Professional Documents
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Injunction Opinion 2-27-18
Injunction Opinion 2-27-18
ATCHAFALAYA BASINKEEPER,
LOUISIANA CRAWFISH PRODUCERS
ASSOCIATION-WEST, GULF RESTORATION CIVIL ACTION
NETWORK, WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE, AND
SIERRA CLUB AND ITS DELTA CHAPTER
VERSUS 18-23-SDD-EWD
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction 1 filed by
Gulf Restoration Network, Waterkeeper Alliance, and Sierra Club and its Delta Chapter
this motion, 2 as did Intervenor Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC (“BBP”) 3 and Intervenor Stupp
Bros, Inc. d/b/a Stuff Corporation (“Stupp”). 4 Plaintiffs filed a Reply in support of their
motion. 5 The Court held a preliminary injunction hearing on February 8 and February 9,
2018 where the Court took evidence and heard argument on Plaintiffs’ motion. All parties
1
Rec. Doc. No. 15. Plaintiffs initially filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Rec. Doc. No. 16),
which the Court denied (Rec. Doc. No. 24).
2
Rec. Doc. No. 37-2.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 36.
4
Rec. Doc. No. 51.
5
Rec. Doc. No. 65.
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were granted leave to file Post-Hearing Briefs on the motion, 6 which the Court has
reviewed in considering this motion. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the
I. BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of the Corps issuance of permits to Bayou Bridge pipeline,
to construct and maintain a pipeline across the Atchafalaya Basin capable of carrying
nearly half a million barrels a day of crude oil The Corps performed two Environmental
Assessments (“EAs”), one pursuant to Section 408 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
(“RHA”), 7 and one pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) 8 Based on
these EAs, the Corps ultimately concluded that no Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”) was necessary; however, Plaintiffs maintain that the Corps’ review failed to assess
critical environmental impacts arising from project construction and operations and a long
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). 9 Plaintiffs also contend the Corps’ failed to
consider oil spill risks in violation of the CWA. Further, Plaintiffs argue that the Corps has
violated both NEPA and CWA by relying on inadequate mitigation. Alleged violations of
both NEPA and the CWA are reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 10
6
Rec. Doc. Nos. 73, 74, 75, & 76.
7
Rec. Doc. No. 37-7.
8
Rec. Doc. No. 15-31.
9
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f.
10
5 U.S.C. § 706.
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Under § 706 of the APA, a reviewing court must uphold the agency's action unless
accordance with law.” 11 The reviewing court must hold unlawful and set aside agency
one. 13 “The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” 14
In applying this standard, “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative
record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” 15
A. NEPA
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 17 mandates that federal
agencies evaluate the environmental impacts of proposed agency action before taking
action. 18 NEPA is a procedural statute intended “to ensure that federal agencies ‘carefully
11
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
12
Id. § 706(2)(B)-(D).
13
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)
abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977).
14
Id.
15
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973).
16
U.S. v. Garner, 767 F.2d 104, 116 (5th Cir. 1985).
17
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d.
18
42 U.S.C. § 4332(1); Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87,
97 (1983).
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same time ‘guarantee that the relevant information will be made available to the larger
audience that may also play a role in both the decision making process and the
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed EIS for all “major federal
actions significantly [affecting] the quality of the human environment.” 20 The threshold
discusses the relevant issues and either reaches a conclusion that preparation of an EIS
prepare an [EIS].” 23
In making this determination, agencies are to consider both direct and indirect
effects of its decision “which are caused by the action and are later in time or farther
19
Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 676 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989)).
20
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
21
Sabine River, 951 F.2d at 677.
22
Id.
23
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1).
24
40 C.F.R. §1508.8(b); O’Reilly v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 477 F.3d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 2007)
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decision.” 25 The Corps must consider even relatively unlikely events with significant
time-consuming to prepare and has been the kiss of death to many a federal project-is
necessary.” 27 Thus, the ultimate purpose of the EA is to lead to one of two findings:
“either that the project requires the preparation of an EIS to detail its environmental
impact, or that the project will have no significant impact ... necessitating no further study
If the former is found, then the agency must proceed with a full blown EIS; if the latter is
found, the agency issues a FONSI and has no further obligations under NEPA. 29
NEPA “is a procedural statute that demands that the decision to go forward with a federal
one.” 31 The statute “does not command the agency to favor an environmentally
preferable course of action, only that it make its decision to proceed with the action after
25
City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440, 453 (5th Cir. 2005).
26
40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4).
27
Sabine River, 951 F.2d at 677 (internal quotations and citations removed).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835.
31
Sabine River, 951 F.2d at 676 (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350).
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taking a ‘hard look at environmental consequences.’” 32 Indeed, “NEPA does not prohibit
mandates that the agency gather, study, and disseminate information concerning the
environmental effects can thus be NEPA compliant where ‘the agency has considered
those effects and determined that competing policy values outweigh those costs.’” 35
Further, the Fifth Circuit has found that the fact that plaintiffs or their experts take
great issue with the factual findings and ultimate conclusions of the agency does not
render those findings and conclusions “arbitrary and capricious.” 36 As the court noted,
government agencies-and not the federal courts-are the entities NEPA entrusts with
Where conflicting evidence is before the agency, the agency and not the
reviewing court has the discretion to accept or reject from the several
sources of evidence. The agency may even rely on the opinions of its own
experts, so long as the experts are qualified and express a reasonable
opinion. 37
Moreover, even if a court was convinced that the plaintiffs' experts were more
32
Id. (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835).
33
Id.
34
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351.
35
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 255 F.Supp.3d 101, 113 (D.D.C.
2017)(quoting Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 191 (4th Cir. 2009)).
36
Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2003).
37
Id. at 243, quoting Sabine River, 951 F.2d at 678.
