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valor of ignorance. Nor did he retreat from, such an writer called attention to “the time-honored usage of
indefensible stand in the face of his being informed the Court that minute resolutions, summons and
that what the Clerk did was solely in accordance with processes of the Court as well as official actions of the
what was previously decided by this Court, which Chief Justice, upon being duly adopted and recorded
certainly will not tolerate, anybody else, much less a are transmitted to the interested parties by and upon
subordinate, to speak and act for itself. This gross the signature of the Clerk of Court who is duly
disrespect shown to this Court has no justification.” authorized to do so. With the thousands of resolutions
In the 1970 case of In re: Almacen , the now Chief
2
approved monthly by the Court, it would unduly tax
Justice again clarified for all concerned the nature of the time and attention of the Chief Justice and
members of the Court to the prejudice of the
administration of justice if all such papers, other than The failure of counsel to appear at the hearing is
decisions, could be released only upon their own not a direct but an indirect contempt. (People vs.
signatures. The situation is analogous to Gagui, 2 SCRA 752).
administrative decisions signed by the Executive Threats and disrespectful language in a pleading
Secretary ‘by authority of the President,’ which filed in court constitutes direct contempt (Paragas vs.
decisions are given full faith and credit by our courts Cruz, 14 SCRA 809).
as decisions of the President, ‘unless disapproved or It is true that a judge may punish a party for
reprobated by the Chief Executive.’ ” refusing to follow the order of the court, but if the
Notes.—A charge of contempt will not prosper if order is outside the court’s jurisdiction, it is void.
based solely on the order of the judge that the lawyer (Gosiengfiao vs. Yatco, 1 SCRA 358.)
acted with provoking gestures and exhibited a The power to punish for contempt should be
threatening attitude, which are at best generalities exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive
and conclusions of law. (Delgra, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 31 principle and on the corrective rather than retaliatory
SCRA 237). idea of punishment. (People vs. Estenzo, 64 SCRA
A contempt charge in the Supreme Court raising 211; Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42.)
issues involving questions of fact may be referred to The Supreme Court upon finding a lawyer guilty of
the lower court for rehearing and recommendation. indirect contempt for using disrespectful and offensive
(Estrada vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 6 SCRA 12). language in the pleadings, may recommend to the
Contempt is premature where, although the Solicitor General the disbarment or suspension of the
administrator failed to deposit funds, they were duly barrister preparing, the contemptuous pleadings.
accounted for. (Go vs. Go Tuana, 6 SCRA 741). (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31
In unfounded charge of partiality made in a SCRA 1.).
pleading against a judge constitutes direct contempt
and, hence, no formal charge is necessary. Malolos vs.
Reyes, 1 SCRA 559).
No. L-27072. January 9, 1970. agency to advance the ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
AL., petitioners, vs. HON.GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.” Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is
Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago,
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and attainment of the liberties of the people.” Thus, it has been
Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling, and said of a lawyer that “as an officer, of the court, it is his
Morton F. Meads. sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
Legal ethics; Attorneys; Legal duties of attorneys; Duty of
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.”
an attorney to the courts.—Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Disrespectful language in
Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out the duty of
pleadings; Case at bar.—The language of attorney in his
an attorney to the courts—observe and maintain the respect
motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first
as a “civilized, democratic tribunal,” but by innuendo would
canon of legal ethics pronounces that “it is the duty of the
suggest that it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing
lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
the Court’s decision as “false, erroneous and illegal” and
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
accusing two justices for being interested in the decision of
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.”
the case without any basis in fact; asking the other
That same canon makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
members of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or
lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and
benefits received from any of the petitioners including the
clamor. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct
President—constitute disrespectful language to the Court.
that should be with all good fidelity to the courts. The duty
It undermines and degrades the administration of justice.
of an attorney to the courts “can only be maintained by
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That language is
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial
necessary for the defense of client is no justification,—It ill
office which he is bound to uphold.”
behooves an attorney to justify his disrespectful language
Same; Same; Same; Same; Duty not to promote distrust
with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of
in the administration of justice.—A lawyer is an officer of
his client. A client’s cause does not permit an attorney to
the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or
cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must offended parties in a contempt case. The Supreme Court
always keep in perspective the thought that “since lawyers may motu proprio start proceedings of this Nature. For,
are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, inherent in courts is the power “to control, in furtherance of
their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all
to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’ success other persons in any manner connected with a case before
is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must it, in every manner appertaining thereto.” [Sec. 5(d), Rule
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.” 185, Rules of Court]
Same; Same; Same; Duty to abstain from offensive Same; Same; Sane; Duty not to mislead the judge; Use of
personality against a party or witness.—It has been said distorted quotation.—Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal
that “a lawyer’s language should be dignified in keeping Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with
with the dignity of the legal profession.” It is the lawyer’s candor and fairness, and specifically states that “it is not
duty as a member of the Bar “to abstain from an offensive candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote.” In
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor this case, deliberately misquoted Section 1, Rule 51 by
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the intentionally omitting the qualification which should not
justice of the cause with which he is charged.” In this case, have been done.
it was necessary for attorney to accuse petitioners of having Same; Same; Same; Duty to counsel or maintain such
made “false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate actions or proceedings only as appear to be just.—A lawyer
attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur”; to has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client
describe a proposition of petitioners as “corrupt on its face,” takes be within his knowledge and responsibility. Canon 16
laying bare “the immoral and arrogant attitude of the of the Canons of Legal Ethics should remind a lawyer that
petitioners”; and to charge petitioners with “a lawyer should be within his knowledge and
opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only responsibility.” Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same should remind a lawyer that “a lawyer should use his best
case. efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing
Same; Same; Same; Same; Defense that Solicitor those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do,
General or his assistants may not be considered offended particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts,
parties in the case.—It is not a defense to say that the judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client
Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered
persists in such wrong doing the lawyer should terminate difference; it erects no shield against the charge of indirect
their relation.” contempt.
Remedial law; Special civil actions; Contempt; Indirect Same; Same; Same; Same; Misbehaviour as an officer of
contempt; Improper conduct tending to degrade the court in the performance of his official duties and
administration of justice; Use of improper language in improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
motion to inhibit.—Counsel was held guilty of indirect justice; Use of disrespectful language in pleadings.—Counsel
contempt for use of the following language in his motion to was held guilty of indirect contempt under Section 3(a),
inhibit, tending to degrade the administration of justice: Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for misbehavior as an officer
calling petitioners as “vulturous executives” and speaking of of the court in the performance of his official duties and
the Supreme Court as a “civilized, democratic tribunal,” but under Section 3(d) of the same rule, for improper conduct
by innuendo would suggest that it is not; categorizing its tending to degrade the administration of justice for the use
decision of July 31, 1968 as “false, erroneous and illegal” in of the following language in his pleadings; accusing
a presumptuous manner; warning the Court that loss of petitioners of having made “false, ridiculous and wild
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
be allowed to happen in our country “although the process against MacArthur”; describing such efforts as “scatter-shot
has already begun”; mentioning “unjudicial prejudice” desperation” and a proposition of petitioners as “corrupt on
against respondent and “unjudicial favoritism” for its face”, laying bare “the immoral and arrogant attitude of
petitioners, and that “any other justices who have received the petitioners”; and charging petitioners with
favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the opportunistically changing their claim and stories not only
petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same
agents or principals, including the President” should inhibit case.
themselves, which accusations have no basis in fact and in Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that offensive statements
law. were made to Solicitor General or his assistants who may
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Effect of not be considered offended parties in the case.—It is no
voluntarily deleting paragraph 6 which contained, defense to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants
disrespectful language.—The deletion of paragraph 6 which may not be considered offended parties in this case. The
contained disrespectful language did not erase the fact that Court may motu proprio start proceedings for contempt.
it has been made. It does not make much of a distinguishing For, inherent in courts is the power “to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, DISCIPLINARY ACTION in the Supreme Court.
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a Contempt.
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.”
