Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Abdusakur M. Tan, Abdulwahid Sahidulla, Abraham Burahan: Petitioners
Abdusakur M. Tan, Abdulwahid Sahidulla, Abraham Burahan: Petitioners
SYNOPSIS
Respondents filed before the COMELEC petitions for declaration of failure of
election in all the precincts in the Municipality of Luuk, Sulu and the Municipalities
of Parang and Indanan, Sulu, docketed as SPA No. 01-257 and SPA No. 01-265.
Subsequently, they amended the petitions impleading petitioners who were the
winning candidates. On the issue of whether the COMELEC En Banc has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the amended petitions, the Court ruled in the
negative. There was no failure of elections when elections had been conducted
and winners had been already proclaimed. The proper recourse of the respondents
should have been to file regular election protest cases to ventilate the veracity of
the alleged election fraud and irregularities of the election in the subject precincts
with the consequent determination and declaration of the real winners in the
election. Anent the validity of the Order of the COMELEC where it recalled the
annulment of the proclamation of petitioners as winning candidates, the Court ruled
that respondents failed to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.
SYLLABUS
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETIONARY TO THE COMELEC. — The OSG agreed that
the public respondent is vested with authority to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidates or to annul such proclamation but contend that the public
respondent may in the exercise of its discretion allow such proclamation or set
aside its order annulling the proclamation of the winning candidates, ratiocinating
that: . . . While we agree with the petitioner that the COMELEC can suspend the
proclamation pending the resolution of the petition to declare a failure of election,
the same order, however, is merely provisional in nature and can be lifted when
the evidence so warrants. In Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762 [1997], it is
said to be akin to a temporary restraining order which a court can issue ex
parte under exigent circumstances. We agree with the OSG. The respondents
failed to show that the public respondent committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess lack of jurisdiction in issuing its June 28, 2001 Order.
CALLEJO, SR., J : p
FACTS: Before us are two consolidated petitions filed under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, assailing the Orders of the Commission on Elections En
Banc dated June 28, 2001, October 3, 2001 and April 17, 2002 in SPA No. 01-257
and SPA No. 01-265 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The factual antecedents insofar as pertinent to the instant petitions are as follows:
In the May 14, 2001 elections, Abdusakur Tan and Abdulwahid Sahidulla were
candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, while Munib Estino and
Abraham Burahan were candidates for Congressman of the Second and First
District of Sulu, respectively. The other candidates for Governor and Vice-
Governor were Yusop Jikiri and Abdel Anni. The candidates for the position of
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the First District of Sulu were Den
Rasher Salim, Talib Hayudini, Rizal Tingkahan and Barlie Nahudan, while those
for the Second District were Abraham Daud, Lukman Omar, Onnih Ahmad and
Basaron Burahan.
On May 17, 2001, Abdusakur Tan, Abdulwahid Sahidulla and Abraham Burahan
(Abdusakur Tan, et al. for brevity) filed with the COMELEC (public respondent) a
petition to "declare failure of elections in all the precincts in the Municipality of
Luuk," Province of Sulu, which was docketed as SPA No. 01-257. 1 The petitioners
prayed that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the
Honorable Commission DECLARE a FAILURE of ELECTIONS in all the
precincts in the Municipality of Luuk, Sulu where no voting was actually
held, as the registered voters never did their votes.
The petitioners further pray that pending final resolution of this petition that
an order be immediately issued directing the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Luuk, Sulu as well as the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Sulu to suspend and desist from continuing with, the CANVASSING of
the election returns and/or certificate of canvass.
Other relief consistent with law, justice and equity are also prayed for. 2
Petitioners further pray that pending final resolution of this petition that an
order be immediately issued directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Luuk, Sulu as well as the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu to
suspend, and desist from continuing with, the CANVASSING of the
election returns and/or certificate of canvass.
Other relief consistent with law, justice, and equity are also prayed for. 10
FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Arao and private respondent Warlito Pulmones were
candidates for the Office of City Mayor of Pagadian City in the January 18, 1988,
local elections. After canvass, petitioner was shown to have garnered 12,447
votes, while private respondent, only 12,030 votes, or a margin of 417 votes in
favor of petitioner. Consequently, on January 21, 1988, petitioner was proclaimed
City Mayor-elect of Pagadian City.
On January 28, 1988, private respondent filed his Protest with COMELEC more
particularly alleging that "while fraud and anomalies were rampant in practically all
the voting centers of Pagadian City, the violations were glaringly and notably
perpetrated in the following districts and/or precincts, to wit: (a) [I]n all the three (3)
precincts of Kawit District . . . (b) [I]n Tuburan District . . . particularly in Precincts
77 and 80 . . . (c) (I)n Bonifacio District, particularly Precinct 69 . . . (d) [I)n Sta.