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persuasive than those relied upon by the agency, the court would still be compelled to
uphold the agency’s finding so long as their experts were qualified and their opinions
reasonable. 38
B. CWA
The Clean Water Act is a pollution control statute that establishes a comprehensive
program designed to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters.” 39 To achieve this goal, the CWA prohibits the discharge of
pollutants, including dredged or fill material, into navigable waters unless authorized by a
CWA permit. 40 The CWA defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States,”
Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Corps to regulate discharges of dredged
and fill material into wetlands through permitting procedures. 42 In addition to passing a
public interest review which balances reasonably expected benefits against reasonably
foreseeable detriments, all CWA section 404 permits must meet guidelines issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Corps under CWA section 404(b)(1). 43 These
“404(b)(1) Guidelines” specify that the Corps must ensure that the proposed fill will not
cause significantly adverse effects on human health or welfare, aquatic life, and aquatic
38
Id. (citing Sabine River, 951 F.2d at 678; Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851 (“[w]hen specialists
express conflicting views, an agency must have the discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own
qualified experts, even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive.”)).
39
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
40
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
41
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)-(b).
42
33 U.S.C. § 1344.
43
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1), 1344(e)(1); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4.
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ecosystems. 44 To comply with this requirement, the Corps must make a written
determination of the effects of a proposed activity “on the physical, chemical, and
The 404(b)(1) Guidelines also provide that “no discharge of dredged or fill material
shall be permitted unless appropriate and practicable steps have been taken which will
minimize potential adverse impacts of the discharge on the aquatic ecosystem.” 46 Under
the Guidelines, a project may generally not be permitted where there is “a practicable
alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the
aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse
environmental consequences.” 47
C. RHA 48
The principal purpose in enacting the Rivers and Harbors Act 49 was to facilitate the
federal government's ability to ensure that navigable waterways, like any other routes of
commerce over which it has assumed control, remain free of obstruction. 50 “The
coverage of the Rivers and Harbors Act is broad, and its principal beneficiary is the United
44
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c)(1)-(3).
45
Id. § 230.11.
46
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d).
47
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a); see generally City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 332 F.Supp.2d 992, 1015–16
(S.D.Tex. 2004).
48
Plaintiffs have not brought a challenge under the RHA; however, the Section 408 EA upon which the
Corps relied in the Section 404 EA was conducted pursuant to the RHA, thus it is summarily explained.
49
33 U.S.C. § 408.
50
Board of Com’rs of Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., LLC, 88
F.Supp.3d 615, 632 (E.D. La. 2015)(citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201, 88
S.Ct. 379, 19 L.Ed.2d 407 (1967)).
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States government.” 51 Section 408 of the Rivers and Harbors Act makes it illegal for any
person to damage or impair a public work built by the United States to prevent floods. 52
However, the Corps may “grant permission for the alteration or permanent occupation or
use of any of the aforementioned public works when ... such occupation or use will not be
injurious to the public interest and will not impair the usefulness of such work.” 53
pipeline through the Atchafalaya Basin” pending a merits challenge to the permit. 54 A
preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” that may only be awarded
upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. 55 A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) that their
substantial injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom they seek to enjoin;
and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. 56
applying the four-part test, “a sliding scale is utilized, which takes into account the intensity
51
Id. at 632-33 (citing In re S. Scrap Material Co., L.L.C., 713 F.Supp.2d 568, 575 (E.D.La. 2010) (Feldman,
J.) (citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201, 88 S.Ct. 379, 19 L.Ed.2d 407
(1967))).
52
Id. at 633 (citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 408).
53
Id., n. 160 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 408).
54
Rec. Doc. 15-1.
55
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008).
56
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Hidalgo Cty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2012); accord
Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974).
57
Monumental Task Committee, Inc. v. Foxx, 157 F.Supp.3d 573, 582 (E.D. La. 2016)(citing Texas v.
Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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ultimate success at final hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable injury
“should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried the burden of
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. 63 “Given this limited purpose,
and given the haste that is often necessary if those positions are to be preserved, a
preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less
formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” 64 For this reason,
the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court deciding whether to grant a
58
Id.
59
Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 958 (3d Cir. 1984).
60
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985).
61
Planned Parenthood v. Suehs, 692 F.3d at 348.
62
Miss. Power & Light Co., 760 F.2d at 621.
63
Monumental Task Committee, Inc. v. Foxx, 157 F.Supp.3d at 582 (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451
U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981)).
64
Id. (quoting Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395)(internal quotation marks omitted).
65
Id.
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“Perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary
irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered.” 66 The focus of this
inquiry is not so much the magnitude but the irreparability of the threatened harm. 67 The
Fifth Circuit has defined irreparable harm to mean “harm for which there is no adequate
injunction.” 69 “[A] preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility
of some remote future injury.” 70 There must be more than “an unfounded fear on the part
of the applicant.” 71 Accordingly, the party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that
the threatened harm is “more than mere speculation.” 72 Therefore, “[a] presently existing
66
11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1
(3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter Wright & Miller].
67
See Callaway, 489 F.2d at 575.
68
Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 2013); accord
Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir. 2011).
69
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).
70
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wright & Miller, supra, § 2948.1); Morrell v. City of Shreveport, 536
Fed.Appx. 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2013).
71
Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985).
72
Janvey, 647 F.3d at 601; see also Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674, 51 S.Ct. 286, 75
L.Ed. 602 (1931) (“[An injunction] will not be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at
some indefinite time in the future.”); Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (“[T]he injury
must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.”).
73
Morrell, 536 Fed.Appx. at 435 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,
262 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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a preliminary injunction may not be granted unless the plaintiff has shown a likelihood—
not just a possibility—of irreparable harm. 74 In Winter, the district court and Ninth Circuit
had held that when a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits,
harm. 75 The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's “possibility” standard as too
lenient. 76 Accordingly, a court must deny a motion for a preliminary injunction unless the
injunction.
