Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2009 LABOR Case Digest
2009 LABOR Case Digest
As a rule, a party who does not appeal from the decision may not
obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what
he has obtained from the lower tribunal, if any, whose decision is
brought up on appeal. Due process prevents the grant of additional
awards to parties who did not appeal. As an exception, he may assign
an error where the purpose is to maintain the judgment on other
grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment
or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed or filed a separate
petition. (AKLAN COLLEGE, INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN
CASTIGADOR, NUENA SERMON and JOCELYN ZOLINA, G.R. No. 178309,
January 27, 2009)
Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a
constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who
seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules
allowing it. To reiterate, perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The
requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly
followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly
discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing
1
party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so
does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of
the decision. Thus, the propriety of the monetary awards of the Labor
Arbiter is already binding upon this Court, much more with the Court of
Appeals. (ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-
MANAGERS,INC. and E. GANZON, INC. G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117,
G.R. Nos. 186984-85, September 18, 2009)
• Certiorari
2
As to the other ground cited by private respondents’ counsel,
suffice it to say that it was a bare allegation unsubstantiated by any
proof or affidavit of merit. Besides, they could have filed the petition on
time with a motion to be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis. While
social justice requires that the law look tenderly on the disadvantaged
sectors of society, neither the rich nor the poor has a license to
disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental rule of human relations
enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe
procedural rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his
due and observing honesty and good faith. For indeed, while
technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly
procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all courts
are devoted. (LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION v. ARIES C. CAALAM and
GERALDINE ESGUERRA, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009)
• Date of Filing
• Delayed Filing
We agree with the Court of Appeals that since no intent to delay
the administration of justice could be attributed to Guinmapang, a one
day delay does not justify the appeal’s denial. More importantly, the
Court of Appeals declared that Guinmapang’s appeal, on its face,
appears to be impressed with merit. The constitutional mandate to
accord full protection to labor and to safeguard the employee’s means
of livelihood should be given proper attention and sanction. A greater
injustice may occur if said appeal is not given due course than if the
reglementary period to appeal were strictly followed. In this case, we
are inclined to excuse the one day delay in order to fully settle the
merits of the case. This is in line with our policy to encourage full
3
adjudication of the merits of an appeal. (REPUBLIC CEMENT
CORPORATION v. PETER I. GUINMAPANG, G.R. No. 168910, August 24,
2009)
• Appeal Bond
The decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the NLRC by any parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt thereof, with proof of payment of the
required appeal fee accompanied by a memorandum of appeal. And
where, as here, the judgment involves monetary award, an appeal
4
therefrom by the employer may be “perfected only upon the posting of
a cash or surety bond.” A mere notice of appeal without complying
with the other requisites mentioned does not stop the running of the
period for perfecting an appeal as in fact no motion for extension of
said period is allowed. (WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and
SCANDIC SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED v. ERIBERTO S. BULTRON, G.R.
No. 185261, October 2, 2009)
Attorney’s Fees
Finally, the Court overrules the deletion by the NLRC of the Labor
Arbiter’s award for attorney’s fees to petitioner. Petitioner is evidently
entitled to attorney’s fees, since h3e was compelled to litigate to
protect his interest by reason of unjustified and unlawful termination of
his employment by respondents CCBP and Taguibao. (ERWIN H. REYES
v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 180551,
February 10, 2009)
5
his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. The
duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper
and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at
tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and
energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against
any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just
compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to
secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.
(EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J.
MASMUD) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No.
183385, February 13, 2009)
6
(10%) of the monetary award. (LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. KJGS FLEET
MANAGEMENT MANILA G.R. No. 182430, December 4, 2009)
Backwages
Burden of Proof
7
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where the employee must allege nonpayment, the
general rule is that the burden rests on the employer to prove
payment, rather than on the employee to prove nonpayment. The
reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls,
records, remittances and other similar documents — which will show
that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of
workers have been paid — are not in the possession of the employee
but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. Since in the
case at bar petitioner company has not shown any proof of payment of
the correct amount of salary, holiday pay and 13th month pay, we
affirm the award of Madriaga’s monetary claims. (MANTLE TRADING
SERVICES, INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL ROSARIO v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S. MADRIAGA,G.R. No.
166705,July 28,2009)
8
absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have
been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as
manifested by some overt acts. Clearly, jurisprudence dictates that
the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go
back to work rests on the employer. (TACLOBAN FAR EAST MARKETING
CORPORATION and FRANCISCO Y. ROMUALDEZ v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182320,
September 11, 2009)
Cause of Action
If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, as in the herein questioned
provision, the literal meaning thereof shall prevail. That is settled. As
such, the daily-paid employees must be paid their regular salaries on
9
the holidays which are so declared by the national government,
regardless of whether they fall on rest days.
