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Gerald Horne Race War! White Supremacy and The Japanese Attack On The British Empire PDF
Gerald Horne Race War! White Supremacy and The Japanese Attack On The British Empire PDF
RACE WAR
White Supremacy and the
a
New York University Press • New York and London
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York and London
www.nyupress.org
D767.H595 2003
940.53'089'009171241—dc22 2003016114
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Preface vii
Acknowledgments xix
Introduction 1
3 Race/War 60
4 Internment 80
5 War/Race 105
Epilogue 319
Notes 329
Index 379
v
Preface
vii
viii PREFACE
This is a book about race and racism within the British Empire in Asia.
The focus is on Hong Kong, though the narrative ranges from Fiji and
New Zealand to India. The narrative is told from both a “top down”
perspective, for example, the viewpoints of Europeans in “British Asia”
in the pre- and postwar eras and a “bottom-up” perspective, that is, the
viewpoints of destitute and interned Europeans, along with those of
U.S. Negroes and some Africans and Asians.
The chronology veers from the period leading up to the Pacific War,
to the war itself and the immediate postwar era. The thesis is simple: an
all-encompassing British racism—amply bolstered by other European
powers and particularly by the United States—demobilized the colo�
nized, making them highly susceptible to Japanese racial appeals. This
was a major factor contributing to Tokyo’s early success in the war. Eu�
ropeans and Euro-Americans interned by the Japanese authorities dur�
ing the war received a harsh and sobering taste of racial subordination;
and, after the war concluded, a Chinese bourgeoisie was given a boost
as a result of the looting, fleecing, and fleeing of many British, not to
mention the profitable collaboration of some Asians with Tokyo.
The subtext—but not the principal focus—of this book is the bru�
tality unleashed by Japanese forces, particularly in China. Initially at
least, many of those subjected to European colonialism and imperialism
welcomed the invaders as liberators from a private hell. However, as
the war ground on, it became apparent that this fond wish was far from
the truth.
I should make clear early on that if I had been living during the era
of the Pacific War, I would have fought against Japan—though I would
have been subjected to discriminatory, racially segregated treatment in
the U.S. military. Thus, readers should be alert to the fact that my in�
dictment of London—and Washington—is not intended as an exculpa�
tion of Tokyo. Instead, I am seeking to show how London’s racial poli�
cies in particular actually enabled Tokyo. Likewise, I recognize—above
all—that there were salient factors beyond “race” that shaped the Pa�
cific War, economics, geopolitics, and antifascism in the first place.
In other words, this book is not the latest chapter in the ongoing
saga that has become so popular in North America and, to an extent, in
PREFACE ix
the North Atlantic generally—that is, the “good war” fought by the
“greatest generation.”3 The physicist Freeman Dyson once concluded
that “a good cause can become bad if we fight for it with means that are
indiscriminately murderous. A bad cause can become good if enough
people fight for it in a spirit of comradeship and self-sacrifice.” The his�
torian Michael Sherry has added, “that grasp of moral complexity has
weakened amid the recent feel-good politics of nostalgia about Amer�
ica’s role in World War II”—and he might well have added, that of Great
Britain as well.4 Thus, as one nuanced study of “Chinese collaboration
with Japan” argues, accounts of this complicated era should seek to
“break free from the moralistic framework in which wartime history is
viewed. . . . which holds the historian’s task to be that of assigning
‘praise and blame.’”5
This approach has been exemplified by scholars in other contexts.
The journalist and historian Roger Wilkins has wrestled with the idea
that those apostles of freedom and liberty who founded the nation to
which he swears fervent allegiance, were slaveholders.6 He could have
added that the victorious North in the U.S. Civil War tolerated a viru�
lent racial segregation, dispossession of Native Americans—and
worse—but that does not mean that they deserved to be defeated dur�
ing this titanic conflict. In short, Japan’s claim to be the “champion of
the colored races” was fraudulent in no minor way, though inevitably
some who fought on her behalf actually believed the claim—just as
some who fought for the United States during the Gulf War actually be�
lieved this war was fundamentally about human rights and not about
oil. But although Tokyo’s claim was fraudulent the shock Tokyo ad-
ministered to the ingrained system of white supremacy—which was an
essential underpinning of the Empire and the United States alike—was
central to the devolution of the doctrine of white supremacy. Despite
this doctrine, however, the Allies did not merit defeat.
To the contrary. The withering experience of the war was critical in
compelling a forced retreat from the dictates of white supremacy, as
Washington and London most notably increasingly came to see racism
as a threat to national security. Britain was compelled to deploy tens of
thousands of Africans to fight Japanese troops in India and Burma.7
Ironically, just as African Americans earlier in the century had pointed
to Japan as evidence for the proposition that modernity was not solely
the province of those of European descent, London—reeling from their
defeat at the hands of Tokyo—pointed anxiously to the success of these
x PREFACE
African troops as evidence for the proposition that the Japanese were
not superior beings. The United States contained an obstreperous
African American population that had been cultivated for decades by
Japanese operatives. As the war plodded on, it was evident that Lon�
don—and Washington—would have to adjust their policies of white su�
premacy and rules privileging those of “pure European descent.”
The enormous atrocities committed by Japan should not obscure
the point that the war it helped to trigger led to this result. As Frank
Furedi observed in noting the similar impact triggered by another pil�
loried regime, “other than the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Japanese
war effort probably constituted the most significant challenge to the
Western-dominated world order”—though, for various reasons, this “is
rarely acknowledged.”8
This underscores the differing kinds of bigotry that Japan and its
European and Euro-American antagonists represented. B. V. A. Roling,
an eminent Dutch jurist who served on the postwar tribunal in Tokyo
that tried Japanese war criminals, has concluded that Japanese chau�
vinism grew out of discrimination. “In slavery,” he has noted, “the feel�
ing of being ‘the chosen people’ can easily surface.” The brusque impo�
sition of unequal treaties on Japan in the nineteenth century and the
failure to provide this nation with full membership in the club of impe�
rialists generated a severe counterreaction. Roling adds that “Japan
wanted to expel the colonial powers from Asia. But there was no plan
to exterminate all Europeans.”9 Thus there was a critical distinction be-
tween Tokyo and Berlin.
That there is something to what he says is suggested by the experi�
ence of Israel Epstein. In 1942 he was in “Japanese-controlled Hong
Kong, where his political activities made freedom so dangerous that he
decided to slip into an internment camp. . . . ‘I was safer as an enemy
national interned with 3000 other foreign nationals,’” he recalled years
later, “‘than I would have been walking around in Hong Kong.’”10 It is
hard to imagine anyone choosing internment in German-occupied Eu�
rope. One of the leading scholars of race in Japan has observed that the
“Japanese equivalent of white [supremacy] was improbable if not im�
possible. . . . Whereas racism in the West was markedly characterized by
denigration of others, the Japanese were preoccupied far more with el�
evating themselves.”11
Though the term World War II is often tossed casually over a com�
plex series of differing struggles, this book seeks to distinguish the Pa-
PREFACE xi
had never heard the Chinese spoken of as anything but decadent, dirty
and unspeakable.”22
The tightly interwoven questions of white supremacy and eco�
nomic exploitation were major reasons why many African Americans
saw their fates linked with those of Asians thousands of miles away and
why a modicum of sympathy existed for Japan—at least for a while—
on both sides of the Pacific. Moreover, British colonial officials often de�
ployed the lessons they had learned in Africa in Asia, and vice versa.
These ties were sensed by some U.S. Negroes particularly. Thus, in the
1930s, the influential Negro intellectual W. E. B. Du Bois insisted that it
was impossible to understand the black experience in the United States
without reference to “that dark and vast sea of human labor in China
and India, the South Seas and all of Africa. . . . that great majority of
mankind, on whose bent and broken backs rest today the founding
stones of modern history.” Negroes and Asians, he thought, shared a
“common destiny,” both were “despised and rejected by race and color;
paid a wage below the level of decent living; driven, beaten, [im]pris�
oned and enslaved in all but name” with the “resultant wealth . . . dis�
tributed and displayed and made the basis of world power and univer�
sal dominion and armed arrogance in London and Paris, Berlin and
Rome, New York and Rio de Janeiro.”23
Japan’s ability to insinuate itself within the interstices of this racial�
ized edifice of exploitation—though it was a colonizing power itself—
was facilitated by the stern refusal of those of “pure European descent”
to fully accept the new phenomenon of an Asian power. This point has
to be qualified, however. As Japan launched its offensive in China in
the early 1930s, Henry Stimson, U.S. Secretary of State, was not prone
to articulate a fervent denunciation. He said he “did not want to be
driven by China, that after all the white races in the Orient had got to
stand more or less together.” In pursuit of these alleged common inter�
ests, Tokyo hired “Ralph Townsend, a former U.S. consul in China, as
a propagandist to convince Americans that Japan was ‘fighting the
white man’s battle’ against Chinese nationalism.” Britain, which had
pursued the wrongheaded policy of viewing Japan as its overseer in
the region, was similarly reluctant to speak against Tokyo’s depreda�
tions. Of course, arguably these anti-China and pro-Japan policies were
driven by white supremacy in terms of the flagrant disregard for
China’s basic interests and the utter disbelief that Japan—being a
power not of “pure European descent”—could ever mount an effective
xiv PREFACE
challenge to the existing racial order. And, as stressed below, both Lon-
don and Washington were similarly driven by anticommunism, which
both united them at certain junctures with Tokyo and made all three
powers somewhat leery of a China which had a formidable Commu�
nist Party.24 However, this study will not target anticommunism, unlike
previous books I have penned which have addressed this weighty ide�
ology,25 but “race,” which served to divide Tokyo from London and
Washington.26
Thus, in war it seemed that Imperial Japan was more of a menace
than Nazi Germany. The U.S. historian Allan Nevins noted that “prob�
ably in all our history, no foe has been so detested as were the Japanese.
Emotions forgotten since our most savage Indian wars were awakened
by the ferocities of Japanese commanders.” Or as the chief of the evac�
uation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast put it, “‘You needn’t
worry about the Italians at all except in certain cases. Also, the same for
the Germans except in individual cases. But we must worry about the
Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.”27
That the Japanese were often regarded as no more than degraded
Negroes was reflected even in children’s doggerel. Thus, by the spring
of 1942 the rhyme “eenie, meenie, minie, moe . . . catch a nigger by the
toe, if he hollers let him go. . . . if he hollers, make him pay, fifty dollars
every day” had morphed into “catch the emperor by the toe” with a
similar refrain.28 The Negroes were now needed for the purposes of na�
tional unity. However, that the concept of white supremacy was still
alive and well was indicated by the substitution of Japanese in their
place. From the mouths of babes came a profound—though flawed—
”wisdom” betokening a shift in the tectonic plates of race.
Because of severe apprehension about the impact of Tokyo’s racial
appeals, their opponents began to stress racial equality.29 Wartime
Japanese propaganda, which targeted Negroes, was “successful” in that
it “forced the American military to reevaluate its racial hierarchy if it
wished to maintain domestic tranquility.” The Japanese Foreign Min�
istry—like many Negroes and Asians—argued that “white racial bias
towards the Japanese and discrimination [against] blacks originated
from the same source.”30 All of a sudden, “any use of the word ‘nigger’
in BBC broadcasts was discouraged” and this potent megaphone of the
airwaves, just as suddenly, decided that the “word ‘natives’” was
“derogatory and edited . . . out of Colonial Office radio talks.” This was
PREFACE xv
united against white supremacy was designed to obscure its own grab
for national supremacy.
The conclusion sums up the story with a focus on the aftermath of
the war in Hong Kong, noting, for example, the rise of a Chinese bour�
geoisie, the city’s growing reputation as a “paradise for collaborators,”
the trials of accused collaborators, and the racial reforms sparked by a
chastened Empire, desperate to maintain its eroding position in “British
Asia.”
The epilogue updates this story to the present, examining the fates
of the Negro-Tokyo relationship, a passel of internees—particularly
those who after the war departed Hong Kong for friendlier racial climes
in South Africa—the response, years later, by a number of Asians to the
Pacific War, the continuing story of racial discrimination in Hong Kong,
and the not altogether remote prospect of a future “race war.”
Acknowledgments
xix
xx ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In the United States, Walter Hill of the National Archives not only
has been a reliable guide through this labyrinth but a good friend as
well. The library at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, where
I was a member of the faculty when this research was conducted, was
equally helpful. As the footnotes reveal, archives from the Atlantic to
the Pacific provided useful materials.
Introduction
1
2 INTRODUCTION
Driving this racial hysteria was many Europeans’ fear that the day
of reckoning had arrived. Not only would they be severely punished for
past racial transgressions but worse, a new racial order would be
forcibly imposed—with them at the bottom. This angst was not allevi�
ated by the knowledge that the defeat of the Japanese invaders rested
heavily on the often narrow shoulders of Asians and Africans, some of
whom were none too keen to rescue those who had persecuted them on
racial grounds.
Japanese militarists played adroitly on the feelings of those bruised
by the ravages of white supremacy. In their internment camps the “ma�
jority” of the guards were Korean and Formosan under Japanese com�
mand; in these camps what unfolded was thought to be a new racial
order with the latter on top and the European internees at the bottom.
Non-Japanese Asians were being instructed to view Europeans as “in�
ferior, subjugated people.”6 In Washington’s “eyes, the worst Japanese
war crime was the attempt to cripple the white man’s prestige by sow�
ing the seeds of racial pride under the banner of Pan-Asianism.” The
“International Military Tribunal for the Far East. . . . accused Japan of,
among other things, ‘racial arrogance’ in challenging the stability of the
status quo that existed under Western rule.”7 Placing the presumed ben�
eficiaries of white supremacy in the bull’s-eye was not without a
painfully direct effect. The “death rate” of “Hong Kong survivors,” that
is, veterans of military internment camps, was, according to one ac�
count, “23% higher than that of veterans who had served in other the�
atres.”8
Ironically, Japan’s targeted racial policies had a strangely deraci�
nating impact. Patrick Hardie was a Eurasian, born in Borneo in 1928.
He grew up in Singapore where he recalled later a “house-to-house
search for the white men” there after the Japanese takeover. His brother
“looked very western,” meaning “white,” but when the Japanese forces
arrived he changed his “racial” identity and “called himself a Malay.”
Later they reported to the newly imposed Tokyo authorities at “Beach
Road.” The “Japanese got two tables and said, ‘What is your father?
English? Then you have to go to one side. Those [with] fathers who are
Eurasians, they will go to one side.’” And “having white father[s], all
these people were brought to Roxy Theatre in East Coast Road, Ka�
tong,” and were eventually interned. Patrick Hardie, on the other
hand, who was not taken for “white” by the invaders, was not in�
terned; instead he became a driver for them. London’s policies, which
4 INTRODUCTION
Given the shattering nature of Japan’s racial policies in the occupied ter�
ritories, why is it that these policies are—or were—not better known?
John Dower writes that “if one asks Americans today in what ways
World War II was racist and atrocious, they will point overwhelmingly
to the Nazi genocide of the Jews. When the war was being fought, how-
ever, the enemy perceived to be most atrocious by Americans was not
the Germans but the Japanese and the racial issues that provoked great�
est emotion among Americans were associated with the war in Asia. . . .
Japan’s aggression stirred the deepest recesses of white [supremacy]
and provoked a response bordering on the apocalyptic.”10
These words suggest that the Pacific War should have left a cav�
ernous imprint on the consciousness of Euro-Americans, not to mention
the British. But there was another factor looming that served to vitiate
this possibility. James Belich, the leading scholar of the titanic wars that
led to a stalemate between the British invaders and the indigenous peo�
ple of New Zealand, argues that as a result of this humbling episode,
the British, like a child awakening from a vivid nightmare, resorted to
their “final safety net,” which was “to forget.”11 The Japanese racial as�
sault was greeted with a similar syndrome of amnesia.
This blind spot about Asia and race was not simply limited to Japan
and the war. The prominent U.S. journalist, Theodore White, acknowl�
edged in 1975 that he had consciously omitted from his “reporting in all
the years” he had spent in Asia “the simple dynamics of race hatred.
Our presence there was self-defeating because they hated all of us, with
historic good reason,” he concluded in a thinly veiled reference to the
racially marked colonialism endured by so many Asians. Even chief
U.S. ally Chiang Kai-Shek, White asserts, “hated white men.” White too
felt that only the largest U.S. minority group could understand: “Per-
haps only black Americans can sense,” he averred, “that wild and help-
less fury which the Asians felt at the presence of white men.”12 This was
the powerful gravitational pull of which Japan took advantage before
and during the war.
The scholar Alexander Saxton is no doubt correct that “there were
good reasons for supporting the Allied cause in the Second World War;
yet it added little to understanding white racism in American cul-
INTRODUCTION 5
ture.”13 This is true, though the caveat might be added that it has added
little to our understanding of racism in British culture either. Thus, be-
cause these policies are—and were—shrouded, fewer lessons could be
drawn leading to deeper understanding of race and racism.
One reason why this wrenching wartime experience has not led to
a crystalline comprehension is because as these events were unfolding,
the London authorities chose to downplay them. When Japanese racial
atrocities targeting Europeans and Euro-Americans were revealed,
London noticed that “generally speaking . . . there has been a relative
lack of Chinese interest in the British and American disclosures”; worse,
it was noted forlornly, “it is also possible that the Chinese appreciate—
and secretly sympathize with—the fact that one Japanese aim in perpe�
trating these atrocities was the humiliation of the white man, as part of
the plan for his expulsion from East Asia.”14 In a “secret” memorandum
from India, a British official cautioned that “publicity” about the “spe�
cific question of ill treatment of white captives should not be under-
taken for the present, though a statement in general terms might be is-
sued without reference to race of prisoners.” Hence, it was decided that
“the point is to emphasise by every means Japanese barbarity towards
other Asiatics, but not to bolster up [the] Japanese self-proclaimed role
as defender of Asiatics by putting out stories of their barbarous treat�
ment of Europeans.”15
Thus, in the heat of war the shoots of postwar racial policy and the
forced retreat from white supremacy were already evident: a compelled
assertion of equality between European and non-European peoples,
and further, an assertion of “nonracialism,” denying even the relevance
of a characteristic that heretofore had been proclaimed from on high.
The United States, in some ways more sensitive than the United
Kingdom to such racial questions because of its tortured history of
racial slavery and indigenous dispossession, went a step further. In
mid-1942 the U.S. Joint Psychological Warfare Committee sent a “se�
cret” proposal to their British allies, warning that “it is essential to avoid
giving unwitting aid to the Japanese propaganda attempt to convert the
Pacific war into a racialist, Pan-Asia war.” It was “advisable to institute
a program of propaganda directed toward people in this country to
lessen the strong racial prejudice existing in white Americans toward
colored races, including the Negro. Such propaganda could not take the
form of direct statements regarding this racial prejudice, but could be
done indirectly by telling the accomplishments of colored races.” It was
6 INTRODUCTION
There are other reasons why the racial policies of this horrendous war
are not better known. For various reasons, the question of race in the
Asia-Pacific region has been obscured intentionally. As the twentieth
century dawned and the war in the Philippines gripped the feverish
imaginations of many in Washington, the U.S. military in Hawaii
“sought to avoid racial conflicts: one general order explicitly stated
‘such delicate subjects as . . . the race question, etc., will not be discussed
at all except among ourselves and officially.’” There was a decided fear
among many officers “who believed, quite as sweepingly, that ‘there
was a natural bond between the rural Filipinos and the American
Negro’” troops and a robust ventilation of the “race question” could
only convince these two groups of their mutual hostility toward white
supremacy.21 A corollary to this reticence was the report that during the
Pacific War London was “reluctant to initiate an anti-German campaign
among West Africans because officials calculated that such propaganda
might encourage a revolt against white rule as such. ‘Having been en�
couraged to hate one branch of the white race, they may extend the feel�
ing to others,’ warned one memorandum.”22
Washington, and especially London, faced tremendous constraints
in coping with Japan’s “race war.” At that desperate moment they had
to distinguish themselves not only from Japan’s racial policies—but
also had to distance themselves from their own racial practices. London
had to proclaim the exalted aims of democracy of the Atlantic Charter,
while seeking to deny democracy to their Asian and African colonies.
The British Empire especially was flummoxed by the turn that race took
during the war. One approach adopted was an eerie silence about what
was going on. Even in the Middle East, it was decided that though “the
Palestine question raises great attention . . . one should discuss as little
as possible sensitive points like colour” or “racial characteristics.”23
Consequently, given this orchestrated silence, unearthing the im�
pact of the race war on the British Empire is not easy. Complicating this
conundrum is the fact that even before the war erupted, “It is striking
how little racist thinking was questioned before the Second World War.
Even critical critics of imperialism were reluctant to criticize the racist
justification for national expansion.”24 Back then, “few Britons of any
8 INTRODUCTION
class were concerned with the conditions of the people ruled by Eng�
land. . . . School textbooks barely mentioned the colonies. Those works
that did predictably described the colonies in paternalistic and racist
terms, as did most popular literature.”25 Even in the early postwar era,
“it would be vain to search through the debates of the House of Com�
mons in recent years for any general debate on the problems of the
British Empire as a whole or the impact of these problems. . . . In the old
days the annual India debate used to be guaranteed to empty the
House.”26 Though Japan imposed a brutally racial policy on Europeans
interned in Hong Kong, few of the flood of memoirs that emerged from
this catastrophic experience even raised this topic, as if it were too tor�
menting—or dangerous—to recall.27
Sun Yat-Sen. The BDS “aimed at driving all Europeans and Americans
out of Asia” and so did Sun. Simultaneously, after the Bolshevik Revo�
lution in European capitals there was a perception of a growing alliance
between Tokyo, Moscow, and the Chinese leadership aimed at their
common antagonists, principally London and Washington. When
Tokyo and Moscow concluded a treaty in 1925, when others were seek�
ing to isolate the Bolsheviks, the perception of an alliance was strength-
ened.42 As Soviet and Japanese influence rose among Sun’s forces, the
Chinese leader’s “speeches became increasingly anti-western. . . . [His]
concept of nationality came to imply racial struggle in which China
would rid herself of the unequal treaties, extra-territoriality and foreign
controls on her economy, while the People’s Livelihood implied a so�
cialist state.”43
Even before the rise of Sun, the Empress Dowager “entered into a
pact with the Boxers giving them a free hand against foreign white res�
idents in the country and their Chinese sympathizers such as all Chris�
tians were presumed to be.”44 As for Chiang Kai-Shek, he attended the
“Shinbo Gykyo (Preparatory Military Academy) in Tokyo; he remained
in Japan four years. . . . As a part of his study he served with the 13th
Field Artillery (Takada), Regiment of the Imperial Army,” where he
gained a “working insight into the Japanese language, mentality and
strength.”45 As late as the winter of 1940–41, “it was widely rumored
that secret meetings were being held there between Japanese agents and
representatives of Chiang kai-shek.”46 Chiang was not unique. Amy Li
Chong Yuet-ming, the late wife of contemporary Hong Kong’s preemi�
nent billionaire, Li Ka-shing, was “fluent” in Japanese.47 Ironically, the
British may have boosted Japan’s efforts by vigorously persecuting the
most passionate anti-Tokyo forces: the Chinese Communist Party.48
Hence, when the Japanese invaded Hong Kong in 1941, some Chi�
nese willingly and eagerly joined the war against the British crown.
Quickly there emerged a “sensational revelation,” a “plan to massacre
the entire European community of the colony.” “Zero hour was to have
been a.m. on December 13, 1941.” Chinese triads, or brotherhoods
widely viewed as organized crime formations, were to spearhead this
scheme. “Leaders of the underworld were gathered together and a
meeting was held between them and police officials at the Cecil Hotel.”
After hours of vigorous debate—and perhaps the payment of a sizable
bribe—the authorities “came to terms with the underworld.”49
INTRODUCTION 13
the war had decimated the European colonists, as many were killed or
died during internment. After August 1945 some had the wherewithal
to repair to the more comfortable racial climes of South Africa, while
still others fled the region virtually penniless after their wilting experi�
ence. Much of their property had been looted, either by the Japanese in�
vaders or the Chinese. Their roles in the economy had been supplanted
during the war by these two groups as well. So when the British fled
and the Japanese were ousted, this created opportunities for the Chi�
nese—which horrified many.
One gentleman wrote to the colonial authorities in 1947, “deploring
the fact that a number of persons appear to have flourished under
enemy occupation.” But the “difficulty of obtaining evidence and oth�
erwise establishing the fact of ‘collaboration’ as the origin of improved
fortunes, as distinct from other causes, [was] great.” Tseng Yu-Hao and
Denis Victor were not deterred by such assertions when they wrote to
the crown’s representative. Hong Kong was “accused” of being the
“Paradise of Collaborators,” they sputtered. This was a “black mark”
on the colony’s reputation. Hong Kong’s “leading collaborators are
mostly proteges or even members of some high councils of which
[Hong Kong’s] government has no control.” Many of these were “buy�
ers of land in the occupation days” who were now “trying to influence
the former sellers to sign the deeds a second time,” thus multiplying the
indignity.55 Their appeals went unheeded, not least because at that junc�
ture London required the support or at least sympathy of the collabo�
rators in their confrontation with the growing power of the Communist
Party, just across the border on the mainland.
“Race war” is not an alien concept in the Empire or the United States.
The rebellion in India in 1857 was viewed in these disquieting terms.56
In South Africa Jan Smuts noted privately, “I have heard natives saying,
‘Why fight against Japan? We are oppressed by the whites and we shall
not fare worse under the Japanese.’”
In 1943 as a veritable “race war” was raging in Asia Senator Elbert
Thomas of Utah worried about providing aid to China since just as
“Genghis Khan got into Europe. . . . we can loose in Asia forces so great
that the world will be deluged,” that is, in aiding China’s resistance to
Japan, the United States might wind up bolstering a bigger foe. Con�
gressman Charles Eaton shared this concern. If the “Oriental peoples”
were to “have independent and civilized nations,” then “eventually the
INTRODUCTION 15
17
18 TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT”
police. . . . The judiciary were all Europeans as were most of the legal lu
minaries. . . . Most of the firemen were Chinese but the drivers were Eu
ropean policemen. . . . The first floor was the living quarters for Chinese
firemen. The second floor was for the European.”36 As one writer put it,
“In government there was a distinct level beyond which the Chinese,
however able and well-qualified, could not rise.”37
Though Hong Kong University had been initiated by the colonists,
its enrollment was limited and its eminently qualified graduates faced
all manner of discriminatory barriers. Man Wah Leung Bentley, who
was at the university in 1940, remembered later that “the teaching
staff”—which was mostly British—that she “encountered at lectures
and tutorials showed no interest in their students’ progress or intellec
tual concerns and treated them like strangers.” These professors “did
not encourage criticism or dissent.” HKU “forbade the discussion of po
litical topics and the formation of political clubs . . . for fear of upsetting
the status quo.”38 Yet, while HKU regularly turned out graduates of im
peccable intellect, illiterate Canadians in the colony could rise higher on
the socioeconomic ladder for racial reasons alone.39
Sir Shouson Chow, born in 186l, was the first Chinese to join the Ex
ecutive Council that helped to administer Hong Kong. His admission to
this celestial circle was a direct response to the unrest of 1925 in Shang
hai where nine were killed by British troops—an event that was echoed
in Hong Kong. Perhaps not coincidentally, in 1907 he received the
“Order of the Rising Sun (4th Class)” from Japan and soon became the
“first person to be knighted in Hong Kong by a representative of the
British royal family and only the third Chinese person to be knighted—
in a colonial history of nearly 80 years.” But in his youth he had to en
dure the degrading spectacle of setting sail for the United States for ed
ucation and suffering through “queue-pulling” or the pulling of his pig-
tail. This was during a time when “British soldiers would beat Chinese
people in the streets for no apparent reason.” He recalled a time in 1919
when laws were passed in Hong Kong “restricting Chinese from living
in certain areas of Cheung Chau.” He recalled a time when “the Foreign
Office . . . was unashamedly racist, like most of the British policy-mak
ers of the time.”40 Not surprisingly, during the invasion he was viewed
widely as one of the chief collaborators with Tokyo.
As late as the eve of the war, a cruel repression enveloped Hong
Kong. Police kept a vigilant eye on the Chinese community, harassing,
imprisoning, or banishing political activists and censoring mail and
24 TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT”
whom Carroll had a “long family connection.” The Carrolls had begun
“what was then the first modern shipyard in Yokohama.”45 William
Carroll was indicted for collaboration after the war. The saga of the Car-
rolls suggests how ingrained British biases could boomerang.
But it was not only those so unlucky to be born Irish or Cuban who
could suffer in Hong Kong. Those from Scotland were at times deri
sively referred to as “Scotch coolies.”46 Professor Walter Brown, a Scotch
nationalist who taught at Hong Kong University, objected to such
craven practices; he objected to the Anglocentric use of the word “Eng
lish” when the word “British” would have sufficed. So he devoted
hours of his leisure time in the library crossing out such misusages in its
books and entering “BRITISH” firmly in the margin.47
Needy Scotch doctors were often forced to emigrate to Hong Kong
because of lack of opportunities at home or financial inability to buy
themselves into a practice; this did not improve their ill-humor toward
English elites.48 “White Russians”—exiles from the Bolshevik Revolu
tion—were “seen by Britons and others to undermine ‘white prestige’
by the employment they took, their lifestyle, their homes but mostly by
the sheer poverty of the majority.” Thus, “taboos about specific forms of
interaction with the Russians were as strong as those for Asians.”49
Then there were the Portuguese, who—said Emily Hahn—”don’t claim
to be pure white but they do consider themselves, haughtily, far above
the British Eurasians in social standing. The other Eurasians don’t share
this conviction. Neither do the British.”50
In “British China,” class prejudice—and anxiety—was often de
ployed to articulate race prejudice. The Chinese were brutalized in
order to provide a sense of identity to Europeans as a class, so they
could bask in the reality that no matter their status, at least they were
not Asian. As one commentator at the time put it, “they take it out on
the Chinese so as to make themselves feel big.”51 “They” may not have
felt “big” because too often those who decamped from Britain to Hong
Kong were—in the words of one London diplomat—”third rate men.”52
The scholar, Charles Boxer, who was interned in Hong Kong during the
war, observed that “Hong Kong is the dumping ground for the duds. . . .
Any old fool who can’t be used elsewhere is dumped out here.’”53
Queenie Cooper remained realistic enough to conclude that “in Eng
land a girl of my class would have been a domestic servant . . . but for
five years I’ve been living in [Hong Kong] like a queen.”54 Fearing that
their “third rate” status would stigmatize them, many expatriates
26 TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT”
indicating how deeply the taboo was felt.” Of course, this “taboo” was
wildly skewed, mostly targeting couplings between Asian men and Eu
ropean women and the offspring therefrom. There was a “fear,” Bickers
writes, “of male Chinese sexual desire for ‘white’ women.” A British
naval officer expressed unease at the familiarity between a missionary
woman from the United States and her Chinese landlord. “It will al
ways seem queer to me,” he asserted wondrously, “to hear a coloured
man call a white Christian girl by her Christian name.” The “subtext” of
this anxiety was “clearly sexual,” says Bickers.76 The prospect of this
kind of coupling was so disturbing that in 1925 the “League of Nations
set up a special committee to examine the situation. It concluded un
happily that ‘the breach of the natural racial barrier . . . affects very
deeply the prestige of the Western nations in the Orient.’”77
In the late 1930s Esther Holland was planning to marry a Chinese
man. She had met him while he was visiting Britain and was told re
provingly, “Esther, you are young and good looking. Why can’t you
find nice English boy? There are plenty.” A concerned European “wrote
to [her] brother and asked him what the status of a young British girl
who marries a Chinese would be. He wrote me a long reply and said, ‘If
there is such a girl within your ken, do all in your power to dissuade
her. In the first place, she’ll lose her British nationality. . . . All the British
ers would look down upon her and she would have no British social
standing whatever.’” Unimpressed, she defied convention and married
him. Soon she found herself in conversation with another British
woman whom she casually informed about her betrothal. She “saw a
look of disgust come over her face. Her brows came together and her
mouth went down at the corners.”78
This phobia about Asian men and European women was also a re
flection of a patriarchy that saw women as property to be defended as
fiercely as any other form of commerce. On the other hand, couplings
between Asian women and European men were also frowned on but
not condemned as vigorously.79 The formal taboo against interracial ro
mance extended to the silver screen. In 1930 the British Board of Film
Censors forbade English actor John Longden from kissing on-screen the
heroine, Chinese actress Anna May Wong.80
On the other hand,81 after the successful invasion, many Britons re-
called ruefully that “many of the British cadets, studying Cantonese for
the required three years of training, fell in love with these [Chinese]
girls as a kind of ritual. . . . Well, of course most of these girls have been
TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT” 31
drawing pay from the Japanese on the side, probably for years and
years. After the surrender, they came out of hiding.”82
The “stigma” attached to Eurasians was so severe that “before
World War II most found it easier to go ‘the Chinese way,’” that is, to
melt into the Chinese community, though often marriage to a non-Chi
nese was seen as a halfway house, a step away from racial purgatory.83
Generally, Hong Kong was a stunning geographic tableau of racial
inequality, with Europeans residing at “The Peak” high above the is-
land, with the Chinese crowded in the sprawling flatlands. The affluent
Robert Ho Tung, patriarch of the clan, had to obtain “special permis
sion” to reside in that “exclusive residential district.” Their wealth did
not deliver the Ho Tungs from the petty and profound biases of their
nearby residents. “We had little contact with the neighboring children,”
Jean Gittins, a member of this prominent family, maintains. “I do not re-
member ever having been invited to any of their homes. They had no
intention, I am sure, of being unkind, although they would on occasion
suddenly refuse to play with us because we were Chinese, or they
might tell us we shouldn’t be living on the Peak.” Adding to the indig
nity of it all was the fact that the nearby “Peak School . . . did not nor
mally admit Chinese children.”84
The result of this prejudice was predictable: some of the staunchest
opponents of white supremacy in Asia—and helpmates to the invading
Japanese—were Eurasians. Among them was Lawrence Klindt Ken
twell, born in Hong Kong in 1882, the “illegitimate son” of a “ship’s cap
tain and a Chinese mother.” A “pupil of Sun Yat-sen,” he grew up in
Hawaii, then studied at Columbia University in New York City before
attending Oxford and becoming a barrister. Yet, despite his accom
plishments, he felt that the barrier of racial discrimination was hand-
cuffing his very existence. At Oxford his application to join the Officers’
Training Corps had been rejected on the grounds “that I was not a per-
son of pure European descent.” In 1926 in Shanghai he founded the
China Courier, an “anti-British journal” in partnership with another
Eurasian, G. R. Graves. By 1939 he was on the payroll of Tokyo as he
castigated “Britain’s own acts of perfidy in this country and . . . the suf
fering and misery she has caused the Chinese people.” He had “no
doubt” that he was “regarded as a despised Eurasian, a half-cast [sic]
outcast,” compelled to suffer “all sort of hidden indignities.” His “bit
terness” was “full to the brim”; hence his goal was the “[complete] de
struction of England.”85 In pursuit of this lofty goal he accepted the post
32 TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT”
look down on the yellow race with preconceived notions. I think it will
be very difficult to abolish racial prejudice.”
The Asiatic Exclusion League was gaining momentum, particularly
on the West Coast, as they placed a heavy emphasis on Japan. “It is use-
less,” said the AEL, “to expect that people with such different racial
characteristics and such different civilization can ever mix with our
people and become absorbed into our body politic. They cannot become
good American citizens,” they snapped, “it is useless to attempt to
make them such.” These were “minorities” of a new type, however, in
that “to the Asiatic, the Caucasian is an inferior.” It was noted approv
ingly, “California has decreed that, whenever it is so desired, the local
school authorities may provide separate schools for the Chinese and
Japanese children.”95 Some San Franciscans raised the cry, “White men
and women, patronize your own race.”96 Japanese immigrants were a
“band of spies,” it was reported; “they are educated as spies, they have
schools in Japan to educate spies.” This was a matter of simple survival:
“It is a question of which race can dominate and live on this Coast.”97
The Democratic Party in California mimicked these judgments. Re
peatedly its early twentieth century platforms called for “the continu
ance and strict enforcement of the Chinese exclusion law, and its appli
cation to the same classes of all Asiatic races.”98 Hiram Johnson, per-
haps the preeminent politician of this era in what was to become the
nation’s largest state, was a member in good standing of the Native
Sons of the Golden West, a leading nativist organization in the forefront
of the struggle for the exclusion of the Japanese.99
Even before World War II, strains between Washington and Tokyo
were rising. As Noriko Kawamura put it, “On the eve of the Pacific War
[many] were aware of the grave prospect of interracial rivalry—or even
a race war—between the white and yellow races.” President Wilson
said that he “had been more and more impressed with the idea that
‘white civilization’ and its domination over the world rested largely on
our ability to keep this country intact, as we would have to build up the
nations ravaged by the war” and that “he was willing to go to any
lengths rather than to have the nation actually involved in the conflict.”
Wilson “frankly” said that “in order to keep the white race or part of it
strong to meet the yellow race—Japan, for instance—[if he felt that] it
was wise to do nothing, he would do nothing, and would submit to
anything and any imputation of weakness or cowardice” in order to
avoid declaring war on Germany.100
TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT” 35
The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 also figured into ever more com
plex calculations about Japan. Early in 1918 a top aide to President
Woodrow Wilson told him, “I have never changed my opinion that it
would be a great political mistake to send the Japanese troops into
Siberia. . . . It would arouse the Slavs throughout Europe because of the
race question if for nothing else.”101 This powerful aide, Colonel House,
told A. J. Balfour that the unfolding 1918 Japanese intervention in
Siberia “may be the greatest misfortune that has befallen the Allies. . . .
The race question, in particular, will be sharply emphasized and an at-
tempt made to show that we are using a yellow race to destroy a white
race.”102 Thus, some in the higher echelons of the U.S. government were
prepared to run the extraordinary risk of allowing Bolshevism to sur
vive in order to foil Japan.
When Japan at Versailles proposed a clause in the peace treaty con
cerning racial discrimination, pandemonium erupted not only in the
United States but in the Empire more generally, especially Australia.
“Many societies sprang up” in Japan “to advocate that the conference at
Paris should be used for the abolition of racial discrimination. . . . This
was widely reported in the press in what became a campaign for racial
equality. . . . It had the advantage of being an issue on which Japan could
make common cause with China.” In sum, moving aggressively against
racial discrimination was a genuinely popular matter within Japan and
was not solely—at least at first—a matter of mere elite manipulation.103
Noriko Kawamura feels that Tokyo’s concern in this matter was
“genuine.” “Tokyo’s instructions on this issue were explicit from the
very beginning”; after all, the Japanese encountered prejudice while
traveling and seeking to immigrate, to a greater degree even than na
tionals from other countries considerably less developed economically.
Nevertheless, the Japanese concern was said to be demagogic in light of
their colonization of Korea. Wilson “abstained from voting on the racial
question”; it was “obvious that he did not fight for the principle of racial
equality. . . . Wilson was well aware of the strong opposition against the
racial equality principle in his own country.” As ever, the slippery
United States sought adroitly to shift the burden of Tokyo’s wrath. As a
Wilson aide wrote, “It has taken considerable finesse to lift the load
from our shoulders and place it upon the British, but happily, it has
been done.”104
The Japanese government and people were irate about what they
deemed to be a deliberate affront when this proviso on race was
36 TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT”
brought the baseball star Babe Ruth to Japan in the 1930s, the BDS mur
dered Shoriki. They hoped to kill Charles Chaplin “hoping that this
would bring on war between Japan and the United States.” With a
membership of about ten thousand, the BDS were the “Leninists” of the
Japanese right wing. During the U.S. war with the Philippines in the
early twentieth century, the BDS “shipped arms, fighting men and offi
cers to the Aguinaldo Insurrectos.”120
As the BDS gained influence in the 1930s and as Japan turned to-
ward militant right-wing nationalism, this had a knock-on effect in the
United States. State Senator Tom Collins of Phoenix was told as much
by one of his constituents, I. L. Shauer, in 1935: “I have just returned
from Japan where I have been living for the past fifteen years.” He was
concerned about the intensified harassment of Issei and Nissei in Ari
zona: “Bombings of the Japanese in Salt River Valley last summer and
fall resounded across the Pacific.” Thus, “it would be very inopportune
to pass” an anti-Japanese “alien land law. . . . at present while there is so
much tension in the Orient. As you know, Japan is our best customer,
and it does seem unwise to do anything that would arouse animosity or
ill will with a friendly customer.”121 The United States was tempting
fate by pursuing a policy of white supremacy with Japan, where race
consciousness was swelling. Furthermore, Japan was also a major eco
nomic power whose interests could not be ignored easily.
The British Empire controlled more territory than either Canberra, Ot
tawa, or Washington and inspired racial prejudice in these three conti
nental giants. Within the Empire and, particularly in London itself, the
subjects of the crown were not all equal: they were sliced and diced into
racial categories. A typical incident occurred in London in 1937, when a
hotel proprietor refused to accept Asian lodgers. Now he “had not . . .
the slightest objection to Asiatics.” It was “his clientele” that demurred.
Failure to adhere to their wishes “would mean the loss of two or three
hundred of his regular clients.” The British authorities acknowledged
that “the existence of [a] certain amount of colour prejudice must be rec
ognized”; still, they worried that if this became widely known in Cey
lon—where the rejected lodgers lived—”this information would lead to
very serious consequences.”122
Whereas the United States admitted only those defined as “white”
into the hallowed halls of privilege, London accomplished the same
40 TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT”
thing by using different words. In 1936, for example, the Air Ministry
pointed out that “‘colour’ is an absolute bar to a commission in the Royal
Air Force. . . . ‘All candidates must be of pure European descent.’”123
What did these three words mean? As one British official put it a
few years earlier, “The question is really much less of fact than one of
expediency. It is not so much whether a man actually has mixed blood
which matters, as whether people think so.” He was referring to an ap
plicant for a police appointment in Hong Kong who was barred from
the job though he claimed that his “great grandfather . . . was a Dutch
official.” The officials went back and forth on how to define precisely
this slippery three-word phrase. One noted that challenging the racial
bona fides of applicants could easily transmute into a petty settling of
scores. “Cameron is a case in point,” he said. “They all said he was ‘a
nigger’ because they didn’t like him in Nigeria.”124
There was a bizarre fixation in London on this rule of “pure Euro
pean descent.” After watching British Tommies bathing in a communal
cleansing station, Lord Curzon confessed that he never knew that the
working classes had such white skins: those who were not “white”
were automatically deemed to be of subordinate class and those of a
subordinate class were assumed to be not “white,” at least not in the
same way as their “betters.” Class bias was articulated via racial preju
dice and vice versa in an endless loop that Asians and Africans particu
larly had difficulty escaping.125
London enforced these race rules with an energetic relish. A mere
thirty-eight months before war erupted in Europe, colonial officials
were discussing judicial appointments in the colonies. From Nairobi
there was objection to “transfer to this Colony of men from the West In-
dies who have a ‘slight touch of color.’” “I would strongly advise
against this proposal,” he intoned scornfully. “Kenya is a cruel colony
and I am convinced that on the social side the newcomer would be
treated as an outsider and that things would be made uncomfortable for
him and his wife. I fancy that he would be debarred from memberships
of the various European Clubs and that he would not desire to be asso
ciated solely with the Indians.” From Dar-es-Salaam a colonial official
remarked that “the European population here is not very level-
headed.” It would be easy to “deplore this prejudice and its lack of log
ical justification—but there it is and I [do] not think I need to say
more.”126
TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT” 41
Although he did not, inevitably this issue arose time and time again
in an Empire whose benefits were doled out on the basis of color. Per-
haps because the very process was irrational, the British authorities
often sank into a morass of absurdity in defending the rule of “pure Eu
ropean descent.” Why would someone object to officials from the West
Indies being transferred to East Africa, for example? Well, in both East
and West Africa, according to one administrator, there was a “tendency
to suspect colour in anyone who has been been near the [West] Indies
and a Kenya settler indignant at being sent to gaol by a ‘Negro judge’
would raise cain . . . in Nairobi.”127 But why didn’t such repulsive poli
cies spark more outrage within the Empire? Well, the official rule was
that individuals were not rejected for certain posts because of their color
and great pains were taken to hide the reality. As one official put it in
1927, “It is most important that no indication should leak out that men
are rejected for the Colonial Services on account of colour.”128 Many
subjects of His Majesty were deluded into thinking that they were
racially and legally equal.
There were special provisos designed for specific populations.
When in 1939 London was soliciting subjects of the Empire to sign up
for military duty, one key official said that “we should . . . be most care
ful to word the announcement as not in any [way] to imply that we re
gard all ‘Colonial British Subjects’ as not being of pure European de-
scent, otherwise great offence will be given in some quarters (e.g. in
Malta).”129 Closer to Africa than to London, the Maltese were perpetu
ally concerned that they would be confused with their nearest neighbor
and not their patron.
Thus throughout the Empire rules were devised to make sure those
with a hint of melanin did not get crucial posts. Yet as the metronome
of war pounded ever louder, some officials began to worry that this
could compromise the Empire’s security. In September 1939 Sir A. F.
Richards in a “secret” message responded to frantic queries about “loy
alty” in the West Indies. Perhaps it was the press of war that compelled
him to acknowledge that “this colour question . . . is one of the biggest
questions in the Empire. In my opinion,” he continued, “if it is not faced
and solved by recession from the ‘pure European birth on both sides’
rule it will wreck the Empire yet.” Plaintively, he lamented, “How can
a world Imperial Power with all too few pure white subjects justify this
principle—if principle you call it.”130
42 TO BE OF “PURE EUROPEAN DESCENT”
As the United States expanded into the Pacific in the wake of the Span
ish-American War of 1898, Washington feared that the black troops they
relied on would prove unreliable. Serious consideration was given to
“exclude black Americans from service to the Philippines,” as it was felt
that “there was a natural bond between the rural Filipinos and the
American Negro.”3 But this apprehension was minor compared to the
43
44 THE ASIATIC BLACK MAN?
stream . . . which begins off the coast of Africa and then goes to Asia.”
“There is a large infusion of Negro blood in their veins,” it was re-
ported. “In view, therefore, of the brilliant master strokes of the Japan
ese [army], under General Kuroki and Nodzu and Field Marshal
Oyama, and the unprecedented achievements of the Japanese naval
forces, under the command of the brilliant Admiral Toga [sic], [this]
may therefore justly be regarded as the achievements of the Negro
race.”8 Indeed, the joint discrimination faced by those of African and
Japanese descent in the United States and the fervent praise of Tokyo by
some Negroes, had led as early as 1906 to mutterings about a “black
American-Japanese alliance.”9
Japan became the touchstone, the lodestar, for matters local and
global. This Asian nation was recommended to Liberia as a “most use
ful lesson. . . . As Japan aspires to leadership in the east, Liberia should
so aspire to figure in the kaleidoscopic changes that ere long must come
to the west coast of Africa. . . . Japan has shown that yellow men with
guns are all conquerable over white Russians, at least; so let Liberia
show what the black men can do with a gun.”10 Keeping the Japanese
out of schools in the West showed that “as California would treat Japan
ese, she would also treat Negroes.”11
This veneration of Tokyo was of particular concern to W. E. B. Du
Bois. This war moved the dapper and diminutive activist to soaring
rhetorical heights in 1906, months after the war had ended. “Since 732,”
he began, “when Charles Martel beat back the Saracens at Tours, white
races have had the hegemony of civilization”; but now “the Russo-
Japanese war has marked an epoch. The magic of the word ‘white’ is al
ready broken. . . . The awakening of the yellow races is certain. That the
awakening of the brown and black races will follow in time, no unprej
udiced student of history can doubt.”12
Most famously, Du Bois clashed sharply with his fellow black
leader Booker T. Washington. But when it came to the question of Japan,
the two were as one. In 1912 Washington asserted that “there is no other
race living outside of America whose fortunes the Negro peoples of this
country have followed with greater interest or admiration” than Japan;
“in no other part of the world,” he said, “have the Japanese people a
larger number of admirers and well-wishers than among the black peo
ple of the United States.”13
Yet, perhaps more than Du Bois or Washington, Marcus Garvey,
whose Universal Negro Improvement Association had transcontinental
46 THE ASIATIC BLACK MAN?
1922 the Office of Naval Intelligence noticed that in San Francisco the
UNIA leader George Farr was “being financed by local Japanese inter
ests.” Recently at the Emmanuel Gospel Mission in the city by the bay,
“the music, dancing[,] the crowd were all frivolous. The congregation
was composed largely of the mixed foreign population, Mexicans, Hin
dus, etc. and a number of Negroes.” This multiracial assemblage was
bent on “anti-Caucasian agitation,” as protests abounded—notably
from “Hendric, a Hindu” and the “Negroes.” “Both the Hindu and the
Negro preach among the Negroes, Hawaiians, Mexicans and Hindus,
the doctrine of the supposed necessity of the union of all colored races
against the whites. And they also preach: ‘assert yourself, fellow broth
ers; hit the white man back twice if he hits you.’” They were buoyed by
the growth of the “movement in India, the Bolshevik success in Russia;
rise of the Japanese Empire. . . . Their audience is such that it cares little
or nothing about the inconsistency of the supposed rise of the colored
race against the white.” This church, it was thought, “is really one of the
worst things that was ever born in the name of Christ’s religion.”20 Yet
it had a “Hindu” leader, “one of the moving forces in the Gospel Mis
sion,” who was “very strong against Christianity” as he alleged that the
“whites and the Christians are hardly human, but very much of devils.”
He spoke French and “knows a number of Japanese.”21
This was one of many intriguing incidents monitored by the U.S.
authorities. In May 1920 they had detected “secret meetings of Ne
groes,” for example, one in New York of “over 1000” with a Japanese
speaker who exclaimed, “Let the Negro join the Japanese forces and we
will show him to prominence. Every race has had his day except the yel
low and the black man. . . . We will give you the ammunition to fight the
whites. . . . on the Pacific Coast the two races should join hands.” The
Negroes, it was reported, “were very much affected by the utterances of
this Japanese and they cheered for some time when he concluded his
harangue.”22
Incidents like those involving the shaken Kathleen Skaten were be-
coming more common. In her handwritten 1921 letter to the U.S. Secre
tary of War she recounted what she had witnessed in New York City.
There was “an argument” with “an angry Negro and an indignant
white woman in a train today.” The “Negro was glad of the invasion of
Japan into America in the rumored war. It would give the Negro an op
portunity to ‘defend’ himself and kill off the oppressor. The idea con
veyed was that Japan influence is being used to rouse the Negro [to] the
48 THE ASIATIC BLACK MAN?
Jap [sic] side.” She conceded that she “may be hysterical on the subject
of Japan.” But this admission could not obscure the larger point that
white supremacy was creating a dire challenge to U.S. national secu-
rity.23
In the era before Japan had assaulted the British Empire, the UNIA
was not unique within the constellation of Black Nationalism. Garvey
was born in the British colony of Jamaica and, strikingly, a dispropor
tionate number of those attracted to his banner also hailed from British
colonies. The Pacific Movement of the Eastern World, which “gained a
significant black nationalist following during the 1930s” in the United
States—perhaps “forty thousand members,” with “other estimates”
soaring “as high as one million,” also attracted adherents from the
“British West Indies.”24 If these figures are accurate, it would mean that
such groupings attracted a substantially larger Negro membership than
organizations within the orbit of the Communist Party, for example—
which was one of the few entities with influence among Negroes that
managed to resist Japan’s racial siren song.
Certainly the Nation of Islam, which began in Black America over
seven decades ago and still remains potent, has been the heartiest of the
Black Nationalist groups that originally had a pro-Tokyo orientation.
From the beginning, stubborn rumors persisted that the notorious
Japanese agent, Satohara Takahashi, was “bankrolling the NOI.” The
Federal Bureau of Investigation charged that these “Muslims and other
black nationalists were receiving carbine rifles and sophisticated mili
tary weapons from Japanese espionage agents.” One Takahashi-spon
sored group was “directed toward the extermination of the White Race”
while “during meetings and services a large sign [was] always dis
played bearing the inscription, ‘The Paleface Has to Go.’” Elijah
Muhammad, a patron saint of the NOI, was actively engaged in these
circles. He emphasized that “the Japanese will slaughter the white
man. . . . The Japanese are the brothers of the black man and the time
will soon come when from the clouds hundreds of Japanese planes with
the most poisonous gas will let their bombs fall on the United States and
nothing will be left of it.” Like his “colored” counterparts in New
Zealand—the Ratana, noted below—Elijah Muhammad also believed
that he and his people were somehow related to the Japanese. “The Asi
atic race is made up of all dark-skinned people,” he stated, “including
the Japanese and the Asiatic black man.” The implication was clear, he
thought: “Members of the Asiatic race must stick together.”25
THE ASIATIC BLACK MAN? 49
This notion that Negroes and Japanese were blood relatives was not
peculiar to the NOI. Harry Dean, born in 1864, was the grandson of Paul
Cuffee, perhaps the most prominent and affluent Negro of the early
nineteenth century. Like his grandfather, he was an “African and proud
of it.” He too was a sailor and he recounted in some detail his travels to
southeastern Africa in the late nineteenth century and the story of “Teo
Saga,” a “chief” who was “more Japanese than African. . . . The story
runs that before the cataclysm South Africa, Madagascar, Sumatra, Java
and even Korea and Japan were all connected by land, and formed a
great, illustrious, and powerful empire. The people were highly cul
tured, the rulers rich and wise. When the great flood came over the land
it left only the remote provinces. However that may be, one may still
find such Japanese names as Teo Saga on the coast of Africa to this very
day.”26
Yet this pro-Tokyo bent was not unique to Black Nationalism. The
iconoclastic and militantly anticommunist black journalist, George
Schuyler, who proudly called himself “conservative,” also bowed in the
direction of the Rising Sun. He wrote a roman a clef that posited “race
war” as a major theme. He was “fascinated by Japan and by the mean
ing to blacks worldwide of its great military expansion. At the invita
tion of the [Pittsburgh] Courier he wrote a series of articles on the subject
that the publisher found too pro-Japan to be printed.”27
Japan-related themes were a frequent staple of black writers in the
wake of the 1905 victory, with revenge against white supremacy as a
repetitive theme. In 1913 James Corrothers wrote a story in the Crisis,
journal of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), that “situated the problems of black leadership
within global affairs by imagining a military alliance of Japan and Mex
ico against the United States, further supported by black deserters from
the U.S. Army and the secession of Hawaii, led by angry Japanese-
Americans.” The U.S. president had to appeal to “Jed Blackburn,” a Jack
Johnson type character who “led a force of ten thousand black soldiers
on a suicidal counterattack of Japan’s invasion of Southern Califor
nia.”28 J. E. Bruce was another black writer who wrote wishful fiction
about Japan defeating the United States militarily. In his plot, the U.S.
president had to call for volunteers to prevent this defeat, which led to
a reduction in racism against African Americans who were now pivotal
to national security—a scenario not far distant from what occurred dur
ing the Pacific War and the Cold War.29
50 THE ASIATIC BLACK MAN?
1941 that “we have already established connections with very influen
tial Negroes to keep us informed with regard to the Negro movement.”
U.S. intelligence asserted that “Japanese authorities are watching
closely the Negroes who are employed in defense production plants,
naval stations and other military establishments, particularly in the
naval bases at Norfolk, Va., Philadelphia, Pa. [and] Brooklyn, N.Y.”49
This campaign by Tokyo among Negroes, which was a prominent
though often ignored feature of the interwar years, had a basis in mate-
rial reality. Negroes had reason to believe that Tokyo’s effort at Ver
sailles to proclaim racial equality as a principle of international diplo
macy would redound to their benefit. A few years later Du Bois ex
plained that the exclusion of Japanese immigrants from the United
States—a step that inflamed Tokyo—had resulted from a deal between
the South and the West in which the former endorsed the Oriental Ex
clusion Act of 1924 in exchange for the sacrifice of the Dyer federal an
tilynching bill.50
Hence, the U.S. authorities should not have been surprised by the
growth and depth of the developing Tokyo-Negro alliance. In Kansas
City in 1933 a “Japanese visited . . . with the object of organizing among
the Negroes [an] Anti-White Race Movement.” “Nightly meetings”
were being greeted “enthusiastically.” The “Japanese organizer is said
to have promised Japanese assistance in arms, cash and supplies, in a
war against the white race.” These agents were “covering the entire
United States in the interests of the new organization; also that this or
ganization is working in conjunction with the old Garvey (Negro) asso
ciation. . . . This combined movement is, locally, among Negroes only
and will have no dealings with Communists. It has already grown so
strong that it has stripped local communistic bodies of practically all
their Negro members. . . . Information is extremely difficult to obtain.”51
As in Kansas City, so in Pittsburgh: From the latter city came re-
ports about Japanese agents holding meetings “attended by a large
number of other colored people.” They were being told to “dispose of
any property they might possess. . . . and go to the Continent of Africa,
which the Japanese Government is soon to undertake to colonize; that
the Japanese Government will build for them an army; that they will
build for them a navy and will see that that they become a formidable
nation.” This promise to fulfill Garvey’s old dream was reported at
meetings “intended for [and] attended by Negroes only, and that if
even a light-skinned Negro is present at the time [the Japanese agent]
56 THE ASIATIC BLACK MAN?
makes his address, the invectives against the United States are elimi
nated from his talk.” There was a suspicion that this agent was Filipino
since he spoke Spanish, suggestive of the pro-Asian bias involved.52
Such meetings were sufficiently well-known to be reported in the
black press as the Pittsburgh Courier reported that a “Japanese scholar”
was offering “free transportation “back to Africa’” along with “75 acres
of land, a house, farm equipment, animals and crop seed, all free.”53
This Japanese initiative was also a spur to race changes domestically as
the U.S. government, which otherwise excluded blacks from meaning
ful employment, felt compelled to search for a “good Negro operative”
so that “he might find out what is going on.”54
The Japanese offensive among Negroes had created a dilemma for
the United States. The government knew that the only organized and
militant anti-Tokyo force among blacks was the Communist Party and
their allies. Yet this was precisely the group under harshest attack by the
U.S. authorities—which, ironically, bolstered the pro-Tokyo forces. Not
least because of Tokyo’s anticommunism and Japan’s racial appeals,
which were seen as contrary to working-class unity, the U.S. Commu
nists kept Japanese agents under surveillance as well. Thus, at the same
time that U.S. agents were eyeballing Japanese-sponsored meetings, the
Communists and their allies were doing the same. For example, in 1932
an operative of the soon to be defunct “Communist front,” the “League
of Struggle for Negro Rights,” broached a “very important matter. . . .
The UNIA is conducting a drive throughout the country, holding mass
meetings with Japanese speakers, preparing the masses ideologically in
support of the Japanese attack against the Soviet Union and Chinese
masses. The line they follow is to point out the unity that should exist
between the colored races as against the whites. Such meetings are held
here in Chicago and we also know of a few held in Gary. . . . There seems
to be a definitely organizationally prepared plan to enlist the Negro
masses behind the wagon of Garvey and his movement. As we were in-
formed there are 250 Japanese students touring the country and every-
where speaking under the auspices of the UNIA.”55 But before Decem
ber 1941 the U.S. authorities were reluctant to ease pressure on Com
munists, so as to heighten the same on pro-Tokyo Negroes.
For this left-wing grouping was on to something. A black commu
nity languishing under the cruel lash of lynching and an ideology that
heralded as superior all things “white,” was predisposed to lend an
eager ear to Japanese agents preaching a radically different message. In
THE ASIATIC BLACK MAN? 57
New York, for example, Hikida Yasuichi had “polished his English in a
high school in Michigan,” then proceeded “to study sociology for one
year (1922) at Columbia University.” This dapper spokesman of Tokyo,
graying and animated, was “often warmly welcomed into the homes of
leading [black] citizens.”56 There he was often accompanied by a Negro
woman—that a white man of similar or virtually any stature would be
reluctant to share such company openly was yet another living rebuke
to prevailing racial mores in the United States.57 Described as “suave
and genial,” he “often” traveled in Jim Crow accommodations, like
those he was seeking to influence. He had a wide-ranging knowledge
of black history, having written a biography of the Haitian hero, Tous
saint L’Ouverture, and was a frequent speaker at the foremost institu
tions of black higher education, Tuskegee and Hampton Institutes. He
worked in swank Forest Hill as a servant but “maintained a Harlem ad-
dress at the colored YMCA,” an address from which “every year un
failingly he sent his Negro friends Christmas cards—usually a picture
of Japan’s Rising Sun.”58
Hikida’s profile was similar to that of other Japanese nationals, who
came to the United States in the run-up to the blitzkrieg against the Em
pire, settled in black communities, and worked as menials amongst af
fluent whites. Besides Forest Hills, Saratoga, New York, Lexington,
Kentucky, and the posher sections of Florida were their favorite haunts.
They often worked as chauffeurs—a prime position for those seeking
unguarded but vital tidbits of information. There they could also more
easily propagandize among the legions of Negro servants who toiled
alongside them. Like Hikida, they often had Negro women compan
ions—or wives. This revelation had reached a leading aide of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who learned that there were a “small number of
Japanese nationals married to Negresses [sic],” which was viewed as a
“fifth column move on the part of the Japanese in creating such mar
riages to build good will and sympathy.”59
But the most intimate of relationships was not the only place where
the Japanese had insinuated themselves. The famous composer W. C.
Handy recalled a cook who traveled about the country for five years as
a member of his vaudeville troupe, who later turned out to be an eaves-
dropping Japanese Army officer. This Japanese crusade was not with-
out effect, or so thought the perceptive black journalist Roi Ottley.
“Some Negroes,” he thought, “came to look upon the Japanese as be-
longing to a messianic race, which would lead black men out of
58 THE ASIATIC BLACK MAN?
ninety percent of the American colored population who have any views
on the subject at all, are pro-Japanese as a result of the intensive Japan
ese propaganda among this racial group.’”63
The proliferation of accounts in the black press about Japanese
agents addressing black audiences was not solely a product of the lat
ter’s hunger for news about Nippon. Tokyo made a concerted effort to
bring Negro journalists across the Pacific for visits where they were
wined and dined. Months before the strike against the Empire, the
United States intercepted a message to the highest levels in Tokyo,
meant “to be kept secret.” Why the need for surreptitiousness? It seems
that an emissary from Tokyo had been “using a Negro literary critic”
and “had him open a news service for Negro newspapers. The Negro
press is so poor that it has no news service of its own and as I have told
you in various messages, had been getting relatively good results and
because of the advantage we have in using men like this in our political
and subversive activities.” That was not all. Much has been made of al
leged and actual Soviet spying in the U.S. capital, but Tokyo too felt that
“in organizing our schemes among the Negroes. . . . Washington . . .
should be our hub.” Further, “in the arsenals at Philadelphia and Brook
lyn there are also a few unskilled Negro laborers, so I would say in the
future there will be considerable profit in our getting Negroes to gather
military intelligence for us.” “Chicago, Los Angeles and New Orleans”
were also targeted.64
Thus, as the pulse of an approaching war became ever more rapid,
Tokyo thought it possessed an advantage in having a firm base of sup-
port among the Negroes, situated strategically within the boundaries of
the Empire’s chief military ally. This was not an unlikely assumption.
However, timely concessions on the racial front by the United States,
along with strong antifascist sentiment among Negroes eventually viti
ated Tokyo’s putative advantage.
3
Race/War
T H E B R I T I S H C O U L D H A R D LY A F F O R D to alienate anyone—least
of all Chinese—as they faced the grim prospect of a Japanese invasion.
But such dire realities were far from the mind of the working-class men
fleeing the austere future awaiting them in a Britain fearful of being
overrun by Germany. Harold Robert Yates was “really looking forward
to going to Hong Kong. . . . It was reckoned to be the best station in the
British Army at that time. . . . Generally the standard of living for the
soldiers was much better.” His “money went further” to begin with.
There was a “pleasant climate. There was plenty of sport, swimming
and football. And of course there were plenty of women.”
Not only was the food of better quality there, but it was “relatively
cheap . . . compared with the U.K.” Beer and cigarettes, clothes and
cameras were cheap too. Sure, there were downsides. While he was in
Hong Kong, “occasionally someone would rape a Chinese girl,” though
a “lot weren’t reported.” One ghastly case involved a girl who was “cry
ing and of course she’d been a virgin.” But that was a blip on an other-
wise happy screen, he thought. “Normally we were finished at twelve
o’clock and we were . . . freed to leave the barracks.” The reason they
had such latitude was that they had “barrack room servants” called
“‘boys’” who were compelled to “clean anything, except rifles. [They
weren’t] allowed to touch rifles,” he stressed. This was the system that
obtained in Asia, “but not in [the] U.K. itself.”
These luxuries helped to make soldiers softer than they were back
home and, consequently, more susceptible to being swept away by an
invasion. There were “Chinese and Indian constables at that time, the
officers were all British—but the Chinese or Indian constables had no
power to arrest us of course. So we could get away with quite a lot.”
And they did, carousing, brawling, and boozing madly. Anyway,
“Hong Kong was absolutely riddled with corruption” and “police took
bribes.” The colony had “the best police that money can buy.” Yates got
60
RACE/WAR 61
on “fairly well with the Middlesex Regiment but not so well with the
Royal Scots. And the Royal Scots and of course the Middlesex didn’t get
on well,” as fierce “fights” were frequent. As he recalled it, “British civil
ians wanted Chinese and soldiers to walk on one pavement while they
used the other,” and, as he recalled, there were signs that read, “dogs
and soldiers not allowed.” If a “girl went with a soldier, you know, she’s
considered no good,” though civilians “admired the Navy a little better
than the Army.”
But when the war began in 1939 these fusty attitudes changed.
Then civilians began “inviting soldiers to their homes.” But Yates’s atti
tude was, “if you don’t want to know us in peace-time, we don’t want
to know you in war-time.”
Along with these intra-European tensions there was the ever-pres
ent problem of tensions with Asians. The Sikhs mutinied in 1940 on
Stonecutter’s Island, as the “British were trying to get them to wear
steel helmets.”1 This violation of their fundamental religious beliefs was
an illustration of the British tin ear and tone deafness when it came to
dealing with Asians.
U.S. authorities had their ear to the ground and did not like what
they were hearing. In July 1940 the State Department was told “of the
fear by this Government of Chinese mob violence in Hong Kong which
may require a Japanese attack to start it. . . . Many Chinese shops are
being equipped with iron grills and show evidence of various forms of
protection against mob violence. This Government endeavor[s] for rea
sons of policy to blame the state of alarm more on external develop
ments than on this internal situation which is undoubtedly potentially
serious.”2
This was true. The United States had cause to suspect the “loyalty
of many of both the Indian and Chinese police.” The British, it was re-
ported, “had more to fear from dissatisfied elements within the colony
than from outside sources.” Who were these “outside sources”? Agents
of Tokyo? Actually, an agent of Tokyo had informed the gullible U.S. of
ficial that “the Indian troops and the police were being incited to sub-
ordination by Communist agents.”3
The confluence of anticommunism and white supremacy greased
the path for Japan. Somewhat naively the colonial governor asserted in
the spring of 1941, “I am struck with [the] continuing growth of Staff of
Japanese Consulate in Hong Kong. Excluding clerks, staff in 1931 when
Japanese population was 2205 numbered 5 and remained at that figure
62 RACE/WAR
until 1937. [The] number has steadily risen and during 1940 averaged
11: today with Japanese population [of] 463 Consular Office number 12,
clerical staff has risen from three to eight during this period. With
American infiltration [and] Philippino [sic] population of 869 American
Consulate has only 7 officers with 9 deputy Commissioners, clerks and
5 lady assistants. I have now been asked . . . for visa for two more non-
official Consular officers to come to Hong Kong with no indication of
what posts they will fill. . . . The functions of such a large staff,” he said
guilelessly, “can hardly be consular in the accepted use of the term.”4
There was “nothing to be gained,” countered the Colonial Office, “by
making it difficult for Japanese civilians to enter or remain in Hong
Kong.”5
Still, London was becoming more trusting of Japan, its anticommu
nist ally, but still maintained an inflexible doubt about the colonized
Chinese, who it suspected “were tampering with the safes.”6
through the mobs at tremendous speed to save their own wives and
children.”
Yet even as the battle for Hong Kong raged, Gwen Dew had reason
to understand why there might be inadequate Chinese defense of the
Crown Colony. She and others had repaired to the Repulse Bay Hotel as
the war intensified. There she found “so-called society women from
their villas on the hills.” They “had always lived in high luxury, with
countless Chinese servants and splendid homes.” Now “their mouths
had prickly persimmons in them.” There was one “dowager duchess”
with her “limousine, her flying veils and her scalding tongue,” all of
which “had been topics of the day in more gossipy times.” She was “not
a guest of the hotel, but had come from her spacious home on The Peak”
at the time of the invasion. From “time to time” the “snipers” would
“fire at the hotel and we could hear the answering guns of the British
near-by.”
Suddenly, Dew’s “own private war began.” “Mrs. Elegant, let us
call her, looked around and in a penetrating voice said: ‘what are all
these Chinese doing in here? What right have they to be here?’” Since
“some of the Chinese were millionaires and well-known Chungking
government officials, this was ill-timed, to say the least.” Remarkably,
the “faces [of the Chinese] turned white.” Dew took the high road.
“There were also some amahs and servants, but they were all human
beings and our allies, as far as I was concerned. ‘Why shouldn’t they be
here?’” she asked. The “dowager duchess” snorted, “‘I know more
about these Chinese than you do. You people come out from America
for a few months and tell us who have been here twenty years how to
run the Chinese.’” Dew was “mad!” She exploded: “‘You’ve lived in a
pretty house high on the hill, with a score of servants whom you’ve
paid a few dollars a month and that’s about all.’”
Another furor erupted when Dew sought to make sure that the Chi
nese huddled in the hotel were able to get something to eat. “This blew
the lid off again. ‘The idea of giving all those people food!’ Mrs. Elegant
sniffed. ‘They shouldn’t be here at all and they will get plenty of food if
we don’t.’” Then, lo and behold, a Chinese man showed up with more
food. Her “antagonist snatched the plate from his hand and said: ‘We
don’t want any more Chinese in here.’” Dew “exploded” again “as
though a shell had made a direct hit. ‘Of all the stupid, ill-mannered
women I’ve ever known, you are the worst,’” she cried. She “stated
66 RACE/WAR
rudely” and fairly, “It has been talk of your sort that has caused inter-
national wars in the first place. Here we crouch and our only hope of
Hong Kong being saved is if the Chinese army manages to arrive to res
cue us. . . . ‘ She tossed her head like an excited bull and announced to
our diverted audience, ‘American fool.’”
Begging to differ, Dew thought it was the British fighting forces
who were waging war like fools. The Japanese “were able to tap wires
and give orders to the British to fire against their own men. . . . Mem
bers of the Maryknoll Mission, near Fort Stanley, later told of watching
the fighting on the hills opposite them, with British troops on two
ridges, who suddenly began firing at one another, killing many. Some-
how the Japs [sic] had managed to give such an order, and it was carried
out.” Presumably one of their fluent English speakers was instrumental
here.21
Dew’s experience was not unique. Her fellow Hong Kong journal
ist, Emily Hahn, recounted that before the invasion her friend Margaret
was “simply laying out anyone with whom she had dealings, especially
one Indian gentleman with a dark red fez. When after the surrender, he
joined the Japanese, with a glad cry I remembered Margaret’s savage
rudeness to him and I thought I understood.”22
This was just one example of an all-encompassing discord that
reigned during the invasion. The British Foreign Office was told that
when one Briton saw the Japanese land he called police headquarters,
“only to be told that it was not their business. He then telephoned to
military HQ and the sergeant who replied, when told the Japs [sic] were
landing and to inform his [commanding officer] said, ‘I can’t wake him
up at this time, its 11 p.m. and he’s gone to bed, he’ll be mad if I wake
him up.’”23 He was supine in dreamland—as was British policy.
The invasion of Hong Kong was a nightmare for all concerned, but
particularly for the Europeans and Euro-Americans, for unlike the
Asians a passing glance revealed them as the probable target of the in
vaders and their allies. Father James Smith of the Maryknoll Mission
discovered “during these terrible and anxious days” that “many came
back to the Sacraments after years of laxity; confessions were heard
among [them] everywhere, in the streets and in dugouts and pill-
boxes.”24 Robert K. M. Simpson had taught at Hong Kong University
and was a member of the defense corps. One of his “colleagues, widely
informed and well-balanced, as he began to see what the end must be,
developed the reaction of violently opening and closing his fists and his
RACE/WAR 67
in the world.”29 Her compatriot Ellen Field was shocked when she was
compelled to deal with a “very officious Chinese clerk” who “made
sure that foreigners never got preferential treatment.”30 What abomina
tion awaited them next?
Morris “Two-Gun” Cohen—gangster, Zionist, and former body-
guard to Sun Yat-Sen—had led a dissolute and swashbuckling life, with
a lengthy list of convictions including “carnal knowledge of [a] girl
under 16 years.”31 Not surprisingly, he was full of bluster and bombast
and was not to be intimidated easily. Yet he was trapped in Hong Kong
at the time of the invasion and was visibly fearful. His colleague,
Solomon Bard, found him “rather frightened. . . . He was just a very or
dinary frightened man, as we were all. He was nervous. Very nerv
ous.”32 Robert Simpson, who taught at Hong Kong University, like
many Europeans was incredulous about what he was witnessing.
“There were some who to the last were simply unable to believe that
Britain could lose Hong Kong. . . . It was utterly incredible that Japan
ese troops could defeat [the] British.” A comrade of his signaled the
emotional holocaust marked by this defeat when he mused that “to sur
render Hong Kong to Japan” was like “relinquishing the right to read
Shakespeare.”33
Benjamin A. Proulx was full of contradictions; he compared the vic
torious Japanese at length to “apes” before noting with wonder, “They
were our conquerors.”34 David Bosanquet reflected sadly that “We had
been beaten ignominiously. It had happened so fast. It left us utterly de
flated. Our world had collapsed. Many of us, including me, were racked
with strange new doubts, apprehensive of what the future held—if
there was to be one.” It was all so “soul destroying.”35 It was not just
being beaten, but being beaten in a context redolent with racial mean
ing that heightened the distress among those of “pure European de-
scent.”