Plaintiffs content that numerous courts have found that the loss of trees constitutes
irreparable injury, even where they constitute a relatively small part of a larger
ecosystem. 77 The Fifth Circuit found that the loss of trees along a river, impacting the
river’s ecology, could constitute irreparable harm even though the total acreage affected
Plaintiffs also claim that construction of the project has commenced and will start
with clearing a 75-foot wide path through the unique and valuable cypress forest swamp,
including countless trees over a century old. Trees in the path provide valuable habitat
74
See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22–23, 129 S.Ct. 365.
75
Id. at 21, 129 S.Ct. 365.
76
Id. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365 (“Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm
is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”).
77
Rec. Doc. No. 15-1 at 44 (citations omitted).
78
Id. at 45.
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for wildlife and a variety of other ecological benefits. 79 There are also many individual
“heritage” trees in the right of way that were already ancient at the time of the Louisiana
Purchase. It is also highly unlikely that any cypress forests will regenerate. 80 Plaintiffs
state: “It is hard to imagine a more compelling example of ‘irreparable’ harm than that.” 81
Plaintiffs also contend that construction will also alter the Basin’s hydrology and
siltation rates, leading to the loss of yet more cypress-tupelo swamp due to sediment
accretion. 82 Further, spoil banks will aggravate hypoxic condition in the Basin by inhibiting
the natural north-south flow of water, degrading aquatic habitat and further suffocating
Plaintiffs posit that these impacts are not just irreparable to the environment but
have real consequences for Plaintiffs and their members. For example, hundreds of
in the Basin harvesting crawfish, a profession that once sustained Basin communities for
generations. 84
In opposition, the Corps contends that Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing their lawsuit and
filing their motion for relief belies any harm that is immediate or irreparable. Preliminary
injunctions are generally granted under the theory that there is an urgent need for speedy
action to protect the Plaintiff’s rights, and a plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit thus undercuts
79
Id. at 45-46.
80
Id. at 46 (citing Wilson Decl., Conner Decl.).
81
Id.
82
Id. (citing Van Heerden Decl., Exhibit 2, Eustis Decl.).
83
Id. at 46-47 (citing Exhibit 1 at 19-20; Eustis Decl.; Meche Decl.).
84
Id. at 47.
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allegations of irreparable harm. 85 The Corps argues that, here, rather than filing promptly,
Plaintiffs waited nearly a month to file their complaint and then waited over two weeks to
move for a TRO and file their preliminary injunction motion although Plaintiff Atchafalaya
Basinkeeper has been aware of the proposed route since January 5. Thus, Plaintiffs’
delay in seeking an order to enjoin the tree-clearing that allegedly causes irreparable
harm is “inexplicable and unexplained.” 86 The Corps further contends that Plaintiffs’
proffered Declarations fail to show that the injury to their aesthetic and recreational
interests are irreparable in light of the mitigation required under the permits. That
mitigation has been deemed sufficient to compensate for losses to the natural
environment, and Plaintiffs have failed to establish the threat of irreparable harm in this
motion.
harm. BBP contends Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to support the suggestion that
there are a great number of heritage trees that will be cut. For instance, one of Plaintiffs’
declarants claims that there are many “old growth” trees in the surrounding “forest,” but
does not establish that there are “many” in the narrow right-of-way. 87 Indeed, of the two
tree. 88
85
Rec. Doc. No. 37-2 (citing Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Shalala, 81 F.Supp.2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000)).
86
Id. at 42.
87
Rec. Doc. No. 36 at 36 (citing Rec. Doc. No. 15-43 ¶ 15 (Conner Decl.)).
88
Id. (citing Rec. Doc. No. 15-43 at Fig. 2; Rec. Doc. No. 15-44 Ex. E (Wilson Decl.)).
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BBP claims that, during the tree survey conducted by BBP, the survey identified
only five cypress trees with a 36 inches or greater dbh 89 in either the permanent or
temporary right of way. Even if all five trees are cut down, BBP contends this is a de
minimus number, representing less than 0.08% of the remaining cypress relic trees in the
Basin. 90 Further, BBP maintains that the Corps reasonably concluded that much of the
cleared area “would be allowed to revegetate” 91 While Plaintiffs disagree with this
conclusion, BBP contends their language reveals their uncertainty – the trees will
“probably” not grow back. Not only are these assertions speculative, but they rely on
expert say-so, which is insufficient when the Corps has applied its own expertise to reach
a contrary conclusion.
BBP also contends Plaintiffs have conceded that mitigation is available to remedy
past harm – the very antithesis of irreparable harm. 92 Thus, whatever impact may have
occurred from earlier developments, BBP maintains that all Plaintiffs show is that many
of the harms alleged have already occurred. Because these past harms cannot be
prevented by a preliminary injunction, they cannot form the basis of preliminary injunctive
relief. 93
In reply, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ claim that harm was not imminent based
on Plaintiffs’ alleged “delay” is without merit. Plaintiffs repeatedly visited the project site
89
Diameter at breast height, meaning at four and a half feet above ground.
90
Rec. Doc. No. 36 at 37.
91
See Section 408 EA at 56; Section 404 EA at 45.
92
Rec. Doc. No. 36 at 38 (citing Rec. Doc. 15-1 at 27-32).
93
Id. at 39(citing Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2009)).
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to look for signs that construction was imminent and saw none. Further, Plaintiffs
reasonably anticipated construction would not begin until later in the year. As soon as
Plaintiffs saw indications that construction was imminent, they filed the injunction motion
within days. Further, in their post-hearing brief, Plaintiffs rely on the testimony of their
fact and expert witnesses, which Plaintiffs contend was “virtually uncontested,” in arguing
they have established the threat of irreparable harm. Plaintiffs contend they presented
testimony that the loss of forests would have grave ecological impacts, such as the loss
of habitat and the destruction of legacy trees that could be thousands of years old. Dr.
