, 24, 106, 159, 170
National Aeronautics and Space performance pressure
Administration, 115 and cultures of competition, 64
National Business Ethics Survey, 78 and decision making, 119
National Law Journal, 28 permissiveness
National Public Survey on White-collar growth of, 77
Crime, 82 and response to crime, 156, 167
National School Lunch Program, 31 Petersilia, Joan, 141, 143, 155
210 index
self restraint and white-collar crime, 76, Steele, Eric H., 152
170 states, as steering mechanisms, 166
Sennett, Richard, 59 Stewart, Martha, 8
Shapiro, Susan P., 6, 14–16, 97, 160 stigma, 144–145, 168
Shapiro, Ian, 109 Strange, Susan, 167
Shichor, David, 40, 131, 150, 153 Strategic Litigation Against Public
Shipler, David K., 12 Participation, 80
Shover, Neal 2, 11, 40, 52, 53, 55, 76–83, Strauss, Murray A., 59
102, 111, 126, 127, 131, 132, 141, 146, Streeck, Wolfgang, 167
147, 152, 161, 162 Superfund, 48
Sidak, Joseph Gregory, 127 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
signaling behaviors, 172 Act, 83
Silva, Phil A., 55 Sutherland, Edwin H., 6, 131, 165, 166
Simon, David R., 71 Swartz, Mimi, 66
Simpson, Sally S., 2, 72, 75, 76–83, 105, Sydney Morning Herald, 49
114, 120, 126, 127, 148 Sykes, Gresham, 72
situational crime prevention, 2, 128 Szockyj, Elizabeth, 150
Sjoberg, Gideon, 108 Szwajkowski, Eugene, 72, 160
Skolnick, Jerome H., 145
Skrzycki, Cindy, 83, 84 t’hart, Paul, 125
SLAPP, See Strategic Litigation Against Tabarrok, Alexander, 44
Public Participation Tacoma News Tribune, 9, 10
Smirich, Linda, 164 Tampa Tribute, 9
Smith, Ken G., 118 tax evasion, 31, 48, 56
Smith, Russell G., 39, 40, 94 Taxpayers Against Fraud, 118
Smith Vernon L., 109, 110 Taylor, Ian, 39
Snider, Laureen, 12, 85, 159 Taylor, Scott, 105
social class, 56 Teale, Alan, 46
definition of, 57 technology, and lure, 37–41
and childrearing, 59, 61–62 tempted individuals, 51
and cultural capital, 57, 70–71, 72 Tennyson, Sharon, 93
and generative worlds, See generative Thompson, Carol Y., 132, 146, 169
worlds Thornton, Dorothy, 59, 102, 157, 173
and rationalization, 59–60, 62–63, threat, 96
70–72 See also deterrence
and work, 11, 58, 60, 116 Tibbets, Steven G., 126
Social Security Administration, 29 Tickell, Adam, 37
Solow, Steven P., 80 Tillman, Robert, 33, 37, 46, 49, 72, 75,
Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey, 74, 161, 172 92, 98, 121, 165
Spalek, Basia, 153 Timilty, Joseph, 137
Sparrow, Malcolm K., 43, 93 Titus, Richard M., 10
Spencer, John C., 64 Tombs, Steven, 106, 159
Sperduto, Kim, 68 Tonry, Michael, 52
Stafford, Mark C., 168 transnational corporations,
Stanford University prison simulation, and globalization, 45
134 and allocation of lure 49
state largesse and influence on oversight, 105
and lure, 29–32 Troy, Carmelita, 118
as entitlement, 69 Tversky, Amos, 124
State Bar of California, 78 Tyler, Tom R., 158
Staw, Barry M., 72 Tyson Foods, 27
212 index
Uggen, Christopher, 142 Waring, Elin, 2, 7, 11, 26, 28, 38, 52, 70,
Union Carbide Corporation, 106 97, 114, 115, 126, 133, 140, 141, 143,
United Nations, 45 144, 145, 146, 147
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 52 Warr, Mark, 112, 126, 168
U.S. Center for Disease Control, 42 Washington Post, 9, 20, 32, 44, 45, 75, 79
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Watergate scandals, 154
16, 31, 47 Weber, Marvin, 74
U.S. Congress, Senate, 29 Weder, Beatrice, 47
U.S. Department of Commerce, 52 Weir, Adrianne, 111
U.S. Department of Health Education Weisberg, Herbert W., 93
and Welfare, 29 Weisburd, David, 2, 7, 11, 26, 27–28, 38,
U.S. Department of Health and Human 39, 52, 70, 97, 110, 114, 115, 126,
Services, 42 133, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146,
U.S. Department of Justice, 10, 80, 96, 147
117, 139, 140, 150 Weiss, Richard A., 45
U.S. Department of Labor, 107 Weissman, Robert 108
U.S. Department of Treasury, 39 Western, Bruce, 128
U.S. District Courts, 103 Wheeler, Stanton, 2, 7, 11, 26, 27–28, 38,
U.S. Federal Reserve Board, 34 52, 70, 93, 97, 133, 140, 145
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Whistleblower Protection Act, See
83–102 oversight, whistleblowers
U.S. General Accounting Office, 29, 32, white-collar crime
84 amount, 10, 13
U.S. Mine Safety and Health characteristics of, 4
Administration, 104 corporate crime, 24
U.S. Securities and Exchange data deficiencies, 13, 150
Commission, 18, 97 definition of, 6–8, 52, 160
U.S. Sentencing Commission, 55, 89, 90, ordinary white-collar crime, 24
96 organizational white-collar crime, 24
United Way of America, 62 upperworld white-collar crime, 24
University of Colorado, 9 Wickersham, Peter, 78
Urbas, Gregor, 40, 94 Wikstrom, P-O, 75
Urry, John, 37 Wilkinson, Rorden, 108
USA Today, 40 Williams, Arlington, 110
Williams, Norma, 108
Vaiana, Mary, 33 Wilson, James Q., 1, 63, 77–83, 92, 170
van den Haag, Ernest, 3, 156 Winans, R. Foster, 125
Vandivier, Kermit, 119, 126 Wood, Greg, 171
Vaughan, Diane, 30, 37, 39, 77, 101, 115, World Almanac, 47
126, 152, 160, 163 Wright, Bradley R. Entner, 55
victimization, 151–153, 160 Wright, John P., 23
von Hirsch, Andrew, 75 Wright, Richard T., 111, 112