Lucia District, particularly Precinct No. 42 . . . (e) [I)n all of the seven (7) precincts
in Sto Niño District . . . (f) [I)n San Jose District, particularly Precinct No. 32 . . . (g)
[I)n Precinct No. 33 of San Jose District . . . (h) [I)n Precinct No. 34 of San Jose
District . . . (i) [I)n all the precincts in San Pedro District . . . (j) [I)n Precincts 19 and
22 of Gatas District . . . (k) . . . in all the precincts in Balangasa District but more
notably in Precincts 8 and 11 . . ."
On February 8, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer with Counterprotest. However,
COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the counterprotest per its Resolution for
failure to pay the required filing fee with the reglementary period.
On February 15, 1988, or after the 10-day period to file an election protest, private
respondent filed an Amended Protest enumerating therein thirteen (13) precincts
which were not previously specified: Precincts 1-A, 4, 6, 9, 17, 20, 21, 30, 31, 35,
36, 50 and 70. Actually, other precincts, i.e., Precincts 101, 110, 111, 112, 113,
121, 122, 129, 137, 143, 153, 108 and 131, which were not particularly mentioned
in the Petition, were included in the Amended Protest.
On March 3, 1988, petitioner filed his Protestee's Comments and Observations on
the Amended Protest, although received by COMELEC only on April 4, 1988.
After revision of ballots and hearing, COMELEC (First Division) promulgated a
Resolution the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE . . . the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to DISMISS Election Protest Case No. 88-1 and
DECLARES protestee winner of the election protest by a margin of 378
votes in lieu of the original lead of protestee by 417 votes over protestant
at the time of the former's proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers
of Pagadian City."
Private respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner claims that on January 15, 1992, he filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to the Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent raising the following points:
(a) examination and appreciation of ballots should have been confined to
31 protested precincts per original protest filed January 28, 1988,
considering that amended protest was decreed as "not admissible" in the
February 7, 1991, Resolution of COMELEC (First Division);
(b) examination of ballots to determine identical handwritings should be
limited to Precincts 19, 22, 8 and 11 as alleged in the original protest;
(c) it was contrary to basic rules for COMELEC to pass upon ballots (in
favor of protestee) as identical with each other when they were not even
questioned by protestant, thus depriving protestee the right to present
controverting evidence;
(d) COMELEC failed to consider its records showing that there were 139
assisted illiterate or disabled voters, hence, to invalidate their votes is
technically a disenfranchisement and a subversion of sovereign will;
(e) it is statistically improbable for a candidate to have utilized 332 groups
(persons) to write 723 ballots (a ratio of 1 person for 2 ballots);
(f) mathematical computation of protestant in his motion for
reconsideration is erroneous and self-serving; and,
(g) COMELEC should have credited 10 more votes for protestee as
affirmed/admitted during the revision of ballots.
However, in his Comment, private respondent Pulmones denies all these
averments of petitioner, and claims that they contain "baseless and unfounded"
allegations which are precisely to be rejected in this petition.
On January 23, 1992, COMELEC En Banc promulgated its Decision thus —
"ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc hereby renders judgment: a.
GRANTING Protestant Pulmones' Motion for Reconsideration; b.
DENYING Protestee Arao's Manifestation for the dismissal of Protestant's
Motion for Reconsideration; c. AFFIRMING the factual findings of the
Commission (First Division) relative to the examination of the contested
ballots of both Protestant and Protestee; d. DECLARING Protestant
Warlito Pulmones as the duly elected Mayor of Pagadian City in the
January 18, 1988 elections with a margin of 516 votes against Protestee
Benjamin F. Arao; and, e. ORDERING Protestee Arao to VACATE his
office and surrender the same to Protestant Pulmones once this decision
becomes final and executory." 17
Meanwhile, on February 28, 1992, acting on the motion of Pulmones, respondent
COMELEC granted the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its Decision of
January 23, 1992.
On March 4, 1992, petitioner filed with Us an urgent motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order against the February
28, 1992, Order of public respondent. LLphil
On March 5, 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for
by petitioner, and required private respondent to comment thereon.
ISSUE: Whether respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion or exceeded
its jurisdiction: (1) when it examined and invalidated 426 ballots for petitioner in
precincts not included in the original protest but only in the amended protest filed
beyond the ten-day period; (2) when it invalidated 466 ballots for petitioner as
having identical handwritings although protestant did not raise such issues, nor
impugn the validity of the ballots on such ground; and, (3) when it concluded that
certain ballots were with identical handwritings, some marked, and others stray,
and deducting them from the total votes of petitioner without stating the grounds
therefor.