Conner explained how the claimed “temporary” impacts were not temporary in light of the
fact that cypress forests can no longer regenerate themselves due to changed conditions
of the Basin. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend they explained how the carving of yet another
channel from one side of the Basin to the other would alter the Basin’s hydrology and
result in changes in sediment dynamics that would cause two kinds of irreparable harm:
robbing the delta of the sediment necessary to sustain it and putting that sediment instead
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a threat of irreparable harm. First,
the Court finds no unjustified delay in the timing of Plaintiff’s motion. Further, the Court
agrees that the impact of the loss of legacy trees cannot be mitigated against or restored
to the same condition. The Court also finds that the project potentially threatens the
hydrology of the Basin and poses the threat of destruction of already diminishing
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wetlands. The Court adopts by reference the comments and findings made during the
Plaintiffs must also demonstrate a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the
merits of their claims. Courts use “a bewildering variety of formulations of the need for
showing some likelihood of success.” 95 Some courts require the movant to show that the
likelihood of success on the merits is greater than fifty percent. 96 However, the Fifth
Circuit recognizes that a finding of substantial likelihood does not require a finding of a
fixed quantitative value. 97 Rather, “a sliding scale can be employed, balancing the
hardships associated with the issuance or denial of a preliminary injunction with the
When the other factors weigh strongly in favor of an injunction, “a showing of some
likelihood of success on the merits will justify temporary injunctive relief.” 99 However, no
matter how severe and irreparable the threatened harm and irrespective of the hardships
which a preliminary injunction or lack of one might cause the parties, “the injunction should
never issue if there is no chance that the movant will eventually prevail on the merits.” 100
94
Courts within the Fifth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit use both the “substantial likelihood” and the “sliding
scale” standard for success on the merits. The Court notes that it would reach the same conclusion under
application of either standard.
95
Wright & Miller, supra, § 2948.3.
96
See, e.g., Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985).
97
Fla. Med. Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 601 F.2d 199, 203 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1979).
98
Id.
99
Productos Carnic, S.A. v. Cent. Am. Beef & Seafood Trading Co., 621 F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1980).
100
Seatrain Int'l, 518 F.2d at 180.
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To show a likelihood of success, plaintiffs must at least present a prima facie case,
but need not prove that they are entitled to summary judgment. 101 To assess the
likelihood of success on the merits, the court looks to standards provided by the
1. The Environmental Impact of Oil Spills and Incorporation of the RHA 408
EA analysis to support a FONSI relative to the CWA 404 Permit
A major dispute between the Parties is whether the Corps performed sufficient
analysis of the environmental impact on the Basin of possible oil spills. It is undisputed
that NEPA requires an assessment of direct and indirect effects which are reasonably
foreseeable. The Corps must analyze even relatively unlikely events with significant
impacts, like accidents. 103 Plaintiffs argue that the permit issuance was arbitrary and
capricious for failure to analyze the environmental impact of oil spills in connection with
the 404 EA. Plaintiffs advance three arguments. First, Plaintiffs contend that the Corps
impermissibly relied on the RHA 408 analysis, which is limited in scope and purpose, to
the CWA. Second, Plaintiffs contend that the public received insufficient notice that the
RHA 408 EA would inform the Corps’ spill analysis in the Section 404 EA. Finally, the
Plaintiffs contend that the spill modeling relied upon by the Corps was arbitrary and
capricious.
101
Daniels Health Scis., 710 F.3d at 582.
102
Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2013).
103
Supra, n. 26. ???
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A careful reading of the Section 404 EA reveals that the environmental impacts of
possible oil spills were not analyzed except in connection with the Environmental Justice
review required by Executive Order 12989. 104 In fact, as part of the “Corps Analysis of
Applicant’s Responses to Comments from the General Public” in the Section 404 EA, the
prepared as part of Section 408 review” by reference as part of its conclusory findings in
Plaintiffs argue that this amounts to impermissible stacking. Plaintiffs argue that
the Section 408 EA expressly states that it did not look at impacts to wetlands in the
104
Rec Doc. 15-31, pp 75 – 92.
105
Rec. Doc. 15-31, p. 31 (emphasis added).
106
Section 404 EA at 91.
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Basin. Plaintiffs are concerned about the risk of a spill in the Basin, but by its own terms,
the Section 408 EA doesn’t address this. Plaintiffs acknowledge that NEPA allows an
agency to rely on, or “tier,” to one NEPA document in another, but contend that this tiering
of a single project into two separate environmental analyses under NEPA is strictly
prohibited: “Proposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other closely
enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a single impact
statements.” 107 Plaintiffs maintain that the Corps should have done a single
environmental review of the project informing both permits, not separate, isolated reviews
At the hearing, the Corps explained the process of conducting the Section 408 EA
in conjunction with the Section 404 EA. The New Orleans District Commander reviewed
all of the environmental documentation, including the Section 408 EA, in reaching the
NEPA FONSI as to the RHA permit and the CWA permit, and a single administrative
record supports both determinations and is properly before the Court for consideration.
The Corps cites the Supreme Court’s decision in National Association of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 108 holding that, under the APA, a court must “uphold a decision
of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” The Corps
contends that the District Commander’s path is made clear in the conclusory findings on
107
40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a).
108
551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007).
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page 91 of the Section 404 EA where the Commander references the Section 408 EA
The Corps and BBP also addressed Plaintiffs’ complaint that the Section 408 EA
analyzed a very limited portion of the project such that it was insufficient to support the
much broader Section 404 permit. The Corps and BBP explained at the hearing that both
the Section 404 EA and the Section 408 EA relied on a spill model and analysis that
considered the risk of oil spills every 200 feet along the entire pipeline route. 109 Both EAs
reference the spill model prepared in accordance with PHMSA regulations. Further, the
Corps argues it demonstrated that the preparation of separate EAs is consistent with the
Corps’ procedures under the Engineering Circular and not an attempt to avoid compliance
The Section 408 EA explained that “[t]he model shows how far an unabated plume
could propagate in 6 hours from a release located generally every 200 feet along the
pipeline route in accordance with PHMSA modeling protocols.” 111 While the Section 408
EA applied the spill model results to the specific federal easements and projects to
determine the risks and impacts at those locations, the PHMSA model itself clearly
covered the entire pipeline. Further, the Section 408 EA compared alternative routes to
the preferred route, including with respect to the risks of an oil spill: these “alternatives
109
Section 404 EA at 75-76; Section 408 EA at 17-19.
