Panlilio V RTC Manila, G.R. No. 173846
Panlilio V RTC Manila, G.R. No. 173846
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the April 27, 2006 Decision 2 and August 2, 2006 Resolution 3 of the Court of the
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90947. TAHcCI
On October 15, 2004, Jose Marcel Panlilio, Erlinda Panlilio, Nicole Morris and Mario Cristobal
(petitioners), as corporate officers of Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (SIHI), filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24, a petition for Suspension of Payments and Rehabilitation 4
in SEC Corp. Case No. 04-111180.
On October 18, 2004, the RTC of Manila, Branch 24, issued an Order 5 staying all claims against
SIHI upon finding the petition sufficient in form and substance. The pertinent portions of the Order
read:
Finding the petition, together with its annexes, sufficient in form and substance and pursuant
to Section 6, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, the Court hereby:
2)Stays the enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise and whether such
enforcement is by court action or otherwise, against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties
not solidarily liable with the debtor. 6
At the time, however, of the filing of the petition for rehabilitation, there were a number of criminal
charges 7 pending against petitioners in Branch 51 of the RTC of Manila. These criminal charges
were initiated by respondent Social Security System (SSS) and involved charges of violations of
Section 28 (h) 8 of Republic Act 8282, or the Social Security Act of 1997 (SSS law), in relation to
Article 315 (1) (b) 9 of the Revised Penal Code, or Estafa. Consequently, petitioners filed with the
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RTC of Manila, Branch 51, a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings. 10 Petitioners
argued that the stay order issued by Branch 24 should also apply to the criminal charges pending in
Branch 51. Petitioners, thus, prayed that Branch 51 suspend its proceedings until the petition for
rehabilitation was finally resolved.
On December 13, 2004, Branch 51 issued an Order 11 denying petitioners' motion to suspend the
proceedings. It ruled that the stay order issued by Branch 24 did not cover criminal proceedings, to
wit:
Clearly then, the issue is, whether the stay order issued by the RTC commercial court,
Branch 24 includes the above-captioned criminal cases.
The Court shares the view of the private complainants and the SSS that the said stay order
does not include the prosecution of criminal offenses. Precisely, the law "criminalizes" the
non-remittance of SSS contributions by an employer to protect the employees from
unscrupulous employers. Clearly, in these cases, public interest requires that the said
criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.
From the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the stay order issued by RTC Branch
24 does not include the above-captioned cases which are criminal in nature. 12
On August 19, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari 13 with the CA assailing the Order of
Branch 51.
On April 27, 2006, the CA issued a Decision denying the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
The CA discussed that violation of the provisions of the SSS law was a criminal liability and was,
thus, personal to the offender. As such, the CA held that the criminal proceedings against the
petitioners should not be considered a claim against the corporation and, consequently, not covered
by the stay order issued by Branch 24.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 15 which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated August 2, 2006.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioners raising a lone issue for this Court's resolution, to wit:
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To begin with, corporate rehabilitation connotes the restoration of the debtor to a position of
successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continued operation is economically feasible
and its creditors can recover more, by way of the present value of payments projected in the
rehabilitation plan, if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately
liquidated. 17 It contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and
reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency, the purpose
being to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims
out of its earnings. 18
A principal feature of corporate rehabilitation is the suspension of claims against the distressed
corporation. Section 6 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, provides for suspension of
claims against corporations undergoing rehabilitation, to wit:
Section 6 (c). . . .
In November 21, 2000, this Court En Banc promulgated the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, 20 Section 6, Rule 4 of which provides a stay order on all claims against the
corporation, thus:
Stay Order. — If the court finds the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, it shall,
not later than five (5) days from the filing of the petition, issue an Order . . .; (b) staying
enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise and whether such enforcement
is by court action or otherwise, against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily
liable with the debtor; . . . 21
In Finasia Investments and Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 22 the term "claim" has been
construed to refer to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature, or the assertion to have money paid.
The purpose for suspending actions for claims against the corporation in a rehabilitation proceeding
is to enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his
powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the
rescue of the debtor company. 23 IATHaS
The issue to be resolved then is: does the suspension of "all claims" as an incident to a corporate
rehabilitation also contemplate the suspension of criminal charges filed against the corporate officers
of the distressed corporation?