This nervousness was compounded by Japanese propaganda
leaflets raining down on Hong Kong. Phyllis Harrop asserted that the
“subject matter” of these paper missiles was “anything but pleasant. All
definitely aiming at the suppression of the white population and in-
flaming the Chinese and Indians to turn against us. Many of the leaflets
are aiming at killing the white man.” They said, “Kill all the Europeans
as they are responsible for the war and once they are out of the way the
fighting will stop.” These words had a military impact, for the British
were “afraid to shell Kowloon for fear of frightening the Chinese into
RACE/WAR 69
riots and saying we are killing their own people, relatives and friends
in that area.”36
One leaflet featured a picture of a “large, fat, white man, supposed
to be John Bull. He was completely nude and was sitting on a massive
ornate chair. By his side were bags of money spilling out gold and sil
ver coins and on each of his massive knees sat a pretty Chinese girl—
also completely naked. Under this effort was printed: ‘How the British
colony destroys the morals of your womenfolk with their gold.’”37 A
leaflet targeting Indians featured a crude drawing on rough paper
showing a Japanese soldier pointing a rifle at an Indian who was shel
tering a frightened British officer. The caption read, “We cannot fire
while our comrade stands between.” Another leaflet showed Indian
soldiers carrying a white flag, approaching a party of Japanese. “Come,
Indian soldiers,” said the caption. “We treat you especially good!”38 An
intelligence summary filed after the war was well under way noted that
a “Chinese who recently walked from Kweilin to Ishan . . . noticed sev
eral village houses with pictures of Europeans pasted on the walls.
Upon enquiry he was informed that these had been dropped by air-
craft. . . . The front has the caption, ‘Who is dancing with your girl?’
overprinted on an ordinary dance hall scene. In the center there are 2
close ups; the first a man and a woman dancing normally and the sec
ond, the same couple engaged in a concentrated kiss.” The message was
that Chinese women were being “stolen” by European men. Another
leaflet declared, “Asiatic people should not fight amongst themselves,
but shoulder to shoulder drive the Americans and British out of Asia.”39
The British believed that Japanese propaganda was working and
the Chinese were not rallying fervently to the Union Jack. Scribbling fu
riously a few days after the surrender, E. C. Ford railed against the
“Fifth Column activity in the colony.” “What made our defeat in
evitable,” he said accusingly, “was the Chinese, who, being prepared to
sell their rotten souls at any time for a dollar, were sniping and hand
grenading our troops from housetops and flats . . . near . . . our lines.
Caught between the 6” mortars, artillery and explosive bullets of the
Japs [sic] in front, the grenades and rifles of the Chinese in near and
bombs from above, our lines were repeatedly broken.” In fact, when the
“Japs [sic] came to take over Jubilee this morning . . . their guide was a
deserter from the Chinese Royal Engineers.” Then there were the “cow
ardly Rajputans Rifles (Scum of India) and Royal Scots. The last-named
have earned the soubriquet [sic] of ‘His Majesty’s Fleet of Foot.’”; he
70 RACE/WAR
Gordon Hill we came down by a bus from, I’m not sure where it was. . . .
we were fired upon several times by Chinese . . . trying to gun [us]
down as we left.” Yes, “there were occasions when the Royal Scots fell
back”; it was “surprising they didn’t run away altogether when there
was so little to fight for and so little to fight with.” General Maltby was
a “Middlesex man. . . . he regarded us as indisciplined and what he re-
ally meant [was] that we Scots, we’re not English.”45 But it was the Chi
nese that Ford blamed most; in his novel he spoke of how “Chinese fifth
columnists shone signal lights, sniped, spread false rumours and in-
cited desertion, looting and riot.”46
One British soldier told of “tales of small arms having been buried
years before in fake funerals by renegade Chinese working for the Japs
[sic]. True? I just don’t know, but it was of course feasible.” The British
acted as if it were true since “about three or four days before the end of
the battle we were given instructions to shoot out of hand, any Chinese
whether in our uniform or not who we found in the vicinity. . . . So there
must have been a reason for this order. Some men I afterwards spoke to
in POW camp . . . told me that Chinese were throwing hand grenades at
them from buildings behind their front lines.”47
This hearsay report about the massacre of Chinese by the British
during the invasion has been confirmed by Wally Scragg of the military.
During the siege, police shot at rampaging looters at random. A
“Sergeant who had just returned from a visit to Central described wit
nessing the summary execution of 70 Wang Ching-wei agents who had
been rounded up by Special Branch detectives and Chungking agents:
their hands were tied behind their backs and gunny [sacks] were put
over their heads. . . . they were shot in batches by Mr. ‘X,’ using a
Thompson gun and then he went along the line of bodies and shot each
one in the head with a pistol. It was very professionally done.” As the
war reached the “doorstep” of Hong Kong, “the Cantonese . . . began to
desert. . . . I remember finding tunics in the streets from which the num
bers had been removed.”48 Robert Hammond was struck by the fact that
“the British soldiers, to keep order in Hong Kong machine gunned
thousands of looters and fifth columnists.”49 But these massacres did
not decrease the acute anxiety of the Europeans.
As the New Zealander, James Bertram, remembered it, the Chi
nese were not allowed to do “night patrol” during the invasion since
the “Fifth Column scare was at its height.” So the Europeans, some of
whom were not ready for it, “did the night patrols and the Chinese
72 RACE/WAR
recruits did a lot of serious trench-digging.” But the “one mass group
that might have defended Hong Kong with real passion—the Chi
nese—was never called upon.”50 But how could they be called on when
before the war “British soldiers refused to bathe in the same pool” with
Chinese?51 Britain only trained a “few hundred Chinese” in military
and quasi-military operations. Years later an observer who signaled the
sensitivity of his insight by “wish[ing] to remain anonymous,” ac
knowledged that “had it not been [for] such distrust and bad faith cou
pled probably with the shortage of weapons . . . hundreds of thousand
[sic] Chinese volunteers could have been trained for the defence.” There
was a “general European . . . fear of the overwhelming Chinese major
ity” and a withering suspicion that the “local population” would “turn
against the Europeans the moment the Japs [sic] attacked.” The “battle
of Hong Kong,” he sighed “was lost before it began.”52
Myriad sources confirm that the expatriates had “an underlying
fear that the Chinese, however law-abiding they might seem, might rise
up against them.” So it was best to render them militarily impotent.
When the Chinese were recruited, albeit sporadically and sparsely, this
“raised fears among those in the colony who believed the Chinese
might turn on the British.” The British were keen to keep the Chinese in
their place; the expatriate Solomon Bard was “amazed to discover that
there were British volunteers who would refuse even to recognize their
Chinese comrades-in-arms if they met out of uniform on the street.”53
It wasn’t simply weaknesses in the military and police that led to
the defeat of the British. Sir Arthur Dickinson Blackburn recalled that
“in many a gracious home on the Peak or in the Mid-levels, entire Chi
nese staffs deserted, leaving bewildered matrons, some for the first time
in their lives, to grapple with the problems of the pantry.” This could
only contribute to escalating levels of anxiety among Europeans. On the
other hand, he felt that “Eurasians were enthusiastic soldiers. Subtly
discriminated against in the cloistered business community of
Hongkong, they’d found a source of pride in the Volunteers. They had
their own company—No. 3”—which performed admirably, he thought.
Still, apprehension reigned about the reliability of those not of
“pure European descent,” perhaps for fear that the discrimination they
had suffered would sour their attitudes toward British colonialism.54
Thus, London insisted that a majority of the police force in Hong Kong
be recruited overseas because the security of the colony could not be
safely entrusted to locally recruited Chinese policemen—the first line of
RACE/WAR 73
defense in Hong Kong. This was not unique to this Crown Colony: in
the African colonies of the Empire often the police in a given district
were strangers, recruited in another part of the territory and frequently
unable to speak the local language. Police were recruited heavily from
India but they were poorly paid, receiving less than half the wages of a
European constable. Even some of the “White Russians” were paid less
than other Europeans.
George Wright-Nooth of the colony’s police force verifies that the
“principle of divide and rule predominated in recruiting policy. Below
gazetted rank there were Europeans, two categories of Indian, White
Russians and Chinese from widely differing regions of China—a cock-
tail of three races and five languages” with “about a third” being Indi
ans, all of whom spoke “Urdu,” that were “divided roughly between
Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims.” Most of the Sikhs, he said, “were disloyal
and took an active part in humiliating and beating the Europeans,”
while the “Punjabi Muslims generally were very loyal.”55 The “Indian
contingent gave little help during the struggle. Their loyalty had been
undermined.” Closing the barn door after the horse had bolted, after
the war the police became majority “Cantonese” for the first time, while
an effort was made to “get rid of the Sikh police” and retain “Punjabi
Muslims.”56
Nonetheless, the defeat of the British also had causes other than the
debilitating impact of white supremacy on the fighting mettle of Hong
Kong. One Hong Konger acknowledged that “with hindsight the de
fense of Hong Kong was laughable. There were two antique destroyers
and a few torpedo boats, five obsolete airplanes. . . . The second Battal
ion of the Royal Scots had been abroad for seven years and was riddled
with VD and malaria and was unfit to fight.” Apparently “part of [the
military’s] equipment went to Honolulu instead of Hong Kong.”57
Then there were the poorly trained soldiers, such as the Canadians who
arrived days before the invasion. Lucien Brunet of Montreal later con
fessed that he had not “seen a hand grenade before in my life” until that
tumultuous day in December 1941.58 Kenneth M. Baxter, who was in
the trenches during these battles, recalled that “Lewis gunners [had]
mistaken some of us in the bush as the enemy and fired their own peo
ple in the back. . . . [He] tried to keep it quiet.”59 E. C. Ford spoke rue-
fully of the “awful failure of our officers” and the “poor quality of
Canadian troops. . . . They would capture a position by day and desert
it entirely by night to go and feed. At Stanley they even looted their
74 RACE/WAR
There were other reasons for sympathy among some Chinese for
Tokyo. As the writer Han Suyin recalled it, Pearl Harbor “made the
[Chinese] officers almost delirious with pleasure, both because Japan
had delivered a big blow to White Power, which would enable the pro-
Japan clique to emphasize the failures of the whites, and because the
telling criticisms of Chinese chaos, inefficiency and defeat, could now
be shrugged off with a triumphant, ‘And what about you?’” After all,
the Kuomintang—that is, the Chinese nationalists led by Chiang Kai-
Shek—”had looked forward to an alliance with the Axis powers, and
the entry of America into the war did not modify these long-term
views.”65 Edwin Ride, the leading analyst of the Hong Kong resistance
and the son of its leader, Lindsay Ride, concurred, terming Chiang and
his allies “fascist.”66
The British defeat led to a racial and political reversal that was to re
verberate long after the artillery had stopped firing and the Japanese
were driven out of the occupied territories. The New Zealand writer,
James Bertram, who was present in Hong Kong, was astonished as he
saw these “roles” being “reversed.” “It was the dark-skinned warriors,”
he asserted, “who had the advantage of training and technique; the
whites—too often—like the Canadians—had little but their courage.”
Britain, in the irony of ironies, “was meeting Asiatics who had learnt too
well the lessons of the gunboat years.” Simultaneously, those who
flocked to the Union Jack were not exactly likely candidates—and this
too was to resound loudly long after the war. Sammy Kahn, who was
Jewish, had been “driven from his native Halle, he was one of the few
Volunteers who felt he really owed something to Hong Kong. . . . He
had worked so hard to become an ‘Englishman.’”67 It was in order to
avoid these cataclysmic reversals, perhaps, that London instructed the
Hong Kong authorities—in words deemed to be “Most Secret”—that
“the eyes of the world are upon you. We expect you to resist to the end.
The honour of the empire is in your hands.”68 But alas for London, there
were not enough Sammy Kahns to halt the Japanese juggernaut aided
by their Asian allies.
Robert Ward, the U.S. Consul in Hong Kong, realized this. Asked in
1942 why this Crown Colony had collapsed, he recalled that “several of
them”—the British rulers—”said frankly that they would rather turn
the island over to the Japanese than to turn it over to the Chinese, by
which they meant rather than employ the Chinese to defend the colony
76 RACE/WAR
Stunned, she sought a meeting with “Lt. Col. Iguchi” and together they
planned a “brothel system” and she “offered to contact” prostitutes “for
him.” The swiftness of the British defeat left her dumbfounded. “Words
cannot express the feeling that what has been accomplished in a hun
dred years has completely crumbled in a few days. . . . There are signs
of anti-British feelings amongst the Chinese people and I’m afraid the
results are going to be anything but bright when the time comes. . . . It
is evident that [Chinese] feelings are against us by the amount of loot
ing that has taken place and the way in which homes and houses have
been broken into and smashed.” The relationship between the British
and the colonized had deteriorated to the point that the former felt “we
shall be safer in camps than we shall be if we are allowed to remain
free.”73
It was a dreary Christmas Day in 1941 for the Europeans and Euro-
Americans of Hong Kong. Almost a century of prosperous existence
had come to a crashing end at the hands of the Japanese and their allies.
An uncertain fate awaited. The mighty had fallen. Now the invaders
were impressing upon the Chinese and other Asians in Hong Kong that
a new racial reality was dawning. The U.S. reporter George Baxter ac
knowledged that “it was plain that humiliation was part of the Jap [sic]
scheme to convince the natives that the white man had been con
quered.”74 The China-born missionary, Robert Hammond, recalled that
the victors told the Chinese that “from now on the Chinese would not
only be able to have schools and business enterprises, but also would be
able to live like the whites had lived with no fear of being cheated out
of all their possessions by the foreigners,” as had happened so often
during the colonial period.75
The horror of it all struck Gwen Dew like a thunderclap. In a con
scious attempt to lower the prestige of those of “pure European de-
scent” in Hong Kong, the victorious Japanese marched the vanquished
through the streets. “They paraded us, the hungry, bedraggled two
hundred of us, through the crowded Chinese section.” Balefully, she
concluded, “We were the perfect picture of the Fall of the White Man in
the Far East. A white man lying disemboweled in the dirt, a white
woman snatched naked and gang-raped, a parade of whites carrying
their own pitiful burdens—these pictures delighted the Jap [sic]
heart. . . . They are determined upon the rape, the ruin, and the subju
gation of the world—particularly the white world.”76 It was “one of the
78 RACE/WAR
A F T E R B E I N G C O M P E L L E D TO R E S I D E temporarily in a sleazy
brothel, several thousand disheveled and disarrayed Europeans and
Euro-Americans were marched off to what became Stanley internment
camp. Even this brothel, otherwise a site of degraded pleasure, was
fraught with racial tension.
Many Europeans had barely noticed the Indians who resided in
Hong Kong before the war, nor were they fully cognizant of how heav
ily dependent the mighty British Empire was on India itself. Yet, as in
ternee John Streicker put it, the Indian guards at this brothel had “suc
cumbed to the glowing promises of life under the Rising Sun, and
foresworn the British Raj, so our pleas of hunger merely delighted
them.”1 The Europeans, most of whom were accustomed to commodi
ous surroundings, were not just ignored, they were jammed into small
and suffocating rooms, bereft of food and other basic requirements.
They could only gape in amazement as the once graceful city they had
known was transformed into something alien. Bill Harman, an Aus
tralian physician residing in Hong Kong, was appalled by the cutting
down of so many trees: belatedly he “began to realize what it must be
to be so poor that you have to resort to this to get fuel to cook the daily
meal.” Looting had stripped the city bare, though he thought that “the
worst looting was done by the undisciplined Chinese mobs.” There
were “armed robberies all over the place,” as mercantile sentiments and
revenge seeking against the Europeans merged neatly. An escape to the
mainland—which Dr. Harman was able to execute miraculously—
brought no relief, for in so doing he had to run the gauntlet of the Chi
nese military, and “the chance of evading them and not being robbed of
everything was about nil.”2
The missionary, Father James Smith, was struck by the “almost total
absence of English signs on streets and over buildings and stores.” As
an emblem of their hegemony, the invaders had sought to obliterate
80
INTERNMENT 81
signs of what was now seen as an alien language. In “the lobbies of of
fice building[s], all the tenant names were in Chinese or Japanese, and
it was very difficult,” he moaned, “to find one’s own family doctor”—
if one were sufficiently lucky to escape the invaders.3 This was a telling
signal of what was to come. The conquered and increasingly unkempt
community of Europeans and Euro-Americans had received a bitter
foretaste of the racial humiliation that was to follow when they were
subjected to the debasing “March of Humiliation” through the mean
streets of Hong Kong. Their fate was to turn on racial and ethnic factors,
which were once passively accepted as brands of privilege, but now
were to be treated much, much differently. Many were worried that
their racial privilege had been destroyed for all time.
David Bosanquet wondered what the Chinese thought of what they
were seeing. “Was it contempt that an Asiatic race had so easily hum-
bled so many Europeans who had long dominated the indigenous pop
ulation” and would the Chinese ever accept passively the status quo
ante after what they had seen?4 The racial reversal was captured by a
character in a novel by the U.S. writer Emily Hahn: “They say the Eng
lish are monkeys in the zoo and this is Pan-Asia.”5
Conditions were abysmal in this “zoo.” The “almost complete ab
sence of toilet paper” was, perhaps, the least of the problems encoun
tered. “Some ladies wore little more than natural sun-tans.” The “fight
against flies was constant,” while “kitchen staffs were at times defiant
in their attitude and abusive to those who dared to advise them.” The
“diet in Stanley camp was, without doubt, monotonous and . . . unsuit
able for Europeans.” The rice internees were fed had “sand, small
stones, cigarette ends, insects and their young, droppings, glass and
once, at least, rat carcasses.” Some died due to dysentery. A “mild epi
demic of chickenpox with 57 cases occurred late in 1944 and early
1945.” Some suffered “occasional waves of depression.”6
After they seized control,7 there was a “persistent, continuous and
very effective racial and cultural propaganda” unleashed by the
“Japanese military.” The European and Euro-American expatriates who
had expected deference as a virtual birthright “were treated less con
siderately than the higher-class Chinese.”8 A “flood of anti-white prop
aganda poured over the people of Hong Kong and sprayed out from the
colony in all directions.” On 24 January 1942, Major General Yazaki, the
chief of the newly installed “Civil Administration Department” in
Hong Kong, announced curtly, “The object of Japan in fighting this war
82 INTERNMENT
. . . [is] to free the Asiatic races from oppression and to drive out the evil
influence of the white people.” The highest ranking U.S. official in the
Crown Colony, Robert Ward, was concerned that this inflammatory
rhetoric accompanied by equally fiery acts “may well leave marks that
this generation will not erase.” He came from a nation where racial seg
regation was exalted and thus had reason to ponder the larger reper
cussions of the invasion. This Tokyo “gospel,” he continued, “is infi
nitely more dangerous, more insidious, and affects more deeply the
emotions of a much larger section of the world’s population than
Hitler’s.” The “central message was a simple one: the dominance of the
white man is done.”9
Ward had grasped the magnitude and breadth of the matter. Tokyo
had seized the opportunity to overturn the white supremacy that had
been imposed on Hong Kong specifically and Asia more generally. In a
lengthy missive aimed at Japanese troops, entitled “Read This Alone
and the War Can Be Won,” these fighters were instructed sharply:
“Once you set foot on the enemy’s territories you will see for yourself
only too clearly, just what this oppression by the white man means. Im
posing, splendid buildings look down from the summits of mountains
or hills on to the tiny thatched huts of the natives. . . . These white peo
ple may expect, from the moment they issue from their mother’s
wombs, to be allotted a score or so of natives as their personal slaves. Is
this really God’s will?”10
The Japanese propaganda piece, “The Way of Subjects,” asked
plaintively, “How were American Indians treated? What about African
Negroes? They were hunted as white men’s slaves.” The Tokyo-based
correspondent for the New York Times, Otto D. Tolischus, called this a
“startling document” in its indictment of “outrageous acts. . . . unpar
donable in the eyes of God and man,” which allowed Europeans to
“spread their dominion over the colored races” and meant that “Asiat
ics, Negroes and American Indians” were “killed and enslaved.” Tolis
chus was not shocked when Toshio Shiratori, the “official adviser to the
Foreign Office and former Ambassador to Italy,” declared that “Japan’s
true aim was to drive the white man out of Asia.”11 By the time they had
subdued the ineffective British resistance in Hong Kong, Japanese
troops had reached a veritable white-hot mood of resentment against
European colonialism.
This topsy-turvy situation also came as a shock to Emily Hahn, the
journalist who had fled the quotidian pleasures of the United States for
INTERNMENT 83
the exotic danger of Hong Kong. She had been the first woman to earn
a degree in mining engineering from the University of Wisconsin, then
had worked at a hospital in the Congo, resided in Shanghai as the tsip
(common-law wife) of a Chinese scholar, ducked falling bombs in
Chungking, then come to the Crown Colony to write her successful bi
ography of the Soong sisters. With her lovely face and lively mind she
rapidly became a fixture in a community otherwise given to blandness.
Various adjectives were used to describe Hahn but “bland” was one
that was rare. Her open love affair with a married British officer, her pet
gibbons which often accompanied her on her jaunts around town, the
fur coats that she doffed during the winter, her thigh-length boots and
long padded jackets, all lent her an air of eccentricity. She had given up
on smoking opium but now puffed on cigars, which further contributed
to her idiosyncratic image.12
All these affectations—but particularly her well-known relation-
ship with a Chinese man—had served to add to her outré reputation
among expatriates. But when she was interviewed by a Japanese offi
cial, after their defeat of the British, she found that he “was pleased that
an American girl should have married an Oriental. It made him more
friendly.” This surprising turnabout—what the previous ruling elite
saw as a demerit was now seen as meritorious—was to continue. “‘Ac
cording to American law,’” Hahn reminded her Japanese interlocutor,
“‘this Chinese marriage does not make me Chinese.’ ‘According to
Japanese law,’ he said, ‘it does. . . . You cannot be interned. We are eject
ing all Chinese subjects from the internment camp.’” A European friend
scolded her for accepting this racially and ethnically keyed dispensa
tion: “‘You ought to stay with your own people, you know.’” The
“‘British are not my own people,’” she replied with passion, “‘I feel
more at home . . . with the Chinese.’”
The internment came as a surprise to Hahn—and many others. “We
were rather expecting an internment of Jews and Chungking patriots
and such,” she said at the time, “but internment of all Europeans? Im
possible!” Certainly the new conquerors were “fully aware of the social
implications of Hong Kong’s geography” and “wanted to humiliate the
whites as much as they could, and bringing them down from those
costly heights”—at The Peak—”to sea level was an obvious and neces
sary move in the campaign.” Whereas the British by means fair and foul
had limited drastically the ability of those not of “pure European de-
scent” to reside at The Peak, the victorious Japanese “actually did make
84 INTERNMENT
a law, later on, which made it punishable for any enemy white left out-
side of camp to live on the hillside.”13 The world had turned upside
down.
It could have been worse. The aristocratic Sir Arthur Dickinson
Blackburn, a diplomat from the mainland, who had come to Hong
Kong for a visit just before the invasion, was not accustomed to the
humble surroundings that Stanley provided, yet he found its beachside
location “pleasant”; “there is no real ground for complaint regarding
the quarters themselves,” he proclaimed early on, though the “lack of
privacy,” “overcrowding,” and the “consequent friction and nervous
strain” were a “more serious hardship than the food shortage.”14 John
Streicker, who served as Administrative Secretary at the camp, found it
a “perfect site, richly endowed with fresh sea air and lovely scenery.”
There was “very little barbed wire,” which gave camps such an omi
nous air, and what there was—ironically—had been laid by the
British.15 Still, they were so closely packed that the thousands there all
seemed to be inhabitants of one household.
Good humor under trying conditions enabled many to survive the
ordeal of hardship. William G. Sewell, a humble Quaker, recalled that
“if ever we started to grumble we reminded ourselves of the comments
of a Jew who had fled from the Nazis to [Hong Kong]. ‘If I knew that my
family in Europe was nearly as well off as the people in this camp, then
I might begin to believe in God—just begin,’” he announced. Sir
Franklin Gimson, the top British official detained, looking back at war’s
end, concluded, “Now that I am able to contrast our treatment at Stan-
ley with that of other camps, I think we were extremely fortunate that
we escaped so lightly.”16 He was correct: the “death rate” at Stanley
“was much lower than in other camps in Japanese held territories.”17
Stanley was no playground, but it was a far cry from its counterparts in
Europe.
However, as Emily Hahn indicated, many thought internment
camps were for “Jews” and others deemed to be outcasts, certainly not
for the upper echelon of Hong Kong. Sir Franklin initially expected a
France- or Belgium-style occupation where Tokyo would rule through
officials like himself. Indeed, he seemed willing to serve as a quisling.
In a strange letter, days after the surrender, instead of promising sabo
tage he offered the invaders advice on how to locate “petrol supplies”
and tips on how to administer the sprawling metropolis.18 The Japanese
INTERNMENT 85
refused his offer to become their lackey. Instead he was “arrested” and
“detained” for “thirty hours” before being released “owing to the inter
vention of Mr. Kimuru, a former Japanese consul in Hong Kong.” Still
confident, Sir Franklin “got in touch with leaders of the Indian and Por
tuguese communities and offered to make any representations on their
behalf to the Japanese authorities.” These “communities” did not need
the vanquished to represent them, however, and no doubt some looked
forward to gaining an advantage over the once powerful British who
had fallen so precipitously.19
All told, approximately 1,290 men, 908 women, and about 315 chil
dren were detained at Stanley camp.20 To avoid detention, some rushed
to embrace identities that earlier would have been shunned. The lordly
Ellen Field was compelled to masquerade as a lowly Irish woman in
order to avoid internment, as the invaders did not target Europeans
thought to be antagonistic toward London, suggesting that Tokyo was
warring against white supremacy, more than “whiteness” itself.21
Why was anyone detained, in any case? The conquering Japanese
seemed to improvise after their victory. Sir Franklin acknowledged this,
adding that the “Japanese at the outset averred the Europeans had been
interned for ‘their own protection.’ Though this contention appeared to
be at first sight ridiculous, in reality it proved to have some sub-
stance.”22 A number of expatriates concurred.23
The time had arrived for the Chinese to wreak revenge on those
who had oppressed and exploited them since the Opium Wars and they
seized the opportunity aggressively. In Emily Hahn’s novelistic rendi
tion of wartime Hong Kong, a character asserts, “After the poor exhibi
tion they have given during the war, the Chinese might tear them [the
British] to pieces.”24 As conditions in Hong Kong steadily deteriorated
in the following months, these internees—most of whom had become
accustomed to a life with a retinue of servants—would have had a hard
time fending for themselves.
Despite—or perhaps because of—this “favor” of internment, many
faced the future with grave apprehension. Gwen Priestwood had heard
“stories of what had happened to the Germans who were interned by
the Japs [sic] in the First World War: how they came home afterward
with no teeth and no hair.” This grim prospect so disturbed the fashion-
minded writer that she immediately looked in the “mirror, dabbing on
my rouge and lipstick and brushing [her] hair.” She vowed to “fight to
86 INTERNMENT
them that they could not concentrate, and they were unable to remem
ber the orders shouted at them. This was a source of great amusement
to the Japanese, who regarded the Europeans as very inferior beings.”40
That they were given an “elaborate intelligence test” only served to con-
firm in the minds of many Europeans that they were being treated like
so many Negroes.41 The ravenous craving for food, the unfriendly cap-
tors, the racial reversal, all this and more led many to emotional col-
lapse.42 Numerous “internees did show signs of increased irritability,
hypersensitiveness to noise and exaggerated ill-temper. Concentration
became difficult for many, and loss of memory and insomnia at night
were common complaints.”43
There were objective reasons for the emotional abyss of the incar
cerated. Not only had they been defeated, an enormous setback in itself,
but worse in the eyes of many they had been defeated by those not of
“pure European descent,” thus undermining the very predicates of
“white supremacy.” The police officer George Wright-Nooth was
stunned when some of his fellow Sikh officers “stripped off their uni
form, then in their ridiculous red underpants and with their long dank
hair let down, except for the topknot with a silver dagger stuck through
it, had gone on the rampage. They had rushed around swearing and
spitting at European officers and civilians as well as cursing the British
government,” something they would never have dared to do prior to
the invasion. The “bulk of the warders” at the detention camp that he
found himself in were “the original Chinese or Indian staff who had
merely exchanged their British masters for Japanese.” One Indian
warder in particular, Rehimat Khan, “commonly known as Red-
beard. . . . took immense pleasure in humiliating and beating his Euro
pean prisoners.”44
When the Stanley camp was first opened, Sir Arthur Dickinson
Blackburn was shocked when the “Japanese put in a number of English-
speaking Chinese as block supervisors.” The British, for obvious rea
sons, had thought they knew this language group but now found they
did not: the sense of betrayal was boundless and deeply emotional.45
There were other injuries as well. The journalist George Baxter found it
hard to forget the moment when the prisoners were lined up only to
find that “many of the Jap [sic] officers and men broke ranks, facing us,
calmly unbuttoned their trousers and urinated in our direction. One
British woman fainted.”46
INTERNMENT 89
relationship with a Chinese man, wrote that the Japanese leading offi
cial, “Oda,” a “confirmed capitalist,” “had been severely shocked at the
sight of many Hong Kong millionaires he had known, brought low at
Stanley. Even enemy rich men are still rich men,” she divined, “and Oda
felt sympathetic toward them.”59 However, Jean Gittins disagreed. In
her view, “Japanese sought to humiliate the elite by assigning them to
the poorest type of accommodation in the camp.”60
In brief, class conflict did not cease simply because conditions were
harsh. A number of U.S. sailors were trapped in Hong Kong at the pre
cise moment of the Japanese seizure of power. They railed at the lead
ership of Stanley being “overweighted with Standard Oil executives
and other China Coast tycoons.” Despite their leadership roles, they
were subject to “demoralization” while the “unionists, who were
quickly recognized as natural leaders, provided a striking contrast.”61
Though the prisoners at Stanley devised a number of organizations
to protect their interests, many of them—particularly the “capitalists”—
still looked forward to denying a similar level of organization to their
workers in Hong Kong upon their release from detention. Sir Franklin
Gimson made a note in his diary about a “discussion” with some in
terned bosses “on trade unions” where he “heard the usual employer’s
argument that they were not necessary.”62 When it came to unions,
these defrocked economic royalists had learned nothing and forgotten
nothing. The U.S. Consul in Hong Kong, Robert Ward, writing from the
comfort of North America, acknowledged the obvious when he
averred, “It is probable too that had there been stronger unions in the
Colony, the laboring groups would have felt that they had a larger stake
in the continuance of the former Government’s rule. . . . The absence of
unions provided the Japanese with one situation to exploit in their ef
forts to discredit the West.”63
But just as the interned had difficulty overcoming class bias, they
had a similar problem transcending the bonds of race. Jean Gittins, a
prominent member of the Eurasian community, felt this strongly. Some
of the British felt that were it not for the many Eurasians in the camp,
there would be sufficient food for them. Racial discrimination had by no
means moderated in the face of general adversity, and some people
were too bigoted to understand that the food was rationed by the Japan
ese according to the number of mouths to be fed. Then there were those
who, failing to get parcels themselves, became increasingly jealous of
those who did. They were envious not of the large business houses
92 INTERNMENT
whose parcels came regularly and had to be paid for at the end of the
war, but of the Eurasian community whose relatives in town sent
parcels at great personal sacrifice. “One of our neighbors worked him-
self into a bad humor each parcel day. He repeatedly advocated the
pooling of all parcels, even though less than ten per cent of internees re
ceived them, and the contents divided equally between the three thou-
sand others. . . . We were all stunned to find at the end of internment
that, instead of eating the contents of their comfort parcels from the Red
Cross, they saved intact at least one parcel each, besides tens of corned
beef, presumably for a rainy day.”64 This though they were pitiably
emaciated. Thus, Stanley could not escape the failings of the society
communism had presumably left behind. Europeans and Euro-Ameri
cans continued to demand “communism” when the property of non-
Europeans was at play and react passively to the accretion of goods by
others.65
Conflict had to emerge from the Japanese attempt to construct a
new racial reality—a reality at odds with the prevailing ethos of white
supremacy. As time passed, a black market emerged which reflected the
race changes that accelerated with every passing day of the occupation.
As John Streicker described it, “A third party became necessary be-
tween internees and guards” and “these were generally confined to
those with a fluent knowledge of Chinese”—which automatically ruled
out most Europeans and Euro-Americans. It was “not surprising” that
the “Eurasians”—figuratively born to be the “middle man”—took this
role. Although Streicker thought “most of the Europeans felt [this role]
either beneath their dignity or disliked the idea of profiteering at the ex
pense of their fellows,” the fact was that many of the Europeans had no
qualms about “profiteering” before internment.66
Certainly, selfishness tinged with racial chauvinism did not disap
pear with internment. Gwen Dew has written bitterly of the woman she
called “Mrs. Elegant,” a British dowager who despised the Chinese.
While interned, this elderly woman was reluctant to share even a glass
of water: “She managed to get to the bucket first, and before even the
sick children had a chance, she had five glasses of water! Then she
grabbed two dozen lumps of sugar and put them in her pockets and
walked off!” Not stopping there, Mrs. Elegant turned on a “very fine
man with mixed blood” and called him a “dirty wop” for seeming to
question her. Later, at a meeting with Japanese journalists, one gave her
a bottle of spirits but a fellow European internee asked if he could carry
INTERNMENT 93
it, then refused to return it: “‘Of course I took it,’ he yelled” tri
umphantly, after denying the episode had occurred.67
words could safely be ignored. Sir Franklin sniffed at one point that
“the American representative had also a reputation open to question.”
Disputes ranged widely between the two; when Sir Franklin objected to
a “committee of hospital management,” his counterpart from the
United States asked him bluntly, “‘Have you ever heard of the Boston
tea party?’” The thunderstruck Briton could “only exclaim! What?”76
The British were “perturbed at the attitude being taken by the
Dutch and the Americans who were wanting to run their own affairs
without reference to the British. . . . They want direct access to the
Japanese. . . . They often prejudice the harmonious relations between
ourselves and the Japanese.” That was precisely the problem, thought
many from the United States. These non-British nationals felt that in
order to prolong rule of the Empire—that is, over the interned—Sir
Franklin would go to extraordinary lengths to collaborate with the
Japanese. For his part, Sir Franklin felt he had no choice in light of the
“difficulty” he had with the “Dutch, Americans and Norwegians,”
which was “one of the most important aspects of the camp.”
No doubt Sir Franklin’s detractors’ worst fears would have been
confirmed had they been able to read his diary. He was close to “Zin
del,” who was “not prepared to indulge actively in any anti-Japanese
activity”; Zindel felt that it was possible “to achieve far more by play
ing up to the Japanese susceptibility to flattery” than by outright oppo
sition. “I entirely agreed with him,” said Sir Franklin, “and stated that I
found myself in a similar position.” Actually, after U.S. citizens were
evacuated from Stanley in 1942–1943, he had more room for maneu
ver—and collaboration—and was able to wangle more commodious
quarters for himself in contravention of the wishes of many of the in
ternees. Sir Franklin argued that certain “individuals” who “in their
own selfish interests would approach the Japanese direct and obtain
special concessions.”
Ironically, the subjugated of Stanley were subjected to the same tac
tic they had mastered to virtual perfection: divide and conquer. This
was even more ironic in light of the fact that the prewar British press in
Shanghai tended to be more pro-Japan than the U.S.-owned press, in
part because London counted on Tokyo to hammer the Chinese Com-
munists.77 The Northern Irish were beginning to distinguish themselves
from the British in order to cut a separate deal and not be stained by the
broad brush of London’s blunders. An “Australian and New Zealand
Society” was formed at Stanley comprised of “about 100 Australians
96 INTERNMENT
and New Zealanders” interned there. The captors tried to split this
group from the British by offering to transfer them to Shanghai in return
for doing propaganda broadcasts. “Most” refused but “one or two who
showed signs which were not immediately negative” were sent to
Shanghai.78
As Jean Gittins recalled it, “the small Dutch community, subse
quently joined by the Norwegians, numbered well over one hundred.
They kept mostly to themselves and in all those years I cannot recall any
direct contact I ever had with any of their nationals. The Americans, on
the other hand, stood out as the most favoured nation: throughout their
short internment”—they were released prematurely by Tokyo, well be-
fore the war concluded—”they enjoyed many privileges in food and ac
commodation which were denied the rest of the camp. . . . I remember
the envy we felt towards them.”79 Stanley was not unique in this regard.
In camps in the occupied territories generally, “Australians and Ameri
cans were likely to make common cause out of being strongly anti-
British. And, in general, the British, Australians and Americans—all
English speakers . . . were strongly anti-Dutch.”
Yet whatever tensions existed between the Allies, they were over-
shadowed by those between all of them and their Japanese captors. J. P.
S. Devereux, a proud Marine major, “would never willingly have low
ered himself to talk to a yellow man on equal terms. Now he had to
learn to speak lower than low, in the voice of unconditional surrender.”
He was not alone, as “the yellow man returned the white man’s hate
and contempt” in spades. In the early days of captivity a Japanese offi
cer was holding a handkerchief to his nose. A POW sergeant asked him
if he had a cold. “Baka! Stupid! said the Japanese. You smell bad, you smell
very bad.” Later the captor said his prisoner did not smell so terribly.
“Now you smell O.K. You no eat meat since you become pu-ri-so-na. This
story could be read another way: The Japanese liked their white pris
oners to be starving.” And it can be read yet another way: treacherous
tropes of insult traditionally used by Europeans and Euro-Americans—
such as suggesting that some groups emit foul odors—against Africans
particularly, were now being turned back against the perpetrators by
Asians.
That was not the end of it. In the United States it had long been sug
gested that if one treated a group as if they were slaves, before long the
group would begin to believe it themselves and act accordingly. Now
Euro-Americans began to be subjected to similar patterns of oppres-
INTERNMENT 97
sion. In one camp “there was the Dog Man, also an American. . . . He
turned himself into a dog. . . . He went around on all fours, lifted his leg
to pee and slept curled on the floor. When the guards tried to make him
stand on his hind legs he barked at them: when the commandant came
around he snarled and bit him on the boot.”80
Alan Jackson Wood of the British military argued that such aberrant
behavior was more typical of his U.S. counterparts. “Americans gener
ally speaking, could not look after themselves as well as the British. . . .
Generally speaking if the Japanese knocked a British chap down he’d
get up, be knocked down, get up, knocked down. He wouldn’t stay
down until he was knocked out. The Americans normally would be
knocked down once and that was [that], they wouldn’t get up.” Wood’s
observation was based on his experience at an internment camp in
Yokohama where at one point somebody took down a U.S. flag: “It
must have been as a protest to the life which they’d had to live with the
fleas and the lice and the general behaviour of the Americans . . . who
seemed unable to stand up in adversity as the British did.”81
Sir Franklin,82 whose view of the U.S. was becoming increasingly
choleric, was even more outraged when he discovered that Tokyo’s tac
tics were having a material impact on those he purported to represent.
Under the pressure of internment, national bonds that had been taken
for granted were fraying badly. There was a “strong anti-Government
feeling” to the point that his “attempt to reconstitute the administration
of the camp” with himself “in charge,” “would be resisted even to the
extent of arousing riots accompanied by war and bloodshed.” The leg
endary and all-important British “prestige . . . suffered by the display of
low morale of the British internees at Stanley and by its disregard of the
respect due to the higher officials.”
The turning point in this intra-British conflict came in April 1942
when a number of U.S. citizens left the camp. Perhaps sensing that ties
to a government, even a discredited one based in London, might not be
such a bad idea, the formerly rebellious British internees reversed their
strategy. A petition asking Sir Franklin to lead the British community
was signed by “fifteen hundred.” The imperious Sir Franklin then in
structed them that the former administrative council were “purely
members of an advisory board whose advice I could reject or accept at
my discretion.” Some of them must have rued their reversal for he came
out firmly against “repatriation,” since “this was British territory” and
a mass departure might “jeopardise the future retention of Hong Kong
98 INTERNMENT
greatly to the terror and uncertainty of the camp.” Brown’s friend, Mike
Shakhty, was among those who hailed from the “periphery of New
York’s underworld.” He was among the “riff-raff of the Wanchai wa
terfront” who arrived at Stanley. There were “mixed Asiatic bloods—
Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Malayan, Javanese, often with a touch of
Negro or European.” From these various spheres there arose in camp a
“group of Americans” who had “given in, within a prison camp, to a
form of fascism at its very worst. We had the spy system, the strong-arm
boys, uniforms of a type, ruthless revenge against those who criticized
the leader.”
Caught among these finaglers, the elite British were akin to the pi
geons among the cats. Yet Stanley’s Euro-Americans were not solely
comprised of soldiers of fortune, for in this camp “half of our men were
university graduates. At least a dozen held Doctor of Philosophy de
grees. Most of the large universities were represented. Columbia, I
think, headed the list. Stanford, University of California, Yale, Harvard,
George Washington, Oberlin, Pomona, Lehigh, University of Pennsyl
vania, Chicago, Duke and other universities and colleges throughout
the country had graduates in the camp. The small colleges were repre
sented too, especially among the missionary group.” This meant that
the “racial” lessons of a “race war” were bound to be transmitted to an
influential U.S. audience.
Brown’s picture of Stanley diverges sharply from those who have
portrayed an abstemious, altruistic communism that arose in the mili
tary camps. He felt that a “new aristocracy had sprung up which was
divorced from the old class system of Hong Kong. The privileged
groups were the physically strong, the politically dexterous and those
[who] had got large sums of usable money into the camp. The former
heads of big firms, university professors, wealthy widows were on the
edge of starvation, while an engineer, a biscuit salesman, a sailor and a
high government official drank and dined and held gay parties late into
the night. Worst of all, Bayne fraternized with the Japanese.”85
Stanley was like a laboratory experiment, a stew of various per
spectives and persuasions tossed together.
On 5 September 1941 the very proper Sir Mark Young was sworn into
office in Hong Kong. The ceremony took place in the King’s Theatre
on a stage bedecked with mounds of flowers alongside the British
flag. Those present included leaders of the Chinese and Eurasian
100 INTERNMENT
Triad Societies. This was to let the Triad Societies control the wharves
after the war had finished. . . . After the Japanese surrender the leaders
of the Triad societies seized the wharves with the intention of running
them in their own interests.” Historically, the docks had been a focal
point for the triads. Before the war, the “coolies” controlled by Tsang
Pun “boarded vessels arriving at the different wharves and took the
luggage of persons desiring to use his boarding house, from the ship to
the boarding house.” After the war, these “coolies” were “prevented
from boarding the ships” by certain triads. “I get daily complaints from
passengers arriving at my boarding house,” said one official, “about
baggage being stolen and . . . exorbitant charges levied. . . . If a passen
ger demurs about the charges he is assaulted and during the assault one
of his baggage is stolen by the coolie as payment.”94 Despite this ban
ditry, the British authorities reported that “the Chinese public does not
support police activity against Triads and the European population has
little idea of the crime potential they represent.”95
Stanley Ho—one of the richest men in postwar Hong Kong—was
among the Chinese who benefited from the occupation. Born in 1921,
his father fled Hong Kong for Saigon in the 1930s, leaving in disgrace
after going bankrupt. During the war Ho escaped from Hong Kong to
Macao. Years later, with a glow in his voice Ho recalled that he worked
for “the biggest company in Macau during the war, the Macau Cooper
ative Company Limited . . . one-third owned by the Japanese army. I be-
came its secretary. . . . I had to start by learning Japanese.” For most,
Macao was a graveyard of hope but for Ho it was “paradise during the
war. . . . I had big parties almost every night. Bird’s nest, roast pork. . . .
I became the teacher of the most important Japanese man in Macao dur
ing the war. . . . a man called Colonel Sawa.” Each “morning at six” he
would send “his car” to fetch Ho to take him to “Zhongshan across the
border in China. There,” he recounted rapturously, “the two of us
would climb together to the top of a small hill. Then he started singing
in Japanese and he taught me how to sing with him—and in return I
taught him English. I was his English [instructor] for one year, and in
that time all the Japanese soldiers in Special Branch would kneel down
to him—and to me, as his teacher.”
Though the colonel was viewed as no more than a thug by some, to
Ho he was a boon companion. His contacts proved useful when Ho
“started a small trading company. . . . By the end of the war, I’d earned
over a million dollars—having started with just ten. . . . Macao was tiny,
INTERNMENT 103
and yet a bit like Casablanca—all the secret intelligence, the murders,
the gambling—it was a very exciting place. When the war ended, I
bought a boat, the first one to start crossing between Hong Kong and
Macao. . . . I bought up many of the supplies left by the British army.”
What of the political morality of what he was doing? Ho “never felt ha
tred of the pro-Japanese Chinese or the Japanese in Macao. To me they
were just people doing their thing and I was doing my thing.”96
Before the beginning of this successful stint, he “started off with a
job as secretary to the Japanese owner of a firm handling imports of rice,
beans, flour and other goods shipped from Canton. . . . Six months later
[he] became a partner in the company. . . . Stanley’s facility with the
Japanese language can be traced to these days.” By war’s end “he was
the biggest provider of kerosene in Southeast Asia.”97 “Inadvertently,”
as one writer put it, “the Japanese war had created vast opportunities
for those who cared to seek and cultivate them,” people such as Stanley
Ho who “made his first million” as a direct result of this conflagration.98
Ho’s idyll with the Japanese occupiers stands in dramatic contrast
to the unhappiness of his encounter with the British after the war. “It
was quite a contrast,” he said. “I thought I knew the British. When I first
started business, I knocked at the door of one of the senior British offi
cials. . . . I walked in and tried to shake hands with him but he was so
cold, he wouldn’t even shake my hand, just told me to sit down.” The
British official, on his part, may have been justifiably suspicious of Ho,
given Ho’s ties to Tokyo. Moreover, years later it was revealed that Ho
was on a “10 year old Canadian police watch list on Asian organized
crime” as a result of reputed “links . . . to a Macao-based triad gang
called Kung Lok . . . involved in drug trafficking, illicit horse racing and
casino gambling and counterfeiting.” Still, the frostiness with which he
was greeted by this British official was not inconsistent with the white
supremacist ethos that characterized London’s policies.99
Still, Ho was not alone. Henrique De Senna Fernandes found the
“war years” in Macao to be “terrible, but it’s strange, I’ve never had
such happy times either. Every night there were parties.”100 During the
occupation a number of Chinese companies—including quite a few
from Taiwan and Shanghai—were able to enter a market where previ
ously barriers had existed.101 This increased penetration of Hong Kong
by Chinese capital and the opportunities consequently afforded certain
businessmen may shed light on the otherwise confounding words of
Robert S. Ward, the U.S. Consul in Hong Kong in the immediate prewar
104 INTERNMENT
105
106 WAR/RACE
in the South than in Germany.”4 This was most likely the opinion of an
unnamed sixteen-year-old black girl in Columbus, Ohio, who won an
essay contest during the war on the subject “What to do with Adolf
Hitler.” Her idea was to put the “Fuhrer into a black skin and make him
spend the rest of his life in America.”5 Hence it was hard for this op
pressed minority to align with their oppressors, even when confronted
with a foe as demonic as Hitler.
In the spring of 1932, Hitler himself entertained a Georgia-born
Negro, Milton S. J. Wright, at a dinner party at a fashionable Heidelberg
watering hole. Even Jesse Owens (the Negro sprinter whose victories at
the 1936 Berlin Olympics were said to have been a major setback to the
Axis) told the Negro journalist, Roi Ottley, “candidly—as one Negro to
another— . . . the Nazis bent [over] backward in making things com
fortable for them, even to inviting them to the smartest hotels and
restaurants.”6
The Negro response to Germany should be seen as more of a com
ment on London than on Berlin. Decades earlier Negroes had been told
that if they fought Germany in the “war to end all wars,” they would
benefit. Instead colonialism continued, falling heavily upon those of
African descent. Hence, as London was under heavy assault from
Berlin as the Pacific War approached, the Colonial Secretary was told
that there was insistent “anti-British talk” brewing in Jamaica, a colony
that supplied numerous black migrants to Harlem. Jamaicans had a
hard time understanding why it was unacceptable for Berlin to deprive
European nations of sovereignty, but acceptable for London to do the
same in the Caribbean. This alarmed the Jamaican Left, which moved a
supportive pro-London resolution noting that “many of the inhabitants
of Jamaica” were “apparently inclined to be [Axis] sympathizers.”7
Neighboring Haiti too had long admired Japan.8
Further north in Bermuda there were similar currents. In the fall of
1940 a “Bermudian” recalled that “not so long ago a former Bermuda
governor established birth control clinics to limit the Negro population.
This plan was defeated by determined New York West Indians. If the
Negro race is going to be treated in a British Crown Colony as the Nazis
handle their subjugated peoples, then by all means let us have Hitler’s
new world order.”9
This was alarming, though comprehensible. NAACP leader Walter
White recalled later that “during the dark days immediately following”
the commencement of the Pacific War, “bitterness against the Japanese
WAR/RACE 107
The nagging perception that Tokyo was the sole force standing between
Negroes and a continued escalation of white supremacy led many
blacks to rationalize, if not justify, Japan’s creeping encroachment, then
war against China. Hubert Harrison, a native of the former Danish
colony of St. Croix, Virgin Islands, who came to be known as the “Fa
ther of Harlem Radicalism,” hailed the rise of Japan early on and de
rided the idea of the “United States as the champion of China against
Japanese aggression.” Harrison, who—unusually—was close to the
Black Left and the Black Nationalists, recalled the events of the 1890s
when in the wake of Japan’s war against China, the “four powers . . .
proceeded to take what they had denied Japan. England took Wei Hai
Wei, Germany took Shantung, Russia took Port Arthur and France also
took her slice. . . . while the white powers were stripping China the
United States did not assume any ethical role.” So why would the
United States now object to Japan taking her “slice” of China if not for
racial reasons, he mused? Speaking in the early 1920s, he maintained
that “to men of color it seems that [the United States] does so now only
because Japan, as a colored nation, has assumed in China a prerogative
exclusively appropriated hitherto by the dominant and superior
whites.”22 He cited approvingly Motosada Zumoto, editor of The Herald
of Asia, who stated angrily that “if the West persistently refuses to listen
to the voice of Reason and Justice” on China and related matters, “and
aggravates the antagonism of culture by injecting race prejudice, it is
not inconceivable that the result may possibly be war between the races,
incomparably more calamitous than the late great war and wider in ex-
tent.”23
With painfully unrealistic hopes, many Black Nationalists sought a
way out of their conundrum of backing Japanese rapacity in China
while objecting to the same in Africa by fervently praying that the two
Asian giants would combine. Du Bois was among those who suc
cumbed to this notion.24 Others saw Japan’s plunder of the planet’s
largest nation as a form of “tough love,” meant to harden China so it
110 WAR/RACE
ion,” though there was decided agreement that the invasion was a “nec
essary means towards a most desirable . . . end, namely full manhood
status and freedom for the Negroes of the world and the colored races
in general.” The awesome burden of white supremacy had distorted the
vision of too many Negroes, he thought. “This passionate desire to see
some arrogant white imperialistic nations crushed by some colored
group has led many astray,” this “[idea] that the success of Japanese im
perialism will be the means of our racial salvation” explained the rea
sons for black support of Japan’s action.43
Of course, there were noted exceptions to this anti-China, pro-Japan
bias among Negroes. A leading “Chinese air ace” helping Peking to
repel Tokyo’s assault was a U.S. Negro. “E. Vann Wong” was a native of
Greenville, South Carolina, where he was born in 1908 as Edward Vann;
he “took the name of Wong to make his Chinese brothers feel more at
home with him.” He had unsuccessfully tried to enlist with the U.S.
armed forces, when he “heard that in China, ability counted and not
race.” So he crossed the Pacific, where he proceeded to shoot “down a
long [list] of enemy planes during the Sino-Japanese war.”44 Likewise,
when the “Old Harlemite,” Chu John passed away in 1942, this Chinese
man who owned the “World Tea Garden on Lenox Avenue and 140th
Street” was remembered with honor.45 Still, on balance, Harlem pos
sessed a decided fervor for Nippon and a wary skepticism of the Mid
dle Kingdom.
diers should not fight the Japanese.” Among the “forty two specific
statements” he cited, the one that rankled particularly was that the de
fendants had resisted conscription on the grounds that they “might
shoot the wrong man.”
James Thornhill was among those convicted. Born in the Caribbean,
in the U.S. Virgin Islands, he contemptuously referred to the United
States as the “United Snakes of America.” “It will only be a matter of
time,” he contended confidently, “until the Japs are running the United
States.” Indeed, “they will eventually rule the world.” Thus, he in
structed Negroes, “you should learn Japanese.” When “they tell you to
remember Pearl Harbor, you reply ‘Remember Africa.’” After all, “the
white man brought you to this country in 1619, not to Christianize you
but to enslave you. This thing called Christianity is not worth [a] damn.
I am not a Christian,” he declared. “We should be Mohammedans or
Moslems.” Thornhill’s gumption got him a conviction and an eight-
year prison term, though “three members of the jury, including the fore-
lady were colored.”60
Leonard Robert Jordan (also known as Robert Leonard Jordan) was
also among those targeted. He was a small, nattily dressed man with a
passionate flare to his nostrils, which dilated when he spoke.61 A
Harlemite residing at 239 West 116th Street, he was born a British sub
ject in Jamaica, and was “in central South America in 1914 in the Navi
gation Department of Great Britain and later served for the Japanese
Steamship Company. He is alleged to have made the statement that
while in Japan he found the Japanese to be very friendly to the Negroes
and that he had the privilege of studying the customs of the Japanese
and becoming a member of an outstanding society in Japan.” Jordan,
who claimed to have served with the Japanese Navy and was reported
to have been their agent since 1922, declared that “Japan was going to
form a government in Africa which the Negroes could rule under
Japan.” This may have been the least of the inflammatory statements he
routinely made from various street corners in Harlem.62 The eloquence
and sharp debating skills of the “Harlem Mikado” was “said to have
driven a number of competing street speakers to introduce Jap [sic]
propaganda in their talks to hold their audiences.”63 The fiery Jordan al
legedly “intended ‘cutting off the heads of a lot of colored people’”
when he took charge, most notably those not as enthusiastic about
Tokyo as himself.64 The fates of Washington elites would be a mite bet
ter, however. The president would be reduced to “picking cotton” while
118 WAR/RACE
Buddhism as the religion of people of color the world over [as] the key
to racial success.” Under this scenario, “American Negroes who became
Buddhists automatically won Japanese citizenship, would get chances
to visit Japan, study science and professions, receive military and naval
training.” This fiendish plot was said to have “over 11,000,000 followers
in Burma,” and millions of others in the rest of Asia. “Success of the plan
would mean establishment of a black empire in Africa,” a prospect that
probably delighted the paper’s readers, alienated as so many of them
were by colonialism in their ancestral continent.69 The paper’s “investi
gations” revealed that “the scope of the world B [sic] Plan of the Japan
ese is almost unbelievable,” supposedly exposing “the cunning of an
Oriental group” that had “gone back to the wars of the Crusaders in the
interest of Christianity.”70
The FBI was convinced that the Negro Nationalists were part of a
plot to create a force of pro-Tokyo blacks and Asians who would be uti
lized by the Japanese armed forces when they invaded the United
States. The scheme included Policarpio Manansala, a Filipino, linked to
Japan’s race-conscious Black Dragon Society, a paramilitary—indeed,
Leninist—elite of activists and thinkers.71 Manansala was among a mot-
ley array of the discontented and disaffected who spearheaded Tokyo’s
crusade in the United States. Another was “Eugene Holness” (also
known as Lester Holness and Lester Carey) who vowed to “fight for
Japan with every drop of my blood.” He was a leader of the Ethiopia Pa
cific Movement, “second in charge” behind Jordan. Like his com
mander, he had been born outside the United States and was “active as
a street speaker.”72 Then there was Joseph Hilton Smyth—a tall, sallow
man with a long forehead—and his spouse Annastean Haines, a
“brown-skinned beauty.” Smyth founded the “Negro News Syndicate”
with active assistance from Tokyo.73 Others included David D. Erwin, a
“cook,” and General Lee Butler, a “janitor.”74
It was left to a black columnist to point out that “white metropol
itan newspapers are making much of the fact or fiction that the men
[arrested] are British West Indians,” many of whom found it difficult
to understand why they had to pull London’s chestnuts from the fire
lit by Tokyo.75 Harlem was just a leading indicator, however. There
was a “pronounced inclination” among black children generally “to
play the Japanese” in games, “since ‘they are fond of imagining that
they are in a position to avenge themselves against white oppres
sors.’”76 One analyst found that Tokyo had “turned” for spying to “the
120 WAR/RACE
dangerously in the balance.”86 The “belief” that this war was a “‘a white
man’s war’ is rapidly gaining adherents among colored people in the
United States,” he wrote.87
It was clear that unless profound racial reforms were undertaken,
the security of the United States could be in serious jeopardy. Carter G.
Woodson, the doyen of black historians, also was not particularly de-
pressed by the seizure of Hong Kong and Singapore, a fact that had
caused him—like other Negroes—to be “questioned by white Govern
ment officials.” He was unrepentant, however. “I can’t blame the white
Americans,” he ventured, “for being suspicious of our loyalty now, be-
cause they have done enough devilment to have their suspicions justi
fied.”88 Du Bois did not disagree. He felt that the “British Empire has
caused more human misery than Hitler will cause if he lives a hundred
years. . . . It is idiotic to talk about a people who brought the slave trade
to its greatest development, who are the chief exploiters of Africa and
who hold four hundred million Indians in subjection, as the great de-
fenders of democracy.”89 Adam Clayton Powell, the black Congressman
from Harlem, was of like mind; as he saw it, in the fall of 1942 “the dif
ference between nazism and crackerocracy is very small. . . . crackeroc
racy is a pattern of race hatred.”90
From the other shore, the black conservative George Schuyler con
curred. In mid-June 1944 most of the United States was elated about the
nation’s prospects in prevailing in the war. But Schuyler was thinking
different thoughts. “The Europeans,” he noted caustically, “have been a
menace to the rest of the world for the past four hundred years, carry
ing destruction and death wherever they went. . . . True, this system of
world fleecing directly benefited only a handful of Europeans, but indi
rectly it benefited millions of supernumeraries, labor officials and
skilled workers. . . . Europe has been a failure as well as a menace,” he
concluded wearily. “The European age is passing. One can derive a cer
tain pleasure from observing its funeral.”91
On the other hand, the fact that Schuyler could emerge as one of the
harshest critics of white supremacy—though he was the nation’s pre-
eminent black conservative—exposed the fault lines of black conser
vatism and the nation itself. For it was apparent that under pressure
from Japan, Negro conservatives could espouse a philosophy that
hardly comported with that of their Euro-American counterparts.
Moreover, the prevalence of white supremacy meant that Negroes of
virtually all ideological persuasions could flee from the banner of the
WAR/RACE 123
nation in times of stress and strife, severely calling national security into
question.92
These angry and passionate words emerging from all corners of the
black political spectrum were often matched by comparable actions in
the streets of a racially torn nation. On the Pacific coast there were “omi
nous reports of Negroes ‘choosing’ white people,” that is, assaulting
them randomly. George Schuyler felt that a “change comes over many
of these Negroes when they migrate [north].” There “they are ready to
break the law, slice the throat or shatter the eardrums of some white per-
son they have never seen before on the slightest pretext.”93
In Los Angeles in 1944, J. F. Anderson was upset with the “pugna
cious attitude of the colored people who have come here in droves. . . .
People tell me that . . . they have what they call ‘Shove Tuesday’; on that
day the Negro folks emphasize themselves in every way they can, even
to shoving white folks off the sidewalk if they feel inclined to do so. . . .
If the colored folks are not set right on these questions,” he warned,
“there will be trouble in this state.”94
Governor Earl Warren of California was told a similar story that
year. O. L. Turner of San Mateo said that a “dastardly attack was made
by a Negro sailor upon the person of a 24 year old wife and Defense
Worker.” Ruefully, he noted that the “Japs [sic] who were driven out of
this community were far more safe for our white girls and women than
are the hosts of Negroes that have moved in and taken the place of the
Japs [sic] . . . and I am no Jap [sic] lover.” With exasperation, he pleaded,
“How would YOU like to have this or any other Negro . . . attacker hold
the knife to your wife’s throat—or your daughter’s or even your
own?”95 Apparently the situation had deteriorated to the point where L.
G. Brattin felt moved to confide to Governor Warren a “plan which is
determined to be used in disposing of the entire Negro race.” With un
derstatement, he added forebodingly, “The plan will be a revelation to
the entire population of the United States for its very boldness.”96
Theodore Roosevelt McCoin suspected that this diabolical plan was
already in force. In the fall of 1943 he was moved in desperation to write
the president himself because of the awful experiences he was com
pelled to endure “working for E.I. Du Pont at Hanford, Washington.”
For he and “other Negroes is getting very bad here [sic], one killed by
white men, cursed and whipped. . . . the white men on this job hate a
Negro man.” “We don’t want their women,” he cried, “we don’t want
to [be] white, we want to be treated right.” Despite his tormenters’ fears,
124 WAR/RACE
“Every day the white men take the Negro woman in the car and the
Negro man can’t say nothing.” Most ominously for FDR, he mentioned
in passing that as a result of such racial persecution, “they”—not
“we”—”will never win the war.”97
Washington did not make things easier by countenancing a vile
form of discrimination against Filipinos too, while Japan was telling
those who resided in the Philippines that they too would receive a bet
ter deal if Tokyo ruled. When news broke in 1943 that California might
seek to repeal laws banning intermarriage between Filipinos and those
of European descent, Governor Warren was besieged with angry mail.
His press secretary hastened to clarify that Warren had “no authority to
abrogate the law.”98 But John D. Stockman of Hollywood fumed, “We
should have a law against association of Filipino men with white girls,
making them guilty of mesalliance [sic] and immediate arrest and de
portation of the Filipino and the girl given a mental test.” Why? “The
more segregation we have,” he reasoned, “the fewer race wars we will
have.” Desegregation was insane, he declared. “While the best of our
manhood are fighting one Mongoloid race to keep it from exterminat
ing another, we don’t want them to find when they come home that we
have allowed a good California law to be abrogated,” he concluded
with impeccable illogic.99
Miguel Garcia was an intended victim of Stockman’s anger. In No
vember 1944 he alleged that he “was refused employment” by the
American President Lines “as a Purser because he was a Filipino”; that
“no Filipinos have been employed as Pursers” bolstered his claim.100
Filipinos could take solace in the fact that they were not the sole objects
of bigotry; in 1941 the shipyards of Richmond, California, were refusing
“applications from Negroes, Filipinoes [sic], Japanese and Chinese.”101
The sons and daughters of India were expected to hold the line
against Japan’s advance, while meekly accepting their place in the Em
pire. As if this were not enough, in the United States—which purported
to be more enthusiastic about Indian independence—they continued to
be “subjected to a legal discrimination that denies them the privilege of
naturalization.” Ramlal B. Bajpai, then of Washington, D.C., bombarded
Governor Warren with clippings about his countrymen fighting with
the Allies in Burma. But like most politicians the future Chief Justice
was reluctant to risk the anger of his constituents, who held white su
premacy dear.102
WAR/RACE 125
T H E B R I T I S H A U T H O R I T I E S W E R E V E RY C O N C E R N E D with the
presumed enemy within the gates of U.S. territory.1 Weeks after Hong
Kong surrendered and just as Singapore was about to do so, the Foreign
Office briefed the United States on “lessons” to be drawn from the at-
tack on Pearl Harbor. “For some days before” the assault on U.S. terri
tory, “Japanese girls had been making ‘dates’ with sailors for that Sat
urday night and most of them saw that the sailors were filled up with
liquor. This was remarkable because it is apparently unusual for Japan
ese girls to mix with the sailors. Also a Japanese restaurant keeper near
Pearl Harbour gave drinks on the house. On Friday many Japanese quit
their jobs and did not turn up on Saturday morning.” During the bomb
ing, “attempts were made to obstruct military traffic by such means as
drawing lorries across the roads by Japanese truck-drivers. . . . Some of
the local Japanese expected an uprising and a seizure of Hawaii by
force. One Japanese restaurant keeper, who owned a restaurant close to
Pearl Harbour, appeared at the height of the attack dressed in the uni
form of a Japanese officer. . . . He was promptly shot.” It has been sug
gested,” said London ominously, “that many of the [Japanese aviators]
were Hawaiian born Japanese.” Some that crashed had “McKinley
High School . . . rings and Oregon State rings.” Expressing astonish
ment and bewilderment at the hybrid Asian American community that
had arisen in the race-obsessed United States, the lengthy report con
tinued that in Hawaii “the Orientals cooperate and there is none of the
Sino-Japanese animosity which exists in Asia. The Japanese, as the most
pushing, active and well-organized, run the Chinese.”2 These over-
heated assertions were not only suggestive of the temper of the times,
but also foreshadowed the internment of Japanese Americans in the
western United States—though, tellingly, not in Hawaii itself.3
This anti-Nippon attitude quickly gained currency in western
Canada, principally in British Columbia. The clear message that
128
RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED 129
troops were fed was powerful, not least because it was not wholly inac
curate. White supremacy had provided Tokyo with powerful kindling
with which they could set Asia afire. “Once you set foot on the enemy’s
territories,” Japanese troops were told, “you will see for yourselves,
only too clearly, just what this oppression by the white man means. . . .
These white people may expect, from the moment they issue from their
mother’s wombs, to be allotted a score or so of natives as their personal
slaves. Is this really God’s will?”15
Caught up in the frenzy of distaste for white supremacy, one Japan
ese general inquired, “Why should the United States, Britain and other
powers which had every opportunity to advance their own vital inter
ests now cry, ‘Thief’ if Japan so much as looked at neighboring terri
tory?”16 Japan’s chief propaganda organ in Hong Kong added that “one
reason why Japan was deemed a warlike country was because. . . . with
95 percent of Africa, 99 percent of the South Sea Islands, 100 percent of
Australia and 57 percent of Asia under the control of European coun
tries and the United States, Japan had to struggle to keep her inde
pendence. If Japan did not fight, she might possibly have become sub
ject to some European power or America.”17 Once the Empire had
opened the door to colonial exploitation, it was difficult to claim that the
status quo should be frozen, that only Japanese seizure of territory was
wrong but London’s was quite permissible. Accepting such logic would
only serve to rigidify white supremacy.
When Japan took over the Shanghai Times in December 1941, “an
American educated Japanese was appointed editor” and “the staff of
the paper included a Filipino, Conrado A. Uy.” Keeping them company
in Shanghai was a “Lieutenant Matsuda, an American-educated offi
cer” and “Ikushima Kichizo,” an “Episcopal Christian who had studied
at Amherst College . . . and Cambridge,” who worked for Japan’s Naval
Intelligence. Takami Morihiko was “an American as well as a Japanese
citizen. A dark-skinned, square jawed, bearded young man,” he was
“well-built and of medium height” and “was said to look “more Hawai
ian or Filipino than Japanese.” Born in New York City in 1914, he was
the “son of a Japanese-American doctor who was head of the city’s
Japanese residents association. He was educated at an expensive pri
vate school in Lawrenceville, New Jersey and spent one year at
Amherst.” Despite—or perhaps because of—his extensive experience
in the United States, he wound up in Shanghai working for Japanese
Naval Intelligence, where his English-language skills came in quite
handy.32 Also to be found in wartime Shanghai was “Kazumaro Buddy
Ono,” a graduate of Compton High School in Southern California in
1932. He felt he “had been treated like a yellow whore by white men,”
so he said, “to hell with the United States.” The POWs who encountered
him spoke of his “special hostility towards whites.”33 Japanese Ameri
cans were also to be found in Singapore. When Lee Kuan Yew, the fu
ture leader of this city-state then occupied by Japan, went to be “inter-
viewed” for a position with a Japanese news agency, the man sitting on
the other side of the desk “turned” out to be “an American-born Japan
ese, George Takamura, a tall, lean, fair-skinned man who spoke English
with an American accent.”34
What was striking about this participation of Nissei and Issei in
Japan’s military occupation was that it was virtually coterminous with
the Empire in Asia itself—and often stretched beyond. Intelligence offi
cers in India got wind of Tokyo’s “intentions to send espionage parties
into Nepal.” How was this sensitive information uncovered? An “in-
formant” overheard a Japanese “officer” who was “educated in a uni
versity in America from which he graduated. He is aged about 25 years,
strong built” and “fluent in Gurkhali.”35 In wartime Singapore, Charlie
Gan recalled vividly “one Japanese whom my wife was working with.
He spoke beautiful English. Oh! First class. And [a] very understanding
man, very much westernised in his ideas, very friendly.”36 He was be
lieved to hail from North America.
134 RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED
Soon Kim Seng had a similar experience in the “Lion City.” Born in
Burma, he arrived in Singapore in 1933. “The most interesting person[s]
that we met,” he recalled later, “[were] two Japanese brothers, they
were repatriated from America. . . . could not speak Japanese, could not
read and write Japanese. They only speak American [sic].” He was
“very happy to meet someone who could communicate and we did
have a very jolly good time. . . . They were frank” with him and he had
“a very pleasant experience” with them.37 Tan Cheng Hwee, also of Sin
gapore, was interrogated by a man from Japan during the war. “The
Japanese who questioned me,” he recalled later, “knows English. He
told me he was not educated in Singapore.”38 Samuel Eric Travis, the
Director of Henry Waugh and Co. in prewar Singapore, confessed that
he “suffered considerable physical maltreatment” during the war; in a
sworn affadavit he detailed his unpleasant memories of a “fat American
speaking interpreter.”39 An Indian resident in Singapore encountered a
Japanese officer during the occupation “who was [once] in America”
and “could speak English well.”40 He made no comment about his treat
ment.
When the New York Times correspondent Otto D. Tolischus was ar
rested in Tokyo, his torturer—whom he contemptuously referred to as
“The Snake”—reminded him angrily, “I have been beaten and spat
upon in America.” Then he “hit” the dazed Tolischus forcefully and
“spat” in his face. “I’m going to get even with somebody,” he snarled:
later the bruised and battered journalist learned that his assailant was
“Yamada,” who “was supposed to be a graduate of the University of
California, a former Federal court interpreter at Oakland, and a former
YMCA secretary.”41
Tolischus’s abrasive experience was illustrative of something else:
these Japanese from North America who were assisting Tokyo were
often more brutal than Japanese who had not resided in the Western
Hemisphere. They seemed to be exacting retribution for the racial in-
dignities they had suffered. In the Woosung internment camp near
Shanghai, there was a “camp interpreter named Ishihara”—colloqui
ally known as “The Beast of the East” because of his aggressive tactics.
He “spoke excellent English, which he had learned while working in
Hawaii.” At the camp at Mukden, “Cpl. Eichi Noda” was “particularly
disliked by the Americans”; he “had been born and educated to the
high school level in the San Francisco Bay Area.” He often “took the op
portunity to beat Americans. For his cruelty and enmity toward Amer-
RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED 135
icans, Noda was called ‘The Sadist’ or ‘The Rat.’” At the prisoner-of-war
camp in Fukuoka, “the interpreter for Mitsui mining company, an
American-born Japanese who went by the name of ‘Riverside’—the
California city he was raised in—was at times an informer and grew to
be strongly disliked by most of the Americans.” It was an “American
born Japanese named Uno” who conceived of the idea of “a daily
scheduled radio broadcast by POWs to their families back home.” He
was arranging to bring POWS from the occupied territories to Japan for
this purpose when a New Zealander objected: “He was promptly
dragged from the room, beaten and taken away.”42
Reverend Joseph Sandbach of the Stanley internment camp in
Hong Kong has spoken of “Colonel Toganarga. . . . years before he’d
been in America and had been engaged in fair-ground business.” He
was a “rough, tough character. And he was no good to us at all from the
word go.”43 Martin Boyle had enjoyed thoroughly the pleasures, carnal
and otherwise, of prewar Guam, but his preoccupations were inter
rupted abruptly with the arrival of Japanese invaders. He wound up in
terned in Osaka where he encountered, “The Sheik, a tough, thoroughly
Americanized villain who returned to Japan from the United States . . .
in some sort of administrative capacity. . . . He was the spit image of the
city slicker whose picture is now on the wrapper of a well-known brand
of American contraceptives, and that’s why he got his nickname—the
only name I ever knew him by.” Boyle despised him. “He roared . . .
command[s] in perfect English,” he added with disgust. Moreover, he
was violent toward his charges. “The Sheik [was] the only man I ever
saw who was able to knock a man down with one blow of his bare fists.
The Sheik was an ornery son-of-a-bitch.”44
Jack Edwards had a similar experience while imprisoned during
the war in Taiwan. He recounted a guard there who “spoke English
with an American accent.” He was born in the United States. Before
being transferred to Taiwan, Edwards was incarcerated in a camp on
the Malay peninsula. There he encountered an “engineer with a strong
American accent . . . born in the USA.” In an incident that illustrates the
value of the Japanese Americans to Tokyo, a fellow prisoner said, “I
wonder if this little yellow bastard in charge today will stop somewhere
for a woman; while he is in there we can nip off and find some grub.”
He was stopped short when a Japanese American guard said, “Say you
guys, this little yellow bastard has pulled up, but not for a woman. Now
you get the hell out and find some food!”45
136 RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED
edged that the Japanese treated internees harshly, just as the Allies’
treatment of Japanese prisoners often left much to be desired.52
More than once, Japanese propagandists were aghast at the treat
ment of Nissei and Issei.53 This was one of their chief complaints.54
Those interned in Hong Kong read about Professor Ken Nakasawa, a
former faculty member at the University of Southern California, who
was interviewed in Tokyo about the internment. He had been held by
the Los Angeles police, beaten, and “lost three of his front teeth” as a re-
sult.55 “Special radio broadcasts” were “directed to the United States in
an effort to have the Washington government correct” such matters.56
The pro-Tokyo attitudes of some emigrés may have been somewhat
artificial, if the opinions of London’s prewar Consul in San Francisco
are any guide. The Consul’s “Japanese man servant . . . informs . . . that
he is required by the local Japanese consulate . . . to make a monthly
contribution of $5.00 towards the cost of the war in China.” This was not
just an isolated case, but allegedly applied to “all propertied or wage
earning Japanese in the state of California.”57
Yet whether Japanese Americans were voluntary or forced adher
ents to the cause of Imperial Japan, the question asked by Yuji Ichioka
remains: “What is the meaning of loyalty in a racist society”?58 Should
n’t allegiance be mutual? Should one—can one—be loyal to a state that
does not uphold its end of the social contract, when it treats a significant
portion of its citizenry in an apartheid-like fashion? Miya Sannomiya
Kikuchi would have understood this predicament. Growing up in Cal
ifornia in the early twentieth century, this Japanese American woman
was familiar with bigotry. But “the stronger she felt that white Ameri
cans were prejudiced against her, the harder she studied”—something
of a metaphor for the evolution of Japan itself since 1853. In all her
classes, Jewish Americans and Japanese Americans were “the
smartest,” which she “ascrib[ed] . . . to the discrimination both groups
faced.” But when she went in 1913 to the Grand Guignol of bias that
was Alabama, she was shocked and “became bitterly critical of South-
ern racism.”59 How then could she subscribe to the belief that the
United States was the locus of all that was good and Japan the epicen
ter of evil?
This was the grim situation faced by many Japanese Americans.
One Nisei who requested repatriation to Japan in 1944 had the distinct
“feeling that a person of technical or professional training cannot find
full scope for his activities in the United States because of race and caste
138 RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED
lines.” This “man” was “excellent in his field” and he was only one
amidst “so many cases of persons who have . . . requested repatriation
or expatriation for similar reasons.” This raised the “question of
whether the United States [was] not likely to lose many of the best
trained and talented people among its people of Japanese ancestry,” to
Tokyo’s benefit.