110
Government Exhibit 34.
111
Section 408 EA at 18.
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were evaluated for the pipeline route as a whole.” 112 On these grounds, the Corps and
BBP maintain that this is not a case wherein a broader EA incorrectly rested its
conclusions on the results of a narrower EA. The analysis used by the Corps in both EAs
was co-extensive, and the spill model used to support both assessed oil spills every 200
feet along the entire 162-mile route. Moreover, Plaintiffs offered no evidence or testimony
Considering both EAs and the explanations by the Corps and BBP at the hearing,
the Court finds that it was not improper for the Corps to rely upon the Section 408 EA in
reaching its FONSI determination in the Section 404 EA. Plaintiffs’ claim that reliance on
the Section 408 EA in support of the Section 404 EA is a post-hoc litigation tactic
EA, which clearly and explicitly references and incorporates the finding of the Section 408
EA. 113 The Court is also satisfied that the spill analysis included in the Section 408 EA
b. Public Notice
Although the 408 EA was finalized in October 2017, Plaintiffs claim the Corps
maintained its existence as a “highly guarded secret,” and it was never released –
notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ vigorous efforts to gather the information. Also, the Section
112
Id. at 9-10.
113
There was no independent analysis in the Section 404 EA regarding the risk of oil spills, but the Court
is satisfied that the scope of the spill analysis conducted for the Section 408 satisfies the Section 404
requirement.
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408 EA was allegedly never released in draft form for public comment, and the final
document was never posted on the website that the Corps maintains regarding the
pipeline.
Regarding public notice, the Corps notes that the Section 408 EA was expressly
referenced in the Section 404 FONSI, 114 and Plaintiffs actually briefed this provision in
earlier pleadings. Section 1.4 of the Section 408 EA entitled “PUBLIC CONCERNS”
states that “[t]he Atchafalaya Basinkeeper responded to the Section 408 Public Notice by
letter dated March 9, 2017 with several comments. Most of the comments involved the
interaction between the District’s Section 408 process and the Section 10 and Section
404 processes being conducted by the District’s Regulatory Branch.” 115 This is concrete
evidence that the Plaintiffs were aware of the Section 408 EA and had the opportunity to
Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent the Section 408 EA addresses oil spills, it doesn’t
say a word about the risk of a leak or spill in a pipeline buried a few feet below the surface
of a unique aquatic ecosystem; it doesn’t say a word about Energy Transfer Partner’s
(“ETP”) 116 dismal safety and compliance record or the varying risks of different kinds of
crude. Thus, the Section 408 EA does not solve the Corps’ failure to look at spills in its
404 decision.
114
Section 404 EA at 91.
115
Section 408 EA at 6.
116
ETP is Bayou Bridge’s parent company.
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Plaintiffs contend that, because the scope of the RHA Section 408 EA was limited
only to the federal projects and easements along the right of way, it lacks an analysis of
the risk of spills specific to the unique ecosystems found in the Basin and is thus
incompetent analysis under CWA Section 404. According to Plaintiffs, the Basin area of
the right of way comprises only 10 percent of the total length of the right of way. Thus,
Plaintiffs contend, if the Section 408 EA only covers 10 percent of the Basin, then the real
risk of an oil spill incident is ten times as large as acknowledged in just the Basin – and
likely more since the deep underground portions will have additional protections
unavailable elsewhere. Plaintiffs maintain that the Section 408 EA’s conclusion that an
oil spill is unlikely is not supported and speculative for the pipeline as a whole and that
much of the documentation upon which BBP relies is not in the record. Thus, the Corps’
failure to address the full risks and impacts of oil spills renders its decision arbitrary and
capricious.
In defense of its permit, the Corps contends that the Section 408 EA analyzed oil
spill impacts based on a “worst case” spill scenario. 117 This spill model assumes a
“guillotine cut” to an above-ground pipeline that evacuates all of the oil in a particular
segment of the pipeline. 118 The Section 408 EA explains that this model is conservative
in that it greatly overstates the potential volume and impacts of a spill. 119 The Corps also
examined the probability that a spill of any significant volume could occur and determined
117
Section 408 EA at 52-103.
118
Id. at 17-19.
119
Id.
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that it was low. 120 The Corps notes that courts have consistently upheld the use of
of the Section 408 EA oil spill analysis. The Corps maintains that Plaintiffs failed to
understand the extent of the Corps’ analysis because, even though the scope of Section
408 is focused upon federal easement along the right of way, the pipeline spill data that
was reviewed was far broader in scope. Specifically, in analyzing the BBP pipeline, the
Corps reviewed a model that examined oil spill risks every 200 feet for the length of the
162-mile pipeline. 122 The Corps also reviewed data on oil spill impacts in connection with
its Environmental Justice analysis for each census block in the Basin and each
Plaintiffs also took issue with the Section 408 EA for not adequately considering
§ 1508.27(b)(3). However, the Corps argues that Plaintiffs have not identified any
characteristics “unique” to these sections of the route that were not already considered
by the Corps’ discussion of impacts in the federal areas. Although Plaintiffs incorrectly
assert that the Section 408 EA focused on only “a handful of deeply buried pipeline
120
Id. at 107.
121
Rec. Doc. No. 76 at 8-9 (citing Standing Rock, 255 F.Supp.3d at 132; Defs. of Wildlife v. BOEM, 684
F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counc., Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983)).