Company Policy
Computation of Award
Finally, on the increase in the computation of the monetary
award to respondents, the decision of the Labor Arbiter specified that
for purposes of putting up a bond should petitioner appeal, the
backwages were computed only for a certain period. Otherwise, the
actual backwages to be paid to respondents are computed from the
date of dismissal until the finality of the decision. In addition, because
petitioner continues to refuse and accord regular status to respondents
and to pay them their corresponding wages even after the lapse of two
10
(2) years from the finality of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, the Labor
Arbiter correctly included that in its order of execution. Thus, the Labor
Arbiter’s order of execution simply covered the correct computation of
wages and other payments enjoyed by petitioner’s regular employees.
(PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. RIZALINA RAUT,
LEILA EMNACE and GINA CAPISTRANO, G.R. No. 174209, August 25,
2009)
Conclusiveness of Judgment
Contingent Fee
11
legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that
the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. The Court finds nothing
illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and
Evangelina’s husband. The CA committed no error of law when it
awarded the attorney’s fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive
an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award. (EVANGELINA
MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. MASMUD) v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 183385,
February 13, 2009)
Contract of Adhesion
Contract of Employment
Corporate Rehabilitation
12
It then becomes easy to accept the hypothesis that the date when the
claim arose, or when the action is filed, is of no moment. As long as the
corporation is under a management committee or a rehabilitation
receiver, all actions for claims against it --- for money or otherwise ---
must yield to the greater imperative of corporate rehabilitation,
excepting only, as already mentioned, claims for payment of
obligations incurred by the corporation in the ordinary course of
business. Enforcement of writs of execution issued by judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunals, since such writs emanate from “actions for claims,”
must, likewise, be suspended. (MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
v. VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 167768, April 17, 2009)
Damages
Disability Benefits
13
POEA Employment Contract shall x x x be regarded as permanently
unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100%
compensation, i.e., x x x US$60,000.00 for ratings.” Petitioner’s
disability rating being 68.66%, he is entitled to a 100% disability
compensation of US$60,000, as correctly found by the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. So Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v.
Suganob, enlightens, thus:
14
(JOELSON O. ILORETA v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
CARRIERS, INC., G.R. NO. 183908, December 4, 2009)
Dismissal
15
the petitioner encouraged her husband to attack Echavez (all of which
were duly and seasonably disclosed), the petitioner cannot claim that
the respondent company did not give her ample opportunity to be
heard. All told, we are convinced that the respondent company acted
based on a valid cause for dismissal and observed the required
procedures in so acting. (ROSARIO A. GATUS v. QUALITY HOUSE, INC.
and CHRISTOPHER CHUA, G.R. No. 156766, April 16, 2009)
• Constructive Dismissal
16
In the present case, the petitioners ceased verbally
communicating with the respondent and giving him work assignment
after suspecting that he had forged purchase receipts. Under this
situation, the respondent was forced to leave the petitioners’
compound with his family and to transfer to a nearby place. Thus, the
respondent’s act of leaving the petitioners’ premises was in reality not
his choice but a situation the petitioners created. (CRC AGRICULTURAL
TRADING and ROLANDO B. CATINDIG v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 177664, December 23, 2009)
17
Note that the verb “participates” is preceded by the adverb
“knowingly.” This reflects the intent of the legislature to require
“knowledge” as a condition sine qua non before a union officer can be
dismissed from employment for participating in an illegal strike. The
provision is worded in such a way as to make it very difficult for
employers to circumvent the law by arbitrarily dismissing employees in
the guise of exercising management prerogative. This is but one
aspect of the State’s constitutional and statutory mandate to protect
the rights of employees to self-organization. (CLUB FILIPINO, INC.
and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON v. benjamin bautista, et. al., G.R. No.
168406, July 13, 2009)
• Illegal Dismissal
18
In this case, we find no overt act on the part of petitioner that he
was ready to sever his employment ties. The alleged resignation was
actually premised by respondents only on the filing of the complaint for
separation pay, but this alone is not sufficient proof that petitioner
intended to resign from the company. What strongly negates the claim
of resignation is the fact that petitioner filed the amended complaint
for illegal dismissal immediately after he was not allowed to report for
work on June 3, 2000. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the
complaint for illegal dismissal. It would have been illogical for
petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal later
on. If petitioner was determined to resign, as respondents posited, he
would not have commenced the action for illegal dismissal.
Undeniably, petitioner was unceremoniously dismissed in this case.
(BALTAZAR L. PAYNO v. ORIZON TRADING CORP. / ORATA TRADING
and FLORDELIZA LEGASPI, G.R. No. 175345, August 19, 2009)
19
In fine, as petitioners failed to indubitably prove that
respondents were guilty of drug use in contravention of its drug-free
workplace policy amounting to serious misconduct, respondents are
deemed to have been illegally dismissed. (PLANTATION BAY RESORT
and SPA v. ROMEL S. DUBRICO, et al., G.R. No. 182216, December 4,
2009)
Docket Fees
20
persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management
policies specifically in the field of labor relations. Verily, petitioner’s
job as a salesman does not fall under this qualification. (ERWIN H.