In the moving words of one Nisei: “I feel that I’ve made every at-
tempt to identify myself with this country and its people. But every
time I’ve tried I’ve got another boot in the rear. . . . I realized that any
white foreigner who came here had a better chance than I had. . . . I have
a Japanese face that I can’t change. . . . Look at the difference in the way
they treated the Italians and Germans and what they did to us. You
can’t tell me that having a Japanese face didn’t make a difference. . . . I
figure that if it happened once it can happen again. . . . I can’t see much
improvement during my life. The Negroes have been in this country for
generations and look how they are treated.”
“I don’t expect an easy time in Japan,” he continued. “I know how
tough things are. . . . but when I get turned down for a job it will be be-
cause there isn’t a job, and not because I look different from someone
else.” The logic of white supremacy was driving U.S. citizens straight
into the arms of Tokyo. “I don’t think I’ll ever forget evacuation,” he
vowed, “if a gang rushes me and piles on me, even if there are five or
six of them, I’ll get every one of them, no matter how long it takes to
track them down. . . . I’m not afraid to die, and I’ll fight for any country
that treats me right, but I’ve gone through too much to talk about
democracy in this country any more.”60
Such angry despair was one reason why Tokyo radio broadcasts to
foreign audiences were able to employ “a large number of Nisei.” One
such person was Kanai Hiroto, educated in Pasadena, who was an “in
terpreter” for the hated and feared secret police, the Kempeitai: he “in
terrogated U.S. fliers” who had been captured, and led them to decid
edly perilous fates.61
having met the Japs [sic] one can only imagine kicking their heads in.
They look like animals, they behave like animals and they can be killed
unemotionally as swatting flies. And they need to be killed, not
wounded, for as long as they breathe, they’re dangerous.”71 Harold
Robert Yates of the British military concurred, adding, “I don’t think
you’ll find a British soldier who will talk about a German soldier in a
disparaging manner. . . . There’s only two enemies who have ever made
the British soldier actually hate them. One were the Indian mutineers
and the other, of course, is undoubtedly the Japanese. None of us I don’t
think would ever [have] a reunion or meet any Japanese soldier. . . . A
British soldier will call a German ‘Jerry,’ which is rather an affectionate
term to us. . . . But a Jap [sic] was never given a nickname like that.”
Decades after the war, he continued to maintain, “I still hate the Japan
ese.”72 Lt. Col. Graeme Crew agreed, declaring bluntly, “We hated their
guts.”73
This animus was reciprocated, in the sense that it was widely
thought in Japan that the Europeans and Euro-Americans wanted to re
duce them to the level of Native Americans and Negroes. This percep
tion led many Japanese to confront white supremacy fiercely. They felt
that their nation must subdue the Empire and their allies in order to es
cape this unpleasant fate; ineluctably, in the right-wing atmosphere
then prevailing in Tokyo, defensiveness was transformed into chauvin
ism. The U.S. journalist, Gwen Dew, then interned in Hong Kong, was
subjected to a disquisition by “Colonel Toda” of the Japanese military,
who “went into a long dissertation about Greek and Roman civilization,
how it changed from time to time, with the inference, of course, that
now Japan was going to take charge of the history of the world, and our
era of white influence has ceased.”74 Ellen Field met a Japanese officer
in occupied Hong Kong who would not allow her to deliver medicine
to the camp for interned soldiers. Abruptly he reminded her, “If British
soldiers’ stomachs are not strong enough to expel these germs, it proves
how weak they are. Japanese are immune to this disease. This demon
strates the decadence of the white race.”75
Nevertheless, this chauvinism must be seen in the context of the
palpable fear among common, ordinary Japanese—not being of “pure
European descent”—that they could suffer the fate of Negroes or the
colonized Hong Kong Chinese. Indeed, this real fear is what made the
chauvinism so effective. Gwen Terasaki, a Euro-American married to a
Japanese diplomat, was in Japan during the war. It was assumed that
RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED 141
she did not understand the language. So a “harassed mother told the
crying child on her back to hush or she would give him to the foreigner,
me. The child immediately choked off his cries and became fearfully
silent.”76
Japan stoked these fires of fear. One of their propagandists derided
U.S. pretensions in light of the tens of thousands of American illiter
ates—a disproportionate percentage of whom were racial minorities.77
In the Empire and the United States there was much to-do about the
“Yellow Peril.” Well, argued Japanese propaganda, “We are more justi
fied in saying that our world today is menaced by the ‘White Peril’
which is infinitely more dangerous than the “Yellow Peril.’”78 With
pride, Japanese elites claimed that the “war that has been thrust upon”
Tokyo “is certain to be the greatest leveller of class and race, irrespective
of colour or creed, since the French Revolution.”79 General Douglas
MacArthur confirmed the explosive nature of Tokyo’s racial appeal
when he claimed that Japan “might try to overrun Australia in order to
demonstrate their superiority over the white races.”80
The mutual recriminations between these bitter antagonists are re
flected in the attitudes of some Chinese immigrants, who like Japanese
Americans, found themselves collaborating with Tokyo not least be-
cause of their own bitter experience of white supremacy. The most no
torious of this group was George Wong, who participated in torture on
behalf of the occupiers in wartime Hong Kong. During his postwar
trial, one witness testified that Wong was an “American citizen who
had torn up his papers. Before [the] war, he had nothing to do with Japs
[sic]. But since [the] war he had torn up his papers because it was a war
between yellow and white races. He said he hated Americans.”81 A
young man in his thirties, Wong had roots in Hoi Ping, Kwangtung.
Wong operated an auto repair shop on Nathan Road before making the
fateful decision to throw in his lot with Tokyo.82 He was not alone. The
U.S. Consul in Hong Kong, Robert Ward, spoke contemptuously of a
“renegade Chinese named Ts’ao, a graduate of West Point and from a
good family, who had become a panderer, a dope-smuggler. . . . a col
laborator with the Japanese.”83
This collaboration began early on. On 8 December 1941, one “B.
Mishima” was jailed by the British as the invasion was unfolding. He
was treated harshly and given little water and food. “I still recall,” he
said a year later, “an incident which occurred on the day when we first
entered Stanley Camp. When they saw the Japanese entering the camp,
142 RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED
the Chinese inmates in the prison put up their thumbs, indicating tri
umph for the Japanese forces. Their act was seen by the British guards
who severely reprimanded the prisoners.”84
When the invaders seized a radio station in Hong Kong, one of the
first things they did was to install an “Australian Chinese” announcer
who, in the words of internee John Streicker, “appeared to like the
Japanese an awful lot and us not at all. . . . Naturally we christened her
Lady Haw Haw.”85 T’ien-wei Wu contends that Tokyo “had little diffi
culty in successfully recruiting numerous Chinese collaborators or trai
tors to fill the ranks of the puppet governments” in China and Hong
Kong.86 Frank Ching maintains that “the British were distinctly embar
rassed by the fact that all the men they had appointed to senior posi
tions had cooperated with the Japanese.”87 In fact, says Wing-Tak Han,
“the Japanese administration was much more embracing than that of
the British; it included people from all levels in society.”88 There was a
“strong anti-British sentiment,” in particular “among well-to-do Chi
nese.”89
Japanese propaganda stressed the “discriminatory treatment” ac
corded Chinese in North America, including Canada where the King
was still sovereign.90 I. Y. Chang recalled bitterly that “those of us who
lived in the sea ports and big cities of Asia” have noticed “the clubs and
homes of the Oriental are open to all races without any barrier of colour
or race,” while “the opposite is the case with European clubs and
homes.”91
There was a “large body of opinion [in] what was regarded as the
‘left’ of the [KMT]” who agreed with Eugene Ch’en—a “wartime in-
formant for the Japanese”—and his pro-Tokyo sympathies. Ch’en
Kung-po “had been one of the founders of the Chinese Communist
Party in 1921” and had graduated from Columbia before becoming one
of Tokyo’s key collaborators. The leading British diplomat, John
Keswick, complained that Chinese nationalist “underground channels
to occupied China were ‘double circuits’ from which ‘the Japanese seem
to derive more benefit . . . than the Chinese.’” Among this latter group
in Shanghai were the “Chinese-American collaborationist Hubert
Moy”—who attended Columbia University—and his “mistress,” Mar
quita Kwong.92 In that vein, Emily Hahn had a Chinese friend in Hong
Kong named “Bubbles” who “before the war . . . must have been a
Japanese agent. She had specialized in American seamen and British
soldiers, young men who were inclined to credit Chinese girls, espe-
RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED 143
cially pretty ones, with the most impeccable romantic and patriotic sen
timents. Naturally, they thought”—wrongly, as it turned out—”Chi
nese girls would love Chiang Kai-shek and hate the Japs [sic].”93 The
British in particular had few allies. The interned officer George Wright-
Nooth conceded that “Strangely it was usually better to fall into the
hands of the Communists rather than the Nationalists. The former’s ha
tred of the Japanese was intense, whereas if the Nationalists thought
there was more money in it for them they would often hand escapees
over.”94
Ellen Field’s own experience corroborated this observation. During
the war, a U.S. pilot was shot down near Hong Kong. He “managed to
crawl into the undergrowth where he lay hidden until he saw a Chinese
peasant. Supposing that all the Chinese in Hong Kong were still loyal to
the British, he had called the man and asked him to bring help, giving
him, as a token, his U.S. navy ring. But the Chinese had betrayed him,
going straight to the Japanese gendarmerie.”95 The collaborators from
the Chinese diaspora had plenty of company.
Why would they side with Tokyo in light of the bloody massacres
in Nanking and elsewhere and the debasement of the occupation? The
answer is not so much that they liked Tokyo but that they disliked more
London and its policies of “pure European descent.” Moreover, the
leading force contesting Japanese hegemony in China, the Communist
Party, had been subjected to destructively negative publicity by Euro
pean and Euro-American propagandists. The fact that by war’s end
Chinese were “occupying judicial and executive posts with responsibil
ities unknown before the war,” shows how biased the British had been
toward the Chinese.96 Similarly, as the Europeans were chased into exile
from Hong Kong or interned, the Chinese often took their places, in
cluding quite a few from the Japanese colony of Taiwan.97
The invaders probably made their deepest inroads among the Indi
ans, then in open rebellion against British colonialism and predisposed
not to view the vanquished as allies and heroes. Why? To cite one ex-
ample among many, the mother of the U.S. historian and presidential
advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., visited India in the early 1930s; she
asked a British official how to say “thank you” in Hindustani. He re-
fused, telling her “No white person ever thanks an Indian for any-
thing.”98 When the Chinese writer Han Suyin visited India in 1942, she
did “not remember meeting any Indian who was not a servant, a bearer,
a something-wallah. . . . In the hotels no Indians stayed as guests; these
144 RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED
edifices were only for the British, or diplomatic guests, such as us.” But
“in the back streets of Calcutta, just behind the hotel . . . I saw scribbled
upon a wall ‘Long Live Subhas Chandra Bose,’” a reference to the pro-
Tokyo Indian leader.99
Han Suyin’s observations in India, including the scribbled graffiti,
indicated the source of the difficulties faced by the British in forging a
united front with Indians in Hong Kong. Indian sympathies were often
with their brethren back home and with Tokyo’s position in Hong
Kong. A British “internal intelligence” report from Hong Kong filed
during the war noted that “the Indians are in the words of one refugee
‘belonging number one people.’ In other words they are receiving ex
cellent treatment from the Japanese. They have many representatives in
the Government, several being highly paid. The Indian police are
solidly behind the Japanese.”100 Indian “officers and men were sub
jected to intense propaganda and a large number were persuaded to
work for the Japanese administration.” The chief of Japanese counter-
intelligence in Hong Kong “endeared himself in particular to the Indi
ans in Hong Kong and therein lay his most powerful weapon against”
the anti-Tokyo resistance.101 The British writer Phyllis Harrop agreed.
“The Indians are being especially favoured,” she acknowledged. “They
have been allowed, or should I say, encouraged, to stage an ‘Indepen
dence Day.’ This is, I suppose, to help in the Japanese attack on
India.”102
Mohammed Sadig was one of many Indians who collaborated with
Tokyo in Hong Kong. One witness against him, swearing on the
“Koran,” said that Sadig stated, “When the Japanese are ruling India
you will not be sent back to India but to England.”103 Sadig’s alleged re-
marks were representative of a virtual tidal wave of anti-British senti
ment in the Indian community of Hong Kong in the aftermath of 8 De
cember 1941. Gwen Dew “saw an Indian knock down an aged British
doctor who did not understand his order that a road was temporarily
closed. A number of times Indian guards kicked women, or hit them
with guns.”104 Emily Hahn saw “Indians everywhere” in occupied
Hong Kong: “renegades from the British regiment that had been sta
tioned in Hong Kong and former policemen and watchmen who had a
grudge against the English and were glad to welcome their new con
querors. In this part of town they were under the command of a white
man named Grover and his Eurasian henchman, John. Grover had run
a butcher shop in Hong Kong and had passed as English until Pearl
RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED 145
among the Chinese against the Indians.” The British, they charged,
“brought Indian troops and policemen to this country” and were “the
first to start a gigantic propaganda machine to fan fear and dread in
Chinese and other Asiatic minds against the Nipponese. . . . While the
Nipponese attitude towards the Indian has always been one of sympa
thetic understanding, the same could not be said of the Chinese atti
tude, due to British perfidy.”113
Indians resident in wartime Osaka, Japan, according to Martin
Boyle who was interned there, were none too sympathetic to the Allies
either, although they too were prisoners of war.114 That was the
dilemma faced by the Empire: because of their treatment of Indians in
the past, some Indians now preferred imprisonment over dodging bul
lets on the battlefield.
Naturally, the Japanese distinguished between Indian and British
prisoners. Their instructions regarding the interrogation of prisoners of
war stated bluntly that the “means of obtaining [a] statement” will
“vary with nationality.” The need to “rouse anti-British feelings”
among the Indian troops was stressed. “Contrast treatment of British
and Indian troops. Point out slave attitude of Britishers towards Indi
ans. Stress patriotism of Eastern Asiatic Indians and activities of INA.”
“British and Indian troops must be kept in different camps and receive
different treatment. Indian troops must be treated by [Japanese] officers
and men as if they were brothers. . . . Awaken in them a sense of supe
riority over the British.” Chinese troops were to be treated similarly.
“Point out common racial homogeneity of China and Japan.” British
troops should be reminded of “American atrocities . . . to women in
England.” Generally speaking, the rule of thumb was, “Do not kill In
dians; kill whites but not officers, or those who understand Japan
ese.”115
The Empire had its own special approach to Indians, as well. The
“racial arrogance” of the Japanese should be emphasized, it was said,
“along with ‘Japanese sharp practice in commerce. (It remains to be
seen whether we have enough evidence for this).” Their “treatment of
women” should also be stressed, but the British—who were not exactly
renowned for their advanced theory and practice in this realm—added
cautiously, “This needs to be handled with the greatest possible care
and quite impersonally.” London was hoisted on its own petard in
launching this crusade. “In dealing with all items in this section,” it was
said prudently, “it will be necessary to bear in mind [Indian National]
RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED 147
Congress criticisms of the British and either avoid instances where un
favorable comments on the British might be made or else discuss such
comments quite frankly.”116
Japanese racial ideology was sufficiently flexible to allow for a spe
cial appeal to disgruntled Europeans too. The collaboration of “White
Russians”—that is, refugees from the Bolshevik Revolution—with
Japanese forces in China and throughout Asia was well known. More
generally, disaffected minorities reached out to Tokyo. A petition from
“citizens of Ukrainian descent” complained about the Polish govern-
ment.117 The beleaguered Macedonians beseeched Tokyo to assist them
in their struggle against “Greek and Serb domination.”118 The Ukrain
ian population “in Eastern Galicia” sought Tokyo’s support in fighting
“persecution.”119 Thus, viewed widely as leader by default of the ma
jority of the “colored” world and having made decided inroads in Eu
rope itself, Japan thought it was well poised for global domination.
were many tragic love affairs, broken marriages and the infidelity of
some whose husbands were across the water in the prisoner of war
camps in Kowloon.” In these camps, where resurgent spirits fought
tenaciously against death, “the cemetery was popular with camp
lovers.”132 As Emily Hahn put it, “a freshly dug grave is one of the most
private places you can find.”133
The Stanley Journal published by the internees included such “Stan-
ley Proverbs” as “never put off till tomorrow the man you can do
today” and a poem about the “Camp Gigolo” (he was “young and quite
good looking and reasonably dressed, yet he’s often designated as Stan-
ley’s major pest.”) There was also the admonition, “My son, beware of
the damsel who telleth you that thou are one in a hundred for there is
no doubt thou might well be that,” suggesting once again that sexual in
tercourse is the poor person’s grand opera.134 Of course, the cemetery
was also popular with those bone-tired and haggard with hunger and
seeking a bit of rest, with nary a thought in their minds—nor the en
ergy—for a romp through the tombstones.
It was remarkable how the former burghers of Hong Kong, many of
whom were dismissive of the mating habits of their alleged racial infe
riors, engaged in behaviors they might have denounced officially
months earlier. At Stanley “there was a regular red light district. . . . A
girl for a tin of bully beef” was the going rate. A “brothel of sorts” was
established.135 John Streicker, Administrative Secretary at Stanley, noted
soberly that “very often between persons, one or both of whom had a
legal partner elsewhere,” affairs ensued. “This caused comment at first
but soon became accepted.”136 “One sensational marriage” at Stanley,
“of a young man of 25 to an old lady of 60” initially drew criticism, but
after a while it too ceased to be of interest.137
Many of the men at Stanley were “holding women responsible for
lowering morals, promiscuity and the increase in babies” that resulted.
It is unclear, however, how the women could have had babies without
the men’s participation. Some men had difficulty adjusting to the fact
that their decreased status and the transformation brought about by in
ternment of necessity had fundamentally altered gender dynamics.
Why should women defer, for example, to men who were deferring to
the Japanese who were supposedly their racial inferiors? Consequently,
the women became more assertive. Many said that internment “had
changed them,” some had “gained more tolerance” and “another in-
RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED 151
ternee spoke for many when she said: “My husband had a lot of trouble
adjusting to the ‘new me.’”138
Her husband was not alone in having difficulty accepting new re
alities. Father Meyer, a Catholic priest who was interned at Stanley, was
opposed to abortion and made no effort to hide his views. Some women
might have argued that if he was opposed to abortion, he should avoid
having one. But this would not have deterred this determined man of
the cloth who “feared a loosening of morals if such operations were al
lowed to be conducted indiscriminately. He objected to the attitude that
children now should not be born in the camp owing to the general con
ditions prevailing.”139 This “might lead to a general belief” that abor
tions “could be lightly undertaken with the result that with this period
of the camp’s history the moral standards of the camp might be lowered
and rather more promiscuous sexual intercourse undertaken.”140 In the
spring of 1945 Father Mayer—and he was not alone—expressed his
“deepest concern over the apparent ease” with which abortions were
done, “not less than seven cases.” “Any woman who desired it has been
accommodated.”141
A “surgical board” was established to rule on whether pregnancies
should be terminated. In March 1945 the case of “Mrs. E. Philippens”
came before the board. Some said that “there did not seem to be any
reason to terminate the pregnancy,” though one doctor objected, con
sidering it “definitely wrong” to “continue any pregnancy” due to
“malnutrition, semi-starvation and avitaminosis.” After all, “it was
proved in the last war that the children born toward the end of the pe
riod of hostilities lost their permanent teeth in their early teens and
were mentally very poorly developed.”142
The women and their allies did not blithely accept such remarks. By
the summer of 1945 the “Camp Medical Officer,” after a “brisk discus
sion” with fellow medics, presented a “motion accusing Father Meyer
[et al.] of gross impertinence in attempting to interfere with rational
medicine. [The motion] was defeated by a large majority.”143 There was
another concern—one that was once thought to be a preoccupation of
class and race subordinates—namely, that “legitimacy of the child
should in no circumstances be allowed to influence the decision to ter
minate or otherwise a pregnancy.”144
Some interned men—and women too—were concerned with the
tendency of some women to become a bit too friendly with their captors
152 RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED
left Hong Kong as a sad man and returned to the U.K. in 1945” at war’s
end.157 But while he was falling, male—and female—Asians were tak
ing his place.
Some European and Euro-American women adapted to the newer
conditions, though old habits died hard. As Gwen Priestwood escaped
to the mainland, dodging Japanese troops and Nationalist bandits alike,
“she was also careful to take” her “powder compact and Elizabeth
Arden lipstick.” The “plan” was that “Anthony should be in charge
and” she “should take orders—’provided they are reasonable orders,’”
she “added mentally, womanlike.” Priestwood was wrestling with the
change from her previous status as a sheltered socialite to her present
role as a desperate escaped prisoner. Her male comrade was little help.
“Those old flannel trousers you’re wearing,” he said. “I don’t like to see
foreign women dressed like that—and it’s bad for the peasants and
coolies to see you so poorly dressed.” Even on arrival in “bomb-torn
Chungking,” she “began to realize, it was up to a white girl to do her bit
to maintain white prestige—even if she had escaped from a prison
camp and marched and ridden across China for weeks. ‘I’ll buy a dress,’
I promised.’” She took a bath, stepped out of the tub and stared in the
mirror, then noted “with some satisfaction that the rigorous Japanese
diet had, at least, given me a pretty decent figure.” Priestwood was try
ing hard to pretend that the intertwined worlds of race, gender, and
class had not been decisively transformed.158
The Euro-American, Gwen Dew, was tickled that some questioned
her rooming with a man in camp. “This was funny,” she mused, “for I
had been assigned to rooms with men since December 20 and under
war conditions everyone becomes merely a human being, not a man or
woman, and there is no false modesty.”159 Dew’s avant-garde approach
showed just how much gender relations had been transformed—if only
temporarily.160
Perhaps the final fall from grace for the women of Stanley came
when they were forced to wear khaki shorts because their few changes
of clothes had turned to rags. “Having been made locally for dispatch
to Africa where they were intended to be bought at cut rate by natives,”
now they were eagerly grabbed up by the former mollycoddled mis
tresses of Hong Kong.161 On the other hand, Sir Franklin Gimson is
probably correct in suggesting that “women endured privations better
than men possibly because domestic duties eliminated to some extent
the opportunity for morbid introspection and criticism of administra-
RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED 155
tion.” Men had further to fall and often received the brunt of the occu
piers’ assaults. Their identities were more bound up with the Empire
and thus they were more likely to crack when the Empire itself crum-
bled.162
There was a “tradition” in the Empire of “merging a sense of au
thority with the white racial identity,” Suke Wolton noted, citing George
Orwell, whose “legitimacy as a representative of the rule of law, even
when dealing with a mad elephant, seemed to be intimately bound up
with the prestige of being white.” Actually, this tendency was not spe
cific to the Empire. In 1896 the London Times “regretted the Italian hu
miliation” in Ethiopia, ‘complaining of the disrepute it had brought to
all white armies: “the chief feeling expressed is one of sincere regret, not
merely because by this defeat the prestige of European armies as a
whole is considerably impaired.’”163
Women were also under immense pressure as reflected in the self-
policing of those outside Stanley who were tending as best they could
to their loved ones in the camps of interned soldiers. As Emily Hahn ob
served, “Any woman who forgot herself and broke the rules of the
men’s prison camp was the object of our indignation. We kept watchful
eyes on the girls who had bad reputations for being emotional. It was
always the same ones who smiled, or waved at their husbands behind
the barbed wire, or otherwise loused up the proceedings and we knew
it. We were savage against these women. . . . I was as bad as the rest of
them. I joined in cursing the Portuguese girls who giggled, passing
camp.” The Japanese were not charmed. Sometimes there was “mass
punishment” for all the women, which brought down further collective
wrath upon the heads of those directly involved.164
Such pressures led directly to the formation of the British Women’s
Group in April 1942, which quickly agreed that the “Dutch ladies” and
the “Maryknoll Sisters” could be invited to their meetings. In early 1943
the British Women’s Group observed that “a year ago the presence of
women had . . . been largely resented” in the camp; but now “this feel
ing had died down, especially as the women had contributed very
greatly to the harmonious running of the camp. The women were work
ing in clinics, diet and community kitchens as well as in the hospital
and school.” The group also decided that “the use of the word
‘Eurasian’ . . . was deplored and it was agreed that a letter be sent to the
Council pointing out the need for more careful wording.” The men also
had become more sensitive under conditions of duress; “some” had
156 RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED
“requested that they should be taught to darn and patch their clothes
before the women were repatriated.”
But this compelled sensitivity had its limits. “In the minds of the
men,” according to the minutes of the BWG, “women did not count in
the camp. . . . ‘we don’t want any women in our meetings!’” they said.
Thus, “the women organized work squads and were doing a nice, quiet
job when suddenly they were given a man supervisor.” The women
promptly rebelled. “After that they respected us as they thought at any
time we might be a strong political block who would vote as one.” Fur
ther, the men expected that complaints about “delinquent and noisy
children” would be taken up by “the women’s group. . . . It was, how-
ever, agreed that it was a camp problem”—and not just a problem for or
of women.165
The experience of interned women beyond Hong Kong was both
similar and different.166 Unlike their counterparts in Hong Kong—and
reflecting Tokyo’s improvisation and lack of an overall plan for the in
ternees—a group of four hundred women and children were segre
gated from male internees in Sumatra.167 Sister Jessie Elizabeth Simons,
an interned Australian nurse, recalled that some of her comrades
sought to make themselves appear as unattractive as possible.168 Shirley
Fenton Huie, also interned in Indonesia, had a different recollection,
emphasizing how interned women traded sexual favors for the neces
sities of life.
Like some of her male counterparts elsewhere in Asia, the trauma
tizing experience of internment “taught” Huie “to understand better
the attitude of poor and underprivileged people. Coolies often used to
carry around with them a piece of material about one metre long and,
say, half a metre wide. My mother confessed that she had often won
dered why they carried such a piece of material, sometimes slung over
one shoulder, sometimes wrapped around the waist. It was not until we
ourselves were reduced to the state of coolies that we learned to appre
ciate the uses of a rag! In the first place,” she marveled, “one can use it
to wipe one’s brow, one’s hands, one’s neck, one’s armpits . . . any-
where! In the second place, it is always handy to wrap something in,
and especially if one intends to steal something, say, for instance, a
dropped cigarette, a piece of wood from the Commandant’s kitchen, a
piece of handy firewood. . . . Just nonchalantly drop your rag to cover
the object, and leave it there for a while. If nobody seems to have no
ticed anything, pick up the rag when leaving, at the same time making
RACE REVERSED/GENDER TRANSFORMED 157
Philippines, she had more problems with her fellow Americans and
their ethos than with the Japanese. The Americans’ antipathy toward
her soared when she fell deeply in love with a fellow internee, though
her spouse was interned in a neighboring camp.176 Gender bias may
have been involved in the animosity between her and her camp
mates.177
As for the Japanese, they had to endure a gender reversal after the
war. “Male writers” tended to “typically rely on metaphors of linguis
tic and sexual subordination.” Their “stories” were “often told from the
perspective of an adolescent boy and suggest that the occupied society,
like the narrator himself, has yet to attain, or has been stripped, of its
masculinity.” With “remarkable consistency, male writers from both
mainland Japan and Okinawa have articulated their humiliating expe
rience of the defeat and occupation in terms of the sexual violation of
women.”178
7
The White Pacific
159
160 THE WHITE PACIFIC
Australia is as large in territory as the United States, but its current pop
ulation is approximately the size of Southern California’s. Large in size
and relatively small in population, with a murderous record against the
indigenous people, it was a perfect target for Japan. “Racism was writ-
ten into the Defence Act which governed the composition of Australia’s
forces—it specifically excluded ‘full-blooded’ Aborigines from enlist
ment,” while “descriptions of the Japanese as baboons, apes and mon
keys . . . recall white descriptions of Aborigines as ‘monkeys’ in the
early days of Australian settlement,” said one scholar tellingly.24
The Australian mining magnate W. S. Robinson put his finger on
the problem when he declared that “Australia and New Zealand have
a total population of 9,000,000 whites. Their neighbors are 1,000,000,000
of the coloured races—only a few hours away by air. . . . Australia and
New Zealand are in the uncomfortable position of having most to lose
and the greatest chance of losing it.”25
How true. But Canberra—like Wellington and London and Wash
ington—proceeded blithely, as if white supremacy would reign eter-
nally.26 Canberra was not unaware of the sense of outrage that its poli
cies were creating, particularly in Japan. In the spring of 1919, as
world concern was mounting about the victorious Allies’ unwilling
ness to accept racial equality as a principle of the postwar settlement,
a British diplomat in Tokyo forwarded a lengthy missive detailing the
anger in Nippon. “It is difficult to understand what is at the bottom of
the sudden ebullition of feeling on this subject,” he said, seeming per
plexed, “how far it is real, how far artificial.” Still, he continued, “It is
practically the one topic of discussion and great dissatisfaction is ex-
pressed on all sides at the failure so far of the Japanese Delegates at
Versailles to obtain the insertion in the Covenant of a clause abolish
ing this discrimination.” Warily he observed that “in his speech before
the Japan Society at New York Viscount Ishii, the Japanese Ambas
sador is reported to have said that nothing would contribute more to
universal peace than the rectification at the Peace Conference of racial
discrimination and that a League of Nations with racial discrimination
THE WHITE PACIFIC 165
Even after the war had begun, the Department of Interior ruled
that “as it is desirable that these [coloured] servants be returned to
their own countries as soon as possible, it is suggested that their ex
emptions should not be extended for more than one year.”44 Many Eu
ropean employers from Hong Kong and elsewhere had fallen on hard
times and had begun to dismiss their servants. Canberra was worried
that they would stay on, thus disrupting the “White Australia” policy.
Though these servants might be put in harm’s way in raging war
zones, for Canberra yielding to the sentiments of its Asian allies was
not a priority.
In addition to Chinese servants, Canberra was also trying to deport
“Chinese wives of Army personnel in Australia.” It “has always been a
problem,” wrote one official, “to find suitable accommodation for them;
the fact that the population of Australia is 98% British stock and that
there is no admixture of ‘color’ makes it difficult both for the Chinese
wives and the white people with whom they come in contact. Further-
more, they are unwanted by the white wives of military evacuees. It
seems a great pity that these Chinese wives should ever have been evac
uated from Hong Kong.”45
But this official was not the only one to be upset. “Mrs. Alice Stan
dard” of Hong Kong had been evacuated to Brisbane, and found to her
dismay that she—like others—had plummeted precipitously on the
class ladder. This was causing her no small amount of anxiety.
“Aussies,” she groaned, “have caused us nothing but heartache.”
“Why,” she cried, “did they have to pick this country to send us to, these
Aussies don’t like the English people, they show it in a lot of ways, even
the school kids fling it in our faces, that we are living on charity.”46
“Mrs. Trinder” seemed to agree with Mrs. Standard, or so thought
one Australian official, who complained that she “has occupied a great
deal of the time of the staff in this office and I can say, without hesitation,
that she has been one of the most difficult evacuees with whom we have
had to deal.” He “was inclined to think that Mrs. Trinder, when in Hong
Kong, enjoyed unrestricted recreation by reason of the fact that she then
had servants to care for her children; but conditions here are different.”47
Europeans in Hong Kong had had even more servants at their beck and
call than Euro-Australians, and were in a panic without them.
This Australian bias created a gaping opening for Japanese propa
ganda. A stinging editorial in the Tokyo-administered Hong Kong News
charged in April 1942 that Britain consciously was seeking to fight on
THE WHITE PACIFIC 171
The Japanese assault on Asia sent shock waves through Australia and
New Zealand. Kevin Ireland grew up in New Zealand during the war.
Years later he still could recall vividly “that most terrible time of na
tional fear, impotence . . . the year of the Japanese.” New Zealand had
explored many “taboo” issues over the years, including “sex” and “in
cest,” but the possibility of a Japanese invasion had been neglected, he
thought, because of the mass anxiety it ignited. The “curious thing,”
said Ireland, “was how our cockiness reasserted itself immediately”
after Midway, though “our arrogance was proportionate to the depth of
fear from which we had just been released.” One factor remained con
stant, however: like the soldiers of the Allies, “in our school [sic] boy
games we preferred to shoot imaginary Germans; the Japanese were too
172 THE WHITE PACIFIC
stated the Japs [sic] told them that the country belonged to the blacks,
had been stolen from them by the whites and that ‘bye and bye’ they
(the Japs [sic]) would give it back to them (the blacks).” The Director
General of Security in Canberra added that “the aborigines in Cape
York Peninsula have for years been fed and given tobacco by Japanese
luggers,” which suggested there was an alliance between them. Yet an-
other informant reported that the indigenous people “are not to be
trusted and are more likely to assist the Japs [sic] than the whites. The
reason being that the Japs [sic] have consistently made presents, etc., to
them over a period of years in return for the favors of their women,
etc.”64
Given the fear that the indigenous people would rally en masse to
Tokyo’s banner, it might be imagined that Canberra would be enlisting
Aborigines enthusiastically. But it was not. Like Hong Kong, it feared
placing weapons in the hands of the oppressed lest they be turned on it.
Professor A. P. Elkin of the University of Sydney questioned the “refusal
of the military authorities to accept for military service various aborig
ines of mixed blood in New South Wales.” He acknowledged that
“there has been some discussion in the press of late that the aborigines
might help the Japanese if they were to attempt a landing.” He con
fessed, “This is quite possible” since “during the past ten years or so
they have [seen] the Japanese as a very kind folk.” Besides, “they hold
many grudges” against Canberra. “Disaster” could have been avoided
in “Burma and Java” if a hand had been extended to the “natives.” But
some thought that arming the indigenous people would lead to an even
greater disaster.65
A few months after this initial warning a high-level administrator
in Brisbane was informed that “the aboriginals living in Cape York
Peninsula cannot be trusted to help the Allies in the event of a Japanese
landing.” Reassuringly, he added the now dated—but telling—com
ment that he did not “subscribe to the theory of Communistic sympa
thies [with] which they are reported to be imbued.” Previously, “the
Japanese . . . during their fishing excursions . . . became very friendly
with” the indigenous people. Signaling how the press of war enkindled
race changes, he recommended that to “build up a better feeling toward
the white man” in order to counter Japan, the indigenous people should
be given “flour, sugar, native tobacco.”66
Apparently Japan had made a long-term effort to cultivate the in
digenous people of Australia. In Japan “Wakayama [was] tucked away
176 THE WHITE PACIFIC
in the south-east corner of Honshu. The people from this region have by
tradition followed Nakimini-Fudo, the God of the Sea.” They became
pearl divers off the coast of Australia early on. They “maintained their
pre-eminent position right up to 1941 when over 500 of them were pro
viding Broome with the wherewithal to develop its wealth and liveli
hood.”67 Broome was strategically situated in underpopulated western
Australia, only nine hundred kilometers from the Portuguese colony of
East Timor to the north.
The Japanese effort appears to have been successful, as an “intelli
gence report” complained of the “doubtful loyalty” of “blacks.” The
“matter is worthy of the closest attention,” it said, particularly since the
indigenous people had “an invaluable knowledge of Queensland to
pography [that] would be of inestimable value to the enemy in an over-
land drive. That the enemy would have little difficulty in soliciting
many of these people’s services is born[e] out . . . by the writer’s own
experience. These half-educated half-castes and aboriginals have been
largely influenced by Communist and anti-capitalist propaganda for
many years and can almost invariably be swayed by the agitator. They
are extremely class conscious and consider that they have had a raw
deal from the white man. These sentiments are not displayed to the
white man’s face but are most evident when the coloured group are to
gether in groups. There is little doubt that the Japs [sic] would find
many of them willing helpers.”68
Yet another official warned that the aboriginals in northern Aus
tralia might “retaliate” because of the indignities they had suffered over
the years. Further, “the Japanese have treated the Torres Strait Island
native as a friend, visiting in their houses and treating them as
equals”69—a policy seen as downright seditious. The leading Aus
tralian jurist, Charles Lowe, declared that “evidence was given before
me that the natives of Melville Island were in all probability more
favourably disposed towards the Japanese than towards us.”70
Just as even paranoids sometimes have real enemies, so Canberra
may have had real reason to suspect sedition. As one aborigine put it
years later, “during the war, some whites regarded Aborigines as secu
rity risks. They were too! When you’ve got a decision to make whether
you would back the Australian people or the Japanese who would be
kinder to us, I would have backed the Japanese if they had been kinder
to me. Why not? We [are] still a security risk. Until Australia can accept
the fact that we are not second-class citizens in this country, we will re-
THE WHITE PACIFIC 177
main a security risk. I’ll sell out to someone who will be kinder to me,
thank you very much. Why not?”71 Why not, indeed, was a hard ques
tion for Canberra to answer. In response, Australia and its allies, such as
the United States, began to recognize that steps toward racial justice, no
matter how halting, were the only way to keep this question from being
posed, let alone answered.
Like Wellington, Canberra also feared that its Chinese population
either might join with the invading Japanese or that the Japanese would
masquerade as Chinese, providing an effective cover for internal sub-
version. In a “secret” report on “tactics of Japanese troops,” Canberra
belatedly admitted with chagrin that “we underestimated the enemy.”
An analysis of “Japanese methods” showed that when Tokyo’s troops
successfully invaded Hong Kong, they “entered many Chinese homes
and confiscated all available Chinese civilian clothing.” They “used this
disguise to infiltrate unobserved through the streets.” In Shanghai
“clean shaven Sikhs” were “known to have come down to this area with
the Japanese,” claiming to act under the “authority of Subhas Chandra
Bose” (the pro-Tokyo Indian patriot) and rallying the Indian commu
nity. This was another worry for Canberra, given the proximity of Indi
ans from Fiji, New Zealand, and Australia itself.72
Then and now, some of the best intelligence on the region was pro
duced by Canberra’s emissaries; though perhaps knowledge of the hos
tility to its “White Australia Policy” in the region often led Canberra to
exaggerate the dangers of internal and external Asian subversion. The
well-connected Australian legation in Chungking reported weeks after
Japan’s astounding victory in Singapore, that “British prestige” was
“never lower than it is today.” “Chinese hostility to Britain” was “some-
times quite open,” laced with “expressions of contempt.” The legation
acknowledged belatedly that “the British have not been popular in
China for some generations” and there was an “ineradicable preference
for the Americans among the Chinese.” The ground beneath the feet of
the Empire was eroding: things had become “exceedingly difficult,” be-
cause there was also a “strong pro-German party in Chungking, espe
cially in the army” and China might want to cut a separate deal. Did the
putrid policy of “pure European descent” have anything to do with
this? Well, no, the legation felt that “the evil lies deep in the Chinese
character, which with its lack of civic consciousness and sense of social
responsibility tolerates corruption.” Still, with rare candor F. W. Eggle
ston—Canberra’s representative in China—conceded that “it is difficult
178 THE WHITE PACIFIC
Japan spread the news of racial inequity far and wide. In the neigh-
boring French colony of New Caledonia, reported the pro-Tokyo Hong
Kong News, Governor Christian Laigret “had openly charged Negro
American troops stationed in Noumea of misbehaviour and of being
[the] “terror of the white women in New Caledonia.’”93 The South Pa
cific, a model of white supremacy, was a major target of Japanese prop
aganda. Reality there, the paper said, presented a “scathing indictment”
of the Empire. But with the rise of Tokyo, “the white man in the South
Seas is now in grave danger of being hoist by his own petard.”94 Japan
ese propaganda repeatedly threatened Australians and New Zealan
ders—even when it may have intended otherwise. Thus, Totehiko Kon
ishi in September 1942 reassured them that after the Japanese invasion
and conquest, “a century would be required for Nippon to outnumber
the white Australians”; “to Asianize” this vast land would not be “fea
sible,” though part of the Empire provided “ideal places for Nipponese
settlement.” That the “whites” were promised that they would “not be
treated in the same category as Chinese and Indonesians” was not ex
actly reassuring,95 particularly since it was acknowledged that “for the
development of Australia, the importation of Chinese labour seems to
be the only solution.”96
These observations reflect the impact of the war—including the
presence of Negro soldiers and the pervasive, often frightening, Tokyo
propaganda—on the Empire in the South Pacific. The “Official War His-
tory” drafted in New Zealand notes that “the crucial widening of the
Native (now appropriately, Maori Affairs) Department occurred during
the war years and the war affected and accelerated the change. [The]
chief elements contribut[ing] to this effect” included “increasing racial
consciousness of the Maori during the years of recruiting and fight
ing.”97 It was in 1944 that there was a “conference of representatives of
all the Maori tribes . . . the first conference of its kind that [had] ever
been held.” The Prime Minister spoke, and the indigenous people made
land claims that were to roil Wellington for years to come.98 The war ex
perience itself propelled this consciousness and militancy. For “people
who had the greatest respect for the prestige of the white man saw him
engaged in menial occupations.”99
Make no mistake: race relations in the South Pacific were not mag
ically transformed by dint of war. To the contrary. Peter Hall, a
Eurasian, matriculated after the war at a school in Sydney. He ob
served, “I was called ‘Tojo’ probably because I came from “China.’ . . .
THE WHITE PACIFIC 185
In later years as the Australian sun tanned me, I was nicknamed ‘Wog.’
You just had to grin and bear it, otherwise you would never get any
peace.”100
Hall’s experience was not unusual. Canberra had developed spe
cial rules for “non-European students” who wished to study there that
were not free of discrimination.101 Without a doubt this was part of a
larger immigration scheme that sought by various means to extend the
shelf-life of the “White Australia” policy. Weeks after the Japanese sur
render the cleric Dr. Wilson Macaulay felt compelled to remind Can
berra that “the phrase ‘White Australia’ has a deadly sound in Oriental
ears—it means the same type of racial superiority as Hitler’s ‘herren
volk’ and is equally objectionable.”102 In its defense, Canberra could
point to analogous policies of its chief ally, Washington. In the immedi
ate postwar era an “American army chaplain . . . advised [soldiers] to
think twice before marrying a Filipina because of the prejudice they
might encounter” in North America.103
But the United States, which was reigniting a Cold War against its
most recent ally, the Soviet Union, was also revising its racial policies to
better engage in this conflict. Australia, on the other hand, seemed more
interested in presenting a happy face of racial concord while continuing
the same old antebellum policies. Thus, the National Maritime Union of
the United States, whose merchant seamen often sailed into Perth and
other Australian ports, took issue with the continuing “attempt to dis
criminate against Negro seamen.” They had read an article in the local
press about Australian women dating these visitors: “We have tried to
reason with the girls who have been frenziedly embracing their black
lovers,” said the periodical, “begging them not to go. But they have no
reasoning power.” But why? “By our standards,” said the journal, the
Negroes were “sex-crazed and liable to go mad after drinking very lit
tle alcohol.” They left in their wake “many half-caste children running
around. . . . [They] came . . . from the north with plenty of spending
money” and produced a “degrading spectacle of Australian white girls
rushing the wharf to vie for the attentions of the Negro members of the
crew.” This generated a “revolting sight of local girls hysterically maul
ing black men and begging them with tearful voices to stay. According
to white Americans, in no other Pacific port do white women behave in
such a depraved and abandoned fashion. And for this reason Sydney
has become the favorite port of call for Negro seamen. . . . Some of our
‘Boong Molls,’ as we term them in the police force, reserve themselves
186 THE WHITE PACIFIC
exclusively for the black men. They watch the shipping news carefully
for arrival dates of American ships.”104 Ferdinand Smith, the Negro
leader of the seamen, was “horrified and shocked beyond credulity at
the monstrous libel” of these words, but it just showed that the war had
not changed everything.105
8
Asians versus White Supremacy
187
188 ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY
branch in the department. He too because of his colour has not been
able to get beyond the rank and pay of a subordinate.”9
These policies created fertile soil for pro-Nippon sentiment on the
Malay peninsula. Throughout the prewar era the British feared that not
only Japan but also “Russia” were “now working independently to
reach the same goal—the elimination of white influence in the East.”10
(It is unclear why Moscow would be interested in doing this, unless its
ideology automatically barred it from admission into the hallowed halls
of “whiteness.”)
Only months after the Japanese takeover, even British writers were
proclaiming a “very practical revolution in race relationships.”11 Given
the Empire’s practices, it did not take much to bring this on. Lee Kuan
Yew, the founding father of Singapore, recalls that “the best local grad
uates” had “much lower salaries” than the British. This conservative
politician years later remained contemptuous of the legerdemain nec
essary to maintain the illusion of white supremacy. “Any British, Euro
pean or American who misbehaved or looked like a tramp,” he later re-
called, “was immediately packed off because he would demean the
whole white race, whose superiority,” he added with a dash of sarcasm,
“must never be thrown in doubt.” But whatever mystical faith there
was in the alleged “superiority” of the “whites” was crushed by the
Japanese invasion, as “stories of their scramble to save their skins led
the Asiatics to see them as selfish and cowardly.” Lee, who collaborated
with the Japanese, said the “three and a half years of [the] occupation
were the most important of my life.” He was not alone in benefiting
from the occupation, gaining power (that he never relinquished after-
ward) when the British and other Europeans were ousted from leading
posts. Said Lee, “The luckiest and most prosperous of all were those like
the Shaw brothers who were given [by Tokyo] the license or franchise
to run gambling firms in the amusements parks.”12
Though present-day Malaysia (with a Malay majority) and Singa
pore (with a Chinese majority) often disagree on many things, it is strik
ing that the preeminent figure in Malaysian history, Mahatir Moham
mad, agrees with Lee Kuan Yew on the importance of the Japanese in
terregnum. “It completely changed our world,” he said. “Not only did
the Japanese forces physically oust the British, they also changed our
view of the world.” He studied Japanese and remains friendly with
Tokyo. “For those who went to Japanese schools and were willing to
190 ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY
learn the language, the Japanese Occupation was not too painful. Of
course,” he adds, “people of Chinese origin suffered more and many
were killed or held in captivity.” But as for himself, he was “not vio
lently opposed to the Japanese.” He even accepted some key arguments
of the Japanese right. “Even today some Japanese will argue that their
occupation of Asia was not so much an act of aggression towards the
Asian nations, as it was an attempt to free us from European colonial
rule. There is at least some truth to that argument. . . . The success of the
Japanese invasion convinced us that there is nothing inherently supe
rior in the Europeans. They could be defeated, they could be reduced to
groveling before an Asian race, the Japanese.”13
The Japanese themselves were contemptuous of their British ad
versaries. Masanobu Tsuji was an architect of the Japanese campaign.
Years later he marveled at the fact that the “British Army had blown up
the bridges and abandoned several thousand Indian soldiers on the
north bank of the river.” The British Army, he concluded, slightly be-
mused, “excels in retreat.” Perhaps worse was their utter disregard for
their Indian comrades: “In the Japanese Army there would have been
no blasting until it was certain that the last of our comrades in arms had
crossed the river.” Although Masanobu Tsuji did not say that this disre
gard may have been motivated by white supremacy, his contempt for
the British Army was clear: they “looked like men who had finished
their work by contract at a suitable salary, and were now taking rest free
from the anxiety of the battlefield.”14
Colonialism on the Malay peninsula had prepared the ground for a
Japanese advance. Lim Chok Fui was born in Singapore in 1936 in a
neighborhood which had “no such facilities as water closets or tap
water. We had to get water from wells. . . . Living conditions at the time
could be regarded as similar to those in a rural area or those in a farm
ing village in China.” His home was a bungalow of “900 square feet. . . .
divided into living spaces for four families” with “each family” having
“one room.” There were four in his family. A “common toilet was
shared by all the families. It was a hole dug in the ground with a roof
which was actually a zinc sheet.”15 Meanwhile, the British resided in
regal splendor. “The European colony was a mere handful of about
8000” with “Scotsmen predominating,” and they lorded it over those
not of “pure European descent.”16
This racial supremacy had an intra-European class bias, of course.
Many British troops felt that London “did precisely nothing to make life
ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY 191
more tolerable for the airmen up in Khota Baru.” There was even a
dearth of “good drinking water.” Nonetheless, the troops lived in
greater comfort than non-Europeans. Among some Navy men, even
their “boy” had a “boy” or servant.
As in Hong Kong, the Empire adopted color-coded evacuation poli
cies. When war threatened, London was reluctant to evacuate about
seven thousand “Chinese workmen” at the docks in Singapore—
though this group was to become the heart of the anti-Japanese move
ment—since “the reception areas would be either Australia, India, Cey
lon or South Africa. The first and last of these countries have hitherto
held strong views on the subject of Asiatic labour.”17 As in Hong Kong,
in Singapore Japan relied heavily on a unique crew of “shrewd men, the
barbers.” They “automatically gave all white customers an anti-hang-
over massage whether they wanted merely a shave or hair-cut,” which
relaxed them and made them more willing to engage in casual conver
sations that often yielded a mother-lode of intelligence.18 Although
there were only “3500 souls” in the prewar Japanese community in the
region, the white supremacist policies of the British enhanced their ef-
fectiveness.19
In any event, the British, being outnumbered, could not have held
off a credible invasion, particularly as London had alienated the Chi
nese, Indians, and Malays. Moreover, intra-European conflict weak
ened them further, as white supremacy was no more than a cover for
British, then English supremacy. The case of David Marshall indicates
that those who did not fit the proper national origin profile were also
subject to exclusion. “I applied to join the Singapore Volunteers Corps,”
he said, “and it was with some difficulty that they finally accepted me
as I was neither European, nor a Chinese, nor Eurasian; but they finally
placed me with the odds and sods, East Europeans and some English
volunteers.”20
Harvey Ryves had typical colonialist attitudes. He complained of
the “general inefficiency of Asiatics, particularly Malays, when left to
their own initiative. They have little idea of method or coordination
among themselves.” But somehow this “inefficiency” disappeared
when the Japanese invaders arrived, as “many of the Malays . . . were
established Fifth Columnists,” especially “schoolmasters.” Perhaps rec
ognizing that by maltreating the Malays the British may have helped to
foment sedition, Ryves found that the colonizers had a “fifth column
mania.” “They suspected nearly every Asiatic who was unlucky
192 ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY
ese,” since unlike the former colonizers, “they were very friendly, they
were nice to all the people. . . . They always offer you a cigarette, that
and that. They used to talk [sic] all the jokes.” By contrast, “the British,
they look down upon you if you are a junior staff. They don’t give you
cigarette, like that. . . . They are not friendly, they won’t talk to you in a
friendly manner. But the Japanese do that. I appreciate that.” The
British, he thought, had a “superiority complex. . . . but the Japanese, no.
They treat us all alike. . . . They treat us like friends, whether they are
high ranking officers or not. . . . But the British, no. They won’t do that.”
The ground had been prepared for the invasion in the 1930s by the
Kesatuan Melaya Muda or “Malay Youth Movement,” whose “duty
was to help the Japanese intelligence.” They formed the basis for the
“heihos,” the indigenous collaborators, of which there were “quite a lot.
In Singapore alone I think nearly 10,000. . . . They were in uniform.”
Like those who had been impressed with Japanese stores, Ismail Zain
felt that goods were cheaper as a result of the occupation. Thus, he was
“happy” about the British surrender.35
Dr. F. A. C. Oehlers, who was Eurasian, felt likewise. Born in 1921,
his brother was the first Speaker of the Parliament in Singapore.
Eurasians who were “first generation” were “given red badges” and not
interned, unlike those of “pure European descent.” But because of his
“Occidental heritage,” he—like others similarly situated—was “viewed
with suspicion.” He learned Japanese and, like others, had fond mem
ories of these new colonizers: “There were many decent ones among
them. . . . They used to come along to the house” and the “nucleus of a
kind of camaraderie, a friendship . . . developed.”36
Clearly, the Malays were subjected to systematic anti-British prop
aganda,37 which may account for their negative attitude toward Lon-
don and their positive feelings about Tokyo. Moreover, many associ
ated the end of colonialism—which was seen as inseparable from white
supremacy—with the demise of the Empire, which too was associated
with Tokyo. Thus, Sho Chuan Lam, born in 1927, recalled that the new
occupiers “used to tell us how the British had exploited the Asians. . . .
At times they made us feel very proud that we [were] Asians, telling us
that all this culture and civilization started with the Chinese and other
Asians. I remember one Japanese even told me [that] although they did
not like the Christians, he said Jesus Christ was also an Asian.”38 Patrick
Hardie has a similar recollection. In “every Singapore theatre” during
196 ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY
the occupation, “before they start the film, this is the word, [sic] have to
be shown on the screen. They said in Malay: ‘Alhamdulillah, East Asia
sekarang sudah dikembali ke bangsa Asia. Marilah kita bekerja
bersama—sama untuk Asia Timor Raya’—so it says that ‘Asia have
gone back to the Asian people. So therefore we must work together for
the sake of Southeast Asia.’”39
This propaganda offensive by the new colonizers began from day
one.40 As in Hong Kong, they marched the Europeans, bedraggled and
defeated, through town, providing a living symbol of the fall of white
supremacy and the rise of a new order.41 Gay Wuan Guay was struck by
the “long marches to Changi Jail, to Sime Road. It was a pitiful sight!”
They saw their former “bosses marching haltingly, lamely and some of
them begging for water.” Singaporeans “were no longer cringing like
before” when they “stammered . . . ‘yes, sir.’ . . . and could hardly reply
when they were addressed by a European or Englishman. But now they
could look at a European straight in the eye. Somehow or other the psy
chological breakthrough happened.” This was the beginning of a “new
spirit of independence among the young people. Even the older people
(the leaders) felt that it was time, they realized that the white su
premacy was a myth; that it was time that independence should be
taken seriously. . . . That was the beginning of this political awaken
ing. . . . We felt the British were not superhuman, supermen, as we used
to think.”42
The Japanese methodically ingratiated themselves with the local
population.43 But then again, anything they did in this sphere would
have made them stand out, given the abysmal policies of their British
predecessors. Zamroude Za’ba was born in Malaya in 1921 and worked
with the new occupiers as a clerk in the police department during the
war. As she recalled it, the “good thing” about “those Japanese there”
was that “they could speak Malay rather well,” unlike the British; in
turn, she learned Japanese.44 Mary Lim, born in Malacca in 1922, had a
grandmother who also learned Japanese, simply “by hearing their con
versation. . . . They come quite often to my grandmother, at my grand-
mother’s invitation. . . . So that’s how she picked up Japanese. . . . They
were very nice to my grandmother.”45 This friendliness coupled with
opportunities for education and the advancement of locals was in dra
matic contrast to the Empire. As Robert Chong noted, “In a way, work
ing with them, they impart their full knowledge to you. That’s why I
give them full credit for that. They teach you sincerely and they will en-
ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY 197
we would still be calling the British our masters. . . . Had it not been for
the [Japanese] . . . I [would] probably still be working as a clerk. . . . I
won’t be what I am today.”59 Tan Ban Cheng agreed. Previously, “a lot
of Asians had a sort of inferiority complex.” Then the Japanese “in-
stilled in us . . . the fact that we could do a lot of things, also as good as
any other people in the West.” After the war, “people did not look so
much toward the West for their direction, for their dominance in our af
fairs.”60
F. A. C. Oehlers recalled that previously there was an “in-born feel
ing, this feeling was inculcated in us—that the white man was lord, you
know, and you were second-class,” though “we had so many compe
tent Singapore people, local people, who were teaching and getting half
the salary that young recruits from England were getting. Things like
that irked us.” They were “not permitted to enter Tanglin Club. . . . not
permitted to [set] foot in the Swimming Club.” But the occupation
“made us see also, like it did everybody else; that the white skin, the
white person, the white man, wasn’t [as] all-powerful as he declared
himself to be in the colonial era. And if anything good did come out of
the Japanese Occupation, it was independence. And I’m sure inde
pendence would have been a long time coming if not for the war. . . . not
only in Singapore, all over in India, Ceylon. We got to know that the
British Empire was not invincible.”61
Tan Wee Eng, born in Singapore in 1919, discovered that after the
war, “the British I noticed were little bit more humbler [sic], before that
they were real colonialists.” But after their defeat they were “more civil.
I noticed that in my own department. And they became more friendly—
everyone that I knew. . . . I found I could make friends easily with all my
British [associates]” who had formerly thought themselves “superior.”
Before they were “ordering you about” with “no sort of warmness, no
friendship, just work and purely work and literally you were like slaves
or labourers to them. There was not much friendship involved. . . . They
were . . . snobbish, snooty” as if “they belonged to [a] different society
or different class or different creed.” Before “the Chinese were left out”
of the sports competition for “the Naval Dockyard in the Singapore
Cup” but afterward that changed. Before he had to go to “the canteen
for Asiatics, they called it . . . [through] the back door.” But afterward he
could go where “they were serving the officers. So I went there and I ate
the British set-lunch. Beautiful! I enjoyed [it] and paid like a duke of
course. . . . Beautiful steaks, pork-chops, chicken, mash potatoes. . . . I
200 ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY
enjoyed it very much. . . . It was like heaven returned after the Japanese
occupation.” Thus, he found the arrival of the Japanese “very good,
personally I think. To me, it was a blessing in disguise . . . It was the
sparkle, the dawn of awakening for Asian people. . . . And not only that,
I think the dawn of Afro-Asian people also. The Japanese taught us that
Asians can fight, can stand up and do things for themselves and not to
depend on foster fathers. . . . It led to the fall of the British Empire.”62
Like the Ratana in New Zealand and some Negroes in the United States,
the attempt to trace blood ties between the Japanese and Malays was
symptomatic of an increasingly close relationship between Tokyo and
those who were hostile toward white supremacy. Again, London was
well aware of this gathering storm but found itself incapable of re
sponding effectively, possibly because such action might have meant
disrupting prevailing racial practices. Thus, in its annual report on Siam
in 1937, London’s emissary in a “confidential” report spoke of a “typi
cally stupid piece of Japanese propaganda,” that is, a “speech delivered
by the military attache at a cocktail party given by him to the Bangkok
press. In this oration he made the egregious statement that the present
situation in China might lead Japan to wage war with the white
races.”63
This “stupid propaganda” fed on colonial practices. Mrs. U. M.
Streatfield recalled that in Bangkok in 1931 there were “about a thou-
sand Europeans living and working there and perhaps five hundred of
these were British. The rest were Danes, Americans, Germans, French,
Dutch, Swiss and many others but the communities mixed a good deal.
At any party there might be six or seven nationalities present.” It was
an “astonishing place for parties of every sort”—”we went to a great
many parties” and “played a great deal of bridge,” she observed fondly.
This ostentation hardly embraced the Siamese. Though Bangkok may
not have been as bad as Bombay, where “at night multitudes slept in the
streets” and the dainty had to “step over sleeping bodies,” it was not
Valhalla either.64
Hence, it should have come as no surprise to the Empire to learn
from one of its agents in the summer of 1944 that “the Siamese appeared
to work in harmony with the Japanese and it is considered that an at-
tempt to drive the Japanese from Thailand would not be welcomed.”65
The British seemed paralyzed by such threats. They had hoped that
Tokyo would pulverize the Communists throughout the region, and in
ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY 201
the prewar era were reluctant to do anything to interfere with this pos
sibility. Tokyo often was given the run of the Empire because of its ster
ling anticommunist credentials. Thus, another “confidential” report in
1938 from the British legation in Tokyo spoke of a “Burmese engineer”
who noted that the “Japanese are sending commercial travellers and
other business and professional men to Burma with instructions to
spread anti-British and Pan-Asia propaganda.” Their informant chose
to “pass as a Japanese,” spoke “Japanese fluently,” had had a “Japanese
wife,” and was in a unique position to uncover acts of subversion by
Tokyo.66
Tokyo’s “Pan-Asia propaganda” in Burma67 seemed to be vindi
cated when the British evacuated Rangoon and other areas. When the
war began, “motor convoys” were used “mainly for Europeans, Anglo-
Burmans or Anglo-Indians employed by the Burmah Oil Company. . . .
There was preferential treatment for Europeans and Anglo-Indians.”68
Ho-yungchi spoke sarcastically of “Dorman-Smith,” the “British Gov
ernor of Burma” and his “stroke of sheer genius.” This “bumbling colo
nial governor had segregated black and white refugees. The whites
were either evacuated to India early, aboard ship, or were flown out on
Indian Airways or China National Aviation Corporation planes. The na
tives were sent out on what became known as the ‘black trail.’ . . . An es
timated 400,000 black refugees tried to escape by these trails. . . . The for-
lorn fugitives died by the tens of thousands from starvation and dis
ease.” Not only were the “Indians” of Burma “barred from white trails”
but “so were the Chinese.”69
“Colonel the Rt. Hon. Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith” in numerous
“secret” dispatches from Burma agreed. As early as January 1942 he
was reporting that a “Thakin fifth column was extremely active” there.
“They led Japs [sic] around our forces and created all necessary distur
bances.”70 After the biased evacuation process, “Morale has definitely
deteriorated especially among Indian community. Servants are now
wanting to leave. . . . It is now being said that Europeans will look after
themselves and leave others to their fate.” But the feisty Sir Reginald
had not given up all hope. “Two of [the] main human instincts,” he
thought, “are Love and Fear. It may well be that this part of the world
do not love us. What we have to do is to make them fear the Japs
[sic].”71
But soon pessimism set in. By March 1942 Dorman-Smith was ad
mitting that the “Japanese occupation has generally been accepted with
202 ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY
a grace which must be gratifying to the Japanese. The Thakins have ac
tively co-operated in every way with them and where necessary have
applied persuasion to bring their fellow Burmans into line. . . . It is def
initely disappointing that after all our years of occupation of both
Lower and to a lesser degree Upper Burma we have not been able to cre
ate that loyalty which is generally associated with our subject nations.
But I fear that we must accept the fact that we have not repeat not in
ducted that sort of loyalty which will withstand adversity.”72
Just as many U.S. Negroes had difficulty during the war accepting
that London was the hero and Tokyo the villain, many in Burma did
too. Some nationalists felt that Tokyo “represented a resurgent Asia
against European domination.” As in the United States, those who were
close to the Communists vehemently disagreed.73 But, as elsewhere, the
Communists had been so effectively destabilized that the path was
smoothed nicely for the rise of Japanese-oriented nationalists.
London’s reluctance to arm Africans on African soil or the Chinese
on Chinese soil was matched by its hesitation to arm the Burmese in
Burma. In 1939 the Burma Defense Forces “contained only 472 Burmans
as against 3197 Karens, Chins and Kachins.” It was deemed “imprudent
to enlist Burmans in a force which might have to be used against their
fellow countrymen.”74 On the other side, Japan was enlisting forces of
all kinds. Even animals were included. For example, “trained” mon
keys were taught to “carry a length of string to the top of a tree, loop the
string over a strong branch near the top and then drop the string to the
ground. A strong rope was fastened to the string and the rope was eas
ily pulled over the branch and back to the ground. A Japanese soldier
would then climb up the rope whilst his companions anchored the
other length. Reaching the top the Japanese used it as . . . a visual sig
naling station.”75
Bolting the prison gate after the inmates had fled, London now rec
ognized that the new regime in Rangoon was popular in part76 because
it was “opening . . . some of the higher posts in Government services to
those who had not learned English in school, the friendly attitude to-
wards the common people by their co-religionists the Japanese, whom
they believe would raise their standard of living more so than the
British had done or would do.” Almost incredulously the British noted
that “there was no discrimination made by the Japanese between Indi
ans and Burmans, Hindu-Moslem animosity was now not heard of in
Burma.”77
ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY 203
India was the heart of the Empire. Indeed, there could be no Empire
without this massive, subcontinental nation, not only because of the
wealth it generated but also because of its “human capital” that pro
vided laborers, soldiers, and the like throughout the Empire. Not sur
prisingly, India was also targeted early on by Japan, though given the
unpopularity of London in Delhi, Indians were courting as much as
they were being courted. As early as 1912, London in a “top secret” doc
ument suspected that “Japanese Spies” were active in India. An Indian
patriot, R. B. Bose, was suspected of conspiring to murder a leading
British official; Bose fled to Japan.93
206 ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY
Indians from other parts of the world also organized anti-British ac-
tivities.109 In April 1943 there was a major conference of Indians in the
disapora in Tokyo, with representatives from Thailand, Japan,
Manchuria, “Borneo and Celebes, Sumatra, Philippines. . . . China. . . .
Indo-China and Andamans,” along with Malaya. The conference de
nounced the Empire’s policies of “jailing of leaders” and repression. A
leading Japanese military man in contrast stressed that “through cul
tural relations and Buddhism, we, Nipponese have had traditional re
spect and affection for India for more than 2000 years and it has indeed
been unbearable to us to see the present slavery that India is undergo
ing under the rule of Great Britain.”110 For their part, representatives of
the India Independence League enumerated the sins committed by the
Empire, not least the fact that it had “exterminated the entire aboriginal
races of America and Australia to make room for themselves.”111 Later
they scoffed at the Atlantic Charter, since “it leaves out of its scope
countries like India.” It was no more than a “fresh lease for Asiatic slav
ery,” they gibed. They contrasted it with the Tokyo-backed “Greater
East Asia Assembly with its insistence on the elimination of racial dis
crimination.”112
The human touch, alien to white supremacy, helped to win over
many Indians. Fujiwara Iwaichi of the Japanese forces was struck when
he ate “Indian dishes” with an Indian officer after his surrender, and
was told, “I cannot think of an occasion when Indian officers have ever
had dinner together with British officers with whom we have fought
side by side. Despite our firm request that Indian dishes be put on the
menu at the officers’ club, it was turned down by the British Army.”
This Japanese major, serving in intelligence, played a pivotal role in the
founding of the INA and remained a hero in India years later.113
But the greatest hero for defecting Indians was Subhas Chandra
Bose. The Indian writer P. A. Narasimha Murthy is not alone in observ
ing “the only other leader who equaled, even surpassed him in im
pressing the younger minds was Jawaharlal Nehru”—even today—de
spite his fighting shoulder to shoulder with Japanese forces in Burma
against the British Empire and their allies.114 Bose was not alone. After
the seizure of Hong Kong, the INC was grappling with the question of
whether it should ally with India’s colonial oppressor, London. In a
“confidential draft” the INC wrestled with the fact that the Empire was
“determined to maintain and intensify their imperialist hold and ex
ploitation of the Indian people.” How could Indians back London when
ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY 209
sentences and everything just like our Indian language.” The Japanese-
speaking Kesavan joined the “big crowd” that assembled “in our
streets” when Tojo arrived. He was also part of the throngs that greeted
Subhas Chandra Bose when he arrived in Singapore. It was raining and
Bose was offered an umbrella. Brushing it aside, he inquired, “Can you
provide [an] umbrella for all these people?” The crowd was visibly
moved by his altruism, as Bose switched effortlessly between English
and Hindi.
When asked if the Japanese had encouraged him to join the INA, he
was forthright: “No . . . no . . . no. Never. Never.” He was not alone, as
INA ranks were flooded with “engineers . . . and all professional
groups.” There was a “full cross-section” of the “Indian” population in
the INA, the “whole of India” was represented. “Nobody was con
cerned about the religious feelings of the others.” There were more
“Sikhs” than others but then “they formed the bulk of the [pre-occupa
tion] army.” “All” of his “relatives” joined, since, unlike the British, “We
felt a sense of dignity and freedom from the Japanese.”119
K. M. Rengarajoo, born in 1915, also recalled vividly that rainy rally
with Bose in Singapore. Sheets of precipitation were falling “but not a
single soul moved.” He too agreed that there were Indians from “all
walks of life,” including “a lot of wealthy Indians.” The “Indian Mus
lim” was “giving full support” too, though “they couldn’t get the ap
proval of the Japanese higher authority” to form a separate organiza
tion. The residence of Bose when he visited Singapore, at “Meyer Road
No. 61” became a veritable shrine, despite—or perhaps because of—his
fervent stand against the Empire.120
Narayana Karuppiah was born in India in 1925; he too joined the
INA and studied Japanese and was a devotee of Subhas Chandra Bose,
comparing him “equally” to “Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew . . . Had he
been alive, and had he reached India, Nehru would not [have] become
the Prime Minister. Definitely. [Nehru] would have been the Foreign
Minister.” When he met with Bose one day in Singapore, Bose advised
him to go to Tokyo for advanced training. He did so. But on the day he
arrived—a day on which Bose happened to be in town—the United
States bombed. “We surrounded him,” so that “even if there were any
bomb, the shrapnel wouldn’t [hit] him.” It did not and Bose went on to
address a rally of “thousands” in “Hibiya Park” in Tokyo.
Karuppiah was quick to point out that the INA training in Japan
was paid for by Indians themselves—”everything,” he insisted. Con-
ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY 211
trary to London’s claims, Japan “did not do anything, not even a single
cent for us.” At the military academy in Tokyo, there were also “stu
dents from Thailand, Burma, Manchuria, Machuko, Philippines, Singa
pore and Indians.”121
Despite the transparent reasons why Indians and others deserted
the Empire at its moment of need in Singapore, some Britishers had dif
ficulty coming to grips with this reality. Sir Henry Robert Moore
Brooke-Popham, writing from the safety of Australia in 1942, pointed to
the “low morale [of] Indian troops” as a “prime cause” of the “failure”
in Malaya. This, he snorted, was “due” to the “eastern races” being
“less able to withstand” the “strain” of “modern war.” On the other
hand, he thought that “special mention is due to [the] white population
for devotion to duty.”122
The Indian diaspora presented complications for the Empire be
yond the Malay peninsula. In 1943, a “confidential” message to the fu
ture Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, reported that although there were
only “2547 souls” among the “Indians in S. Rhodesia,” they still created
an “Indian problem.” The “set-aside [of] a residential area for the Asi
atic[s]” in one capital neighborhood was rejected by Europeans in
“Belvedere,” since the reserved area was too close for comfort.123 As in
southern Africa, a similar dilemma confronted the Empire in the South
Pacific. According to a New Zealand analyst, during the “Pacific War
when Europeans and [indigenous] Fijians supplied all possible man-
power against the Japanese, the Fijian Indian community did absolutely
nothing—only a handful of Indians engaged in non-combatant
units.”124
London had to be concerned about this growing estrangement and
disaffection within the broader Indian diaspora, particularly in Africa,
which provided tens of thousands of troops for the Empire. By early
1945 the Colonial Office was taking worried note of the “known atti
tude on racial relations of the white communities of the Union of South
Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya colony.” One clear reason was the
fierce opposition to this “attitude” by Indians who often faced discrim
ination in all three nations. “The Indians,” the Colonial Office said,
“have now come to regard the European communities from the Cape to
Ethiopia as a bloc endangering the Indians’ political welfare and other
interests.”125
Then there was nagging fear about the Indians of British China.
U.S. intelligence in a “restricted” report in 1944 anxiously noted that the
212 ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY
warping colonialism that they should align with the devil they knew,
rather than the one they didn’t.
Japanese propaganda stressed the obvious underdevelopment
brought about by London, telling the Gurkhas—whom the Empire re-
lied on heavily—that they were “merely a soldier slave” to the
British.134 Apparently such appeals were effective. A “secret” report re
vealed that “Gurkhas” were working with Japanese forces in northern
India.135 A BBC-directed “private and confidential” “Review of Japan
ese Broadcast Propaganda” noted that in the prewar era Japanese radio
broadcasts “in Hindi [were] one of the chief mouthpieces for the Indian
Independence movement.” The reviewers were struck by the fact that
“most evils of the Far East are attributed to capitalism and capitalism is
suggested regularly to listeners as a purely British and American sys
tem.” Just as some Europeans conflated opposition to the status quo
with communism, Tokyo—a capitalist nation for sure—often slyly con
flated the status quo with capitalism. In this way, Tokyo added its voice
to Moscow’s, at a time when the Great Depression was in full swing.
The old-time religion of anti–white supremacy rhetoric was not ab
sent either. As late as September 1940, Japanese broadcasts in Hindi
were reassuring Indian listeners that “Japan has no intention to subju
gate China but to free China from white domination.” Looking to the
future, Tokyo also sought to “devote considerable attention to reaching
child audiences overseas.”136 The effectiveness of this anti-London
propaganda became clear when the “Quit India” movement—consist
ing of huge strikes and the like—was launched against the British in the
midst of the war. In a “secret telegram,” London feared that it was
“originally timed to coincide with the end of the rains and the moment
most favourable for a Japanese attack on India.”137
The rhetoric emanating from the “All India Congress Committee”
routinely referred to the colonizers as the “usurper government.” What
about the real prospect of Japanese invaders, the Indians were repeat
edly asked? Should not the “Quit India” movement be postponed until
this threat had passed? This was in October 1942 when a Japanese in
vasion appeared imminent. But the AICC would not retreat. “Some
mealy-mouthed and chicken-hearted people,” it replied, “will, of
course, suggest that the fight for freedom in such a situation be given
up. . . . This is a council [sic] of despair and slavery.” To the contrary,
“there is greater reason for us to further intensify our fight for freedom
in the event of a new invasion.”138
ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY 215
out the formality of consulting Indian leaders or even the Indian legis
lature.” Quite naturally, he thought, they felt the Allies were fighting
“only for the benefit of the white races,” as Tokyo had long said. The In
dians fighting for the Empire were doing so for “purely mercenary” rea
sons. They suffered from “poor morale,” that was only exceeded by the
“attitude of the general public.” By May 1943 “lassitude and indiffer
ence and bitterness” had increased. Yet when Washington raised these
issues with London, it replied, “this is none of your business.” But the
United States was carrying the major burden of the war and saw little
reason not to question the Empire’s policies. Though the Empire may
have been oblivious, Roosevelt’s man detected growing “anti-white
sentiments of hundreds of millions.” The mighty “peoples of Asia”—
and he was “supported in this opinion by other diplomatic and military
observers”—had begun to “cynically regard this war as one between
fascist and imperialist powers.”146
Phillips’s words were reflected in increasing disillusionment in the
United States with the idea of Empire, stemming from the prospect of
losing India to a Japanese antagonist whose racial appeals were res
onating loudly throughout Asia. One of the major tragedies—no,
crimes—of the war took place in this pivotal year, 1943: the famine in
Bengal, which claimed the lives of tens of thousands. Anti-Empire sen
timent was strong in Bengal. It was “always a site of unrest” and the
famine had led to “much increased evidence of pro-Japanese sympathy
among the peasants who are said to be hopeful of a Japanese invasion
in the belief that the Japanese would bring them rice from Burma.”147
The famine did not quell pro-Tokyo sentiment in Bengal.
Phillips’s blistering condemnation of the Empire did not go down
well in London. It is unclear if this U.K. anger might have had anything
to do with the fact that “one of” his “confidential letters” to FDR was
leaked and disseminated in the press, along with the “equally mysteri
ous publication” of a “cable” from Delhi alleging that he was a “persona
non grata.”148 However that may be, Phillips’s views reflected a grow
ing consensus in the United States that the Empire, as constituted, was
unsustainable, and certainly should not be supported at the cost of U.S.
lives and resources.