122
Section 408 EA at 18-19: “The model shows how far an unabated plume could propagate in 6 hours
from a release located generally every 200 feet along the proposed pipeline route in accordance with
PHMSA modeling protocols for determining the relative impact from a hypothetical release.”
123
See Government Exhibit 19; Section 404 EA at 75.
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segments,” 124 the Corps cites to the portions of the EA that repeatedly address and
i.e., above grade pipeline construction. 125 Further, the Tables in the Section 408 EA show
that the federal easements include wetlands, floodplains, and water bodies that are
representative of the land types on other sections of the route. 126 The Corps explained
that the spill model “assumes that the pipeline is placed on top of the ground or is floating
on top of the waterbodies,” 127 and these conservative assumptions overstate the potential
impact of a spill, making the model results applicable along the entire route. 128 The
Section 408 EA also included analysis of crossings that did not involve HDD drilling,
meaning the Section 408 assessed risks from the same closer-to-the-surface pipeline
BBP explained at the hearing that the federal projects and easements to which the
PHMSA model analysis was applied in the Section 408 EA are representative of the Basin
as a whole. Further, the factors that bear on a spill – pipe corrosion, manufacturing and
construction defects, operational errors, equipment failures, etc. 130 – are not unique to
the federal projects and easements analyzed in the Section 408 EA. There is sufficient
information in the Section 408 EA to demonstrate that the spill prevention, lead detection,
124
Rec. Doc. No. 43-8 at 9.
125
Section 408 EA at 54, 60-61, 64, & 77.
126
Id. at 23, 25, 29, 69-70.
127
Id. at 17.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 1-3.
130
Id. at 109-110.
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and spill response measures the Corps relied on in the Section 408 EA apply across the
Plaintiffs expressed particular concern with the Corps’ statement that it would defer
issues “pertaining to potential impacts to surface and ground water resources through
programs administered under the [PHMSA].” 132 Plaintiffs argue that this demonstrates
the Corps’ dismissiveness to an extremely serious risk. The Court cannot agree with
The Court has considered the evidence presented and the arguments of all Parties
on this issue, and the Court finds that, in connection with its Section 408 environmental
analysis, the Corps gave extensive and appropriate consideration to the risk of oil spills
along the entire route of the pipeline, which includes the Basin. Although the Corps’
statement in the Section 404 EA that spill risks were "not within the purview of the
Corps 133 created ambiguity, the Court must nonetheless uphold the agency’s
determination if its decision making “path may reasonably be discerned.” 134 Any
suggestion that the Corps simply dismissed the risk and referred the matter to the PHMSA
is meritless in light of the substantial attention given to this issue as set forth above in
both EAs. Indeed, it is appropriate for the Corps to rely on the expertise of the PHMSA
131
Id. at 111-115.
132
Section 404 EA at 30.
133
Rec. Doc. 15-31, p. 31
134
Note 107 supra.
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in this regard. In OVEC v. Army Corps of Engineers, 135 the court noted that the concerns
raised by the plaintiffs and the EPA primarily related to water quality. 136 In that case, the
court noted that, “[u]nder the Clean Water Act, that responsibility lies with WVDEP and
the NPDES permit, not the § 404 permit.” 137 Further, the court stated that it was not
unreasonable “for the Corps to rely on the expertise of the WVDEP, the agency with
primary responsibility for water quality, in determining that impacts on water quality will
be insignificant.” 138 The Corps’ reliance and deference to the PHMSA in this case is no
Further, Plaintiffs have provided the Court with no scientific or technical challenge
to the PHMSA spill risk model utilized by the Corps. While the Court acknowledges
Plaintiffs have not had access to the specific model, the Court agrees that the record in
this matter is overwhelmingly sufficient for Plaintiffs to understand the analysis performed
and provide the Court with any scientific or technical challenge to the model and analysis
employed. Plaintiffs have failed to do so, and the Court finds that Plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to the claims pertaining to the risk
of oil spills. The Court finds that, on the record presently before the Court, the record is
replete with evidence that the Corps did indeed take a “hard look” at the risk of oil spills;
thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they are likely to
135
883 F.Supp.2d 627 (S.D. W.V. 2012).
136
Id. at 645.
137
Id.
138
Id.
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succeed on the merits of the claim that the Corps was arbitrary or capricious in its
2. Mitigation
Plaintiffs contend the opportunities for public input on the mitigation plan were
insufficient under both NEPA and the CWA. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, to issue a permit for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters “after notice and opportunity for
public hearings.” 139 Likewise, NEPA requires a process for public comment and debate.
The Corps must publish notice soliciting public comment within fifteen days after receipt
of a complete application. 140 If the application is incomplete, the Corps must request from
the applicant any additional information necessary for a complete application. 141
including necessary drawings, sketches, or plans sufficient for public notice.” 142 Detailed
engineering plans and specifications are not required; however, the application must
describe “the location, purpose and need for the proposed activity; scheduling of the
activity; the names and addresses of adjoining property owners; the location and
139
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
140
33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(2); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
141
33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(1).
142
Id. § 325.1(d)(1).
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interstate, state, or local agencies ... including all approvals received or denials already
made.” 143 In short, a complete application is defined in terms of the sufficiency of the
warrant public notice, it is controlled by the Corps' regulation that governs the content of
a public notice. 145 Public notice serves as “the primary method of advising all interested
parties of the proposed activity for which a permit is sought and of soliciting comments
and information necessary to evaluate the probable impact on the public interest.” 146
Therefore, “[t]he notice must ... include sufficient information to give a clear understanding
of the nature and magnitude of the activity to generate meaningful comment.” 147 Further,
the regulation lists items of information that should be incorporated into the notice,
including, in relevant part, “[a]ny other available information which may assist interested
parties in evaluating the likely impact of the proposed activity, if any, on factors affecting
the public interest.” 148 However, “[t]he issuance of a public notice will not be delayed to
Plaintiffs state that, under the CWA, the notice issued by the Corps must include
“sufficient information to give a clear understanding of the nature and magnitude of the
143
Id.
