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BELGICA vs. OCHOA, JR (Executive Secretary)
BELGICA vs. OCHOA, JR (Executive Secretary)
ISSUE/S
W/N there exists an actual case or controversy – YES
W/N there was a violation of the principle of separation of powers – YES
W/N there was a violation of non-delegability of legislative powers – YES
W/N PDAF renders useless the President’s power of item veto – YES
W/N PDAF violates the principle of local autonomy – YES
HOLDING
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Entire 2013 PDAF Article, all provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, previous PDAF and
CDF, all informal practices of similar import and effect, as UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Temporary injunction is declared PERMANENT, prohibiting the disbursement/release of remaining PDAF funds for
2013 and all those concerned ENJOINED
RATIO
1. Yes, because there is an alleged violation of the Constitution with respect to separation of powers, non-
delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability, and local autonomy. And also because it
is a matter of public interest and the preparation and passage of a national budget is an affair of annual
occurrence, and the Court finds the CoA Reports to be sufficient in validating the existence of an actual and
justiciable controversy. Lastly, there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality.
2. The PDAF grants legislators the post-enactment authority in areas of fund release and realignment, and to
identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. These post-
enactment measures are not related to functions of congressional oversight and allow legislators to intervene or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Informal practices through which
legislators have effectively intruded into proper phases of budget execution are deemed as acts of grave abuse
of discretion.
3. 2013 PDAF confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators and violates the
principle of non-delegability since legislators were effectively allowed to individually exercise power of
appropriation, by being given a personal lump-sum and the freedom to decide how much would go to a specific
project or beneficiary which they themselves may determine.
4. President’s veto power (ART 6, SEC 27) “have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the items to which he does not object”. The
PDAF system where there is a lump-sum appropriation, legislator’s identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA, denies the President the chance to veto that item later on. The item veto power of the
President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting and Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which renders the constitutionally-granted power of the President useless. This fosters a “budget
within a budget” and subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and impairs President’s power of item
veto. It forces the President to either (1) accept the entire P24Billion PDAF allocation without knowing specific
projects of the legislators
(2) reject the whole PDAF to the detriment of legislators with legitimate projects
5. PDAF allows for district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development. Insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local
matters and subvert genuine local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely
on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents.