2nd WEEK
2nd WEEK
2 and 3 of the
interisland carrier. These were commingled with similar
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM cargoes belonging to Evergreen Plantation and also Standfilco.
PLASTICS, INC., petitioners,
vs. On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the
SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT interisland carrier into the custody of the consignee. A later
SERVICES, INC. and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. survey conducted on July 8, 1977, upon the instance of the
plaintiff, shows the following:
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.
Of the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 25 or (2)6,
Carlo L. Aquino for Sweet Lines, Inc. supposed to contain 6,400 bags of Low Density Polyethylene
647 originally inside 160 pallets, there were delivered to the
consignee 5,413 bags in good order condition. The survey
REGALADO, J.: shows shortages, damages and losses to be as follows:
A maritime suit 1 was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein Petitioner Undelivered/Damaged bags as tallied during
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum discharge from vessel-173 bags; undelivered
Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against private respondents Sweet Lines, Inc. (SLI) and and damaged as noted and observed whilst
Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc. (DVAPSI), along with S.C.I. Line stored at the pier-699 bags; and
(The Shipping Corporation of India Limited) and F.E. Zuellig, Inc., as co- shortlanded-110 bags (Exhs. P and P-1).
defendants in the court a quo, seeking recovery of the cost of lost or damaged
shipment plus exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs allegedly due to
defendants' negligence, with the following factual backdrop yielded by the Of the 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene 631, the survey
findings of the court below and adopted by respondent court: conducted on the same day shows an actual delivery to the
consignee of only 507 bags in good order condition. Likewise
noted were the following losses, damages and shortages, to
It would appear that in or about March 1977, the vessel SS wit:
"VISHVA YASH" belonging to or operated by the foreign
common carrier, took on board at Baton Rouge, LA, two (2)
consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for Undelivered/damaged bags and tally sheets
transhipment to Davao City, consisting of 600 bags Low during discharge from vessel-17 bags.
Density Polyethylene 631 and another 6,400 bags Low Density
Polyethylene 647, both consigned to the order of Far East Undelivered and damaged as noted and
Bank and Trust Company of Manila, with arrival notice to observed whilst stored at the pier-66 bags;
Tagum Plastics, Inc., Madaum, Tagum, Davao City. Said Shortlanded-10 bags.
cargoes were covered, respectively, by Bills of Lading Nos. 6
and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier (Exhs. E and F). Therefore, of said shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally
The necessary packing or Weight List (Exhs. A and B), as well contained in 175 pallets, only a total of 5,820 bags were
as the Commercial Invoices (Exhs. C and D) accompanied the delivered to the consignee in good order condition, leaving a
shipment. The cargoes were likewise insured by the Tagum balance of 1,080 bags. Such loss from this particular shipment
Plastics Inc. with plaintiff Philippine American General is what any or all defendants may be answerable to (sic).
Insurance Co., Inc., (Exh. G).
As already stated, some bags were either shortlanded or were
In the course of time, the said vessel arrived at Manila and missing, and some of the 1,080 bags were torn, the contents
discharged its cargoes in the Port of Manila for transhipment to thereof partly spilled or were fully/partially emptied, but, worse,
Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign carrier awaited and the contents thereof contaminated with foreign matters and
made use of the services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet therefore could no longer serve their intended purpose. The
Love" owned and operated by defendant interisland carrier. position taken by the consignee was that even those bags
which still had some contents were considered as total losses
as the remaining contents were contaminated with foreign Parenthetically, we observe that herein petitioners are jointly pursuing this case,
matters and therefore did not (sic) longer serve the intended considering their common interest in the shipment subject of the present
purpose of the material. Each bag was valued, taking into controversy, to obviate any question as to who the real party in interest is and to
account the customs duties and other taxes paid as well as protect their respective rights as insurer and insured. In any case, there is no
charges and the conversion value then of a dollar to the peso, impediment to the legal standing of Petitioner Philamgen, even if it alone were to
at P110.28 per bag (see Exhs. L and L-1 M and O). 2 sue herein private respondents in its own capacity as insurer, it having been
subrogated to all rights of recovery for loss of or damage to the shipment insured
Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners, as under its Marine Risk Note No. 438734 dated March 31, 1977 8 in view of the full
plaintiffs, and defendants S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment settlement of the claim thereunder as evidenced by the subrogation
of P532.65 in settlement of the claim against them. Whereupon, the trial court in receipt 9 issued in its favor by Far East Bank and Trust Co., Davao Branch, for
its order of August 12, 1981 3 granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss grounded on the account of petitioner TPI.