In Rosario v. Co 24 (Rosario), a case of recent vintage, the issue resolved by this Court was whether
or not during the pendency of rehabilitation proceedings, criminal charges for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 should be suspended, was disposed of as follows:
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. . . the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
designed to prevent damage to trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. In
Lozano v. Martinez, this Court declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of
worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order. Hence, the criminal prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by
punishing offenders and deterring others.
Consequently, the filing of the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not a "claim" that can
be enjoined within the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. True, although conviction of the
accused for the alleged crime could result in the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the felonious act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is a criminal action.
A criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity
to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the
punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the
conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended
to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate
penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On
the other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely
to indemnify the former. 25
Rosario is at fours with the case at bar. Petitioners are charged with violations of Section 28 (h) of
the SSS law, in relation to Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, or Estafa. The SSS law
clearly "criminalizes" the non-remittance of SSS contributions by an employer to protect the
employees from unscrupulous employers. Therefore, public interest requires that the said criminal
acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society. cDEICH
The rehabilitation of SIHI and the settlement of claims against the corporation is not a legal ground
for the extinction of petitioners' criminal liabilities. There is no reason why criminal proceedings
should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime purpose of the criminal
action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order. 26 As correctly observed in Rosario, 27 it would be absurd for one who has engaged in
criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the
corporation of which he is an officer.
The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of the
corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual capacities. Such being the case, the
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purpose of the law for the issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since the appointed
rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as mandated by law. It bears to stress that
the rehabilitation receiver is not charged to defend the officers of the corporation. If there is anything
that the rehabilitation receiver might be remotely interested in is whether the court also rules that
petitioners are civilly liable. Such a scenario, however, is not a reason to suspend the criminal
proceedings, because as aptly discussed in Rosario, should the court prosecuting the officers of the
corporation find that an award or indemnification is warranted, such award would fall under the
category of claims, the execution of which would be subject to the stay order issued by the
rehabilitation court. 28 The penal sanctions as a consequence of violation of the SSS law, in relation
to the revised penal code can therefore be implemented if petitioners are found guilty after trial.
However, any civil indemnity awarded as a result of their conviction would be subject to the stay
order issued by the rehabilitation court. Only to this extent can the order of suspension be considered
obligatory upon any court, tribunal, branch or body where there are pending actions for claims
against the distressed corporation. 29
On a final note, this Court would like to point out that Congress has recently enacted Republic Act
No. 10142, or the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010. 30 Section 18 thereof
explicitly provides that criminal actions against the individual officer of a corporation are not subject
to the Stay or Suspension Order in rehabilitation proceedings, to wit:
(g)any criminal action against individual debtor or owner, partner, director or officer of a
debtor shall not be affected by any proceeding commenced under this Act.
Withal, based on the foregoing discussion, this Court rules that there is no legal impediment for
Branch 51 to proceed with the cases filed against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 27, 2006 Decision and
August 2, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90947 are AFFIRMED. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 51, is ORDERED to proceed with the criminal cases filed
against petitioners. HcSETI
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
2.Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and
Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring, id. at 31-37.
3.Id. at 28.
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4.Id. at 102-110.
5.Id. at 111-113.
6.Id. at 112.
7.Crim. Cases Nos. 00-184890, 00-183031 to 71, 03-213284 to 88, 03-206273, 03-207141, 03-214539,
03-214667, 03-215273, 03-215650, 03-215651, 03-216015 and 03-216187.
8.(h) Any employer who, after deducting the monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his
employee's compensation, fails to remit the said deduction to the SSS within thirty (30) days from
the date they became due, shall be presumed to have misappropriated such contributions or loan
amortizations and shall suffer the penalties provided in Article Three hundred fifteen of the Revised
Penal Code.
9.(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.
12.Id. at 376.
14.Id. at 37.
15.Id. at 169-174.
16.Id. at 14.
17.Rule 2, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, effective January 19, 2009,
supplanting the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC).
18.Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 163156 and 166845, December 10, 2008,
573 SCRA 434, 450.
19.Emphasis supplied.
21.Emphasis supplied.
23.BF Homes, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76879 and 77143, October 3, 1990, 190 SCRA
262, 269.
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28.Id. at 252-253.
29.Id. at 253.
*Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per raffle
dated June 22, 2009.
**Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per raffle dated July
12, 2010.
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