David V Agbay

RENATO M. DAVID VS. EDITHA A.
AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
Petitioner is a naturalized Canadian citizen who, upon retirement, returned to the Philippines with his wife and
purchased a lot in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is
a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is
disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225)
as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on April 12,
2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen.
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to
receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of
the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public
land. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC but was denied after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
lower court.
Issue:
The Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing
himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for
re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to
falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph
1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position;
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of
the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at
the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by
which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s
motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the
law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.
In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago
v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by
filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused,
as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash
the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him
to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we
held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the
court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking
the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.29(Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the
MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground
stated in the MTC’s order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in
denying the said motion for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

David V Agbay

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David V Agbay

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RENATO M. DAVID VS. EDITHA A.

AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

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