(Section 5[d] Rule 135, Rules of Court). The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Lifting a provision of law out RESOLUTION *
MacArthur’s third motion for reconsideration signed The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968—
by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and after judgment herein was rendered—and signed by
purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for
and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and
General points out, contain the following statements: Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to
1. “d.xxx; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked inhibit themselves from considering, judging and
the applicable law due to the misrepresentation resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof
and obfuscation of the petitioners’ counsel.’ retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges
“[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice
Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is 1. “(a)said decision is in violation of the law, which
the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal law has not been declared unconstitutional.
decision dated January 31, 1968” and the ex 2. (b)said decision ignores totally the applicable
parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above- law in the above-entitled case.
entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and 3. (c)said decision deprives respondent of due
predetermining this case even before the joining of an process of law and the right to adduce evidence
issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states as is the procedure in all previous cases of this
“[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto nature.
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in 4. (d)due course was given to the unfounded
the Philippine Government by the President a short certiorari in the first place when the appeal
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is
in this case.” The appointment referred to was as neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. a wholesome development of the law—but only
The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial served to delay respondent for the benefit of the
ethics, and makes a number of side comments favored party.
projecting what is claimed to be the patent 5. (e)the preliminary injunction issued herein did
wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It not maintain the status quo but destroyed it,
enumerates “incidents” which, according to the and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it
motion, brought about respondent MacArthur’s belief was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at
that “unjudicial prejudice” had been caused it and all.
that there was “unjudicial favoritism” in favor of 6. (f)there are misstatements and
“petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored misrepresentations in the said decision which
party directly benefited by the said decision.” The the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to
“incidents” cited are as follows: correct.
7. (g)the two main issues in the said decision were “Chief Justice” to “Supreme Court” appearing on line
decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago
main issue ‘right to reject any or all bids’ is also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said
being treated on a double standard basis by the motion, which in full reads:
Honorable Supreme Court. “6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial
authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
8. (h)the fact that respondent believes that the matters that come before them, and that no matter what the
Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto
greater understanding than the said decision eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that
any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial
manifests. prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue.
9. (i)the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge
a motion to hold himself in contempt of court—seemingly totally oblivious
two hundred million dollars by said decision— or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved—and also
without an effort by the Honorable Supreme of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal
Court to learn all the facts through presentation case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases.
What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty?
through the trial court, which is elementary.” Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it
that many of our government officials are just amoral?”
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago,
again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and And, in addition, he attempted to explain further sub-
Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed paragraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof. It was
out to this Court that the statements specified by the on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, filed his compliance with this Court’s resolution of
could be defended, or were comments legitimate and November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion
justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of
defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed his exclusive making and that he alone should be held
that if MacArthur’s attorney could not plead such responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his
thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process explanations made on November 21, 1968.
of law. However, counsel sought to change the words
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that
explanations by saying that he already deleted those statements lifted out of context would indeed be
paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule
from his rough draft but that it was still included 138, had been violated.
through inadvertence. On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred
counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction
to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief over the charge against him because it is one of civil
Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit contempt against a party and the charge is originally
themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original cognizable by the Court of First Instance under
motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He
judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking also stressed that said charge was not signed by an
the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. “offended party or witness”, as required by law; and
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not
stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in stand in the stead of an “offended party or witness.”
withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his
lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified
agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he
justices. According to him, “[t]he present steps (sic) manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm
now being taken is against counsel’s upbringing and in this case was neither authorized nor consented to
judicial conscience.” by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967,
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto’s return of November 29, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur’s behalf, offered
1968, he took pains to say that the questioned to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads
statements he made were also taken out of context inquired from him whether he could appear in this
and were necessary for the defense of his client case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside
his professional competence and referred Meads to court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised,
another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the and contained the following paragraphs:
offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he “4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders
agreed to terminate their previous retainer qf the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the
agreement; that he had not participated in any above-entitled case—which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of
manner in the preparation or authorship of any Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: ‘Justices; who may take part—x
x x x, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
pleading or any other document in connection with argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication x x x.’ This
this case. requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the
member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
any of the court papers subject of our November 21,
x x x
1968 order; claimed that he was on six months’ leave
of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as 6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company
abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine
one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
his permission to have his name included as counsel Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required
in all of MacArthur’s pleadings in this case (L-27072), by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and
even while he was on leave of absence. confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
March 3, 1969. respondent’s proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government
without either compensation or due process of law—and invoking the
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits
14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.”
special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth
motion for reconsideration without express leave of This elicited another resolution from this Court on
July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling “to
show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice
hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads,
court.” should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanito M. Caling filed his before August 16, 1969; and xxx to direct that the
return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion three, Atty. Juanito M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L.
for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear
Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at
him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings
motion; that he turned down said request twice on the against all of them will be heard by this Court.”
ground that he did not know anything about the case, On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave
much less the truth of the allegations stated in the his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty.
motion; that “the allegations in said motion were Caling’s statement that he (Santiago) convinced
subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to
together with the background of the case involved by Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby
Meads”; that upon assurance that there was nothing who could help him file another motion for
wrong with the motion be was persuaded in good faith reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty.
to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and Caling; he thereupon accompanied Meads to Caling,
the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to told Caling of Meads’ desire and left Meads with
him especially the oral argument allegedly made in Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the
the case. motion and that he never even read it.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered.
Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved “to Meads’ version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he
require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads went to Atty. Santiago’s office with the fourth motion
to file in writing their answer to the said return [of for reconsideration which he himself prepared.
Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why Santiago started to reset the motion and in fact began
to make some changes in pencil in the first or second that the announced plan to bring the case to the
paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also
wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys.
They then went to Caling whose office was on the Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton
same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at Meads in oral argument with respect to the second
the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and
While Caling was reading the document, Santiago second contempt incidents seriatim.
left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go- 1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L.
signal. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we,
He signed the same after his name was typed indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an
therein. The motion was then filed. According to officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as
Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago “vulturous executives”. He speaks of this Court as a
to the time the motion was filed, the period that “civilized, democratic tribunal”, but by innuendo
elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. would suggest that it is not.
Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph
Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes. categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as “false,
In defending himself from the contempt charge, erroneous and illegal” in a presumptuous manner. He
Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction
Court set forth in the fourth motion for we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined
reconsideration has not been taken out of context the case even before the joining of an issue. He
because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court
“xs” indicate that it is not a complete quotation and for being interested in the decision of this case:
that it is a common practice in court pleadings to Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his
submit partial quotations. Meads further contends brother is the vice president of the favored party who
is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Caesar’s wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, happen in our country, “although the process has
“a significant appointment in the Philippine already begun.”
Government by the President, a short time before the It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.” In this paragraph 6 which contained language that is as
backdrop, he proceeds to state that “it would seem disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has
that the principles thus established [the moral and been made. He explained that he deleted this
ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was
authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should included in the motion filed in this Court only because
first apply to itself.” He puts forth the claim that of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make
lesser and further removed conditions have been much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no
known to create favoritism, only to conclude that shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but
there is no reason for a belief that the conditions also because his signature appeared on the motion to
obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this
Castro “would be less likely to engender favoritism or paragraph 6 describes with derision “many of our
prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.” judicial authorities” who ‘‘believe that they are the
Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and chosen messengers of God in all matters that come
Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which before them, and that no matter what the
could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained
in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice by the Almighty unto eternity.” It depicts them as
Castro not only were not free from the appearance of seemingly “incapable of considering that any
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their emanation from their mind or pen could be the
relationship did affect their judgment. He points out product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy
that courts must be above suspicion at all times like or favoritism for a party or an issue.” After citing acts
of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or
“What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it their agents or principals, including the president.”
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by
of our government officials are just amoral?” the President and in that sense may be considered to
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated have each received a favor from the President. Should
mention of “unjudicial prejudice” against respondent these justices inhibit themselves every time a case
Mac-Arthur and spoke of “unjudicial favoritism” for involving the Administration crops up? Such a
petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored thought may not certainly be entertained. The
party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 consequence thereof would be to paralyze the
is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be
warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of
paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that “any government operating in this country. Counsel is
other justices who have received favors or benefits presumed to know this. But why the unfounded
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on
members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or the part of a losing litigant’s attorney to downgrade
principals, including the President”, should also this Court.
inhibit themselves. The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago’s gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect
accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel’s words
Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we
repeat, “any other justices who have received favors or have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs.
benefits directly or indirectly from any of the Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: “By now,
a lawyer’s duties to the Court have become to promote distrust in the administration of
commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid justice.” Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
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excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20 preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is
(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
terms, spells out one such duty: ‘To observe and attainment of the liberties of the people.” Thus has it
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maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court,
judicial officers.’ As explicit is the first canon of legal it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
ethics which pronounces that ‘[i]t is the duty of the destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful towards the courts so essential to the proper
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent administration of justice.”4
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with
supreme importance.’ That same canon, as a corollary, the statement that it was necessary for the defense of
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to his client. A client’s cause does not permit an attorney
support the courts against ‘unjust criticism and to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers
clamor.’ And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds must always keep in perspective the thought that
him to a conduct that should be ‘with all good fidelity “[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-
x x x to the courts.’ Worth remembering is that the bound servants of society, their first duty is not to
duty of an attorney to the courts ‘can only be their clients, as many suppose, but to the
maintained by rendering no service involving any administration of justice; to this, their clients’ success
disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and
uphold.” must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.” As 5
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-
court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his
ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and
1 position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, “not the attorney, and no other, who can better or more
appropriately support the judiciary and the statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the
incumbent of the judicial position. From this, Mr.
6 courts against MacArthur.” He brands such efforts as
Justice Malcolm continued to say: “It will of course be “scattershot desperation”. He describes a proposition
a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions of petitioners as “corrupt on its face”, laying bare “the
to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.” He
happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of charges petitioners with opportunistically changing
the law than the justice of the peace or judge who their claims and stories not only from case to case but
presides over the court. It may also happen that since from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such
no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing
their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self- of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends
restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to
conditions are necessary for the orderly say that these statements were taken out of context.
administration of justice.”
7 We have analyzed the lines surrounding said
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just statements. They do not in any manner justify the
recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has
Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style been said that “[a] lawyer’s language should be
that undermines and degrades the administration of dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal
justice. The stricture in Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the profession.” It is Sotto’s duty as a member of the Bar
9
Rules—against improper conduct tending to degrade “[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to
the administration of justice —is thus transgressed.
8 advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. the cause with which he is charged.” 10
We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs.
Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses Young,83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the
petitioners of having made “false, ridiculous and wild accused convicted of murder made use of the following
raw language in his brief: “The accused since birth Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the
was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since performance of his official duties; and that he too has
his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in committed, under Section 3(d) of the same rule,
his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A improper conduct tending to degrade the
cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man’s life. administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of
A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds’ work and contempt.
that would transform him into a new man. Once in a 3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty.
small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty.
poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, Santiago to have included the name of the firm of
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden Atty. Regala without the latter’s knowledge and
deed.” We there held that “[s]uch a plea is a disgrace consent. Correctly did Regala insist—and this is
to the bar and an affront to the court.” confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents—that
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of
General or his assistants may not be considered the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know
offended parties in this case. This Court may motu that his name was included as co-counsel in this case.
proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should He is exonerated.
be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish 4. Last to be considered with respect to the first
him for contempt under the circumstances. For, contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy.
inherent in courts is the power “[t]o control, in Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial not also involved in the preparation of any of the
officers, and of all other persons in any manner pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should
connected with a case before it, in every manner be held exempt from contempt.
appertaining thereto.”11 5. We now turn our attention to the second
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto contempt incident. The fourth motion for
has misbehaved, under Section 3(a), Rule 71 of the reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No for the lawyer knowingly to misquote.” While Morton
explanation has been made why this has been done. Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a
Second. It lifted Section 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court, lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being
out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to
“Justices; who may take part.—xxx. only those the rule quoted and that qualification was
members present when any matter is submitted for intentionally omitted.
oral argument will take part in its consideration and Third. The motion contained an express threat to
adjudication x x.” However, the provision in its entire take the case to the World Court and/or the United
thought should be read thus— States government. It must be remembered that
“SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part.—All matters submitted to the respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be
submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In
Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More
such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur
such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission:
however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for “will inevitably xxx raise the graft and corruption of
oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of
parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with
the clerk at the date of submission.”12
May 12, 1955 xxx to the World Court” and would
invoke “the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
did not attempt to explain this point. Government, including the sugar price premium,
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually
why such a distorted quotation came about—the x x x.”
portion left out was anyway marked by “XS”, which is This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the
a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A
Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to notice of appeal to the World Court has even been
characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, embodied in Meads’ return. There is a gross
and specifically states that “it is not candid nor fair
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to read the same is too transparent to survive fair
reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances.
presupposes that a party has already abandoned any Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who
move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads
appear that the appeal to the World Court is being explained to him the allegations thereof and the
dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision background of the case. Caling says that if not for his
of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed
explanation. the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of Santiago began to read the fourth motion for
this Court that he should be exempted from the reconsideration and even started to make changes
contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that
officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14,
fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they
White he has been dragged in only at the last minute, proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that
still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his Santiago did not read the fourth motion for
name should not be attached to pleadings reconsideration during all that time.
contemptuous in character. Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not
prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has
cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client
even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of takes should be within his knowledge and
contempt. responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His Legal Ethics should have reminded him that “[a]
insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to
motion for reconsideration and that he had not even prevent his clients from doing those things which the
lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with bond.” It would not require the adroit mind of a
13
reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond,
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client contrary to the instructions to bidders; is not entitled
persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should to any consideration.
terminate their relation.” It should be emphasized, too, that because the
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the
never be protected where infraction of ethics meets Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had
with complacency rather than punishment. The not taken part in the decision on the merits of this
people should not be given cause to break faith with case, the result would have been the same:
the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor MacArthur’s cause would just the same have failed.
amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.
Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of 1. 1.On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L.
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of
before a court of justice. contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and
again that, if only for one reason, this Court had holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates
really no alternative but to decide the main case and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of
against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our court; and
decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even 2. 2.On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente
adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanito
bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines
“bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional Pl,000,
And We repeat, “[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M.
[MacArthur] had been submitted withoutthe requisite Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the attorney and that no other lawyer would have been
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever given such consideration. The Court considered this
action he may deem proper to take in the premises derogatory imputation as neither pertinent nor
against Morton F. Meads who is an alien. relevant to the issues.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to A lawyer was also found properly held in contempt
the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action for sending to a judge the following telegram “Request
as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment set aside your orders confiscation bond and my arrest
or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose being vindictive abuse use powers unjust malicious as
Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. you are the offended party otherwise will charge you
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append criminally, civilly and administratively.” The
a copy of this decision to the personal records of telegram’s language was dubbed by the Court as
Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and unbecoming of a lawyer and violative of the lawyer’s
Juanito M. Caling. So ordered. oath (People vs. Venturanza, 98 Phil. 211).
Attorneys Vicente C. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto
and Juanito M. Caling and Morton F. Meads held
guilty of contempt of court. Attorneys Graciano C.
Regala & Associates and Erlito R. Uy held not guilty.