REYES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 180551,
February 10, 2009)
Downsizing Scheme
21
the Court has no basis to interfere with the bona fide decision of
management to effect more economic and efficient methods of
production.
Due Process
22
that the essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be
heard, and not that an actual hearing should always and
indispensably be held. (PHILIPPINE PASAY CHUNG HUA ACADEMY
and EMILIO CHING v. SERVANDO L. EDPAN, G.R. No. 168876,
SERVANDO L. EDPAN v. PHILIPPINE PASAY CHUNG HUA ACADEMY
and EMILIO CHING)
23
employee for the violation of his right to due process. It further held
that the penalty should be in the nature of indemnification, in the form
of nominal damages and should depend on the facts of each case,
taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process
violation of the employer. The amount of such damages is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, considering the relevant
circumstances. Thus, in Agabon, the Court ordered the employer to
pay the employee nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
(MANTLE TRADING SERVICES, INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL
ROSARIO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S.
MADRIAGA,G.R. No. 166705,July 28,2009)
In the present case, Jose, Jr. was not given any written notice about
his dismissal. However, the propriety of Jose, Jr.’s dismissal is not affected
by the lack of written notices. When the dismissal is for just cause, the
lack of due process does not render the dismissal ineffectual but merely
gives rise to the payment of P30,000 in nominal damages. (BERNARDO B.
JOSE, JR. v. MICHAELMAR PHILS., INC., G.R. No. 169606, November 27,
2009)
24
opportunity to answer the charges of abandonment. Neither did the
petitioners send a written notice to the respondent informing the latter
that his service had been terminated and the reasons for the
termination of employment. Under these facts, the respondent’s
dismissal was illegal. (CRC AGRICULTURAL TRADING and ROLANDO B.
CATINDIG v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No.
177664, December 23, 2009)
Employer-Employee Relationship
25
emergency leaves. PDMC even withheld taxes on her salary and
declared her as an employee in the official Bureau of Internal Revenue
forms. These are all indicia of an employer-employee relationship
which respondent PDMC failed to refute. (GLORIA V. GOMEZ v. PNOC
DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 174044,
November 27, 2009)
• Control Test
In the case at bench, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were
one in their conclusion that respondents were not independent
contractors, but employees of petitioner. In determining the existence
of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC examined and weighed the circumstances
against the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the
power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and
(4) the power to control the employees’ conduct, or the so-called
“control test.” Of the four, the power of control is the most important
element. More importantly, the control test merely calls for the
existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise
thereof. (DEALCO FARMS, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (5th DIVISION), G.R. No. 153192 January 30, 2009)
In this regard, it has not escaped the notice of the Court that the
operations of the hotel itself do not cease with the end of each event
or function and that there is an ever present need for individuals to
perform certain tasks necessary in the petitioner’s business. Thus,
although the tasks themselves may vary, the need for sufficient
manpower to carry them out does not. In any event, as borne out by
the findings of the NLRC, the petitioner determines the nature of the
tasks to be performed by the private respondent, in the process
exercising control. (MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP vs COURT
OF APPEALS, SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
CORP., G.R. No. 149660, January 20, 2009)
26
order to ensure proper sharing of the proceeds, considering that
Shangri-la and respondent doctor share in the guests’ payments for
medical services rendered. In fine, as Shangri-la does not control how
the work should be performed by petitioners, it is not petitioners’
employer. (JEROMIE D. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO v.
SHANGRI-LA’S MACTAN ISLAND RESORT and DR. JESSICA J.R. PEPITO,
G.R. No. 178827, March 4, 2009)
Equity
Estoppel
27
GOMEZ v. PNOC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 174044, November 27, 2009)
Evidence
It may be true that the NBI agents’ affidavit did not directly
implicate petitioners in the scheme. However, their co-employees
Gimena, Welsh and Derupe, who had personal knowledge of
petitioners’ activities, narrated in their affidavits the nature, dates and
time of their (petitioners’) participation. Petitioners did not refute
these sworn statements. Neither did they explain why their former
colleagues would unjustly and falsely testify against them even if they
had the opportunity to defend themselves during the administrative
investigations conducted by respondent. These pieces of evidence,
when taken together, constituted substantial evidence to prove
petitioners’ culpability. It is of no moment that they were acquitted in
the criminal case. Petitioners’ infractions were willful and serious, thus
their dismissal was proper under the circumstances. (RENITA DEL
ROSARIO, et al., v. MAKATI CINEMA SQUARE CORPORATION, G.R. No.
170014, July 3, 2009)
• Proof of Mailing
28
the postmaster’s certification failed to show that the Malate Post Office
committed an inadvertence in handling the registry return card so that
a corrective certification from the Postmaster was necessary. In the
absence of such justification for the certification, we are compelled to
deny it of any evidentiary value for the purpose it was submitted.