144
Id. 325.1(d)(10) (“An application will be determined to be complete when sufficient information is received
to issue public notice.”).
145
See id. § 325.3(a).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. § 325.3(a)(13).
149
Id. § 325.1(d)(10).
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mitigation is the single most important material issue related to the justification of a § 404
permit.” 151 Plaintiffs rely on the decision by the Virginia District Court in OVEC, which
held that a public notice that contains no substantive information on mitigation violates
NEPA as well as the CWA. 152 Plaintiffs claim that the Corps’ notice for the Bayou Bridge
project fell far short of notice requirements. Even after a supplemental application, the
notice failed to include any detail regarding mitigation. Further, the details of the
mitigation plan – using “out of kind” credits far from the project site – were not revealed
until the permit was issued. Plaintiffs argue these are profound problems that the public
and other agencies never had an opportunity to address. 153 Plaintiffs claim there is no
dispute that the only notice provided regarding mitigation was comprised of a single
credits from Corps-approved mitigation banks within the New Orleans District.” 154 The
Plaintiffs claim they were not able to meaningfully comment on the actual mitigation plan
– out-of-kind mitigation credits for a different type of wetland far from the project site –
which wasn’t revealed until the decision was finalized. Defendants’ argument that the
one sentence description of the mitigation plan meets these standards falls short.
The Corps maintains that the public received sufficient notice regarding proposed
150
Id. quoting 33 C.F.R. § 325.3(a); §325.3(a)(13).
151
Id. (quoting Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 674 F.Supp.2d 783, 804 (S.D.W.
Va. 2009)).
152
Id. (citing OVEC, 674 F.Supp.2d at 809).
153
Id. at 37.
154
Id. at 36 (citing Exhibit 9 at 2).
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mitigation as it provided notice that BBP would be purchasing acreage credits from Corps-
approved mitigation banks in the six watersheds that would be impacted by the project as
required by 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(b)(2). For purposes of the CWA, the Corps contends it
issued public notice providing “sufficient information to give a clear understanding of the
nature and magnitude of the activity to generate meaningful comment,” including “any
information which may assist interested parties in evaluating the likely impact of the
proposed activity ... on the public interest.” 155 If it is determined that no alternative would
have a lesser impact on the aquatic ecosystem, the Corps conducts a public interest
review to evaluate probable impacts of the project balancing the reasonably foreseeable
intrinsic part of this review is formulating special permit conditions that mitigate temporary
and permanent project impacts by avoiding, minimizing, and reducing wetland impacts to
the extent possible and providing on or off-site compensatory mitigation for unavoidable
impacts. 156
The record reflects that, following the public notice and comment period, the Corps
conducted a joint public hearing with the LDEQ on January 12, 2017 and a second public
hearing on February 8, 2017 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and officially fielded additional
comments until January 30, 2017. Plaintiff Atchafalaya Basinkeeper submitted comments
making the very arguments raised in this lawsuit: criticizing the use of mitigation bank
155
33 C.F. R. § 325.3(a), (a)(13).
156
33 C.F. R. §§ 320.4(r), 325.4(a), (c), 332.3(a); 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.92, 230.93(a).
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credits and urging the Corps to instead require BBP to remediate historic spoil banks
created by different companies. Indeed, in the same paragraph where Plaintiffs now
allege they received insufficient notice, they also admit that they nonetheless were able
out-of-kind mitigation.” 157 By Plaintiffs’ own admission, the Corps did provide adequate
The Corps attempts to distinguish the OVEC 158 opinion, arguing that it provides no
support for Plaintiffs’ position. In OVEC, the notices failed entirely to discuss
compensatory mitigation because, at the time the notices were published, the applicants
had yet to develop a compensatory mitigation plan. In contrast, the Corps claims that the
notice Plaintiffs challenge here is “robust,” 159 containing details about the project’s
temporary and permanent impacts and accurately describing the permittee’s planned
mitigation for unavoidable wetland impacts as purchasing mitigation credits from Corps-
approved mitigation banks within the New Orleans District. The Corps argues this notice
satisfies both CWA regulations and NEPA’s aim of fostering meaningful public
participation.
The Court finds that the Corps provided sufficient public notice and opportunity to
comment under both NEPA and the CWA. That Plaintiffs’ complaints at that time are the
same as the complaints raised in this lawsuit is telling. Further, the Court finds that the
157
Rec. Doc. No. 15-1 at 26-27.
158
674 F.Supp.2d 783 (S.D.W.V. 2009).
159
Rec. Doc. No. 37-2 at 34.
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Section 404 EA contains 26 pages of public comments and the Corps’ detailed responses
thereto. 160 The Court finds that the substance and detail of the public comments are
evidence that the public notice was sufficient to provoke robust public debate about the
The Fifth Circuit has “consistently accepted the proposition that reliance on
mitigation measures may reduce a project’s impacts below the level of significance.” 161
The Fifth Circuit also recognized that the Supreme Court “has held that proposed
mitigation measures need not be laid out to the finest detail, even within the more labor-
160
See Section 404 EA at 5-31.
161
O’Reilly, 477 F.3d at 231 (“In Spiller, 352 F.3d at 241, we explicitly approved that principle, while noting
that “we have implicitly endorsed [such] use[.]” Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 803 (5th
Cir.1994) (holding that EAs satisfied NEPA where they considered appropriate alternatives, including
mitigation measures) and Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that it was proper
to consider restrictions placed on dredging permits in reviewing the agency's decision not to file an EIS)).
Other circuits agree. See, e.g., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682
(D.C.Cir.1982); C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 844 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir.1988); Greenpeace
Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir.1992); Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th
Cir.1991); Audubon Soc'y of Cent. Ark. v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.1992)).