The respected writer, Pearl Buck, was typical of this trend. India,
she told Eleanor Roosevelt, was “so filled with bitterness against the
English that we must look for revengeful massacres against all white
people on a scale much greater than have taken place in Malaya and
218 ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY
Burma. This I know.” U.S. troops in India, she predicted, “must be pre-
pared for a revenge which may fall upon them, too, only because they
are helping white men whom the Indians hate.” She considered her let
ter so explosive that she went to extraordinary lengths to insure that
only the Roosevelts read it. “I am typing it myself so that I have no copy.
Please destroy it when you are finished with it.” The president told his
spouse, “You can tell Pearl Buck that I have read her letter . . . with real
interest. I am keeping her letter in my files.”149
Washington promptly embarked on a massive counteroffensive
both to distinguish itself from London and to present its best face to
Asians, particularly Indians. The president was told in the spring of
1942 that Japanese American troops should be sent to “strategic ports of
India” for “counter-propaganda” against Tokyo and its Indian allies.
This would be more effective than an “Anglo-Saxon appeal.”150
Of course, U.S. criticism of the Empire was not new, considering
that it was born in revolt against London. A quarter of a century before
the Pacific War, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan had written,
“British rule in India is far worse, far more burdensome to the people,
and far more unjust . . . than I had supposed.”151 But the hothouse of war
had exacerbated tensions.
It was not only the Empire’s inflexibility on the “color bar” abroad
that disappointed Washington. There was even greater concern about
the “effect of the sterling bloc on Anglo-American-Indian relations,” as
a “serious source of Anglo-American-Indian friction.”152 This was good
for Britain, bad for the United States. Nor was this closed system of
trade and currency good for the colonies either—here the interests of
these colonies and Washington and, ironically, Tokyo converged, for de
stroying “preference” was an aim shared by the United States, Japan,
and India. As it stood, the Empire was in dire need of radical reform,
particularly in the financial realm.
Thus, through means subtle and blunt, the United States acceler
ated the delicate process of disentangling itself from its erstwhile ally,
Britain. Early in 1944 an aide to FDR was preparing a statement for him
on Japan. “The words ‘Japanese-occupied’ should be substituted for the
word ‘colonial’ since the expression ‘colonial territory’ would be offen
sive to the Burmese and play into the hands of the Japanese Propaganda
Ministry.” Suggesting that Japan be expelled from colonial territory, in
other words, might imply the return of the much despised British, inti
mation of which would be a propaganda coup for Tokyo.153
ASIANS VERSUS WHITE SUPREMACY 219
O F T H E N E A R LY F I V E H U N D R E D T H O U S A N D M E N in the U.S.
army in 1940, only forty-seven hundred were Negroes, all serving in
segregated units. Black officers could be counted on one hand—three
chaplains, a colonel, and a captain. The navy allowed Negroes to enlist
only as messmen. The marines and the air corps excluded Negroes com
pletely. In the most notorious example of this system of racism, blood
stored for the wounded was also segregated.1 Negroes were largely ex
cluded from the naval training academy at Annapolis, Maryland. The
“Bureau of Naval Personnel believed that ‘the Negroes’ relative unfa
miliarity with the sea’ gave them a ‘consequent fear of water.’”2 Conve
niently this also fed into stereotypes about Negroes’ alleged unfamil
iarity with bathing and the resultant odors they were said to emit.
This was not the optimal armed force with which the United States
would be forced to engage Japan in a “race war.” If nothing else, it al
lowed Tokyo to make special appeals to those Negroes who would have
to be conscripted and dragooned in order to meet this unique challenge.
U.S. national security could be severely threatened. Closing the racial
gap between black and white was, as a consequence, not a matter of
benevolent and idealistic altruism but that of tough-minded and hard-
headed calculation.
Thus, “the largest number of black POWs were located in the
Philippines. There were twenty among the more than two thousand
POWS from the Los Banos camp. . . . Freed black prisoners told how
they were offered better treatment by the Japanese in exchange for co
operation in an anti-white campaign.”3 Even before their capture,
Negro troops seemed to be favored. When a “troop transport being
fired upon by Japanese was found to contain Negroes . . . Thereupon the
Japanese ceased their firing and took the Negroes aboard the ship.” The
FBI, known to pamper white supremacists, conceded angrily that the
220
RACE AT WAR 221
you. The soldier is advised to meet with the native, but as an adult with
a child. Don’t forget to maintain your position or pose of superiority
even if you sometimes have doubts about it.”8 Even the antifascist
Asian could be excused for concluding that this pamphlet was no more
than a recruiting broadside for Tokyo.
Walter White could only confess to the “bewilderment . . . created
throughout the Pacific . . . by the prejudice of some American white sol
diers” and their “attempt” to “spread race hatred.”9 He recalled en-
countering a white soldier from Mississippi “playing with a group of
dark-skinned children” in Guam. White asked him if he would do the
same at home and was told, “These kids are not niggers.”10
Such episodes were not conducive to the military’s morale or Ne
groes’ fighting spirit. In “Dutch New Guinea” there were complaints
that Negro soldiers did not want to fight the Japanese, cutting and run
ning when they appeared. White investigated and was hesitant to help
those who were skeptical of Negroes’ ability to hold their own on the
battlefield. Still, he conceded reluctantly that some Negroes were
“breaking under fire, retreating to safety.”11 The alleged unreliability of
Negro troops—a highly sensitive matter—was of great concern to Sec
retary of War Henry L. Stimson.12
Reports trickling in from the South Pacific confirmed White’s per
ception that Negro troops were not altogether enthusiastic about the
war they were fighting. The “commanding general” of the “93rd in
fantry division” was told that there was a “marked resentment of vari
ous kinds” among the men. “Some resent being in the war at all. They
say it is a white man’s war and when things are over the Negroes at
home will be worse off than before.”13 A Negro soldier in the dreary
forests and mountains of “Dutch New Guinea” may have been the au
thor of those encapsulating words of the black experience during the
Pacific War: “Just carve on my tombstone, ‘here lies a black man killed
fighting a yellow man for the protection of the white man.’”
To be fair, Negroes were not the only ones with grave doubts about
the Pacific War. A Native American said of his people, “They feel that
this country was taken away from them by white men and for that rea
son they should not now be required to help in case of invasion or at-
tack.” A Native American soldier recounted that “In Okinawa . . . I was
almost shot by soldiers on my own side who mistook me for the enemy
when I came out of a cave. One of my white buddies came out just in
RACE AT WAR 223
time to save me.” One of his so-called comrades shouted at him, “Get
out of there, you damn Jap [sic]!”14
Goaded and prompted, the United States took extraordinary meas
ures to combat a white supremacy that previously had been accepted as
virtually god-given. Special antiracist films were made, and pamphlets
intended to indoctrinate soldiers in the new and developing antiracist
consensus were made obligatory by the press of war.15
The Japanese were not standing still as the United States moved to
reform its centuries-long policies on “race.” A Japanese prisoner of war
captured in the Philippines began to read material that would later be
characterized as “Afrocentric.” He was taken by the points made about
the “racial superiority of blacks” though he could not “readily agree
with this fanatical author, but belonging as I do to a race that the world
regards as second class, I applaud his frontal attack on racial prejudice.
No doubt it was because of the damage my own racial self-esteem had
suffered that I was so drawn to pictures of blacks in the magazines I
read.” He became even more sympathetic toward Negroes when he
saw how Negro prisoners were treated by the Euro-Americans they en-
countered. He asked a Euro-American guard what he thought of his
compatriots, Negroes. “Niggers are cowards in combat,” the guard
snarled, “and I’m betting we’ll have all kinds of trouble with ‘em once
this war is over because we buttered them up so much in the services.”
He was struck by the stark contrasts between the two groups of U.S. cit
izens, for at the camp Negroes “whatever their status, the manner in
which they went mutely about their work with their eyes to the ground
contrasted sharply with the free and easy manner of the white men I
had seen. In essence,” he concluded sadly, in a chilling reminder of the
fate he thought he had eluded by waging war, “they still acted like
slaves.”16
But it would take more than antiracism on paper and celluloid to
reverse centuries of white supremacy. In the spring of 1944 as the war
dragged on, Brigadier General Leonard Russell Boyd who had over-
sight of Negro troops in the South Pacific, conceded that the very struc
ture of racial segregation hampered unit cohesion and battlefield readi
ness. “Our officer problems are multiplied by having mixed white and
Negro officers in the same companies; however, we never place whites
under colored officers in accordance with directed policy.” But just as
the irreligious often discovered the deity as bullets whizzed past their
224 RACE AT WAR
heads, General Boyd found that “racial problems are no problem dur
ing actual combat. Here we have died-in-the-wool southerners sleep
ing in the same 2-man foxhole with colored officers and there is no fric
tion.”17
General Boyd may have been overoptimistic, for throughout the
war there were sharp interracial tensions in the military. At times those
“2-man foxholes” were a picture of mortal combat—though Japan was
not the target. Not atypical was a riot that rocked a naval ammunitions
depot in June 1943. The following month more than seven hundred Ne
groes of the 80th Construction Battalion staged a protest over segrega
tion aboard the transport that was carrying them to their duty station in
the Caribbean, where they would have encountered further antipathy
toward the Empire. Guam, a frequent site of battles with Japan, was also
a site of frequent conflict between “white marines and black sailors . . .
over relations with local women. . . . Sailors began to arm themselves il
licitly with rifles and knives,”18 as the Japanese adversary sat back con
tentedly.
But Japan knew that the racial segregation practiced so assiduously
by its adversaries was like adding a fully armed battalion to Tokyo’s al
ready well-armed forces. It kept close tabs on the subject, methodically
filing documentation on “influential Negro Leaders today” (Du Bois
was listed as an “intellectual leader”), “important Negro publica
tions,”19 “discrimination against colored seamen,” and information on
the “Double V” campaign against fascism abroad and at home spear-
headed by the black press. Details on black troops were collected as
well, including the names and ranks of officers, along with the racial
breakdown of various U.S. states—information that might prove help
ful in case the mainland had to be invaded. Tokyo also kept records
about the sizable and growing black population of Liverpool. Tokyo
had data on Negro illiteracy, death rates, occupational status, educa
tion, and population. Tokyo took note of an editorial underscoring that
“examples of race discrimination in the U.S. are being used by Axis
radio propaganda to weaken the will of Negro troops . . . in the South-
west Pacific and Africa.” No doubt Japanese leaders were happy to see
their radio broadcasts being cited in the U.S. press, for example, when
they told their listeners “[FDR] stated recently that he was against race
discrimination. One might ask the President why he was segregating
Negroes.”20
RACE AT WAR 225
The United Kingdom faced a racial dilemma no less daunting than that
of the United States. It may even have been more so, for it had to defend
territory—such as India and Burma—with tens of thousands of African
and Afro-Caribbean troops, not to mention indigenous people often
hostile to John Bull. Moreover, it faced the unique challenge presented
by Marcus Garvey’s Pan-Africanism, which sought to organize the col
onized against London. Even before Garvey’s rise, London had been
monitoring trans-African threats. Hence, in 1913 London kept a close
eye on “Alfred C. Sams” who then was in Oklahoma but claimed to hail
from the “Gold Coast;” a British colony. He was “inducing Negroes”
there to “emigrate” to Africa, which London found disquieting.46
But the bête noire in London’s eyes was Garvey himself. He was
under tight surveillance. In 1926 an experienced colonial hand reported
in a “confidential” dispatch that “from my experience in the Political In
telligence Department . . . and in Malaya, I do not feel easy in my mind
as to the results of the arrival of this fanatical Negro agitator in Ja
maica.”47 Both the British Consul General in New York and the Embassy
in Washington were informed earlier of the “large meeting of Negroes”
in Manhattan where the “fanatical Negro agitator” “spoke at length on
the Indian situation.” That these cables were forwarded to the Prime
Minister—and the King himself—shows how concerned London was.48
The Empire, which had truly global responsibilities, had representa
tives who had served in Asia and Africa and drew upon their experi
ences in the one to shape their response in the other. In turn, their “sub
jects” often sought to join hands across the oceans.
In 1928 after Garvey had been unceremoniously deported from the
United States to Jamaica, British officials there continued to keep a
watchful eye upon him. They considered their communications sensi
tive: “This ought to be a secret despatch,” began one message, since “I
RACE AT WAR 229
Japan’s rise to power for the illogic of white supremacy, and suspected
that these powers were itching for an opportunity to defeat it. Equally,
if not more important, Tokyo hesitated to offend its anticommunist soul
mate in Rome and therefore backed down from its brief defense of
Ethiopian sovereignty, to the dismay of Pan-Africanists worldwide.59
Tokyo’s retreat did not dampen the enthusiasm of many blacks
globally for Japan, a power that appeared to defy white supremacy. U.S.
intelligence remained ever alert to this reality. Islam had established an
important foothold in North America with the advent of the organiza
tion that became known as the Nation of Islam. Islam itself had been in
existence for more than a millennium and in its orthodox form was
dominant in large swathes of Africa and adjacent regions. Japan, said
U.S. officials, “is in an unequaled position to capture [the] goodwill” of
Muslims globally and had “met with signal success in the pursuance of
this program.” Islam, it was said, is “outspokenly democratic, untrou
bled by racial and social bias. A Negro from Nigeria, for example, has
served as the Chief of the General Staff of Ibn Saud, the most powerful
personality of modern Arabia.” The “acute nationalism” of the Islamic
world was “directed necessarily against western imperialists,” which
has “made all westerners suspect if not invariably unpopular.” Tokyo
was “persistent in broadcasting their anti-western policy to the Mus
lims in proclaiming their pride as members of the Asiatic or ‘colored’
front.” Its “anticommunist policy” was also “gratifying” to Muslims, it
was reported. Japan proclaimed that there were parallels between
Shinto and Islam and promoted an “ominous alliance between fanatical
Japanese patriotism and Muslim ethno-religious fanaticism,” that is, a
“dazzling promise of ‘Japanislam’ [sic].”
In pursuit of its ambitions, Japan was distributing scholarships to
students. Some prominent Japanese had even gone so far as to convert
to Islam. In strategically situated Afghanistan—a dagger pointed at the
Empire’s heart in India—”Japan” had deftly “been able to capitalize on
four fears: of Russia, communism, England and the Hindu Congress
Party.” The guileful Nipponese were said to preach an anti-Hindu mes
sage in Kabul and a pro-Hindu message in Delhi. Now, worried U.S. in
telligence analysts, the same model that had worked so well for Japan
in the Islamic world was being exported to Latin America, a heavily
Catholic region with a modicum of blacks. In one propaganda broad-
cast Tokyo was said to have asserted that the “Bible has now become the
Book of the Japanese,” a “new translation of the Old Testament by
RACE AT WAR 233
Japanese scholars” was “well under way.” “Is the Islamic venture to
branch off into a Catholic policy?” the U.S. authorities asked anxiously.
What was to be done? Creative officials noted with satisfaction that “in
the Near East and the Balkans much can be made of Japanese hostility
toward whites.” In other places, such as Kabul and Delhi, Japan had
tried to be all things to all people. Nothing was said about undermining
white supremacy as a necessary condition to eroding Japan’s appeal.60
By the time Hong Kong was seized, Whitehall may have wished it
had been less stubborn on the racial front. Frankie Zung would have
been defined as a Negro in the United States. According to the writer
Emily Hahn, “his face was memorable because you don’t see many Ne
groid faces in the Far East. Mr. Zung was only half Negro (or rather half
West Indian; he insisted on the distinction) but it showed up in his fea
tures and coloring far more than did his Chinese half.” Yet, there he
was, in Japanese occupied Hong Kong, collaborating energetically
against his ostensible sovereign, London. Why? “The Japanese,” he told
Hahn, “liked any colored person in the world, anyone at all, as long as
he wasn’t white. They made big promises to all the colored races. . . .
Africa and everywhere else.” Zung was married to a Euro-American
but because the occupiers were “so delighted over a white woman mar
rying a Negro”—a potential capital offense in North America—”they
freed her without any argument. . . . She was a blonde . . . very blond.”
As Hahn and Zung strolled through the battered streets of what
had once been described as the “Pearl of the Orient,” “people didn’t
look surprised at seeing us together, as they would have before the
war.” Hahn herself confessed that before the war “if I had noticed Zung
walking with his blond wife, I would have been amazed.” With grudg
ing reluctance, Hahn—who had escaped internment herself because of
the occupiers’ pleasure at her own previous intimacies with a Chinese
man—argued that in Hong Kong “the Japanese have certainly suc
ceeded in wiping out the color bar.” The “Peak,” the neighborhood pre
viously reserved for those of “pure European descent,” was now home
to the likes of Frankie Zung. Turnabout was fair play, thought Hahn.
“The British were cruel with their color distinctions and now they are
being treated in the same way, dosed with their own medicine. It is just.
It is only fair that I, an American white woman, should be wearing
wooden clogs while Mrs. Zung has new patent leather shoes. . . . ‘That’s
our weakness,’ I mused. ‘That’s the big drawback to our winning this
war. We’ll win but we’ll still be up against the color bar and all the
234 RACE AT WAR
resentment it stirs up. The Japs [sic] had a chance,’” she reflected per
ceptively, with their “Asia for the Asiatics” line. “It sounds well. They
missed the boat, but they’ve got a head start with people like Zung.”61
It was to eliminate this “head start” that Britain belatedly gave up
the more egregious aspects of white supremacy. But it was not easy; it
was wrenching and required old thought patterns to be changed. For
tunately for him Anthony Hewitt did not bump into Frankie Zung
when he had his nerve-racking escape from the clutches of the occu
piers. Instead, as he surreptitiously crossed China he encountered Percy
Davis, yet another “Jamaican-Chinese half Negro born in the West In-
dies. . . . exceptionally tall . . . with strong wide shoulders and features
more Negroid than Asian.” He had a head of full “black and curly hair.”
Davis “used to own the World Radio Company in Kowloon,” in Hong
Kong but was now leading the resistance against the Japanese just
across the border. His brother, Lee, was a “Communist guerilla.” Ac
cording to Ah Ting, another Red fighter, Percy Davis was a top Red
“leader” himself, “the chairman here, the big man . . . the big boss.”62
Percy Davis’s fight against Japan was typical of many in the Empire
who overcame their doubts and threw in their lot with London in hope
of a better day. Billy Strachan was in the same category. Born in 1921 in
Kingston, Jamaica, when war clouds loomed he sought to be a pilot for
the Royal Air Force. But he remembered his home, where “there was an
elite group of white men from Britain who headed all government or
ganizations.” This “small group . . . ran the country with a dictatorial
rod. They lived in ultra-luxury” in “vast great houses with a number of
servants” dressed as if they had stepped out from the set of the televi
sion program “Upstairs, Downstairs.” There was “no free education”
and at his school “the whites were so rich and so arrogant they didn’t
care about the blacks.” All in all, there was “terrific racism.”
But even so, he wasn’t prepared for his experience in the United
Kingdom itself where he went to train as a pilot in order to save the Em
pire that had been so unkind to him. There had been a “mass recruit
ment of West Indians . . . in 1943” and the more that arrived, the more
intense was the racism. He had “never been called darkie . . . before”
this. He was terribly “annoyed” by the “animosity and jealousy” he
faced, which was ironic thanks given the sacrifice he offered.63
This “mass recruitment” was unenthusiastically received in certain
quarters of Strachan’s homeland. George Powe recalled that in
Kingston on “every corner you went people would discuss and talk
RACE AT WAR 235
about the War and many people said that they would not fight for
Britain because Britain had enslaved us for a number of years and so
on.” Still irate years after the war had ended, Powe added angrily,
“Show me a black serviceman who claimed not to have encountered
any prejudice in the U.K. during the war and I’ll show you a liar!”64
Powe’s anger was understandable. In June 1944, as the invasion of
Normandy signaled a new phase in the conflict, Sir Frederick Leggett
was instructed that “the better dance halls in Liverpool are still closed
to the West Indians and feelings of bitterness increase because nothing
appears to be happening.”65 Thus, at “Reece’s dance hall in Liverpool,
the manager has frankly explained that he imposed a ban of coloured
persons because white American officers who used the hall objected to
the presence of coloured people on the dance floor.”66 One angry Yank
had bolted from one club muttering, “I would not have a bloody drink
under the same bloody roof as any bloody nigger.”67 Sir George Gater
was instructed that “the colour bar difficulties on Merseyside and at
Manchester, which have been stirred up by the Americans are seriously
affecting the well-being and social life of the West Indian technicians
and trainees.”68
To be sure, blacks and whites from the United States had exported
their penchant for marathon brawling to the United Kingdom. Even as
the war was winding down in 1945, there was yet another “report on [a]
disturbance between American personnel and coloured members” of a
club. Just before midnight one summer’s day, Lawrence Silver, a Negro,
said that one of his colleagues, who was white, said, “Look, there’s a f—
-king nigger there.” The response to this call was predictable: “let’s go
beat him up,” several people said, referring to the now startled Silver.
However, Silver collected himself, ignored and evaded the gathering
mob, and “continued on his way to the Coloured Colonial Social Club.”
Here he gathered his own retinue of “thirty or forty” comrades and re-
turned to thrash his interlocutors soundly.69
On the other hand, people like Billy Strachan who wanted to fight
Japan were perversely “lucky” in that London was not opposed to re-
fusing the aid of Jamaicans like him. This was the dilemma faced by Leo
March. In September 1939, as war was erupting, he offered his services
to the Empire: “I am a fully qualified dental surgeon, trained at the
Royal Dental Hospital of London,” he began. He wished to join the RAF
(Royal Air Force). “Although I was a British subject and fully qualified
for the position I could not be selected as I was not of pure European
236 RACE AT WAR
stand the strains of a long war.” In early 1945 the report worried that
“there is no remedy except victory within the next few months.” It did
not consider extending equal pay for equal work.97
Africans had also been sent to Palestine, where Jews and Arabs
were jockeying intensely for position in an exceedingly tense environ
ment in anticipation of a British withdrawal. The British decided that
the “Basuto troops . . . cannot be relied upon in the present emergency,”
for “any moment now” they “may go on strike.” “These troops are now
a liability not an asset.” Somehow the Basuto had got the idea that they
were “being exploited because they are Africans. . . . This idea is be-
coming more and more deeply rooted and no arguments will change
these ideas.” They had become “useless as a defence against any but
casual individual thieves.”98 Thus, the crisis in the Middle East that
was to bedevil the prospects for peace for generations to come was ex-
acerbated in part by the increasingly discredited policy of white su
premacy.
The rebelliousness of the Basuto was not the only African problem
that faced London. In a “confidential” report in early 1945 the military
grappled with the “difficulty” presented by the “growing claim to
equality irrespective of race on the part of Africans. . . . The situation is
that when in contact with the enemy, British and Africans . . . work to
gether admirably and on equal terms. When such a unit is withdrawn
for rest, the Africans expect to remain on equal terms with their British
comrades, while the latter naturally prefer to exclude them from their
billets, canteens and entertainments. There results a feeling of unfair
discrimination and colour bar prejudice.”99
London was asking Africans to sacrifice their lives perhaps for the
Empire. Africans, in turn, demanded a modicum of respect. The British
“were warned that the Bechuana” of Southern Africa “would take of-
fence if they were sworn at, or if they were called ‘blacks’ or ‘niggers,’”
but these old habits died hard. Thus, Africans were “suspicious and dis
trustful” of the British. Moreover, they had seen the British up close and
now saw their frailties, which shattered the Empire’s image of total and
awe-inspiring superiority. In “two years,” the Africans “had seen a
great deal of the White Man at close range and they had lost much of
their respect for him.” Not only that, they saw that not all Europeans
resided in majestic grandeur—”in Sicily and Italy they found white
people living in poverty and filth”—which also reduced the prestige of
an Empire based not only on English, but British and white supremacy
242 RACE AT WAR
as well. “Here also the Africans for the first time resorted to white pros
titutes and this must have destroyed much of the white man’s prestige
in their eyes. . . . Obviously they felt there is not much difference be-
tween us and the white man after all.”100
How true. But what did this mean for the long-term prospects for
the Empire, not to mention the immediate task of fighting a protracted
war? Not surprisingly, by mid-1944 a “top secret” report observed that
“generally” among many of the African troops “there has been a defi
nite decline in morale. . . . they are tired.” This was the result of the ten
sion between upholding white supremacy on the one hand and fighting
a war ostensibly premised on democracy on the other. But London ex
plained it as a result of the fact that the African “has not the education
nor the outlook on the war and its issues which help the European to
overcome this war weariness.”101
Both Africans and British had to grapple with the spectacle of Ital
ian prisoners of war making artificial limbs in West Africa for wounded
African soldiers. It was hard for Africans to continue to see “whites” as
a cut above them while interned and subordinated Italians in Africa
were being compelled to labor on behalf of Africans.102
London was sensitive to the issue. In Nairobi, Kenya, there were
separate facilities for “coloured prisoners” and “the German POW,”
who—as a further reminder of their subordinate status—were “accom
modated in the female section.” Colonial officials were quick to point
out that the Germans were “entirely shut off from the other Prisoners’
quarters,” thus preventing Africans from seeing subordinated “whites”
in Africa. Moreover, London avoided placing Africans among Euro
peans—even if the latter were a foe. Thus, the point was made force-
fully that “at no time were these men ever mixed up with coloured
criminals.”103
Similarly, in Jamaica colonial officials were sensitive to the “se
rious objections to use of coloured troops for guarding German
civilian internment camps.” Reluctantly they conceded that it was
“not possible to provide other troops for the purpose.” Though the
Foreign Office “strongly opposed the use of coloured troops as
guards,” racial sensitivities had to be ignored. Why? As noted, it
was a problem to secure “other troops” for this task, but there was
also a sort of “mutually assured destruction” between prevailing
racial biases and this was a line that London hesitated to cross. That
is, the British feared that the Germans might have the presumed in-
RACE AT WAR 243
The Pacific War precipitated a massive crisis for white supremacy. The
mighty Empire was reduced to asserting that “it has become abun
dantly clear that the [Africans] are exploding the myth established by
the Japs [sic] during the original conquest of Burma that they are un
surpassed as jungle fighters.”107 The powerful proponents of white su
premacy had sunk to the point where they were extolling the might of
allegedly inferior Africans to undermine the idea of superiority of
Japanese fighters over Europeans. The message to the Africans was
clear: if they were so mighty, why were they languishing under colonial
rule, supervised by Europeans apparently unable to fight their own bat
tles? If British troops were taking flight in the jungles of Burma pursued
by smaller Japanese, why should they react any differently if con-
fronted by Africans?
This thought had crossed the mind of white supremacists. “One
Rhodesian analyst worried that the war—which forced Salisbury to
train Africans as welders, drivers and the like, who perforce saw the
world along with the Rhodesian troops they accompanied—was the
biggest challenge to colonialism since the end of the slave trade.” Still
another Rhodesian worried that “the prestige of white man depends
(whatever the politicians may think) largely on the ability to do things
better than the black man,” and this “prestige” was shaken profoundly
by the war.108
244 RACE AT WAR
It was easy to see why the racist regime of Rhodesia would be ap
prehensive about the war. The Empire came perilously close to being
vanquished in Asia and probably would have been but for the fact that
up to “100,000 West Africans” served in the “SE Asia and India Com
mands” (this did not include the many thousands from East and South-
ern Africa who served similarly). West Africa had “the largest colonial
force in the world fighting overseas and by far the greatest portion of it”
was in the critical battlegrounds of “Burma or Assam.” In some in-
stances their numbers and contributions outweighed those of the
British.109 All told, “167,000 soldiers”110 from Sierra Leone, Gold Coast,
Nigeria, and the Gambia alone fought for London. Despite their mas
sive effort on behalf of the Empire and the Allies, as Lt. J. A. L. Hamil
ton pointed out, they received “little publicity” in official and memoir
accounts.111 After the war ended, London seemed to want to downplay
their contribution for fear that it might provide a rationale for anticolo
nial activities.
At the moment of the most intense combat, however, the Empire
did not stint in its praise for the Africans. One analyst, for example,
complimented the West Africans for their mettle at the crucial battle of
Imphal.112 In a “most secret” report in 1942 “Downing Street” wrote that
“West African toops should be sent to the Far East for employment in
jungle warfare.”113 British officials in India agreed, adding that the “ad-
vantage of West African troops” in Burma “is that they are used to jun
gle,” while “East African troops are at present highly mechanized and
not so used to jungle.” Both “East and West African troops” had “fought
well in . . . Africa operations and should be able to compete with Japan
ese.”114
Despite their contribution to the survival of the Empire, these brave
soldiers often had to contend with harassment and insult. The official
publication of the East African Command included insulting, stereo-
typical drawings of Africans—combined with racially insensitive at-
tacks on the Japanese—and the usual incongruous rhetoric about fight
ing for freedom and democracy.115 Traveling from West Africa to India,
a number of African soldiers “escorted by a European officer” stopped
in Durban. As Captain P. B. Poore recalled it, the Africans “could not
read” and therefore “sat on ‘white only’ seats and totally ignored the
segregation laws.” However, the British chose to ignore this flagrant vi
olation of racial norms, aware as they were of the ongoing war and the
Africans’ contribution. Captain Poore was also sensitive to the issue. “I
RACE AT WAR 245
Atlantic Charter and the other lofty documents that supposedly were
driving the Allies’ war effort.
Often shoeless, despised at every turn, no more than cannon fodder
for their alleged “betters,” African troops had reason to be in ill-humor,
if not mutinous. After “13,000 African troops” were “repatriated from
France” and were about to be demobilized” in West Africa, “trouble”
began. It was late 1944 and “these men had been prisoners of war in
France up to the time of liberation.” “Several French women” were re
portedly “molested by” them. “Arms were smuggled ashore and they
were in possession of large sums of money”—or at least “large” com
pared to the meager sums they usually had. “They were in an uproar,
they “mutinied,” and this was a “serious” matter.130
Speaking of the French, despite their dismal colonial record,
Colonel F. K. Theobald of the British military felt that even Paris did a
better job than his own country. A number of the Togolese, he recalled,
“had been taught the language,” that is, French, whereas those of the
neighboring Gold Coast spoke a pidgin English that was hardly intelli
gible to most English speakers.131 More than a half-century after the war
had ended, Bakary Dibba of the Gambia still recalled vividly the dearth
of enthusiasm in his village. At one rally to drum up interest “there was
no volunteer” so they “started to use force. . . . When they saw you, they
would just grip you and take you.” He was put aboard a ship bound for
India, but all was not lost for it was there that “young men from differ
ent ethnic groups worked together for the first time for a common
cause.” This was a useful rehearsal for the anticolonial struggle that was
to follow after the war. But Mr. Dibba concluded by reflecting gravely
on why he had fought. “They’re the same,” he said, “the British, the
Japanese; they were fighting all for the same thing—sovereignty. . . . I
don’t regret fighting for the colonial masters. But at the end of the day,
they are all the same.” There was no difference—at least for Africans—
between fighting for the British Empire or the Japanese Empire, or so he
said.132
Meanwhile, Robert B. Hammond, a missionary born in Hong Kong,
had endured a traumatizing captivity at the hands of the Japanese dur
ing the war, but managed an early departure in 1942. When he landed
in freedom in East Africa, Mozambique, after a lengthy cruise from
China, he was visibly moved. “Such love, such wondrous love that God
should love us and give His Son to die for us that whosoever believeth
250 RACE AT WAR
on Him should not perish but have everlasting life! This includes the
Africans too!” he added generously.133 Perhaps the “black pilot” from
the United States whose plane crashed as he was attacking Hong Kong
in an attempt to free the likes of Hammond, then “was dragged behind
a lorry through Kowloon until he died,” would have understood this
comment all too well.134
10
Race World
251
252 RACE WORLD
of his many visits to Japan, “If there were Europeans here tonight . . .
they would not be able to tell the Chinese from the Japanese.”1
In fact, “in the first decade of the twentieth century, tens of thou-
sands of Chinese youth sought a modern education in Japan,” at a time
when they were few and far between in the United States and the
United Kingdom.2 In 1905, “buoyed by Japanese success against Russia
and angered by American mistreatment of Chinese immigrants, Chi
nese students, some [just] returned from study in Japan, organized an
anti-American boycott, arguably the first sustained nationalist move
ment in Chinese history.”3 At that conjuncture, in the aftermath of
Japan’s victory over Russia, Tokyo “occupied in the regard of the Asi
atic revolutionaries the place later held by Moscow.”4 As a young trav
eler, Sun often masqueraded as Japanese to avoid harassment, for, as he
put it, “when the Japanese began to be treated with more respect, I had
no trouble in passing. . . . I owe a great deal to this circumstance, as oth
erwise I would not have escaped many dangerous situations.”5
When the Japanese authorities were tried as war criminals after
1945, they sought refuge in their relationships with the colored, partic
ularly Sun. According to Yasaburo Shimonaka, Japan founded the
“Greater East Association” which was “based upon the following arti
cles: blood is thicker than water; China and Japan are brother coun
tries.” All this was motivated, he argued, by Sun Yat-sen. “Sun Yat-Sen
was the origin of this principle and Matsui was the echo.”6 Kumaichi
Yamamoto, former Japanese Ambassador to Thailand, argued that the
concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Pan-Asianism,
and all the rest all came from Sun.7 But these ideas were rejected.
One Soviet writer also pointed to “close ties between the Black
Dragon and . . . Sun Yat-sen. For many years he collaborated with the
Black Dragon Society. . . . Sun Yat-sen as well as the Black Dragon [So
ciety] aimed at driving all Europeans and Americans out of Asia. In all
biographies of Sun Yat-sen written for Europeans and Americans, this
aim was usually disguised. To him, however, it was a guiding princi
ple.” Indeed, argues this analyst, by the time of his death Sun was not
only allying with Tokyo but also with Moscow in common opposition
to the British Empire and the United States.8
Sun was not alone among the Chinese in being influenced by
Tokyo, however. Rebecca E. Karl points out that early-twentieth-cen
tury rhetoric in China on race could have been lifted wholly from then
reigning discourses in Japan. “In the numerous essays on events in the
RACE WORLD 253
Allies when the Pacific War began. Lee Yiu Wa argues that London—not
Tokyo—became the “main target” of Chinese nationalism after World
War I.14 White supremacy served as midwife to this incipient birth of
Japanese-Chinese friendship, for at Versailles “on only one issue de-
bated . . . were the Chinese and Japanese delegates of one mind, and
that was the proposal to amend the League of Nations covenant so as to
recognize racial equality.”15 Just as the construction of “whiteness”
elided differences between and among the English, Irish, Scotch, and
Welsh, Japan’s racial appeal allowed tensions between and among them
and other Asians, particularly the Chinese, to be minimized: dialecti
cally, “whiteness” and white supremacy fed into Japan’s own effort at
racial construction.
The animus toward London was fueled in part by the way the Chi
nese were treated in the United Kingdom. They were barred from the
seamen’s union, for example. Britons went so far as to treat “black im
migrants and sailors much better than they treated Asians” generally.16
Like other “coloureds,” these seamen “did not regard the war as in any
way “theirs.’” In fact, one scholarly study has concluded that “the body
of evidence upon which this study is based offers little support for the
theory of World War II as a people’s war, indeed it points to the contrary
conclusion.”17 Thus, it should have come as no surprise to the Empire
when those who saw themselves as heirs to Sun—Chiang Kai-Shek and
the Kuomintang (KMT)—in the prewar period leaned toward Tokyo,
even as it was nudging, then shoving, the Empire. On the other hand,
one must not underestimate the profound disappointment of those Chi
nese who looked admiringly toward Tokyo, when it became clear that
Japanese imperialism was no savior.18
On the whole, pro-Tokyo sentiment was driven not only by Chinese
anticommunism—which, after all, was shared by London—but also by
antipathy toward white supremacy. Chiang, who spoke Japanese and
had undergone military training there as well, had also expressed an
early interest in Germany, where he also considered doing some train
ing, “published articles on German military practice,” and “studied the
German language.” Thus, “from 1928 to 1938 Chang kai-Shek’s [sic]
government had closer relations with Germany than with any other for
eign power.” There were obvious contradictions in this alliance; Chiang
objected to Germany’s ban on “mixed marriage” which he deemed a
“betrayal.”19
RACE WORLD 255
During a good deal of the Pacific War,33 “the fighting between the
Chinese and the Japanese in parts of the interior was by now quite half-
hearted.” Leading KMT forces were using “American resources to fight
the Reds instead of the Japanese”—a move that Tokyo heartily sup
ported—while since early 1942 top KMT leaders “had been in regular
secret radio contact with Zhou Fohai,” a key Wang supporter in Shang
hai. After the war, Zhou was not tried as a traitor but instead became a
key figure in the Chiang regime. There was a “widely rumored story
that what Wang . . . did was done with the tacit approval of Chiang . . .
all along.”34 Many senior British officials felt that there was a “‘virtu-
ally undeclared peace’ between the Chinese government and the
Japanese invaders.”35 The Nationalists’ attempt to “drive a wedge be-
tween Britain and the U.S.” also seemed to be designed to give Japan a
boost.36
“Many Chinese generals (42 in 1943 alone) went over to [Japan] tak
ing hundreds of thousands of their troops with them.” London had al
lied with Tokyo in the prewar era, which facilitated Japan’s appeal to
Chinese elites. Thus, in the prewar era the British press in Shanghai
tended to be more pro-Tokyo than the U.S. news media. In the prewar
era, Tokyo and London collaborated in “repressing resistance activities
by citizens of China.”37
On this score, certain U.S. elites were in accord with the Empire. “In
public, President Hoover denounced the Japanese takeover [of China],
but he supported it in private.”38 As late as 1935, the publishing empire
of Henry Luce implied that the KMT “in alliance with Japan, might cre
ate a progressive new order in the Far East. TIME [magazine] saw the
Japanese Army as a bulwark against Russia and Communism.”39
As they examined their intelligence files during the war, the Empire
found confirmation for its suspicions that the KMT and other national
ists had decided not to sever relations with Japan. This was not alto
gether unexpected since nationalist Negroes, Maoris, Aborigines, Indi
ans, and others had either an open or veiled affection for Tokyo—so
why not the nationalist Chinese? “Farstan T. Sung” had served as the
Nationalist Chinese Consul-General in Melbourne, Sydney, Johannes
burg, and Vienna, not to mention being “Adviser to the Chinese Min
istry of Finance and General Director of the Opium Control Authority.”
After the war it was found that he had “carried letters and photographs
from” Mozambique to “Lisbon” for the Axis, “successfully evading the
British control at Freetown.”40
258 RACE WORLD
Asiatics extricate themselves from civil war, the death knell for the
British and American devils will be sounded.”46
The most consistent and organized opponent of such thinking was
the Communist Party of China. But the Allies were strongly opposed to
them, even when they had no choice but to join hands with them. Lind
say Ride fled from Hong Kong to the mainland, where he was pivotal
in organizing resistance to Tokyo. He acknowledged that the “most ac
tive, reliable, efficient and anti-Japanese of all the Chinese organiza
tions” was the Communist Party and “their control extended right
through the Japanese occupied areas, even through the New Territories
and into Kowloon.” He emphasized, “There was no overland route into or
out of Hong Kong other than through Red territory, and no one, be he Chinese
or Westerner, could pass in or out without Red help or permission. . . . [em
phasis—LR]” But “as far as the Central Government was concerned, the
Reds were public enemy No. 1; the Japanese came a poor second; any
hostilities taken by the Chinese in this area were invariably against the
Reds and not against the Japanese.” Why were there not more escapes
from Hong Kong? Quite simply, “It was commonly believed that the
Chinese had all turned pro-Japanese” and escapees would be “handed
over” to them.47 The Communists were not the only ones who felt that
the Nationalist “resistance” often was targeted conveniently at Tokyo’s
chief foe: themselves.
In a “most secret” missive, the British-led resistance in China ad
mitted that the Communists “can be regarded as an indigenous growth,
not an offshoot of Russia,” which contradicted the reigning theory that
Communists from Moscow to Madras to Manhattan were one and the
same. The report also noted that “accommodation between Chungking
[Nationalists] and Japan” was a “very lively [possibility].” The Empire
was caught between Communists they despised and Nationalists they
suspected of collaborating with their immediate foe. The bill for white
supremacy was coming due: “There is a latent anti-Western feeling
which might in ordinary circumstances coalesce with the anti-Western
drive by Japan,” it warned.48
The Communists presented a grave obstacle for London.49 Though
cooperation with them seemed unavoidable—as was cooperation with
their supposed patrons in Moscow—London realized that in the long
run, the interests of Reds and the Empire clashed irreparably.50 But even
the Reds, supposed avatars of the class struggle, were making an argu
ment similar to that of their arch-enemy, Tokyo—and pointing up once
260 RACE WORLD
As if the Empire did not have its hands full fighting Tokyo —not to
mention dealing with Moscow—it also had to come to grips with per
sistent probing from Washington. The problem for London was that it
was heavily dependent on Indian troops, who were increasingly at
tracted to various anti-British groups. In the prewar era “India always
paid the maintenance costs of about 20 percent of the British army and
10–20 per cent of [the] RAF, indirectly subsidizing their net estimates to
the same degree.”68 London might be able to survive by keeping all its
various foes off balance, turning one against another, while allying with
yet another. But its rivals were not blind to the fact—as the historian
Christopher Thorne put it—that “as a world power, Britain herself had
been in decline since the last third of the nineteenth century, to the point
where . . . her position had come to rest essentially on a series of
bluffs.”69 As the crucial month of December 1941 approached, it was ap
parent that these brazen bluffs were being called by virtually all the par-
ties, including a progressively stronger Washington.
It was likewise clear that there was a palpable difference between
the war in Europe and that in the Asia-Pacific region. For the most part,
the former involved restoring the sovereignty of nations or resisting
threats to sovereignty, while for the most part the latter involved—or so
thought certain European powers—restoring colonial empires. These
264 RACE WORLD
closed empires did not have the “open door” so necessary for the pen
etration of U.S. business. The United States had its own interests in Asia
that did not necessarily include playing second fiddle to the Empire in-
definitely.70 Thus, it was no source of surprise that London and Wash
ington would clash more severely in the Asia-Pacific theater than in Eu
rope. Anglo-American naval cooperation flourished in the Atlantic but
not in the Pacific, where Douglas MacArthur and Chester Nimitz main
tained separate intelligence organizations from London, even though
the Royal Navy had been largely absent from the region since its deba
cle in Singapore in 1942.71 And despite the unrivalled importance of the
Middle Kingdom during this conflict, when it came to China London
“would not” share “their counter-intelligence files freely with the
Americans.”72 Overall, in the Asia-Pacific the United States practiced a
kind of “jackal” imperialism, feeding hungrily and amply on London’s
“possessions,” while all the while presenting itself as a more reasonable
alternative.73
This had not escaped the attention of London, which knew that de-
spite its state-sanctioned white supremacy, Washington—and other
powers—presented themselves as more progressive on the racial front
in Asia. Thus, the British-controlled “Shanghai Club” on the mainland
excluded the Chinese, in contrast “with the Cercle Sportif Francaise, to
which access was much less restricted, the American Club (Chinese
members from 1929) and the German Club Concordia (Chinese mem
bers from 1917).”74
Differences between the British and the United States were also
prevalent in Hong Kong.75 There the British resistance leader Lindsay
Ride was candid about his dislike for the Yankees. “I was violently
anti the major American . . . policy in China which appeared to us
to be China for the Americans and Wedemeyer and to hell with
everyone else.” Washington, the British thought, was not above cur
rying favor with the Chinese at London’s expense, presenting itself
as the liberal alternative. Thus, “there was a hostile belief among the
Chinese leadership that the [organized British resistance] was being
kept in South China by the British mainly for the purpose of keep
ing a foot in the Hong Kong door.” This view “received a good deal
of support and encouragement from the” sly and artful “Ameri
cans.”76 Disingenuously, the British would argue, many Americans
were often moved to make a “striking observation” about “the in-
tensity of anti-British sentiment within the Chinese government . . .
RACE WORLD 265
rooted in the suspicion that the British wanted to keep China weak
and divided in order to maintain their own imperial strength in
Asia.”77
The status of Hong Kong was a sore point between the Empire and
those in the United States who wished to inherit Britain’s leading role.
The State Department deemed it “politically undesirable” for U.S.
troops to retake Hong Kong, then hand it back to London. Winston
Churchill was determined, however, that “never would we yield an
inch of the territory that was under the British flag.” This had occurred
to President Roosevelt, who was threatening to “go over Churchill’s
head in an appeal to the King and the parliament.” This only fueled sus
picion in London. A poll revealed that more than half the U.S. popula
tion objected to the return of Hong Kong.78
The popular image grew of the effete though sophisticated Empire
continually bilking the naïve though increasingly powerful U.S.79 The
Empire found this image quite distasteful. London realized that there
was an “American aversion to being actively associated with restoring
‘colonial rule’ especially in areas where they believe that it has made us
unpopular.” Washington had a “sincere if unfounded belief,” it thought,
“that they are more popular than we in these areas, and that. . . . it is a
positive military advantage . . . if they are . . . not closely associated with
us.”80 Years later a British Foreign and Commonwealth Office official re-
called that “the problem was . . . to get back into Hong Kong before the
Americans and certainly before the Chinese nationalists.”81
In a “most secret” missive in early 1944 one bureaucrat was stupe
fied by “the tenacity with which those who oppose us in America seek
to eliminate us from the Far Eastern scene.” The “secret” reply, penned
by the key political advisor to Lord Mountbatten, charged hotly that
London “may have to conduct our war against Japan on much the same
lines vis-á-vis the Americans as the Japanese and Germans now adopt
in fighting us—namely, a certain friendly interest and exchange of in-
formation and assistance but no common plan, collaboration, or sacri
fice of interests.”82
Just as white supremacy had benefited from the dexterous manipu-
lation of ethnic differences between the Chinese and Malays and Indians
in Singapore, for example, Japan was now trying to deepen the wedge
between the British and Euro-Americans. Jan Henrik Marsman, who es
caped from wartime Hong Kong, recalled that during his detention
“throughout the Japs [sic] showed they hated the English worse than
266 RACE WORLD
any other nationality, and always they showed no love for the Ameri
cans but they always saved the dregs of their hatred for Englishmen.
Englishmen were given the most brutal treatment of all.”83 According to
the well-connected U.S. journalist Emily Hahn, who was not interned in
wartime Hong Kong, the occupation forces had a “feeling toward the
British” of “ruthless, revengeful hate.” They had a milder approach to-
ward the United States, hoping to take advantage of Washington’s well-
known desire to supplant the Empire by cutting a deal with the United
States.84 As usual, the Chinese Nationalists pursued a parallel strategy,
though for ostensibly different reasons. Chiang’s policy was to “drive a
wedge between the British and Americans while obtaining benefits from
each.”85 None of this had evaded the attention of London.86
The United States had its own divide-and-conquer strategy, or so
thought London. “Britain realized that the Dominions”—principally
New Zealand and Australia—”mistrusted Japan and feared that the
United States wanted to persuade them to follow the U.S. lead.” As
late as 1919, the “War Office” in London still saw the United States as
a “potential threat.” “Even then [U.K.] statesmen recognized that
British and U.S. interests clashed. . . . [while] few politicians regarded
Japan as a threat [and] wanted close ties with it.” In the 1920s
Churchill thought there was not the “slightest chance” that “Japan
would attack Britain ‘in our lifetimes,’ an argument which, however
wrong, was shared by virtually every decision maker.”87 Just as the
Empire was trapped between the Chinese Communists and Tokyo, it
was also trapped between Japan and the United States, both of whom
thought they knew the correct answer to a question that London
would have preferred to ignore: who should be the logical inheritor of
the Empire?
The British resistance in China was highly suspicious of China’s so-
called U.S. allies, which was unhelpful in overcoming the common ad
versary. They believed that U.S. intelligence—the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS)—”issued instructions to their secret agents to penetrate
[the resistance].” They knew this because a U.K. “agent,” an “American
subject by birth but a resident” in Hong Kong, had decided to become
a double agent. According to this “top secret” communique, this man
“had gathered that certain members of the [resistance] official staff were
already in the pay of the OSS.”88
The scholar Lee Yiu Wa has observed that “after 1933, the devotees
of rapprochement with Japan dominated the British government and
RACE WORLD 267
this direction was supported by the Foreign Office and the Treasury.”89
As late as 1937, U.S. radicals were charging that London’s desire to
scotch the ambitions of Washington meant that the Empire was willing
to ally itself with Tokyo. According to the Daily Worker, “the proposed
Anglo-Japanese agreement ‘to guarantee the integrity of China’ is actu
ally designed to divide China up into British and Japanese colonies and
strike a blow against American interests and the American open-door
policy.”90
Those who thought that the intensity of war would put an end to
the animosity between Britain and the United States may have been
surprised by the goings-on in Stanley camp in Hong Kong. In the in
ternment camps this divide-and-conquer strategy was deployed nim
bly against those who had developed it into a fine art in Asia and Africa.
Sir Franklin C. Gimson, who acted as a kind of pro-consul of Stanley
camp in Hong Kong in that he had expressed an early interest in oper
ating on behalf of Tokyo, was quite sensitive to the Yankees’ tendency
to disregard his authority.91
John Streicker, the Administrative Secretary of Stanley, noticed that
“neither the American nor Dutch representatives attended the British
Communal Council meetings.” In any case, “it is doubtful whether they
would have accepted even if they had been invited,” which they decid
edly were not.92 Gwen Priestwood agreed. Bill Hunt, a leading “Amer
ican capitalist” at Stanley had no affection for the Empire; “one way to
make Bill fix anything, the gossip went, was to tell him the British had
tried and failed.”93
Actually, the experience of internment brought both ethnic and
class distinctions into sharp relief. As one writer put it, “the Americans
seemed the best organized entity with a commendable tendency to
work together.” The British, on the other hand, were “divided by class,
occupation and prejudice.”94
Thus, the conflict between London and Washington provided
Tokyo momentum and complicated the war effort. During the war
David Bosanquet escaped from Hong Kong to the mainland, where-
upon he encountered an American.95 Though the American was “very
derogatory about the Japanese,” he took a British attitude toward the
military, which he deemed “beneath his dignity. Fighting was the
task of the coolies”—a view greeted with contempt and incredulity
by the author. Bosanquet’s travails did not cease there. On board ship
from India to home in Britain, the American “ignor[ed]” Bosanquet
268 RACE WORLD
States, all of them whose population belongs to the white race, if Japan
should enter the war.” Why should this be a concern? Because “Hitler
has said that the Japanese are a second-class race, and Germany has not
declared war against the United States. Japan will take positive action
against the United States. In that event, will the American people adopt
the same attitude toward us psychologically that they do toward the
Germans? Their indignation against the Japanese will be stronger than
their hatred of Hitler.” This comment was prescient. Hara Yoshimichi,
“president of the Privy Council, a group of distinguished leaders who
advised the Emperor . . . often asked questions in the Imperial Confer
ences on behalf of the Emperor.” He was blunt: “I fear, therefore, that if
Japan begins a war against the United States, Germany and Great
Britain and Germany and the United States will come to terms, leaving
Japan to herself. That is, we must be prepared for the possibility that ha
tred of the yellow race might shift the hatred now being directed against
Germay to Japan, thus resulting in the German-British war’s being
turned against Japan. . . . We must give serious consideration to race re
lations, exercise constant care to avoid being surrounded by the entire
Aryan race—which should leave Japan isolated—and take steps now to
strengthen relations with Germany and Italy.”
But Japan too was enmeshed in contradictions all its own that al
lowed for no easy exit. The Japanese leader pleaded, “Don’t let hatred
of Japan become stronger than hatred of Hitler, so that everybody will
in fact gang up on Japan.” Tojo, who was to pay the ultimate price as a
chief engineer of Japan’s racial policies, added, “The points are well
taken. . . . I intend to take measures to prevent a racial war once war is
started. I should like to prevent Germany and Italy from making peace
with Great Britain or with the United States.”99
While the Allies dealt with internal rifts not only between London
and Washington but also between Moscow and its partners, the ten
sions between Tokyo and its allies were considerably more acute. A
Soviet writer captured this reality in 1944. “Unquestionably Hitler’s
Germany is not overpleased with her Far Eastern ally. . . . Japan is pur
suing her own aims and apparently has no intention of coordinating her
East Asian affairs with Hitler’s strategic plans. It is impossible to con
ceal Japanese-German difference in estimating the general military sit
uation.”100
The BBC also knew about the deep divisions that often marked
Tokyo-Berlin relations. It reported that “the Japan-German pact did not
270 RACE WORLD
Japanese dislike of the Germans arose from the Nazis’ extreme arro
gance and the fact that they made no attempt to disguise their contempt
for the Japanese.”121 As he was leaving Tokyo, he noted that Japanese
people were saying quite openly that if the Allies lost the European war
“Germany would be Japan’s next objective. In fact, I once heard it said
quite seriously that the Japanese army put the nations of the world into
three classes; enemies, neutral enemies, and friendly enemies. Japan’s
Axis partners making up the last class.”122
His perceptions were confirmed in Shanghai. A 1942 police report
noted that “thought is gradually gaining ground among Germans and
Italians . . . that all trade possibilities will disappear. The ever-increas
ing military and economic might of Japan is evidently beginning to
worry her Axis partners who consider there may be no limit to Japan’s
expansion.” According to a British intelligence report, the Japanese
“were treating all whites, whether enemies or friends, exactly alike.” A
“repatriated American missionary recalled an incident when a German
lady on horseback was stopped at the barrier where Great Western
Road crosses the [railroad] to have her pass examined by the Jap [sic]
sentry. He made her dismount and kept her waiting for some time dur
ing which time her horse dropped a lot of dung. Returning, the sentry
ordered her to clean up the place, refused to lend her a brush and dust-
pan, and made her remove the filth with her hands.”123 Such antipathy
was not just a product of Shanghai’s peculiar environment. In the fall of
1944 Canberra reported that “German nationals in Hong Kong are
being carefully watched and it is rumored that they are liable to be in
terned at any time pending new developments.”124
The wellspring of racial ideology was different in Tokyo, as op
posed to Berlin—or London and Washington, for that matter. In Japan
these doctrines grew out of the anxiety and hysteria caused by the U.S.
intervention there in the 1850s and by Britain’s seizure of Chinese terri
tory. One scholar has concluded that “It is difficult in fact to find any-
thing in seventeenth or eighteenth century Japan which resembles a co
herent ideology of race.” It was mostly post-Meiji, that is, part of the
anxious rush to modernity in the 1860s. Moreover, “German Nazi ide
ology failed to attract much of a following in Japan.”125
The prickly and barbed differences between Tokyo and Berlin
were manifested in ways large and small. The “Japanese in general dis
liked the National Socialist members’ arrogance and contempt for the
Japanese and [the authorities] kept a permanent tail on the German
274 RACE WORLD
Ambassador to Japan, General Eugene Ott and the German military at
tache.”126 Gwen Terasaki, a Euro-American married to a Japanese diplo
mat, noticed this taut unease. After being interned with German offi
cials in the United States after the assault on Pearl Harbor, she quickly
noticed that “the Axis powers were incomparable at several points.”
Again, after decamping in Mozambique she attended an “Axis party”
that “was not a success. This was the beginning of my conviction that
the Tripartite Pact appealed to none of the people represented by the
signatories. . . . How unnatural and even hostile the Germans and the
Japanese were to each other in all their relationships,” she marveled.
While residing in Japan she realized “the hostility I was to experience
toward myself throughout the war occurred almost without exception
because I was mistaken for a German.”127
Jan Henrik Marsman had a similar experience, as Japanese forces
were conducting mopping up operations in December 1941 in Hong
Kong. At the Peninsula Hotel “one morning a very bulky and officious
looking German with a big swastika on his arm band strode toward the
entrance, stopped, clicked his heels, gave the Nazi salute, and trum
peted: ‘Heil Hitler!’” He “apparently expected some sort of response.
But the sons of Hirohito continued their pacing without any heiling or
even momentary hesitation. The German moved forward to enter the
hotel. Japanese bayonets blocked the way. Some guttural conversation
followed, apparently the sentries wanted to see the Nazi’s pass. . . . The
German grew very angry and shouted: ‘Out of my way! Let me pass!’
Japanese steel didn’t give an inch. More hard words followed, and two
other Japanese soldiers came up. One grabbed the German by his neck
and the other yanked him around by his midriff. Together they threw
him into the street.”128
Akira Iriye is correct in saying that “although they shared their hos
tility toward the Anglo-American [nations], too much separated Ger
many and Japan—racially, culturally, and historically—to turn the al
liance into anything more than a marriage of convenience. Even after
Pearl Harbor, Germany and Japan never organized a combined force or
established combined chiefs of staff, unlike their enemies.”129
Germany knew and did not appreciate the fact that Japan never de
clared war on the nation they saw as the root of all evil, the Soviet
Union. The latter reciprocated by not declaring war on Japan until Au-
gust 1945. Iriye has pointed to the conspicuous fact that “many people
in Japan, including some in the army, were envisioning a grand al-
RACE WORLD 275
liance” with Moscow.130 This is one of the many reasons why the thesis
of a “firmly conceived conspiracy between” Berlin and Tokyo “was not
proven” at the Tokyo War Crimes trial. Instead, it was “conclu[ded] that
Japan’s association with the Tripartite Pact was for defensive purposes
to protect their move south in the Pacific and to keep the U.S. out of the
China war. . . . Japan continued to act with independence, not in a global
conspiracy with the Nazis.”131
Personal anecdotes confirmed this conclusion. Hans J. Massaquoi
was born in Germany of parents who were African and German and
grew up there during the war years. One of his coworkers in the midst
of this titanic conflict told him, “Don’t think that they [that is, Japan]
will be satisfied with being the rulers in Asia. . . . As soon as this war is
over, the Japanese will send a special hit squad to Berlin and assassinate
Hitler. After that, they will take over the entire world.”132
One scholar has gone further, suggesting that the blanket term “fas
cism” does not describe the differences he has perceived between Tokyo
and its wartime allies. “A wide gap in fact existed between the doctrines
and regimes of Imperial Japan and those of Italian fascism and German
nazism. . . . The Italian-German influence on the Japanese regime was
confined to economic and legal and economic ‘management fascism.’
. . . Japan’s alliance with Italy and Germany was no more the effect of
ideological proximity than was the alliance of the Western democracies
with the Soviet Union.” “Political parties were suppressed in 1940” in
Japan “but their members continued to sit in the Lower House, an
unimaginable state of affairs in Italy or Germany at that time.”133
Japan may not have acted in concert with Germany but it surely sought
to enlist other nations—particularly those today described as “Third
World” nations—in their crusade. This was particularly the case for
Mexico, which bore a long-term grievance against its northern neighbor
not least because the latter had seized a good deal of its territory in the
nineteenth century. The white supremacy involved in the relations be-
tween Mexico City and Washington added to Tokyo’s desire to inter
vene in their strained bilateral relationship. If Japan could open up a
front on the southern border of the United States, its dream of estab
lishing a new racial order would be that much closer. This thought also
had occurred to the press baron, William Randolph Hearst, who in 1917
produced a film “which showed Japanese and Mexican troops looting,
murdering and raping as they invaded the United States.”134 Although
276 RACE WORLD
There were “several conferences and banquets” and the visitors were
“permitted” to “visit the government arsenals, military and naval acad
emies and private factories capable of turning out military supplies and
apparently every opportunity was given them to study the manufac
ture of munitions.” The purpose of the visit could only be “supply of
war munitions, particularly machine guns and small arms” since “all
the Mexicans connected with this mission have been openly hostile to
the United States and have been insisting in their talk with the Japanese
that the United States is a ‘big tyrant’ and is consistently [taking] liber
ties [with] Mexico.”145
As the revolution wound down by the 1920s—and as left-wing
forces relatively immune to Tokyo’s racial appeals grew in strength—
U.S. concern about the Japan-Mexico relationship eased. But in 1932
U.S. intelligence fixated on an article by General Juan Merigo, who said
that in case of war between the United States and Japan, Mexico would
not necessarily align with the former, “due to the hatred.” In case of
war, he said, “Mexico would . . . become the ally of Japan. That not only
Mexico but Peru, Chile, Argentina, Honduras, Guatemala, Salvador,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Colombia and Venezuela—countries which
have reason to dislike the United States—would also ally themselves
with Japan. . . . If a national plebiscite were taken the Mexican people
would vote to go to war, but as allies of Japan.” This officer was “greatly
loved by his men” and was “extremely well-posted on military affairs,”
so his words had to be taken seriously. Merigo did not mention the
thousands of Brazilians of Japanese descent, particularly in the key
urban center of Sao Paulo. But Washington could not afford to ignore
his words.146 For the “Plan of San Diego” alone showed that white su
premacy was dragging down those who heretofore had accepted this
doctrine as if it were gospel.
Conclusion
In the Wake of White Supremacy
279
280 CONCLUSION
that at times made no distinction between the Japanese foe and the sup-
posed Chinese ally. “The white man is too good,” he said. “He doesn’t
teach the kind of lessons the yellow man is likely to remember. Instead,
he treats the yellow as though he were white.” “And the yellow man
leers and smiles to himself. . . . My view is that they are savages, but sav
ages on their way up. . . . In another five hundred years—or perhaps a
lot less—they can become a frightening menace.” But what was to be
done?
For the time being, Clark was wandering around the rubble-strewn
streets of Hong Kong in search of like-minded people. He spoke to a Eu
ropean doctor who mentioned that he had lived in Japan for twenty-
five years, including the war. “I thought they loved,” he said sadly. “I
know they loved me. . . . Yet when the war started and they were told to
hate all white men, they turned on me like wolves. Then they were told
they weren’t to hate the white man any more. So they came back, and
they were the old friends I used to know.” He spoke to some Chinese
who also had noticed reversals that seemed opportunistic. One in par
ticular recalled that some British had become friendly for the first time.
With rancor he noted when one “used to say that although the Chinese
can own a house on The Peak, he cannot live in it—that The Peak is re-
served only for whites. . . . [or] if you marry a Chinese or Eurasian girl
your Public Service career is finished and your social status wrecked.”
The British, he asserted distastefully, “would not give the local Chinese
a chance for advancement. Before the war no Chinese could ever get a
really worthwhile job.” With firm conviction he declared, “It will be dif
ferent when China take back Hong Kong.” Said Clark warily, “Wher
ever you looked or listened on every hand, this was being said, in a
hundred ways, . . . ‘when China takes back Hong Kong.’”10
Unfortunately for the Chinese, London had no intention of return
ing Hong Kong though it recognized fully that it could not resume its
old ways of ruling—though this was not immediately apparent.11 When
Sir Cecil Harcourt met with his Japanese counterpart on 31 August 1945
on board the HMS Indomitable, he heard loud complaints that “British
sailors attacked the Japanese soldiers” in Hong Kong, even after the
surrender, though “the Chinese populace as a whole has not committed
acts against the Japanese.”12 But the Europeans, who had suffered ter
ribly during the war and had been subjected to ample race-baiting
themselves, were in no mood for rational discussion. That innocent
CONCLUSION 283
Chinese might have been swept up in this revenge was not their pri
mary concern.13
Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt arrived in Hong Kong in 1945 just
after the Japanese had been defeated, at the same time as Russell Clark
was walking the rubbish-strewn streets. Now chastened after the bru
tality of war, he was dismissive of his fellow Europeans “returning to
Hong Kong . . . who did not realize that they had to have a 1946 outlook;
that outlook is imbued with a spirit of national pride in China and the
national sovereignty of China. The 1941 outlook is absolutely taboo.
There seemed to be some who were either unwilling or unable to un
derstand this, but if they continue in ignorance of the change they will
be heading for trouble.” Sir Cecil wanted to overturn decades of racial
segregation and “put Chinese in positions of responsibility in the Gov
ernment” and attack the “colour bar problem.” The prohibition against
Chinese living in The Peak must be replaced with a system whereby
“everywhere a man is judged by his merits and character and not by the
colour of his skin.” Thus, prior to the war, “the majority of policing in
Hong Kong was done by Indians. . . . In this new Chinese national spirit
they will not be policed by foreign races.”14
Alexander Grantham concurred. He returned as Governor in 1947,
having first arrived in Hong Kong in the 1920s. A “marked decline in so
cial snobbishness was one of the first things I noticed after my return,”
he said. “The “taipan” and the senior government official were no
longer regarded, nor did they so regard themselves, as demi-gods. . . . I
observed, too, a greater mixing of the races.” Grantham was contrite in
the wake of the Japanese occupation. “It is the mental arrogance on the
part of some Europeans towards Asians that has created as much, if not
more resentment than the physical aggressions like the establishment of
colonies and territoriality,” he exclaimed. “The basis of the arrogance is
the assumption that the European is inherently superior to the Asian,
taking such forms as the exclusion of Asians from clubs, downright
rudeness or a patronizing manner.” That era was over: “The age of the
‘blimps’ is over, though a few of them still remain, even in Hong Kong.
The insularity and provincial mindedness [of] some of the leading busi
nessmen. . . . also struck me. . . . Such a narrow outlook seemed strange
in one of the great commercial centres of the world.”15
Perhaps. But this “great commercial centre” had just undergone an
occupation that had left those like Grantham and Sir Cecil eager for
284 CONCLUSION
change, while other “blimps” were not so sure. Fortunately for the for
mer, many of the latter had departed for greener pastures. Hong Kong’s
prewar population of two million was down to about 600,000. Accord
ing to the historian G. B. Endacott, a conspicuous factor in the ability of
the new colonial officials to implement their more capacious vision was
that “so few of the old colonials returned and so many new Europeans
came to take their places.” With their departure an “old” form of racism
also exited. Moreover, “political uncertainty and British impoverish
ment through the sacrifices of the war discouraged the inflow of British
capital into the Colony and the Chinese increasingly expanded small
businesses.” The war “inevitably temporarily undermined Britain’s
economic strength and impaired her influence in the world while
Asians developed greater national self-consciousness.” This, along with
an “increasing number of Chinese [who] entered the professions” cre
ated a refurbished economic system that simultaneously allowed for
less space for the old type of racism.16
However, in the immediate postwar era, as the internees—many of
them no more than bags of bones—emerged stumbling from the camps,
some of them hungered for a revival of antebellum white supremacy.
The recently released internee, William Sewell, thought that “many”
from Stanley “were endeavoring to re-establish the status quo, not real
izing that a new order was struggling to birth in Asia.” They did not rec
ognize that “life could never be the same in the Far East. . . . Asia for the
Asiatics had struck responsive chords in the hearts of youth” and “any
shreds of false superiority had gone from the British and Americans.”
Perhaps naively, he thought that now that the war had ended, “Won’t
we all find it easier to identify with those who suffer?”17
This hope reflected the chastened mood of the colonial authorities
and the British generally in Hong Kong. A few days after the respected
South China Morning Post resumed publication in 1945 after the end of
the occupation, a front-page item complained about the “vertical” race
relations that had prevailed. Now a “horizontal,” more nonracial ap
proach was desired, not least because verticality had “provoked much
resentment of which the Japanese later took full advantage.” But people
like Russell Clark who rousted Chinese from automobiles suggested
that change would be resisted; so did the “seeming neglect of the Chi
nese population for the first fortnight of our freedom.” This sparked
“bitterness,” though the “blimps” were happy to report that “we are
CONCLUSION 285
getting back to the old Hong Kong all right.” It was true: “Old conser
vatism dies hard.”18
But die it must. For not only had the British been humiliated at the
hands of those not of “pure European descent,” they had suffered
tremendous losses during the war. White supremacy had been borne on
a wave of wealth and had difficulty sustaining itself in the face of the
gargantuan financial setback sustained during the war. The formerly
eminent Sir C. Grenville Alabaster claimed that as a result of the war he
had lost “furniture, household goods, silver, cutlery, glass, carpets, pic
tures, clothes, bedding . . . jewelry, motor car, wireless set, masonic re
galia, etc.”—all “looted by the Japanese.”19 The Managing Director of
the Hong Kong & Shanghai Hotel said that he was “requested” by the
“Commissioner of Police” to “destroy all spiritous liquor” as the inva
sion unfolded; this was worth about “$275,000—including about
$75,000 worth transferred from the Peninsula Hotel.”20 The Jesuits suf
fered “heavy . . . material losses.” The “entire contents of Loyola and
Wah Yan College, Kowloon, were gone. Ricci Hall was badly dam-
aged.”21 Claims like this proliferated. Some were compensated and
some were not. And, of course, some claims may have been inflated.
Then there was the flight of local residents. The British often had a
strong desire to depart Hong Kong after Japan’s defeat. This was par
ticularly true of senior civil servants. Junior officers, who might stay,
did not have the clout of their elders in the new environment.22 Fur
thermore, many police records were destroyed during the Japanese oc
cupation, which made it difficult to substantiate claims about lost prop
erty or to know who needed to be monitored in a city that had quickly
become a sunny site for shady figures.23 Many of the old European po
lice officers had either been interned or fled,24 which created more jobs
for the Chinese and put more money in their hands.
This abrupt and radical change—from Chinese penury and British
snobbery to the British fleeing in rags while some Chinese gained fi
nancially—led to considerable social unrest. Virtually on the day of the
Japanese surrender, Sir Franklin Gimson told the Colonial Office of his
“concern . . . in the first place, [that] the local leaders of the Chinese are
accused, perhaps on very inadequate grounds, of cooperating with the
Japanese. . . . and have lost the confidence of the local Chinese commu
nity.” That was just one of his concerns: “My own views are that in the
previous constitution the Chinese were not adequately represented on
286 CONCLUSION
being mixed blood hasn’t something to do” with the often chilly recep
tion he received from the colonizers. “Barriers as far as joining clubs” re
mained. “I am beginning to realize,” he said, “why so many Eurasians
prefer to be known as Chinese.”38 Wade had hit on something, said one
interlocutor. The “memories of Stanley, Shamshuipo and other camps
are gradually fading away and the old superiority complex is asserting
itself.” Sadly, he observed that “it is a strange but true thing that wives
of Europeans arriving in Hongkong for the first time are naturally
friendly and willing to make friends with anyone no matter what their
race or colour but when they have been here for some months, one can
see the gradual and subtle change taking place. . . . [They distance them-
selves from] anything that is not pure Nordic or Celtic is Asiatic or
Eurasian.”39 Eurasians in Singapore were organized, but not those in
Shanghai or Hong Kong. Why? “Here there seems to be a fear or a
heavy complex—wherefore the mixed of blood seek absorption in one
side or the other.” Things were so bad for those with even a hint of
“Asiatic blood,” that he suggested that “the United Nations might be
asked to establish somewhere in the world a common nation where all
the products of mixed marriages would be welcomed.”40
It was not simply a problem of tetchy, unreconstructed white su
premacists versus benign Chinese. As noted, a number of Chinese elites
had been collaborators, particularly those tied to the KMT. After the
war, for example, some of the leading members of the notorious Japan
ese military police, the Kempeitai, went to work for the KMT.41 The
“armed strength of the [pro-Tokyo] Wang Jingwei regime from its reg
ular army down to its peace preservation and police units was absorbed
into the [Chinese] Nationalist forces.”42 But however odious their polit
ical connections, their “maliciously anti-British” approach was
grounded in justifiable opposition to continued British rule in Hong
Kong.43 Britain’s dilemma was that the alternative to the KMT—the
Communists—was firmly opposed to colonialism in Hong Kong and,
in any event, the postwar climate made a U.K.-Communist alliance im
possible. Thus, London could not deploy the age-old tactic of leaning
toward the left (that is, the Communists) in order to keep the right (that
is, the KMT) off balance. In 1948 the leadership of Hong Kong Univer
sity warned in a “confidential” message against “over-exhorting” the
“British way of life” among students. Why? “We may provoke the
wrong reactions” among Chinese, who are “fairly evenly divided” be-
tween the “fascist Chiang Kai-shek” and the Communists. Then there
290 CONCLUSION
military may shed light on why the British were suspicious of various
Nationalist activities in Hong Kong.51 The British also believed that the
KMT was involved in drug dealing.52
In 1946 the British were able to capture a letter from Ogata Shun
saku, a leading Japanese figure in Macao. “We should thank especially
the Chinese authorities in Canton,” he said, “for their treatment [of] the
Japanese forces and civilians.” He was “appointed as advisor to the
Canton Headquarters of the Chairman of the Military Commission. . . .
in order to take part in the great reconstruction of China in [the] future.”
He added, “It is a great error to think that Japan has been defeated,”53
not least since leading KMT figures like General Wu Te-Chen had
“studied in Japan.”54
In addition to the relationship between the KMT and Japan, the
British also kept track of other currents. The British Embassy in
Chungking informed the Foreign Office in early 1946 about an “anony
mous article in the ‘Yunnan Daily News’ [which] demands with ex
treme asperity that Siam treat Chinese residents properly now that
China is a Great Power.” The Embassy considered this outrageous; next,
it was thought, the British would be asked to treat Chinese “properly.”
Likewise, much was made of a translated article from the Shanghai
newspaper, Ta Kung Pao, about the supposedly unsettled legal status of
Kowloon—an essential component of colonial Hong Kong.55
Some British advised a more conciliatory approach in this increas
ingly complicated situation. An editorial in the Post regretted use of
“the terms ‘European’ and ‘Chinese.’” No, it said, “the emphasis should
be on ‘British.’ . . . Obviously if we expect the locally-born to be mili
tantly pro-British, it is necessary to convince them that they are
British.”56 The “traditional reluctance to confer full British rights upon
the Hongkong-born” must be rejected, it said. But the British were
trapped once again. Those who wished to return to old-style white su
premacy were haunted by the specter of communism gaining ground,
particularly among the working class, while many of the Chinese who
had collaborated with Japan were profiting handsomely from their
wartime activities. Which segment of the population should the colo
nizers seek to collaborate with?
This was one of many aspects of Hong Kong’s growing and well-
deserved reputation as “the Paradise of Collaborators.” This reputation
derived in part from the British attempt to besmirch those not of “pure
292 CONCLUSION
European descent” who had escaped poverty during the war. Tonya
Lee, for example, dates the rise of Chinese affluence in Hong Kong to
1939—not December 1941—when many British departed: “This opened
up the way at long last for many Eurasians and others of half-caste
blood to fill the gaps left and thereby be recognized for their skills. More
and more Chinese also were taking their rightful place in positions pre
viously reserved exclusively for Europeans brought out on contract.”57
Nevertheless, after the war, many Hong Kong residents were “dis
mayed and disgusted at the number of Chinese collaborators and out-
right traitors who are now resident in, and enjoying the amenities of
this Colony,” particularly alleged traitors from Shanghai. “Prominent
among the traitors now enjoying sanctuary,” one resident claimed, “are
. . . the principal shareholder in a Gambling House, Shanghai, the funds
from the licensing of which were used by the Japanese Gendarmerie. . . .