(EUREKA PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. EDUARDO
VALENCIA, G.R. No. 159358, July 15, 2009)
Execution
We would like to stress the settled rule that the power of the
court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. To be
sure, one man’s goods shall not be sold for another man’s debts. A
sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging
to the judgment debtor, and even incurs liability if he wrongfully
levies upon the property of a third person. (PANTRANCO
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO
RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), G.R. No. 170689, G.R. No.
170705)
29
• Exception
30
INCORPORATED v. MA. LOURDES D. SIENES, G.R. No. 152101,
September 8, 2009)
Forum Shopping
31
. . . Where the petitioner is a corporation, the
certification against forum shopping should be signed by
its duly authorized director or representative …[I]f the
real party-in-interest is a corporate body, an officer of
the corporation can sign the certification against forum
shopping as long as he is authorized by a resolution of
its board of directors.
xxxx
32
established that the tribunal had acted capriciously and whimsically in
total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the
controversy. (PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.)
vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and
JANDELEON JUEZAN, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009)
Hearing
33
Bergante v. First Philippine Scales, Inc. and/or Amparo Policarpio,
Manager, G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009
Inchoate Right
Independent Contractor
34
ground for the withdrawal of De Raedt from the CECAP, De Raedt was
disengaged from the project upon the instruction of SGV’s client, TMI.
Most important of all, SGV did not exercise control over the means and
methods by which De Raedt performed her duties as Sociologist. SGV
did impose rules on De Raedt, but these were necessary to ensure
SGV’s faithful compliance with the terms and conditions of the Sub-
Consultancy Agreement it entered into with TMI. (SYCIP, GORRES,
VELAYO & COMPANY, v. CAROL DE RAEDT, G.R. No. 161366, June 16,
2009)
Insubordination
Interpretation of Doubt
35
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of
the safety and decent living for the laborer. (BECMEN SERVICE
EXPORTER v. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in
behalf oftheir daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON
SERVICES, INC. and JAIME ORTIZ (President,White Falcon Services, Inc.)
AND PROMOTION, INC.,G.R. Nos. 182978-79, G.R. Nos. 184298-99,
April 7, 2009)
Joint Venture
To the Court, the Contract between the Cooperative and DFI, far
from being a job contracting arrangement, is in essence a business
partnership that partakes of the nature of a joint venture. The rules on
job contracting are, therefore, inapposite. The Court may not alter the
intention of the contracting parties as gleaned from their stipulations
without violating the autonomy of contracts principle under Article
1306 of the Civil Code which gives the contracting parties the utmost
liberality and freedom to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order or public policy.
(OLDARICO S. TRAVEÑO, et al v. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS
36
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, TIMOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION,
DIAMOND FARMS, INC., and DOLE ASIA PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164205,
September 3, 2009)
Judgment
Jurisdiction
In sum, when the labor arbiter proceeded with the consolidated cases
despite the SEC suspension order, he exceeded his jurisdiction to hear
and decide illegal dismissal cases and the CA correctly reversed his June
16, 2004 order. (GINA M. TIANGCO, et al, v. UNIWIDE SALES
WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC., G.R. No. 168697, December 14, 2009)
Intra-Corporate Dispute
37
employment was terminated effective 16 April 2000 . It is therefore
clear from the by-laws and from Atty. Garcia himself that he is a
corporate officer. One who is included in the by-laws of a corporation
in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and
not a mere employee. Being a corporate officer, his removal is
deemed to be an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the SEC and
not by the Labor Arbiter. (ATTY. VIRGILIO R. GARCIA v. EASTERN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. and ATTY. SALVADOR C.
HIZON, G.R. No. 173115, EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PHILIPPINES, INC. and ATTY. SALVADOR C. HIZON v. ATTY. VIRGILIO R.
GARCIA, G.R. Nos. 173163-64, April 16, 2009)
Labor-only Contractor
38
In sum, Interserve did not have substantial capital or investment
in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, and work premises; and
respondents, its supposed employees, performed work which was
directly related to the principal business of petitioner. It is, thus,
evident that Interserve falls under the definition of a “labor-only”
contractor, under Article 106 of the Labor Code; as well as Section 5(i)
of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code, as
amended. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC v. ALAN M. AGITO, et
al., G.R. No. 179546, February 13, 2009)
Length of Service
39
Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or
trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in
conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom
suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and
other persons. x x x
40
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and JAIME ORTIZ (President,White
Falcon Services, Inc.) AND PROMOTION, INC.,G.R. Nos. 182978-79, G.R.
Nos. 184298-99, April 7, 2009)
Management Prerogative
• Transfer
41
prerogative. The transfer of employees has been traditionally among
the acts identified as a management prerogative subject only to
limitations found in law, collective bargaining agreement, and general
principles of fair play and justice. Even as the law is solicitous of the
welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to
exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of
management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose
cannot be denied. (GUALBERTO AGUANZA v. ASIAN TERMINAL, INC.,
KEITH JAMES, RICHARD BARCLAY, and ATTY. RODOLFO CORVITE, G.R.