said amicable settlement and the case as to S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig was
consequently "dismissed with prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs." Upon payment of the loss covered by the policy, the insurer's entitlement to
subrogation pro tanto, being of the highest equity, equips it with a cause of action
The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners on this against a third party in case of contractual breach. 10 Further, the insurer's
dispositive portion: subrogatory right to sue for recovery under the bill of lading in case of loss of or
damage to the cargo is jurisprudentially upheld. 11 However, if an insurer, in the
exercise of its subrogatory right, may proceed against the erring carrier and for
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the all intents and purposes stands in the place and in substitution of the
plaintiff Philippine General American Insurance Company Inc. consignee, a fortiori such insurer is presumed to know and is just as bound by
and against the remaining defendants, Sweet Lines Inc. and the contractual terms under the bill of lading as the insured.
Davao Veterans Arrastre Inc. as follows:
On the first issue, petitioners contend that it was error for the Court of Appeals to
Defendant Sweet Lines, Inc. is ordered to pay said plaintiff the reverse the appealed decision on the supposed ground of prescription when SLI
sum of P34,902.00, with legal interest thereon from date of failed to adduce any evidence in support thereof and that the bills of lading said
extrajudicial demand on April 28, 1978 (Exh. M) until fully paid; to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and for instituting a court action
against the carrier were never offered in evidence. Considering that the existence
Defendant Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao Veterans Arrastre and and tenor of this stipulation on the aforesaid periods have allegedly not been
(Port) Services Inc. are directed to pay jointly and severally, established, petitioners maintain that it is inconceivable how they can possibly
the plaintiff the sum of P49,747.55, with legal interest thereon comply therewith. 12 In refutation, SLI avers that it is standard practice in its
from April 28, 1978 until fully paid; operations to issue bills of lading for shipments entrusted to it for carriage and
that it in fact issued bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26 therefor with
Each of said defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the proof of their existence manifest in the records of the case. 13 For its part,
additional sum of P5,000 is reimbursable attorney's fees and DVAPSI insists on the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint as to it due to
other litigation expenses; petitioners' failure to prove its direct responsibility for the loss of and/or damage
to the cargo. 14
xxx xxx xxx Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of Appeals, precisely
establish the stage in the course of the shipment when the goods were lost,
Q Mr. Witness, you said that you processed destroyed or damaged. What can only be inferred from the factual findings of the
and investigated the claim involving the trial court is that by the time the cargo was discharged to DVAPSI, loss or
shipment in question. Is it not a fact that in damage had already occurred and that the same could not have possibly
your processing and investigation you occurred while the same was in the custody of DVAPSI, as demonstrated by the
considered how the shipment was observations of the trial court quoted at the start of this opinion.
transported? Where the losses could have
occurred and what is the extent of the ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and
respective responsibilities of the bailees the dismissal of the complaint in the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court
and/or carriers involved? of Appeals in its challenged judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated, among others, that the The appellate court determined that (t)he intention to donate half of the disputed
property was originally covered by OCT No. 352 which was cancelled by TCT No. property to appellees predecessors can be gleaned from the disparity of technical
44481.They also agreed that the issues are: (1) whether or not there was a variation in the descriptions appearing in the title (OCT No. 352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia
description of the property subject of the private deed of donation and OCT No. 352; (2) Gante and in the deed of donation propter nuptias executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of
whether or not respondents had acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 appellees predecessors.[24]
by acquisitive prescription; (3) whether or not the transfer of the whole property covered
by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the registration of the private deed of donation The CA based its conclusion on the disparity of the following technical
notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid; (4) whether or not respondents descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and the deed of donation, to wit:
are entitled to damages; and (5) whether or not TCT No. 44481 is valid.[16]
The court below described the property covered by OCT No.
RTC Decision 352 as follows:
After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el
Doronio (defendants). It concluded that the parties admitted the identity of the land which municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con
they all occupy;[17] that a title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con
by adverse, open and notorious possession or by prescription; [18] that the deed of donation propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro
in consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence, it led to the Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de Geminiano
eventual issuance of TCT No. 44481 in the names of said parents;[19] and that respondent Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis;
heirs of Fortunato Doronio (plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as they are not the midiendo una extension superficial mil ciento
rightful owners of the portion of the property they are claiming. [20] cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.