Notes.—Contemptuous comment or criticism
directed to Court.—In In re Velasquez, April 29, 1955,
the Supreme Court also held in contempt a lawyer
who, in his motion for reconsideration filed in said
Court, charged that the high court affirmed the order [No. 42992. August 8, 1935]
of the lower court allowing an answer filed 48 days FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner and
after expiration of the time for filing it because the appellant, vs.FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent
lawyer who filed it (Claro M. Recto) was a “big name”
and appellee. In re contempt proceedings against he now is: a priest of justice (ln reThatcher, 80 Ohio
Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO. St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing he
neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
1. 1.CONTEMPT; PHRASES IN CONTEMPT OF administration of' justice, and he prevents anybody
COURT CONTAINED IN A MoTION.—The phrases from harboring and encouraging discontent, which in
contained in attorney V. J, F.'s motion disclose, in the many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the undermining the foundation on which rests the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with aggrieved turn for protection and relief.
no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of
the laws, the rights of the parties and of the 1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPECT OF THE COURTS.—It is
untoward consequences, or with having abused its right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the
power and mocked and flouted the rights of attorney cause and rights of his client, should do so with all
V. J. F.'s client, because the acts of outraging and the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
mocking from which the words "outrage" and not, and will never be so for him to exercise said right
"mockery" used therein are- derived, mean exactly by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the propriety and respect which the dignity of the
the Spanish Language published by the Spanish courts require. The reason for this is that respect of
Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th the courts guarantees the stability of their
ed., pages 132 and 513). institution. Without such guaranty said institution
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; THE LAWYER'S DUTIES TO THE
SUPREME COURT.—As a member of the bar and an 1. 4.ID.; ID.; WANT OF INTENTION.—In his defense,
officer of this court, attorney V. J, F., as any attorney, attorney V. J. F. states that it was not his intention
is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect
and to defend its integrity, not only because it has thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right which require no further comment. Furthermore, it is
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what a well settled rule in all places where the same
conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction
obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from upon to date, for the reason that the question whether
liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the or not the decision which has already been
phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the
defense.
first assignment of error relied upon in said
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTENUATION OF LIABILITY.— petitioner's brief, has not yet been determined, for
Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an which purpose the case was set for hearing on August
extenuation of liability in this case, taking into 5, 1935, said attorney inserted a paragraph the
consideration attorney V. J. F.'s state of mind, translation of which reads as follows:
according to him, when he prepared his said motion. "We should like frankly and respectfully to make it
This court is disposed to make this concession. of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
to prevent others, by following a bad axample, from
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
taking the same course, this court considers it
imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
justice it deserves. popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality
of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. within our power in order that this error may be
Contempt. corrected by the very court which has committed it,
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. because we should not want that some citizen,
Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf. particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
DIAZ, J.: he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the
In a motion filed in this case, which is pending herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it
resolution because the second motion for is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
reconsideration of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, who honorable court and of each and every member
represents the herein petitioner, has not been acted thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time
we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions "and * * * we wish to state sincerely that
like these, which the affected party and his thousands erroneous decisions like these, which the affected
of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism'
confidence in the administration of justice." and make the public lose confidence in the
When the court's attention was called to said administration of justice", disclose, in the opinion of
paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J. Francisco this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority
to show cause, if any, why he should not be found of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
guilty of contempt, giving him a period of ten days for because the court is thereby charged with no less than
that purpose. In his answer Attorney Vicente J. having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the
Francisco, far from regretting having employed the rights of the parties, and of the untoward
phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, consequences, or with having abused its power and
reiterated them several times contending that they mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
did not constitute contempt because, according to him Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and
it is not contempt to tell the truth. mocking from which the words "outrage" and
The phrases: "mockery" used therein are derived, mean exactly the
"* * * and constitutes an outrage to the rights same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the
of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy
popular will expressed at the polls * * *. (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages
"* * * because we should not want that some 132 and 513).
citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of The insertion of the phrases in question in said
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many
denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither
* * * justified nor in the least necessary, because in order
to call the attention of the court in a special way to
the essential points relied upon in his argument and the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that
to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons referred to in his motion promote distrust in the
stated in his said motion were sufficient and the administration of justice and increase the proselytes
phrases in question were superfluous. In order to of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is
amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt
means are annoying and good practice can never of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the
sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort
in the consideration of questions submitted for to intimidation, it would maintain its error
resolution. notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with
There is no question that said paragraph of good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a As a member of the bar and an officer of this court,
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to
which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred
fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press upon him the high privilege, not a right
for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
judicial outrage of which his client has been the he now is: a priest of justice (In reThatcher, 80 Ohio
victim; and because he states in a threatening manner St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he
with the intention of predisposing the mind of the neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is
foundation upon which rests that bulwark called the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his
judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases but
for protection and relief. not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in the person making them should be protected."
defending the cause and rights of his client, should do In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is that it was not his intention to offend the court or to
capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately,
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or there are his phrases which need no further comment.
proceeding without the propriety and respect which Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places
the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is where the same conditions and practice as those in
that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no
their institution. Without such guaranty, said excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact
institution would be resting on a very shaky that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a
foundation. valid defense:
At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention "Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence
to the provisions of rule 1 of Chapter 2 of that the language used was justified by the facts is
Legal Ethics, which reads as follows: not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial
"It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the office should always be observed and enforced." (In
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but f or the of intention con-
maintenance of its importance. Judges, not being stitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this
wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J.
entitled to receive the support of the bar against Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he
unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make
such concession. However, in order to avoid a MALCOLM, J., with whom concurs VICKERS, J.,
recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following dissenting:
the bad example, from taking the same course, this
court considers it imperative to treat the case of said From 1918 when in the case of the United
attorney with the justice it deserves. States vs. Bustos(37 Phil., 731), it was declared that
Briefly, this court is of the opinion and so holds that "The guaranties of a free speech and a free press
the act committed by Attorney Vicente J. Francisco include the right to criticize judicial conduct", until
constitutes a contempt in the face of the court (in facie the present, I have consistently and steadfastly stood
curiæ) and, reiterating what this court said on for the fullest expression of freedom of speech. I stand
another occasion that the power to punish for for the application of that basic principle now.
contempt is inherent in the courts in order that there The language which the majority of the court finds
be due administration of justice (In reKelly, 35 Phil., contemptuous and punishes as such is found in a
944), and so that the institution of the courts of justice second motion of reconsideration in an election case, a
may be stable and said courts may not fail in their class of cases out of which arise more bitter feelings
mission, said attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200 than any other. The motion is phrased in vigorous
within the period of ten days, and to be reprimanded, language, in fact vigorous and convincing enough to
and he is hereby reprimanded; and it is ordered that induce the granting of a rehearing on the merits. It is
the entire paragraph of his motion containing the hardly necessary to add that that action was taken
phrases which as has been stated, constitute contempt entirely uninfluenced by the peroration of the motion
of court be stricken from the record de oficio. So here judicially penalized.
ordered. Following microscopic examination in the majority
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad opinion of the paragraph, attention is directed to
Santos, Hull, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, words which prophesy the loss of public confidence in
JJ., concur. the courts and the growth of Sakdalism. If, however,
the passage flowing from the pen of Mr. Francisco be
set side by side with passages written by the late Mr.
Justice Johnson in the case So that it may not be assumed that the position
of Garchitorena vs. Crescini and Imperial ([1918], 39 taken by me is isolated or peculiar, permit me to offer
Phil., 258), little difference in phraseology will be a few corroborative authorities.
noted. One came f rom a lawyer and is condemned; Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court
the other came from a judge and is accepted. of Pennsylvania was the pioneer authority in the
The main burden of the charge is that threats subject of professional ethics. Speaking for the court
against this court were made by the respondent. in one case, he said: "No class of the community ought
Admittedly a lawyer should maintain a respectful to be allowed freer scope in the expression or
attitude towards the courts. Any attempt on the part publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality
of a lawyer to influence the action of the court by or integrity of judges than members of the bar. * *
intimidation will justify not alone punishment for * To say that an attorney can only act or speak on
contempt but also disbarment. But does anyone this subject under liability to be called to account and
believe that the action taken in this case has been to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the
obtained by coercion or could be obtained by such very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty
methods ? Judges are of sterner stuff than weak to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
plants which bend with every wind. entertained for a moment under our present system."