This man was a close associate of the notorious Woo S. Pao, leader of the
Gestapo . . . a man who was formerly a coolie employed by a tobacco
factory and who, through the influence of Japanese Gendarmerie,
amassed such a fortune that he was able in the spring of 1943 to pur
chase an aeroplane which was presented to the Japanese Forces.” The
writer, who described himself as an “ex-internee,” had “personally en-
countered” these men but “the list is very long.” Why were they “al
lowed to live in safety and luxury, occupying the best houses and, in
many cases, well established in business financed with the proceeds of
their collaboration?”58 Another resident, who described himself as a
“Chinese refugee,” wrote that the “leading collaborators, friends of Iso
gai, Tojo, Noma, and Tanaka are still important and great men of the
Kuomintang.”59
There were curious connections between some of the Chinese and
Japanese. A Japanese man known as “Hiraoka” had been in Hong Kong
for “some years previous to the Pacific War” and was “the owner” of
“properties” in Causeway Bay and Kowloon, among others. These
“were found upon inspection” in 1946 “to be partly occupied by em
ployees of the Wing Fat Printing Co.,” which was also partly owned by
Hiraoka. Now he was interned in Kowloon and this company was
being run by some Chinese, who were apparently his business part-
ners.60 This was not an isolated example. A “secret” report detailed that
the “Ying King Restaurant” in Wanchai-Hong Kong was “being run on
[the] basis of fifty-fifty partnership with Japanese capital,” and local
CONCLUSION 293
Chinese; the former included “some other Japanese Naval people who
were in Hong Kong during the war.” The manager was “Mr. Chang.”61
Intriguingly, later the police reported on an August 1948 meeting of five
hours’ duration at this restaurant with one hundred twenty people
present, representing “74 guilds” of the “General Labor Union.”62
Tseng Yu-Hao and Denis Victor vainly sought to bring the subject of
collaboration to the attention of Governor Mark Young. “Those who
made good as the Mikado’s supporters,” they asserted, accumulated
“ill-gotten fortunes.” The collaborators were now safe, while “in
ternees, ex-political prisoners and other loyal subjects” were suffering.
They demanded that the collaborators “should be stripped of their
wealth.” There were “many purchases of houses . . . in anticipation of
an Axis victory. . . . Many buyers of land in the occupation days are try
ing to influence the former sellers to sign the deeds a second time, al
leging that Hongkong’s authorities shall defend enemy rights if the sell
ers or vendors refuse to adhere to the Mikado’s adherents’ demand.”
They demanded a confiscatory “ninety per cent tax” on “occupation
land deals” which would also “solve the problem of the budget deficit.”
They also wanted “thorough investigations . . . into the sources of in-
come of those who bought land under the enemy occupation.”63 Sepa
rately, Victor complained of “collaborators who purchased homes, con
cubines, and automobiles with ill-gotten gains of the occupation
days.”64 Although the Attorney General was understanding, he averred
that it was “impracticable here as elsewhere to attain the ideal of redis
tribution and removal of inequity”—wouldn’t that be akin to the new
enemy, communism? That remedy would “merely create a problem
within [a] problem.”65
However, some people were not satisfied. T. K. Cheng objected
strenuously to the fact that “five thousand buyers of land” under the oc
cupation had their purchases “legalized” after the war. Although those
who professed “loyalty” to the crown could not engage in commerce,
the actions of collaborators were ratified to their benefit. Was this just?
he asked.66 A self-professed “law man” raised pointed questions about
“those Chinese who have had accumulated a worldly treasure in free
China during Japanese occupation by way of smuggling, speculation
and hoarding.” Shouldn’t they be pursued by prosecutors?67
H. C. Wu had been an “educationist” in Hong Kong. “During
the Japanese occupation,” he told the authorities, “a great number of
294 CONCLUSION
Though World War II is the blanket term used to refer to the conflagra
tion that ended in 1945, it consisted of various conflicts throughout the
planet. Germany primarily was dislodging—or seeking to dislodge—
sovereign states. Japan was ousting for the most part—or seeking to
oust—a semi-colonized regime in China and corrupt colonial empires.
This difference, though it could not be grasped as the war raged, ironi
cally became clear when the war ended. The leading historian of Hong
Kong, G. B. Endacott, has written that this “partly explains why no in
dividual or group was prepared openly to confront the Japanese during
the occupation as some French patriots did against the Germans.”
In Hong Kong, “thirty-one persons appeared before the Military
Courts up to 30 April 1946. . . . One was sentenced to death and
hanged. . . . After the restoration of civil rule on 1 May 1946 a total of
twenty-nine suspected collaborators, including one woman, appeared
before the magistrates.” After 1 May, twenty-eight were found guilty,
including six Indians, seven Europeans or Eurasians, and fifteen Chi
nese, he said.87 Meanwhile, the scholar Henry Lethbridge has observed
that “in France . . . some thirty to forty thousand collaborators were ex
ecuted, often summarily at the hands of the mob. In Hong Kong a few
Japanese . . . and some Chinese underlings, informers and torturers
were lynched or manhandled; but after a few weeks things simmered
down.”88
Actually, the “war crimes court” in Hong Kong “ceased to func
tion” on 31 March 1948.89 According to the South China Morning Post, a
record of twenty were sentenced to death and ninety were sentenced to
prison terms.90 In late February 1948 Hong Kong’s Commissioner of
Prisoners asserted that “there are today 99 Japanese in custody at Stan-
ley Prison. Five have been convicted and sentenced to death. . . . Sixty-
six have been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.”91 Even these
298 CONCLUSION
numbers, paltry as they are, are useful. They can be compared with the
declaration of a journalist weeks after the war, who said: “I think at least
75 per cent [of the] population of Hong Kong and the occupied zones of
China should be considered as war criminals.”92 A convicted collabora
tor went a step further, charging that “more than 95 percent of the peo
ple in Hongkong during the occupation had to work for the Japanese
for a living and I can see no reason why only 10-odd of us are to face
such trials.”93 Another observer took a more qualified approach. There
were many forms of collaboration, he said: those who “betrayed loyal
ists to torture and death,” those who did it for “profit,” and those who
“forced many a starving person to work for the Japanese.” It was “offi
cially decided” that only those in the first category “should be tried . . .
Thereby many who are still at heart pro-Japanese have escaped, to
flaunt their wealth in our faces.”94 Moreover, the British had to rely on
the Japanese more than they initially desired “since neither Chiang Kai
shek nor Chinese residents in Hong Kong were about to applaud the
liberators.” As a result the British were unenthusiastic about witch-
hunts targeting Japanese or their Chinese collaborators.95 Conse
quently, “some collaborators,” claimed another commentator with re
gret, “are becoming wealthy.”96
This pattern was not unique to British colonialism, nor to Hong
Kong. A major collaborator in the Philippines, Claro M. Recto, was a
noted nationalist and opponent of Washington after the war.97 In fact, a
mere “0.6 percent of the wartime leadership” in the Philippines “was
convicted” for collaboration, while “74 percent was never in court.
There was no bloodbath in which the mob ruled at the end of the war,
and there was no purge either internal or external.” As in Hong Kong,
a “quarantine of silence has been placed around the collaboration ques
tion” in the Philippines. There were immense horrors there, though ac
cording to the historian David Steinberg, “many of the atrocities of the
Death March and the humiliations of the prison camps were perpe
trated to demean Americans before Filipinos.”98 Even the detentions
and trials of suspected collaborators were suspicious, as they were often
used as a means to settle scores and exact private revenge, as was the
case at times in Macao.99 Something similar was occurring in Hong
Kong.100 This was not unusual.101 Moreover, those fleeing to Hong Kong
from the mainland seemed to be victims of score settling by their envi
ous opponents.102
CONCLUSION 299
The Hong Kong Chinese had the added burden of being repre
sented by a government that remained highly suspicious of them. Fur
thermore, the procedure they had to endure to obtain redress from the
government was quite discouraging. Ronald Hall, the Consul General
of the United Kingdom in Canton, explicitly observed that “It has been
the policy of HM Government for a number of years not to afford pro
tection in China to persons of Chinese race even when they possess
British nationality, unless they have obtained (or at least applied for and
failed to obtain through no fault of their own) certificates divesting
them of their Chinese nationality.”103 Thus, Hong Kong Chinese who
fled to the mainland and who often had more substantial assets than
many of their new compatriots, were subjected to extortion and revenge
seeking with little hope of aid from “their” government.
London’s dilemma in dealing with collaborators was revealed fur
ther in the spring of 1945. The Acting Attorney General of Hong Kong,
George Strickland, was compelled to state in the spring of 1946 that “We
should not accede to requests for seizure of property belonging to col
laborators wanted by the Chinese authorities. A fortiori, it is unlikely
that it is intended that property of Hongkong collaborators within our
jurisdiction should be confiscated.”104 However nobly motivated, this
measure also had the added impact of protecting collaborators from the
full reach of the law.
Of course, not all actual or suspected collaborators were able to es
cape justice—or vengeance. In February 1946 the “colony’s first treason
trial” took place and the “court. . . . was filled with a large crowd of
spectators,” some of whom were related to the defendant. Espionage
and torture were among the numerous charges against George Wong, a
Chinese man who spoke fluent English.105 His lawyer, Hin-shing Lo, de
clared that Wong was not a British subject, though he was of Chinese
nationality, and cited “Captain Elliot’s proclamation” of 1841 that in
Hong Kong all “British subjects” will “enjoy” British law while “natives
of the island of Hongkong shall be governed according to the laws, cus
toms and usages of China.” Japanese rule, in any event, terminated the
sovereignty of the King and allegiance to him.106 Further, argued the
counsel, “The duty of allegiance is reciprocal to the duty of protec
tion. . . . When therefore a state is unable to protect a portion of its terri
tory from the superior force of an enemy, it loses for the time, its claim
to the allegiance of those whom it failed to protect.”107
300 CONCLUSION
Wong, forty at the time of trial, was a native of Hoi Ping, Kwang
tung, and lived for a while in North America, where he honed his Eng
lish. He came to Hong Kong in 1939 and soon was operating an auto re-
pair shop on Nathan Road. As early as 12 December 1941—a few days
after the invasion—he was reputedly spotted working with the Japan
ese. He was alleged to have said, “I knew Japanese military officers six
months before the attack on Hongkong.”108
The trial was a ping-pong match of charge and countercharge. The
defendant was asked pointedly, “Did you not say to Tony Yvanovich
that ‘this is a war between the yellow and white races.’” Wong replied,
“I can’t remember. If I did, it was part of a story from the newspapers.”
“Why did you tell a lie about your American papers and say you hated
the Americans?” Wong proclaimed, “I told them I had returned from
America, which I did not like, and to which I did not want to return.”109
The much despised Inouye Kanao—otherwise known as “Slap Happy”
because of his penchant for punching internees—also came to testify.
“You said, “[I] hate you whites because in Canada I was called a yellow
bellied, slit-eyed bastard.’” “I never said that,” Wong declared hotly.110
Wong’s lawyer moved to quash the indictment against him. “Not
being a British subject, the Treason Act of 1351 [sic] did not apply to
him. . . . [and] he was acting as some sort of Chinese agent.” Wong ac
knowledged that “my Counsel submitted that during occupation Chi
nese inhabitants owed no allegiance to the British,” but “that is not my
view. During occupation, my view was that Chinese should be loyal to
[the] Chinese government. . . . I owe loyalty to China as a Chinese. . . . I
had been in China Military Service. . . . What I did . . . I did for China
and her Allies.” But other witnesses disagreed that Wong was a simple
Chinese patriot. No, said one witness, “he always boasted about Japs’
[sic] invincibility.” Another testified that Wong “said Japs [sic] wanted a
group of Australian-born Chinese or people who know Australia well
to go there with Jap [sic] invaders.” Grace Lau testified that Wong came
to her house for interrogation accompanied by a “Eurasian.” Wong, she
said, “explained that his scheme was to get a group to guide the Japan
ese to invade Australia, adding that the best qualification was to be
Australian-born.” Wong was disbelieved. He was convicted, received a
“sentence of death,” and was executed. Soon his tearful spouse, Yoke
Shim, was reduced to inquire whether “you could allow me to bury my
husband’s dead body myself.”111 This was “the first time in the history
of a colony that a traitor has been hung here,” reported the Post. That he
CONCLUSION 301
claimed that this was where he was conscripted in 1942 (this statement
was viewed as contradicting his earlier assertion that he was con-
scripted in Manchuria in 1936).122
“Slap Happy” found it difficult to refute the harsh recollections of
him by internees. He was a “bastard,” said Kenneth Baxter, a Scottish
internee.123 Lucien Brunet of Quebec recalled sadly the time when
“Captain Norris of the Winnipeg Grenadiers argued with the Kamloops
Kid and he hit Norris in the face and punch[ed] him [in] the chin. . . .
Later on, Atkinson tried to intervene and tried to stop it. Kamloops Kid
turn[ed] to him and hit Atkinson on the legs. . . . [Inouye],” he con
cluded, “was an awful chap.”124
Such contradictions were a part of the uphill climb he had in exon
erating himself. Inouye had received bad advice from counsel, which
initially claimed on his behalf that he was a Canadian citizen. His effort
to deny this predicate placed him in jeopardy for violating antitreason
laws, and was rejected. He pressed on, questioning the validity of a war
crimes court trying a British subject.125 But his occasional shout of
“Long live the Emperor” could not have helped his cause in Hong
Kong.126
There were several problems with his prosecution. In “summing
up,” the judge in the “Supreme Court of Hong Kong” noted that “sev
eral members of the jury are Chinese and although you may still speak
English, still it is not always easy to follow a legal argument in a lan
guage other than your own.”127 Though dismissively tossed aside, the
authorities took seriously his claim that he could not be tried for trea
son because he was not a British citizen. As early as October 1945 a “se
cret priority” message to London inquired, “Can administration prose-
cute residents who are not British subjects but who by virtue of resi
dence in Hongkong prior to December 1941 enjoyed His Majesty’s
protection and committed serious offenses?”128 This profound due
process consideration was cast aside and he was convicted and sen
tenced “into execution” on 26 August 1947 “by causing” him to “to be
hanged by the neck until he is dead.129 Such “war criminals,” said one
judge, “belonged to a black or evil race.”130
Inouye was not the only one to be cast into this racial purgatory, nor
was he the only man of Asian descent with roots in North America to be
accused of collaboration. In the autumn of 1946 William L. Bryce, an
army veteran from Los Angeles—a survivor of the “death marches” of
Bataan and Corregidor—was stunned into disbelief while strolling
304 CONCLUSION
also contended that “the Japanese were far superior to the American
people and if the American army had Japanese officers, why, they could
whip the world.” Once Kawakita was said to have seen David Huddle
chewing gum; the internee testified that he “grabbed me by the shirt
collar and told me to open my mouth. Well, I didn’t have a chance to
swallow the gum and I tried to conceal it under my tongue. And when
I opened my mouth he saw the gum. He says, ‘You lie,’ and he drew
back—he held me with his left hand by the shirt collar, and he drew
back with his right and he hit me three times in the nose and just broke
my nose.”
Johnnie E. Carter alleged that on “one particular night he was sit
ting there, and he asked me, he says, ’Why do the Americans hate to die
and the Japanese like to die?’” Carter offered a tepid reply and “he an
swered me by hitting me over the head and across the back.” Woodrow
T. Shaffer was mortified when Kawakita “knocked” a prisoner “into the
cesspool,” then told the unfortunate soul to “submerge until his head
just showed,” at which point the Japanese American “struck” the man
“with sticks when he refused to submerge” further.
The bespectacled Kawakita, who was about 5’4” and 145 pounds,
sat impassively in suit and tie at the defendant’s table as these damning
charges were made against him. His high cheek bones and broad shoul
ders and slightly hunched back sat still as his fate was being decided.
Interestingly, when talking to his Japanese colleagues during the war,
“All he ever talked about was his high school days, the pretty scenery
and things like that.” Meiji Fujisawa had known Kawakita in California
and, like him, had moved to Japan where his helpful comrade got him
a job as an interpreter. But Fujisawa was no help at the trial and one can
imagine Kawakita sinking deeper into his chair as his fellow “inter
preter” said, “I heard from other Japanese employees that Kawakita
was mistreating prisoners of war.” Kawakita may have slumped even
further when Fujisawa said that he saw his erstwhile colleague carrying
a “wooden sword . . . about two and a half feet”—a visible symbol of
Imperial Japan—around the camp. Yes, agreed Merle Chandler, “It was
built like a Japanese officer’s sword.”
Kawakita was doomed. The judge was harsh, noting the “zeal with
which the defendant practiced his treachery in many ways, but per-
haps most eloquently by his nicknames—’efficiency expert’ and ‘em
pire builder’—given him by the American prisoners of war. . . . He fer
vently wished Japan would win the war, hoped and believed she
CONCLUSION 307
would win, but feared she would not. If Japan won, he planned to re-
turn to the United States and—as he boasted to American prisoners of
war—be a ‘big shot’ because of his knowledge of the language and the
people.” His “brutal slave-driving tactics” were also denounced.132
Kawakita was duly convicted and some of the denizens of Los Angeles
drew the inappropriate lesson that they were justified in interning
Japanese Americans, while others drew the appropriate conclusion that
perhaps the kind of white supremacy that had driven an outwardly
normal North American into the arms of a U.S. foe should be recon
sidered.
The problem was that Kawakita was not the sole Japanese Ameri
can to cross the line—or, at least, to be accused of crossing the line. Iva
Toguri was born on the fourth of July in 1916 in Watts, Los Angeles, and
graduated from UCLA. She voted for the Republican Wendell Wilkie in
1940, then found herself trapped in wartime Tokyo shortly thereafter.
Matters were complicated by the fact that she was not fluent in Japan
ese. Yet on skimpy evidence she was accused of being the notorious
“Tokyo Rose,” whose seductively appealing radio broadcasts from
Japan were intended to demoralize the U.S. populace, including sol
diers. Although there were no fewer than twenty-seven Japanese-
American “radio girls,” she was unlucky enough to have her fate sealed
by an all-white jury.133
Then there was Isamu Ishara, a thirty-six-year-old interpreter for
Japan, toiling at a POW camp of twelve hundred in China. Educated in
Hawaii, he was “charged with administering the water and electric
treatment [torture]. . . . beatings. . . . under-feeding prisoners and steal
ing their food and cigarettes.”134 He did not escape condemnation. Nor
did yet another interpreter, identified simply as “Takemoto.” A resident
of Hong Kong before the war, he had served as the “propietor of the
curio shop, Nikko and Co., in the Hongkong Hotel.”135
Nimori Genichiro, fifty-three, was also a “civilian interpreter.” He
was on the ill-fated Lisbon Maru—the “only Japanese on board who
could speak English”—and was said to have ordered sentries to fire into
the holds of the ship, killing Allied soldiers. He had become a Christian
at Cornell College in Mount Vernon, Iowa, and had “spent various pe
riods in New York, Connecticut and Iowa.” He spent “eighteen years”
in Dayton, Ohio, “where he first worked in an amusement park, learned
the trade and later became manager.” He denied using the term “bas
tard” as was charged to describe internees; no, he used the less elegant
308 CONCLUSION
don was reluctant to alienate this large nation further. Those seen as
traitors in Manchester—for example, the INA—were viewed as heroes
in Calcutta.
Thus, though many of them were purged from the police, the au
thorities proceeded cautiously in reining in a community widely
thought to have engaged in mass sedition. As the first anniversary of
the surrender approached, the “Indian community was asked to regis
ter,” but “as far as” the colony’s Solicitor could “ascertain this rule ap
plied to no other section” of the colony—an indicator of the suspicion
with which they were viewed. Though acknowledging that “race, reli
gion and caste, here as in India draw out hard and violent feelings,”
what was causing the Solicitor “great anxiety” was something else. “In
dians who had collaborated with the Japanese were given contracts or
employment with the Government or free passages out of the colony
while a very large body of Indians (and Malays who have always been
regarded for practical purposes as members of the Indian community
through inter-marriage, social intercourse, etc.) who had remained
loyal and more than loyal during the period have been usually over-
looked on the question of obtaining fitting employment.”144
An exception to the simple story of white supremacy was the obvi
ous pro-Tokyo tilt of the “White”—or anticommunist—Russians.
Throughout Japanese-occupied Asia they earned a well-merited repu
tation for their slavish adherence to Japanese dictates. Hong Kong was
no exception. On the other hand, their treatment in postwar Hong Kong
underscored the continued viability of the doctrine of white supremacy
in that although they drove cars and exhibited other signs of affluence,
they did not attract British scrutiny—unlike Chinese collaborators, for
example. Some complained about how these Russians “made various
degrees of fortunes in gold bars, duress notes, etc.” during the war and
were now “living in ease” in Hong Kong. But such complaints were in-
frequent.145
There were also some Irish collaborators, many of whom had legit
imate grievances about British rule in their homeland and others who
felt they were not receiving their full due from white supremacy.
Among this group was Frank Henry Johnston. He was a radio broad-
caster for Tokyo occupation forces in China. His life had been one
mishap after another prior to that time. He was convicted of stealing
while living in Florida and later stole jewelry from the actress, Delores
Del Rio. He was deported to Ireland but somehow slipped back into the
310 CONCLUSION
C. M. Foure, editor of the pro-Tokyo Hong Kong News during the war,
was said to be cut from the same cloth as Boon. A “former Royal Navy
Commander,” he had commanded a gunboat in Canton in 1930. When
Chinese mobs attacked a “European settlement,” he “opened up on the
crowds,” an act “for which he was dismissed.” He became “violently
anti-Establishment” as a result, though not necessarily “anti-British.”
He was “something of an outcast from conventional society and had few
friends.” Back in Hong Kong he “went native,” residing in a “low class
Chinese slum.” He was also thought to have moved to the left politically,
which makes his alliance with the racial appeals of Japan all the more
striking. A former internee noted that “Most could not forgive his rabid
communism or that militancy with which he had advised the Chinese
trade guilds before the war. He was regarded as a traitor to his class, if
not to this country” and his “race.” Perhaps he thought that given white
supremacy, it was inevitable that Tokyo would prevail.154 John David
Provoo of the United States was “an American” who was also said to be
“Japanese-hearted.” He “spoke Japanese fluently” and taught the lan
guage in “Japan before the war.” He too came under legal fire.155
Then there were the much despised Eurasians, who contributed
their share to Tokyo’s war effort and were punished afterward. “D. W.
Luke, a Eurasian clerk” was said to be “the first Government servant to
offer his services to the Japanese.” One of these people of “mixed-race”
was said to be William Chang, alias Khan Mohammed, “a half-bred
Chinese Negro who claims himself [to be] an Indian.” And “Frank Lee,
alias Lesson,” who was “employed by the Texaco Oil Co. before the
war” was “said to be a Negro.”156 Another in the list was a tradition-
ally defined Eurasian, Joseph James Richards, who was tried for high
treason. Before the war he worked for the Japanese Consulate as an
“informer,” then for the Hong Kong News—the pro-Tokyo sheet—dur
ing the occupation. Apparently his mother was Japanese, for his father
was a “British Consul.” “In spite of that fact he received very little con
sideration, whereas on the other hand the Japs [sic] appreciated his
services.”157
Days after the surrender, the authorities put forward a “secret” and
“unanimous recommendation” that Sir Robert Kotewall “be detained
and brought to trial [this] being the only way in which to convict or
clear him satisfactorily in the eyes of the world.”158 However, his activ
ities and connections past and present were far too significant for such
a powerful personage to be derailed easily. During the famous 1925
312 CONCLUSION
The major war crimes trials were not held in Hong Kong but in Tokyo
and they were very different from their counterparts in Europe. For as
Yukiko Koshiro has put it, “The Tokyo War Crimes Trial was marked by
Eurocentrism in its legal ideas, its personnel, its historical thinking and,
as some observers have commented, by its racism.”160 This statement,
particularly the reference to racism, is not as provocative as it may ini
tially seem. B. V. A. Roling of the Netherlands was one of the eleven
judges at this important trial. He has declared that while “racial dis
crimination may have been one of the roots of the Pacific War,” this
could hardly be said about German and Italian aggression in Europe.
The Holocaust notwithstanding, “Tokyo had more judges than Nurem
berg—eleven instead of four, and we had twenty-eight defendants, five
more than at Nuremberg.” This was not the only major distinction he
drew between the two postwar trials. “Nobody wanted to defend
Hitler. That was impossible. You can’t defend the man who was behind
the genocide of the Jews and Gypsies. It was quite different in Japan.
The Japanese defended the action of Japan in this Asian land and in the
world, to liberate Asia and to change the world. And they had a case, in
this respect. . . . [The] Tokyo Trial was far more difficult and complicated
than the Nuremberg one. Nuremberg was a clear case of aggression to
dominate the European continent.”
Judge Roling viewed a number of Japanese leaders, including the
Foreign Minister, in a surprisingly sympathetic light, arguing that “less
than a quarter of a century later, the U.N. was doing precisely that
which had earned Hirota the death sentence,” that is, aggressively con-
fronting colonialism. Washington, he thought, took Tokyo more seri
ously than Nuremberg. Secretary of War Henry Stimson was “afraid
CONCLUSION 313
Even before the war ended, the colonial authorities were moving to
eliminate the more egregious aspects of white supremacy in Hong
Kong. Indeed, “During the war a secret draft, prepared in the Colonial
Office . . . stated that there should be no discrimination, statutory or oth
erwise, on racial grounds in post-war Hong Kong; every public servant
should be required to qualify in Cantonese.” By November 1945 Chi
nese were “occupying judicial and executive posts with responsibilities
unknown before the war.”163 After the chastening experience of Japan
ese occupation, a “new sense of egalitarianism was in the air. In Lon-
don, the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced that the age of
racial discrimination was over. In Hong Kong, the governor, proclaim
ing an end to inequality, repealed laws such as the one forbidding Chi
nese to live on The Peak.”164
314 CONCLUSION
Even the Labour Party “correspondent . . . saw in this influx the hidden
hand of ‘Uncle Joe’ Stalin. ‘Do you think,’ he confided . . . ‘this sudden
influx of 400 West Indians is a subtle move of Russia to create for us in
another twenty years time a Colour Question here?’”173 This was con
sistent with prewar policy when a “Tory M.P. for Tottenham” suggested
that “German Jews were better off in concentration camps than they
were in Britain.” In the 1930s “immigration officers were sending Jews
back to Germany.”174
Australia was little better. Jean Gittins, a Eurasian from Hong Kong,
who migrated to Australia after the war, quickly observed a “phobia”
toward the Chinese. This was reflected in the notorious witticism that
“two Wongs do not make a white.” She was asked by an immigration
officer if she were Chinese. “Fifty percent,” was her reply. He re
sponded, “Can you make it a little less?” She refused and complications
ensued. “It seemed that a person’s looks were all that mattered,” she
sighed.175
These were simple signs of what was to come in the tottering,
though still viable Empire. In July 1945, even before the war had con
cluded, Lindsay Ride of the Hong Kong resistance told the Colonial Of
fice in a “personal and confidential” message that he had “copies of [an]
application” for a soon to be opened postwar position, but “I note,” he
admonished, “there is a clause about European parentage.” The in
creasingly sensitive Ride inquired gently, “Is this meant to debar Chi
nese? . . . We have one or two excellent Chinese officers whom I think
you should take . . . especially . . . Francis Lee. . . . He was my secretary
in HKU.”176
Other reforms were easier to accept in that they did not necessarily
challenge the preeminence of those of “pure European descent.” Thus,
in 1946 a colonial bureaucrat advocated more radio broadcasts to the
Chinese in Hong and more libraries too, since “It cannot be said that the
Chinese are not fond of reading.” It is “necessary,” he said, “to establish
at least one good library in Hong Kong and one in Kowloon with a trav
elling library book service to all districts of the New Territories.” Draw
ing on his previous colonial experience elsewhere, he added that “such
a system has been carried out with great success in Northern Nigeria,
Trinidad, Jamaica and elsewhere.”177
Setting up more libraries in Hong Kong was actually part of a self-
described process of “dissemination of propaganda.” That it was “very
largely a continuation of the Psychological Warfare Unit” shows how
316 CONCLUSION
the war continued to resonate even after the cannons were stilled. There
were to be “British Council releases in the newspapers and Chinese
magazines.” The intention was not to “indulge in a Story Book Secret
Service” but “having somebody . . . who is able to walk around talking
to the Chinese, listen[ing] to them and generally speaking, to ascertain
their point of view on current matters.” This was viewed as critical
when the concept of colonialism itself was under siege. “Staff salaries
should be drastically revised and increased,” especially for the all-im
portant “translators,” without which the colonists would be deaf and
dumb. Perhaps not surprisingly, the “European papers welcomed” the
new initiative while “the Chinese press” was “slightly suspicious.”178
Chinese skepticism about British intentions was foremost in the
minds of those seeking to reconstitute the defense forces of Hong Kong
after the war. The question of who should be allowed into this force was
a leading agenda item in a late December 1946 meeting. “It was agreed
that five main communities had to be taken into consideration . . .
British (excluding Scottish) . . . Scottish . . . Portuguese . . . Eurasians . . .
Chinese.” There “were two diametrically opposed view points on this
subject, some members of the Committee holding that the Corps should
be entirely mixed without regard to race and others being of the opin
ion that it would be preferable to maintain the racial units as in the old
Corps.” Such meetings were held throughout the Empire. The choice
was simple: should the policies of “pure European descent” and segre
gation that had led to the occupation prevail, or should another course
be pursued?
It was decided to do some of both. “The Committee finally agreed
that the most satisfactory solution would be to have all the technical
personnel, Headquarter staff and Armoured Car Squadrons completely
mixed without regard to race.” The “two rifle companies would, how-
ever, be divided into British, Scottish, Portuguese, Eurasian and Chi
nese platoons.” This “arrangement would eliminate any criticism on
the score of racial discrimination and at the same time satisfy the un
doubted demand for some continuation of the tradition of the racial
units of the old Corps, though on a considerably diminished role.” Nat
urally, there were no Chinese—who formed a mere 95 percent or more
of the population—at this meeting.179
These tentative steps toward equality, halting in nature, were not
welcomed warmly by many Europeans. By early 1948 the “Council of
European Civil Servants” expressed a “vague resentment that lower
CONCLUSION 317
319
320 EPILOGUE
Though Japan had been expelled from Hong Kong and the occupied
territories and was said to be held in utter contempt by Asians because
of its wartime role, as a new century dawned, it was found that “things
Japanese have become immensely popular across East Asia, especially
among young people, many of whom adore Japanese music, movies,
television, animation, fashion and food. . . . In South Korea,” where anti-
Tokyo sentiment was very real, “Japanese-culture cafes and teahouses
EPILOGUE 323
whites,” he recalled later, “and you were adopted by all the whites be-
cause you were aligned with them for being from the mainland.”29
Others had a different perspective. A Eurasian, Clifford Matthews,
who fought in Hong Kong, later confessed that he did “not feel bitter
ness at all” toward Japan. “I feel more angry against Germany for all
their acts toward the Russians and Jews,” he confided. “I never felt bit
terly towards the Japanese at all because I knew there was a real . . .
racism too among British towards them and towards Chinese.”30 John
Streicker, a leader at Stanley camp—and no doubt many others—vehe
mently disagreed. Japan, he thought, “had learned to run before it could
walk.” Undoubtedly unaware of the condescension of his words, he
found a “nasty and vicious period of infancy” in this advanced nation,
in “which the spoilt child was never smacked by its western godpar
ents,” though “it may yet be not too late to re-educate this erring race.”
In the same vein he asked, “Will the beaten nation grow to a vicious, in-
corrigible delinquent, hating always the great powers sent to chastise
her, or will she, like a beaten dog, nuzzle the hand which administered
the beating?”31
Such provocative comments should be read in light of the curious
fact that many of those interned in Hong Kong embarked for a kind of
freedom in racially divided societies in Africa or Malaya, which
launched a bitter struggle against the main anti-Tokyo force: the Com
munists. John Fleming, a Scot and former partner in a major Hong Kong
firm, had been interned at Stanley but after the war he left for South
Africa where he “set up a cattle ranch near East London.”32 Ben Wylie,
once interned in Stanely, left for Durban.33 William Aneurin Jones and
his spouse, Evelyn—known to friends as “Johnnie”—were interned at
Stanley and both died in apartheid South Africa in 1972.34 Pen
nyfeather-Evans also apparently found the charged racial dynamics of
South Africa congenial, as he left internment in Hong Kong—and his
previous post as Chief of Police—for this politically divided land. Major
George Gray of Hong Kong “retired to Kenya where, as a District Com
mander of the Police Reserve, he saw action against the Mau Maus.”
Then it was off to South Africa for him too.35 Lance Searle, upon being
freed from internment, immediately “transferred to the Malayan Police
where he became well-known for his Special Branch work against the
Communist terrorists during the Emergency there.”36
Those of African descent had reason to think that the rise of Japan
and the Pacific War was of some consequence to them. The popular
326 EPILOGUE
Harlem journalist Roi Ottley observed in 1952 that the European colo
nial powers “inspire little hope in the hearts of black Africans, for losses
in the Far East cause Europe to hold all the more tenaciously to Africa
and to deal all the more arbitrarily and repressively with aspirations of
blacks.”37 Hyoe Murakami, a Japanese historian who fought in the Pa
cific War, concurred. “Japan was defeated in World War II,” he said, “yet
as a result of that war countries of Asia achieved independence, to be
followed in turn by those of Africa. . . . To say that Japan liberated those
countries would be going too far; yet without that great conflict that ex-
tended from Southeast Asia throughout the Pacific and that brought
Japan down in ruin, those countries would almost certainly not have
achieved independence so swiftly. The same goddess history that pun
ished Japan and the Japanese for their presumption also commanded
that the West should stop seeing itself as the sole standard-bearer and
arbiter of civilization.”38 Fujiwara Iwaichi, a major in Japanese intelli
gence during the war, added that after the war, “the white man’s con
trol over Asia lasting several hundred years has collapsed and has come
to an end. An unprecedented historical achievement has been realized
and its impact has been spreading to the Middle East, Africa and Latin
America like prairie fire.”39
The eminent British military historian, Basil Liddell-Hart, did not
disagree. The Pacific War—notably the fall of Singapore—meant that
“the white man had lost his ascendancy with disproof of his magic. The
realization of his vulnerability fostered and encouraged the post-war
spread of Asiatic revolt against European domination or intrusion.”40
Chu Shuen Choo, the son of a “planter” born in Malaya in 1921, blamed
London for the bias he observed. He was struck by the “unfairness
given to the Communists during the victory parade” after the surren
der. “They were not given enough recognition for their services during
the war,” he thought. “It’s always the rich people who stand to win all
these wars. The winners are always the rich people. It’s the middle class
and the lower class who suffered the most.”41
Needless to say, many in Asia—not to mention elsewhere—did not
recall Japan’s occupation so positively, no matter what the alleged long-
term beneficial consequences. After the war, the racial underpinnings of
the war were downplayed and newer myths more congenial to white
supremacy arose. Thus, in the prize-winning Hollywood cinematic ex
travaganza, Bridge on the River Kwai, Japanese officers exploded in rage
because they supposedly did not have the technical knowledge to build
EPILOGUE 327
329
330 NOTES TO THE PREFACE
twenty, thirty, or even fifty races all progressing toward some unique destiny and possessing
peculiar racial traits. Then a “new race consciousness” emerged which divided the world into
about five racial groups according to “color,” not nationality.
17. For a useful exploration of the construction and intricacy of white supremacy, see, e.g.,
George M. Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African His-
tory, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Recently Dan Waters, a veteran observer of
Hong Kong, has written, “Because white Americans, Australians and other whites originated
from European stock, the term ‘European,’ to cover all “Westerners’ or ‘Caucasians’ is common
in Hong Kong.” See Dan Waters, Faces of Hong Kong: An Old Hand’s Reflections, Singapore: Pren
tice Hall, 1995, p. ix. However, when I resided in Hong Kong in 1999–2000 I noticed that the
term “European” was rarely used; instead the imprecise term “Westerner” seemed to be the
phrase of choice. I found this curious in that it was intended to describe Europeans and Euro-
Americans who came from west of Hong Kong, and Euro-Australians and Euro-New Zealan
ders who came from east of Hong Kong. Moreover, the preference for the term “Westerner”
over “white” seemed to me to relate to its “geographic” and ostensibly nonracial character, no
small thing in a region that had endured singeing racial tribulations. I discuss the use of such
terms in my study of colonial Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa where “it was discovered
that boards which used the word ‘European’ instead of ‘white’ caused confusion among white
tourists from the United States of America, Canada and Australia, among others, who joined the
‘non-Europeans’ in their inferior situations. Thousands of boards with the words ‘Europeans’
and ‘non-Europeans’ were scrapped and replaced with ones reading ‘white’ and ‘non-white.’”
See Gerald Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe,
1965–1980, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p. 306.
18. David K. Yoo, Growing Up Nisei: Race, Generation and Culture among Japanese-Americans of
California, 1924–1929, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000, pp. 2, 10, 163. I strive through-
out to distinguish between “racial” discrimination and other forms of discrimination, for ex-
ample, that which stems from national origin bias.
19. Barry Sautman, ed., Racial Identities in East Asia, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology, no date, circa 1996, p. i.
20. Henry Lethbridge, “Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: Changes in Social Struc
ture,” in Ian Jarvie, ed., Hong Kong: A Society in Transition, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1969, 77–127, p. 95.
21. W. Somerset Maugham, On a Chinese Screen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 78.
22. W. Somerset Maugham, The Painted Veil, London: Heinemann, 1978, p. 166.
23. W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay toward a History of the
Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880, New
York: Russell & Russell, 1956, pp. 15–16. See also Eric Foner, “American Freedom in a Global
Age,” American Historical Review, 106 (Number 1, February 2000): 1–16, p. 3.
24. Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History, New York: Norton,
1997, pp. 169, 186.
25. See, e.g., Gerald Horne, Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946–1956, London:
Associated University Presses, 1988; Gerald Horne, Black Liberation/Red Scare: Ben Davis and the
Communist Party, Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1994.
26. Matthew Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict dur
ing the Algerian War for Independence,” American Historical Review, 105 (Number 3, June 2000):
739–769, pp. 753, 768.
27. Ronald Takaki, Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II, Boston:
Little Brown, 2001, pp. 148, 171.
28. See, e.g., New York Herald Tribune, 5 April 1942, and Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma:
Volume II, The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, New Brunswick: Transaction, 2000, p. 1438.
29. See, e.g., Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945, Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
30. Sato Masaharu and Barak Kushner, “”Negro Propaganda Operations’: Japan’s Short-
Wave Radio Broadcast for World War II Black Americans,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and
Television, 19 (Number 1, March 1999): 5–26, p. 5.
31. Suke Wolton, Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office and the Politics of Race and Empire in the Second
World War: The Loss of White Prestige, New York: St. Martin’s, 2000, pp. 48, 50.
32. David Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century,
1919–1963, New York: Henry Holt, p. 467.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION 331
29. Peter Duus, “Nagai Ryutaro and the ‘White Peril,’ 1905–1944,” Journal of Asian Studies, 31
(Number 1, November 1971): 41–48, pp. 42, 47. The author calls for a “more complex assessment
of Japanese nationalism.”
30. Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present, London:
HarperCollins, 1996, pp. 77, 78.
31. Judd, Empire, p. 74–75, 82.
32. Buck Clayton, Buck Clayton’s Jazz World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 71.
33. Lewis Bush, Clutch of Circumstance, Tokyo: Okyuma, 1956, p. 197.
34. Ellen Field, Twilight in Hong Kong, London: Frederick Muller, 1960, p. 59. When she passed
a Japanese soldier in occupied Hong Kong, Ellen Field muttered, “Good morning, you little yel
low monkey.”
35. Benjamin Proulx, Underground from Hong Kong, New York: Dutton, 1943, p. 135.
36. O. D. Gallagher, Retreat in the East, London: George G. Harrap, 1942, pp. 110, 149.
37. Barbara Tuchman, Sand against the Wind: Stilwell and the American Experience in China,
1911–1945, London: Macmillan, 1970, p. 127.
38. See G. B. Endacott, Hong Kong Eclipse, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 325.
39. See David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia, 1850–1939, Queensland:
University of Queensland Press, 1999, pp. 3, 178.
40. Robert S. Vaillant, “The Selling of Japan: Japanese Manipulation of Western Opinion,
1900–1905,” Monumenta Japponica, 29 (Number 4, Winter 1974): 425–438, p. 416.
41. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York: Norton, 1997, p. 147.
42. B. Nicolaevsky, “Russia, Japan and the Pan-Asiatic Movement to 1925,” Far Eastern Quar
terly, 8 (Number 3, May 1949): 259–295, pp. 260, 270, 272, 273, 277.
43. C. M. Turnbull, “Sir Cecil Clementi and Malaya: The Hong Kong Connection,” Journal of
Oriental Studies, 22 (Number 1, 1984): 33–60, p. 36.
44. W. P. Morgan, Triad Societies in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Government Press, 1960, p. 24.
45. Paul M. A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang K’ai-Shek: A Political Study, Boston: World
Peace Foundation, 1943, p. 259.
46. Janice R. MacKinnon and Stephen R. MacKinnon, Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times of an
American Radical, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p. 226.
47. South China Morning Post, 5 January 1990.
48. Chan Lau Kit-Ching, From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong
Kong, 1921–1936, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999, p. 177l.
49. China Mail, 6 October 1945.
50. Morgan, Triad Societies in Hong Kong, pp. 25, 71.
51. T’in-wei Wu, “Contending Forces during the War of Resistance,” in James C. Hsiung and
Steven I. Levine, eds., China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945, Armonk, New York:
M. E. Sharpe, 1992, 51–78, pp. 64, 72. See also “Statements by Japanese Officers concerning Se
cret Negotiations between Chinese and Japanese Representatives, early 1944, Prior to the Fall of
Kweilin,” Box 10, 5072; “[Japanese] Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War [by Japanese],
Box 9, 5043; “Enemy Publication No. 278, Japanese Account [of] Malaya Campaign, 1941–42,”
JAPAL, Imperial War Museum—London.
52. John J. Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plan for Conquest after Pearl Harbor,
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 34, 35. See also Hanama Tasaki, Long the Imperial Way,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950.
53. Agnes Keith, Three Came Home: A Woman’s Ordeal in a Japanese Prison Camp, London:
Eland, 1985, p. 7. The author encountered a Japanese American from Seattle toiling for Tokyo in
Borneo.
54. George Wright-Nooth, with Mark Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and
Heroics—Hong Kong 1941–1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1994, p. 224.
55. Attorney General to Hon. C.S., 7 February 1947; Tseng Yu-hao and Denis Victor, 25 Janu
ary 1947, HKRS, 156–1–1045 Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
56. Christopher Hibbert, The Great Mutiny: India, 1857, New York: Viking, 1978.
57. Christopher Thorne, The Far Eastern War: States and Societies, 1941–1945, London: Unwin,
1986, p. 181.
58. New York Times, 27 May 1944.
59. W. E. B. Du Bois, “Prospect of a World without Race Conflict,” American Journal of Sociol
ogy, 49 (Number 5, March 1944): 450–456, pp. 451, 453.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 333
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1. Interview with Lucien Brunet, 26 November 1995, Oral History Project, Hong Kong Museum
of History.
2. Robert B. Hammond, Bondservants of the Japanese, San Pedro, Calif.: Sheffield Press, 1943, p.
7.
3. South China Morning Post, 18 November 1971.
4. H. J. Lethbridge, “Caste, Class and Race in Hong Kong before the Japanese Occupation,”
in H. J. Lethbridge, ed., Hong Kong: Stability and Change, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1978, 163–237, p. 178.
5. Peter Wesley Smith, “Discriminatory Legislation in Hong Kong,” Paper presented at Hong
Kong Baptist University, June 1987, 0842. PWS.Uf, Special Collections, Hong Kong Collections,
Hong Kong University.
6. Paul Gillingham, At the Peak: Hong Kong between the Wars, Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1985, p.
128.
7. Lewis Bush, The Road to Inamura, London: Robert Hale, 1961, p. 159.
8. Percy Chen, China Called Me: My Life Inside the Chinese Revolution, Boston: Little, Brown,
1979, p. 385.
9. Alexander Grantham, Via Ports: From Hong Kong to Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1965, p. 107.
10. Letter from T. H. Reid, Esq., 13 August 1899, HKRS 58-1-14, Public Records Office—Hong
Kong.
11. Proposal, 28 April 1919, HKRS, 58-1-192 (7), Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
12. Letter from W. Schofield with attachment, 15 September 1930, HKRS 58-1-87 (8), Public
Records Office—Hong Kong.
13. Gillingham, At the Peak, p. 8.
14. Chris Elder, ed., China’s Treaty Ports: Half Love and Half Hate, Hong Kong: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1999, p. 118.
15. Robert Blake, Jardine Matheson: Traders of the Far East, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1999, p. 242.
16. Emily Hahn, China to Me: A Partial Autobiography, Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1944, p. 110.
17. Vertical File—”Biographical,” Marjorie Angus, History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
18. George Wright-Nooth, with Mark Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and
Heroics—Hong Kong 1941–1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1994, p. 21.
19. Hermann Joseph Hiery, The Neglected War: The German South Pacific and the Influence of
World War I, Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1995, p. 76.
20. Wing Chung Ng, “Becoming ‘Chinese Canadian’: The Genesis of a Cultural Category,” in
Elizabeth Sinn, The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 1998, pp. 203–215.
21. Barbara W. Tuchman, Sand against the Wind: Stilwell and the American Experience in China,
1911–1945, London: Macmillan, 1970, p. 174.
22. Liang Yen, The House of the Golden Dragons, London: Souvenir Press, 1961, p. 234.
23. Interview, Major Albert Hood, 006243/03, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
24. Interview, Andrew Salmon, 005202/04, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London. U.
M. Streatfield moved to Bombay in the 1930s; there she was shocked by the presence of the
“multitudes” who “slept in the streets, you had to step over sleeping bodies.” See Narrative of
U. M. Streatfield, 87/1/1, Imperial War Museum—London.
25. Frank Ching, The Li Dynasty: Hong Kong Aristocrats, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1999, p. 98.
26. Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism, 1900–1949, Manches
ter: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 174.
27. Dan Waters, Faces of Hong Kong: An Old Hand’s Reflections, Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1995,
p. 142.
28. Interview, John Sutcliffe Whitehead, 006020/10, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—
London.
29. Alice Y. Lan and Betty M. Hu, We Flee from Hong Kong, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1944,
p. 56.
30. Kenneth Andrew, Chop Suey, Devon: Arthur Stockwell, 1975, p. 122.
334 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
31. Ken Cuthbertson, Nobody Said Not to Go: The Life, Loves and Adventures of Emily Hahn, New
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1998, p. 132.
32. Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism, 1900–1949, Manches
ter: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 81. See Elder, China’s Treaty Ports, p. 10.
33. Bernard Wasserstein, Secret War in Shanghai: Treachery, Subversion and Collaboration in the
Second World War, London: Profile, 1999, p. 12.
34. Chris Elder, China’s Treaty Ports, p. 214.
35. Interview, John Sutcliffe Whitehead, 006020/10, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—
London.
36. Kenneth Andrew, Diary of an Ex-Hong Kong Cop, Cornwall: United Writers, 1979, p. 52.
37. Gillingham, At the Peak, p. 11.
38. Man Wah Leung Bentley, “Remembrances of Times Past: The University and Chungk
ing,” in Clifford Matthews and Oswald Cheung, eds., Dispersal and Renewal: Hong Kong Univer
sity during the War Years, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998, 105–107, p. 106. Hong
Kong University maintained separate statistical categories for “Eurasians” and “Jews,” among
others. See “Statistics of Pre-War Enrolment [sic] 1937–1941,” “Section: Statistics (44)” “file” No.
44/1, “Dead File;” Registrar to Vice-Chancellor, 15 April 1939, Registry, Hong Kong University.
39. Norman MacKenzie, “An Academic Odyssey: A Professor in Five Continents (Part 2),” in
Matthews and Cheung, Dispersal and Renewal, 179–191, p. 184.
40. South China Morning Post, 24 October 1999.
41. C. M. Turnbull, “Sir Cecil Clementi and Malaya: The Hong Kong Connection,” Journal of
Oriental Studies, 22 (Number 2, 1984): 33–60.
42. Shinoa Airlie, Thistle and Bamboo: The Life and Times of Sir James Stewart Lockhart, Hong
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 57. See also Cuthbertson, Nobody Said Not to Go, p. 136.
43. Varda Priver, “The Jewish Community of Hong Kong,” HKRS 365-1-520, Public Records
Office—Hong Kong; see also HKRS 58-1-23 (51). On the Eurasian Cemetery, see HKRS 58-1-69
(17).
44. James Bertram, The Shadow of War: A New Zealander in the Far East, 1939–1946, London:
Victor Gollancz, 1947, pp. 80–81.
45. South China Morning Post, 11 September 1983.
46. Wright-Nooth, with Adkin, Prisoner of the Turnip Heads, p. 30.
47. Norman MacKenzie, “An Academic Odyssey: A Professor in Five Continents,” in
Matthews and Cheung, Dispersal and Renewal, 25–38, p. 25.
48. Lethbridge, “Caste, Class and Race in Hong Kong before the Japanese Occupation,” in
Lethbridge, Hong Kong, pp. 163–237.
49. Bickers, Britain in China, p. 72.
50. Emily Hahn, Hong Kong Holiday, Garden City: Doubleday, 1946, p. 199.
51. Bickers, Britain in China, p. 97.
52. Bickers, Britain in China, p. 61.
53. Hahn, China to Me, p. 209.
54. William G. Sewell, Strange Harmony, London: Edinburgh House, 1947, p. 113.
55. Lethbridge, “Caste, Class and Race in Hong Kong Before the Japanese Occupation,” in
Lethbridge, Hong Kong, 163–237, pp. 170, 179.
56. Blake, Jardine Matheson, p. 141.
57. Hong Kong News, 9 January 1942.
58. Hong Kong News, 31 January 1942.
59. Hong Kong News, 20 February 1942.
60. Oral History, Graeme Crew, 006118/04, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
61. Interview, Major Albert Hood, 006243/03, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
62. Interview, Charles Drage, 006131/05, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
63. Vertical File—Biographical, “B-Miscellaneous,” Harold Bates, History Workshop, Hong
Kong University.
64. Kate Whitehead and Nury Vittachi, After Sex: Sex in South China, Hong Kong: Chameleon,
1997, p. 32.
65. Kenneth Andrew, Hong Kong Detective, London: John Long, 1962, p. 44.
66. Interview, Harry Sidney George Hale, 006125/12, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—
London.
67. Charles Higham, Wallis: Secret Lives of the Duchess of Windsor, London: Sidgwick & Jack-
son, 1988, p. 35.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 335
68. Anton Gill, Ruling Passions: Sex, Race and Empire, London: BBC Books, 1995, p. 37. See
also p. 67: One British officer went a step further than the energetic Sellon. “I naturally prefer
to satisfy myself with a woman, a friend and a lady of my own class,” he began soberly be-
fore succumbing to an untramelled licentiousness, “but in the absence of the best I gladly take
the next best available, down the scale from a lady for whom I do not care, to prostitutes of
all classes and colours, men, boys and animals, melons and masturbation.”
69. Lethbridge, “Caste, Class and Race in Hong Kong Before the Japanese Occupation,” in
Lethbridge, Hong Kong, p. 177.
70. H. D. Bryan, U. K. Consulate, Kweilin, to Lindsay Ride, 15 January 1943, Folder 88,
MSS840, Lindsay Ride Papers, Australian War Memorial—Canberra.
71. Andrew, Chop Suey, p. 121.
72. Wright-Nooth, with Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads, p. 19.
73. Elder, China’s Treaty Ports, p. 195.
74. Interview, Charles Drage, 006131/05, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
75. Gill, Ruling Passions, pp. 48, 53.
76. Bickers, British in China, p. 101.
77. Elder, China’s Treaty Ports, p. 184. See also p. 200: Christopher Isherwood, who visited
China in 1938, encountered another brand of affection. He visited a “bathhouse where you
were erotically soaped and massaged by young men. You could pick your attendants and
many of them were beautiful. . . . It was like a sex fantasy.” The idea that men of one “race”
were being sexually subordinated by men of an allegedly superior “race” was at the heart of
the opposition to white supremacy.
78. Esther Holland Jian, British Girl—Chinese Wife, Beijing: New World Press, 1985, pp. 20,
33.
79. See Vertical File—Biographical, “Sir Sidney Gordon,” History Workshop, Hong Kong Uni
versity. See also South China Morning Post, 3 September 1988.
80. Gillingham, At the Peak, p. 11.
81. Dan Waters, Faces of Hong Kong: An Old Hand’s Reflections, Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1995,
p. 124.
82. Hahn, China to Me, p. 348.
83. Vertical File—Biographical, “Ho Tung Family,” History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
South China Morning Post, 22 July 1989.
84. Jean Gittins, Stanley: Behind Barbed Wire, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1982,
pp. 8, 11, 12, 14.
85. Wasserstein, Secret War in Shanghai, pp. 183, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192.
86. “South Pacific Command, Intelligence Summaries No. 9 to 31-1942,” 12 February 1942,
AWM 422/7/8, #423/11/172, Australian War Memorial.
87. Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore, 1941–1942: The Japanese Version of the Malayan Campaign of
World War II, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 295.
88. Carmen Blacker, The Japanese Enlightenment: A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1964, pp. xi, 135, 138, 164.
89. Warren Cohen, East Asia at the Center: Four Thousand Years of Engagement, New York: Co
lumbia University Press, 2000, p. 351.
90. Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908–1923, London:
Athlone Press, 1972, p. 271.
91. Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, in Elting Morrison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roo
sevelt, Volume 5, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 717.
92. David P. Rapkin, “The Emergence and Intensification of U.S.-Japan Rivalry in the Early
Twentieth Century,” in William Thompson, ed., Great Power Rivalries, Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1999, 337–370, p. 350.
93. Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History, New York: Norton,
1997, pp. 5, 24, 36, 38, 101, 113. See also Miwa Kimitada, “Japanese Opinions on Woodrow Wil
son in War and Peace,” Monumenta Nipponica, 22 (Numbers 3–4, 1967): 368–389.
94. Fred H. Matthews, “White Community and ‘Yellow Peril,’” Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, 50 (Number 4, March 1964): 612–633, p. 612.
95. Proceedings of the Asiatic Exclusion League, 5 January 1908, Box 1, Asiatic Exclusion
League Papers, Labor Archives and Research Center, San Francisco State University.
96. Raymond Leslie Buell, “The Development of Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United
States,” Political Science Quarterly, 37 (Number 4, December 1922): 605–638, p. 621.
336 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
97. First International Convention of the Asiatic Exclusion League, 3 February 1908, Box 1,
Asiatic Exclusion League Papers, Labor Archives and Research Center, San Francisco State University.
98. Democratic Party Platform, 1900, Part 6, Carton 1, Hiram Johnson Papers, University of Cal
ifornia—Berkeley.
99. Native Sons of the Golden West, circa 1915, Part 3, Box 62, Hiram Johnson Papers, Univer
sity of California—Berkeley.
100. Noriko Kawamura, Turbulence in the Pacific: Japanese-U.S. Relations during World War I,
101. Colonel House to Woodrow Wilson, 2 February 1918, in Charles Seymour, ed., The Inti-
mate Papers of Colonel House, Volume 3, London: Ernest Benn, 1928, p. 403.
102. Colonel House to A. J. Balfour, 4 March 1918, in Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Pa
105. Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Pre-War
106. Sterling Seagrave, The Yamato Dynasty: The Secret History of Japan’s Imperial Family, New
107. William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, 8 March 1915, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume 2, Washington, D.C.: Gov
108. Count Sei-Ichiro Terashima, “Exclusionists Not True to the Principles of American
Founders,” in Naoichi Masaoka, ed., Japan to America, New York: G. P. Putnam, 1915, 64–69, p.
64.
109. Memorandum from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 25 March 1919, Box 249, Stanley Hornbeck Pa
110. Memorandum to “the Honorable Secretary of State,” 4 April 1919, Box 251, Stanley Horn-
beck Papers.
111. Memorandum to U.S. Secretary of State, 28 April 1919, Box 251, Stanley Hornbeck Papers.
113. Letter from Frances Hewitt, 8 November 1919, Claremont Colleges Library, California.
114. Tuchman, Sand against the Wind, pp. 24, 87, 127, 174.
Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Volume I: Japan-U.S. Talks in 1941, Tokyo: Foreign Ministry
of Japan, 1990.
117. “Anti-British Propaganda,” Japan Advertiser, 9 May 1933, Box 1, Paul Hibbert Clyde Pa
pers—Duke University.
Northern Steamship Company, Kemble Maritime Ephemera, Huntington Library—San Marino, Cal
ifornia.
119. Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Rev
olution of the 1920s, Hanover: University Press of New England, 1991, p. 73.
120. Report, 19 January 1942, Box 299, Stanley Hornbeck Papers—Stanford University.
121. I. L. Shauer to Tom Collins, 28 February 1935, MS 164, File 13, Thomas Collins Papers, Ari
122. Memoranda, 3 March 1937, 2 April 1937, 24 March 1937, CO 54/948/6, Public Records Of
fice—London.
123. From the Air Ministry, “Royal Air Force Cadetships: Question of Colour Bar,” 7 July
125. Lethbridge, “Caste, Class and Race in Hong Kong before the Japanese Occupation,” in
126. Memoranda, “Judicial Offices: Appointment of Officers Not of Pure European Descent,”
127. “Judicial Appointment to—of Officers Not of Pure European Descent,” 2 May 1936.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1. Reginald Kearney, African American Views of the Japanese: Solidarity or Sedition? Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1998, p. xxvi.
2. As this was the term used predominantly during the times to which I am referring, I will,
from time to time, use the archaic term “Negro” to describe those now termed “African Amer
ican.”
3. Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940, Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997, p. 60.
4. Joseph Bryant, “The War in the Far East,” The Colored American Magazine, 9 (Number 3,
March 1905): 133–136, p. 134.
5. “The Effect of Togo’s Victory upon the Warfare between Races,” The Colored American Mag
azine, 9 (Number 1, July 1905): 347–348, p. 347.
6. “The Peace of Portsmouth,” The Colored American Magazine, 9 (Number 4, October 1905):
531–532, p. 531.
7. John E. Milholland, “The Negro and the Nation,” The Colored American Magazine, 9 (Num
ber 5, November 1905): 609–615, p. 611.
8. Rev. James Marmaduke Boddy, “The Ethnology of the Japanese Race,” The Colored Ameri
can Magazine, 9 (Number 4, October 1905): 577–585, p. 581.
9. Marc Gallicchio, The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism
in Asia, 1895–1945, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 93.
10. “Liberia’s Opportunity,” The Colored American Magazine, 12 (Number 3, March 1907):
167–168, p. 167.
11. “The California Muddle,” The Colored American Magazine, 12 (Number 3, March 1907):
168–169, p. 169.
12. W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Color Line Belts the World,” in Herbert Aptheker, ed., Writings by
W. E. B. Du Bois in Periodicals Edited by Others, Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus-Thomson, 1982, p. 330.
13. Booker T. Washington to Naoichi Masaoka, 5 December 1912, in Louis Harlan and Ray
mond W. Smock, eds., The Booker T. Washington Papers, Volume 12: 1912–1914, Urbana: Univer
sity of Illinois Press, 1982, p. 84.
14. Robert A. Hill, ed., The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Papers, Volume I,
1826–August 1919, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, p. 306.
15. Hill, Marcus Garvey Papers, Volume I, p. 312.
16. Robert A. Hill, ed., Marcus Garvey Papers, Volume III, September 1920–August 1921, Berke
ley: University of California Press, 1984, pp. 136–138.
17. Robert A. Hill, ed., Marcus Garvey Papers, Volume II, 27 August 1919–31 August 1920, Berke
ley: University of California Press, 1983, pp. 83–85.
18. Hill, Marcus Garvey Papers, Volume III, p. 62.
19. Hill, Marcus Garvey Papers, Volume III, pp. 138, 632.
20. Theodore Kornweibel, ed., Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917–1925): The First
World War, the Red Scare and the Garvey Movement, Frederick, Md.: University Publications of
America, 1985, Memorandum from Office of Naval Intelligence, 18 March 1922, Reel 23, #686.
21. Memorandum, 18 March 1922, Reel 22, #689, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans.
22. Report, Week ending 12 May 1920, Reel 17, #531, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans.
23. Kathleen Skaten, 30 April 1921, Reel 22, #1075, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans.
24. Robert A. Hill, The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, Vol
ume VII (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 506. See also Negro World, 14 June
1924.
25. Karl Evanzz, The Messenger: The Rise and Fall of Elijah Muhammad, New York: Pantheon,
1999, pp. 104, 110, 135, 138, 144, 145, 404. It is intriguing that the inspiration of the group that
was to become the NOI—W. D. Fard—was reported to have been born in New Zealand. His
“sidekick” and “best friend” was a “Chinese American.”
26. Harry Dean, Umbabla: The Adventures of a Negro Sea-Captain in Africa and on the Seven Seas
in His Attempt to Found an Ethiopian Empire, London: George H. Harrap, 1929, pp. 20, 93.
338 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
27. George Schuyler, Empire, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991, pp. 51, 71. See af
terword by Robert A. Hill and Kent Rasmussen, p. 281.
28. Kevin K. Gaines, Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics and Culture in the Twentieth
Century, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996, p. 206.
29. J. E. Bruce, The Call of a Nation, no date, Group D, Manuscript F 10-5, Schomburg Center for
Research in Black Culture—New York City.
30. David Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century,
1919–1963, New York: Holt, 2000, p. 392. There was more about Garvey and black unrest in the
1924 book The Negro Problem, by one Mitsukawa Kametaro, the founder of an ultranationalist
society.
31. Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois, p. 219.
32. W. E. B. Du Bois, Dark Princess, Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1995, pp. 150, 151,
262, 297.
33. California Eagle, 5 September 1914.
34. California Eagle, 29 January 1916.
35. California Eagle, 2 March 1918.
36. New York Amsterdam News, 12 May 1934.
37. New York Amsterdam News, 9 June 1934. See also Patrick J. Washburn, A Question of Sedi
tion: The Federal Government’s Investigation of the Black Press during World War II, New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1986, p. 261.
38. Walter White, A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White, Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 1995, p. 69.
39. Hazel Rowley, Richard Wright: The Life and Times, New York: Holt, 2001, p. 15.
40. Lawrence S. Little, “A Quest for Self-Determination: The African Methodist Episcopal
Church during the Age of Imperialism, 1884–1916,” Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University,
1993, p. 227.
41. New York Amsterdam News, 12 September 1923.
42. A’Leila Bundles, On Her Own Ground: The Life and Times of Madam C. J. Walker, New York:
Scribner, 2001, p. 258.
43. Kornweibel, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans, Report by George Holman, 24 October
1919, Reel 13, #0072.
44. Kornweibel, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans, Memorandum to Assistant Chief of
Staff, War Department, 24 July 1924, Reel 23, #372.
45. Kornweibel, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans, Memorandum from A. A. Hopkins, 26
July 1921, Reel 23, #379.
46. Kornweibel, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans, Memorandum for Colonel Enochs, 9
May 1921, Reel 22, #0198.
47. Ephemera re: Delilah Leontium Beasley, 1871–1934, MS 133, California Historical Society—
San Francisco.
48. Eric Arnesen, Brotherhoods of Color: Black Railroad Workers and the Struggle for Equality,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 154.
49. David Lowman, Magic: The Untold Story of U.S. Intelligence and the Evacuation of Japanese
Residents from the West Coast during World War II, no place: Athena, 2001, pp. 131, 147, 252.
50. Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois, p. 416.
51. Kornweibel, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans, E. P. Eldredge to Director of Naval In
telligence, 12 September 1933, Reel 20, #547.
52. Kornweibel, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans, Memorandum, 1 June 1934, Reel 20,
#580.
53. Pittsburgh Courier, 29 October 1938. See also New York Amsterdam News, 30 March 1935;
New York Amsterdam News, 27 July 1935; New York Amsterdam News, 29 August 1936.
54. Kornweibel, Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans, Village President of Madison County,
Illinois to Chief, Bureau of Intelligence, 15 December 1933, Reel 20, #559.
55. J. Lawson to B. D. Amis, 5 April 1932, Reel 234, delo 3038, Records of CPUSA, Library of
Congress.
56. Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois, p. 390.
57. Roi Ottley, Inside Black America, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948, pp. 256, 257.
58. Roi Ottley, New World A-Coming, New York: Arno Press, 1968, pp. 329, 330.
59. J. Edgar Hoover to Jonathan Daniels, 11 August 1943, Official File, Box 6, 4245g, Franklin
D. Roosevelt Presidential Library.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 339
62. New York Amsterdam News, 5 February 1938. See also New York Amsterdam News, 7 July
1939.
63. Gallicchio, The African American Encounter with Japan and China, p. 107.
64. Intercepted Message from Nomura in Washington, D.C., to Tokyo, 4 July 1941, Box 2,
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. Interview, Harold Robert Yates, 005216/10, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
2. Memorandum to Secretary of State, 10 July 1940, Box 206, Stanley Hornbeck Papers—Stan
ford University.
3. Memorandum to Secretary of State, 9 July 1940, Box 206, Stanley Hornbeck Papers.
4. Governor Sir G. Northcote to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 May 1941, Reel 12, Vol
ume 27943, FO 371, British Foreign Office: Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945, Wilmington: Schol
5. Memorandum from Colonial Office, 16 June 1941, Reel 12, Volume 27943, British Foreign
6. Memorandum, 30 May 1941, Reel 12, Volume 27943, No. 13179/1/42, British Foreign Office:
7. Gwen Priestwood, Through Japanese Barbed Wire, New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, pp. 1,
2.
8. Interview, Joan Cummack, 5 July 1995, Oral History Project, Hong Kong Museum of History.
9. George Baxter, Personal Experiences during the Siege of Hong Kong, December 8th–25th, Hong
10. John Streicker, Captive Colony: The Story of Stanley Camp, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Collec
11. “Indexes, Bibliographies, Catalogues,” File “Maryknoll Mission,” Father James Smith, M.
M., “The Maryknoll Mission, Hong Kong, 1941–1946,” History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
12. Interview, Brigadier R. C. B. Anderson, 005251/04, Sound Archives, Imperial War Mu
seum—London.
13. Chohong Choi, “Hong Kong in the Context of the Pacific War: An American Perspective,”
14. James Bertram, The Shadow of War: A New Zealander in the Far East, 1939–1946, London:
15. Colin Crisswell and Mike Watson, The Royal Hong Kong Police, Hong Kong: Macmillan, no
date, p. 8.
16. “Supplement of the London Gazette, 29 January 1948,” HKMS, 100-1-5, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
17. “Indexes, Bibliographies, Catalogues,” File “Maryknoll Mission,” History Workshop, Hong
Kong University.
18. G. A. Leiper, A Yen for My Thoughts: A Memoir of Occupied Hong Kong, Hong Kong: South
20. Emily Hahn, China to Me: A Partial Autobiography, Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1944, p. 265.
21. Gwen Dew, Prisoners of the Japs, New York: Knopf, 1943, pp. 58, 73, 82, 89, 96.
23. Memorandum, 29 January 1942, Reel 2, Volume 35940, F5476/6/23, British Foreign Office:
24. “Indexes, Bibliographies, Catalogues,” File “Maryknoll Mission,” History Workshop, Hong
Kong University.
25. Robert K. M. Simpson, These Defenceless Doors: A Memoir of Personal Experience in the Bat
tle of Hong Kong and After, Hong Kong Collections: Hong Kong University, MF 2521408, no date,
p. 133.
26. Vertical File, “Events—1941 Siege,” Off-Beat, 3–16 January 1996, published by Police Pub
27. Interview, Victor Robert Joseph Merrett, MBE, AFS, MSAAT, 006124/10, Sound Archives,
28. Ellen Field, Twilight in Hong Kong, London: Frederick Muller, 1960, pp. 58, 67, 84.
29. Priestwood, Through Japanese Barbed Wire, p. 25.
30. Field, Twilight in Hong Kong, p. 78.
31. “Vertical File—Biographical, M. A. Cohen,” Chief Constable, Edmonton, Canada to C.
Becker, Acting Deputy, Attorney General of Alberta, 14 July 1925, History Workshop, Hong Kong
University.
32. Daniel S. Levy, Two-Gun Cohen: A Biography, New York: St. Martin’s, 1997, pp. 209, 212.
33. Simpson, These Defenceless Doors, p. 133.
34. Benjamin A. Proulx, Underground from Hong Kong, New York: Dutton, 1943, p. 124.
35. David Bosanquet, Escape through China, London: Robert Hale, 1983, pp. 11, 49.
36. Phyllis Harrop to Colonial Secretary, 7 April 1942, Volume 31820, Reel 3, British Foreign
Office: Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1980.
37. Freddie Guest, Escape from the Bloodied Sun, London: Jarrolds, 1957, p. 32.
38. Robert L. Gandt, Seasons of Storms: The Siege of Hongkong 1941, Hong Kong: South China
Morning Post, 1982, p. 84.
39. “Kweilin Intelligence Summary No. 73,” “Confidential Sheet 25,” 3 November 1944,
HRRS 211-2-32, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
40. Statement by E. C. Ford, 31 December 1941, “Memos of the Battle for Hong Kong and Im
pressions of a Prison Camp by R. S. M. (I.G.) Ford. E. C.,” Special Collections: Hong Kong Uni
versity. This memorandum can also be found at HKMS 100-1-6, Public Records Office—Hong
Kong. See also “English Translations of Japanese Documents in Japanese Occupation in Hong
Kong,” HKLB 940.547252 E58, Special Collections: Hong Kong University.
41. Sir Arthur Dickinson Blackburn, “An Account of Personal Experiences of My Wife and
Myself at Hongkong during the Japanese Attack and Afterwards,” Hong Kong Collections:
Hong Kong University, MSS 940.547252, 1942.
42. Barbara Sue-White, Turbans and Traders: Hong Kong’s Indian Communities, Hong Kong: Ox-
ford University Press, 1994, pp. 30, 39, 182.
43. Interview, Alan Jackson Wood, 004792/06, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
See also Gary Wayne Catron, “China and Hong Kong, 1945–1967,” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University, 1971, p. 27.
44. Oral History, Harold Robert Yates, 005216/10, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—Lon
don.
45. Interview, James Allan Ford, 13128/5, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
46. James Allan Ford, The Brave White Flag, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961, p. 215.
47. Vertical File, “Events–1941–1945 War, B. Yates, Esq.” History Workshop, Hong Kong Univer
sity.
48. Vertical File, “Events–1941 Siege,” Off-Beat, published by Police Public Relations Branch,
Hong Kong, 3–16 January 1996, History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
49. Robert B. Hammond, Bondservants of the Japanese, San Pedro, Calif.: Sheffield Press, 1943,
p. 24.
50. James Bertram, The Shadow of War: A New Zealander in the Far East, 1939–1946, London:
Victor Gollancz, 1947, pp. 115, 121.
51. Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, London: Victor Gollancz, 1944, p. 359.
52. Vertical File, “Events, 1941–1945 War,” Letter to “Dear Mr. Birch,” circa December 1977,
History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
53. Paul Gillingham, At the Peak: Hong Kong between the Wars, Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1985,
pp. 130, 174.
54. Blackburn, “An Account of Personal Experiences of My Wife and Myself.”
55. George Wright-Nooth, with Mark Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and
Heroics—Hong Kong 1941 to 1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1994, p. 35.
56. Norman Miners, “The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947,” Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 18 (Number 3, October 1990): 296–315, pp. 297, 299, 300, 310,
311.
57. Narrative of Mrs. D. Ingram, 93/18/1, Imperial War Museum—London.
58. Interview, Lucien Brunet, 26 November 1995, Oral History Project, Hong Kong Museum of
History.
59. Interview, Kenneth M. Baxter, 31 March 1995, Oral History Project, Hong Kong Museum of
History.
60. Ford, “Memos of the Battle for Hong Kong.”
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 341
61. Chan Lau Kit-ching, From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong
62. Memorandum from B. C. K. Hawkins, 19 May 1955, HKRS 163-1-670, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
63. Miners, “The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force,” 296–315, p. 300.
65. Han Suyin, Birdless Summer: China, Autobiography, History, London: Jonathan Cape, 1968,
pp. 235–236. See also Memorandum from Lindsay Ride, 25 April 1945, HKMS 100-1-5, Public
66. Edwin Ride, BAAG: Hong Kong Resistance, 1942–1945, Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1981, p. 5.
68. From “Admiralty” to Governor of Hong Kong, “Most Secret,” 21 December 1941, HKMS
70. Memorandum, 29 January 1942, Reel 2, Volume 35940, British Foreign Office: Japan Corre
spondence, 1941–1945.
71. Memorandum from Sir Arthur D. Blackburn, May 1942, Reel 2, Volume 35940, British For
72. Despatch No. 13, Chungking Legation, 5 February 1942, A5954 (A5954/69), #527/15, Na
73. Phyllis Harrop to Colonial Secretary, 7 April 1942, Reel 3, Volume 31820, British Foreign
74. Baxter, Personal Experiences during the Siege of Hong Kong, p. 22.
76. Gwen Dew, “Horrors in Hong Kong,” November 1942, Geoffrey Emerson Papers, History
78. “Indexes, Bibliographies, Catalogues,” File “Maryknoll Mission,” History Workshop, Hong
Kong University.
80. Interview, James Allan Ford, 13128/5, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
82. Memorandum to U.S. Secretary of State, 14 March 1942, Box 206, Stanley Hornbeck Papers.
83. Jack Edwards, Banzai, You Bastards, Hong Kong: Corporate Communications, 1989, p. 45.
84. Interview, Clifford Matthews, 25 November 1996, Oral History Project, Hong Kong Museum
85. Levy, Two-Gun Cohen, p. 212. Even after the Communists came to power, Cohen main
tained positive relations with Peking. In 1955 a “confidential” report to Hong Kong’s Secretary
of State reported that he had “arrived in Hong Kong and is reported to be leaving for
Peking. . . . He is going at the invitation of the Chinese government and with the knowledge of
State, Hong Kong, from Governor’s Deputy, 15 December 1955, History Workshop, Hong Kong
University.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. John Streicker, Captive Colony: The Story of Stanley Camp, Hong Kong, HK 940.547252 S8,
2. Bill Harman to “My Dear,” 9 March 1942, MS 7724, Bill Harman Papers, National Library of
Australia—Canberra.
M., “The Maryknoll Mission, Hong Kong, 1941–1946,” History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
4. David Bosanquet, Escape through China, London: Robert Hale, 1983, p. 40.
6. Report, “Civilian Internment Camp. Stanley. Hong Kong. Health Report.” 6 March 1946,
7. Undated, unidentified, mimeographed report, circa 1945, HKRS 163-1-81, Public Records
Office—Hong Kong.
8. Robert S. Ward, Asia for the Asiatics? The Techniques of Japanese Occupation, Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1945, pp. 57, 79.