RULING:
As regards the first issue of petitioner, it appears that the original Protest of private
respondent Pulmones did in fact cover all the forty-five (45) precincts the
COMELEC took cognizance of in resolving EPC No. 88-1. As alleged in par. 5 of
his Protest —
"5. That while fraud and anomalies were rampant in practically all the
voting centers of Pagadian City, the violations were glaringly and notably
perpetrated in the following districts and/or precincts . . ."
The prayer in the same Protest also confirms that it refers to forty-five (45)
precincts, which tallies with the total number of precincts contested by protestant,
now private respondent.
It may be noted that while protestant did attempt to introduce new precincts in his
Amended Protest filed on February 15, 1988, namely, Precincts Nos. 101, 111,
112, 113, 121, 122, 129, 137, 143, 153, 108 and 131, which were not enumerated
in the original Protest, these precincts were not taken into consideration by
COMELEC in deciding EPC No. 88-1. Hence, the first issue clearly appears to be
based on a wrong premise.
On the second issue, the failure or omission of protestant to raise the question of
identical handwriting or of impugning the validity of the ballots on that ground,
resulting in the invalidation of 466 ballots for petitioner, does not preclude
respondent COMELEC from rejecting them on that ground.
Unlike an ordinary suit, an election protest is of utmost public concern. The rights
of the contending parties in the position aspired for must yield to the far
greater interest of the citizens in the sanctity of the electoral process. This
being the case, the choice of the people to represent them may not be
bargained away by the sheer negligence of a party, nor defeated by technical
rules of procedure. Thus, COMELEC cannot just close its eyes to the illegality of
the ballots brought before it, where the ground for the invalidation was omitted by
the protestant. As held in Yalung v. Atienza:
". . . Inasmuch as it is not necessary to specify in detail in the motion of
protest in which of the ballots the frauds and irregularities were committed,
such a procedure being well-nigh impossible, and it being enough to
allege in what the fraud and irregularity considered, and that had it not
been for such anomalies, the result of the election would have been
otherwise, all of which have been alleged in the motion of protest in
question, the court or the commissioners appointed by the same may
revise all the ballots, admitting the valid and legal ones and rejecting the
others, with a view to arriving at the lawfully expressed will of the
electors. The institution of popular suffrage is one of public interest and
not a private interest of the candidates, so that if in the revision of the
ballots some illegal ballots are found which have not been specifically
impugned in the motion of protest, the court may reject them motu propio,
since it is not essential that the contestant set forth the grounds of his
contest with the same precision required of a pleading in ordinary civil
cases.
"In the case of Lucero vs. De Guzman (45 Phil. 852), this court stated the
following: 'The purpose of the legislature in declaring that contests should
not be conducted upon pleadings or by action was to free the courts as
far as possible from the technicalities incident to ordinary proceeding by
action and to enable the courts to administer justice speedily and without
complication."
"The trial court, then, did not err in taking into account in the revision of
the ballots, irregularities not set forth in the motion of protest."
With regard to the third issue, the complaint of petitioner against the alleged
omission of COMELEC to state the reasons for its conclusion that certain ballots
were with identical handwritings, some marked and others stray, does not in any
magnitude diminish the straightforward statement of the public respondent that "it
painstakingly examined and appreciated individually the contested ballots for both
protestant and protestee in accordance with existing norms . . ."
Petitioner did not question this alleged irregularity by bringing the matter to the
attention of COMELEC (First Division) immediately after the promulgation of its
Resolution. The Resolution containing the alleged jurisdictional defect was
promulgated on December 11, 1991. However, it was not until he filed his petition
on February 17, 1992, that petitioner complained for the first time. Certainly, that
Resolution having been rendered by a division of COMELEC could have been
subject of a motion for reconsideration. Admittedly, petitioner did not take steps to
have the matter reconsidered by public respondent before coming to Us.
Having been declared winner in the Resolution of December 11, 1991, petitioner
would not ordinarily be expected to initiate a motion for reconsideration.
Nonetheless, he could have brought up his objections in his Memorandum in
opposition to the Protestant's Motion for Reconsideration so that public respondent
could have properly ruled thereon. Consequently, petitioner may be deemed to
have waived his right to question the Resolution when he failed to act accordingly
despite the opportunity so to do. He should not be permitted, in other words, to
remain mute and unaffected in the face of a perceived jurisdictional defect and,
worse, profit from his quiescence, only to grumble in the end when it turns out to
be prejudicial to his interest. As it has been said, "[n]either equity not the law
relieves those who seek aid in Court merely to avoid the effects of their own
negligence . . ." (Lipscomb v. Talbott, 243 Mo 1, 36 [1912]).