The RTC disposed of the case, thus: On the other hand, the property donated to appellees
predecessors was described in the deed of donation as:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
renders judgment DISMISSING the herein Complaint filed by Fourth A piece of residential land located in the
plaintiffs against defendants.[21] barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the
area is bounded on the north by Gabriel
Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio;
on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the
Disagreeing with the judgment of the RTC, respondents appealed to the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said
CA. They argued that the trial court erred in not finding that respondents predecessor-in- land is a house of light materials also a part of the
interest acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or dowry. Value 200.00.[25] (Emphasis ours)
intestate succession; that the deed of donation dated April 26, 1919 was null and void; that
assuming that the deed of donation was valid, only one-half of the property was actually Taking note that the boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino Doronio and
donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and that respondents acquired ownership Veronica Pico differ from the boundaries of the land owned by spouses Simeon Doronio
of the other half portion of the property by acquisitive prescription. [22]
and Cornelia Gante, the CA concluded that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante
donated only half of the property covered by OCT No. 352. [26] Our Ruling
Regarding the allegation of petitioners that OCT No. 352 is inadmissible in OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although Not
evidence, the CA pointed out that, while the OCT is written in the Spanish language, this Translated into English or Filipino Is
document already forms part of the records of this case for failure of appellees to interpose Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection
a timely objection when it was offered as evidence in the proceedings a quo. It is a well-
settled rule that any objection to the admissibility of such evidence not raised will be Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence on the ground
considered waived and said evidence will have to form part of the records of the case as that it is written in Spanish language. They posit that (d)ocumentary evidence in an
competent and admitted evidence.[27] unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English or Filipino.[30]
The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners
predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in an
predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. On this aspect, the CA reasoned out: unofficial language must be accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino as a
prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at the trial
Moreover, We find the donation of the entire property in favor of to enable the court, where a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the
appellees predecessors invalid as it impairs the legitime of appellants issue.[31] Where such document, not so accompanied with a translation in English or
predecessor. Article 961 of the Civil Code is explicit. In default of Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must
testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, x x x, in the legitimate be presumed that the language in which the document is written is understood by all, and
x x x relatives of the deceased, x x x. As Spouses Simeon Doronio and the document is admissible in evidence.[32]
Cornelia Gante died intestate, their property shall pass to their lawful
heirs, namely: Fortunato and Marcelino Doronio. Donating the entire Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides:
property to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico and excluding
another heir, Fortunato, tantamounts to divesting the latter of his SECTION 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered
rightful share in his parents inheritance. Besides, a persons prerogative orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that
he cannot give by donation more than what he can give by will (Article Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor
what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is shall become reasonably apparent.
reducible to the extent of such excess.[28]
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within
Petitioners were not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is
under Rule 45. allowed by the court.
Issues In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
(Emphasis ours)
Petitioners now contend that the CA erred in:
Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence on
1. DECLARING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL time, it is now too late in the day for them to question its admissibility. The rule is that
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352 DESPITE OF LACK OF evidence not objected may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court
TRANSLATION THEREOF. in arriving at its judgment.[33] This is true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible
and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. [34]
2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORS- As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of
IN-INTEREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANTS. Exhibit A, that is, OCT No. 352 in their comment[35] on respondents formal offer of
documentary evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged, among others, that
3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for the purpose they are offered
DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS because these exhibits being public and official documents are the best evidence of
PREMATURE, AND THUS IT IS that they contain and not for what a party would like it to prove.[36] Said evidence was
ILLEGAL AND UNPROCEDURAL.[29] admitted by the RTC.[37] Once admitted without objection, even though not admissible
under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it.[38] Consequently, the evidence that expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
was not objected to became property of the case, and all parties to the case are considered generally upon an application or motion.
amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the said evidence. [39]
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in
Issues on Impairment of Legitime Remedial Law expounds further:
Should Be Threshed Out in a Special
Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for It may accordingly be stated generally
Reconveyance and Damages that actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary
On the other hand, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the rules and provisions relating to actions at law or
impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the suits in equity, and that special proceedings
settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed include those proceedings which are not ordinary
upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of according to some special mode as in the case of
legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate. [40] proceedings commenced without summons and
prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters characteristics of ordinary actions x x x. A special
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a
made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings distinct and independent proceeding for particular
require the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.[41] relief, such as may be instituted independently of
a pending action, by petition or motion upon
As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:[42] notice.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and
defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise: annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
x x x a) A civil action is one by which a advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature
party sues another for the enforcement or of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
of a wrong.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of
A civil action may either be ordinary or the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
special. Both are governed by the rules for probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules
prescribed for a special civil action. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court,
questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the
xxxx deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or heir.
a particular fact.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court
distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the estate
formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner proceedings.
