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Case On Failure To Appear in Preliminaary Case in Ejectment
Case On Failure To Appear in Preliminaary Case in Ejectment
The Facts:
Lolina (Porter) filed a case for ejectment against Remedios (Mauleon) to recover possession of a property located at
10 Avenue, Caloocan City. According to her, the property had been sold to her by the spouses Remedios and
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Renato thru a Deed of Sale executed on August 28, 2007. Despite the sale, the spouses refused to vacate the
property despite demand for them to do so. They also failed to pay the rent. Answering, Remedios averred that
Lolina’s complaint should be dismissed because it failed to implead her husband, Renato and there is a pending
action for annulment of documents, title and reconveynace at the RTC Branch 58 of Caloocan City. During the
preliminary conference held on March 27, 2009, Remedios and her counsel failed to appear, hence Lolina moved for
rendition of judgment based on Section 7 of the Rules of Summary Procedure, which the MTC granted, ordering
Remedios to vacate the property. Instead of an appeal, Remedios filed a “Very Urgent Manifestation with Motion to
Reconsider The Order dated March 27, 2009”, and another “Manifestation with Motion to Resolve Pending
Incidents, to Dismiss the Case and/or nullify the Proceedings as the Precipitate Rendition of Judgment”. Lolina on
the other hand moved for issuance of writ of execution, arguing that the decision had become final. The MTC
denied the motions filed by Remedios and granted the motion for issuance of writ of execution filed by Lolina.
Remedios thru a petition for certiorari with the RTC, sought to nullify the MTC orders as well as the order granting
the writ of execution, saying she was denied of due process; her motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2009
deserve consideration; and the pending incidents as well as the reconveyance case were determinative of the
ejectment case.
The RTC ruled otherwise, dismissing the petition for certiorari. Since the MTC case was for possession de fact it
was never deprived of jurisdiction by virtue of the reconveyance and annulment of documents case. Even if she
moved for postponement of the preliminary conference, the motion was received only after the MTC have already
rendered a ruling on the motion filed by Lolina, thus Remedios was not deprived of due process. The CA also sided
with the RTC, holding that Remedios inappropriately filed a petition for certiorari instead of an appeal. Ejectment
was proper, and the pendency of the annulment of documents and reconveyance case did not abate the ejectment
case which is a summary proceeding. Remedios therefore elevated her case to the court of last resort, the Supreme
Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the RTC properly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
by Remedios.
The Ruling:
At the outset, it bears to note that petitioner’s course of action before the RTC was principally anchored on the
validity of the August 18, 2009 Order which granted the execution of the MeTC Decision. On this score, Section
1(e), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that an order of execution is not appealable, hence, an
aggrieved party may resort to the special civil action ofcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is
because an order of execution is not a final order or resolution within the contemplation of the rules, but is issued to
carry out the enforcement of a final judgment or order against the losing party, hence, generally not
appealable. While there are circumstances wherein appeal from an improper execution is allowed, none obtains in
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this case. Consequently, the Court finds that petitioner properly availed of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC,
contrary to the finding of the CA that she should have appealed therefrom.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court nonetheless perceives no reversible error on the part of the CA in
upholding the RTC’s finding that no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the MeTC Decision and the
August 18, 2009 Order directing its execution.
Records show that during the scheduled preliminary conference on March 27, 2009, petitioner and her counsel failed
to appear despite notice. Hence, the MeTC was justified in granting respondent’s motion to render judgment in the
ejectment case pursuant to Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure which read as
follows:
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above
provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein:Provided, however, That the court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are
two or more defendants.
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is
filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. x x x.
xxxx
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
x x x.
The use of the word “shall” in the foregoing provisions makes the attendance of the parties in the preliminary
conference mandatory, and non-appearance thereat is excusable only when the party offers a justifiable cause for his
failure to attend. The petitioner in this case, however, failed in this respect.
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It is undisputed that petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent motion to postpone the March 27, 2009 hearing on the same
date and only after the MeTC judge had already granted respondent’s motion for rendition of judgment. As such, the
MeTC properly declared that the aforesaid motion deserves scant consideration and, in fact, should not even be
received considering the three (3)-day notice rule on motions, stated in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of
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Court, viz.:
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as
to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good
cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s asseveration that her non-appearance in the March 27, 2009 hearing was due to her counsel’s assurance
that he had duly filed a motion for postponement, which the MeTC should have purportedly granted, cannot be 6
sustained since no party has the right to assume that such motion would be approved by the courts. Consequently,
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absent any justifiable reason for her and her counsel’s non-appearance at the said preliminary conference, the Court
concurs with the RTC’s finding that no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed against the MeTC in submitting the
case for decision and, subsequently, ordering petitioner’s ejectment from the subject property.
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Similarly, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against the MeTC in issuing the August 18, 2009 Order
directing the execution of its Decision. Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for the immediate
execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases, which can only be stayed if the defendant perfects
an appeal, files a supersedeas bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or other reasonable compensation for the
use and occupancy of the subject premises during the pendency of the appeal. These requirements are mandatory
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and concurrent, without which execution will issue as a matter of right. 10
In this case, it is evident that petitioner failed to interpose an appeal from the MeTC Decision rendering the same
final and executory. Hence, the August 18, 2009 Order granting its execution was properly issued.
It is settled that when a decision has acquired finality, the same becomes immutable and unalterable. By this
principle of immutability of judgments, the Court is now precluded from further examining the MeTC Decision and
to further dwell on petitioner’s perceived errors therein, i.e., that her possession of the subject property was not by
virtue of respondent’s tolerance, hence, the ejectment complaint should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;
and that the pending annulment of documents and reconveyance case was prejudicial to the ejectment suit. As held
in the case of Ocampo v. Vda. de Fernandez: 11
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final
at some definite point in time.
Resultantly, the implementation and execution of judgments that had attained finality are already ministerial on the
courts. Public policy also dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory, and unappealable, the prevailing
party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay
in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.
Hence, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution, the
issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty.
Finally, the Court finds that the CA did not err in holding that petitioner was bound by the negligence of her former
counsel which, as she purports, led her to lose her case and her right to appeal. Seeing no cogent reason to deviate
therefrom, the Court hereunder quotes the CA’s ruling on this score with full approval:
We likewise cannot countenance the argument raised by appellant [petitioner herein] that she should not be bound
by the negligence of her former counsel. Appellant claims that her failure to attend the preliminary conference
which resulted in the alleged precipitate and hasty rendition of the decision of the MTC was due to the assurance of
her former counsel that her appearance was not necessary. Moreover, appellant claims that her former counsel failed
to file a timely notice of appeal, thus, she lost her right thereto.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural
technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the
client is deprived of his day in court. In which case, the remedy then is to reopen the case and allow the party who
was denied his day in court to adduce his evidence. However, a thorough review of the instant case reveals that
appellant cannot seek refuge or obtain reprieve under these principles.
A review of the records would disclose that appellant was not deprived of her day in court before the MTC. After
the filing of the complaint, appellant was able to file her Answer to the complaint, hence, it cannot be successfully
argued that she was deprived of her day in court. x x x.
On her lost appeal, time and again it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules.
Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
Hence, there is no justifiable reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule that clients should suffer the
consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom they themselves hired and had
the full authority to fire at any time and replace with another even without any justifiable reason.12
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 11, 2012 and the
Resolution dated August 30, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121353 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on November 12, 2012
is LIFTEDand DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.