Centralized Control Decentralized Execution in The Era of Forward Reach
Centralized Control Decentralized Execution in The Era of Forward Reach
Centralized Control Decentralized Execution in The Era of Forward Reach
Davis)
Centralized Control/
Decentralized Execution
in the Era of Forward Reach
By M A R K G. D A V I S
T
he phenomenon of political and mili- demonstrated that technology can provide com-
tary leaders reaching forward into the manders on all levels with immediate situational
realm of tactical operations has existed awareness and that joint publications can offer
since Thucydides. It differs today be- doctrine on every aspect of operations. Moreover,
cause of technology, doctrine, and the current op- warfare is no longer controlled under the same
erational environment. Enduring Freedom model that prevailed throughout most of the 20th
century. Commanders can anticipate conducting
operations in an environment in which political
Major Mark G. Davis, USA, is a student at the School of Advanced Air goals are vague; domestic and international sup-
and Space Studies who has previously served in a variety of special port is tentative; and casualties are dutifully
operations assignments. avoided. To redress this dilemma, DOD has spent
billions on command, control, communications, Action Armed Forces. It is therefore imperative that
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and recon- the Air Force core tenet of centralized control and
naissance (C4ISR) systems. As a result, centralized decentralized execution be modified to reflect the
control and decentralized execution pursued by principles outlined in joint doctrine. Centralized
the Air Force is not valid in view of joint doctrine planning and direction is consistent throughout
and the emergence of effects-based operations. joint doctrine and clearly shows that this tenet is
contradictory to the basic command and control
Takeoff to Landing tenet outlined.
The first doctrinal issue is the inconsistency From a joint perspective, centralized control
between centralized control and decentralized and decentralized execution is illogical and can-
execution and the joint precept of centralized not exist together because control is about execu-
planning and direction. As a reaction to the tion and is inherent in command, as explained in
Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for
from a joint perspective, centralized control and Joint Operations. An aircraft is
under centralized direction virtu-
decentralized execution is illogical and cannot ally from takeoff to landing
exist together through a series of control func-
tions: Joint force commanders and
bombing of Vietnam during Rolling Thunder in JFACC maintain operational or tactical control of
1971, the Air Force altered the concept of cen- each aircraft on the air tasking order; the airman
tralized control to include decentralized execu- is required to execute only those missions derived
tion. Since then, centralized control and decen- from the air tasking order or in the case of time
tralized execution has been accepted by the sensitive targets when directed by joint com-
service as the best way to employ airpower. By manders; the airman must adhere to the instruc-
contrast, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the tions as outlined in the airspace control order and
Armed Forces of the United States, establishes that special instructions; to receive direction and guid-
centralized planning and direction is “essential ance the airman must communicate over the the-
for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all ater air-to-ground system, which exists to expe-
forces available.” What is more, Air Force Doc- dite the ability of joint commanders to control air
trine Document (AFDD 1), “Air Force Basic Doc- operations; and finally, if the aircraft is conduct-
trine,” states that “centralized control is the best ing close air support, it must receive clearance
way to employ air power,” which would be op- from an air or ground controller before releasing
posed by the Army and Marine Corps, which uti- its ordnance. The only decentralized aspect in
lize centralized planning and this mission scenario is the tactics involved in
direction and mission-type striking the target, and even then rules of engage-
orders to employ forces. ment could be a controlling factor.
Because senior officers Another clear discrepancy between joint and
of the Air Force are routinely service doctrine involves control of airpower.
55th Signal Company (Andres J. Rodriguez)
selected as joint force air AFDD 1 is unequivocal in insisting that “Air and
component commanders space power must be controlled by an airman.” By
(JFACCs), it is essential that comparison, Joint Publication 3-56.1, Command
its doctrine and execution and Control for Joint Air Operations, states that a
methodologies mirror those joint force commander will assign responsibilities
prescribed in joint doctrine. for air operations to a commander with the pre-
Its tenet of centralized con- ponderance of air assets and skill to control joint
trol is not a recognized term air operations.” Moreover , when “a JFACC is not
in joint doctrine and is caus- designated, the JFC may plan, direct, and control
Gardez Valley, ing confusion not only joint air operations.” Joint doctrine makes it quite
Afghanistan. within the Air Force but throughout the joint clear that centralized planning and direction of
community. The following statement is an exam- joint air operations can be assigned not only to
ple of the dichotomy between Air Force and joint airmen, as Air Force doctrine would seem to
doctrine. Joint Pub 1 states, “Unity of effort, cen- imply, but to senior officers from the Army, Navy,
tralized planning and direction, and decentral- and Marine Corps with control over substantial
ized execution are key considerations in joint op- air resources and requisite qualifications.
erations.” Where conflict arises between service
and joint doctrine, joint doctrine takes prece- Centrifugal Force?
dence, according to Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Command relationships are another doctri-
nal issue that generates concern. Joint Pub 3-0
outlines four relationships: combatant command,
Desert Storm.
not exist to provide an integrated network to have the authority to play JFACC, wing com-
control operations. Today, unity of effort is mander, and tactical fighter pilot.
achieved not by decentralized execution but A fifth issue is focused on the principles of
through an elaborate system of systems that en- war, specifically unity of command. In Joint Pub
ables centralized planning and direction on the 3-0, unity of command means that “all forces op-
highest levels. The spirit of decentralized execu- erate under a single commander with requisite au-
tion resides in senior commanders issuing mis- thority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a
sion-type orders to subordinates and allowing common purpose.” In comparing this tenet with
them to develop plans and execute missions unity of command it might be concluded that it is
based on the mission and intent of higher com- merely a duplication of a principle of war, readily
mand, as outlined in Joint Pub 3-0. The joint air acknowledged as the enduring bedrock of doc-
operations planning process, air tasking order trine. Centralized control and decentralized exe-
cycle, and theater air-to-ground system have cution is not necessary when such principles are
usurped this precept of joint operations. Decen- already inherent in joint operations.
tralized execution is established joint doctrine, The final doctrinal issue deals specifically
but it would appear that the Air Force tenet of with the emergence of effects-based operations
centralized control is inconsistent with its spirit and its impact on centralized control and decen-
and the realities of modern joint air operations tralized execution. These operations are con-
that require centralized planning and direction. ceived and planned in a systems framework that
The fourth issue that invalidates the tenet of considers the full range of direct, indirect, and
centralized control and decentralized execution is cascading effects by the application of military,
that doctrine allows joint commanders to reach diplomatic, psychological, and economic instru-
forward. This is best illustrated in Joint Pub 3-0: ments. They embrace the notion that political,
“JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redi- economic, and diplomatic considerations are
rect efforts, and direct coordination among subor- more important than military conquest. They
dinate commanders . . . in addition the command represent a top-down process rather than usual
authority [combatant command] provides the bottom-up operations.
JFCs unlimited authority to direct every aspect of Because of casual linkages among target sets
the operation.” Until doctrinal changes are imple- and the danger of objective fratricide, effects-
mented, joint force commanders will continue to based operations must be orchestrated by a cen-
tralized planning and execution authority that
has situational understanding of every aspect of