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal
remedies according to definite established rules. The term special Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case,
proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No.
71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly
our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, affected by the contract.[50]
under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55, was
not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon Consequently, although respondents are not parties in the deed of donation, they
the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del can set up its nullity because they are directly affected by the same. [51] The subject of the
Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher. deed being the land they are occupying, its enforcement will definitely affect them.
We likewise find merit in petitioners contention that before any conclusion about Petitioners cannot also use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No.
the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps U-920[52] as a shield against the verification of the validity of the deed of
be taken first.[43] The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all donation.According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting of title.[53] In
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of
the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the Court, which provides:
partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be
established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested
the legitimes.[44] under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance,
Declaration of Validity of Donation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action to determine
Can Be Challenged by an Interested any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or
Party Not Impleaded in Petition for statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
Quieting of Title or Declaratory Relief
or Where There is No Res Judicata.
Moreover, This Court Can Consider An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title
a Factual Matter or Unassigned Error to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
in the Interest of Substantial Justice. ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought
under this rule.
Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the determination of validity of the deed of
donation on the ground that (1) it has been impliedly admitted by respondents; (2) it has SECTION 2. Parties. All persons shall be made parties
already been determined with finality by the RTC in Petition Case No. U-920; or (3) the who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
only issue in an action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land.[45] declaration; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided
in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
The validity of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of action. (Emphasis ours)
petitioners predecessors was one of the issues in this case before the lower courts. The pre-
trial order[46] of the RTC stated that one of the issues before it is (w)hether or not the However, respondents were not made parties in the said Petition Case No. U-
transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the private deed of 920. Worse, instead of issuing summons to interested parties, the RTC merely allowed the
donation notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid. Before the CA, one posting of notices on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of
of the errors assigned by respondents is that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan. As pointed out by the CA, citing the ruling of the RTC:
FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE DEED OF DONATION DATED APRIL 26,
1919 WAS NULL AND VOID.[47] x x x In the said case or Petition No. U-920, notices were posted on the
bulletin boards of barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and
The issue of the validity of donation is likewise brought to Us by petitioners as Lingayen, Pangasinan, so that there was a notice to the whole world
they stated in their Memorandum[48] that one of the issues to be resolved is regarding the and during the initial hearing and/or hearings, no one interposed
alleged fact that THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE objection thereto.[54]
DONATION INVALID. We are thus poised to inspect the deed of donation and to
determine its validity. Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly
speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings
We cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondents may no longer question the are characterized as quasi in rem.[55] The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only
validity of the deed of donation on the ground that they already impliedly admitted between the parties.[56] Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case
it. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the said case.
beginning. The right to set up the defense of its illegality cannot be waived.[49] The right to
set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in the
The rules on quieting of title[57] expressly provide that any declaration in a suit unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which the
to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be
considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error. [69]
Although We confirm here the invalidity of the deed of donation and of its
resulting TCT No. 44481, the controversy between the parties is yet to be fully settled. The
issues as to who truly are the present owners of the property and what is the extent of their
ownership remain unresolved. The same may be properly threshed out in the settlement of
the estates of the registered owners of the property, namely: spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante.
(1) Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners
predecessors NULL AND VOID; and
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to:
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955 The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of
exclusion, but again the motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the review and
vs. annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the
THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban
Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO without prior proof of conspiracy.
PANGANIBAN, respondents.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman, City ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged
Attorney Pedro R. Revilla and Assistant City Attorney Julian E. Lustre for confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling
petitioner. was made.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and Rufino Navarro
for respondents. Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence
REYES, J.B.L., J.: against him.
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly
22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be
unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one given in evidence against him.
Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession
prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the progress of the trial on may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as
May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being
Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41;
defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have
Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession been admitted as such.
on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other
accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered
objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that:
be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of
such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
Thereafter, according to the transcript, the following remarks were made: during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
FISCAL LUSTRE:
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the
May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of pendency of the unlawful enterprises("during its existence") and in furtherance of
the confession of Consunji as against the accused Consunji himself? its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy
had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs.
COURT: Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52
Phil., 985).
That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court
that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy
thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the
required by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9 alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even
been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of
identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. For all we remembered that in the heat of the battle over which the presides, a
know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the
between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown.
in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out,
confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy. possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the
case for a new trial, — a step which this Court is always very loath to
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first
not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is
upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the
Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final
of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from
latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is
the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has all
Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the
confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where
object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the
objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer
(Marcella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1). appeal.