9. Robert S. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques
of Control, “Restricted,” “Detailed to the Far Eastern Unit Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com
merce Department”: Washington, D.C., 1943, pp. ii, 24, 90, 94, 104 (read at Hong Kong Univer
sity).
10. Ian Morrison, Our Japanese Foe, New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1943, p. 152.
11. Otto D. Tolischus, Tokyo Record, New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943, pp. 3, 71, 186–187,
407.
12. Robert L. Gandt, Season of Storms: The Siege of Hongkong, 1941, Hong Kong: South China
Morning Post, 1982, p. 21.
13. Emily Hahn, China to Me: A Partial Autobiography, Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1944, pp. 311,
312, 321.
14. Sir Arthur Dickinson Blackburn, “An Account of Personal Experiences of My Wife and
Myself at Hongkong during the Japanese Attack and Afterwards,” Hong Kong Collections: Hong
Kong University, MSS 940.547252, 1942.
15. John Streicker, Captive Colony, 4–12, pp. 5–8.
16. Undated Report from Sir Franklin Gimson, circa 1945, HKRS 163-1-81, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
17. Alan Birch and Martin Cole, Captive Colony: The Occupation of Hong Kong, 1941–1945,
Hong Kong: Heinemman, 1982, p. 50.
18. The text of Sir Franklin’s letter can be found in Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupa
tion, p. 21.
19. Undated Report from Sir Franklin Gimson, circa 1945, HKRS, 163-1-81, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
20. John Streicker, Captive Colony, pp. 7–15. See also “Provisional Lists of Foreign (other than
Japanese) casualties, Prisoners of War and Internees in Hong Kong compiled in the month fol
lowing the surrender of British Forces to the Japanese,” circa early 1942, HKRS 112D/S1/1, Pub
lic Records Office—Hong Kong.
21. Ellen Field, Twilight in Hong Kong, London: Frederick Muller, 1960, pp. 101–102.
22. Sir Franklin Gimson, “Account of Internment in Stanley and the Restoration of British
Rule to Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Collections: Hong Kong University, MSS 940.547252 G 49 I, circa
1972.
23. Phyllis Harrop to Colonial Secretary, 7 April 1942, Volume 31820, Reel 3, British Foreign
Office: Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1980.
24. Hahn, Miss Jill, p. 226.
25. Edwin Ride, BAAG: Hong Kong Resistance, 1942–1945, Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1981, p. 5.
26. Lewis Bush, The Road to Inamura, London: Robert Hale, 1961, p. 170.
27. G. B. Endacott, Hong Kong Eclipse, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978.
28. Anthony Hewitt, Bridge with Three Men: Across China to the Western Heaven in 1942, Lon-
don: Jonathan Cape, 1986, p. 4.
29. Interview, Lucien Brunet, 26 November 1995, Oral History Project, Hong Kong Museum of
History.
30. Gwen Priestwood, Through Japanese Barbed Wire, New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, pp.
66–67.
31. Bosanquet, Escape through China, p. 45.
32. John Streicker, Captive Colony, pp. 13–15.
33. I. D. Zia, The Unforgettable Epoch (1937–1945), Hong Kong Collections: Hong Kong University,
HK 940.548151 Z6, circa 1969, p. 37.
34. File—Author, “Archer, B.” Bernice Archer, “Stanley Interment Camp, Hong Kong,
1942–1945,” Bristol Polytechnic, B.A., 1992, p. 78, History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
35. Jean Gittins, Stanley: Behind Barbed Wire, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1982,
p. 77.
36. Benjamin A. Proulx, Underground from Hong Kong, New York: Dutton, 1943, p. 150.
37. Robert B. Hammond, Bondservants of the Japanese, San Pedro, Calif.: Sheffield Press, 1943,
p. 28.
38. National Maritime Union Pilot, 11 September 1942.
39. Streicker, Captive Colony, pp. 13–14.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 343
40. Ralph Goodwin, Passport to Eternity, London: Arthur Baker, 1957, p. 61.
41. Robert K. M. Simpson, These Defenceless Doors: A Memoir of Personal Experience in the Bat
tle of Hong Kong and After, Hong Kong Collections: Hong Kong University, MF 2521408, no date, p.
168.
42. R. B. Goodwin, Hongkong Escape, London: Arthur Baker, 1953, p. 28.
43. Geoffrey Charles Emerson, “Stanley Internment Camp, Hong Kong, 1942–1945: A Study
of Civilian Internment during the Second World War,” M.Phil. thesis, University of Hong Kong,
1973, p. 138.
44. George Wright-Nooth, with Mark Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and
Heroics—Hong Kong 1941–1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1994, p. 74.
45. Blackburn, “An Account of Personal Experiences of My Wife and Myself.” See also Agnes
Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, London: Victor Gallancz, 1944, p. 362.
46. George Baxter, Personal Experiences during the Siege of Hong Kong, December 8th–25th, 1941,
Hong Kong Collections: Hong Kong University, 940.5425 B35, circa 1942, pp. 31.
47. Daniel S. Levy, Two-Gun Cohen: A Biography, New York: St. Martin’s, 1997, pp. 217,
226–227.
48. Thomas F. Ryan, S.J., Jesuits under Fire in the Siege of Hong Kong, 1941, London: Burns,
Oates and Washbourne, 1944, p. 102.
49. Ward, Asia for the Asiatics? pp. 175–176.
50. “Indexes, Bibliographies, Catalogues,” File “Maryknoll Mission,” History Workshop, Hong
Kong University.
51. Church Review, July 1942, HKMS 110-1-1, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
52. William G. Sewell, Strange Harmony, London: Edinburgh House, 1947, pp. 103, 113, 119.
53. Proulx, Underground from Hong Kong, p. 135.
54. Les Fisher, I Will Remember: Recollections and Reflections on Hong Kong, 1941 to 1945—In-
ternment and Freedom, Totton, Hampshire, U.K.: Fisher, 1996, p. 73.
55. Wright-Nooth, with Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads, p. 77. As with other aspects of in
ternment, it is useful to speculate on whether similar traits developed among enslaved Africans
in North America—and whether a residue of such traits continues to persist.
56. Gittins, Stanley, p. 149.
57. William G. Sewell, Strange Harmony, London: Edinburgh House, 1947, p. 115.
58. Levy, Two-Gun Cohen, pp. 226–227.
59. Hahn, China to Me, p. 360.
60. Gittins, Stanley, p. 50.
61. National Maritime Union Pilot, 31 July 1942.
62. Sir Franklin Gimson, “Diary of Events,” April 1943, HKMS 100-1-6, Public Records Office—
Hong Kong.
63. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation, p. 99.
64. Gittins, Stanley, p. 66.
65. Streicker, Captive Colony, pp. 5–16.
66. Streicker, Captive Colony, pp. 8–11.
67. Gwen Dew, Prisoner of the Japs, New York: Knopf, 1943, pp. 117, 142.
68. Kenneth Andrew, Hong Kong Detective, London: John Long, 1962, p. 92.
69. Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present, London:
HarperCollins, 1996, pp. 145, 223.
70. Oral History, Major Reginald Graham, 006181, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—
London.
71. Oral History, Harry Sidney George Hale, 006125/12, Sound Archives, Imperial War Mu
seum—London.
72. Wright-Nooth, with Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads, p. 89.
73. Oral History, Billy Strachan, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
74. Oral History, Billy Strachan, 10042/5/1, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
75. Oral History, Harold Robert Yates, 005216/10, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—Lon
don.
76. Sir Franklin Gimson, “Account of Internment in Stanley and the Restoration of British
Rule to Hong Kong Kong,” circa 1972, MSS 940.547252 G 49 I, Hong Kong Collections: Hong Kong
University.
77. Bernard Wasserstein, Secret War in Shanghai: Treachery, Subversion and Collaboration in the
Second World War, London: Profile, 1999, p. 63.
344 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
78. “Diary of Events,” March–April 1943, HKRS 163-1-80, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
79. Gittins, Stanley, p. 117.
80. Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific, New York: Mor
row, 1994, pp. 22, 44, 315, 346.
81. Oral History, Alan Jackson Wood, 004792/06, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—Lon
don.
82. Undated report, unidentified author, circa 1945, HKRS 163-1-81, Public Records Office—
Hong Kong.
83. Undated report from Sir Franklin Gimson, circa 1945, HKRS, 163-1-81, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
84. “Diary of Events,” December 1942, HKRS 163-1-80, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
85. Wenzell Brown, Hong Kong Aftermath, New York: Smith & Durrell, 1943, pp. 114, 115, 127,
129, 158, 192, 197, 198, 224.
86. Chart of Hong Kong Leaders, 27 June 1944, HKRS 211-2-35, Public Records Office—Hong
Kong.
87. Hahn, China to Me, p. 328. See also Vertical File—Biographical, “Kotewall, Robert,” His-
tory Workshop, Hong Kong University. This file contains correspondence from Andrew Whitfield
of Birmingham University concerning CO 968/120/1, at the Public Records Office in London
concerning “Colonial Renegades in the Far East.”
88. Report by Eugenie Zaitzeff, 6 December 1943, HKRS 211-2-40, Public Records Office—Hong
Kong.
89. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation, pp. 24, 42, 58, 60.
90. “The Preliminary Report of the Hong Kong War Damage Claims Commission,” circa
1947, HKRS 258-5-7, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
91. “Proposed Record Talk by E. J. Wayne” for the BBC, 10 July 1946, HKRS 41-1-978, Public
Records Office—Hong Kong.
92. Martin Booth, The Dragon Syndicates: The Global Phenomenon of the Triads, Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1999, p. 174. See also “Chinese Collaborators (Surrender) Ordinance,
1947,” HKRS 46-1-14, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
93. Memorandum from G. Moore, CID, HQ, 26 January 1948, HKRS 163-1-670, Public Records
Office—Hong Kong.
94. Memorandum from G. Moore, 9 July 1948, HKRS 163-1-800, Public Records Office—Hong
Kong.
95. Memorandum, 11 July 1947, 41-1-2240, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
96. Jill McGivering, Macao Remembers, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.
107–111.
97. Stanley Ho, Vertical File—Biographical, Discovery, April 1996, History Workshop, Hong
Kong University.
98. Stanley Ho, Vertical File—Biographical, Kaleidoscope, undated, volume 3, number 1, History
Workshop, Hong Kong University.
99. South China Morning Post, 11 March 2000.
101. “Foreign Companies Registered under Japanese Law in Hongkong,” 12 September 1944,
HKRS 123-5-240-B, Public Records Office—Hong Kong. The Chinese companies included Mei Ah
Knitting Company, Dah Chung Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Shanghai Commercial Bank, Industrial
Bank of China—all of Shanghai. See also “Companies Incorporated in Japan Registered in
Hongkong during Occupation,” from 1 July 1944 to 13 July 1945, 123-5-240-A, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong. There were quite a few on this list from Taiwan, including Kabusiki Kaisa Tai
wan Ginko (the Formosa Bank Ltd.).
102. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation, p. 41.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1. See, e.g., Gerald Horne, Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s, Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1995, passim.
2. Marc Gallicchio, The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism
in Asia, 1895–1945, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 121.
3. Harold Brackman, “”A Calamity Almost beyond Comprehension’: Nazi Anti-Semitism
and the Holocaust in the Thought of W. E. B. Du Bois,” American Jewish History, 88 (Number 1,
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 345
March 2000): 53–94, p. 70. Hans J. Massaquoi, a black American born in Germany in 1926, lived
there throughout the war; though harassed, his dark skin did not cause him to suffer anything
like the persecution suffered by the Jews. See Hans J. Massaquoi, Destined to Witness: Growing
Up Black in Nazi Germany, New York: Morrow, 1999, passim.
4. David Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century,
1919–1963, New York: Holt, 2000, pp. 398, 468.
5. H. Van Straelen, The Far East Must Be Understood, London: Luzac & Co., 1945, p. 86.
6. Roi Ottley, Inside Black America, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948, pp. 251, 252.
7. To “Hon. Colonial Secretary,” 4 September 1941, 1B/5/77/49, CSO 750, 1941, Jamaica Na
tional Archives. Hubert Julian, the daredevil pilot and soldier of fortune whose roots were in
Trinidad was among the black New Yorkers whose anticommunism helped to attract him to the
Axis, in this case Mussolini’s Italy. See Hubert Julian, Black Eagle, London: Jarrolds, 1964, pp. 41,
44, 114.
8. Brenda Gayle Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902–1915, Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1988, p. 29; Hans Schmidt, The United States and the Occupation of Haiti,
1915–1934, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995, p. 92.
9. New York Amsterdam News, 16 November 1940.
10. Walter White, A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White, Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 1995, p. 220.
11. New York Amsterdam News, 20 December 1941.
12. Marc Gallicchio, The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black International-
ism in Asia, 1895-1945, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 89.
13. Reginald Kearney, African American Views of the Japanese: Solidarity or Sedition? Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1998, p. 117.
14. Ottley, Inside Black America, p. 266.
15. George Schuyler column, 12 February 1944, Reel 7, George Schuyler Papers, Syracuse Uni
versity.
16. New York Amsterdam News, 12 February 1944.
17. Hugh Mulzac, A Star to Steer By, New York: International, p. 23.
18. New York Amsterdam News, 22 June 1940.
19. New York Amsterdam News, 30 January 1929.
20. New York Amsterdam News, 5 October 1940. He continued, “Five hundred years of history
and experience have taught the white race nothing. Its leaders are just as vicious, rapacious and
hypocritical as mankind has ever been, but somebody is now on the gallows to pay, and they
should and must.”
21. Saul K. Padover, “Japanese Race Propaganda,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 7 (Number 2,
Summer 1943): 191–204, pp. 197–199, 204.
22. Negro World, 31 December 1921.
23. Negro World, 28 May 1921. See also Jeffrey B. Perry, ed., A Hubert Harrison Reader, Mid
dletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2001, p. 230.
24. See, e.g., W. E. B. Du Bois, “Listen, Japan and China,” Crisis, 40 (January 1933): 20, in Her
bert Aptheker, ed., Writings in Periodicals Edited by W. E. B. Du Bois: Selections from The Crisis,
Millwood: Kraus-Thomsom, 1983, p. 682: “Remember Japan that white America despises and
fears you. Remember China that England covets your land and labor. Unite! Beckon the three
hundred million Indians; drive Europe out of Asia. . . . Get together China and Japan, cease
quarreling and fighting! Arise and lead! The world needs Asia.” See also Negro World, 31 De
cember 1921.
25. W. E. B. Du Bois, “Japan and China,” The Crisis, 39 (March 1932): 93.
26. See, e.g., Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to
the Cold War, 1944–1963, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.
27. New York Amsterdam News, 18 November 193l. J. A. Rogers also thought that the existence
of a strong Japan had motivated the United States to recognize the Soviet Union. See, e.g., New
York Amsterdam News, 28 April 1934.
28. New York Amsterdam News, 16 August 1941.
29. W. E. B. Du Bois, Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1945,
pp. 58–59.
30. Du Bois, Color and Democracy, pp. 58–59.
31. Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois, p. 414.
32. New York Amsterdam News, 15 March 1941.
346 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
33. James Weldon Johnson, Along This Way, Harmondworth: Penguin, 1941, pp. 198, 200.
34. Oklahoma Black Dispatch, 27 September 1928.
35. Kansas City Call, 19 October 1928.
36. Patrick J. Washburn, A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government’s Investigation of the
Black Press during World War II, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 75.
37. Pittsburgh Courier, 28 March 1942.
38. George Schuyler column, 12 March 1943, Reel 7, George Schuyler Papers.
39. Afro-American, 15 January 1938. See, e.g., James Ford, The Negro and the Democratic Front,
New York: International, 1938.
40. New York Amsterdam News, 17 February 1932.
41. New York Amsterdam News, 9 March 1932.
42. George Schuyler column, 14 September 1940, Reel 7, George Schuyler Papers.
43. New York Amsterdam News, 12 March 1938.
44. New York Amsterdam News, 30 September 1939.
45. New York Amsterdam News, 17 January 1942.
46. New York Amsterdam News, 3 August 1940.
47. San Francisco News, 2 March 1942.
48. Robert Hill, ed., The FBI’s RACON: Racial Conditions in the United States during World War
II, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995, p. 512.
49. New York Amsterdam News, 29 November 1941.
50. New York Amsterdam News, 13 December 1941.
51. New York Amsterdam News, 3 January 1942; Elinor Des Verney Sinnette, Arthur Alfonso
Schomburg: Black Bibliophile and Collector, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989, p. 167.
52. New York Amsterdam News, 10 January 1942.
53. Chicago Herald American, 23 September 1942; Eric Walter Clemons, “Japanese Race Propa
ganda during World War II: A Comparative Analysis of Propaganda Tactics in Southeast Asia
and the West,” 213–236, p. 227, in Barry Sautman, ed., Racial Identities in East Asia, Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, no date.
54. New York Amsterdam News, 21 March 1942.
55. New York Amsterdam News, 8 August 1942.
56. People’s Voice, 8 August 1942.
57. New York Amsterdam News, 21 March 1942.
58. New York Amsterdam News, 14 February 1942.
59. New York Amsterdam News, 21 February 1942.
60. Deposition of Keith Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Southern District Court of New
York, Box 1049, R33.18.2.5, C-113-264, United States v. James Thornhill, National Archives—New
York City.
61. Roi Ottley, New World A-Coming, New York: Arno Press, 1968, p. 336.
62. Hill, The FBI’s RACON, pp. 7, 191, 532.
63. People’s Voice, 28 February 1942.
64. People’s Voice, 26 December 1942.
65. Karl Evanzz, The Messenger: The Rise and Fall of Elijah Muhammad, New York: Pantheon,
1999, p. 126.
66. New York Amsterdam News, 28 February 1942.
67. Robert O. Jordan to Hachiro Arita, 18 November 1936, A461, ET/11, Diplomatic Archives—
Tokyo.
68. Letter from “Pacific Movement of Chicago, USA,” 14 December 1933, CO 554/95/8, Pub
lic Records Office—London.
69. People’s Voice, 28 February 1942; People’s Voice, 7 March 1942.
70. People’s Voice, 21 March 1942.
71. Ottley, Inside Black America, p. 261.
72. Affadavit by Ketih Brown, circa 1942, CR-113-40, R33.18.2.4, Box 1044, National Archives—
New York City.
73. Ottley, Inside Black America, p. 263; Ottley, New World A-Coming, p. 337. Other pro-Tokyo
elements who were arrested included “Stokley Delmar Hart, president of the Brotherhood of
Liberty; Charles Newby, alias Father Divine Nassam, president of the Colored American Na
tional Organization. Mrs. A. Moore, secretary of the Brotherhood and ‘prophet’ Elijah Muham
mad.” See New York Amsterdam News, 26 September 1942. See also New York Amsterdam News, 3
October 1942: Among those arrested in Chicago was Frederic H. Hammurabi Robb, “African
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 347
born” and influential in the Windy City. He studied at the University of London and obtained
a law degree from Northwestern University.
74. New York Amsterdam News, 6 February 1943.
76. Philip A. Klinkner, with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of
77. Tony Matthews, Shadows Dancing: Japanese Espionage against the West, 1939–1945, London:
78. Speeches of John E. Rankin of Mississippi in the House, 18 February 1942 and 23 February 1942,
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942, MS 11158, California Historical Society—
San Francisco.
79. Hill, The FBI’s RACON, pp. 81, 104, 129, 305, 350, 397. See J. Edgar Hoover to SAC, 28 April
1942, Roll 1, Section 3, #0133, FBI File on the NAACP. Most alarming for the United States was
the fact that when the Japanese sank two British warships early in the war, two black workers
in the War Department itself “called out to each other, “We just got the ‘Repulse’ and ‘Prince of
Wales.’ Good hunting, eh?” See Klinkner, with Smith, The Unsteady March, p. 163. See also Beth
Tompkins Bates, Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black America, 1925–1945,
81. FBI Report, 12 June 1942, Roll 1, Section 3, #0145, FBI File on the NAACP.
82. Suke Wolton, Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office and the Politics of Race and Empire in the Second
World War: The Loss of White Prestige, New York: St. Martin’s, 2000, p. 49.
91. George Schuyler column, 17 June 1944, Reel 7, George Schuyler Papers.
92. In 1944 Schuyler wrote of what he termed “the Caucasian Problem.” See Jeffrey B. Leak,
ed., Rac[e]ing to the Right: Selected Essays of George S. Schuyler, Knoxville: University of Tennessee
93. Column by George Schuyler, 20 November 1943, Reel 7, George Schuyler Papers.
94. J. F. Anderson to “Dear Sir,” 9 December 1944, 3676, Earl Warren Papers, California State
Archives—Sacramento.
95. O. L. Turner to Governor Earl Warren, 24 February 1944, 3676, Earl Warren Papers, Califor
96. L. G. Brattin to Earl Warren, 24 August 1943, 3676, Earl Warren Papers, California State
Archives—Sacramento.
97. Theodore Roosevelt McCoin to “Dear President,” 25 October 1943, RG 211, War Man-
power Commission, Regional Central Files, Box 32, Files 4–5, National Archives and Records Ad
98. Verne Scoggins to Mr. A. E. Shaw, 15 September 1943, F3640-3655, Earl Warren Papers, Cal
99. John D. Stockman to Earl Warren, 5 October 1943, F3640-3655, Earl Warren Papers, Califor
100. Memorandum, 15 March 1945, RG 228, Region XII, Box 25, entry n. 70, 12-BR-501, Na
101. Shirley Ann Wilson Moore, To Place Our Deeds: The African American Community in Rich
102. Ramlal B. Bajpai to Earl Warren, 21 July 1944, 3656, Earl Warren Papers, California State
Archives—Sacramento. See, e.g., New York Times, 9 February 1944; Baltimore Sun, 22 February
1944.
105. George Schuyler column, 29 May 1943, Reel 7, George Schuyler Papers. The novelist
Richard Wright agreed with Schuyler: “If government can force the migration of a whole
348 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
section of the population, and then wash its hands of further responsibility . . . that same tactic
can be used against other sections of the population, at any time, and in any situation the gov
ernment chooses to term an emergency.” New York Amsterdam News, 26 May 1945.
106. California Eagle, 18 December 1941.
107. California Eagle, 9 April 1942.
108. California Eagle, 23 April 1942: “Race in Vancouver fails to profit from Jap [sic] evacua
tion.” See California Eagle, 28 August 1942: “Trinity Baptist Makes Use of Jap [sic] Property.” An
editorial claimed that because of the internment, “the opportunities open to colored people are
fairly obvious.” See California Eagle, 30 April 1942.
109. People’s Voice, 21 February 1942.
110. Walter White, A Rising Wind, Garden City: Doubleday, 1945, p. 153.
111. Christopher Thorne, Border Crossings: Studies in International History, Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1988, p. 270.
112. Roi Ottley, No Green Pastures, London: John Murray, 1952, pp. 93, 153, 164.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1. Memorandum, 27 October 1941, NAB 354, FO 371/27986, National Archives of Singapore.
2. Far Eastern Department of British Foreign Office, London, to U.S., 17 February 1942, Reel
3, Volume 31821, F1584, British Foreign Office: Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945, Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources, 1980.
3. Memorandum from Far Eastern Department, British Foreign Office, 20 December 1941,
Volume 28062, Reel 20, F14109, British Foreign Office: Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945, Wilming
ton: Scholarly Resources, 1980. For expressions of pro-Tokyo sentiment among Japanese Cana
dians, see, e.g., Keibo Oiwa, ed., Stone Voices: Wartime Writings of Japanese-Canadian Issei, Mon
treal: Vehicule Press, 1991.
4. British Foreign Office, Reel 3, Volume 31823, F2219/132/23, Report on 8–9 January 1942
Conference in Ottawa.
5. Ian Nish, “Overseas Japanese, Overseas Chinese and British Justice, 1931,” in Brook Bar
rington, ed., Empires, Imperialism and Southeast Asia, Monash Asia Institute, Centre of Southeast
Asia Studies, Monash University, 1997, 113–125, p. 114, History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
6. Li Shu-Fan, Hong Kong Surgeon, London: Victor Gollancz, 1964, p. 143.
7. Paul Gillingham, At the Peak: Hong Kong between the Wars, Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1985,
pp. 130, 169.
8. George Wright-Nooth, with Mark Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and
Heroics—Hong Kong 1941–1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1994, p. 52.
9. Emily Hahn, Hong Kong Holiday, Garden City: Doubleday, 1946, p. 95.
10. George Harry Bainborough, 005210/04, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
11. Chohong Choi, “Hong Kong in the Context of the Pacific War: An American Perspective,”
M.Phil. thesis, Hong Kong University, 1998, pp. 16–17.
12. Owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia, Boston: Little Brown, 1945, p. 127.
13. Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History, New York: New
Press, 1992, pp. 51, 119, 164, 212, 379.
14. Russell Braddon, The Other 100 Years War: Japan’s Bid for Supremacy, 1941–2041, London:
Collins, 1983, p. 17.
15. Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore, 1941–1942: The Japanese Version of the Malayan Campaign of
World War II, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 295.
16. Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961,
p. 25.
17. Hong Kong News, 3 June 1943.
18. C. Calvin Smith, War and Wartime Changes: The Transformation of Arkansas, 1940–1945,
Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1986, p. 14.
19. John Stephan, “Hijacked by Utopia: American Nikkei in Manchuria,” Amerasia Journal, 23
(Number 3, 1997): 1–42, pp. 12, 30.
20. Yuki Ichioka, “Beyond National Boundaries: The Complexity of Japanese-American His-
tory,” Amerasia Journal, 23 (Number 3, 1997): viii–xi, p. viii.
21. Letter to Fred Farr, 3 February 1943, MS 5685, Fred Farr Papers, California Historical Soci
ety—San Francisco. See also http://www.nikkeiheritage.org, the website of the National Japan-
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 349
61. Raymond Lamont-Brown, Kempeitai: Japan’s Dreaded Military Police, Gloucestershire, U.K.:
Sutton, 1998, pp. 46, 103. See also Eriko Yamamoto, “Cheers for Japanese Athletes: The 1932 Los
Angeles Olympics and the Japanese-American Community,” Pacific Historical Review, 69 (Num
ber 3, August 2000): 399–430.
62. Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941–1945, London: Orion, 1998, p. 610.
63. Robert E. Hertzstein, Henry R. Luce: A Political Portrait of the Man Who Created the Ameri
can Century, New York: Scribner’s, 1994, p. 104.
64. Hertzstein, Henry R. Luce, pp. 101, 104. See also Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic
Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945, Boston: Little Brown, 1950; John K. Emmerson, The Japanese
Thread: Thirty Years of Foreign Service, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978; Charles W.
Cross, Born a Foreigner: A Memoir of the American Presence in Twentieth Century Asia, Boulder:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1999; Armin H. Meyer, Tokyo: An Ambassador’s Journal, Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1974.
65. Anthony Hewitt, Bridge with Three Men: Across China to the Western Heaven in 1942, Lon-
don: Jonathan Cape, 1986, p. 2.
66. Robert Blake, Jardine Matheson: Traders of the Far East, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1999, p. 241. See also Robert L. Gandt, Seasons of Storms: The Siege of Hongkong 1941, Hong Kong:
South China Morning Post, 1982, p. 30.
67. Vertical Files, “Events—1941–1945, War,” “B. Yates, Esq.,” History Workshop, Hong Kong
University.
68. Interview, Lance Sergeant Andrew Salmon, 005202/04, Sound Archives, Imperial War Mu
seum—London.
69. Dew, Prisoner of the Japs, p. 264.
70. Chohong Choi, “Hong Kong in the Context of the Pacific War,” pp. 42, 60.
71. Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941–1945, p. 612.
72. Oral History, Harold Robert Yates, 005216/10, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—Lon
don.
73. Interview, Lt. Col. Graeme Crew, 006118/04, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—Lon
don.
74. Dew, Prisoner of the Japs, p. 155.
75. Field, Twilight in Hong Kong, p. 146.
76. Gwen Terasaki, Bridge to the Sun, Tokyo: Charles Tuttle, 1984, p. 106.
77. Hong Kong News, 4 November 1943.
78. Hong Kong News, 28 April 1945.
79. Hong Kong News, 8 July 1942.
80. David Day, The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939–1942,
New York: Norton, 1989, p. 290.
81. Report on “Rex vs. George Wong,” circa 1946, HKRS 41-1-1338, Public Records Office—
Hong Kong.
82. South China Morning Post, 1 April 1946.
83. Robert S. Ward, Asia for the Asiatics? The Techniques of Japanese Occupation, Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1943, p. 90.
84. Hong Kong News, 25 December 1942.
85. John Streicker, Captive Colony: The Story of Stanley Camp, Hong Kong, HK 940.547252 S8,
Hong Kong Collections, Hong Kong University, pp. 1–2.
86. T’ien-wei Wu, “Contending Forces during the War of Resistance,” in James C. Hsiung and
Steven I. Levine, eds., China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945, Armonk, New York:
M. E. Sharpe, 1992, 51–78, p. 64.
87. Frank Ching, The Li Dynasty: Hong Kong Aristocrats, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1999, p. 123.
88. Wing-Tak Han, “Bureaucracy and the Japanese Occupation of Hong Kong,” in William H.
Newell, Japan in Asia, 1942–1945, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981, 7–24, p. 8.
89. Ken Cuthbertson, Nobody Said Not to Go: The Lives, Loves and Adventures of Emily Hahn,
New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1998, p. 215.
90. Hong Kong News, 26 December 1942.
91. Hong Kong News, 1 January 1943.
92. Wasserstein, Secret War in Shanghai, pp. 192, 194, 210, 250, 173.
93. Hahn, Hong Kong Holiday, p. 112.
94. Wright-Nooth, with Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads, p. 112.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 351
130. Oral History, Otto C. Schwarz, 7 August 1979, Number 497, North Texas State Univer
sity, Cruiser Houston Collection, University of Houston.
131. Kay Saunders and Helen Taylor, “The Reception of Black American Servicemen in Aus
tralia during World War II: The Resilience of “‘White Australia,’” Journal of Black Studies, 25
(Number 3, January 1995): 331–348, p. 337.
132. Bush, The Road to Inamura, p. 159.
133. Hahn, Miss Jill, pp. 247–248.
134. “The Stanley Journal,” 1943, British Women’s Group Minutes, HRMS 72, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
135. Geoffrey Charles Emerson, “Stanley Internment Camp, Hong Kong, 1942–1945: A Study
of Civilian Internment during the Second World War,” M.Phil. thesis, University of Hong Kong,
1973, p. 171.
136. Streicker, Captive Colony.
137. Notes from Bush, Clutch of Circumstance.
138. Bernice Archer, “Stanley Internment Camp, Hong Kong, 1942–1945,” B.A., Bristol Poly-
technic, 1992, p. 81.
139. Memorandum, 12 April 1945, HKRS 163-1-80, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
140. Memorandum, 13 April 1945, HKRS 163-1-80, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
141. Memorandum, 16 April 1945, HKRS 163-1-80, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
142. Minutes of Surgical Board, 27 March 1945, HKRS, 163-1-80, Public Records Office—Hong
Kong.
143. Memorandum, circa July 1945, HKRS 163-1-80, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
144. From “Representative of Internees” to “Camp Medical Officer,” 18 April 1945, HKRS
163-1-80, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
145. “Diary of Events,” September 1942, HKRS 163-1-80, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
146. Emily Hahn, China to Me: A Partial Autobiography, Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1944, p. 328.
147. Undated Report from Sir Franklin Gimson, circa 1945, HKRS 163-1-81, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
148. Hahn, Miss Jill, p. 250.
149. Lamont-Brown, Kempeitai, p. 70.
150. Sir Arthur Dickinson Blackburn, “An Account of Personal Experiences of My Wife and
Myself at Hongkong during the Japanese Attack and Afterwards,” MSS 940.547252, Hong Kong
Collections, Hong Kong University.
151. I. D. Zia, The Unforgettable Epoch (1937–1945) , circa 1969, HK 940.548151 Z6, Hong Kong
Collections, University of Hong Kong.
152. Streicker, Captive Colony, Hong Kong Collections, Hong Kong University.
153. Liang Yen, The House of the Golden Dragons, London: Souvenir Press, 1961, pp.
232–233.
154. Archer, “Stanley Internment Camp, Hong Kong, 1942–1945,” p. 71.
155. Emerson, “Stanley Internment Camp, Hong Kong, 1942–1945,” p. 219.
156. Hahn, Miss Jill, p. 248.
157. Winnie Davis, “Life in Hong Kong Before 1945,” for class of Elisabeth Sinn, circa Spring
1994, History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
158. Gwen Priestwood, Through Japanese Barbed Wire, New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, pp.
76, 77, 182.
159. Dew, Prisoner of the Japs, p. 267.
160. Dew, Prisoner of the Japs, p. 279.
161. Streicker, Captive Colony, Hong Kong Collections, Hong Kong University. See also “The
Diary of Inspector Fred Kelly of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force Compiled during His In
ternment in Stanley Detention Camp, 21 January–31 August 1945,” 940.547252 K29, Hong Kong
Collections, Hong Kong University.
162. Archer, “Stanley Internment Camp, Hong Kong, 1942–1945,” p. 80.
163. Suke Wolton, Lord Hailey: The Colonial Office and the Politics of Race and Empire in the Sec
ond World War: The Loss of White Prestige, New York: St. Martin’s, 2000, pp. 8, 41. See also London
Times, 4 March 1896.
164. Hahn, Hong Kong Holiday, pp. 212–213. See also Linda Bryden, “Sex, Race and Colonial-
ism: An Historiographical Review,” International History Review, 29 (Number 4, December 1998):
806–822; Sonya O. Rose, ‘The “Sex Question’ in Anglo-American Relations in the Second World
War,” International History Review, 29 (Number 4, December 1998): 884–903.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 353
165. “British Women’s Group Minutes,” 1942–1943, HKMS 72, Public Records Office—Hong
Kong.
167. Betty Jeffrey, White Coolies, London: Angus and Robertson, 1954, pp. 31, 45, 67, 97.
168. Sister Jessie Elizabeth Simons, In Japanese Hands: Australian Nurses as POWs, Melbourne:
HarperCollins, 1992, pp. 25, 49, 55, 70, 74–76, 82, 90, 97, 104–105, 108–109, 130, 135, 140, 148–150,
170. Report on Stanley, 6 March 1946, HKRS 163-1-81, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
172. “The Effects of the War Years on School-Children in Hong Kong,” Overseas Education 19
174. Oral History, Ralph Malcolm Macdonald King, 004655/04, Sound Archives, Imperial War
Museum—London.
175. “Divorces,” circa 1947, HKRS 163-1-503, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
176. Margaret Sams, Forbidden Family: A Wartime Memoir of the Philippines, 1941–1945, Madi
177. Report on Santo Tomas, 11 September 1944, A700, 9-11-24, Diplomatic Archives—Tokyo.
178. Michael S. Molasky, The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa: Literature and Mem
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
1. To “Acting Prime Minister” from R. Wang, et al. of “Association of New Zealand Born Chi
2. H. Van Straelen, The Far East Must Be Understood, London: Luzac & Co., 1945, p. 7.
3. Sean Brawley, “”No ‘White Policy’ in New Zealand,’: Fact and Fiction in New Zealand’s
Asian Immigration Record, 1946–1978,” Journal of New Zealand History, 27 (Number 1, April
1993): 16–36, pp. 16, 19. See also Victor Rine, Machiavelli of Nippon: Japan’s Plan of World Con-
quest: Willed by Emperor Meiji, Developed by Premier Tanaka, New York: The Wandering Eye,
1932.
Printer, 1972, pp. 8, 9. See also Alexander Howard and Ernest Newman, The Menacing Rise of
5. P. S. O’Connor, “Keeping New Zealand White, 1908–1920,” New Zealand Journal of History,
2 (Number 1, April 1968): 41–65, p. 52. Ninety percent of the Indians of New Zealand were Pun
jabi or Gujarati, and most were Hindus. There were also some Sikhs and Indians from Fiji. See
W. T. Roy, “Indians in New Zealand,” Journal of New Zealand Federation of Historical Societies, 1
6. Jacqueline Leckie, “In Defence of Race and Empire: The White New Zealand League of
7. Manying Ip, Dragons on the Long White Cloud: The Making of Chinese New Zealanders, North
8. Paul Spoonley, The Politics of Nostalgia: Racism and the Extreme Right in New Zealand, Palmer
10. Clipping, 25 February 1925, MA 29, Box 9, National Archives of New Zealand.
11. Rotorua Chronicle, 15 January 1925, MA 29, Box 9, National Archives of New Zealand.
12. J. G. Coates to G. Grindley, 17 July 1926, MA 29, Box 9, National Archives of New Zealand.
13. Letter, 21 January 1925, MA 29, Box 9, National Archives of New Zealand.
14. Memorandum to Sir James Parr, 28 February 1925; E. Blomfield to Sir James Parr, 4 Feb
ruary 1925; K. Pitiroi Mohi to Minister of Native Affairs, 29 January 1925, all in MA 29, Box 29,
15. Undated Clipping, Evening Post, MA 29, Box 9, National Archives of New Zealand.
16. New Zealand Times, 25 June 1924, MA 29, Box 9, National Archives of New Zealand.
17. New Zealand Herald, 19 January 1925, MA 29, Box 9, National Archives of New Zealand.
18. Clipping, 8 December 1921, MA 29, Box 9, National Archives of New Zealand.
19. Caroline Ralston, “The Pattern of Race Relations in 19th Century Pacific Port Towns,”
Journal of Pacific History, 6 (1971): 39–60, p. 45.
20. Charles Weeks, “The Last Exile of Apolosi Nawai: A Case Study of Indirect Rule during
the Twilight of the British Empire,” Pacific Studies 18 (Number 3, September 1995): 27–45, pp. 27,
29, 30, 32, 33, 39. See also Deryck Scarr, ed., More Pacific Island Portraits, Canberra: Australian Na
tional University, 1978.
21. Timothy J. McNaught, The Fijian Colonial Experience: A Study of the Neo-Traditional Order
under British Colonial Rule Prior to World War II, Canberra: Australian National University, Pa
cific Research Monograph, No. 7, 1982, pp. 76, 78, 149.
22. Acting Assistant Secretary to External Affairs and Cook Islands Department, 22 April
1941, EA 1, #83/3/5, National Archives of New Zealand.
23. Penelope Griffith, “Dr. Imasu Kawase and the First Book on New Zealand in Japanese,”
Turnbull Library Record, 9 (Number 1, May 1976): 12–17, p. 16.
24. Mark Johnston, Fighting the Enemy: Australian Soldiers and Their Adversaries in World War
II, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 85, 87.
25. David Day, The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939–1942,
New York: Norton, 1989, p. 325.
26. Hank Nelson, “The Troops, the Town and the Battle: Rabaul, 1942,” Journal of Pacific His-
tory, 27 (Number 2, December 1992): 198–216, pp. 207, 208, 214, 216.
27. Report on Black Dragon Society, undated, PR 88/178, J. L. Hehir Papers, Australian War
Memorial.
28. Reginald Clarry to Anthony Eden, 28 December 1937, FO 371/22177, NAB 349, National
Archives of Singapore.
29. Rosemary Campbell, “The Americans of Brisbane, 1942–1945,” M.A. thesis, University of
Sydney, 1986, pp. 126–127, MS 1192, Australian War Memorial.
30. Richard Hall, Black Armband Days: Truth from the Dark Side of Australia’s Past, Milsons
Point: Vintage, 1998, pp. 171, 180, 184.
31. Day, The Great Betrayal, p. 240.
32. W. E. Prentice to Stanley Weintraub, 26 June 1986, Misc 157, Letters concerning Pearl Har
bour, Imperial War Museum—London.
33. Emily Hahn, China to Me: A Partial Autobiography, Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1944, p. 204.
34. “Admission of Coloured Persons from Japan for Duration of the War,” 12 November 1940,
A433 (A433/1), #1940/2/2969, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
35. Memoranda, 20 May 194l, 7 September 1936, A659 (A659/1), #1941, 1/3100, National
Archives of Australia—Canberra.
36. “Aide-memoire” from “Chinese Legation,” circa December 1941; Secretary of Interior to
External Affairs, 20 December 1941, A981 (A981/4) #REF 16, National Archives of Australia—Can
berra.
37. “Espionage (Japanese),” “Most Secret,” 10 March 1944, A8911 (A8911/1), #11, National
Archives of Australia—Canberra.
38. Dutch Consul General in Sydney to Interior Department, 1 January 1942, A981 (A981/4),
#REF 16, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
39. Jean Gittins, Eastern Windows, Western Skies, Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1969,
p. 117.
40. Clipping, Daily News, 25 July 1940, A433 (A433/1), #1949/2/44, National Archives of Aus
tralia—Canberra.
41. Memorandum from A. R. Peters, 10 April 1941, A433 (A433/1), #1949/2/44, National
Archives of Australia—Canberra.
42. From the Interior Department to the Colonial Secretary, 21 April 1941, A433 (A433/1),
#1949/2/44, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
43. Clipping, Sun and Guardian, 11 May 1941, A433 (A433/1) #1949/2/44, National Archives of
Australia—Canberra.
44. Memorandum from Department of Interior, 4 September 1942, no. 42/2/2845, A433
(A433/1), #1949/2/44, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
45. A. Hubbard to H. J. Kilpatrick, China Command, “Hong Kong and Shanghai Evacuees—
Applications to Leave Hong Kong or Other Overseas Destinations,” 21 January 1941, A433
(A433/1), #1940/2/3117, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
46. Letter from “Mrs. Alice Standard,” circa 15 March 1941, “Hong Kong and Shanghai Evac
uees,” A433 (A433/1), #1940/2/2677, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 355
75. “Secret” Memorandum for “War Cabinet,” 9 January 1942, “Agenda No. 11/1942,” A981
(A981/4) #REF 16, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
76. Memorandum from Interior Department, 2 April 1942, “Chinese and Other Coloured
Persons Evacuated to Australia,” A433 (A433/1) #1949/2/5470, National Archives of Australia—
Canberra.
77. File on “Chinese and Other Coloured Immigration,” A433 (A433/1) #1944/2/53, Argus,
26 January 1944, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
78. Ross Mackay, “The War Years: Methodists in Papua, 1942–1945,” Journal of Pacific History,
27 (Number 1, June 1992): 29–43, pp. 31, 32, 35, 39, 41. See also Sydney Morning Herald, 2 Sep
tember 1942.
79. Memorandum, “Defence of New Caledonia since Outbreak of War with Japan, December
1941,” 17 November 1943, A5954 (A5954/69) #535/2, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
80. Memorandum from External Affairs Department, 23 October 1944, A989 (A989/1),
#1944/43/554/2/11, “Migration—Australia Sub-Committee No. (3b), Coloured Immigration,”
National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
81. Report from Australia Government, 11 August 1942; Report from War Cabinet, 19 Janu
ary 1942; Memorandum from Department of Labour and National Service, 13 January 1942,
A981 (A981/4), #WAR 35, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
82. “Secret” memorandum re: “Presence of United States Coloured Troops in Australia,” 2
February 1942, A2676 (A2676/1) #1848, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
83. Memorandum, 14 April 1944, “Presence of United States Coloured Troops in Australia,”
“Defence Co-Ordination,” A2684 (A2684/3), #1330, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
84. “Secret” Memorandum, 13 August 1942, A826 (A816/1), #19/312/116, National Archives
of Australia—Canberra.
85. Memorandum from Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom; Memo
randum from Office of Australia Military Liaison,” War Section-American Coloured Troops,”
A1608/1, #B45/1/10, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
86. Campbell, “The Americans of Brisbane, 1942–1945,” pp. 130, 136, 145.
87. “American Coloured Soldiers,” 1 August 1942, AWM 60 (AWM 60) #75/1/74, Australian
War Memorial—Canberra.
88. Day, The Great Betrayal, p. 324.
89. Kay Saunders and Helen Taylor, “The Reception of Black American Servicemen in Aus
tralia during World War II: The Resilience of “White Australia,’” Journal of Black Studies, 25
(Number 3, January 1995): 331–348, p. 337.
90. H. I. London, Non-White Immigration and the “White Australia’ Policy, New York: New York
University Press, 1970, p. 15.
91. Adam Shoemaker, Black Words/White Page: Aboriginal Literature, 1929–1988, St. Lucia: Uni
versity of Queensland Press, 1989, pp. 18, 20.
92. Paul W. van der Veur, “Political Awakening in West New Guinea,” Pacific Affairs, 36
(Number 1, Spring 1963): 54–73, p. 57.
93. Hong Kong News, 28 December 1943.
94. Hong Kong News, 19 June 1942.
95. Hong Kong News, 14 September 1942.
96. Hong Kong News, 15 September 1942.
97. “Official War History,” circa 1945, MA 1, #19/1/565, National Archives of New Zealand.
98. “Maori Conference,” clipping, Wellington Standard, 26 October 1944, MA 1, #19/1/535,
National Archives of New Zealand.
99. “Effect of War on Native Peoples of the South Pacific,” Taranaki Daily News, 11 January
1951, ITI, #IT 67/12/84, National Archives of New Zealand.
100. Peter Hall, In the Web, Heswall, U.K.: Peter Hall, 1992, p. 72.
101. Memorandum, 23 February 1951, HKRS 41-1-6669, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
102. South China Morning Post, 23 November 1945.
103. South China Morning Post, 26 February 1946.
104. Smith’s Weekly (Australia), 2 November 1946.
105. Ferdinand Smith to Honorable N. J. O. Makin, Australian Ambassador to the United
States, 20 November 1946, Reel 34, Part II, #071, National Negro Congress Papers, Schomburg Cen
ter—New York Public Library. The copy of the article from the Australian weekly can also be
found with this correspondence.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 357
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1. Tran My-Van, “Japan through Vietnamese Eyes (1905–1945),” Journal of Southeast Asian
2. Tatsuo Hayashida, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose: His Great Struggle and Martyrdom, Bombay:
3. P. A. Narasimha Murthy, India and Japan: Dimensions of Their Relations, Historical and Politi
Study of the Political and Psychological Implications of Possible Invasion and Actual Occupa
5. Robert H. Taylor, translator, Marxism and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945: Thein Pe Myint’s
Wartime Traveler, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1984, p. 8. See also Frank Trager, ed., Burma:
7. “Secret” report from Governor Clementi, 25 February 1930, NAB 658, National Archives of
Singapore.
9. Sir George Maxwell to Brendan Bracken, 22 September 1942, NAB 460, British Association
10. Undated note, NAB 478, British Association of Malaysia Papers, National Archives of Singa
pore.
11. Clipping of article by Margery Perham, 14 March 1942, NAB 460, British Association of
12. Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story, Singapore: Times Publishing, 1998, pp. 52, 74, 76.
13. Mahatir Mohammad, A New Deal for Asia, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Pelanduk,
14. Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore, 1941–1942: The Japanese Version of the Malayan Campaign of
World War II, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 142, 273.
15. Oral History, Lim Chok Fui, 21 August 1981, National Archives of Singapore.
17. From “Director of Dockyards,” December 1941, UK-ADM, 1/16397, NAB 427, National
Archives of Singapore.
18. O. D. Gallagher, Retreat in the East, London: George G. Harrap, 1942, pp. 16–17, 35, 68.
19. Undated article, circa 1969, NAB 478, British Association of Malaysia Papers, National
Archives of Singapore.
20. David Marshall to Stanley Weintraub, 24 August 1988, “Letters concerning Pearl Har
22. Narrative of Edith Stevenson, circa December 1941, 86/29/1, Imperial War Museum—Lon
don.
23. Narrative of Raymond Burridge, 31 July 1986, “Letters Concerning Pearl Harbour,” Misc
24. Yoji Akashi, “Japanese Cultural Policy in Malaya and Singapore, 1942–1945,” in Grant K.
Goodman, ed., Japanese Cultural Policies in Southeast Asia during World War II, London: Macmil
25. Oral History, Victor Krusemann, 2 December 1983, National Archives of Singapore.
26. Oral History, Joginder Singh, 16 November 1983, National Archives of Singapore.
27. Oral History, Kip Lin Lee, 29 May 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
28. Oral History, Gay Wan Guay, 17 April 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
29. Oral History, Tan Cheng Hwee, 22 March 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
31. Oral History, Tan Ban Cheng, 25 January 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
32. Oral History, Heng Chiang Ki, 2 February 1982, National Archives of Singapore.
33. Oral History, Charlie Chea Fook Ying, 30 December 1983, National Archives of Singapore.
34. Oral History, Kip Lin Lee, 29 May 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
35. Oral History, Ismail Zain, 5 September 1985, National Archives of Singapore.
37. Oral History, Patrick Hardie, 4 April 1985, National Archives of Singapore.
38. Oral History, Sho Chuan Lam, 5 September 1983, National Archives of Singapore.
39. Oral History, Patrick Hardie, 4 April 1985, National Archives of Singapore.
40. Sister Jessie Elizabeth Simons, In Japanese Hands: Australian Nurses as POWs, Melbourne:
41. See also R. H. W. Reece, The Name of Brooke: The End of White Rajah Rule in Sarawak, Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 144, 146, 151, 158.
42. Oral History, Gay Wan Guay, 17 April 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
43. Oral History, Arthur Alexander Thompson, 29 March 1982, National Archives of Singapore.
44. Oral History, Zamroude Za’ba, 22 February 1983, National Archives of Singapore.
45. Oral History, Mary Lim, 30 September 1982, National Archives of Singapore.
46. Oral History, Robert Chong, 4 June 1983, National Archives of Singapore.
47. Oral History, Tan Ban Cheng, 25 January 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
48. Report by Lt. M. M. Pillai, no date, NAB 630, British Association of Malaysia Papers, Na
49. Oral History, Robert Chong, 4 June 1983, National Archives of Singapore.
50. Oral History, Robert Chong, 4 June 1983, National Archives of Singapore.
52. Oral History, Charlie Gan, 11 December 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
54. Ian Morrison, “Aspects of the Racial Problem in Malaya,” Pacific Affairs, 22 (Number 3,
55. Steven Runciman, The White Rajahs: A History of Sarawak from 1841 to 1946, London:
56. UK-US Report, 3 November 1943, Microfilm Acc. No. 3861, Reel 1, from National
57. Oral History, Arthur Alexander Thompson, 29 March 1982, National Archives of Singa
pore.
58. Oral History, Ismail Zain, 5 September 1985, National Archives of Singapore.
59. Oral History, Ng Seng Yong, 24 June 1983, National Archives of Singapore.
60. Oral History, Tan Ban Cheng, 25 January 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
62. Oral History, Tan Wee Eng, 5 June 1985, National Archives of Singapore.
65. “Information Report No. 64,” CSDIC, India, Red Fort, Delhi, August 1944, National
Archives of India.
66. Report on “Japan and Burma” from U.K. Legation in Tokyo, 26 December 1938, FO
67. James Lunt, A Hell of a Licking: The Retreat from Burma, 1941–1942, London: Collins, 1986,
p. 277.
68. Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941–1945, London: Orion, 1998.
69. Ho-yungchi, The Big Circle: China’s Role in the Burma Campaigns, New York: Exposition
70. Dispatch from Burma, 29 January 1942, 86/8/1, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith Papers, Imper
71. Dispatch from Burma, 4 February 1942, 86/8/1, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith Papers, Imper
73. Robert H. Taylor, translator, Marxism and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945: Thein Pe Myint’s
Wartime Traveler, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1984, p. 8. See also Frank Trager, ed., Burma:
74. Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941–1945, p. 13. See also Kazuo Tamayama, ed., Japanese
Soldiers of the Burma Campaign, Book One, January–March 1942: The War as Seen through the Eyes of
75. Report, 14 February 1945, Reel 2, Acc. No. 3862, National Archives of India. See also “Infor
mation Report No. 75,” 9 September 1944, CSDIC, India, Red Fort, Delhi, National Archives of
India: evidently the Japanese also were “training” monkeys. “About 500 . . . were lined up and
were dressed in Japanese uniform . . . to ride ponies.”
76. “Information Report,” Number 123, CSDIC, India, Red Fort, Delhi, 23 March 1945, National
Archives of India.
77. “Information Report,” Number 75, CSDIC, India, Red Fort, Delhi, 9 September 1944, Na
tional Archives of India.
78. Izumiya Tatsuro, The Minami Organ, Rangoon: Translation & Publications Depart
ment/Higher Education Department, 1981, pp. 105, 137, 140–141. In August 1943 a “Treaty of Al
liance between Japan and Burma” was drawn up. See Treaty, 1 August 1943, Box 1, Folder 2,
Burmese Archive Collection, Yale University—New Haven.
79. Harry J. Benda, “Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945,” Pacific Af
fairs, 28 (Number 4, December 1955): 350–362, pp. 353, 355, 357.
80. See also Shirley Fenton Huie, The Forgotten Ones: Women and Children under Nippon, Lon-
don: HarperCollins, 1992, pp. 9, 108.
81. Translation from Japanese, “Commemoration Committee Celebrating the 77th Birthday of
Viscount Naganari Ogasawara,” Tokyo: Committee, 1943, Library of the National Institute for De-
fence Studies, Japan Defence Agency, Tokyo.
82. From Near East Services to Head of Middle East Section, 9 October 1942, Misc. A-Z Files,
E1/1024, BBC Written Archives—Reading, U.K.
83. Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies: Official Report of the Netherlands
East Indies Government on Japanese Subversive Activities in the Archipelago during the Last Decade,
New York: Netherlands Information Bureau, no date, p. 33.
84. Oral History, Patrick Hardie, 4 April 1985, National Archives of Singapore
85. Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, Ithaca: Cornell Uni
versity Press, 1969, p. 112.
86. Memorandum, “Japan. Relations with Netherlands East Indies,” circa 1942, A981
(A981/4), #JAP 158, Part 5, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
87. “Information Report No. 47,” CSDIC, India, Red Fort, Delhi, 23 May 1944, National Archives
of India.
88. Barbara Gifford Shimes and Guy Hobbs, The Kempeitai in Java and Sumatra: Selections from
the Authentic History of the Kempeitai, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1986, p. 28.
89. George McTurnana Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell Univer
sity Press, 1970, pp. 102, 116. See also Anthony Reid and Oki Akira, eds., The Japanese Experience in
Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942–1945, Athens: Ohio University Center for International Stud
ies, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986; Ooi Keat Gin, ed., Japanese Empire in the Tropics: Se
lected Documents and Reports on the Japanese Period in Sarawak, Northwest Borneo, 1941–1945,Athens:
Ohio University CIS: CSAS, 1998.
90. Scott Sherman, “AReturn to Java,” Lingua Franca, 11 (Number 7, October 2001): 38–49, p. 42.
91. Telegram from Sir Henry Robert Moore Brooke-Popham, Sir Henry Robert Moore Brooke-
Popham Papers, 7 August 1942, 6/9, Liddell-Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College—Lon
don.
92. See Motoe Terami-Wada, “The Japanese Propaganda Corps in the Philippines: Laying the
Foundation,” in Grant K. Goodman, ed., Japanese Cultural Policies in Southeast Asia during World
War II, London: Macmillan, 1991, 173–211, pp. 202, 205. See also Elmer N. Lear, “Collaboration in
Leyte: The Philippines under Japanese Occupation,” Far Eastern Quarterly, 11 (Number 2, Febru
ary 1952): 183–206, p. 183. “A significant proportion of the [Filipino] population did collaborate
with Japanese rule.”
93. “Activities of Japanese Spies in India,” 8 June 1943, in P. N. Chopra, ed., Quit India Move
ment: Volume 2, Role of Big Business; British Secret Documents, New Delhi: Interprint, 1991, pp.
117–120.
94. Murthy, India and Japan, pp. 21, 97. See also Veena Choudhury, Indian Nationalism and Exter
nal Forces, 1920–1947, Delhi: Capital, 1985.
95. Anna Everett, Returning the Gaze: A Genealogy of Black Film Criticism, 1909–1949, Durham:
Duke University Press, 2001, p. 167.
96. Louis Ogull to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 31 August 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Nehru Li
brary—New Delhi.
97. Debchaudhury, “Japanese Imperialism and the Indian Nationalist Movement,” pp. 42, 157.
98. P. D. Butler to Anthony Eden, 18 January 1941, External Affairs [EA], File 374-X, National
Archives of India.
360 NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
99. See OS-6, 28, 30, P-1, P-2, 1939, All Indian Congress Committee Papers, Nehru Library—New
Delhi.
100. Diethelm Weidemann, “Sources on S. C. Bose and the Freedom Struggle of India in the
Central State Archives of the GDR,” Acc. No. 998, Nehru Library—New Delhi.
101. Los Angeles Examiner, 2 March 1941.
102. Memorandum, 12 November 1940, EA, File 272, 7-41, 1941, National Archives of India.
103. From “Legation Kabul,” 12 October 1940, EA File 272, National Archives of India.
104. See also H. I. Saith, India Looks at Japan, Lahore: Indian Printing Works, no date, circa
1944, p. 81.
105. From U.K. legation, Kabul, 28 December 1940, EA File 272, National Archives of India.
106. Charles Chenevix Trench, The Indian Army and the King’s Enemies, 1900–1947, London:
Thames and Hudson, 1988, pp. 194–195.
107. Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941–1945, pp. 606, 607.
108. Ian Morrison, “Aspects of the Racial Problem in Malaya,” Pacific Affairs, 22 (Number 3,
September 1949): 239–253, p. 241.
109. J. Victor Morais, Witness to History: Memoirs of an Editor, Petaling Jaya, Selangor,
Malaysia: Life, no date, p. 52.
110. Minutes of Conference of the Representatives of Indians in East Asia, 27–30 April 1943
(2603), Serial No. 6, Doc. No. 31, India Independence League Papers, National Archives of India.
111. “Conference of the Committee of Representatives, India Independence League,” 27–30
April 1943 (2603), Serial No. 5, Doc. No. 29, India Independence League Papers, National Archives of
India.
112. Young India, 1 (Number 41, 12 December 2603 [1943]), Group 1, Serial Nos. 21–34, S. C.
Bose Papers, National Archives of India.
113. Fujiwara Iwaichi, F. Kikan: Japanese Army Intelligence Operations in Southeast Asia during
World War II, Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1983, p. 86.
114. Murthy, India and Japan, p. 148.
115. “Confidential Draft,” 28 December 1941, 1/1941–42, (Parts 1 and 2), All Indian Congress
Committee Papers, Nehru Library—New Delhi.
116. Gautam Chattopadhyay, “Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian Communist Movement:
A Study in Cooperation and Conflict,” in Sisir K. Bose, ed., Netaji and India’s Freedom: Proceed
ings of the International Netaji Seminar, Calcutta: Netaji Research Burreau, 1975, 422–440, p. 425.
117. “Information Report,” undated, CSDIC, India, Red Fort, Delhi, National Archives of India.
118. Memorandum, “Far East: India—General,” 30 October 1945, HS 1/200, Public Records Of
fice—London.
119. Oral History, Damodaran K. Kesavan, 19 November 1981, National Archives of Singapore.
See also Oral History, A. K. Motiwalla, 19 August 1982, National Archives of Singapore. Motiwalla,
who was born in 1928, recalled that “when the Japanese occupied Singapore, they more . . . Ko
reans and Formosans in front. . . . they were the people more here [sic].”
120. Oral History, K. M. Rengarajoo, 30 January 1985, National Archives of Singapore. See also
Oral History, K. R. Menon, 26 February 1982, National Archives of Singapore. Menon was born in
1907 in Cochin, India, and came to Singapore in 1931, where he served as Secretary General of
the Indian Youth League.
121. Oral History, Narayana Karuppiah, 25 June 1984, National Archives of Singapore.
122. Report, 2 April 1942, 6/9, Sir Henry Robert Moore Brooke-Popham Papers, Liddell-Hart Cen
tre for Military Archives, King’s College—London.
123. See, e.g., Rhodesia Herald, 21 July 1943; Memorandum, “Indians in S. Rhodesia,” 3 Au-
gust 1943, DO 35/1169, Public Records Office—London.
124. “Effect of War on Native Peoples of South Pacific,” Taranaki Daily News, 11 January 1951,
IT1, #IT 67/12/84, National Archives of New Zealand.
125. H. S. L. Polak to Duke of Devonshire, 12 February 1945, CO 847/25/4, Public Records Of
fice—London.
126. Report by Research and Analysis Branch, “Indian Minorities in South and East Asia: The
Background of the Indian Independence Movement Outside India,” 8 September 1944, Reel 9,
#1, OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part I, Japan and Its Occupied Territories
during World War II.
127. Memorandum, 16 August 1944, Reel 1, N. 62, Acc. No. 3861, National Archives of Malaysia,
National Archives of India.
128. Iwaichi, F. Kikan, p. 209.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 361
129. Memorandum from British Embassy in Chungking, 26 April 1944, EA, File 182-X/44,
National Archives of India.
130. From Intelligence Bureau, Delhi, 4 April 1944, EA, File 182-X/44, National Archives of India.
131. Report, 17 February 1926, Reel 2, #875, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports, Japan, 1918–1941,
Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1985.
132. “Joint Declaration of the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations,” 1943, in David J. Lu,
ed., Japan: A Documentary History, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, pp. 423–424.
133. Narrative of L. H. Landon, no date, 80/2/1, Imperial War Museum—London.
134. Captured Japanese document, 18 April 1944, EA, File 29-C-A, National Archives of India.
135. Report, May 1944, EA, File 29-C-A, National Archives of India.
136. “Review of Japanese Broadcast Propaganda,” circa December 1941, E1/1032, File 1, BBC
Written Archives—Reading, U.K.
137. “Secret Telegram No. 6664,” from Governor General, Delhi to Secretary of State for India,
London, 22 August 1942, Acc. No. 647, Underground Documents of 1942 Movement, Nehru Li
brary—New Delhi.
138. “Current Topic Pamphlet II,” 22 October 1942, “All India Congress Committee,” Under-
ground Documents of 1942 Movement.
139. Debchaudhury, “Japanese Imperialism and the Indian Nationalist Movement,” p. 156.
140. Reverend Swami Prabhavananda to William D. Hassett, 7 September 1944, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Papers, Nehru Library—New Delhi.
141. M. K. Gandhi to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 July 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Nehru Li
brary—New Delhi.
142. Henry A. Wallace to Brigadier General, 7 August 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Nehru
Library—New Delhi.
143. William Phillips to President Roosevelt, 3 March 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Nehru
Library—New Delhi.
144. William Phillips to President Roosevelt, 7 April 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Nehru
Library—New Delhi.
145. William Phillips to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 19 April 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers,
Nehru Library—New Delhi. For more on these themes, see the book by William Phillips, Ventures
in Diplomacy, Boston: Beacon, 1952.
146. William Phillips to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 14 May 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers,
Nehru Library—New Delhi.
147. William Phillips to Franklin D. Roosevelt, circa September 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt Pa
pers, Nehru Library—New Delhi.
148. William Phillips to “Dear Ed,” Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, 5 January 1945,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Nehru Library—New Delhi. See also New York Times, 3 September 1944.
149. Pearl Buck to Eleanor Roosevelt, 7 March 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Nehru Li
brary—New Delhi.
150. Letter from Marion S. Mayo, 11 April 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Nehru Library—
New Delhi.
151. William Jennings Bryan, “British Rule in India,” no date, circa 1916, X.708 2102, British
Library—London.
152. William D. Pawley to Franklin D. Roosevelt, no date, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Nehru
Library—New Delhi.
153. Memorandum to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 19 January 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers,
Nehru Library—New Delhi.
154.WinstonChurchilltoFranklinD.Roosevelt,14August1942,inWarrenKimball,ed.,Churchill
and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 563.
155. See, e.g., Gerald Horne, Black Liberation/Red Scare: Ben Davis and the Communist Party,
Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1994.
156. Victor Kiernan, “The Communist Party of India and the Second World War: Some Rem
ininiscences,” 20 November 1987, Acc. No. 1132, Nehru Library—New Delhi. Kiernan was a lead
ing party member in Lahore during the war.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
1. Philip A. Klinkner, with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial
Equality in America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, p. 149.
362 NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
2. Ronald H. Spector, At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century, New
York: Viking, 2001, pp. 136, 265.
3. Reginald Kearney, African American Views of the Japanese: Solidarity or Sedition? Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1998, p. 120.
4. Robert Hill, ed., The FBI’s RACON: Racial Conditions in the United States during World War
II, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995, p. 389.
5. A. V. H. Hartendorp, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Manila: Bookmark, 1967, pp.
270, 271.
6. Walter White, A Rising Wind, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1945, pp. 16, 153. See also
Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed
Forces, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
7. Speech by Walter White, 16 June 1942, Roll 1, Section 3, #0154, FBI File on the NAACP.
8. Robert Jefferson, “”Poor Colored People Were Catching Hell All Over’: Staging Politics of
African-American Identity in the Southwest Pacific Theater and the Politics of Demobilization,
1944–1946,” 18, unpublished paper in possession of author. See also Robert Jefferson, “Making
the Men of the 93rd: African American Servicemen in the Years of the Great Depression and the
Second World War, 1935–1947,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1995.
9. Report by Walter White, 9 April 1945, Part 14, Reel 13, #215, Papers of the NAACP.
10. Undated article by Walter White, circa 1944, Part 14, Reel 13, #0087, Papers of the NAACP.
11. Report from Walter White, 12 February 1945, Part 14, Reel 13, #155, Papers of the NAACP.
12. Entry, 21 February 1945, Reel 9, L: 129, Henry L. Stimson Diaries—Yale University.
13. To Commanding General, no date, Box 1, Leonard Russell Boyd Papers—Hoover Institute,
Stanford University.
14. Ronald Takaki, Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II, Boston:
Little Brown, 2001, pp. 24, 59, 69.
15. “Command of Negro Troops,” Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944, Box
1, Leonard Russell Boyd Papers.
16. Ooka Shohei, Taken Captive: A Japanese POW’s Story, New York: John Wiley, 1996, p. 209.
17. Leonard Russell Boyd to Major General J. E. Hull, 17 May 1944, Box 2, Leonard Russell Boyd
Papers.
18. Spector, At War at Sea, pp. 267, 270.
19. Lists of “Influential Negro Leaders Today”; “Important Negro publications”; A700, 9–10,
Diplomatic Archives—Tokyo.
20. Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Joseph Curran, 14 January 1942. Material on “Double V”
campaign; details on Negro troops; details on racial breakdown of states; material on black pop
ulation of Liverpool; material on Negro illiteracy, death rates, occupational status, Negro pop
ulation, Negro education; undated editorial from PM; Commonweal editorial, 23 January 1942,
I460-1-3, Diplomatic Archives—Tokyo.
21. Charlotta A. Bass, Forty Years: Memoirs from the Pages of a Newspaper, Los Angeles: C. A.
Bass, 1960, p. 125.
22. Marc Gallicchio, The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black International-
ism in Asia, 1895–1945, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, pp. 172, 195.
23. New York Amsterdam News, 17 February 1945.
24. Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850–1943: A Trans-Pacific Community, Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 2000, p. 199.
25. Takaki, Double Victory, p. 172.
26. Gallicchio, The African American Encounter, p. 183.
27. Takaki, Double Victory, p. 170.
28. Adolph Newton, with Winston Eldridge, Better than Good: A Black Sailor’s War, 1943–1945,
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999, pp. 29, 64.
29. Hong Kong News, 14 August 1944.
30. Hong Kong News, 16 April 1945.
31. Hong Kong News, 23 June 1942.
32. Hong Kong News, 23 February 1943.
33. Hong Kong News, 29 June 1943.
34. Hong Kong News, 4 February 1943.
35. Hong Kong News, 18 August 1944
36. Hong Kong News, 2 June 1943.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 363
37. Hong Kong News, 6 August 1943. Reporting on U.S. Negroes was a main staple of this
newspaper. See, e.g., Hong Kong News, 28 April 1945 editorial on “The White Peril.”
38. Hong Kong News, 25 July 1943. See also Hong Kong News, 12 July 1945.
45. Hong Kong News, 16 October 1942; Joe Louis was often featured in this newspaper. See,
46. James Guess, M.D., Clarksville, Oklahoma, to Sir Edward Grey, 20 December 1913, , FO
115/1803, Public Records Office—London. See also New York Times, 11 February 1914; Galveston
47. To Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 March 1926, FO 115/3120, Public Records Office—
London.
48. U.K Consul General to U.K. Embassy, Washington, 17 March 1922, FO 115/2766, Public
Records Office—London.
49. R. E. Stubbs to “My Dear Wilson,” 24 February 1928, CO 318/391/12, Public Records Of
50. Frank Furedi, The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race, London: Pluto
51. Thomas Stanway to Under Secretary for the Colonies, 20 January 1936, CO 852/62/6,
53. D. Ryan, Edward Curran & Co. Ltd., Cardiff, to Assistant Secretary of Board of Trade, 26
54. Memorandum to G. L. M. Clauson, OBE, 6 July 1936, CO 852/62/9, Public Records Office—
London.
55. Memorandum from G. L. M. Clauson, OBE, 28 July 1936, CO 852/62/9, Public Records Of
fice—London.
56. “Japan’s Activities in Abyssinia,” 5 December 1933, Reel 15, #123, U.S. Military Intelligence
57. “Japanese Concession and Monopoly in Ethiopia,” 17 January 1934, Reel 15, #126, U.S.
58. Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination, New York: Knopf, 1942, p. 198.
59. Richard Albert Bradshaw, “Japan and European Colonialism in Africa, 1800–1937,” Ph.D.
60. “Japanese Infiltration among the Muslims Throughout the World,” 15 May 1943, Reel 1,
O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part I, Japan and Its Occupied Territories
61. Emily Hahn, Hong Kong Holiday, Garden City: Doubleday, 1946, pp. 245, 246, 250, 251, 259.
62. Anthony Hewitt, Bridge with Three Men: Across China to the Western Heaven in 1942, Lon-
63. Oral History, Billy Strachan, 10042/5/1, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—London.
64. Robert N. Murray, Lest We Forget: The Experiences of World War II West Indian Ex-Service
65. Memorandum to Sir Frederick Leggett, 14 June 1944, LAB 26/55, Public Records Office—
London.
66. From the Colonial Office to Sir Frederick Leggett, 23 June 1944, LAB 26/55, Public Records
Office—London.
67. Undated letter from L. N. Constantine, LAB 26/55, Public Records Office—London.
68. Letter to Sir George Gater, 17 March 1944, LAB 26/55, Public Records Office—London.
69. Police Report, 1 September 1945, MEPO 3/2321, Public Records Office—London; Daily Ex-
70. Letter from Leo March, 26 September 1939, CO 323/1673/6, Public Records Office—Lon
don.
74. Sonya O. Rose, “Sex, Citizenship and the Nation in World War II Britain,” American His
75. Memorandum from Civil Service Commission, 22 December 1942, ADM 178/299, Public
Records Office—London.
76. Letter from Viola Smith, 23 March 1941, AIR 2/6243, Public Records Office—London.
77. W. A. Dickins to Viola Smith, 2 April 1941, AIR 2/6243, Public Records Office—London.
79. Letter “From the Master Balliol College,” 4 October 1939, CO 323/1673/6, Public Records
Office—London.
82. Graham Smith, When Jim Crow Met John Bull: Black American Soldiers in World War II
Britain, London: I. B. Tauris, 1987, pp. 29, 31, 83, 85, 109, 217.
83. Report from the War Cabinet, September 1942, PREM 4/26/9, Public Records Office—Lon
don.
84. Letter from Government House, Nyasaland, 16 February 1920, FO 115/2619, Public
Records Office—London.
85. Memoranda, 18 September 1943, 20 September 1943, CO 968/92/2, Public Records Office—
London.
90. Secretary of State for War to the Prime Minister, 2 December 1943, PREM 4/26/9, Public
Records Office—London.
92. List of Crimes Committed by Negroes, 21 October 1943, PREM 4/26/9, Public Records Of
fice—London.
93. Report from the Duke of Melbourne, 21 October 1943, PREM 4/26/9, Public Records Of
fice—London.
94. From the Foreign Office to Washington, 1 January 1944, CO 968/92/2, Public Records Of
fice—London.
95. Sir A. Geddes to Lord Curzon, 13 February 1922, FO 115/27/66, Public Records Office—
London.
100. “A Short Account of Relations between Bechuana and British in a HAA troop,” circa 25
101. “Visit by Lt. Col. Arden-Clarke,” 28 July 1944, WO 204/6670, Public Records Office—Lon
don.
102. Report, circa 1944, “Prisoners of War in British Territory. West Africa.” CO 980/18, Pub
103. Report from East African Command, 2 March 1942, CO 980/17, Public Records Office—
London. See also “Prisoners of War in British Territory. Kenya,” 21 April 1942, CO 980/17, Pub
104. “Civil Internees in British Territory,” CO 980/35, 23 July 1943, Public Records Office—Lon
don.
105. “Civil Internees in British Territory,” 31 August 1942, CO 980/26, Public Records Office—
London.
106. Wenzell Brown, Hong Kong Aftermath, New York: Smith & Durrell, 1943, p. 101.
107. “West Africans in Burma,” 02 (660), clipping, SEAC, 24 February 1945, 2 December 1944,
1965–1980, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p. 57. See also “Rhodesian
109. West African Forces Observer, 18 June 1945, Imperial War Museum—London.
110. New York Times, 15 April 2000.
111. Account of Lt. J. A. L. Hamilton, 97/36/1, Imperial War Museum—London.
112. “Rhino Review,” circa 1944, 9/5–8, William Dimoline Papers, Liddell-Hart Centre for Mili
tary Archives, King’s College-London.
113. Report on “Employment of East and West African Troops,” 17 December 1942, WO
193.91, Public Records Office—London.
114. From “C-in-C India,” to War Office, 9 December 1942, WO 193/91, Public Records Office—
London.
115. Jambo, circa 1944, Misc 4, Liddell-Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College—London.
116. Account of Colonel F. K. Theobald, 97/36/, Imperial War Museum—London.
117. Account of Colonel F. K. Theobald, 97/36/1, Imperial War Museum—London.
118. Account of Captain P. B. Poore, 92/15/1, Imperial War Museum—London.
119. John Nunneley, Tales from the King’s African Rifles, Surrey: Askari Books, 1998, p. 167.
120. Nunneley, Tales from the King’s African Rifles, p. 172.
121. Timothy H. Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Ser
vice in the King’s African Rifles, 1902–1964, Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1999, pp. 33, 201.
122. Nunneley, Tales from the King’s African Rifles, p. 141.
123. Hong Kong News, 5 April 1944.
124. “Incident between East African Soldiers and Sinhalese,” November 1943, CO
54/985/20, Public Records Office—London.
125. Memorandum, 19 October 1944, EA, File 741(9)-F.E./44, National Archives of India.
126. Memoranda, 25 November 1944, 13 December 1944, EA, File 890-F.E./44, National
Archives of India.
127. Memorandum, 16 March 1944, EA, File 890-F.E./44, National Archives of India.
128. Memorandum, EA, File 114-FE/44, National Archives of India.
129. Account of Colonel F. K. Theobald, 97/36/1, Imperial War Museum—London.
130. Memorandum, 2 December 1944, FO 371/42267, Public Records Office—London.
131. Account of Colonel F. K. Theobald, 97/36/1, Imperial War Museum—London.
132. New York Times, 15 April 2000.
133. Robert B. Hammond, Bondservants of the Japanese, San Pedro, Calif.: Sheffield Press, 1943,
p. 78.