The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up f (Ex parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.)
or his rights even in the face of a hostile court. He Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the
owes entire devotion to the interests of his client. His Supreme Court of Kansas and subsequently was
zeal when a case is lost, which he thinks should have elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States.
been won, may induce intemperate outbursts. Courts In the former capacity, in sustaining a contempt of
will do well charitably to overlook professional court, he nevertheless observed: "We remark again,
improprieties of the moment induced by chagrin at that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed
losing a case. any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion,
or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that,
in every case where a judge decides for one party, he affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still less
decides against another; and often times both parties can I find there anything that obstructed the
are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The administration of justice in any sense that I possibly
disappointment, theref ore, is great, and it is not in can give to those words." (Toledo Newspaper
human nature that there should be other than bitter Co. vs. United States [1917], 247 U. S., 402.)
feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the cause In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged
of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be with having said in effect that the Supreme Court had
patient, and tolerate every thing which appears but decided the election protest in favor of Cailles because
the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second Governor-General Wood, out of friendship for Cailles,
thought will generally make a party ashamed of such had invited members of the court to Malacañang
outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none previous to formulating the decision, and there,
by passing it in silence." (In re Pryor [1877], 26 Am. following a secret conference, had offered them a
Rep., 747.) banquet. The proceedings for contempt initiated
The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court against the respondent by the Attorney-General were
of the United States was until recently the leader of halted by the court. In the opinion it was said: "We
progressive thought in American jurisprudence. In a doubt very much if any one would think f or a moment
dissenting opinion in a famous case, he said: "When it that members of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
is considered how contrary it is to our practice and Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity
ways of thinking for the same person to be accuser for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief
and sole judge in a matter which, if he be sensitive, Executive. * * * We feel also, that litigants and
may involve strong personal feeling," I should expect lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for
the power to be limited by the necessities of the case words said in the heat of the moment, because of
'to insure order and decorum in their presence'. * * chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the
* I confess that I cannot find in all this or in the court to condone even contemptuous language." (In re
evidence in the case anything that would have Gomez [1922], 43 Phil., 376.)
To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court constitutes contempt of court, but conceding that it
is a jurisdiction to be exercised with scrupulous care. did require explanation, I would accept his disavowal
The members of the court sit as prosecutors and as of wrong intent at its face value. I would not mar the
judges. Human sensitiveness to an attorney's unjust record of a member of the bar of long and honorable
aspersions on judicial character may induce too standing with this blemish. With due deference to the
drastic action. It may result in the long run in making opinion of the majority, I must strongly dissent
of lawyers weak exponents of their clients' causes. therefrom.
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by Respondent attorney found guilty of contempt, fined,
following a calm and impartial course from the bench and reprimanded.
than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary
by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious
exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs
lawyers of independent thought and courageous
bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and
unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will
do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate
language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which
affects in no way the outcome of a case.
Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his
intention to be recreant to the respect and
consideration which he has always shown the highest
tribunal in the Philippines, and that the language of
the last paragraph of his motion of June 19 was not
meant to offend the dignity of the court. I do not think [No. L-2028. April 28, 1949]
that the language found in Mr. Francisco's motion PHILIPPINE SHEET METAL WORKERS' UNION (CLO),
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, PHILIPPINE CAN COMPANY, AND LIBERAL Lazatin & Caballero for petitioners.
LABOR UNION, respondents. Juan R. Maralit for respondent Court of Industrial
1.EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS;
Relations.
FINALITY OF FINDINGS WHEN THERE IS FAIR HEARING AND AMPLE
REYES, J.:
EVIDENCE.—It appearing that there has been fair hearing and
that there is ample evidence to support the conclusions of fact of This is a petition for certiorari to review an order of
the lower court, there exists no ground for interfering with those the Court of Industrial Relations on the ground that
conclusions. the same was rendered in excess of jurisdiction and
2.ID.; JUSTIFICATION FOR REDUCING NUMBER OF WORKERS BY
with grave abuse of discretion.
INTRODUCTION OF MACHINERY.—There was real justification for
reducing the number of workers in respondent company's The said order was issued in case No. 37-V (2) of
factory, such a measure having been made necessary by the said court involving an industrial dispute between the
introduction of machinery in the manufacture of its products. respondent company (a corporation engaged in the
3.ID. ; RIGHT OF MANUFACTURER TO USE NEW LABOR-SAVING
manufacture of tin plates, aluminum sheets, etc.) and
DEVICES.—There can be no question as to the right of the
manufacturer to use new labor-saving devices with a view to its laborers some of whom belong to the Philippine
effecting more economy and efficiency in its method of Sheet Metal Workers’ Union (CLO) and some to the
production. Liberal Labor Union. The dispute was over certain
4.ID.; EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO DISMISS EMPLOYEES FOR FAILURE OF
demands made upon the company by the laborers, one
LATTER TO OBSERVE PROPER DISCIPLINE AND EFFICIENCY.—The
right to reduce personnel should, of course, not be abused. It of the demands (No. 13th in the list) being for the
should not be made a pretext for easing out laborers on account recall of eleven workers who had been laid off.
of their union activities. But neither should it be denied when it Temporarily taken back on certain conditions pending
is shown that they are not discharging their duties in a manner
final determination of the controversy, these eleven
consistent with good discipline and the efficient operation of an
industrial enterprise. workers were in the end ordered retained in the
454 decision handed down by the court on February 19,
PETITION for review on certiorari an order of the 1947, which disposed of this part of the case as
Court of Industrial Relations. follows:
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
"The petitioner tried to prove that the 11 laborers were laid off by the before the decision came down, filed a motion in the
respondent company due to their union activities. As a matter of fact, of
the 11 workers laid off, there are included officers and members of the case, asking for authority to lay off at least 15 workers
petitioning union, namely, the president, Pablo Sicat; the vice-president, in its can department on the ground that the
Generoso Villanueva; and the secretary, Marcos Eugenio. The respondent installation and operation of nine new labor-saving
company proved that the laying off of these eleven workers was due to
lack of materials. With regard tc this contention, the examining division machines in said department had rendered the
of this Court was ordered tc investigate the availability of materials used services of the said workers unnecessary. The
in connection witi the work performed by these eleven laborers, the
volume of business and the work performed by these workers during
Philippine Sheet Metal Workers' Union (CLO)
Sundays, legal holidays, and night shift. opposed the motion, alleging that there was more
"After considering the evidence, both testimonial and documentary
than sufficient work in the company to keep all its
and the response of the chief of the examining division of this workers busy, and, on the further allegation that the
Court, we are of the opinion that there was really lack of materials at the company had hired without the authority of the court
tune of the laying off of these 11 laborers. However, there is also sufficient
evidence to the effect that the respondent company, in reducing the
some ten new laborers pending resolution of the
number of its personnel, selected workers that belonged to the petitioning principal case, it in turn asked that the company be
union. This is discrimination and the same can mot be tolerated. The declared guilty of contempt of court. About a year
right to reduce personnel must not be abused and must not be taken
advantage of to dismiss laborers with whom the management is later, the court, after due hearing and investigation,
displeased due to their union activities. In the present case, it is the rendered an order, dated February 5, 1948, granting
opinion of the Court that the management of the company selected these the company's motion to lay off 15 workers and denied
11 workers because they organized a labor union. Although the company
has the right to reduce its personnel, the said company erred in abusing the petition to have the company declared in contempt
this right. It is, therefore, ordered that these 11 workers be retained in of court. This order is the one now before us for
the respondent company until the occurrence of facts that may give rise to
a just cause of their laying off or dismissal, or there is evidence of
review.
sufficient weight to convince the Court that their conduct is not The fifteen laborers slated for dismissal had each of
satisfactory. As a consequence, the company is ordered to pay their them a bad record according to the list submitted by
corresponding wages from the date of their lay-off to the date of their
temporary readmission in the company."
the company, which reads as follows:
"1. Pablo Sicat, coppersmith, por haber abandonado por mucho tiempo
su trabajo;
As a separate incident from the above, the "2. Manuel Pajarillo, making the handles of the cans, por frecuentes
company, on February 10, 1947, that is, nine days ausencias;
"3. Marcos Eugenio, solderer, por haber estado saliendo a menud" en "3. En su fabrica la compañía tiene ochenta y cinco (85) obreros,
horas de trabajo y dejado el servicio sin causa razonable ni permiso; y el propuesto despido de los quince (15) obreros, entre hombres y
"4. Miguel Magcalin, solderer, por haber abandonado definitivamente mujeres, se debe principalmente a que sus servicios son ya
el trabajo; innecesarios porque sus trabajos han sido absorbidos por las nuevas
"5. Juanito Villanueva, solderer, por ineficiencia;
maquinas.