No. 163505, August 14, 2009)
Money Claims
42
within 10 calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision,
disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. The
employee need not file a motion for the issuance of the writ of
execution since the Labor Arbiter shall thereafter motu proprio issue
the writ. With the new rules in place, there is hardly any difficulty in
determining the employer’s intransigence in immediately complying
with the order. (JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009)
43
purpose of the rules on completeness of service and the notice of
change of address, which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings,
judgments and processes beyond the power of the party being served
to determine at his pleasure. (PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. HEIRS OF
BERNARDIN J. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 164267, G.R. No. 166996)
44
governed by his POEA-SEC until his repatriation to the Philippines on
17 July 2002. (CARLOS N. NISDA v. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY and
KHALIFA A. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES, G. R. No.
179177, July 23, 2009)
The law fixes the period of time within which petitioner could
seek remedy for his illegal dismissal and for as long as he filed his
Complaint within the prescriptive period, he shall be entitled to the full
protection of his right to backwages. In illegal dismissal cases, the
employee concerned is given a period of four years from the time of
his illegal dismissal within which to institute the complaint. This is
based on Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which states that actions
based upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff must be brought
within four years. The four-year prescriptive period shall commence to
run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker. Here,
petitioner was dismissed from service on 15 September 2001. He filed
his complaint for illegal dismissal on 14 June 2004. Clearly, then, the
instant case was filed within the prescriptive period. (ERWIN H. REYES
v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 180551,
February 10, 2009)
45
than three (3) years; hence, the petitioner seasonably filed her
monetary claim when she filed her complaint before the NLRC.
(JANUARIA A. RIVERA v. UNITED LABORATORIES, INC.,G.R. No. 155639
April 22, 2009)
xxxx
46
statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). A “borrowing statute” directs
the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law
(Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several
kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an
action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued,
will not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict
of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
xxxx
Thus, in our considered view, respondent’s complaint was filed well
within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our
Labor Code. This point, however, has already been mooted by our
finding that respondent’s service award had been paid, albeit the
payroll termed such payment as severance pay. (LWV
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. MARCELO B. DUPO, G.R. No.
172342, July 13, 2009)
Probationary Employee
47
A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for
an employer, during which the latter determines whether or not he is
qualified for permanent employment. The probationary employment is
intended to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness
of a probationary employee while at work, and to ascertain whether he
will become an efficient and productive employee. While the employer
observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to
ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the
probationer, on the other hand, seeks to prove to the employer that he
has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent
employment. Thus, the word probationary, as used to describe the
period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, not
its length. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS.
VIOLETA T. CARIÑO v. ADELAIDA . MANALO, G.R. No. 178835, February
13, 2009 )
48
reasonable standards set by the employer at the time of the
employee’s engagement. Undeniably, respondent was hired as a
probationary teacher and, as such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to
show by competent evidence that she did not meet the standards set
by the school. This requirement, petitioner failed to discharge. To
note, the termination of respondent was effected by that letter stating
that she was being relieved from employment because the school
authorities allegedly decided, as a cost-cutting measure, that the
position of “Principal” was to be abolished. Nowhere in that letter was
respondent informed that her performance as a school teacher was
less than satisfactory. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER
and MRS. VIOLETA T. CARIÑO v. ADELAIDA . MANALO, G.R. No. 178835,
February 13, 2009 )
Project Employee
49
continuously rehired after the cessation of a project. Respondent
remained a project employee of Alcatel working on the PLDT 1342
project. (ALCATEL PHILIPPINES, INC., v. RENE R. RELOS, G.R. No.
164315, July 3, 2009)
Protection to Labor
50
(GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS
vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY), THE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 178647)
Quitclaim
• Invalid Quitclaims
51
have already executed quitclaims on various dates. We, however, take
judicial notice that 33 of these quitclaims failed to indicate the
amounts received by the terminated employees. Because of this,
petitioner leaves us no choice but to invalidate and set aside these
quitclaims. However, the actual amount received by the employees
upon signing the said documents shall be deducted from whatever
remaining amount is due them to avoid double recovery of separation
pay and other monetary benefits. We hereby order the Labor Arbiter to
effect the necessary computation on this matter. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (HEPI), owner of Hyatt Regency Manila, v.
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF
WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
(SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009)
52
different corporations involved in the instant case, the only entity
which has the right and interest to question the execution sale and
the eventual right to annul the same, if any, is PNB-Madecor or its
successor-in-interest. Settled is the rule that proceedings in court
must be instituted by the real party in interest. (PANTRANCO
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO
RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), G.R. No. 170689, G.R. No.
170705)
Re-computation of Awards
xxxx
53
(AKLAN COLLEGE, INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN CASTIGADOR,
NUENA SERMON and JOCELYN ZOLINA, G.R. No. 178309, January 27,
2009)
Recruitment Agency
Regular Employment
54
been engaged since 1993 and 1994, respectively, without regard to
continuity or brokenness of the service. (DEALCO FARMS, INC., vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION), G.R. No.