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji
individual extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the Court below is
establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the confessions in directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this opinion. Costs
essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.
been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower
Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as
against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to
establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the
record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate,
in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be
able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under
the rules of evidence, should be excluded.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of
Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:
If petitioner was genuinely concerned with the ends of justice being served, her
actuations should have been otherwise. Instead, she attempted to capitalize on a
mere technicality to have the estafa case against her dismissed. 11 But even
assuming that petitioner's objection was timely, it was at best pointless and
superfluous. For there is no debating the fact that the testimony of complaining
witness is relevant and material in the criminal prosecution of petitioner for
estafa. It is inconceivable that a situation could exist wherein an offended party's
testimony is immaterial in a criminal proceeding. Consequently, even if the offer
was belatedly made by the prosecution, there is no reason for the testimony to
be expunged from the record. On the contrary, the unoffered oral evidence must
be admitted if only to satisfy the court's sense of justice and fairness and to
stress that substantial justice may not be denied merely on the ground of
technicality. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Br. 35, denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss (by way of demurrer to evidence) is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86062 June 6, 1990 In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court declared that it
"had resolved the issue of whether the accused has civil obligation to ITI on the
INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC., petitioner, basis of the admissibility in evidence of the xerox copies of the airway bills." 5
vs.
RUFO AVILES and JOSEPHINE AVILES, respondents. Right or wrong, the acquittal on the merits of the accused can no longer be the
Balane, Barican, Cruz, Alampay Law Office for petitioner. subject of an appeal under the double jeopardy rule. However, the petitioner
Francisco G. Mendoza private respondents. seeks to press the civil liability of the private respondents, on the ground that the
dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for the recovery of the
CRUZ, J.: amount. More to the point, ITI argues that the evidence of the airways bills
should not have been rejected and that it had sufficiently established the
indebtedness of the private respondents to it.
This case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules on the
admissibility of documentary evidence and the viability. of a civil action for
damages arising from the same acts imputed to the defendant in a criminal The Court of Appeals 6 affirmed, the decision of the trial court in toto, adding that
action where he has been acquitted. the existing record spoken of in Section 2 (e) and (d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court must be in the custody, of a public officer only. It also declared that:
In the information filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, the private
respondents herein, it was alleged that being then sub-agents of Interpacific Since no evidence of civil liability was presented, no necessity
Transit, Inc. and as such enjoying its trust and confidence, they collected from its existed on the part of the private respondents to present
various clients payments for airway bills in the amount of P204,030.66 which, evidence of payment of an obligation which was not shown to
instead of remitting it to their principal, they unlawfully converted to their own exist.
personal use and benefit. 1
The petitioner now asks this Court to annul that judgment as contrary to law and
At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly the facts established at the As in the courts below, it is insisting on the
received by the accused for which they had not rendered proper accounting. This admissibility of its evidence to prove the civil liability of the private respondents.
was done in, the course of the direct examination of one of the prosecution
witnesses. 2 The defense objected to their presentation, invoking the best We agree with the petitioner. The certified photocopies of the airway bills should
evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills in have been considered.
due time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court allowed the marking of the said
documents a s Exhibits "B" to "OO." The e prosecution n did submit the original In assessing this evidence, the lower courts confined themselves to the best
airway bills nor did it prove their loss to justify their substitution with secondary evidence rule and the nature of the documents being presented, which they held
evidence. Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the said bills formally did not come under any of the exceptions to the rule. There is no question that
were offered, 3 in evidence, the defense interposed no objection. the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were not admissible
unless there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and neither were the
In acquitting the accused, Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial Court of other exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The trouble is that in rejecting
Makati rejected the agency theory of the prosecution and held that the these copies under Rule 130, Section 2, the respondent court disregarded an
relationship between the petitioner and Rufo Aviles was that of creditor and equally important principle long observed in our trial courts and amply supported
debtor only. "Under such relationship,' it declared, "the outstanding account, if by jurisprudence.
any, of the accused in favor of ITI would be in the nature of an indebtedness, the
non- payment of which does not Constitute estafa." 4 This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time
it is formally offered. as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is
The court' also held that the certified photocopies of the airway by were not premature.
admissible under the rule that "there can be no evidence of a writing the content
of which is the subject of inquiry other' than the writing itself." Loss of the It is instructive at this paint to make a distinction between Identification of
originals had not been proved to justify the exception to the rule as one of the documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the
prosecution witness had testified that they were still in the ITI bodega. Neither course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence an an
had it been shown that the originals had been "recorded in an existing record a exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not before.