"6. Melitona Basilio, solderer, por haber estado saliendo a menudo en
“4. En la selección de dichos quince (15) obreros la compañía,
horas de trabajo sin causa razonable;
"7. Felicidad Villanueva, painting rubber, por ineficiencia; mediante un grupo o comité de tres (3) de sus funcionarios y
"8. Conchita Basilio, painting rubber, por ser perezosa y salidas a empleados de confianza, con el gerente de la misma a la cabeza, se
menudo en horas de trabajo; baso en los servicios y la conducta de cada obrero.
"9. Soledad del Rosario, painting rubber, por no tener interes en el "5. El comité de selección no se guió por la afiliación de los
trabajo y salidas a menudo en horas de labor; obreros a ninguna de las dos uniones obreras existentes en el seno
"10. Fortunata Angelo, painting rubber, por ser ineficiente y de la fabrica, y solamente tuvo en cuenta al verificar la selección
desobediente; estos (a) Abandono del trabajo, sin aviso o justa
"11. Segundina San Juan, painting rubber, por ineficiencia e causa; (b) Frecuentes ausencias injustificadas en la (el)
inobediencia; todos miembros de la union recurrente; servicio; (c) Salidas a menudo durante las horas de labor, sin causa
"12. Fermino Tiozon, can maker, por ser perezoso;
razonable; y (d) ineficiencia, negligencia o falta de interés en el
"13. Genaro Galvez, general helper, por ser perezoso;
cumplimiento del deber.
"'14. Leonardo Soliman, operator-messenger, por ineficiencia, por
haber estado llegando tarde a la fabrica y durmiendo en horas de trabajo; "6. Los obreros cuyo despido esta propuesto por la compañía han
miembros de la union terceristas; y incurrido en las faltas que se atribuyen por la misma a cada uno de
"15. Ho Ching Sing, laborer, por haber abandonado el traba; sin previa ellos.
notificación; no unionista." "7. La compañía no ha aceptado nuevos obreros y si ha hecho
trabajar algunas veces a ciertos obreros o mecánicos suyos en
And the order complained of is based upon the exceso de las ocho horas, ha sido en interés de la eficiencia o por
following conclusions of fact of the court below: exigencias del servicio y no por haber tenido mucho volumen de
"1. La compañía tiene instalada y en operación en su fabrica, trabajo en su fabrica.
además de las maquinas antiguas, trece (13) nuevas unidades de "Indudablemente, la compañía abrigando el deseo laudable de
'labor saving machines', entre similares y enteramente diferente, des-arrollar su negocio y aumentar su producción, ha introducido
que llegaron de los Estados Unidos de America en distintas fechas importantes cambios y mejoras en la elaboración de sus productos,
desde el agosto de 1946 hasta el junio de 1947. recurriendo al empleo de maquinarias modernas para atender
"2. Dichas nuevas maquinas ahorran obra de mano y tiempo, debidamente y satisfacer mejor las demandas del publico
hacer mas fáciles y rápidos los trabajos y aumentan el volumen de consumidor. El propósito de la compañía merece aplausos, el medio
la producción. de que se vale para realizarlo es digno de encomio y su objetivo
significa desenvolvimiento progresivo en la solución de los "No se puede detener el curso de los tiempos. Si se quiere sobrevivir y
problemas industriales para el beneficio de la comunidad. Todo prosperar, la única alternativa es adaptarse a las exigencias del presente
paso o medida que tienda a favorecer el interés publico y con miras mundo moderno. No se puede cerrar los ojos a la realidad. No se puede
a dar impulso a la mecanización de las industrias, contribuye a la depender de métodos antiguos, hay que recurrir a métodos más eficientes
y avanzados. La producción no solo debe ser de elevada calidad sino
mejora de la economía y la ansiada rehabilitación del país; y por lo
ilimitada y su costo al alcance de todos. Debe seguirse el ejemplo de
tanto, no debe ser obstruido sino, por el contrario, fomentado."
otros países.,,
It appearing that there has been fair hearing and The right to reduce personnel should, of course, not
that there is ample evidence to support the be abused. It should not be made a pretext for easing
conclusions of fact of the lower court, we would have out laborers on account of their union activities. But
no ground for interfering with those conclusions. And neither should it be denied when it is shown that they
these make it clear that there was real justification are not discharging their duties in a manner
for reducing the number of workers in respondent consistent with good discipline and the efficient
company's factory, such a measure having been made operation of an industrial enterprise. We, therefore,
necessary by the introduction of machinery in the approve of the following pronouncement of the court
manufacture of its products, and that the company below:
cannot be charged with discrimination in recommend- "La compañía tiene derecho de despedir a sus empleados u obreros. Si
ing the dismissal of the fifteen laborers named in the bien este derecho esta sujeto a la regulación del Estado, en su normal
ejercicio no se inmiscuye la ley. El patrono paga el jornal de sus obreros
above list since their selection was made by a por su trabajo, y es lógico y justo que el mismo tenga derecho a esperar de
committee composed of both officers and employees los mismos lealtad y fiel cumplimiento de sus obligaciones. No es el
who took no account of the laborers' affiliation to the propósito de la ley obligar al principal a retener en su servicio a un obrero
cuando no recibe de este trabajo adecuado, diligencia (diligencia) y buen
unions and only considered their proven record. comportamiento, o cuando su continuación en el empleo es claramente
There can be no question as to the right of the opuesta a los intereses de su patrono, porque la ley al proteger los
manufacturer to use new labor-saving devices with a derechos del obrero no autoriza la opresión ni la destrucción del
principal."
view to effecting more economy and efficiency in its
method of production. As the lower court observes in The petitioner contends that the order complained
its order, of was made with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of jurisdiction in that it is contrary to the Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto,
pronouncement made by the lower court in its Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, and Montemayor, J
decision in the main case where it disapproved of the J., concur.
dismissal of eleven workers "with whom the
management is displeased due to their union
activities." It appears, however, that the
pronouncement was made upon a distinct set of facts,
which are different from those found by the court in
connection with the present incident, and that very
decision, in ordering the reinstatement of the eleven
laborers, qualifies the order by saying that those
laborers are to be retained only "until the occurrence
of facts that may give rise to a just cause of their
laying off or dismissal, or there is evidence of
sufficient weight to convince the Court that their
conduct is not satisfactory."
After a careful review of the record, we find that the
Court of Industrial Relations has neither exceeded its
jurisdiction nor committed grave abuse of discretion
in rendering the order complained of. The petition for
certiorari is, therefore, denied, but without costs
against the petitioner for the reasons stated in its G.R. No. 142440. February 17, 2003.
*
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Use Regulatory Board (HLURB for brevity). After
Aristotle Q. Sarmiento for petitioner. conducting the required hearings and an ocular
Edito A. Rodriguez for private respondents. inspection of the property, HLURB Arbiter Cesar A.