153192 January 30, 2009)
Reinstatement
55
Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the
implementation of the order of reinstatement is ministerial and
mandatory. This injunction or suspension of claims by legislative fiat
partakes of the nature of a restraining order that constitutes a legal
justification for respondent’s non-compliance with the reinstatement
order. Respondent’s failure to exercise the alternative options of
actual reinstatement and payroll reinstatement was thus justified.
Such being the case, respondent’s obligation to pay the salaries
pending appeal, as the normal effect of the non-exercise of the
options, did not attach. (JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO
vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009)
Retirement Coverage
56
plan. To be sure, there is no limitation by law that barred her from
continuing her work with UNILAB; even the above-quoted
Implementing Rules, in setting the retirement age at 60, deferred to
the parties’ agreement. Her employment terms under this renewed
employment are based on what she and the company agreed upon.
Whether these terms included renewed coverage in the retirement
plan is an evidentiary gap that could have been conclusively shown by
evidence of deductions of contributions to the plan after 1988. Two
indicators, however, tell us that no such coverage took place. The first
is that the terms of the retirement plan, before and after its 1992
amendment, continued to exclude those who have rendered 30 years
of service or have reached 60 years of age. Therefore, the plan could
not have covered her. The second is the absence of evidence of, or of
any demand for, any reimbursement of what Rivera would have paid
as contributions to the plan had her coverage and deductions
continued after 1988. Thus, we conclude that her renewed service did
not have the benefit of any retirement plan coverage. (JANUARIA A.
RIVERA v. UNITED LABORATORIES, INC.,G.R. No. 155639 April 22,
2009)
Seafarer
• Death Benefits
The general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of
the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he
died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the
employer may be exempted from liability if he can successfully prove
that the seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable
to his deliberate or willful act. In sum, respondents’ entitlement to any
death benefits depends on whether the evidence of the petitioners
suffices to prove that the deceased committed suicide; the burden of
proof rests on his employer. (GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES
CORP. and IMC SHIPPING CO., PTE. LTD. v. LEONILA SURIGAO for
Herself and In Behalf of Her Minor Children,Namely KAYE ANGELI and
MIRIAM,Both Surnamed SURIGAO G.R. No. 183646)
57
Security Guard
“Temporary off–detail”
58
continued to hire petitioner’s services, to replace respondent with
another. Petitioner suddenly prevented him from reporting on his
tour of duty at the bank on December 15, 2001 and had not
thereafter asked him to report for duty. (EAGLE STAR SECURITY
SERVICES, INC. v. BONIFACIO L. MIRANDO, G.R. No. 179512, July 30,
2009)
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that PNB may be held liable
for the debts of PNEI, petitioners still cannot proceed against the
Pantranco properties, the same being owned by PNB-Madecor,
notwithstanding the fact that PNB-Madecor was a subsidiary of
PNB. The general rule remains that PNB-Madecor has a personality
separate and distinct from PNB. The mere fact that a corporation
owns all of the stocks of another corporation, taken alone, is not
sufficient to justify their being treated as one entity. If used to
perform legitimate functions, a subsidiary’s separate existence
shall be respected, and the liability of the parent corporation as
well as the subsidiary will be confined to those arising in their
respective businesses. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), G.R. No. 170689, G.R. No. 170705)
Separation Pay
59
Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that “[a]n employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.” Since,
in the present case, reinstatement is no longer practicable or feasible,
separation pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. Moreover,
the awards of separation pay and backwages are not mutually
exclusive and both may be given to Tagulao and Serrano.
60
backwages. (Emphasis added) (NISSAN NORTH EDSA BALINTAWAK,
QUEZON CITY v. ANGELITO SERRANO, JR. and EDWIN TAGULAO, G.R.
No. 162538, June 4, 2009)
Social Justice
61
dependent upon the wage-earner. (ABELARDO P. ABEL v. PHILEX
MINING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 178976, July 31, 2009)
62
MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and SCANDIC SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED v.
ERIBERTO S. BULTRON, G.R. No. 185261, October 2, 2009)
Strike
• Illegal Strike
On the other hand, the Lustria decision involved the unfair labor
practices alleged by the union with particularity. In said case, Labor
Arbiter Lustria sided with the Union and found QCSC guilty of such
practices. As a consequence, the affected employees were granted
backwages and separation pay. The grant of backwages and
separation pay however was not premised on the declaration of the
illegality of the strike but on the finding that these affected employees
were constructively dismissed from work, as evidenced by the layoffs
effected by the company. As explained in the Lustria decision:
63
authorized cause and observance of due process. This
opinion finds support from the hard and cold fact of
absence of prior notice, report with the regional office of
the Department of Labor and Employment having
jurisdiction over the area and they remain under lay-off
status of employment. In conclusion, they are entitled to
backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as
prayed.