134. George Wright-Nooth, with Mark Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and
Heroics—Hong Kong, 1941–1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1994, p. 238.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 10
1. Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967,
pp. 37–38, 160–161, 209, 210–211.
2. William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984,
p. 44.
3. Warren Cohen, East Asia at the Center: Four Thousand Years of Engagement with the World,
New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 311.
4. Richard Storry, The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism, London: Chatto and
Windus, 1957, p. 18.
5. Yansheng Ma Lum and Raymond Mun Kong Lum, Sun Yat-Sen in Hawaii: Activities and
Supporters, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999, p. 39.
6. R. John Pritchard, ed., The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Records of the International Mil
itary Tribunal for the Far East with an Authoritative Commentary and Comprehensive Guide, Volume
68, Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen, 1998, pp. 32, 691.
7. R. John Pritchard, ed., The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Records of the International Mil
itary Tribunal for the Far East with an Authoritative Commentary and Comprehensive Guide, Volume
38, Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998, pp. 17, 924.
8. B. Nicolaevsky, “Russia, Japan and the Pan-Asiatic Movement to 1925,” Far Eastern Quar
terly 8 (Number 3, May 1949): 259–295, pp. 273, 277. See also George McTurnan Kahin, Na
tionalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, pp. 119–120:
“Many Japanese officers during late 1944 and through 1945 at least up until the Potsdam
Agreement appeared confident that Russia would eventually join with Japan against the
United States.”
366 NOTES TO CHAPTER 10
9. Rebecca E. Karl, “Creating Asia: China in the World at the Beginning of the Twentieth Cen
tury,” American Historical Review, 103 (Number 4, October 1998): 1096–1118, pp. 1115, 1117.
10. Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-Sen: Reluctant Revolutionary, Boston: Little Brown, 1980, pp.
61, 63.
11. Lewis Bush, Land of the Dragonfly, London: Robert Hale, 1959, p. 135. Even after the Chi
nese invasion by Japan, a significant percentage of the Japanese bureaucracy and populace op
posed this maneuver. See, e.g., Barbara J. Brooks, Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty
Ports, and War in China, 1895–1938, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. See also Michael
J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future, New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.
12. Hu Sheng, From the Opium War to the May Fourth Movement, Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press, 1981, pp. 327, 345.
13. Owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia, Boston: Little, Brown, 1945, pp. 81, 82.
14. Lee Yiu Wa, “The Foreign Policy of an Incompetent Empire: A Study of British Policy To-
wards the Sino-Japanese War in 1937–1941,” M.Phil. thesis, Hong Kong University, 1998, pp.
33–34.
15. Hallett Abend, Treaty Ports, Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, p. 242. See also Edward R.
Slack, Opium, State and Society: China’s Narco-Economy and the Guomindang, 1924–1937, Hon
olulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001.
16. Victor Silverman, Imagining Internationalism in British and American Labor, 1939–1949, Ur
bana: University of Illinois, 2000, pp. 42, 77.
17. Tony Lane, The Merchant Seamen’s War, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990,
pp. 8–9, 156, 172.
18. Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850–1943: A Trans-Pacific Community, Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 2000, p. 200.
19. William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1984, p. 168. For another viewpoint, see, e.g., Maria Hsia Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society:
Fascism and Developmental Nationalism, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of
California, 1984.
20. John Deane Potter, No Time for Breakfast: A Record of Seven Years Travel, London: Andrew
Melrose, 1953, p. 158.
21. Lee Yiu Wa, “The Foreign Policy of an Incompetent Empire,” pp. 93, 262, 269.
22. Lynn Pan, Old Shanghai: Gangsters in Paradise, Singapore: Cultured Lotus, 1999, p. 141.
23. Lee Yiu Wa, “The Foreign Policy of an Incompetent Empire,” p. 269.
24. Cohen, East Asia at the Center, p. 345.
25. Poshek Fu, Passivity, Resistance and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai,
1937–1945, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
26. Translation of 28 November 1952 article from Peking Daily, HKRS 63-11315, Public Records
Office—Hong Kong.
27. Lee Ngok, “The Later Career of Wang Ching-Wei, with Special Reference to His National
Government’s Cooperation with Japan, 1938–1945,” M.A. thesis, Hong Kong University, 1966,
pp. 1, 2.
28. Cedric Dover, Hell in the Sunshine, London: Secker and Warburg, 1943, p. 65. See also the
intriguing letter to the New York Times of 15 November 1941 on China.
29. T’ien-wei Wu, “Contending Forces during the War of Resistance,” in James C. Hsiung and
Steven I. Levine, eds., China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945, Armonk: M. E.
Sharpe, 1992, 51–78, p. 64.
30. Stein Tannesson, “Le Duan and China, 1979 and 1952–1979,” Paper presented at the In
ternational Workshop on “New Evidence on China, Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War,”
Hong Kong University, 11–12 January 2000.
31. Sir Lindsay Ride, Vertical File—Biographical, History Workshop, Hong Kong University .
32. Chohong Choi, “Hong Kong in the Context of the Pacific War: An American Perspective,”
M.Phil. thesis, Hong Kong University, 1998, p. 111.
33. T’ien-wei Wu, “Contending Forces,” 51–78, p. 64.
34. Pan, Old Shanghai , pp. 152–153, 158, 199, 203.
35. R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency, Berke
ley: University of California Press, 1972, pp. 248, 268.
36. Memorandum from Upshur Evans, 9 May 1944, Folder 94, Lindsay Ride Papers, Australian
War Memorial—Canberra.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 367
37. Bernard Wasserstein, Secret War in Shanghai: Treachery, Subversion and Collaboration in the
Second World War, London: Profile, 1999, pp. 63, 165.
38. Sterling Seagrave, The Yamato Dynasty: The Secret History of Japan’s Imperial Family, New
York: Bantam, 1999, p. 143.
39. Robert E. Hertzstein, Henry R. Luce: A Political Portrait of the Man Who Created the Ameri
can Century, New York: Scribner’s, 1994, p. 101. One journalist has written that Jan Smuts,
leader of racist South Africa, “was particularly friendly. . . . toward Japan” as well. See Frank
Gervasi, War Has Seven Faces, Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, p. 55.
40. Memorandum from Francis Patron, U.K. Consul-General in Lisbon to U.K. Consul-Gen
eral in Mozambique, “China—Collaborators,” 9 January 1946, A4144 (A4244/1), #356/1946,
National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
41. “Hong Kong—Intelligence Reports,” External Affairs, A10322 (A10322), #30, f1944, 1–15
October 1944, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
42. Sir Frederick Eggleston to H. V. Evatt, Minister for Foreign Affairs—Australia, 22 July
1943, A4144, #609,/1943, #23761, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
43. From Chungking Legation to External Affairs, 15 May 1943, A989 (A989/1),
#1843/150/4/4, National Archives of Australia—Canberra.
44. Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore, 1941–1942: The Japanese Version of the Malayan Campaign of
World War II, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 273.
45. “B. Yates, Esq.,” Vertical File, “Events—1941–45 War,” History Workshop, Hong Kong Uni
versity.
46. “Kweiling Intelligence Summary,” “Confidential Sheet No. 27,” 29 September 1944, Ap
pendix B, HRRS211-2-32, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
47. “Report on the Activities of a M19/19 Organization Operating in South China,” 30 Sep
tember 1946, MSS840, Lindsay Ride Papers, Australian War Memorial—Canberra.
48. “China—Fact and Fiction,” no date, Folder 11, Lindsay Ride Papers, Australian War Memo-
rial: This report also noted that Wang’s Naking force “consists almost entirely of Chinese. . . .
with solid financial interests” and “includes more poets than any other government in the
world.”
49. Bill Harman to “My Dear,” 9 March 1942, Bill Harman Papers—National Library of Aus
tralia.
50. From British Embassy, Chungking, to Colonel E. D. G. Hooper, 11 April 1944, Folder 111,
PR 82/68, Lindsay Ride Papers, Australian War Memorial—Canberra.
51. Christopher Thorne, The Issue of War: States, Societies, and the Far Eastern Conflict of
1941–1945, Hamish Hamilton, 1985, p. 31.
52. Edwin Ride, BAAG: Hong Kong Resistance, 1942–1945, Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1981, p. 121.
53. “Report on the Activities of a M19/19 Organization Operating in South China,” 30 Sep
tember 1946, MSS840, Lindsay Ride Papers, Australian War Memorial—Canberra.
54. “A Memorandum on . . . British Propaganda,” circa 1944, Folder 3-4, PR 82/68, Lindsay
Ride Papers, Australian War Memorial—Canberra.
55. Lindsay Ride to U.K. Embassy, Chungking, 5 September 1942, Folder 102, Lindsay Ride
Papers, Australian War Memorial—Canberra.
56. David Bosanquet, Escape through China, London: Robert Hale, 1983, p. 52.
57. Wasserstein, Secret War in Shanghai, p. 240.
58. Speech by Li Chai Sum, 21 January 1943, Folder 88, Lindsay Ride Papers, Australian War
Memorial—Canberra.
59. From U.K. Legation in Chungking to Anthony Eden, 15 February 1944, Reel 1, V41789,
F1247, British Foreign Office: Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources,
1980.
60. Memorandum from Lisbon to Foreign Office, 18 January 1943, Reel 4, V35953, F442,
British Foreign Office: Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945.
61. From “C.-in-C., India,” 15 October [year not noted, circa 1942], Reel 2, Volume 35940,
F5476/6/23, British Foreign Office: Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945.
62. Report, 17 January 1943, Reel 4, Volume 35953, F442/442/23, British Foreign Office: Japan
Correspondence, 1941–1945.
63. PM, 8 October 1943. See also PM, 28 January 1944; PM, 30 January 1944.
64. From Japanese Editor to FESD, 22 May 1945, E1/1029/2, File 2a, Acc. No. 10640/1, Writ-
ten Archives—British Broadcasting Corporation—Reading, U.K.
368 NOTES TO CHAPTER 10
65. Memorandum from “RHAL,” 4 March 1942, Reel 1, V35937, British Foreign Office: Japan
Correspondence, 1941–1945.
66. From the Government of India, 17 February 1942, Reel 1, V35937, British Foreign Office:
Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945.
67. From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 1 March 1942, Reel 1, V35937, British Foreign
Office: Japan Correspondence, 1941–1945.
68. John Robert Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Foreign Pol-
icy, 1919–1926, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 12.
69. Christopher Thorne, The Issue of War: States and Societies, and the Far Eastern Conflict of
1941–1945, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985, p. 38.
70. For an early-twentieth-century view of U.S. interests in the region see, e.g., A. T. Mahan,
The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies, Port Washington, New York: Ken
nikat, 1970 (originally published in 1900).
71. See, e.g., William S. Stephenson, ed., British Security Coordination: The Secret History of
British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940–1945, New York: Fromm International Publishing, 1998.
See also http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=30826932407858, and Alan
Harris Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence, Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1998.
72. Wasserstein, Secret War in Shanghai, pp. 199, 203.
73. Nigel Cameron, Barbarians and Mandarins: Thirteen Centuries of Western Travellers in China,
Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 337. On “jackal” imperialism, see, e.g., Cohen,
East Asia at the Center, p. 261. See also John E. Moser, Twisting the Lion’s Tail: American Anglopho
bia between the World Wars, New York: New York University Press, 1999.
74. Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism, 1900–1949, Manches
ter: Manchester University Press, 1999, pp. 78, 83, 144.
75. Donald Greene to “Professor Weintraub,” 30 July 1986, Misc 257 (Item 2433), “Letters con
cerning Pearl Harbour,” Imperial War Museum—London.
76. Ride, BAAG, p. 123.
77. R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency, Berke
ley: University of California Press, 1972, p. 247.
78. Lanxin Xiang, Recasting the Imperial Far East: Britain and America in China, 1945–1950, Ar
monk: M. E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 17, 21, 22, 25, 69.
79. Chin-tung Liang, General Stillwell in China, 1942–1944: The Full Story, New York: St. John’s
University, 1972, p. 165. See also Andrew Whitfield, “The Handing Back of Hong Kong: 1945
and 1997,” Historian (Number 54, Summer 1997): 4–9.
80. Memorandum from Ashley Clarke, 5 April 1944, FO 371/ 41797, National Archives of Sin
gapore.
81. E. G. Boxshall to G. B. Endacott, 2l May 1969, HKMS 100-1-6, Public Records Office—Hong
Kong.
82. Memoranda, circa February 1944, NAB 357, FO 371, 41795, National Archives of Singapore.
83. Jan Henrik Marsman, I Escaped from Hong Kong, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1943, p.
79.
84. Ken Cuthbertson, Nobody Said Not to Go: The Life, Loves and Adventures of Emily Hahn, New
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1998, p. 246.
85. Wasserstein, Secret War in Shanghai, p. 213.
86. Unsigned memorandum, circa early 1942, Reel 2, V31813, British Foreign Office: Japan Cor
respondence, 1941–1945, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1980.
87. John Robert Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Foreign Pol-
icy, 1919–1926, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, pp. 8, 41, 96, 144, 162.
88. Major D. Hall Caine to Commandant BAAG, 28 February 1945, Folder 61, Lindsay Ride Pa
pers, Australian War Memorial—Canberra.
89. Lee Yiu Wa, “The Foreign Policy of an Incompetent Empire,” p. 64.
90. Daily Worker, 10 May 1937.
91. Sir Franklin C. Gimson, “Account of Internment and the Restoration of British Rule to
Hong Kong,” circa 1972, MSS 940.547252 G491, Hong Kong Collections, Hong Kong University.
92. John Streicker, The Captive Colony: The Story of Stanley Camp, Hong Kong, HK 940.547252
S8, Hong Kong Collections, Hong Kong University.
93. Gwen Priestwood, Through Japanese Barbed Wire, New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, pp.
68, 191.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 369
94. Vaudine England, The Quest of Noel Croucher: Quiet Philosopher, Hong Kong: Hong Kong
95. The term “American” is used as a matter of convenience to describe U.S. citizens and is
not intended to deny others in the Western Hemisphere the right to claim this term.
98. L. D. Meo, Japan’s Radio War on Australia, 1941–1945, Melbourne: Melbourne University
99. Nobutaka Ike, ed., Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conference, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1967, pp. xxvii, 237. See also Miwa Kimitada, “Japanese Opinions on
Woodrow Wilson in War and Peace,” Monumenta Nipponica, 22 (Numbers 3–4, 1967): 368–389,
p. 384: “Field Marshal Yamagata. . . . most powerful of the oligarchs was the head of the Choshu
batsu (clique) in control of the imperial army. . . . He dreaded . . . a ‘white alliance’ including
Germany and Russia to force Japan to give up her recent gains in China and elsewhere.”
100. A. Zhukov, “Japanese-German Relations during the Second World War,” The Communist,
101. Undated memorandum, E1/1029/2, File 2a, Acc. No. 10640/1, BBC Written Archives—
Reading, U.K.
102. Extract from intercepted letter, 18 September 1942, E1/1029/2, File 1, BBC Written
Archives—Reading, U.K.
103. Memorandum, 17–25 April 1942, R34/651, BBC Written Archives—Reading, U.K.
104. Memorandum, 5–12 November 1942, R34/651, BBC Written Archives—Reading, U.K.
105. Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism,
mation of Japanese-American Relations,” in Gunter Bischof and Robert L. Dupont, eds., The Pa
cific War Revisited, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997, 179–198, pp. 179–180,
198.
107. Interview with Ohshima Hiroshi, 9 October 1962 and 24 March 1971, Box 43, John Toland
108. Anti-Semitism in Europe was not limited to Germany. See, e.g., Louise London, White-
hall and the Jews, 1933–1948: British Immigration Policy and the Holocaust, New York: Cambridge
109. Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz, The Fugu Plan: The Untold Story of the Japanese and the
Jews during World War II, New York: Paddington, 1979, p. 257.
110. Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years, 1933–1941, New York:
111. Pamela Rotner Sakamoto, Japanese Diplomats and Jewish Refugees: A World War II Dilemma,
112. Solomon Bard, “Mount Davis and Sham Shui Po: A Medical Officer with the Volunteers,”
in Clifford Matthews and Oswald Cheung, eds., Dispersal and Renewal: Hong Kong University
during the War Years, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998, 193–202, p. 200.
114. Memorandum, 1–8 October 1942, R34/651, BBC Written Archives—Reading, U.K.
116. Letter from James Ross, circa 1 July 1994, Box 1, Matook R. Nissim Papers, Stanford Uni
versity.
118. Narrative of Jack Smith, circa 1949–1950, Y0077-10.V, Hoover Institute, California.
119. “Propaganda,” 3 June 1942, CAB 119/50, FO 371/22215, Public Records Office—London.
120. W. Empson to ESD, 27 June 1943, E1/1029/2, File 2a, BBC Written Archives, Reading, U.K.
121. L. D. Meo, Japan’s Radio War on Australia, 1941–1945, Melbourne: Melbourne University
122. John Morris, Traveller from Tokyo, London: Cresset Press, 1943, p. 141.
124. “Conditions in Hong Kong and Southern China,” 6 October 1944, A3269 (A3269/12),
125. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998,
7. Sterling Seagrave, The Yamato Dynasty: The Secret History of Japan’s Imperial Family, New
York: Bantam, 1999, p. 289.
8. Alan Birch, “‘No’ Business as Usual,” May 1979, Geoffrey Emerson Papers, History Work-
shop, Hong Kong University.
9. Hong Kong News, 22 February 1942.
10. Russell S. Clark, An End to Tears, Sydney: Star Weekly, 1946, pp. 10, 17, 23, 25, 40, 42,
45–46, 69, 78, 82, 85, 86, 148, 163, 164, 165, 173, 175, 179.
11. Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke, Footprints: The Memoirs of Sir Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke, Hong Kong:
Sino-American Press, 1975, p. 107.
12. “Report of Preliminary Negotiations with Japanese Representatives Held by Rear Ad
miral C. J. H. Harcourt, C.B., C.B.E., on Board HMS Indomitable at Hong Kong on Friday, 31st
August 1945,” HKRS 163-1-81, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
13. Christopher Somerville, Our War: How the British Commonwealth Fought the Second World
War, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998, p. 293.
14. Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, “The Military Administration of Hong Kong,” Royal
Central Asian Journal, 34 (1947): 7–18, pp. 14, 15, History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
15. Alexander Grantham, Via Ports: From Hong Kong to Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1965, pp. 104, 107.
16. G. B. Endacott, Hong Kong Eclipse, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 317,
319, 320.
17. William G. Sewell, Strange Harmony, London: Edinburgh House, 1947, p. 186.
18. South China Morning Post, 19 September 1945.
19. Sir C. Grenville Alabaster, OBE, KC, to Colonial Secretary, 8 May 1947, HKRS, 41-1-
4329, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
20. Managing Director to Colonial Secretary, 2 January 1947, HKRS 41-1-1898, Public
Records Office—Hong Kong.
21. Thomas F. Ryan, S.J., Jesuits under Fire in the Siege of Hong Kong, 1941, London: Burns,
Oates and Washbourne, 1944, p. 173.
22. See, e.g., South China Morning Post, 18 November 1984.
23. “Confidential” memorandum from Chief Commissioner of Police in Hong Kong, 11
January 1946, File 190/INA, Indian National Army Papers, National Archives of India.
24. “Catalogues, Indexes, Bibliographies,” File—”Police Museum,” Ng Chi-wa, ed., Police
Museum, Hong Kong: Police Museum, 1994.
25. Sir Franklin Gimson to G. E. J. Gent, 2 September 1945, HRKS 163-1-81, Public Records
Office—Hong Kong.
26. South China Morning Post, 29 October 1946. See, e.g., Gerald Horne, Fire This Time: The
Watts Uprising and the 1960s, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995, passim.
27. South China Morning Post, 6 November 1946.
28. Oral History, Cyril A. Luckin, 005190/05, Sound Archives, Imperial War Museum—Lon
don.
29. Alan Birch, “‘No’ Business as Usual,” May 1979, Geoffrey Emerson Papers, History Work-
shop, Hong Kong University.
30. Winnie Davies, “Life in Hong Kong before 1945,” Student Paper for class of Elisabeth
Sinn, circa Spring 1994, History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
31. South China Morning Post, 12 December 1946.
32. South China Morning Post, 14 December 1946.
33. South China Morning Post, 17 December 1946.
34. South China Morning Post, 1 January 1947.
35. South China Morning Post, 1 August 1947.
36. South China Morning Post, 2 August 1947.
37. South China Morning Post, 14 February 1948.
38. South China Morning Post, 2 August 1947.
39. South China Morning Post, 8 August 1947.
40. South China Morning Post, 17 August 1947.
41. Raymond Lamont-Brown, Kempeitai: Japan’s Dreaded Military Police, Gloucestershire,
U.K.: Sutton, 1998, p. 155.
42. David P. Bassett and Larry N. Shyu, eds., Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945,
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 13. See also Sybilla Jane Flower, “British Pris
oners of War of the Japanese, 1941–1943,” in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata, The History of
372 NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION
Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, Volume II: The Diplomatic Dimensions, 1931–2000, New York:
44. Memorandum to Walter Adams, 29 November 1948, Vice-Chancellor’s Office. IUC Corre
45. Memorandum to Colonial Secretary, 13 December 1947, HKRS 163-1-610, Public Records
Office—Hong Kong.
46. C. Y. Liang, Secretary in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Colonial Secretary, 17 March 1948,
47. Memorandum, 13 October 1945, HKRS 169-2-119, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
48. From “Staff Officer (Intelligence), Hong Kong,” to “Chief of Staff,” 11 October 1945, HKRS
49. Memorandum, 7 March 1947, HKRS 163-1-401, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
50. Donald G. Gillin and Charles Etter, “Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in
China, 1945–1949,” Journal of Asian Studies, 42 (Number 3, May 1983): 497–518, pp. 497, 499, 500,
505, 508.
51. Sir Cecil Harcourt to T. W. Kwok, Special Commissioner for Kwantung and Kwangsi,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 January 1946, HKRS 169-2-150, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
52. Memorandum to the Colonial Secretary, 7 December 1948, HKRS 411-1-4018, Public
53. Translation of letter from Ogata Shunsaku to “Dear Brother Seisaku,” 2 June 1946, HKRS
55. From U.K. Embassy, Chungking, to Foreign Office, London, 14 February 1946, HKRS 169-
57. Tanya Lee, Tanya: Child of the East Wind: An Autobiography, Port Macquarie, Australia: Per
60. T. P. Gregory to W. F. C. Jenner, circa 1946, HKRS 251-3-24, Public Records Office—Hong
Kong.
61. Memorandum, 16 July 1946, HKRS 163-1-120, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
62. Report, 10 August 1948, HKRS 41-1-4251, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
63. Tseng Yu-Hao and Denis Victor to Governor Mark Young, 25 January 1947, HKRS 156-1-
65. Attorney General to “Hon. C.S.,” 7 February 1947, HKRS 156-1-1045, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
68. H. C. Wu to “Dear Excellency,” 21 November 1945, HKRS 170-1-460, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
69. Custodian of Property to Secretariat, 6 April 1946, HKRS 170-1-755, Public Records Office—
Hong Kong.
70. C. L. Hsu to Col. W. M. Thomson, 13 March 1946, HKRS 170-1-755, Public Records Office—
Hong Kong.
72. General Chang Fa Kwei to Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, 20 October 1945, HKRS 169-
73. “Chinese Military Delegation, Hong Kong,” to Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, 29 Octo
74. Ibid.
75. “Liaison Office, Kowloon,” to “Hon. C.S.” 4 September 1945, HKRS 163-1-26A. See also
circa September 1945, and “Investigation into the Seizure of Property by the Japanese in the
Colony of Hong Kong. Statutory Declaratory of Keiji Makimura,” 18 December 1945, HKRS
Hong Kong, 12 August 1946, HKRS 41-1-1376, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
116. Kanao or Kanawa Inouye and related spellings are also used.
117. “Confidential” documents, 5 September 1947, HKRS 163-1-216, Public Records Office—
Hong Kong.
118. Patricia E. Roy, A White Man’s Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and
Japanese Immigrants, 1858–1914, Vancouver, B.C.: University of British Columbia Press, 1989,
119. W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orien
tals in British Columbia, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990, pp. 68, 103, 180.
120. Peition from Inouye Kanao,” 15 August 1947; Memorandum from the “Chief Justice,”
22 July 1947, Memorandum from Inouye Kanao, 15 August 1947, HKRS 163-1-216, Public
121. Memorandum, circa 1947, HKRS 163-1-216, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
123. Oral History, Kenneth M. Baxter, 31 March 1995, Oral History Project, Hong Kong Mu
seum of History.
124. Oral History, Lucien Brunet, 26 November 1995, Oral History Project, Hong Kong Mu
seum of History.
127. Memorandum, 22 April 1947, HKRS 163-1-216, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
128. To War Office from CINC Hong Kong, 22 October 1945, 169-2-167, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
129. Colonial Secretary to Commissioner of Prisons, 19 April 1947, HKRS 163-1-216, Pub
132. U.S.A. vs. Tonoya Kawakita, Records of the District Court of the U.S. for the Southern Dis
trict of California, Central Division, No. 19413, Boxes 1126, ll47, 1l48, Record Group 21, National
133. Russell Warren Howe, The Hunt for “Tokyo Rose,” Lanham, Md.: Madison Books,
1990.
134. South China Morning Post, 2 January 1946. Contrast the case of Cleveland Tom, a “Ja
maican of Chinese Race” who joined the Hong Kong Volunteers in November 1940, fought
during the invasion, and was “detained” by the Japanese thereafter. Boldly, he escaped and
“joined the Chinese guerillas.” Tom said, “From June 1943 until the end of the war I served
with the Chinese American troops as interpreter being sent with them at one time to India.”
He returned to Hong Kong in November 1945, but now needed help in returning to Ja
maica—a plea that was unlikely to be met favorably. See Case of Cleveland Tom, circa 1946,
137. Statement from Wadmull Chattulani, 16 October 1945, HKRS 76-3-137, Public Records
Office—Hong Kong.
139. Case of F. M. Arculli, circa 1946, HKRS 76-3-107, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
141. Case of Mohammed Yusuf Shah, circa 1947, HKRS 163-1-427, Public Records Office—
Hong Kong.
142. Files on Indian police, some of whom fought with the INA, circa 1946, HKRS 230-2-
143. Memorandum to CINC, Hong Kong, 7 March 1946, HKRS 169-2-167, Public Records
Office—Hong Kong.
144. Memorandum from A. El Arculli, 20 June 1946, HKRS 163-1-203, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
146. Memorandum, circa 1947, HKRS 76-3-255, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
147. Memorandum, 15 February 1951, HKRS 41-1-6765, Public Records Office—Hong Kong. See
also South China Morning Post, 16 May 1947.
148. From “C in C Hong Kong” to “War Office,” 17 April 1946, WO 203/5296b, Public Records
Office—London.
149. South China Morning Post, 3 September 1946.
150. South China Morning Post, 13 November 1946.
151. South China Morning Post, 14 November 1946.
152. South China Morning Post, 29 August 1946.
153. South China Morning Post, 21 September 1946.
154. George Wright-Nooth, with Mark Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and
Heroics—Hong Kong, 1941–1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1994, p. 98.
155. Robert S. La Forte, ed., With Only the Will to Live: Accounts of Americans in Japanese Prison
Camps, 1941–1945, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1994, p. 68.
156. “Most Secret” memorandum, no date, File 191/INA, Indian National Army Papers, Na
tional Archives of India.
157. Memorandum, 7 May 1946, HKRS 76-3-48, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
158. Minutes of War Activities Committee, 23 October 1945, HKRS 169-2-5, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
159. “Most secret” memorandum, no date, File 191/INA, Indian National Army Records, Na
tional Archives of India.
160. Yukiko Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racisms and the Occupation of Japan, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999, p. 18.
161. B. V. A. Roling and Antonio Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond, Cambridge, U.K.: Polity,
1994, pp. 20, 47, 55, 67, 87. The historian Richard Minear agrees with Judge Roling: “But Japan
was not Germany; Tojo was not Hitler; the Pacific War was not identical with the European
war. . . . The categories and assumptions of Nuremberg broke down completely in their appli
cation at Tokyo.” See Richard Minnear, Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 134.
162. Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, New York: HarperCollins, 2000, p.
596.
163. Peter Wesley Smith, “Discriminatory Legislation in Hong Kong,” 0842. PWS. Uf, Paper
presented at Hong Kong Baptist University, June 1987, Hong Kong Collections, Hong Kong Uni
versity.
164. Frank Ching, The Li Dynasty: Hong Kong Aristocrats, Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1999, p. 126.
165. Suke Wolton, Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office and the Politics of Race and Empire in the Sec
ond World War: The Loss of White Prestige, New York: St. Martin’s, 2000, pp. 145, 146.
166. Jon Halliday, “Hong Kong: Britain’s Chinese Colony,” New Left Review, no date, circa
1975, File—Authors, History Workshop, Hong Kong University.
167. Wing Chung Ng, “Becoming ‘Chinese Canadian’: The Genesis of a Cultural Category,”
in Elizabeth Sinn, The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University,
1998, 203–215, p. 204.
168. Bill Ong Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through Immigration Policy,
1850–1990, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 36.
169. Ronald Takaki, Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II, Boston:
Little Brown, 2001, pp. 118–120.
170. Shian Li, “The Extraterritoriality Negotiations of 1943,” Modern Asian Studies, 30 (Num
ber 3, 1996): 617–650, p. 629.
171. Andrew Coe, Eagles and Dragons: A History of Americans in China and the Origins of the
American Club, Hong Kong: American Club, 1997, p. 142.
172. N. J. Miners, “The Hong Kong Government Opium Monopoly, 1914–1941,” Journal of Im
perial and Commonwealth History, 11 (Number 3, May 1983): 275–299, 275.
173. Clive Harris, “Post-War Migration and the Industrial Reserve Army,” in Winston James
and Clive Harris, ed., Inside Babylon: The Caribbean Diaspora in Britain, London: Verso, 1993, 9–54,
p. 10. See also Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, London:
Macmillan, 1975.
174. Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1965,
p. 110. See also Ronald Segal, The Race War, London: Jonathan Cape, 1966.
175. Jean Gittins, A Stranger No More, South Yarra, Vic., Australia: Gittins, 1987, pp. 113, 116.
376 NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION
176. Lindsay Ride to D. M. MacDougall, Colonial Office, 16 July 1945, HKRS 211-2-38, Public
Records Office—Hong Kong.
177. Memorandum from T. J. Rowell, 5 November 1946, HKRS 41-1-1603, Public Records Of
fice—Hong Kong.
178. Memorandum from S. A. Gray, 27 April 1946, HKRS 41-1-1603, Public Records Office—
Hong Kong.
179. Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the Volunteers, 27 December 1946, HKRS 163-1-412, Pub
lic Records Office—Hong Kong.
180. “Letter from Council of European Civil Servants,” 23 February 1948, HKRS 163-1-580,
Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
181. Memorandum from Director of Public Works, 30 January 1948, HKRS 156-1-1168, Public
Records Office—Hong Kong.
182. Memorandum from Creech Jones, 8 January 1947, HKRS 46-1-164, Public Records Office—
Hong Kong.
183. Memorandum, 8 February 1956, HKRS 41-1-2941, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
184. Oral History, Dr. Clifford Matthews, 25 November 1996, Oral History Project, Hong Kong
Museum of History.
185. Dan Waters, Faces of Hong Kong: An Old Hand’s Reflections, Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1995,
p. 145.
186. “Appendix A, circa 1956, HKRS 41-1-2941, Public Records Office—Hong Kong.
27. Carl Woideck, The John Coltrane Companion: Five Decades of Commentary, New York:
Schirmer, 1998, pp. 34, 39.
28. Nikitah Okembe-Ra Imani to [email protected], 5 October 1999.
29. Caroline Clarke, “Take a Lesson,” Black Enterprise, 31 (Number 9, April 2001): 127–132, p.
130. See also Caroline Clarke, Take a Lesson, New York: John Wiley, 2001.
30. Interview, Clifford Matthews, 25 November 1996, Oral History Project, Hong Kong Museum
of History.
31. John Streicker, Captive Colony: The Story of Stanley Camp, HK 940.547252 S8, Hong Kong Col
lections, Hong Kong University.
32. South China Morning Post, 27 January 1973.
33. South China Morning Post, 22 April 1948.
34. South China Morning Post, 27 July 1972.
35. Sir Arthur Dickinson Blackburn, “An Account of Personal Experiences of My Wife and
Myself at Hongkong during the Japanese Attack and Afterwards,” MSS 940.547252, Hong Kong
Collections, Hong Kong University.
36. George Wright-Nooth, with Mark Adkin, Prisoners of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and
Heroics—Hong Kong, 1941–1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1994, pp. 250, 257.
37. Roi Ottley, No Green Pastures, London: John Murray, 1952, p. 9.
38. Hyoe Murakami, Japan: The Years of Trial, 1919–1952, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1982, pp. 17–18.
39. Fujiwara Iwaichi, F. Kikan: Japanese Army Intelligence Operations in Southeast Asia During
World War II, Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1983, p. 306.
40. Lecture by Basil Liddell-Hart, circa 1965, Basil Liddell-Hart Papers, Liddell-Hart Centre for
Military Archives, King’s College—London.
41. Oral History, Chu Shuen Choo, 15 August 1985, National Archives of Singapore.
42. Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941–1945, London: Orion, 1998, p. 628.
43. New York Times Book Review, 1 June 2001. See also Gore Vidal, The Last Empire: Essays,
1992–2001, Garden City: Doubleday, 2001.
44. Asahi Shimbun Correspondents, compilers, 28 Years in the Guam Jungle: Sergeant Yokoi
Home from World War II, Tokyo: Japan Publications, 1972.
Index
Abbott, Robert: racial discrimination in Lon- plained by, 108; Japan’s appeal, vii–viii, xiii,
don, vii 57–58, 324; job discrimination, 124, 227;
Abeywickrama, Mr. (a Ceylonese): on London hotels’ treatment of, vii; meetings
Africans eating children, 247–48 with Japanese and non-whites, 46, 47,
Accredited Advertising Agents of Hong 55–56; in Mexican-Japanese alliance, 53;
Kong: racial reversal by, 321 Nazi Germany to, 105–6, 127; in Plan of San
Afghanistan: Japanese propaganda in, 232 Diego, 277; playing Japanese in kids’
Africa: Japan’s contribution to independence, games, 119; pro-Japan sentiments, 43–48,
326; postwar racial discrimination, 317–18. 115–20, 127; revocation of their citizenship,
See also Africans 125; right-wing Europe’s attraction, 126–27;
African-American press: Afro-American, 112, Russo-Japanese War’s effect, 32, 44–45, 49;
120; Amsterdam News (New York), 51; Cali� Singapore’s fall to, 121–22; Sino-Japanese
fornia Eagle (Los Angeles), 50–51; Colored War to, 58, 109–13; soldier’s epitaph, 222; in
American Magazine, 44; Crisis, 49; news serv- the South, 1; surveillance of, 47, 53–55; trav-
ice in Japan, 59; Pittsburgh Courier, 49, 111; elers to Japan, 54; travelers to Nazi Ger-
pro-Japan sentiments, 50–51; on WWII as a many, 105; using them to deflect criticisms
race war, 107 of Jim Crow, 6; vote on backing the war,
African Americans, 43–59; aid to victims of 105–6; West Coast population, 54; WWII as
Japanese earthquake (1923), 52; air ace in a race war, 105–8. See also Black nationalists
Sino-Japanese War, 113; alienation among, African Methodist Episcopal Church: support
52; alliance with Japan, 15, 43, 48–49, 53–54, for Japan in Russo-Japanese War, 52
55–56; animus toward Japanese soldiers to, Africans: in British armed forces, ix–x, 9,
226; anti-white violence, 123; applicability 244–49; in defeating Japanese, 3; distrust of
of Tokyo War Crimes Trials, 312–13; in Britons, 241; reluctance to fight Japanese,
armed forces, 149, 183–84, 220–28, 238–41; 14; reports of cannibalism, 247–49; U.S.’s at-
Asian Americans among, 113–15; Asians’ traction to, 239; white supremacy to, 241–43
fate and theirs, xiii, 43; in Australia, 181–82; Afro-American: report of snickering at Ameri-
benefits from internment of Japanese Amer- can defeats, 120; support for Japan in Sino-
icans, 125–26; Britain and, vii, 94, 106, 236, Japanese War, 112
347n79; British treatment of, vii, 94; China Afro-Caribbeans: migration to Harlem, 105
compared to Japan to, 110–13; Chinese Ah Ting: Communist guerilla, 234
Americans and, 111; in Communist Party, Akira Iriye: on Japanese alliances, 274
268; conservatives among, 122–23; doubts Alabama: Grand Guignol of bias, 137
about their reliability as soldiers, 43, 222; Alabaster, C. Grenville: wartime losses, 285
fictional collaborator with Japanese, 114; All India Congress Committee: colonizers to,
Filipino bond presumed, 7, 43–44; first ones 214
seen by Japanese, 8; Hitler as an, 106; Ambrose, Stephen: on racism as motivation
Japanese agents among, 57, 113–14, 117; for war, 270
Japanese Americans, relations with, 54, 111; American Club (Shanghai): Chinese member-
Japanese as role models, 50–51; Japanese ship, 264
husbands, 57; in Japanese internment Americans: badges to distinguish black
camps, 220; Japanese military intelligence, Americans from black Britons, 238; in
59, 114, 119–20; Japanese propaganda China, 153; a Chinese American’s hatred
aimed at, xiv, 55, 59, 108, 220–21; Japanese for, 141; collaboration with Japan, 311; in in-
racially tinged attacks on, 329n2; Japanese- ternment camps, 93–95, 96, 98; unpopular-
sponsored back-to-Africa movement, ity in Britain, 94. See also African Ameri-
55–56; Japanese-supplied guns, 116; Japan’s cans; Chinese Americans; Euro-Americans;
advantage among, 59; Japan’s alliance ex- Japanese Americans
379
380 INDEX
Amsterdam News (New York): pro-Japan senti- Aung San: Subhas Chandra Bose and, 209; in
ments, 51 “30 comrades,” 203
Anderson, Benedict: Indonesian Communist Australia, 164–71, 174–86; Aborigines in, 183;
Party songs, 205 African Americans in, 181–82; armed forces
Anderson, J. F.: on anti-white violence, 123 (see Australian armed forces); black seamen
Andrew, Kenneth: on marriage to Chinese in Sydney, 185–86; Chinese in, 168–70, 178,
women, 28; on relations between U.S. and 315; “coloured” unfit for settlement, 180;
British sailors, 93; on Sinophobia in prewar doubts about Aborigines’ loyalty, 174–77;
Hong Kong, 21 doubts about Chinese loyalty, 177; doubts
Anti-Mongolian Association: anti-immigra- about Melanesians’ loyalty, 179; Dutch emi-
tion to Canada, 301 grés, 169; homosexuality among African-
Anti-Semitism: Japan lacking in, 271–72; in American troops, 149; interracial sex, 149,
New Zealand, 161; victims of, 24 185; Italians in, 174; MacArthur on threat
Anti-White Race Movement: Japanese sup- to, Douglas, 141; movement away from
port for, 55 Britain, toward U.S., 180–81; name-calling
Anticommunism: in Britain, xiv; in Burma, in, 184–85; non-European students, 185; op-
202; in Japan, xiv; in postwar Hong Kong, position to black troop deployments, 116,
289–90; pro-Japan sentiments, 187–88, 181–83; opposition to declaration of racial
200–201; in United States, xiv, 56; white su- equality, 229; opposition to evacuees from
premacy and, 61–62 Malaya, 178–79; opposition to nonracial
Apolosi (a Fijian): feared as Japanese agent, evacuation of Hong Kong, 168–71, 179;
173 population, 164; racial reform, 177, 183–84,
“Apple Cart” (Shaw), 93 185–86; racist witticism, 315; reaction to
Archer, Bernice: on lacking servants, 153 Japan’s racial policies, 6; repatriation of
Arculli, Fakir Mohammed: trial of, 308 Chinese to Hong Kong, 168; size, 164; threat
Asia: national independence in, Japan’s con- of Japanese invasion, 184; “White Aus-
tribution to, 326. See also Asians tralia” policy, 38; White Russians in, 174;
Asian Americans: in African-American com- white supremacy in, 159, 166–67, 179,
munities, 113–15; pro-Japan sentiments, 119 180–81. See also Australians
Asians: African Americans’ fate and theirs, Australian and New Zealand Society: in
xiii, 43; “Asia for Asiatics” (“Aji, Ajino, Stanley internment camp, 95–96
Ajia!”), 26–27, 209, 284, 313; Asian Australian armed forces: Aborigines prohib-
men/women and European women/men, ited, 164, 175; Chinese wives in Australia,
30; as blacks, 44–45, 48–49; book’s focus on, 170; fraternization with African-American
xi; in British armed forces, 9; as children, troops, 182–83; Papuan servants, 167
221–22; in defeating Japanese, 3; distrust of Australians: Britons’ dislike for, 192;
in Malaya, 192; equating themselves with Churchill on, 167; dislike of Britons, 170; in
simians, 9; hatred of Euro-Americans, 4; Melanesia, 19; in Stanley internment camp,
Japan’s appeal to, viii, 11; Jesus Christ one, 95–96
195; London hotels’ treatment of, 39; in pre-
war Hong Kong, 17; Russo-Japanese War’s Ba Maw: on killing British soldiers, 246
effect on, 32, 44; U.S. citizenship, 314; U.S.’s Bagai, Ram Mohan: on British rule in India,
attraction to, 239; vs. white supremacy, 206
187–219 Bainborough, George Harry: on female
“Asiatic Black Man,” 44, 324 Japanese agents, 129
Asiatic Society: Black Dragon Society and, Bajpai, Ramlal B.: naturalization for Indian
213; purpose, 213 Americans, 124
Association of New Zealand Born Chinese, Bangkok: Europeans in, 200
159 Bard, Solomon: on British soldiers’ not ac-
Association of Restricted License Banks and knowledging Chinese comrades, 72; gender
Deposit-Trading Companies (Hong Kong): reversal in internment camps, 147–48; dur-
support for anti-bias laws, 322 ing Hong Kong invasion, 68; on lack of
Atlantic Charter: effect on Indian independ- anti-Semitism in Japan, 271
ence movement, 216; scoffed at, 208 Bass, Charlotta: questioning Madame Chiang
Atlee, Clement: on Indians in Southern Kai-Shek, 225
Rhodesia, 211 Basutos: in British armed forces, 240–41
INDEX 381
Bates, Harold: on European disdain for 238; in British Empire, 106; British opposi-
British troops in Hong Kong, 27 tion to using black troops as guards of
Baxter, George: on Japanese humiliation of white prisoners, 242–43; brotherhood with
whites, 77; on urinating on prisoners in Japanese, 48; Chinese racial discrimination,
Stanley internment camp, 88 225; Japan as role model, 50–51; in Japanese
Baxter, Kenneth M.: on British friendly fire, Empire, 228; Japanese support for their
73; on Inouye Kanao, 303 anti-racism, 52; Japan’s response to Italian
Bayne, Jake: fraternizing with Japanese cap- invasion of Ethiopia, 231–32; Japan’s treat-
tors, 99; in Stanley internment camp, 98 ment of, 58, 107; Lindbergh on confronting
BB Plan: Jordan and, Leonard Robert, 118–19 them and Orientals, 107; lovers of whites
BBC. See British Broadcasting Corporation among, 108; in Nazi prisoner-of-war camps,
Beasley, Delilah: on objections to Interna- 127; plan to dispose of them, 123; separat-
tional House, 54 ing German from black prisoners in Kenya,
Belgian Congo: U.S. armed forces in 242; sexuality of, 149; Southerners venting
Leopoldville, 240 anti-Japanese sentiments, 106–7; view of
Belich, James: on British forgetfulness, 4 where Nazis live, 105–6; war weariness
Bengal: famine (1943), 217 among black troops, 242; white man’s war,
Berlin, Isaiah: on racial reform in U.S., 121 108, 122, 222. See also African Americans;
Bertram, James: on British defeat at Hong Black nationalists
Kong, 75; on fifth column scare during “Blimps,” 283–85
Hong Kong invasion, 71–72; on Hilda Sel- Board, Ruby: support for white Australia pol-
wyn-Clarke, 24 icy, 169
Bible: Japanese translation, 232–33 Boddy, J. M.: on Japanese as a Negro race,
Bickers, Robert: on dislike for Eurasians in 44–45
Hong Kong, 29–30 Bolsheviks: Japan and, 35
Bilbo, Theodore: advocating removal of Boon, Cecil (“Queenie”): effeminate intern-
blacks from U.S., 227 ment camp liaison, 148; trial of, 310
Birch, Alan: “nigger” used, 10 Bosanquet, David: on British defeat at Hong
Birth of a Nation (film), 50 Kong, 68; Chinese attitude toward in-
Black Dragon Society: Asiatic Society and, ternees, 81; on fighting as work for coolies,
213; Chiang Kai-Shek and, 255; Italian inva- 267; grave digging at Stanley internment
sion of Ethiopia, 231; Japanese-American camp, 86–87; peevishness, 267–68
member, 136; Jews in, 271; leader, 253; Man- Bose, R. B.: conference organized by, 187;
ansala and, 119; oath, 166; in Philippines, flight to Japan, 205
39; size, 39; Sun Yat-Sen and, 11–12, 252; Bose, Subhas Chandra: graffiti supporting,
white supremacy target of, 38–39 144; Ho Chi Minh and, 209; on Japan’s vic-
Black Followers of Buddhism: tenets, 118–19 tory in Russo-Japanese war, 187; Lee Kuan
Black nationalists: British colonies as source, Yew and, 210; pro-Japan sentiments, 177,
48; Pacific Movement of the Eastern World, 208–9; in Singapore, 210; strategy, 209–10;
48, 115; pro-Japan sentiments, 48–49, 118; Sukarno and, 209; U.S. intelligence report
support for Japan in Sino-Japanese War, on, 212
109; Universal Negro Improvement Associ- Boxer, Charles: on British dumped in prewar
ation, 45–47, 56. See also Garvey, Marcus; Hong Kong, 25
Nation of Islam Boyd, Leonard Russell: on racial segregation
Blackburn, Arthur Dickinson: on British de- in U.S. armed forces, 223–24
feat at Hong Kong, 72; on desertion by Chi- Boyle, Martin: on Indians’ view of Allies, 146;
nese servants, 72; on Japanese behavior to- interned, 146; on Japanese Americans in
ward European women, 152; Pennyfeather- Japanese occupation forces, 135
Evans and, 70; on Stanley internment camp, Brattin, L. G.: plan to dispose of blacks, 123
84, 88 Brennan, Desmond: on his Indian servant’s
Blacker, Carmen: on Meiji Restoration, 32 loyalty, 171
Blacks: Asians as, 44–45, 48–49; Asians’ des- Bridge on the River Kwai (film): racist assump-
tiny and theirs, xiii; “Asiatic Black Man,” tions, 326–27
44, 324; Australian opposition to troop de- Britain: abrogation of extraterritoriality, 261,
ployments, 116, 181–83; badges to distin- 286; African Americans and, vii, 94, 106,
guish black Americans from black Britons, 236, 347n79;
382 INDEX
Britain (Continued): Eurasians in, 63, 72, 76; fighting among, 60;
alliance with/trust in Japan, 62, 95, 160, friendly fire by, 66, 73; Highlanders, 74;
188, 200–201, 255, 266–67, 295; Americans’ Hong Kong as a post, 60–61; Hong Kong
unpopularity, 94; anti-British propaganda, defense corps, 63, 69–70, 74, 75–76, 316; In-
38, 166, 177, 195–96, 201; anticommunism dians in, 9, 69–70, 76, 190, 207, 208, 211, 217,
in, xiv; armed forces (see British armed 263; in internment camps, 86, 90; Japanese
forces); Australia’s movement away from, contempt for, 190; knowledge of host coun-
180–81; China, antagonism toward, xii–xiii; tries, 192; Kowloon not shelled by, 68–69; in
China, support for (1938), 255; Chinese in Malaya, 190–91, 207, 211; Middlesex Regi-
China protected, 299; Chinese nationalist- ment, 61; Polish officers in, 245–45; Por-
Japan ties, 259; Chinese nationalists in driv- tuguese in, 63; racism in, 244–45; Rajputana
ing wedge between it and U.S., 266; to Chi- Rifles, 70; Rajputs in, 70; rapes by, 61; re-
nese students, 253–54; cooperation with fusal to bathe with Chinese, 72; Royal Air
Chinese Communist Party, 259–60; as de- Force, sobriquets for, 260; Royal Scots, 70,
fender of democracy, 122; disloyality 71, 76; Samoans in, 163; servants hired by,
among Polynesians, 163; forgetfulness of 19, 60; shanghaiing by, 249; siestas, 167;
humbling encounters with indigenous peo- Sikhs in, 61, 70, 192–93; softness, 60, 245;
ple, 4; Garvey’s followers monitored, supply of available troops, advantage in,
228–29; Jamaican immigrants, 314–15; 245; war weariness among black troops,
Japan in driving wedge between it and 242; West Africans in, 244, 247; white su-
U.S., 265–66; Japan’s proposal to end racial premacy’s effect on its performance, 63–74,
discrimination (1919), 37; Jews returned to 258–59, 260–61
Germany, 315; Koumintang supported, 290; British Board of Film Censors: prohibition on
New Zealand’s movement away from, 160; English actor kissing Chinese actress on-
opposition to black troop deployments, screen, 30
238–41; opposition to using black troops as British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC):
guards of white prisoners, 242–43; prestige, Japanese-language broadcasts, 272; “na-
260; propaganda featuring cannibals eating tives” in broadcasts, xiv–xv; “nigger” in
Japanese prisoners, 248; propaganda in broadcasts, xiv; on Tokyo-Berlin relations,
postwar Hong Kong, 315–16; racial 269–70; on unreliability of news bulletins
dilemma, 228; racial discrimination not dis- from China, 262
cussed, 229; racial reform, 229, 237; racial British Empire: anti-Empire sentiment and
segregation in, 238; racism a threat to na- pro-Japan collaboration, 258; awareness of
tional security, ix; racism in, 39; reaction to gathering storm, 200; blacks in, 106; British
Japan’s racial policies, 5, 6–7; redistribution soldiers, 22, 27, 30–31, 40; class conscious-
of wealth in Asia, 292; reliance on U.S., 32; ness, 25–27, 40; color in deciding on post-
rift with U.S., 215–16, 239, 263–68; survival ings, 41; colored population, 108;
of, 263; Treason Act of 1351 [sic], 300; U.S.’s “coloured” in, 180; communism vs. pro-
distrust of its intentions in Asia, 94; white Japan sentiments, 187–88, 200–201; compe-
supremacy in, 236–37 tition with Japanese in Africa, 229–31; di-
British armed forces: Africans in, ix–x, 9, vide and conquer policy, 95, 145; effect of
244–49; Africans in compared to African Japanese successes, xv; Hong Kong
Americans in U.S. armed forces, 239; Amer- foothold (1842), 1, 9; Hong Kong’s place in,
ican armed forces’ relation with, 93, 94; 1; “imperial preferences” in sustaining it,
Asians in, 9; badges to distinguish black 94, 215, 218, 297; India to, 205; Indians in,
Americans from black Britons, 238; Basutos 143–44; knowledge of effects of white su-
in, 240–41; blacks in, racism against, 234–35; premacy policies, 258; opium trade, 314;
British-American clashes in Shanghai, 93; Pan-European nature of white supremacy,
Britons in, 76, 90; in Burma, ix–x, 203; Cana- xii; “race war” an accepted concept, 14;
dians in, 73–74; canings, 245; Chinese in, 69, racism, its role in, 238; racist thinking un-
72; Chinese Royal Engineers, 69; Chinese questioned, 7–8; repression of Asian politi-
trained by, number of, 72; choice of places cal organizations, 188; rights to citizenship,
to fight, 170–71; civilian attitudes toward, 159; ruling class deemed necessary, 229;
61; combat readiness in Hong Kong, 73–74; Singapore’s place in, 1; its supremacy a dis-
composition in Hong Kong, 63; Cook Is- guise for English elite’s supremacy, 167;
landers in, 163; East Africans in, 244; Tamils in, 209; “third-raters” in, 219; undo-
INDEX 383
ing of, 280; U.S. as rival for Empire, 93,: Buck, Pearl: on Chinese rejecting Christ,:
264–68; U.S. disillusionment with the idea: 159–60; on coming massacres of whites in:
of it, 217–19; white supremacy a disguise: India, 217–18; on relationship between col-:
for its supremacy, 167; white supremacy in,: ored people everywhere, 126:
xi–xii, xv: Burma: anti-British propaganda, 201; anti-
British press: reporting from China, 262–63;: communism in, 202; British armed forces
in Shanghai, 95, 257: in, ix–x, 203; Burma Defense Forces, 202;
British racism: American moves against, 94; Burma Independence Army, 203, 246; Chi-
in choice of places to fight, 170–71; com- nese in, 201; collaborators in, 201; evacua-
pared to American, 182; in defeat in Hong tion of, 201; government, 202; Indians in,
Kong, 63; a disguise shrouding British’s 201; Japanese humiliation of whites, 78;
Empire’s supremacy, 167; effect on Japan, pro-Japan sentiments, 202–3; Rangoon,
viii; hotels, vii, 39; “nigger” in, 9; persist- 203–4, 215; retreat from, 246–47
ence during Hong Kong invasion, 65–66; Burridge, Raymond: on Britons’ dislike for
Strachan on, 234–35; a threat to national Australians, 192; on fall of Singapore,
security, ix. See also “Pure European de- 192–93
scent” Bush, Lewis: on cross-dressers as entertainers
British West Indies: black nationalists from,: in interment camps, 148; internment by
48; recruitment of blacks, 234–35; tariffs on: Japanese, 10; on love-making in internment
Japanese goods, 58; U.S. armed forces in,: camps, 149–50
240: Butler, General Lee: arrested, 119:
British Women’s Group, 155–56
Britons: Africans’ distrust of, 241; Aus- California Eagle (Los Angeles): on Japan as
tralians’ dislike of, 170; “blimps,” 283–85; role model for blacks, 50–51
British women as ambassadors, 288; dam- Cameron, Mrs. P. A.: support for white Aus-:
age claims by, 101; Euro-Americans com- tralia policy, 169:
pared to, 93; homosexuality among, 149; Canada: Anti-Mongolian Association, 301;:
postwar, 198, 199–200; postwar Kong Kong, collaborators from, 301; discrimination:
departure from, 285; in prewar Hong Kong, against Chinese, 19, 324; discrimination:
25–26, 62; relations with Euro-Americans, against Japanese, 301–2; immigrant exclu-:
93–95; in Stanley internment camp, 93–94, sion laws, 38, 301, 314; Japanese Canadians:
96, 97–98, 267 as leverage to improve fate of Britons in:
Brooke-Popham, Robert Moore: on Indians: Hong Kong, 129:
compared to whites in British Army, 211; on: Canadian Jewish Notes: on occupied Shanghai:
inferiority of Japanese armed forces, 139; on: as Jewish sanctuary, 272:
Portuguese evacuees from East Timor, 205: Canadians: in British armed forces, 73–74;:
Brooks, Roy: in Japanese press, 228: “Europeans,” 24; in prewar Hong Kong, 23:
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters: Japan-: Cannibalism: reports of African, 247–49
ese Americans and, 54: Capitalism: conflated with status quo, 214;:
Brown, Keith: on trails of pro-Japan African Hong Kong’s success, 100–101, 153–54, 279,:
Americans, 116–17 284, 291–97:
Brown, Walter: fixing Anglocentric textbooks,: Carey, Lester. See Holness, Eugene
25: Carroll, Tony: Japanese ties, 24–25; marginal:
Brown, Wenzell: fantasizing a Nego mammy,: status in Hong Kong, 24:
243; on soldiers of fortune in China, 98; on: Carroll, W. J.: trial of, 310:
Stanley internment camp, 98, 99: Carroll, William: collaboration with Japan, 25:
Bruce, J. E.: race war fiction, 49: Carter, Johnnie E.: Tonoya Kawakita victim,:
Brunet, Lucien: on British military training,: 306:
73; on Inouye Kanao, 303; on poverty in: Cartoons: by Yoshinori Kobayashi, 323:
prewar Hong Kong, 17; on Shamshuipo in-: Castro, Sonny (“Sonya,” “Sweetheart of:
ternment camp, 86: Shamshuipo”): cross-dressing entertainer,:
Bryan, William Jennings: on Britain in India,: 148:
218: Central British School (Hong Kong), 18:
Bryant, Joseph: on Japan’s rise to power, 44: Cercle Sportif Francaise: Chinese member-:
Bryce, William L.: spotting Japanese collabo-: ship, 264:
rator, 303: Ceylon: Britain’s African troops in, 247:
384 INDEX
Chamber of Property Consultants (Hong Japan trade, 258; Japanese atrocities, viii, 5,
Kong): support for anti-bias laws, 322 261; Japanese brutality in, viii; Japan’s pro-
Chamberlain, Joseph: wife, 93 posal to end racial discrimination (1919),
Chan Tsan Kan: property lost, 295 254; Ku Klux Klan in, 38; lack of resistance
Chandler, Merle: on Tonoya Kawakita, 306 to Japan, 256–57; nationalism, 253–59, 266,
Chang, I. Y.: on European exclusionism in 294–95; Nazi Germany, relations with, 270;
Asia, 142 Peking anti-American protest (1946),
Chang, Robert: on Japanese occupiers of Sin- 287–88; prejudice against Hong Kong Chi-
gapore, 196–96 nese, 319; pro-Japan sentiments, 253–58;
Chang, William: collaboration with Japan, racial discrimination against blacks, 225; re-
311 porting from, 262; soldiers of fortune in, 98;
Chaplin, Charles: plans to assassinate him, 39 Soviet aid, 255; triads in, 12–13, 74; Western
Chattey, “Crumb”: gay defender of Hong clubs in, 264
Kong, 149 China Courier: founders, 31
Chattopadhyay, Guatam: on Subhas Chandra Chinese (in China): American attitudes to-
Bose, 209 ward, 20; in Australia, 178, 315; bour-
Chattulani, Wadmull: trial of, 308 geoisie, viii, 14; British protection, 299; in
Cheat, The (film), 50 Burma, 201; Canadian discrimination, 19;
Ch’en, Eugene: pro-Japan sentiments, 142 Christ rejected, 159–60; collaboration with
Chen, Percy: on prewar government in Hong Japan, 13–14, 142–43; failure to distinguish
Kong, 18 Chinese Americans from them, 323; in
Ch’en Kung-po: collaboration with Japan, India, 212–13; in Japan, 271; Japanese prop-
142; founder Chinese Communist Party, 142 aganda aimed at, 68–69, 77; in Malaya, 194,
Cheng, T. K.: on benefits of collaborating, 293 197; marriage to, 28, 282; in New Zealand,
Chiang Kai-Shek: alliance with Axis forces, 159–60, 161, 173; prejudice against Hong
75; Black Dragon Society and, 255; British Kong Chinese, 319; in prewar Hong Kong,
liberators, attitude toward, 298; in Chung- 1–2, 12–14, 17–18, 20, 22, 24; in Singapore,
king, 258; Gandhi’s negotiations with Japan, 197; students, Britain to, 253–54; students,
219; German ties, 254; hatred for whites, 4; Russo-Japanese War’s effect on, 252; stu-
Japanese armed forces in Manchuria, 290; dents in Japan, 252–53; in Thailand, 291; to
Japanese ties, 12, 13; military training, 254, Truman, 225; as “Uncle Toms,” 111; U.S. cit-
255; Ride on, Edwin, 75; Sun Yat-Sen’s heir, izenship, 314
254; Wang Ching-wei and, 256 Chinese (in Hong Kong): anti-Japan senti-
Chiang Kai-Shek, Madame: questioned about ment, 63–64, 74; in British armed forces, 69,
Chinese racial discrimination against 72; British massacre of, 71; business success,
blacks, 225 100–101, 153–54, 279, 284, 291–97; cama-
Children: Asians as, 221–22; evacuation from raderie with Japanese, 104; car drivers, 73;
Hong Kong, 167–71, 179, 323–24; intern- collaboration with Japan, 12, 64–65, 69–73,
ment of, 151, 156, 157; rhyme about “nig- 75, 279, 291–97; damage claims by, 101; ex-
gers,” xiv; segregating them and women patriates’ view of, 22; in government, 100,
from men in internment camps, 156; spot- 142, 285; Hong Kong defense corps, 63,
ting those of mixed marriages, 29; those 69–70, 74, 75–76, 316; Japanese surrender,
born toward the end of hostilities, 151 282; job discrimination against, 282; loyality
China: alliance with Japan, 12; American doubted, 63, 72; money circulating among,
reservations about aiding resistance, 14–15; 101, 285; number trained in military opera-
Americans in, 153; anti-British propaganda, tions, 72; plight of those fleeing to main-
177; bourgeoisie, viii, 14; Boxers in, 12; land, 299; in police, 60, 61, 73; police’s atti-
British antagonism toward, xii–xiii; British tude toward, 22–23; in postwar Hong
protection of Chinese in, 299; British report- Kong, 285, 286–97, 317, 319; repatriation
ing from, 262–63; British support for (1938), from Australia, 168; in Stanley internment
255; communists (see Communist Party, camp, 141–42; switching loyalties, 100–104
China); Du Bois’s attitude toward, 110; Chinese Americans: African Americans and,
Eurasians in, 20; fears of its potential 111; collaboration with Japan, 142; failure to
power, 11; fears of Japan allying with it and distinguish them from Chinese, 323; in
Russia, 12; interracial marriages, 20; Japan Harlem, 113; hatred for Americans, 141; in
compared to, to African Americans, 110–13; Japanese occupation forces, 141; job dis-
INDEX 385
crimination, 124; segregated schools for, Cold War: unlikehood in wake of Japanese
33–34; U.S. citizenship, 314 victory, 268
Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Hong Collaboration with Japan, 291–310; Ameri-
Kong): in occupied Hong Kong, 100; oppo- cans, 311; anti-Empire sentiment and, 258;
sition to anti-bias laws, 322 Asians having spent time in North Amer-
Chinese Civil Servants’ Club (Hong Kong): ica, 301; benefits of, 293; Burmese, 201;
petition for back pay, 319 Canadians, 301; Carroll’s, William, 25;
Chinese Manufacturers Union (Hong Kong): Chang’s, William, 311; Ch’en Kung-po’s,
in occupied Hong Kong, 100 142; Chinese, 13–14, 142–43; Chinese
Ching, Frank: accusations against Wen Ho Americans, 142; Chinese in Hong Kong,
Lee, 323; on Japan’s placing Chinese in gov- 12, 14, 25, 28, 31, 64–65, 69–73, 75, 84–85,
ernment positions, 20 95, 100, 279, 291–97, 300; Communist
“Chinks”: Stilwell’s use, 10 Party’s opposition to, 13, 143; Eurasians,
Chohong Choi: on Chiang Kai-Shek, 256; on 28, 31, 311; fictional African American col-
inferiority of Japanese pilots, 139; on keep- laborator, 114; Foure’s, C. M., 311;
ing Chinese out of Hong Kong defense Gurkhas, 214; in Hong Kong invasion, 12,
corps, 63 28, 64–65, 69–73, 75, 300; in Hong Kong oc-
Chow, George: escape from Hong Kong, 261 cupation, 25, 84–85, 95, 100, 267; in Hong
Chu Shuen Choo: on ingratitude toward Kong postwar, 279, 291–302; in Hong Kong
Communists, 326 prewar, 14, 31; Hsien Ping-shi’s, 258;
Churchill, Randolph: wife, 93 Hsu’s, C. L., 294; Indians, 144, 145, 214;
Churchill, Winston: on Australians, 167; on Irish, 309–10; Isamu Ishara’s, 307; Japanese
Gandhi’s negotiations with Japan, 219; Americans, 304–8; Johnston’s, Frank
Phillips (William) on, 215–16; on possibility Henry, 309–10; Khan’s, Mohammed, 311;
of Japanese attack on Britain, 266; on yield- Koumintang (KMT), 258; Kwong’s, Mar-
ing British territory, 265 quita, 311; Lee Kuan Yew’s, 189; Lee’s,
Citizens’ Party (Hong Kong): anti-bias laws, Frank, 311; Luke’s, D. W., 311; in Malaya,
321 195; Moy’s, Hubert, 142; Nimori
Clark, Russell: on Japanese, 281–82; on post- Genichiro’s, 311; number/number exe-
war Hong Kong, 280–81 cuted, 297; in Philippines, 298; Provoo’s,
Clarkson, Adrienne Poy: evacuation to John David, 311; Recto’s, Claro M., 298; re-
Canada, 323–24 distribution of collaborator’s wealth,
Clarry, Reginald: on Japanese anti-British 293–97, 299; Richards’s, Joseph James, 311;
propaganda, 166 in Shanghai, 292; in Singapore, 195; spot-
Class consciousness: in British Empire, 25–27, ting collaborator in U.S., 303; in Stanley in-
40; in internment camps, 91, 92–93, 157, ternment camp, 95; triads, 312; Wang
267; as racial conflict, 260; replacement for Ching-wei’s, 13, 256; White Russians, 147,
race consciousness, 317; ruling class 272; Zung’s, Frankie, 233–34
deemed necessary, 229; Soviet Union’s Collins, Tom: warned against anti-Japanese
damage to class-based opposition to op- legislation, 39
pression, 327; whiteness of working class “Colonial”: replaced by “Japanese-occu-
skin, 40 pied,” 218
Clayton, Buck: confronting American Colonialism: Chinese in India, supposed,
marines in Shanghai, 9–10; disembarking in 213; Euro-Americans’ fears of it being
Japan, vii turned against them, 11; fissure within, 98;
Cliff, Norman: on Japanese, 280 Japanese as antipode to European, 11, 326;
Clubb, O. Edmond: on aid to China, 255 loss of support for, 157; in Malaya, 190;
Clyde, Paul Hibbert: on anti-British propa- portrayal in British textbooks, 8; prewar vs.
ganda in Japan, 38 postwar rationale, 314; U. S. opposition to
Coates, J. G.: on Ratana Movement, 162 restoring colonial rule, 264–65; U.N. con-
Cohen, Morris “Two-Gun”: China ties, frontation with, 312. See also Decoloniza-
341n85; on end of white supremacy, 79; tion; White supremacy
during Hong Kong invasion, 68; in Stanley Colored American Magazine: on Japan’s rise to
internment camp, 89; Sun Yat-Sen and, 68 power, 44
Cohen, Warren: on Japan liberating Asians “Coloured”: in British Empire, 180
from the West, 32 Coltrane, John: Asian music’s influence, 324
386 INDEX
Communist Party, China (CCP): Allied oppo- Davis, Lee: Communist guerilla, 234:
sition to, 259; “an indigenous growth,” 259; Davis, Percy: anti-Japan sentiment, 234:
British cooperation, 259–60; British perse- Dean, Harry: on blood relations between Ne-:
cution, 12, 143; as captors, 143; Chiang’s groes and Japanese, 49:
use of Japanese against, 290–91; common Decolonization: independence for Asian
opponent of Britain, Japan, U.S., xiv; states, 14–15; independence in Africa, 326;
founders, 142; ingratitude toward, 326; U.N. confrontation with colonialism,
Koumintang ban on its publications, 290; 264–65; U.S. opposition to restoring colo-
nationalists and, 259; opposition to collabo- nial rule, 264–65
ration with Japan, 13, 143; opposition to Delano, Sara: family home in Hong Kong, 19:
Japan, 12, 253; in postwar Hong Kong, 319; Delano, Warren: in China trade, 19:
redistribution of collaborator’s wealth, sup- Democracy: Britain as its defender, 122; in:
port for, 294 British policy making, 7; pro-Japan feelings:
Communist Party, India: backing the Allies,: and, xv; as a rationale for war, 215:
219: Desegregation: as Japanese plot, 120:
Communist Party, Indonesia (PKI): school-: Devereux, J. P. S.: on talking to Japanese cap-:
teachers, 205: tors, 96:
Communist Party, United States: African: Dew, Gwen: on Chinese perfidy during
Americans in, 268; anticommunism toward,: Hong Kong invasion, 64–65; disquisition of
xiv, 56; backing the Allies, 219; Negroes: Japan’s place in the world, 140; on dowager
and, 48, 55; surveillance of Japanese activi-: in Stanley internment camp, 92–93; on Indi-
ties in U.S., 56: ans in occupied Hong Kong, 144; on Japan-
Conference of Pan-Asianists (1926), 187: ese Americans in Japanese occupation
Cook Islanders: in British armed forces, 163: forces, 132; on Japanese as copyists, 139; on
Cooke, Marvel: on Chinese Americans in: Japanese humiliation of whites, 77–78; on
Harlem, 113: racism’s persistence during Hong Kong in-
Cooper, Queenie: on being a third-rate: vasion, 65–66; on rooming with men, 154
queen, 25: Dibba, Bakary: on fighting for Empires, 249:
Coppin, Alan Dudley: on Chinese businesses: Diosesan Boys’ School (Hong Kong), 18:
in internment camps, 153–54, 287: Diosesan Girls’ School (Hong Kong), 18:
Corrothers, James: race war fiction, 49: “Dr. Takis.” See Guzman, Mimo D.