CORONA, J.: Manuel, found that:
To this date, the parcel of land, Lot No. 2, Block No. 9 under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 261758 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila
The instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of District II, sold by the respondent to complainants, is still registered in
Court seeks a review of the Resolution dated 1 the name of one Antonio Tuazon, Jr., despite full payment of the lot by
December 15, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (Third the buyers, complainants herein, in violation of Section 25 of PD 957. We
are not persuaded by the respondent’s argument that complainants are
Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 55988 denying not entitled to delivery of title pending their payment of taxes and other
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a assessments (Respondent’s Answer Par. II). This is in contravention with
Section 26 of PD 957 which provides that “Real Esate (sic) Tax and
petition for review, thereby dismissing the case, and assessment on a lot x x x shall be paid by the owner or developer with out
the Resolution dated March 10, 2000 which denied the
2
(sic) recourse to the buyer for as long as the title has not passed to the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. buyer; x x x.” The only exception to this rule is when the title has passed
to the buyer and the latter took possession of and occupied the lot. This is
It appears that private respondents, Ernesto Ong not obtaining in the instant case.
and Ma. Sonia Tan Soon Ha purchased from As to the issue of non-development, the above quoted ocular inspection
petitioner, El Reyno Homes, Inc., Lot 2, Block 9 of speaks for itself.
We are not also convinced with the argument of respondent that it “is
subdivision plan PSD-04-001498 situated at the physically and legally impossible for it at this point in time to force before
Loyola Grand Villas W-2, Quezon City containing an the development of the property as it may result in violence and
area of 1,000 square meters initially covered by bloodshed x x x” (Respondent’s Opposition par. 1, sub-par, b, citing its par.
7 of its Answer). This principle which is enriched under Articles 1266 and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261758. For its 1267 of the Civil Code does not apply in the instant case for the simple
failure to develop and deliver the title to the property, reason that in order for the said principle to apply, it is a condition sine
qua non that the prestation constituting the object of the obligation must
the private respondents filed an action against the have become legally or physically impossible of compliance without the
fault of the obligor and before he has incurred in delay. requiring the parties to file their respective
(Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts,
1983 Edition, p. 249)
4
memoranda within 10 days from receipt thereof.
In an urgent motion filed on April 30, 1992,
Hence, the HLURB arbiter rendered the following petitioner El Reyno Homes, Inc. requested that it be
judgment: given an extension of 15 days from May 1, 1992, or
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent EL
REYNO HOMES, INC., within thirty (30) days from finality hereof to: until May 16, 1992, to file its memorandum of appeal
which was granted by the Board on May 8, 1992.
1. 1.To deliver immediately the title to the complainants; However, the petitioner failed to file its
2. 2.Complete the development of the said subdivision in accordance
with the approved subdivision plan such as to: memorandum of appeal within the extended period
prompting the private respondents to file a motion to
1. a.construct the road going to the property of the complainants; dismiss the appeal. Despite the filing of a
2. b.construct the drainage and/or sewer pipe serving the said subject
lot; memorandum of appeal by the petitioner on May 22,
6
3. c.provide and/or construct water distribution line; 1992, or six (6) days after the expiration of the period
4. d.provide electrical power supply;
of extension on May 16, 1992, the Board issued an
1. 3.Pay to this Board an administrative fine of P10,000.00 for Order on December 16, 1992 dismissing the appeal of
7
violation of Sections 20 and 25 in relation to Section 38 of PD 957. the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
2. 4.Pay to the complainant the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. “Considering the foregoing, respondent’s (herein petitioner) appeal is
hereby declared ABANDONED and hence DISMISSED.
Finding the respondent’s counterclaim without merit, the same is SO ORDERED.”
hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.” 5
On January 26, 1993, the petitioner filed a motion for
From the said decision, the petitioner filed a notice of reconsideration which was denied by the Board in an
appeal with the HLURB Board of Commissioners Order dated May 4, 1993.
8
(Board for brevity) on March 11, 1992 which On May 24, 1993, the petitioner timely filed a notice
subsequently issued an Order on April 3, 1992 of appeal with the Office of the President which
subsequently issued an
Order dated May 28, 1993 requiring the said 1. 1.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
petitioner to file its memorandum of appeal. AN ERROR IN DISMISSING THE CASE ON
The petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal on PURE TECHNICALITY THEREBY DENYING
July 20, 1993 while the respondents filed their reply THE PETITIONER ITS DAY IN COURT AND
memorandum on August 10, 1993. IN EFFECT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
On October 27, 1999, the Office of the President THE HOUSING AND LAND USE
rendered a decision dismissing the appeal of the
9 REGULATORY BOARD WHICH GROSSLY
petitioner. On November 25, 1999, the petitioner filed ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE APPEAL AS
with the Court of Appeals a motion for an HAVING BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF
extension of 15 days within which to file a petition
10 DECIDING THE CASE.
for review counted from December 1, 1999, or until 2. 2.THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES WAS
December 16, 1999. MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND WITHOUT
On December 9, 1999, which was within the LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS.
requested period of extension, the petitioner filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
11 The petitioner claims that the delay in filing its
In the questioned Resolution dated December 15, memorandum of appeal with the Board was due to the
1999 however, the Court of Appeals denied sudden and unexpected absence without official leave
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a of Attorney Herenio Martinez on May 15, 1992 to
petition for review for not having been accompanied whom the instant case was allegedly assigned. The
by an affidavit of service, consequently dismissing the absence of Attorney Martinez, who remained in
case. The motion for reconsideration of the questioned possession of the records of this case, was beyond the
resolution was denied by the appellate court on March control of the petitioner, such that a rigid application
10, 2000. of the rules would defeat substantial justice especially
Hence, the instant petition with the following
12 since the said petitioner filed its memorandum of
assignments of error: appeal, albeit 6 days after the expiration of the
extended period. Besides, Section 2 of the HLURB
rules provides for a liberal construction thereof “in motion for extension of time to file a petition.
order to promote public interest and to assist the Invoking the ruling of this Court in the case
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the petitioner
14
determination of every action, application or other opined that the Court of Appeals should have decided
proceedings.” the petition on the merits rather than on mere
Likewise, according to petitioner, the Court of technicality in order to promote substantial justice.
Appeals erred when it denied petitioner’s motion for Additionally, petitioner argues that the award of
extension of time to file a petition for review because attorney’s fees by the HLURB arbiter had no factual
of its failure to attach an affidavit of service. The nor legal basis. It alleges that the private respondents
private respondents were furnished a copy of the still had obligations to settle under the contract, thus,
motion for extension of time to file a petition for the petitioner was not yet in default nor bound to
review by registered mail posted on November 24, deliver the title to the lot to the said private
1999 at Greenhills Post Office, San Juan, Metro respondents.
Manila under Registry Receipt No. 15088 addressed In their comment, the private respondents contend
15
to their counsel, Atty. Edito A. Rodriguez, at 16 CRM that, while the rules of procedure may be liberally
Rhia Street, BF Almanza, Las Piñas City. The construed, such liberality should not apply in case of
pleading was actually received by the counsel of wanton disregard of said rules or if it will only cause
private respondents on November 29, 1999 per needless delay. Respondents point out that petitioner
certification of the Las Piñas Post Office dated
13 was silent until the motion for extension of time to file
January 5, 2000. The purpose of the rule on service of its petition for review was denied and the case was
pleadings, to ensure that the other party was properly dismissed by the appellate court, before it exerted
notified of the pleading, had thus been served. effort to comply with the requirements. They claim
Moreover, petitioner filed the petition for review with that the petitioner was advised of its failure to attach
the Court of Appeals on December 9, 1999 which was the affidavit of service on the same day that it filed its
well within the extended period prayed for in its said motion. They also maintain that the award of
16
attorney’s fees is justified by the circumstances of the However, as correctly pointed out by the private
case, praying that it be increased because the case is respondents, such liberality in the application of rules
now on appeal to the Supreme Court. of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the
By way of reply, the petitioner insists that its
17 wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay
failure to attach the required affidavit of service to its in the administration of justice. It is equally settled
motion was not a wanton disregard of the rules nor that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
intended to cause needless delay in the compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice. It also reiterates the alleged administration of justice.