Substitution of Parties
Suspension
Thus, the CA and the NLRC correctly observed that the worst that
respondent committed was an inadvertent infraction. For that, the
extreme penalty of dismissal imposed on him by petitioners was
grossly disproportionate. Taking into account the managerial position
he held and the prior warning issued to him for failing to communicate
with his superiors, the penalty commensurate to the violation he
committed should be suspension for three months. The period of his
suspension is to be deducted from the period for which he is entitled to
backwages as awarded by the NLRC and affirmed by the CA. (GULF
AIR, JASSIM HINDRI ABDULLAH and RESTY AREVALO v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO J.C. REYES, G.R. No.
159687, April 24, 2009)
64
Teachers
• Employment Status
Termination of Employment
65
Just
Causes
• Neglect of Duty/Abandonment
Hence, we find it hard to believe that he will just abandon his job
after petitioners gave him a chance to continue working for them. We
uphold the following findings of the Court of Appeals that respondent
did not abandon his job:
66
In the instant case, respondent was informed by no less than his
immediate superior, the chief cook and by his brother that he was
being terminated. Like the Court of Appeals, the Court finds no reason
why these two would give respondent the false impression that he was
being dismissed, and in turn, the Court, like the appellate court again,
is inclined to believe that they were given prior instruction, or they at
least had prior knowledge of the termination. Moreover, as previously
discussed, the charge of abandonment does not square with the fact
that a week after respondent’s alleged dismissal, he filed a complaint
with the NLRC. (HARBORVIEW RESTAURANT v. REYNALDO LABRO, G.R.
No. 168273, April 30, 2009)
67
Furthermore, the Court agrees with respondents when they
argued in their petition filed with the CA that if an employee's aim is to
secure the benefits due him from his employer, abandonment would
surely be an illogical and impractical recourse, especially for simple
laborers such as respondent Aguilar. Considering the difficult times in
which our country is in it is illogical and even suicidal for an employee
like Aguilar to abandon his work, knowing fully well of the widespread
unemployment and underemployment problems as well as the
difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood, simply because his
employer rejected his demand for salary increase. Under the given
facts, no basis in reason exists for the petitioners' theory that Aguilar
abandoned his job. (BARON REPUBLIC THEATRICAL V. NORMITA P.
PERALTA et al, G.R. No. 170525, October 2, 2009)
• Gross Negligence
• Serious Misconduct
68
MARALIT v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R. No. 163788, August 24,
2009)
By sleeping on the job and leaving his work area without prior
authorization, Tomada did not merely disregard company rules.
Tomada, in effect, issued an open invitation for others to violate those
same company rules. Indeed, considering the presence of trainees in
the building and Tomada’s acts, Tomada failed to live up to his
company’s reasonable expectations. Tomada’s offenses cannot be
excused upon a plea of being a “first offense,” or have not resulted in
prejudice to the company in any way. No employer may rationally be
expected to continue in employment a person whose lack of morals,
respect and loyalty to his employer, regard for his employer’s rules,
and appreciation of the dignity and responsibility of his office, has so
plainly and completely been bared. (EDUARDO M. TOMADA, SR. v.
RFM CORPORATION-BAKERY FLOUR DIVISION and JOSE MARIA
CONCEPCION III, G.R. No. 163270, September 11, 2009)
o Simple Misconduct
69
employer, has the right to discipline its erring employees, exercise of
such right should be tempered with compassion and understanding.
The magnitude of the infraction committed by an employee must be
weighed and equated with the penalty prescribed and must be
commensurate thereto, in view of the gravity of the penalty of
dismissal or termination from the service. The employer should bear in
mind that in termination cases, what is at stake is not simply the
employee’s job or position but his very livelihood. (PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. INOCENCIO B. BERBANO,
JR., G.R. No. 165199, November 27, 2009)
Petitioner, in his Position Paper filed before the LA and in his Sagot
na Sinumpaang Salaysay, averred that sometime in August 2004,
Alido informed him of the illegal activities in the company
premises. But this fact was not reflected in his Partial Audit Report;
instead, petitioner made it appear therein that it was upon the
initiative of Lejos that he discovered the illegal activities only on
October 28, 2004, after Lejos already resigned from the company.
The basis for terminating the employment of petitioner actually
came from petitioner himself due to the substantial and
irreconcilable inconsistencies in the narration of facts in his Audit
Report and his Sagot na Sinumpaang Salaysay filed before the
company, and his pleadings before the lower tribunals and before
this Court. In sum, it cannot be denied that he withheld this
information from his immediate supervisor and from the company –
a clear breach of the trust and confidence the company had
reposed in him as one of its Auditors.( ROMEO N. VENTURA, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
GENUINO ICE CO., INC., and HECTOR GENUINO, G.R. No. 182570,
January 27, 2009
70
payment collection is the lifeblood of the cooperative. The collection
provides respondent PELCO I with the financial resources to continue
its operations. Respondent PELCO I cannot afford to continue in its
employ dishonest bill collectors.