Cotton industry: Japanese-British competi-: Dog Man (prisoner in internment camp), 97:
tion in Africa, 230: Dorman-Smith, Reginald: on failure to in-:
Council of European Civil Servants (Hong duce loyalty in Burma, 201–2; on fifth colu-:
Kong): opposition to racial reform, 316–17 mists in Burma, 201:
Crackerocracy: Powell on, Adam Clayton,: Dover, Cedric: on Wang Ching-wei, 256:
122: Dower, John: on American reaction to Japan’s:
Crew, Graeme: on hatred for Japanese, 140: racial policies, 4; writings of, xi:
Crisis: Corrothers’ story in, 49: Drage, Charles: on children of mixed mar-:
Crown Colonies: governors in, 18: riages, 29; on European disdain for British:
Cuffee, Paul: prominence, 49: military in Hong Kong, 27:
Cumings, Bruce: on Japan’s attraction to: Du Bois, W. E. B.: attitude toward China, 110;
Asian progressives, 11: attitude toward Japan, 110; on blacks’ and
Curzon, George Nathaniel, Marquis of: Asians’ destiny, xiii; on Britain as defender
Kedleston: on India in Britain’s power, 9;: of democracy, 122; combining Japan and
on whiteness of working class skin, 40;: China, 109; Dark Princess, 50; on Germany
wife, 93: winning WWII, xv; on internment of Japan-
ese Americans, 125; to Japan’s government,
Da Dilva, M. A.: accusation against Tsui: 224; Nazi Germany’s treatment of, 105;
Kwok Ching, 301: problem of the epoch, 327; race war fiction
Daily Worker (newspaper): on proposed: by, 50; Russo-Japanese War’s effect, 251; on
Anglo-Japanese agreement about China,: Russo-Japanese War’s impact, 45; in Shang-
267: hai, 110; on Sino-Japanese enmity, 110–11;
Dark Princess (Du Bois): race war fiction, 50: on “Yellow Peril,” 15
Davis, Catherine: on Chinese and Jews in: Durrani, Mahmood Khan: on racial discrimi-:
Japan, 271: nation in India, 207:
INDEX 387
Dutch: emigrés to Australia, 169; in Indone- them, 11; fears of Japanese alliance with
sia, 204; in Stanley internment camp, 95, 96, Russia and China, 12; in internment camps,
267; trading practices in Indonesia, 203 viii, 80, 99; “monkey” to, 10; to Nisei, xii; in
Duus, Peter: on Japan’s desire to overthrow Plan of San Diego, 277; relations with
white supremacy, 8–9 Britons, 93–95; white devils, viewed as, 11,
Dyson, Freeman: on good and bad causes, ix 47; womens’ fall in status, 153–54
Europe: antifascist resistance, 104
East Africa: U.S. armed forces in, 240 “European”: meaning in Hong Kong, 24–25,
East Africans: in British armed forces, 244 330n17
East Timor: desertion of native soldiers, 205 Europeans: in Bangkok, 200; book’s focus on,
Eaton, Charles: on independence for Asian xi; death rate in Japanese internment
states, 14–15 camps, 3; European women/men and
Economic exploitation: white supremacy Asian men/women, 30; exclusionism in
and, xii–xiii Asia, 142; in Fiji, 163; in Hong Kong police,
Eden, Anthony: reports of Indian diasporans, 285; in internment camps, viii, 3, 85; in
206; reports of Japanese anti-British propa- Japan, 282; Japanese behavior toward Euro-
ganda, 166; reports of lack of interest in pean women, 152; “monkey” to, 10; in oc-
Japanese atrocities, 261 cupied Singapore, 197; in postwar Hong
Education: in prewar Hong Kong, 18; segre- Kong, 284, 286, 296; in prewar Hong Kong,
gated schools for Chinese, Japanese in U.S., 1, 14, 17, 18–19, 22–26, 26–27, 71–72, 74;
33–34, 54 prostitutes, 26; returnees to Hong Kong,
Edwards, Jack: humiliation by Japanese, 78; 283; Russo-Japanese War’s effect on, 32;
on Japanese Americans in Japanese occupa- simians to Japanese, 147; suitability of
tion forces, 135 Shanghai’s prison, 310; womens’ fall in sta-
Eggleston, F. W.: on getting Aborigines to tus, 153–54
fight, 177 Extraterritoriality: abrogation in Hong Kong,
Eggleston, Frederick W.: on Koumintang, 258 286; abrogation in Shanghai, 261
Eichi Noda (“The Sadist,” “The Rat”): Japan-
ese American in Japanese occupation Far Eastern Economic Review: on Hong Kong,
forces, 134–35, 136 2; on Tung Chee-hwa, 321
Eisenhower, Dwight David: German ancestry, Farr, George: Japanese financial aid, 47
270; Tonoya Kawakita’s death sentence, 304 Farstan T. Sung: Axis courier, 257
Elkin, A. P.: on Australian armed forces, 175 Fascism: in Japan’s alliance with Germany,
Embree, Edwin: on balance of power be- Italy, 275
tween whites and others, 15 FBI: on pro-Japan sentiment among African-
Empathy: in internment camps, 156–57 and Asian Americans, 119–20
Endacott, G. B.: on lack of resistance in Hong Field, Ellen: avoiding internment by mas-
Kong, 297 querading as Irish, 85; on British defeat at
Epstein, Israel: internment by Japanese, x Hong Kong, 67; on Chinese collaborators,
Erwin, David D.: arrested, 119 143; on having to wait for Chinese clerks,
Ethiopia: Italian invasion, 155, 231–32; Japan 68; on Nimori Genichiro, 132; prohibited
and, 231–32 from taking medicine to prisoners, 140
Ethiopia Pacific Movement: Holness in, Eu- Fiji: Indians in, 211; Japanese agent, 173; race
gene, 119; Jordan in, Leonard Robert, 118; relations in, 163
letters to foreign rulers, 118 Filipinos: bond with African Americans, 7,
“Eurasian”: term deplored, 155 43–44; Japanese propaganda aimed at, 109;
Eurasians: in British armed forces, 63, 72, 76; job discrimination, 124; law against marry-
in China, 20; collaboration with Japan, 28, ing those of European descent, 124; as
31, 311; in Malaya, 195; marriage prospects, tongzhong, 253; U.S. citizenship, 314. See also
31, 282; in postwar Hong Kong, 289, 317; in Philippines
prewar Hong Kong, 24, 26, 28–32, 167–68; Fisher, Les: on communism among prisoners
in Stanley internment camp, 91–92 in Stanley internment camp, 90; on cross-
Euro-Americans: Asian hatred of, 4; attitudes dressers as entertainers in interment camps,
toward black soldiers, 223; book’s focus on, 148
xi; Britons compared to, 93; fear of, 140–41; Fleming, John: postwar relocation to South
fears of colonialism being turned against Africa, 325
388 INDEX
Hahn, Emily: on American men’s view of Japanese agents in, 117; Japanese Ameri-:
Chinese girls, 142–43; on attitudes toward cans in, 114–15; reaction to “Harlem:
Eurasians in Hong Kong, 29; avoiding in- Mikado,” 118–19; spying in, 116; University:
ternment, 83, 233; on British defeat at Hong of Tokio, 116:
Kong, 85; career, 82–83; on color bars, Harman, Bill: on looting in occupied Hong:
233–34; on emotionally expressive women Kong, 80:
in internment camps, 155; on evacuation of Harrison, Hubert: on U.S. objections to Japan:
Hong Kong, 167–68; on failure of transpo- taking a slice of China, 109:
ration during Hong Kong invasion, 64; on Harrop, Phyllis: on Indian police in Hong
Indians in occupied Hong Kong, 144; on in- Kong, 76; on Indians in occupied Hong
ternment for Jews, 83; on Japanese hatred Kong, 144; on looting during Hong Kong
of English, 266; on Kotewell’s switching invasion, 77; setting up brothel system for
loyalties, 100; on love-making in graves, Japanese, 76–77
150; on millionaires in Stanley internment Hart, Stokley Delmar: arrested, 346n73
camp, 90–91; on persistence of racism dur- Hastie, William: barred from National Press:
ing occupation of Hong Kong, 66; personal Club, 227:
style, 83; on racial reversal, 81, 132; Sino- Hata Shoryu: on desire to overthrow white:
phobia recalled, 21; on women fraternizing supremacy, 130:
with their captors, 152; on Zung, 233–34 Hatred: Asians for Euro-Americans, 4; a Chi-:
Haines, Annastean: arrested, 119; husband,: nese American’s for Americans, 141; of:
119: Japan compared to Hitler, 269; Japanese-:
Haiti: pro-Japan sentiments, 106: American, 279; Japanese for English,:
Hale, Harry Sidney George: on relations be-: 265–66; Japanese for whites, 282; Nazi Ger-:
tween U.S. and British sailors in Hong: many’s ability to deflect hatred toward:
Kong, 93; on venereal disease among: Japan, 270; Truman’s, 225:
British military in Hong Kong, 27: Hearst, William Randolph: Japanese and
Hall, Peter: name-calling in Australia, 184–85 Mexicans looting in U.S., 275–78
Hall, Ronald: on Britain’s protection of Chi-: Hehir, J. L.: on Black Dragon Society, 166:
nese in China, 299: Hell: preferred to a heaven full of whites,
Hamilton, J. A. L.: on publicity given Africans: 159–60
in British armed forces, 244: Heng Chian Ki: on fall of Singapore, 194:
Hammond, Robert: on British gunning down: Henninburg, Alphonse: on relationship be-:
Hong Kong looters, 71; on hunger in Stan-: tween prejudices, 126:
ley internment camp, 87; on Japanese hu-: Herald of Asia: editor, 109:
miliation of whites, 77; on poverty in pre-: Hewitt, Anthony: escape from occupation,:
war Hong Kong, 17: 234:
Hammond, Robert B.: on God’s love, 249–50 Hewitt, Frances: on Japan’s desire for racial:
Han Suyin: on Indians in India, 143–44; on: equality, 37:
Pearl Harbor to Chinese officers, 75: Hikida Yasuichi: Japanese agent among:
Hanama Tasaki: on joining Japan’s military,: African Americans, 57:
13: Hin-shing Lo: defense of George Wong, 299:
Handy, W. C.: Japanese agent cook, 57: Hindus: anti-Hindu and pro-Hindu Japanese:
Hara Yoshimichi: on Japan beginning war: propaganda, 232:
against U.S., 269: Hirohito, Emperor of Japan: on Versaille:
Harbin (China): Japanese occupation of, 272: Treaty’s failure to abolish racial discrimina-:
Harcourt, Cecil: on Chinese during Japanese: tion, 36, 313:
surrender, 282–83; on Europeans returning: Hiroshima: bombing, 279, 329n2
to Hong Kong, 283: Hiroto, Kanai: Nisei interpreter for Kem-:
Harcourt, Lewis: wife, 93: peitai, 138:
Hardie, Patrick: on movies in occupied Singa- Hitler, Adolph: in black skin, 106; Mein
pore, 195–96; racial identity of, 3; on Kampf, 270, 271; Wright and, Milton, 106:
Sukarno, 203–4 Ho, Betty M.: on racial discrimination in pre-:
“Harlem Mikado.” See Jordan, Leonard war Hong Kong, 21:
Robert Ho, Stanley: British official’s treatment of,:
Harlem (New York City): Afro-Caribbean mi- 103; Japanese ties, 102; in Macao, 102; rise:
gration to, 105; Chinese Americans in, 113; of, 102–3; Sawa and, 102:
390 INDEX
Ho Chi Minh: deportation from Hong Kong, rickshaw drivers, 21–22; Rose Hill, 19;
188; lack of resistance to Japanese in China, scent of, 19; Scotch in, 25; “singsong”
256; Subhas Chandra Bose and, 209 houses, 28; Sinophobia, 21–22;
Ho Kom-tong: in Hong Kong Jockey Club, 20 snobbery/gossip, 26; social classes, 18; Star
Ho Tung, Robert: living at The Peak, 31 Ferry, 21; theft, 22; town hall, 18; trade,
Holick, Alexander: Tonoya Kawakita victim, nineteenth century, 19; U.S. view of situa-
305 tion, 61; venereal diseases, 27; Victorian
Holland, Esther: marriage to Chinese man, 30 School, 18; Wanchai, 74; White Russians in,
Holness, Eugene (also known as Lester Hol- 25, 73; Yamati, 74
ness, Lester Carey): arrested, 119; in Hong Kong, Japanese invasion (Dec. 8-25,
Ethiopia Pacific Movement, 119 1941), 60–79; anti-Empire sentiment, 258;
Homosexuality: among African-American British complacency during, 76; British de-
troops in Australia, 149; among Britons, feat, 2, 63, 67, 68, 75–77, 78–79, 85; British
149; homosexual defender of Hong Kong, massacre of Chinese, 71; British surrender,
149; in Japanese internment camps, 149 63; Chinese collaboration with Japan, 12,
Hong Kong: Aberdeen district, 1; areas of, 1; 64–65, 69–73, 300; collaboration with Japan,
Kowloon (see Kowloon); New Territories, 1, 12, 28, 64–65, 69–73, 75, 300; desertion by
259; Outlying Islands, 1; police (see Hong Chinese drivers, 64; desertion by Chinese
Kong police); Repulse Bay Beach, 1; size, 1; servants, 72; discord during, 66; emotional
Victoria Peak (see Peak, The) collapse during, 66; fear induced by, 68;
Hong Kong, before World War II: American fifth columnists during, 64; German-Japan-
consulate, 61; Asians in, 17; British armed ese relations, 274; humiliation of whites
forces in, 22, 27, 30–31, 40; British foothold after British surrender, 77–78, 147; Japanese
(1842), 1, 9; Britons in, 25–26, 62; Canadi- agents, 64; Japanese called “Ethiopians,”
ans in, 23; cemeteries in, 24; Central British 107; Japanese in Chinese civilian clothing,
School, 18; Cheung Chan, 18, 23; Chinese 177; Japanese propaganda, 68–69, 77; loot-
in, 1–2, 12–14, 17–18, 20, 22, 24; collabora- ing during, 77; Rajputana Rifles’ casualties,
tion with Japan, 14, 31; compared to 70; rapes during, 152; religious revival dur-
colony of ostriches, 62; Contagious Dis- ing, 66; reporting the Japanese landing, 66;
eases Act (1867), 27; cost of living, 19, 60; Singapore during, 192; squabbling during,
as Crown Colony, 18; Delano in, Sara, 19; 67
democracy in, 1; Diosesan Boys’ School, 18; Hong Kong, Japanese occupation (1941-
Diosesan Girls’ School, 18; diseases, 17, 27; 1945): anti-white propaganda, 81–82;
distribution of wealth, 101; education, 18, British resistance, motive for, 264–65; ca-
31; employment patterns, 22–23, 26; maraderie among Chinese and Japanese,
Eurasians in, 24, 26, 28–32, 167–68; Euro- 104; cannibalism, 87; capitalism encour-
pean Reservation, 18; Europeans in, 1, 14, aged, 100–101, 153–54; Chinese Chamber
17, 18–19, 22–26, 26–27, 71, 74; evacuation of Commerce, 100; Chinese fleeing to
of women and children, 167–71, 179; Exec- mainland, 299; Chinese in, 279; Chinese
utive Council, 18, 23; firemen, 23; General Manufacturers Union, 100; Civil Adminis-
Strike (1925), 74; government, 18, 20; Indi- tration Department, 81; collaboration with
ans in, 1, 24; intrigue, 1; Irish in, 24; Japan- Japan, 25, 84–85, 95, 100; collaborators in,
ese Consulate, 61–62; Japanese in, 19, 233, 279, 289, 298, 299–303, 308–11; dam-
61–62, 74, 129, 286; justice system, 22–23; ages in, 101; destruction of police records,
Kings’s College, 18; Kowloon School, 18; 285; dragging black pilot to death, 250;
labor unions, 24, 74, 91; libraries, 18; mass economic boom, roots of later, 100; escapes
transit, 21; Matilda Hospital, 70; misce- from, 259, 261; going native in, 87; goods
genation in, 28–29; murder cases in, 22; taken by Japan, 280; government, Chinese
Peak School, 31; Perry in, Matthew, 8; in, 100, 142; Hong Kong defense corps, 63,
place in British Empire, 1; plan to massacre 69–70, 74, 75–76; Indians during, 144–46,
Europeans there, 12–13; political activism, 212; Japanese hatred of English, 264–65;
23–24; population (1941), 1; Portuguese in, Japanese in, 104; lack of resistance, 104,
24, 25, 167–68; poverty, 2, 17, 20; prostitu- 297; liquor destroyed, 285; looting, 80, 285,
tion, 26–27; Queen’s College, 18; racial dis- 294; monitoring of German nationals, 273;
crimination, 21–22, 28; racial inequality, 2, physical destruction, 279; police, 88; prohi-
17–18; residential segregation, 18–19, 31; bition on whites living on The Peak, 83–84,
INDEX 391
89; racial reform, 313; racism, 66; role in 322; trade, 2; U.S. as model for, 322; war
Japan’s war effort, 101; street signs, 80–81; trials in, 299–303, 308–11; White Russians
switching loyalties in, 100–104; tensions in, in, 309
93; triads in, 101–2; West Point, 101–2 Hong Kong Club: anti-Semitism, 24
Hong Kong, Japanese surrender (August Hong Kong Cricket Club: postwar discrimi-
1945): anti-Japanese acts, 282; British raid nation, 317
on Koumintang headquarters, 290; popula- Hong Kong defense corps, 63, 69–70, 74,
tion at, 284; post-liberation in, xi; triad 75–76, 316
bandidtry following, 102 Hong Kong Hotels Association: support for
Hong Kong, post-World War II: Accredited anti-bias laws, 322
Advertising Agents of Hong Kong, 321; Hong Kong Jockey Club: Chinese barred
anti-bias laws, 320–22; anticommunism, from, 20
British, 289–90; Association of Restricted Hong Kong News: on Asians’ rights in Hong
License Banks and Deposit-Trading Com- Kong, 26–27; on Britain’s choice of places
panies, 322; “blimps” in, 283–85; British to fight, 170–71; on British divide and con-
propaganda, 315–16; Britons departure, quer policy, 145; editor, 311; on Hastie
285; capitalism’s success, 100–101, 153–54, being barred from National Press Club,
279, 284, 291–97; Causeway Bay, 292; 227; on immigration exclusion by U.S., 38;
Chamber of Property Consultants, 322; Japanese journal, 26; on job discrimination
Chinese businesses, 284; Chinese Chamber against African Americans, 227
of Commerce, 322; Chinese driving cars, Hong Kong police: attitudes toward Chinese,
281; Chinese in, 285, 286–97, 317, 319; Citi- 22, 23–24; Chief of Police during invasion,
zens’ Party, 321; civil service applicants, 70; Chinese in, 60, 61, 73; destruction of
315; Clark on, 280–81; class consciousness, police records, 285; Europeans in, 285; In-
317; collaboration, dealing with past, dians in, 60, 61, 72–73, 76, 144, 283, 308–9;
291–302; collaboration with Japan, 279, interned in Stanley internment camp, 90;
291–302; Communists in, 319; Council of during Japanese occupation, 88; Muslims
European Civil Servants (Hong Kong), in, 73; in postwar Hong Kong, 283; Sikhs
316–17; emptiness, 280; Eurasians in, 289, in, 73, 88
317; European flight from, 296; European Hong Kong Stock Exchange: racial, ethnic
returnees, 283, 284; Europeans in, 286; ex- exclusion, 24
traterritoriality lost, 286; Far Eastern Eco� Hong Kong Trade Development Council:
nomic Review on, 2; ferry travel, 288; first chairman, 322
traitor hung in, 300–301; foreign reserves, Hong Kong University: Japanese propa-
2; government, 285–86, 313; Hong Kong ganda about, 280–81; looting at, 280; over-
defense forces, 316; Hong Kong Hotels As- exhorting British way of life, 289; student
sociation, 322; Hong Kong University, 289; sentiments, 261; teaching at, 23
(Stanley) Ho’s fortunes, 103; hunger, 281; Hood, Albert: on European disdain for
importance in world business, 322; income British military in Hong Kong, 27; on
distribution, 2; Indians in, 308–9; Japanese poverty in prewar Hong Kong, 20
in, 296–97; Japanese influence, 323; job dis- Hoover, Herbert: Japanese takeover of
crimination, 309, 320; job hiring hierarchy, China, 257
287; judicial system, 319–20; Kowloon House, Edward Mandell (“Colonel”): on
Riots (1946), 286; “Let’s Get the Hell out of Japan’s Siberian expedition (1918), 35
China” movement, 286; libraries, 315–16; Hsien Ping-shi: collaboration with Japan, 258
Nationalists in, 319; petition for back pay Hsu, C. L.: collaboration with Japan, 294
by civil servants, 319; police, 283; popula- Hu Sheng: on Chinese students in Japan, 253
tion (2003), 2; racial differentiation, 317; Huddle, David: Tonoya Kawakita victim, 306
racial discrimination, 320–22; racial reform, Hughes, Billy: on white supremacy in Aus-
315–17; racial reversal, 285, 321–22; racial tralia, 166–67
segregation’s decline, 279; racism, 284; re- Huie, Fenton: on rags, 156–57; trading sex
distribution of collaborator’s wealth, for necessities, 156
293–97; released internees, 284; reversion Hung-yuk, Anna Wu: on lack of anti-bias
to China, 319; salary differentials, 287; laws in postwar Hong Kong, 320
snobbery, 283, 288–89; social unrest, 285; Hunt, Bill: besting Britons in Stanley intern-
Society of Hong Kong Real Estate Agents, ment camp, 267
392 INDEX
Hussain, Mustapha: discrimination against, Kong, 144–46, 212; in postwar Hong Kong,
188 308–9; in prewar Hong Kong, 1, 24; in Ran-
Hyoe Murakami: on Japan’s contribution to goon, 215; in Shanghai, 212; in Singapore,
national independence elsewhere, 326; on 197; in Southern Rhodesia, 211; in United
Japan’s contribution to others’ national in- States, 124, 215, 314. See also Gurkhas; Hin-
dependence, 326 dus; Sikhs
Indonesia: communists in, 205; Dutch in, 203,
Ibn Saud: his chief of staff, 232 204
Ikushima Kichizo: Japanese American in Inouye Chotakara: relation to Inouye Kanao,
Japanese occupation forces, 133 302
Immigrant exclusion laws: in Canada, 38, Inouye Kanao (“Slap Happy,” “Kamloops
301, 314; in New Zealand, 161; in United Kid”): trial of, 301–3; on George Wong, 300
States, 34, 36, 38, 55, 213, 314; World War Inouye Matsumto: relation to Inouye Kanao,
II’s effect on, 314; worth to Japanese armed 302
forces, 314 International League of Darker Peoples:
“Imperial preferences”: in sustaining British token of friendship for Japan, 52
Empire, 94, 215, 218, 297 International Military Tribunal for the Far
Imphal, battle of: West Africans in, 244 East: accusations against Japan, 3
India, 205–19; All India Congress Committee, Internment: children in, 151, 156, 157; effect
214; Bengal famine (1943), 217; British on gender dynamics, 150–51; effect on mar-
Army’s African troops in, ix–x; to British riages, 157–58; long-term effects, 157; men-
Empire, 205; censorship in, 206; Chinese in, tal stability, 157; released internees, reloca-
212–13; communists in, 219; diaspora, 206; tion of, 325
Free India Movement, 212; “imperial pref- Internment camps, American: for Japanese
erences” to, 218; Indian Independent Army, Americans, 125–26; Japanese concern for
203; Indian National Army, 207, 209–11, prisoners, 136–37; premonition of, 128; sug-
308; Indian National Congress, 207, 216; In- gestion to sterilize Japanese internees,
dians in, 143–44; Japanese spying in, 205; 152–53
market for British goods, 9; massacres of Internment camps, British: propaganda fea-
whites predicted, 217–18; Muslim League, turing cannibals eating Japanese prisoners,
216; Pakistan, creation of, 219; poverty in 248; separating German from black prison-
Bombay, 333n24; pro-Japan sentiments, xv, ers in Kenya, 242; separating Jewish from
144, 188, 206–8, 212; “Quit India” move- non-Jewish prisoners in Trinidad, 242–43
ment, 214–15; racial discrimination, 207; re- Internment camps, Japanese, 80–104; African
sistance to fighting Japan, 213–14, 216–17; Americans in, 220; Argyle Street (Hong
in rift between Britain and U.S., 215–16; Kong), 86, 136; Asian American expatriate
U.S.armed forces in, 218, 248. See also Indi- authorities, 13; British armed forces in, 86;
ans British Women’s Group in, 155–56; Britons
India Independence League, 208 in, 129, 148–49; Changi (Singapore), 136,
Indian Americans, 124, 215, 314 196; Chinese businesses in, 153; class con-
Indian National Army, 207, 209–11, 308 sciousness in, 91, 92–93, 157, 267; cross-
Indian National Congress, 207, 216 dressers as entertainers, 148–49; death rate
Indian Youth League: founder, 194 of Europeans, 3, 84; dehumanization of cap-
Indians: Allies, their view of, 146; in Ameri- tives, 147–48; difference between Britons
can films, 206; in British armed forces, 9, and Americans in, 93–94, 97; effect on
69–70, 76, 190, 207, 208, 211, 217, 263; in women, 150–56; emotional metamorphosis
British Empire, 143–44; British propaganda in, 89; empathy for the underprivileged,
aimed at, 146–47; in Burma, 201; collabora- 156–57; Europeans in, viii, 3; exclusion of
tion with Japan, 144, 145, 214; diasporans, Europeans deemed antagonistic to Britain,
206, 208, 211–12; in Fiji, 163, 211; as guards 85; feminizing men, 147–49; Formosan
at Stanley internment camp, 80, 88; in Hong guards, 3; homosexuality in, 149; Indians
Kong police force, 60, 61, 72–73, 144, 283, in, 146; in Indonesia, 156; interrogation pro-
308–9; in India, 143–44; in Japanese intern- cedures, 146; Japanese Americans in, 132;
ment camps, 146; Japanese propaganda Korean guards, 3; Los Banos (Philippines),
aimed at, 68–69, 146; in Malaya, 188; in 220; love-making in, 149–50; Ma Tau Chang
New Zealand, 161, 172; in occupied Hong (Hong Kong), 86; men in, 155–56; Mukden
INDEX 393
(China), 134; Osaka (China), 135; postwar- 165, 268–75; alliance with Soviet Union, 12,
Hong Kong capitalism’s roots, 100–101, 365n8; alliance with/trust in Britain, 62, 95,
153–54; punishment of women, 155; racial 160, 188, 200–201, 255, 266–67, 295; anti-
reversal in, 81–89, 96–97, 99, 147; Santo Chinese policies in Southeast Asia, 6; anti-
Tomas (Philippines), 157–58; segregation of Semitism lacking in, 271–72; anti-white be-
women and children from men, 156; havior in, 37; anticommunism in, xiv; ap-
Shamshuipo (Hong Kong), 86, 148, 153–54, peal to African Americans, vii–viii, xiii,
287; slave mentality in, 97–98; in Sumatra, 57–58, 324; appeal to Asians, viii; its appeal
156; on Taiwan, 135; U.S. sailors in, 91; to Asians, 11; armed forces (see Japanese
Warm Road Goal (Shanghai), 212; women, armed forces); “Asia for Asiatics” (“Aji,
emotionally expressive, 155; women frater- Ajino, Ajia!”), 26–27, 209, 284, 313; Asians’
nizing with captors, 152; Yokohama hatred for Euro-Americans, 4; Asians in de-
(Japan), 97. See also Stanley internment feating, 3; banditry by, 130–31; bigotry in, x;
camp black market, 271; in British Empire’s undo-
Ireland, Kevin: on threat of invasion of New ing, 280; British racism’s effect on, viii; bru-
Zealand, 171–72 tality in China, viii; its challenge to Western
Irian Jaya: black soldiers in, 183 domination, x, xiii–xiv; as “champion of
Irish: collaboration by, 309–10; in prewar colored races,” ix, 114; China, trade with,
Hong Kong, 24 258; China compared to, to African Ameri-
Isamu Ishara: collaboration with Japan, 307 cans, 110–13; Chinese in, 271; Chinese stu-
Isherwood, Christopher: bathhouse beauties, dents in, 252–53; classes of nations created
335n77 by, 273; collaboration with (see Collabora-
Ishihara (“The Beast of the East”): Japanese tion with Japan); colonizing neighbors, pol-
American in Japanese occupation forces, icy of, 32; competition with British in
134, 136 Africa, 229–31; cultural influence, postwar,
Ishii Kikujiro, Viscount: on rectifying racial 322–23; defeat, acceptance of, 279, 280; de-
discrimination, 164–65 feat questioned, 291; detestation for, xiv;
Ismail Zain: on fall of Singapore, 194–95; on driving wedge between Britain and U.S.,
postwar Britons, 198 265–66; Du Bois’s attitude toward, 110;
Isogai: collaborator friends, 292 early successes, viii; effect of U.S.’s Negro-
Isoroku Yamamoto: on defeating U.S., 129 phobia, 329n2; effect on British Empire in
Issei: alien land law and, 54; contributions to Asia, xv; Ethiopia and, 155, 231–32; Euro-
Japanese war effort, 13; harassment of, 39; peans in, 282; failure to declare war on the
outflow of, 131. See also Japanese Ameri- Soviet Union, 274–75; fears of it allying
cans; Nisei with Russia and China, 12; global domina-
Italians: in Australia, 174 tion, poised for, 147; Hong Kong’s role in its
Italy: invasion of Ethiopia, 155, 231–32; Tri- war effort, 101; immigration exclusion laws,
partite Pact and, 274 view of U.S.’s, 38; “imperial preferences”
Iwao Oyama: in Russo-Japanese War (1904- to, 218; International Military Tribunal for
1905), 45 the Far East’s accusations, 3; Jews in, 271;
Izumiya Tatsuro: on British armed forces in Jews in Manchuria, assistance to, 271; Jews
Burma, 203 in occupied territories, 272; Korean inter-
vention (1910), 32, 35; League of Nations
Jamaica: anti-British talk in, 106; black nation- and, 165; Liberia and, 45; lynching Negroes,
alists from, 48; emigrants to Britain, 314–15; sales of novel about, 51; Manchurian con-
whites in, 234 quest (1931), 74, 112; Meiji Restoration (see
Jansen, Marius B.: on Sun Yat-Sen, 251 Meiji Restoration); Mexico and, 53, 275–78;
Japan: advantage among African Americans, mobilization against white supremacy, 160;
59; African American press in, 59; African multiculturalism of, 142, 172; national inde-
American travelers, 54; African Americans, pendence for others, 14–15, 326; national-
appeal to, vii–viii, xiii, 57–58, 324; African ism, 272, 323; Nazi Germany compared to,
Americans’ admiration for, 43–48; Africans x, xiv; Nazi Germany’s ability to deflect ha-
in defeating, 3; alliance with African Ameri- tred toward it, 270; Nisei with Canadian or
cans, 15, 43, 48–49, 53–54, 55–56; alliance American citizenship, 302; pacifism in,
with China, 12; alliance with Nazi Ger- 329n2; Pan-Asianism, 3, 5, 251; popularity
many, Fascist Italy (Tripartite Pact), 108, of acting against racial discrimination, 35;
394 INDEX
agent, 117–18; pro-Japan sentiments,: Kotewell, Robert (also known as Law Kuk-:
117–18; release from prison, 324: wo): anti-strike activities, 311–12; switching:
Julian, Hubert: attraction to Mussolini’s Italy, loyalties, 100; triad connection, 312:
345n7 Koumintang (KMT): alliance with Axis:
forces, 75, 290–91; ban on Communist Party:
Kahn, Sammy: British loyalist, 75: publications, 290; British support, 290; as:
Kanji Kato, Michibeisen Miraiki (with Kyosuke: captors, 143; Chungking agents’ summary:
Fukunaga), 114: execution, 71; collaborators among, 258;:
Karuppiah, Narayana: on Subhas Chandra: drug dealing, 291; pro-Japan sentiments, 13,:
Bose, 210: 255–56; source of Japanese military intelli-:
Kearney, L. D. (“Pegleg”): Ku Klux Klan in: gence, 256; Sun Yat-Sen’s heir, 254; U.S.:
China, 38: support, 255, 257:
Kempeitai (Japan’s secret police): Nisei inter-: Kowloon (Hong Kong): black dragged to
preter for, 138: death during occupation, 250; British fear
Kennedy, John F.: Tonoya Kawakita deported,: of shelling during invasion, 68–69; Commu-
304: nist Party in, 259; fifth columnists during
Kenseikai: Japan’s alliance with Germany,: invasion, 64; governor of interned British
165: troops, 31–32; Japanese-owned wartime
Kentwell, Lawrence Klindt: China Courier
businesses, 292; legal issue, 291; library for,
founder, 31; Eurasian, 31–32; Sun Yat-Sen: 315; looting at Loyola and Wah Yan Col-
and, 31: lege, 285; riots (1946), 286; triads during in-
Kenya: home to released internees, 325; sepa-: vasion, 74; World Radio Company, 234
rating German from black prisoners, 242: Kowloon School (Hong Kong), 18:
Kesatuan Melaya Muda (Malay Youth Move-: Krusemann, Victor: on Europeans’ racism,:
ment), 195: 193:
Kesavan, Damordaran K.: on Indian National Ku Klux Klan: in China, 38:
Army, 209–10 Kumaichi Yamamota: Sun Yat-Sen’s influ-:
Keswick, John: on Chinese underground, 142: ence, 252:
Khaki shorts: women wearing, 154: Kuriowa, S.: support for black anti-racism, 52:
Khan, Mohammed: collaboration with Japan,: Kwong, Marquita: collaboration with Japan,:
311: 142:
Khan, Rehimat: as guard at Stanley intern-: Kyosuke Fukunaga, Michibeisen Miraiki (with:
ment camp, 88: Kanji Kato), 114:
Khan, Shah Nawaz: on racial discrimination:
on trains in Malaya, 207: Lady Haw Haw: Streicker on, 142:
Kimura Tokataro: relation to Inouye Kanao,: Laigret, Christian: on African-American sol-:
302: diers, 184:
Kindermann, Karl: in Black Dragon Society,: Lam Kin Yan: triad connections, 312:
271: Lan, Alice Y.: on racial discrimination in pre-:
King, Ralph Malcolm Macdonald: on Japan-: war Hong Kong, 21:
ese trustworthiness, 280; post-internment: Landon, L. H.: on Indian resistance to fight-
behavior, 157: ing Japan, 213–14
King’s College (Hong Kong), 18: Latin America: Japanese propagranda in,:
Kip Lin Lee: on fall of Singapore, 194: 232–33; pro-Japan sentiments, 278:
Kipling, Rudyard: on killing Chinese, 22;: Lattimore, Owen: on Chinese students in:
wife, 93: Japan, 253; on replacing one set of masters:
Kiyoshi Watanabe: on Japanese Americans in: with another, 130:
Japanese occupation forces, 136: Lau, Edward: on judicial system in Hong
Kojiro Sato: on racial discrimination in the: Kong, 319–20
West, 165: Lau, Grace: on George Wong, 300:
Korea: Japanese intervention (1910), 32, 35; Lavine, Morris: on Japanese Americans on ju-:
Japanese postwar influence, 322–23 ries, 304:
Koreans: as guards in Japanese internment: Law Kuk-wo. See Kotewell, Robert
camps, 3: Le Duan: on lack of resistance to Japanese in:
Korjima Kiyofumi: on desire to overthrow: China, 256:
white supremacy, 130: League of Colored Peoples, 231:
396 INDEX
League of Nations: Japan and, 165; racial dis- Louis, Joe: in Japanese press, 228; Schmeling
crimination and, 165 bout, 58
League of Struggle for Negro Rights, 56 Lowe, Charles: on pro-Japan Aborigines,
Lee, Frank: collaboration with Japan, 311 176
Lee, Tonya: on rise of Chinese affluence in Loyalty: an Indian servant’s, 171; distrust of
Hong Kong, 291–92 Asians, non-British Europeans in Malaya,
Lee, Wen Ho: accusations against, 323 192; doubts about Aborigines in Australia,
Lee Kuan Yew: collaboration with Japan, 189; 174–77; doubts about African Americans’
job interview with Japanese news agency, in U.S., 122; doubts about Basutos in
133; on maintaining white supremacy, 189; British armed forces, 241; doubts about
Subhas Chandra Bose and, 210 Chinese in Australia, 177; doubts about
Lee Yiu Wa: Britain to Chinese nationalists, Chinese in Hong Kong, 63, 72; doubts
254; on Japan and Europeans as colonizers, about Indians in postwar Hong Kong, 309;
255; on rapprochement with Japan, 266–67 doubts about Maoris in New Zealand,
Leggett, Frederick: on American racism in 172–73; doubts about Melanesians’ loyalty
Britain, 235 in Papua New Guinea, 179; doubts about
Leiper, G. A.: on desertion by Chinese driv- oppressed people in racist societies, 137;
ers during Hong Kong invasion, 64 failure to induce it in Burma, 201–2
Leo Kwan Wing-wah: on call for anti-bias Loyola and Wan Yan College (Hong Kong):
laws in postwar Hong Kong, 320 looted, 285
Leopoldville (Belgian Congo): U.S. armed Luce, Henry: on Koumintang, 257
forces in, 240 Luckin, Cyril: on businesses in prewar
Lethbridge, Henry: on Chinese-British antag- Hong Kong, 286
onisms, xii; on number of collaborators, Luke, D. W.: collaboration with Japan, 311
297; on number of collaborators executed,
297 Macao: Ho in, 102; Sawa in, 102; Senna Fer-
“Let’s Get the Hell out of China” movement, nandes in, 103; war trials in, 298
286 MacArthur, Douglas: naval intelligence, 264;
Leun Lok Tong: in occupied Hong Kong, 101 on threat to Australia, 141
Lewis, David Levering: on blacks’ view of Macaulay, Wilson: on “White Australia,” 185
where Nazis live, 105–6 MacDougall, D. M.: spoils of war, 294–95
Li Chong Yuet-Ming, Amy: Japanese ties, 12 Macedonians: call for Japanese help, 147
Li Ka-shing: wife’s Japanese ties, 12 MacFarlane, Iris: on spotting children of
Li Shu-Fan: on Japanese Americans in Japan- mixed marriages, 29
ese internment camps, 132; on rapes during MacGregor, Atholl: proclaiming divorces in
invasion of Hong Kong, 152 Stanley internment camp, 157
Li Ta-Chao: class struggle becomes racial Macmillan, Harold: badges to distinguish
conflict, 260 black Americans from black Britons, 238
Liang Yen, 19–20; on lustful Americans in Mah Wah Leung Bentley: on teachers at
China, 153 Hong Kong University, 23
Liberia: Japan as model for, 45 Mahatir Mohammad: on Japanese interreg-
Liddell-hart, Basil: on white supremacy’s de- num in Malaya, 189–90
cline, 326 Makino Nobuaki: at Versailles, 36
Lij Alaya Ababa: seeking a Japanese wife, 231 Malay Youth Movement (Kesatuan Melaya
Lim, Mary: grandmother learning Japanese, Muda ), 195
196 Malaya: anti-British propaganda, 195–96;
Lim Chok Fui: on prewar Singapore, 190 British armed forces in, 190–91, 207, 211;
Lindbergh, Charles: on confronting blacks Chinese in, 194, 197; collaborators in, 195;
and Orientals, 107 colonialism in, 190; color bar in civil serv-
“Little”: recommendation to avoid using, 6 ice, 188; distrust of Asians, non-British Eu-
London hotels: treatment of African Ameri- ropeans, 192; Eurasians in, 195; evacuation
cans, vii; treatment of Asians, vii to Australia, 178–79; fifth columnists,
London Times: on Italy’s humiliation in 191–92; “heihos,” 195; home to released
Ethiopia, 155 internees, 325; independence from Britain,
Longden, John: prohibition on kissing Chi- 198–200; Indians in, 188; intra-European
nese actress on-screen, 30 conflict, 191; Japanese anti-Chinese poli-
INDEX 397
cies in, 6; Japanese interregnum, impor-: Maxwell, George: on color bar in Malaya’s:
tance of, 189–90; Kesatuan Melaya Muda: civil service, 188:
(Malay Youth Movement), 195; pro-Japan: McCarthy, Joseph: Schuyler and, 112:
sentiments, 189, 195–98, 207; racial dis-: McCoin, Theodore Roosevelt: on racism in
crimination on trains, 207: U.S., 123–24
Malays: in Singapore, 197: McKinney, T. Nimrod: alien land law and, 54;
Malliet, A. M. Wendell: on African Ameri-: Japanese ties, 53–54
cans’ pro-Japan sentiments, 115–16; on at-: Meiji Restoration: Japanese racial ideology’s
tention to racial consequences of the war,: roots, 273; motivation for, 32; Perry’s land-
121; on racial reversal, 107: ing and, 8; white supremacy, refutation of,
Maltby, C. M.: on Japanese agents in Hong: 8–9
Kong, 64; Scots to, 71: Mein Kampf: on Japan, 271; Japanese transla-:
Maltese: concerns about their identity, 41: tion, 270:
Manansala, Policarpio: Black Dragon Society: Melanesia: Australians in prewar, 19:
link, 119; pro-Japan sentiments, 119: Melbourne, Duke of: on subversives among:
Manchuria: Japanese armed forces in post-: black troops in Britain, 240:
war, 290; Japan’s assistance to Jews in, 271;: Men: gender reversal in Japanese internment
Japan’s conquest (1931), 74, 112; rape in,: camps, 147–49, 155–56
152; white supremacy slain in, 112: Merigo, Juan: on Mexico’s role in U.S.-Japan:
March, Leo: volunteering for service in war, 278:
British armed forces, 235–36 Merrett, Victor: on British defeat at Hong:
Marijuana: effect on sexual desire, 239–40; Kong, 67:
effect on women’s sexual desires, 239–40 Mexico: Japan and, 53, 275–78
Marriage: Chinese wives of army personnel: Meyer, Father (priest interned at Stanley in-:
in Australia, 170; to Chinese women, 28,: ternment camp): opposition to abortion,:
282; Eurasians’ prospects for, 31, 282; of: 151:
Filipinos and those of European descent,: Michitsura Nodzu: in Russo-Japanese War:
124; in internment camps, 150; intern-: (1904-1905), 45:
ment’s effects, 157–58; interracial marriage: Middle East: use of Basuto troops in British:
in China, 20; Japanese husbands of African: armed forces in, 241:
Americans, 57; mixed marriage, reaction: Milholland, John: on Russo-Japanese War’s:
to, 28–30, 317; spotting children of mixed: impact, 44:
marriages, 29: Minear, Richard: on Tokyo War Crimes Trials,
Marshall, David: on Singapore Volunteers: 375n161
Corps, 191: Miroir de la Guadeloupe: justification for anti-:
Marsman, Jan Henrik: on German-Japanese Jewish decrees, 127:
relations in Hong Kong, 274; on Japanese Mishima, B.: on Chinese in Stanley intern-:
hatred for English, 265–66 ment camp, 141–42; on Indians prison:
Martel, Charles, 45: guards in Hong Kong, 145:
Martin, Mary Erwin: on kindness by Japan-: Miya Sannomiya Kikuchi: in Alabama, 137:
ese American in Japanese occupation: Moko, Peter: handling insults to Maoris, 162:
forces, 136: “Monkey”: European and Euro-American:
Masanobu Tsuji: on British armed forces, 190: usage, 10:
Masao Dodo: on Japan’s treatment of blacks,: Moore, Mrs. A.: arrested, 346n73
58: Morris, John: on Japanese dislike of Germans,
Massaquoi, Hans J.: on Japans’ independ-: 273; on war betweeen Japan and Nazi Ger-
ence of Nazi Germany, 275: many, 268–69; writing anti-Nazi articles in
Matsuda (“Cardiff Joe”): in Japanese occupa-: Japan, 272–73
tion forces, 136: Morrison, Ian: on white supremacy in the Far:
Matsutaro Shoiki: murdered, 38–39 East, 2:
Matthews, Clifford: on end of white su-: Motosada Zumoto: on possibility of race war,:
premacy, 78–79; humiliation of Eurasians: 109:
in postwar Hong Kong, 317; on Japanese: Moy, Hubert: collaboration with Japan, 142:
captors, 325: Muhammad, Elijah: arrested, 116, 346n73; on:
Maugham, W. Somerset: attitudes toward brotherhood among blacks and Japanese,:
Chinese, xii–xiii 48:
398 INDEX
Mulgan, A. E.: on Maori loyalty, 172 Negrophobia in U.S.: effect on Japan, 329n2
Mulzac, Hugh: on blacks staying out of white Nehru, Jawaharlal: compared to Subhas
man’s war, 108 Chandra Bose, 208; Indian National Army,
Murray, William H.: on coming race war, 277; 207; on Japan’s victory in Russo-Japanese
on Japanese in Mexico, 277 war, 187; Russo-Japanese War’s effect on,
Murthy, P. A. Narasimha: on Subhas Chandra 251
Bose, 208–9 Nevins, Allan: on detestation of Japanese, xiv
Muslim League: growth, 216 New Caledonia: black soldiers in, 184
Muslims: in Hong Kong police, 73; Japanese New Hebrides: Australian concerns about,
progaganda aimed at, 203–4, 232 180
Myanmar. See Burma New York Herald Tribune: on Japanese humilia-
Myers, George Clarence: arrest, 120 tion of whites, 78
New York Times: Hong Kong correspondent,
Nagasaki: bombing, 279, 329n2 82
Nang Bun Yue: spoils of war, 294–95 New Zealand, 159–64, 171–74; anti-Semitism
Nash, Ian: on Japan liberating Asians from in, 161; Chinese in, 161, 173; doubts about
the West, 32 Maoris’ loyalty, 172–73; immigrant exclu-
Nation of Islam: advent, 232; “Asiatic Black sion laws, 161; Indian immigrants, 172; In-
Man,” 44, 324; pro-Japan sentiments, 48–49, dians in, 161; Japanese agents in, 173;
324; Satohara Takahashi and, 48 Japanese businesses coming in, 172; Japan-
National Association for the Advancement of ese in, 173; Japan’s complaints of discrimi-
Colored People (NAACP): journal of, 49; nation in, 160; Maoris in, 159, 160–64,
leaders, 51, 111 172–73, 173–74, 184; movement away from
National Council of Women in New South Britain, toward U.S., 160; racial reform,
Wales, 169 159–60, 161, 164; racism a threat to national
National Negro Business League: internment security, 160, 164; Ratana Movement in, 48,
of Japanese and opportunities for blacks, 161–62; Russo-Japanese War’s effect on,
125–26 160; threat of Japanese invasion, 171–72;
National Press Club: Hastie barred, 227 Waitangi, Treaty of (1840), 162; white su-
National security: racism a threat to, ix, premacy in, 159, 161, 174
47–48, 52, 122–23, 160, 164, 174 New Zealand armed forces: Maoris in, 173–74
Nationalism: in China, 253–59, 266, 294–95; in New Zealanders: in Stanley internment
Hong Kong, 319; in Japan, 272, 323 camp, 95–96
Native Americans: in Plan of San Diego, 277; Newby, Charles (alias: Father Divine Nas-
in U.S. armed forces, 222–23 sam): arrested, 346n73
Native Sons of the Golden West: Japanese ex- Newton, Adolph: on stabbing a dead pilot,
clusion, 34; recommendation to revoke citi- 226
zenship of African Americans, 125 Ng Seng Yong: on independence from
“Natives”: in BBC broadcasts, xiv–xv; recom- Britain, 198
mendation to avoid using, 6 “Nigger”: in BBC broadcasts, xiv; British
Nazi Germans: Japanese dislike of, 273 usage, 9; in children’s rhyme, xiv; a histo-
Nazi Germany: ability to deflect hatred toward rian’s use of, 10; Stilwell’s use, 10; Truman’s
Japan, 270; African Americans’ attitude to- use, 225
ward, 105–6, 127; African Americans travel- Nimitz, Chester: naval intelligence, 264
ers, 105; alliance with Japan, 108, 165, 268–75; Nimori Genichiro: collaboration with Japan,
blacks in Nazi prisoner-of-war camps, 127; 307–8; Field on, Ellen, 132; Wright-Nooth
China, relations with, 270; color problem in, on, George, 132
105; Du Bois in, 105; Du Bois on it winning Nisei: alien land law and, 54; Canadian or
WWII, xv; Japan compared to, x, xiv; Japan- American citizenship holders in Japan, 302;
ese competition in Africa, 230–31; overtures Euro-Americans to, xii; harassment of, 39;
to African Americans, 105; racism in, 273–74; Japanese complaints of treatment in Ameri-
treatment of Jesse Owens, 106; Tripartite Pact can internment camps, 137; outflow of, 131;
and, 274; war with Japan, 268–69 requests for repatriation to Japan, 137–38.
“Negroes”: usage at time of study, 337n2. See See also Issei; Japanese Americans
also African Americans; Afro-Caribbeans; Nogi Harumichi: on desire to overthrow
Blacks white supremacy, 130
INDEX 399
Priestwood, Gwen: British relations with oth- denied, 229; as response to Japanese racial
ers in Stanley internment camp, 267; on appeals, xiv
day Hong Kong invaded, 62; on desertion Racial inequality: Hong Kong, prewar, 2
by Chinese drivers during Hong Kong in- Racial reform: African-American soldiers an
vasion, 64; flight from Hong Kong, 154; on inducement to, 183–84; in Australia, 177,
Japanese humiliation of whites, 78; on 183–84, 185–86; in Britain, 229, 237; in
keeping up appearances, 85–86, 154; on New Zealand, 159–60, 161, 164; during oc-
playing ball with Japanese guards, 86; on cupation of Hong Kong, 313; in postwar
squabbling during Hong Kong invasion, 67 Hong Kong, 315–17; “race war’s” effect
Proulx, Benjamin A.: on Japanese captors, 10; on, xiv–xv, 120–22; in United States, 121,
on Japanese victors at Hong Kong, 68; on 185–86, 220, 322
sticking together in Stanley interment Racial reversal: African-American view of,
camp, 90 107–8; atrocity stories and, 263; effect on
Provoo, John David: collaboration with Japanese people, 132; ending of Japan’s
Japan, 311 dream, 279; humiliation of whites, 77–78,
Punjabi Muslims: in Hong Kong police, 73 147, 196, 261; in internment camps, 81–89,
“Pure European descent”: as bar to enlist- 96–97, 99, 147; in postwar Hong Kong,
ment in British armed forces, 235–38; de- 285, 321–22; property theft in, 280, 296
fense of, 41; doctrine, xi–xii; Japan’s rever- Racial segregation: in Britain, 238; decline in
sal of, 3–4; meaning, 40; as prerequisite for post-WWII Hong Kong, 279; desegrega-
advanced society, 43. See also White su- tion a Japanese plot, 120; in Hong Kong
premacy ferries, 288; incompatible with being pow-
“Purple mansions”: service at, 28 erful, 120; residential segregation in pre-
war Hong Kong, 18–19, 31; Stockman’s
Queen’s College (Hong Kong), 18 support, 124; in travel, 20–21, 38, 207, 224;
“Queue-pulling”: defined, 23 in U.S. armed forces, 223–24
Racism: American racism in Britain, 235;
Race: children’s rhyme a measure of attitudes Australian witticism, 315; in Bridge on the
toward, xiv; number of, 329n16; reality of, River Kwai, 326–27; in British armed
xi–xii forces, 244–45; British Empire’s role, 238;
Race hatred: Asians’ for Euro-Americans, 4 class consciousness a replacement for, 317;
Race relations: “horizontal” vs. “vertical,” embracing all non-Europeans, 10–11; inter-
284 racial sex, 149; Japanese vs. Western, x;
Race war: acceptance of concept, 14; effect on Japan’s vs. Nazi Germany’s, 273–74; loy-
racial reform, xiv–xv, 120–22; fiction about, alty in racist societies, 137; as motivation
49; future prospects, 15, 327; Garvey’s pre- for war, 270; in postwar Hong Kong, 284;
diction, 46; predictions, 33, 34, 276–77, 314; prewar silence about, 7–8; reality of, xi; on
WWII viewed as, 107 relationship between prejudices, 126; re-
Racial discrimination: age for it over, 313; treat or redefine, 160; a threat to national
avoiding discussion of, 229; Britain’s choice security, ix, 47–48, 52, 122–23, 160, 164,
of places to fight, 170–71; in Canada, 19, 174; trans-Pacific racism, 33–34; in U.S.
301–2, 324; in China, 225; effect of U.S.’s armed forces, 221–22; U.S.’s in Japanese
Negrophobia on Japan, 329n2; Greater East propaganda, 227–28. See also British
Asia Assembly, 208; in India, 207; Japan’s racism
proposal to end racial discrimination Rael, Marcus A.: Tonoya Kawakita victim,
(1919), 35–37, 164–65, 225, 254; League of 305
Nations and, 165; in North Borneo, 318; Rags: uses for, 156–57
popularity in Japan of acting against, 35; in Rajputs: in British armed forces, 70
postwar Africa, 317–18; in postwar Hong Rangoon (Burma): evacuation from, 215; In-
Kong, 320–22; postwar Singapore, 314; in dians in, 215; Sukarno, 203–4
prewar Hong Kong, 21–22, 28; Roosevelt Rankin, John: on desegregation, 120
(Franklin Delano) against, 224; in Stanley Rape: by Japanese armed forces, 152
internment camp, 91–92; on trains in Ratnayake, A.: on Britain’s African troops in
Malaya, 207 Ceylon, 247
Racial equality: compelled assertions of, 5–6, Recto, Claro M.: collaboration with Japan,
120–22; Japan’s desire for, 35–37; possibility 298
INDEX 401
Rengarajoo, K. M.: on British racism, 194; on: Sadig, Mohammed: on Indian collaborators,:
Subhas Chandra Bose, 210: 144:
Rich, Maury: on Tonoya Kawakita, 305: Salmon, Andrew: on inferiority of Japanese:
Richard, A. F.: on color in the British Empire,: armed forces, 139; on poverty in prewar:
41: Hong Kong, 20:
Richards, Joseph James: collaboration with: Samoans: in British armed forces, 163:
Japan, 311: Sams, Margaret: in love out of marriage in
Ride, Edwin: on Chiang Kai-Shek, 75: internment, 157–58
Ride, Lindsay: on British prestige, 260; on: San Francisco (California): African- and
Chinese Communist Party, 259; on civil: Asian American communities, 113–14
service applicants in Hong Kong, 315;: Sandbach, Joseph: on Japanese Americans:
Hong Kong resistance, 75; on Koumintag: in Japanese occupation forces, 135:
and Japanese military intelligence, 256; on: Sassoon family: anti-Semitism, victims of,:
Overseas Chinesse Volunteer Unit, 260; on: 24:
supporting Chinese Communists, 260; on: Sato Kojiro, Japanese-American War (Sato Ko-:
U.S.’s China policies, 264: jiro): premonition of Pearl Harbor, 50:
Robb, Frederic H. Hammurabi: arrested, Satohara Takahashi: Nation of Islam and, 48:
346n73 Sawa, Colonel: Ho and, 102:
Robinson, W. S.: on Australia and New: Saxton, Alexander: on WWII’s effect on un-:
Zealand’s population, 164: derstanding white racism, 4:
Rockefeller, John D.: International House pro-: Schmeling, Max: Louis bout, 58:
posed, 54: Schomburg, Arthur: investigation of, 115;:
Rogers, J. A.: on blacks who love whites, 108;: on Japan, 58:
on Japan’s beneficence to blacks, 51: Schuyler, George: on anti-white violence,
Roling, B. V. A.: on Japanese chauvinism, x;: 123; on British Empire’s role in racism,
on Tokyo War Crimes Trials, 312: 238; interest in Japan, 49; on internment
Roosevelt, Eleanor: told of coming massacres: of Japanese Americans, 125; on Japanese
of whites in India, 217–18; told of snicker-: Americans’ hospitality to African Ameri-
ing at American defeats, 120: cans, 111; on Japanese treatment of whites
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: family’s China: vs. white’s treatment of blacks, 107; on
trade connection, 19; Gandhi on democracy: Japan’s deflation of white supremacy, 112;
as a rationale for war, 215; letter opener,: McCarthy and, 112; on passing of Euro-
226; against racial discrimination, 224;: pean world, 122
swami’s letter drafting Indians to fight for: Schwarz, Otto: on homosexuality in intern-:
Britain, 215; on yielding British territory,: ment camps, 149:
265: Scotch: in prewar Hong Kong, 25:
Roosevelt, Theodore: on Japanese in Mexico,: Scragg, Wally: confirmation of British mas-:
276; on Japanese view of Euro-Americans: sacre of Chinese, 71:
as white devils, 11; on Japan’s importance,: Seagrave, Sterling: on Japanese dissimula-:
33: tion, 280:
Ross, James: on lack of anti-Semitism among: Searle, Lance: postwar relocation to Malaya,:
Japanese occupiers, 272: 325:
Russia. See Soviet Union Second World War. See World War II:
Russian Revolution (1917): Japan and, 35: Segregation. See Racial segregation
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905): African: Sellon, Edward: sex with Indian women, 28:
Methodist Episcopal Church support for: Selwyn-Clarke, Hilda: political activism, 24:
Japanese, 52; effect on Asian countries, 187;: Selwyn-Clarke, Percy: on disease in prewar:
effect on Chinese students, 252; effect on: Hong Kong, 17:
Du Bois, 251; effect on Nehru, 252; effect on: Senna Fernandes, Henrique de: in wartime:
New Zealand, 160; effect on Sun Yat-Sen,: Macao, 103:
251; effect on white supremacy, 32–33,: Sewell, William G.: on effect of British atti-:
44–45, 49; Japanese war leaders, 45: tudes on prisoners in Stanley internment:
Ruth, Babe: in Japan, 39: camp, 89; on a Jew’s view of Stanley in-:
Ryves, Harvey: on British armed forces’ ternment camp, 84; on released internees:
knowledge of host countries, 192; on fifth in Hong Kong, 284; on work in Stanley:
columnists in Malaya, 191–92 internment camp, 90:
402 INDEX
Sexuality: Asian men/women and European orators in, 195; evacuation from, 191; fall to
women/men, 30; of blacks, 149; interracial Japan, xv, 2, 121–22, 177, 192–93, 193–97,
sex, 149, 185; lustful Americans in China, 153; 258; humiliation of whites after British sur-
marijuana’s effect on women’s sexual de- render, 196; independence from Britain,
sires, 239–40; running the gamut, 335n68; sex 198–200; Indians in, 197; during Japanese
with Indian women, 28; sexual aggression by invasion of Hong Kong, 192; Japanese mili-
Japanese armed forces, 152; suggestion to tary intelligence, 191; Japanese misrule, 193;
sterilize Japanese internees, 152–53; trading Japanese occupiers, 196–97; Japanese pros-
sex for necessities, 156; white supremacy titutes, 194; Japanese toy stores, 194; living
and, 335n77. See also Homosexuality conditions, prewar, 190; Malays in, 197;
Shaffer, Woodrow T.: Tonoya Kawakita vic-: movies in occupied, 195–96; place in British
tim, 305, 306: Empire, 1; racial discrimination in postwar,
Shah, Mohammed Yusuf: trial of, 308: 314; Singapore Volunteers Corps, 191; Sub-
Shakhty, Mike: in Stanley internment camp,: has Chandra Bose in, 210
98: Singh, Hukam: newspaper editor in Hong:
Shanghai: abrogation of extraterritoriality,: Kong, 145:
261; British-American clashes, 93; British: Singh, Joginder: on fall of Singapore, 193:
press in, 257; collaboration with Japan, 292;: “Singsong” houses: types, 28:
Du Bois in, 110; foreign press, 95; Indians: Sino-Japanese enmity: Du Bois on, 110–11;:
in, 212; Japanese Americans in Japanese oc-: lacking in Hawaii, 128:
cupation forces, 133–34; Jewish sanctuary,: Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945): African-
272; Sikhs in Japanese occupation forces,: American air ace, 113; to African Ameri-
177; suitability of its prison for Europeans,: cans, 58, 109–13
310; unrest (1925), 23: Sinophobia: in prewar Hong Kong, 21–22
Shanghai Club: Chinese membership, 264: Skaten, Kathleen: on a Negro’s hope for
Shanghai Times: Japanese takeover of, 133: Japanese invasion of U.S., 47–48
Sharp, Martin: questioning about Eurasian: “Slant-eyed”: recommendation to avoid:
blood, 29: using, 6:
Shauer, I. L.: on proposed anti-Japanese legis-: Slim, William: Japanese as “soldier ants,” 138:
lation, 39: Smith, Ferdinand: black seamen in Sydney,:
Shaw, George Bernard, “Apple Cart,” 93: 186:
Sherry, Michael: on American nostalgia for: Smith, James: on fifth columnists in Hong
WWII, ix: Kong, 64; on Japanese humiliation of
Sho Chuan Lam: on anti-British propaganda: whites, 78; on religious revival during
in Singapore, 195: Hong Kong invasion, 66; on street signs in
Shoichi Yokoi: refusal to surrender, 327: occupied Hong Kong, 80–81
Shouson Chow: on Executive Council, 23;: Smith, Viola: on son being barred from serv-:
pro-Japan sentiments, 100: ing in RAF, 237:
Sierra Leone: British opposition to deploy-: Smuts, Jan: on Africans’ reluctance to fight:
ment of black American troops, 239: Japanese, 14:
Sikhs: in British armed forces, 61, 70, 192–93;: Smyth, Joseph Hilton: arrested, 119; wife, 119:
in Hong Kong police, 73, 88; in Indian Na-: So Leung: trial of, 301:
tional Army, 210; in Japanese occupation: Society of Hong Kong Real Estate Agents::
forces, 177; in occupied Hong Kong, 88: support for anti-bias laws, 322:
Silver, Lawrence: on interracial conflict in: Soon Kim Seng: on Japanese Americans in:
U.S. armed forces, 235: Japanese occupation forces, 134:
Simon, John: on “Yellow Peril” becoming South, The: Nazis in, 105–6; venting anti-
real, 255–56 Japanese sentiments against blacks, 106–7
Simons, Jessie Elizabeth: women making: South Africa: home to released internees, 325:
themselves unattractive in internment: South China Morning Post: on race relations in:
camps, 156: postwar Hong Kong, 284; on racial discrim-:
Simpson, Robert K. M.: on British defeat at ination by clubs in postwar Hong Kong,:
Hong Kong, 68; on emotional collapse dur- 320:
ing Hong Kong invasion, 66–67 South Korea: Japanese influence, postwar,
Singapore: anti-Empire sentiment, 258; anti- 322–23
Japanese forces, 197; Chinese in, 197; collab- South Pacific: race relations in, 184–85
INDEX 403
Southern Rhodesia: Indians in, 211: Stimson, Henry: Tokyo War Crimes Trials:
Soviet Union: aid to China, 255; alliance with and African Americans, 312–13; U.S.’s anti-:
Japan, 274, 365n8; damage to class-based China pro-Japan policies (1930s), xiii:
opposition to oppression, 327; fears of Stimson, Henry L.: reliability of African-:
Japan allying with it and China, 12; Japan’s American troops, 222:
failure to declare war on it, 274–75 Stockman, John D.: on benefits of racial segre-:
Standard, Alice: on Australians’ dislike of: gation, 124:
Britons, 170: Stoddard, George: on Japanese Americans in:
Stanley internment camp, 80–104; abortions Japanese occupation forces, 136:
in, 151; Administrative Secretary, 84; Strachan, Billy: on British racism, 234–35;:
Americans in, 93–94, 95, 96, 98; aristocracy fighting for Britain, 235; on unpopularity of:
of, 99, 153; Australian and New Zealand Americans in Britain, 94; on whites in Ja-:
Society, 95–96; Australians in, 95–96; best- maica, 234:
ing Britons, 267; black market, 92; British Streatfield, U. M.: on poverty in Bombay,:
soldiers in, 90; Britons in, 93–94, 96, 97–98, 333n24; on prewar Bangkok, 200:
267; cannibalism, 87; cemetery in, 150; Chi- Streicker, John: on going native in occupied:
nese in, 141–42; class conflict, 91, 267; com- Hong Kong, 87; on Lady Haw Haw, 142;:
munism among prisoners, 90, 92; condi- position in Stanley internment camp, 150;:
tions, 81, 84; conflict between Britons and on postwar Japanese, 280; on Stanley in-:
Americans in, 94–95; criminals in, 98–99; ternment camp, 80, 84, 92, 150, 267, 325; on:
death rate, 84; dissension in, 98; divide suggestion to sterilize Japanese internees,:
and conquer by Japanese, 95; divorces in, 152–53:
157–58; Dutch in, 95, 96, 267; educational Strickland, George: on redistribution of col-:
level of prisoners, 99; effect of British atti- laborator’s wealth, 299:
tudes on prisoners, 89; emotional collapse, Stubbs, R. E.: on Garvey and Sun Yat-Sen, 229:
88; Eurasians in, 91–92; Euro-Americans Sue-White, Barbara: on deserters from :
in, 80, 99; Europeans in, 85; food rationing, Rajputana Rifles, 70:
91–92; Gimson’s position, 94; grave dig- Sugihara Chiune: saving Jews, 271:
ging, 86–87; hunger, 87–88; Indian guards, Suguira Shigtetake: on trans-Pacific racism,
80, 88; informers in, 90; internees released 33–34
from it, 284; keeping up appearances, Sukarno: Rangoon-bound, 203–4; Subhas:
85–86; love affairs in, 150; marriages in, Chandra Bose and, 209:
150; memory loss, 87–88; mental stability Sumio Uesugi: on white racism, 46:
in, 157; millionaires in, 90–91; New Sun Yat-Sen: Black Dragon Society and,:
Zealanders in, 95–96; Norwegians in, 96; 11–12, 252; bodyguard, 68; Garvey com-:
number of prisoners, 85; “Oda,” 91; play- pared to, 229; heirs, 254; influence on Japan,:
ing ball with Japanese guards, 86; police 252; in Koumintang, 256; Pan-Asianism,:
prisoners, 90; proverbs of, 150; racial dis- 251; pro-Japan sentiments, 251–53; Russo-:
crimination in, 91–92; red light district in, Japanese War’s effect on, 251; triad official,:
150; sharing in, 92–93; slapping prisoners, 13; Wang Ching-wei and, 256:
89; smelling bad in, 96; Stanley Journal, 150; Sun Yat-Sen, Madame: on day Hong Kong in-:
sticking together in, 90; supervisors, 88; vaded, 62:
tensions between allies in, 96; tobacco in, Sutemi, Count: at Versailles, 36:
153; unions, talk about, 91; urinating on
prisoners, 88; U.S. sailors in, 91; work in, Taiwan: Japanese humiliation of whites, 78:
90 Takami Morihiko: Japanese American in:
Stanway, Thomas: on competition in Africa,: Japanese occupation forces, 133:
230: Takamura, George: Japanese American in:
Star Ferry (Hong Kong): racial segregation,: Japanese occupation forces, 133:
21: Takeo Miki: Tonoya Kawakita and, 304:
Status quo: capitalism conflated with, 214;: Tako Oda: Japanese American in Japanese oc-:
whiteness conflated with, 255: cupation forces, 136:
Steinberg, David: on atrocities in the Philip-: Talbot, Harry: validating pilferage, 296:
pines, 298: Tamasado Kuroki: in Russo-Japanese War:
Stilwell, Joseph: on anti-white behavior in: (1904-1905), 45:
Japan, 37; racial slurs, 10, 37: Tamils: British Empire to, 209:
404 INDEX
Tan Ban Cheng: on British racism, 194; on in- Townsend, Ralph: U.S.’s anti-China pro-
dependence from Britain, 199; on Japanese Japan policies (1930s), xiii
occupiers of Singapore, 197 Toyoma Mitsura: Black Dragon Society, 253
Tan Cheng Hwee: Japanese Americans in Travel: ferry travel in Hong Kong, 288; racial
Japanese occupation forces, 134 segregation in, 20–21, 38, 207, 224
Tan Cheng Wee: on fall of Singapore, 193 Travis, Samuel Eric: on Japanese Americans
Tan Wee Eng: on postwar Britons, 199–200 in Japanese occupation forces, 134
Tan Yee Triad Society: in occupied Hong Treason Act of 1351 [sic] (Britain), 300
Kong, 101 Triads: banditry by, 102; in China, 12–13, 74;
Tanaka Giichi: collaborating friends, 292 collaboration with Japanese, 312; in General
Tang, W. K.: on Chinese in Hong Kong, 287 Strike (1925), 74; Japanese influence, 74;
Taylor, Tom: applying to serve in RAF, 237 Kotewell’s connections, 312; labor unions
Terasaki, Gwen: feared as Euro-American, and, 74; leaders, 101; in occupied Hong
140–41; on Tripartite Pact, 274 Kong, 101–2; plan to massacre Europeans in
Thailand: Chinese in, 291; Japanese anti-Chi- Hong Kong, 12–13; Sun Yat-Sen and, 13;
nese policies in, 6; Japanese inroads, 200 Tan Yee Triad Society, 101; Wo Yung Yee
Theobald, F. K.: on British propaganda fea- Triad Society, 101
turing cannibals eating Japanese prisoners, Trinder, Mrs.: missing pre-evacuation ser-
248; on canings in British armed forces, 245; vants, 170
painting faces black, 246; removing rank Trinidad: separating Jewish from non-Jewish
badges, 246; on softness in British armed prisoners, 242–43; U.S. armed forces in, 240
forces, 245; on Togolese, 249 Truman, Harry S.: on the Lord’s work, 225
Third Reich. See Nazi Germany Tseng Yu-Hao: on collaborators in Hong
Thomas, Elbert: on aiding China’s resistance, Kong, 14, 293
14 Tsui Kwok Ching: trial of, 301
Thompson, Arthur Alexander: on getting Tu King Pao (newspaper): on legal status of
British out of Singapore, 198 Kowloon, 291
Thorne, Christopher: on Britain’s survival, Tung Chee-hwa: anti-bias laws in postwar
263; writings of, xi Hong Kong, 321; on reluctance to ban racial
Thornhill, James: arrested, 115; pro-Japan discrimination in postwar Hong Kong, 321
sentiments, 117 Turner, O. L.: anti-white violence, reports of,
Thorpe, Richard: fantasizing a Negro 123
mammy, 243
T’ien-wei Wu: on Japanese recruitment of Ukrainians: call for Japanese help, 147
Chinese, 142; on Wang Ching-wei, 256 United Nations: confronting colonialism, 312
Time (magazine): on Japanese armed forces, United States: abrogation of extraterritoriality
257 in Shanghai, 261; African-American soldiers
Togo Heihachiro, Admiral: in Russo-Japanese in rift with Britain, 239; American racism in
War (1904-1905), 45 Britain, 235; anti-China pro-Japan policies
Togolese: French-speaking, 249 (1930s), xiii–xiv; anti-Japan sentiment,
Toguri, Iva: “Tokyo Rose” charge, 307 32–34; anticommunism in, xiv, 56; armed
Tojo Hideki, General: collaborating friends, forces (see United States armed forces); atti-
292; on preventing race war, 269 tudes toward Chinese, 20; Australia’s
“Tokyo Rose,” 307 movement toward, 180–81; avoiding dis-
Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1946-1948), 275, cussion of racial discrimination, 229; British
312–13 reliance on, 32; Chinese nationalists in driv-
Toland, John: Ohshima Hiroshi interview, 271 ing wedge between it and Britain, 266; citi-
Tolischus, Otto D.: on Japanese propaganda zenship for Asians, 314; collaboration by
in occupied Hong Kong, 82 Americans, 311; communists in (see Com-
Tom, Cleveland: wartime service, 374n134 munist Party, United States); detestation for
Tongzhong: Filipinos as, 253 Japanese, xiv; disillusionment with the idea
Tonoya Kawakita: trial for treason, 304–7 of Empire, 217–19; distrust of British inten-
Toshio Shiratori: on Japan’s wartime objec- tions in Asia, 94; “good war” theories in,
tives, 82 viii–ix; harassment of Japanese in, 39; immi-
Totehiko Konishi: invasion of Australia, 184 grant exclusion laws, 34, 36, 38, 55, 213, 314;
Toussant L’Ouverture: biography about, 57 “imperial preferences” to, 218; Indians in,
INDEX 405
124, 215, 314; interracial sex in, 149; Japan in Universal Negro Improvement Association
driving wedge between it and Britain, (UNIA): in California, 46–47; Japanese
265–66; Japanese agents in, 57; Japan’s pro- speakers at meetings, 46, 56; leader, 47;
posal to end racial discrimination (1919), membership, 45–46
36–37; Jim Crow air raid shelters, 115; University of Hawaii: Parsons on, 324–25
Koumintang, support for, 255; lack of pre- “University of Tokio, The,” 116
disposition to white supremacy, 180; as
model for postwar Hong Kong, 322; New Vann, Edward (“E. Vann Wong”): Chinese air
Hebrides and, 180; New Zealand’s move- ace, 113
ment toward, 160; nostalgia for, viii–ix; op- Versailles (Paris Peace Conference, 1919):
position to restoring colonial rule, 264–65; Japan’s proposal to end racial discrimina-
race relations in, Pacific War’s effect on, xv; tion, 35–37, 164–65, 225, 254
“race war” an accepted concept, 14; racial Victor, Denis: on collaborators in Hong Kong,
reform, 121, 185–86, 220, 322; racism a threat 14, 293
to national security, ix, 47–48, 52; reaction to Victoria Peak (Hong Kong). See Peak, The
Japan’s racial policies, 4, 7; reservations Victorian School (Hong Kong), 18
about aiding Chinese resistance, 14–15; rift Vidal, Gore: defensive alliance of whites, call
with Britain, 215–16, 239, 263–68; as rival for for, 327
British Empire, 93, 264–68; segregated Villa, Pancho: Japanese aid to, 277
schools for Chinese, Japanese, 33–34, 54; the Villaneueva, Jimmy: in Japanese press, 228
South, 105–7; view of situation in prewar
Hong Kong, 61; war against First Philippine Wade, Leslie: on postwar Hong Kong, 288
Republic (1899-1903), 7, 53; war trials in, Waitangi, Treaty of (1840): violations, 162
304–7; white supemacy, 322. See also Ameri- Walker, C. J.: support for International
cans; Asian Americans; Chinese Americans; League of Darker Peoples, 52
Euro-Americans; Japanese Americans Walton, Lester: on censorship in India, 206
United States armed forces: African-Ameri- Wang Ching-wei: agents’ summary execu-
can soldiers an inducement to racial reform, tion, 71; Blackburn on, 76; Chiang Kai-Shek
183–84; African-Americans in, 149, 183–84, and, 256; collaboration with Japan, 13, 256;
220–28, 238–41; Africans in British armed hatred for whites, 256; in Koumintang, 257;
forces compared to African Americans in in Nanking, 258; Sun Yat-Sen and, 256
U.S. armed forces, 239; antiracist propa- War in Europe: Pacific War compared to, xi,
ganda, 223; British-American clashes in 263, 297
Shanghai, 93; in British West Indies, 240; War trials: due process consideration, 303;
deployment of black troops to Australia, Hong Kong, 299–303, 308–11; Macao, 298;
116, 181–83; deployment of black troops to Nuremberg, 312, 375n161; Tokyo War
Britain, 238–41; deployment of Japanese Crimes Trials (1946-1948), 275, 312–13;
American troops to India, 218; in East United States, 304–7
Africa, 240; in India, crimes against civil- Ward, Robert: on camaraderie among Chi-
ians, 248; interracial conflict, 221, 224, 235; nese and Japanese in occupied Hong Kong,
interracial sex in, 149; Japanese monitoring 103–4; on Chinese Americans in Japanese
of race relations, 224; Japanese POW on occupation forces, 141; on Chinese in gov-
African-American troops, 223; in ernment of occupied Hong Kong, 100; on
Leopoldville (Belgian Congo), 240; Native Japanese propaganda in occupied Hong
Americans in, 222–23; racial segregation’s Kong, 82; keeping them out of Hong Kong
effect on combat readiness, 223–24; racism defense corps, 75–76; on lack of unions in
in, 221–22; racist behavior in Britain, Hong Kong, 91
235–36; scalping Japanese troops, 226; stab- Ware, Jeffries: in Japanese press, 228
bing dead pilots, 226; in Trinidad, 240; tro- Warren, Earl: anti-white violence, reports of,
phies from dead Japanese, 226; “You and 123; law against Filipinos marrying those of
the Native” pamphlet, 221–22 European descent, 124; naturalization for
United States Joint Psychological Warfare Indian Americans, 124
Committee: on necessity to reduce racial Washington, Booker T.: on Negro interest in
prejudice, 5–6 Japan, 45
United States Office of Naval Intelligence: Wasserstein, Bernard: on expatriates’ view of
surveillance of African Americans, 47 Chinese in Hong Kong, 22
406 INDEX
Wong An Bew (pseudonym for Japanese: Yasaburo Shimonaka: on Greater East Associ-:
agent): spying by, 173: ation, 252:
Wong Wo: triad leader, 101: Yates, Harold Robert: on hatred for Japanese,
Woo, Peter: on postwar Hong Kong’s impor-: 140; on Hong Kong as a military post,
tance, 322: 60–61
Wood, Alan Jackson: on difference between: Yazaki, General: on Japan’s wartime objec-:
Britons and Americans in internment: tives, 81:
camps, 97: “Yellow”: recommendation to avoid using, 6:
Woodson, Carter G.: on white suspicions of: “Yellow Peril”: Du Bois on, 15; fears of, 11;:
African Americans’ loyalty, 122: first statesman to use the term, 11; Japanese:
Wook, Alan Jackson: on Sikhs during Hong: view, 141:
Kong invasion, 70: Yoke Shim: husband’s burial, 300:
“Wops”: Stilwell’s use, 10: Yoshici Nagatani: on race as American weak-:
Working class: whiteness of their skin, 40: ness, 114:
World War II: effect on immigrant exclusion Yoshimitsu Abe: on marketing stolen goods,:
laws, 314; “good war” theories, viii–ix; ori- 296:
gins, 165; as a people’s war, 254; racial un- Yoshinori Kobayashi: cartoon by, 323:
derpinnings downplayed, 326–27; rich peo- “You and the Native” (U.S. Army pamphlet),
ple winners of, 326; spoils of war, 293–97. 221–22
See also Pacific War; War in Europe Young, Louise: on white united front against:
Wright, Milton S. J.: dinner with Hitler, 106: Japan, 270:
Wright, Richard: grandmother’s prayers, Young, Mark: on redistribution and inequal-
51–52 ity, 293; swearing in ceremony, 99–100
Wright-Nooth, George: on being taking pris- Yourdo Choho (Tokyo): publisher, 52:
oner, 143; birthplace, 147; Chinese girl- Yuji Ichioka: on loyalty in racist societies,:
friends, warning about, 29; on difference 137:
between Britons and Americans in intern- Yukiko Koshiro: on Tokyo War Crimes Trial,:
ment camps, 93–94; on “hairy apes” in in- 312; writings of, xi:
ternment camps, 147; on Japanese Ameri- Yunan Daily News: on Thailand’s treatment of:
cans in Japanese internment camps, 132; on Chinese, 291:
Nimori Genichiro, 132; on police in British Yung Yee Ton: in occupied Hong Kong, 101:
Empire, 73; on Sikh police in occupied
Hong Kong, 88 Zaitzeff, Eugenie: on pro-Japan activists in:
Wright-North, George: Wu, H. C.: on collabo- occupied Hong Kong, 100:
rators in Hong Kong, 293–94 Zamroude Za’ba: on Japanese occupiers of:
Wu-Tang Clan: Asian music’s influence, 324: Singapore, 196:
Wu Te-Chen: on Japanese defeat, 291: Zhou Fohai: political career, 257:
Wylie, Ben: postwar relocation to South: Zia, I. D.: on cannibalism in occupied Hong:
Africa, 325: Kong, 87; on rape to Japanese soldiers,:
152:
Yam Shing: on salary differentials in Hong: Zindel (prisoner in Stanley internment:
Kong, 287: camp): collaboration with Japan, 95:
Yamagata Aritomo: white united front Zung, Frankie: collaboration with Japan,:
against, 369n99 233–34; living at The Peak, 233:
About the Author
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