20
lack of factual or legal basis for the award of The HLURB Board of Commissioners considered
attorney’s fees in favor of the private respondents. the appeal filed by the petitioner from the adverse
We deny the instant petition. decision of the HLURB arbiter as abandoned after it
In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid failed to file the required memorandum of appeal
application of the rules of procedure to afford the within the extended period prayed for by the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases petitioner itself. The delay was allegedly brought
on the merits. This is in line with the timehonored about by the failure of its counsel to turn over the
principle that cases should be decided only after records before his sudden and unexpected absence
giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and without official leave on May 15, 1992. This
defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection unsubstantiated allegation of the petitioner is far
should thus not serve as basis of decisions. In that from convincing. The record shows that the petitioner
way, the ends of justice would be better served. For,
18 was represented by Atty. Emiliano L. Tamboan, Jr.
indeed, the general objective of procedure is to throughout the trial of the case before the HLURB
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims arbiter and subsequently by Atty. Aristotle Q.
of contending parties, bearing always in mind that Sarmiento. No Atty. Herenio Martinez ever entered
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the his appearance at any stage of the proceedings in this
administration of justice. 19 case. It is obvious that this tale of “abandonment by
its supposed counsel” was merely concocted by the from became final after the lapse of the original
petitioner in its desperate attempt to evade the legal period within which the petition should have been
effects of failure to file timely appeal. filed. The subsequent compliance by the petitioner
After its motion for reconsideration was denied by with the required attachment of affidavit of service
the Board, the petitioner filed an appeal with the did not cure the defect.
Office of the President but this was denied on October The petitioner has no one to blame but itself for its
27, 1999. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion failure to attach the required affidavit of service to its
for extension of time to file a petition with the Court motion. In fact, it did not even exert enough effort to
of Appeals. Apparently unmindful of its previous comply with this particular procedural requirement as
mistake, the petitioner this time failed to attach to its soon as practicable. Its counsel waited indifferently
said motion for extension of time the required until the motion for extension was denied and the
affidavit of service. And in an attempt to cover up the case was eventually dismissed on December 15,
grave consequences of its second mistake, the 1999—despite having been advised on the day it filed
petitioner, in its subsequent motion for the motion for extension on No-vember 25, 1999 of
reconsideration, contended that the purpose of this such failure to attach the required affidavit of service.
particular procedural requirement had anyway been As if it were not enough, the explanation regarding
served already when the private respondents’ counsel the mode of service used in the instant petition was
actually received a copy of its motion on November 29, left unsigned by the counsel of the petitioner. It 21
1999, as shown by the certification of the Las Piñas should be pointed out that herein petitioner filed the
Post Office. instant petition with this Court as an appeal from
We agree with the appellate court that the failure of the adverse resolutions of the Court of Appeals. We
22
the petitioner to attach the required affidavit of emphasize that the right to appeal is a mere statutory
service warranted outright denial of the motion for privilege. Not being a natural right or a part of due
extension of time to file its petition for review. process, the right to appeal may be exercised only in
Consequently, the judgment sought to be appealed the manner and in accordance with the rules provided
therefore. Failure to bring an appeal in the manner was invaded by squatters for its failure to introduce
and within the period prescribed by the rules renders the required development. As found by the HLURB
the judgment appealed from final and executory. 23 arbiter, the same was due to the fault of the said
The case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals which
24 petitioner and that the squatters entered the property
was relied upon by the petitioner does not apply after petitioner was already in delay. Likewise, title to
squarely to the case at bar. In that particular case, the property has not been delivered up to the present
the Solicitor General filed the record on appeal 6 days despite full payment of the price of the lot in
late. This Court suspended the rules on perfection of contravention of Section 25 of the same decree.
26
appeal as its strict application would have resulted in WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
the State’s loss of close to 300 hectares of prime is hereby DENIED and the questioned resolutions of
sugarland which a private individual had apparently the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
succeeded in registering in his name through SO ORDERED.
fraudulent misrepresentation and machination. Puno (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-
On the other hand, herein petitioner has failed to Gutierrezand Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
convince the Court that an extremely compelling
Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.
reason exists to justify suspension of the strict
Notes.—The rules of procedure are mere tools
application of the rules and to avert the commission of
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and
grave injustice. A review of the questioned decision of
their strict and rigid application especially on
the HLURB arbiter does not show any reversible error
technical matters, which tend to frustrate rather than
in its appreciation of the facts and its application of
promote substantial justice, must be avoided. (Samala
the pertinent laws. No development of roads, drainage
vs. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 535 [2001])
and water system has as yet been introduced by the
When the error relates to something so elementary
petitioner to the subject property in violation of
as to be inexcusable, the Court’s discretion becomes
Section 20 of P.D. No. 957. The petitioner cannot
25
rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to appeal of the petitioner herein in CA-G.R. CV No.
fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with 79317 and its resolution in the same case denying the
the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of its first
after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and
resolution.
defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, The Antecedents
thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of
The Spouses Benjamin and Anna Marie Bautista filed
justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of
a complaint, in behalf of their son Karl Bautista and
justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing Gloria Pomera, against the Asian Spirit Airlines in
always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for breach of
promote the administration of justice. In this case, however, contract and damages. After trial, the court rendered
such liberality in the application of rules of procedure may a decision on March 24, 2003 in favor of the plaintiffs
not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the and against the defendant. The fallo of the decision
rules or cause needless delay in the administration of reads:
justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered IN FAVOR OF THE
persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to PLAINTIFFS and AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ordering the latter to
facilitate the orderly administration of justice. pay the former:
The petitioner avers that the late filing of its brief did
its failure to file its brief.
not cause material injury or prejudice to the
On March 10, 2004, the defendant-appellant filed
respondents and the issues raised by it in its brief
an unverified Motion to Admit Attached Appellant’s
require an examination of the evidence on record.
Brief. The plaintiffs-appellees opposed the motion. On
6 7
petitioner did not even bother appending to its Motion In an avuncular case, we emphasized that:
17
to Admit its motion for extension to file brief which its Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are, thus, enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.
counsel’s secretary allegedly failed to file in the CA. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
Blaming its counsel’s unidentified secretary for its application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
abject failure to file its brief is a common practice for bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in
negligent lawyers to cover up for their own proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is
negligence, incompetence, indolence, and ineptitude. true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
Such excuse is the most hackneyed and habitual procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. The
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe instant case is no exception to this rule.
the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules In the present case, we find no cogent reason to
of Court. It bears stressing that it is the duty of
13
exempt the petitioner from the effects of its failure to
counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system that comply with the Rules of Court.
insures that all pleadings should be filed and duly The right to appeal is a statutory right and the
served within the period therefor and, if he fails to do party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
so, the negligence of his secretary or clerk to file such with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so,
pleading is imputable to the said counsel. 14
the right to appeal is lost. More so, as in this case,
We agree with the petitioner’s contention that the where petitioner not only neglected to file its brief
rules of procedure may be relaxed for the most within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an
persuasive reasons. But as this Court held in Galang extension of time for a cogent ground before the
v. Court of Appeals: 15
expiration of the time sought to be extended. 18
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the application of the rules of procedure to afford the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases
on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored Notes.—It is error on the part of the Court of
principle that cases should be decided only after Appeals to dismiss an appeal on the ground that it
giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and was formally deficient where it clear from the records
defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection that such party exerted due diligence to get copies of
should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that its appealed resolutions certified but failed to do so on
way, the ends of justice would be better served. For,19 account of a typhoon, a fortuitous event. (Hagonoy
indeed, the general objective of procedure is to Market Vendors Association vs. Municipality of
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims Hagonoy, 376 SCRA 376[2002])
of contending parties, bearing always in mind that Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the indispensable for the prevention of needless delays
administration of justice. In this case, however, such
20 and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of
liberality in the application of rules of judicial business. (Saint Louis University vs.
procedure may not be invoked if it will result in Cordero, 434 SCRA 575 [2004])
the wanton disregard of the rules or cause
needless delay in the administration of
justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most
persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to
facilitate the orderly administration of justice.
21