71
(MA. WENELITA S. TIRAZONA, vs. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO- SERVICE
INC. (PET INC.) AND/OR KEN KUBOTA, MAMORU ONO and JUNICHI
HIROSE, G.R. No. 169712, January 20, 2009)
72
suffice. (GULF AIR, JASSIM HINDRI ABDULLAH and RESTY AREVALO v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO J.C. REYES,
G.R. No. 159687, April 24, 2009)
73
RAMON L. APOSTOL and BEN M. OPULENCIA, G.R. No. 164423, June 16,
2009)
o Positions of Trust
Authorized Causes
• Retrenchment
The proper view, therefore, is that the Sec. 1 criteria qualify the
factors of “seniority and needs of the company” in Sec. 5(c). Stated a
bit differently, Sec. 5(c) should be understood in the light of Sec. 1
which, to stress, provides seniority, efficiency and attitude, job
knowledge and potential, and attendance as among the factors that
should guide the company in choosing the employees to be laid-off or
kept. All other things being equal, a company would necessarily need
to retain those who had rendered dedicated and highly efficient service
and whose knowledge, attendance, and potential hew with company
standards. Any other measure would be senseless in the business
viewpoint. Accordingly, the merit rating used by MMPC based on Sec.
5 in conjunction with and as qualified by the factors provided under
Sec. 1 is fair and reasonable, and, to be sure, well within the
contemplation of the parties’ CBA. In fact, Alfredo, shorn of the
contention that the merit rating is against the CBA, has not shown any
arbitrariness on the part of MMPC in the evaluation, selection, and
retrenchment of employees. (ALFREDO A. MENDROS, JR v. MITSUBISHI
MOTORS PHILS. CORPORATION (MMPC), G.R. No. 169780, February 16,
2009)
Records do not show any criterion adopted or used by petitioner
in dismissing respondent. Respondent was terminated without
considering her seniority. Retrenchment scheme without taking
seniority into account rendered the retrenchment invalid. While
respondent was the third most senior employee among the 7
employees in petitioner's personnel department, she was retrenched
74
while her other co-employees junior than her were either retained in
the Personnel Department or were transferred to other positions in the
company. There was no showing that respondent was offered to be
transferred to other positions.(EMCOR INCORPORATED v. MA. LOURDES
D. SIENES, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009)
75
salary. Indeed, a job is more than the salary it carries. Payment of 30
days salary cannot compensate for the psychological effect or the
stigma of immediately finding one’s self laid off from work. It cannot
be a fully effective substitute for the 30 days’ written notice
requirement by law, especially when, as in this case, no notice was
given to the DOLE. Even as the letters of voluntary acceptance were
dated July 25, 1998, the notices of termination given on July 23, 1998
were effective the following day. In essence, respondents had already
been dismissed before they signed the letters of voluntary acceptance.
Clearly, petitioner deprived respondents of their right to statutory due
process. For this, we affirm the appellate court’s award of nominal
damages to respondents. But, consistent with our ruling in Agabon v.
National Labor Relations Commission, the amount of nominal damages
should be P30,000. We also sustain the award of attorney’s fees as it
is sanctioned by law. (MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC. v. ALAN G. DEMECILLO,
et al., G.R. No. 170669, February 4, 2009)
• Losses
Third, it bears to state that the aforequoted Art. 283 of the Code
uses the phrase “retrenchment to prevent losses.” The phrase
necessarily implies that retrenchment may be effected even in the
event only of imminent, impending, or expected losses. The employer
need not wait for substantial losses to materialize before exercising
ultimate and drastic option to prevent such losses. In the case at
bench, MMPC was already financially hemorrhaging before finally
resorting to retrenchment. (ALFREDO A. MENDROS, JR v. MITSUBISHI
MOTORS PHILS. CORPORATION (MMPC), G.R. No. 169780, February 16,
2009)
76
Unfair Labor Practice
Then came the Lustria decision, issued two (2) months later,
finding that QCSC had committed unfair labor practices against the
union and accordingly granting backwages and separation pay in favor
of 112 employees. The Lustria decision emanated from a complaint for
unfair labor practice against QCSC. Culled from the union’s pleadings
were the specific acts committed by QCSC, such as:
77
to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that
element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practices.
(GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS
vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY), THE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 178647)
78
. . ., but in the case at bar the facts and the evidence did not
establish even at least a rational basis why the union would wield a
strike based on alleged unfair labor practices it did not even bother to
substantiate during the conciliation proceedings. It is not enough that
the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor
practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie
showing to warrant such a belief. (RENITA DEL ROSARIO, et al., v.
MAKATI CINEMA SQUARE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 170014, July 3,
2009)
Voluntary Resignation
Work-related Disease
79
established. Petitioner Nisda was able to sufficiently prove, by
substantial evidence, that his Coronary Artery Disease was work-
related, given the arduous nature of his job that caused his disease or,
at least, aggravated any pre-existing condition he might have had.
Respondents Sea Serve and ADAMS, on the other hand, utterly failed
to refute the said connection. (CARLOS N. NISDA v. SEA SERVE
MARITIME AGENCY and KHALIFA A. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE
SERVICES, G. R. No. 179177, July 23, 2009)
80