certified copy of which is made evidence by law." The mere fact that a particular document is Identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. repeat, no objection was really made in the case before us because it was not
The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes this will advance its cause, made at the proper time.
and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, the trial court
is, under Rule 132, Section 35, not authorized to consider it. It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection, this
time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is curious that it
Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally did not, especially so since the objections to the formal offer of exhibits was
offered, not earlier. The Identification of the document before it is marked as an made in writing. In fact, the defense filed no objection at all not only to the
exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the photocopies but to all the other exhibits of the prosecution.
party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and marking of the document is
not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not objected to
evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its
formally offered as an exhibit. judgment. 9 This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and
would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.
In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the
private respondents as secondary evidence only when they, were being The records certainly would have been the, beet proof of such
Identified for marking by the prosecution. They were nevertheless marked as former conviction. The certificate was not the best proof. There
exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted later. it seems to be no justification for the presentation of proof of a
is true that the originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, character. ... Under an objection upon the ground that the said
the defense did not object when the exhibits as previously marked were formally certificate was not the best proof, it should have been rejected.
offered in evidence. And these were subsequently admitted by the trial court. 7 Once admitted, however, without objection, even though not
admissible under an objection, we are not inclined now to
In People v. Teodoro, 8 a document being Identified by a prosecution witness reject it. If the defendant had opportunely presented an
was objected to as merely secondary, whereupon the trial judge ordered the objection to the admissibility of said certificate, no doubt the
testimony stricken out. This Court, in holding the objection to be premature, said: prosecution would have presented the best proof upon the
questions to which said certificate relates. 10
It must be noted that the Fiscal was only Identifying the official
records of service of the defendant preparatory to introducing (It) is universally accepted that when secondary or incompetent
them as evidence. ... The time for the presentation of the evidence is presented and accepted without any objection on
records had not yet come; presentation was to be made after the part of the other party, the latter is bound thereby and the
their Identification. For what purpose and to what end the court is obliged to grant it the probatory value it deserves. 11
Fiscal would introduce them as evidence was not yet stated or
disclosed. ... The objection of counsel for the defendant was, We hold therefore that it was erroneous for the lower courts to reject the
therefore, premature, especially as the Fiscal had not yet photocopies of the airway bills to prove the liability of the private respondents to
stated for what purpose he would introduce the said records. ... the petitioner. While we may agree that there was really no criminal liability that
could attach to them because they had no fiduciary relationship with ITI, the
The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is rejected evidence sufficiently established their indebtedness to the petitioner.
offered. (Emphasis supplied). Hence, we must reverse the ruling below that "on account of the inadmissibility of
the prosecution's Exhibits 'B' and 'OO', coupled with the denial made by the
The objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bins while they accused, there appears to be no concrete proof of such accountability."
were being Identified and marked as exhibits did not constitute the objection it
should have made when the exhibits were formally offered in evidence by the Accoording to Rule 120, Section 2, of the Rules of Court:
prosecution. No valid and timely objection was made at that time. And it is no
argument to say that the earlier objection should be considered a continuing In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act
objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132, for that provision obviously refers to a single from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
objection to a class of evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the
offered is considered to encompass the rest of the evidence. The presumption is, accused in favor of the offended party.
of course, that there was an offer and a seasonable objection thereto. But, to
With the admission of such exhibits pursuant to the ruling above made, we find
that there is concrete proof of the defendant's accountability. More than this, we
also disbelieve the evidence of the private respondents that the said airway bills
had been paid for. The evidence consists only of check stubs corresponding to
payments allegedly made by the accused to the ITI, and we find this insufficient.
As it is Aviles who has alleged payment, it is for him to prove that allegation. He
did not produce any receipt of such payment. He said that the cancelled payment
checks had been lost and relied merely on the check stubs, which are self-
serving. The prosecution correctly stressed in its motion for reconsideration that
the accused could have easily secured a certification from the bank that the
checks allegedly issued to ITI had been honored. No such certification was
presented. In short, the private respondents failed to establish their allegation
that payment for the airway bills delivered to them had been duly remitted to ITI.
By the same token, we find that remand of this case to, the trial court for further
hearings would be a needless waste of time and effort to the prejudice of the
speedy administration of justice. Applying the above ruling, we hereby declare
therefore, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the trial as reflected in the
records before us, that the private respondents are liable to the petitioner in the
sum of P204,030.66, representing the cost of the airway bills.
SO ORDERED.