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, patent and
substantial, the petition is DENIED.llcd
SYLLABUS
FACTS: Danilo F. Gatchalian and Gregorio N. Aruelo, Jr. were rival candidates
for the office of the Vice Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 11, 1992
elections.
On May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Gatchalian as
the duly elected Vice Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan by a margin of four votes.
On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a verified petition docketed as SPC No. 92-130 seeking to annul
the proclamation of Gatchalian.
On June 2, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Regional Trial Court, an election
protest alleging that the protest was filed ex abudante cautela, there being a
pending pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC. It likewise contained a
claim for damages in the amount of P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
On the same date, Aruelo paid the amount of P610.00 as filing fees.
On June 10, 1992, Gatchalian received an amended summons from the
clerk of court of the trial court, giving him five days within which to answer.
Instead of filing an answer, Gatchalian filed a motion to dismiss on June
15, 1992 on the following grounds: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b)
there was a pending pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC, and hence
the protest was premature; and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing
fees and cash deposit upon filing of the petition. Aruelo filed an opposition to
the motion to dismiss, to which Gatchalian filed a reply.
Meanwhile, on June 17, 1992, the COMELEC denied Aruelo's pre-
proclamation case.
In its Order dated July 10, 1992, the trial court denied Gatchalian's
motion to dismiss and ordered him to file his answer within five days from
notice thereof. Gatchalian's motion for reconsideration was denied on August
3, 1992.
On August 6, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the Court of Appeals, a
petition for certiorari (CA -G.R. SP No. 28621) alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
as well as his motion for reconsideration.
On November 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
concluding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in denying Gatchalian's motion to dismiss. It further ruled that the
election protest was timely filed and that Gatchalian's averment that the
election protest should be dismissed on the ground of non-payment of filing
fee was devoid of merit.
Hence, this petition.
SYNOPSIS
This Court found that petitioner's petition with the COMELEC was not referred to
a division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to the
Commissionen banc. The petition for certiorari assailed the trial court's order
denying the motion to dismiss private respondent's election protest. The
questioned order of the trial court is interlocutory because it does not end the trial
court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other. The authority to resolve a petition
for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned
order of the trial court; falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the
COMELEC en banc. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of petitioner's petition in the first instance.
In order to write finis to the controversy at bar, the Court resolved the issues raised
by petitioner. A close scrutiny of the receipts will show that private respondent
failed to pay the filing fee of P300.00 for his protest as prescribed by the COMELEC
rules. A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. Patently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
private respondent's election protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not
ordering the dismissal of private respondent's protest case. The Court noted that
the verification of aforesaid protest was defective. Since the petition lacked proper
verification, it should be treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed.
Further, the Court found that private respondent did not comply with the required
certification against forum shopping. Private respondent successively filed a
"petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return" and an
election protest. Yet, he did not disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed
a petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election returns.
The instant petition was GRANTED.
SYLLABUS
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY'S BELIEF THAT HE NO LONGER HAD A PENDING CASE
BEFORE THE COMELEC BECAUSE HE DEEMED THE PRE-PROCLAMATION
CASE ABANDONED UPON FILING OF ELECTION PROTEST IS NOT A VALID
REASON FOR NON-DISCLOSURE. — [P]rivate respondent's belief that he no
longer had a pending case before the COMELEC because he deemed it
abandoned upon filing of his protest is not a valid reason for non-disclosure of the
pendency of said pre-proclamation case. Note that the COMELEC dismissed
private respondent's pre-proclamation case only on July 3, 1998. Before the
dismissal, said case was legally still pending resolution.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE FACT THAT ELECTION PROTEST WAS NOT BASED ON
SAME CAUSE OF ACTION AS THE PRE-PROCLAMATION CASE IS NOT A
VALID EXCUSE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. — [T]he fact that private
respondent's protest was not based on the same cause of action as his pre-
proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not complying with the required
disclosure in the certification against forum shopping.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDATORY. — The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused
by the fact that a party is not guilty of forum shopping. The rule applies to any
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether
the party filing it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing any
initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not and will not
commit forum shopping. Otherwise we would have an absurd situation, as in this
case, where the parties themselves would be the judge of whether their actions
constitute a violation of the rule, and compliance therewith would depend on their
belief that they might or might not have violated the requirement. Such
interpretation of the requirement would defeat the very purpose of the rule.
10. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; PRE-PROCLAMATION
CONTROVERSIES; SHOULD NOT BE ENTERTAINED BY THE COMELEC
AFTER THE WINNING CANDIDATES WERE PROCLAIMED. — It could be
argued that private respondent's petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion
of election returns was a pre-proclamation case. The issues raised in that petition
pertain to the preparation and appreciation of election returns and the proceedings
of the municipal board of canvassers. But note that such petition was filed after the
proclamation of petitioner as the winning candidate, thus, the petition was no
longer viable, for pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by
the COMELEC after the winning candidates have been proclaimed.
QUISUMBING, J : p
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May
14, 1998, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner Ferdinand
Thomas Soller duly elected mayor.
On May 19, 1998, private respondent Angel Saulong filed with the COMELEC a
'petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return". On May
25, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro, an election protest against petitioner docketed as EC-31-98.
On June 15, 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Petitioner also
moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
forum-shopping, and failure to state cause of action.
On July 3, 1998, COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private
respondent.
On October 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but said motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with
the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing private respondent's election protest.
On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's suit. The
election tribunal held that private respondent paid the required filing fee. It also
declared that the defect in the verification is a mere technical defect which should
not bar the determination of the merits of the case. The election tribunal stated that
there was no forum shopping to speak of. ADSTCI
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J : p
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, filed by petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo. He alleged that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), herein public respondent, committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing in HRET Case No. 01-024, Pablo Ocampo
vs. Mario "Mark Jimenez" Crespo, the (a) Resolution dated March 27, 2003
holding that "protestant" (herein petitioner) cannot be proclaimed the duly elected
Representative of the 6th District of Manila since being a second placer, he "cannot
be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates";
and (b) Resolution 3 dated June 2, 2003 denying his motion for reconsideration.
FACTS: On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed
private respondent Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the May 14, 2001 elections.
He was credited with 32,097 votes or a margin of 768 votes over petitioner who
obtained 31,329 votes.
On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed with the HRET an electoral protest against private
respondent, impugning the election in 807 precincts in the 6th District of Manila on
the following grounds: (1) misreading of votes garnered by
petitioner; (2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of election
returns; (4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5) presence of
ballots written by one person or two persons. The case was docketed as HRET
Case No. 01-024. Petitioner prayed that a revision and appreciation of the ballots
in the 807 contested precincts be conducted; and that, thereafter, he be proclaimed
the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
On June 18, 2001, private respondent filed his answer with counter-
protest vehemently denying that he engaged in massive vote buying. He also
opposed petitioner's allegation that there is a need for the revision and appreciation
of ballots.
After the preliminary conference between the parties on July 12, 2001, the HRET
issued a Resolution limiting the issues to: first, whether massive vote-buying was
committed by private respondent; and second, whether petitioner can be
proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th District of Manila.
Meanwhile, on March 6, 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases Nos. 01-020,
Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo, and 01-023,
Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo, issued Resolutions declaring that
private respondent is "ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of
Manila for lack of residence in the district" and ordering "him to vacate his
office." Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
On March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to implement Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, which reads:
"Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof, order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong."
Petitioner averred that since private respondent was declared disqualified
in HRET Cases Nos. 01-020 and 01-023, the votes cast for him should not be
counted. And having garnered the second highest number of votes, he
(petitioner) should be declared the winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
On March 26, 2003, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner's motion to
implement the afore-quoted provision.
On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that private respondent
was guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying him as Congressman of the 6th District
of Manila. Anent the second issue of whether petitioner can be proclaimed the duly
elected Congressman, the HRET held:
". . . Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer
cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified
candidates. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the
winner of the elective office. . . .”
Petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: (1) whether the votes cast in favor of private respondent should not be
counted pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646; and (2) whether petitioner, a
second placer in the May 14, 2001 congressional elections, can be proclaimed the
duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
RULING: The issues raised are not novel. In Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia, we
expounded on the application of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646. There, we emphasized
that there must be a final judgment before the election in order that the votes of a
disqualified candidate can be considered "stray", thus:
"Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code
require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified
candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet
been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted
for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides."
The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate
who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people
voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in
the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom
they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
In the present case, private respondent was declared disqualified almost twenty-
two (22) months after the May 14, 2001 elections. Obviously, the requirement
of “final judgment before election" is absent. Therefore, petitioner can not invoke
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled jurisprudence that the
subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner. As a matter of fact, even as early as 1912, it was
held that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in
the event that the candidate who won is found to be ineligible for the office for
which he was elected.
At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. The Twelfth Congress
formally adjourned on June 11, 2004. And on May 17, 2004, the City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected Congressman of the
Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.