162
Id. (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d
351 (1989) ( “There is a fundamental distinction ... between a requirement that mitigation be discussed in
sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated ... and a substantive
requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted.”); Miss. River Basin
Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 176–77 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352, 109 S.Ct.
1835)).
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and the reasons set forth there for its conclusion that each significant
environmental impact it had identified would be reduced to insignificance by
its prescribed mitigation measure. 163
With respect to compensatory mitigation under the CWA, the Code of Federal
***
the environmentally preferable compensatory mitigation may be provided
through mitigation banks
***
Compensatory mitigation requirements must be commensurate with
the amount and type of impact that is associated with a particular DA
permit. 164
imposing a mechanical and rigid hierarchy under which the outcome here – mitigation
credits miles away from the pipeline site that bear zero ecological or hydrologic
relationship to the impacts of the project – was the only permissible one. Citing 33 C.F.R.
332.3(a), the Plaintiffs contend the regulations direct precisely the opposite: a careful
and balanced analysis to arrive at the “environmentally preferable” approach that actually
163
Id. at 231-32 (internal citations omitted).
164
33 C.F.R. § 332.3(1) (emphasis added).
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offsets the environmental impacts which result from permit issuance. Plaintiffs aver no
such careful analysis ever took place, in violation of the CWA and NEPA.
Rather than working through the hierarchy as the regulations direct, Plaintiffs claim
the Corps simply selected a mitigation banking approach under which off-site and out-of-
kind mitigation credits would be used, without any consideration or analysis of whether
other alternatives would be feasible. Plaintiffs submit that there appears to have been
zero consideration given to the core question of whether the off-site credits would
“successfully replace lost functions and services” in light of aquatic habitat, connectivity,
In opposition, the Corps argues that it must choose from a “limited menu” of
compensatory mitigation options in a “strict priority” order. 166 Because wetland mitigation
bank credits appear first in this hierarchy, the Corps contends wetland mitigation bank
credits should be used for impacts within the service area of an approved bank that has
an appropriate number and type of resource credits. 167 The Corps claims this priority
outstanding resource based on rigorous scientific and technical analysis.” 168 Further,
while in-kind mitigation is ordinarily preferable, the Corps contends it may authorize out-
of-kind mitigation if it determines, based on a watershed approach, that it “will serve the
165
33 C.F. R. § 332.3(b)(1).
166
Rec. Doc. No. 76 at 15.
167
33 C.F. R. § 332.3(b)(2).
168
Rec. Doc. No. 76 at 15-16, quoting 33 C.F. R. § 332.3(b)(2).
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The Court starts with the plain words of the regulation. 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(b)(1)
provides:
The regulation does not use the word “hierarchy,” nor does the regulation specify
a “strict priority” as argued by the Corps. A plain reading of the regulation proscribes the
order of considering the “type and location of compensatory mitigation,” but this is not the
same as a “strict priority” as to the type of mitigation selected as the Corps suggests.
mitigation bank credits are to be considered first. 172 Accordingly, the Court takes no issue
with the Corps proceeding through specified order of consideration; however, rote
reliance on what the Corps calls a “strict priority” without any rational explanation as to
169
33 C.F. R. § 332.3(e)(1)-(2).
170
Emphasis added.
171
33 C.F.R. 332.3(b)(1).
172
33 C.F.R. 332.3(b)(2).
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how the mitigation choices serves the stated goal of “replac[ing] lost functions and
33 C.F.R 332.3(b)(2) specifies that “the district engineer should give preference to
the use of mitigation bank credits when [stated] considerations are applicable. However,
these same considerations may also be used to override this preference, where
appropriate.” 174 Thus, while there is a stated preference for the use of mitigation bank
credits when considerations exist, 175 the same considerations “may also be used to
override this preference, where appropriate, as, for example, where . . . a permittee-
responsible project will restore an outstanding resource based on rigorous scientific and
technical analysis.” 176 There was no analysis or consideration in the Section 404 EA of
whether a “preference” for mitigation bank credits was appropriate or whether the
particular mitigation bank credits to be acquired are “located where it is most likely to
173
33 C.F.R. 332.3(b)(1).
174
Emphasis added.
175
“Since an approved instrument (including an approved mitigation plan and appropriate real estate and
financial assurances) for a mitigation bank is required to be in place before its credits can begin to be used
to compensate for authorized impacts, use of a mitigation bank can help reduce risk and uncertainty, as
well as temporal loss of resource functions and services. Mitigation bank credits are not released for
debiting until specific milestones associated with the mitigation bank site's protection and development are
achieved, thus use of mitigation bank credits can also help reduce risk that mitigation will not be fully
successful. Mitigation banks typically involve larger, more ecologically valuable parcels, and more rigorous
scientific and technical analysis, planning and implementation than permittee-responsible mitigation. Also,
development of a mitigation bank requires site identification in advance, project-specific planning, and
significant investment of financial resources that is often not practicable for many in-lieu fee programs. For
these reasons, the district engineer should give preference to the use of mitigation bank credits when these
considerations are applicable.” 33 C.F.R. 332.3(b)(2).
176
Id.
177
33 C.F.R. 332.3(b)(1).
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ROW will have unavoidable environmental impacts in the Atchafalaya Basin. 179
wetlands [will] be permanently converted from forested to herbaceous wetlands within the
permanent right-of-way.” 180 The Section 404 EA states that “[t]he proposed project will
change and/or reduce wetland functional quality along the route of the proposed ROW by
conversion of forested habitat types.” 181 The EA identifies “[a] key issue(s) of concern in
178
Section 404 EA at 2.
179
The applicant, Intervenor BBP, concedes that there will be “unavoidable impacts” in the Section 404 EA
at 22-30. The Corp notes in the EA “there will be permanent conversion and green impacts associated with
construction and maintenance of the pipeline ROW.” Section 404 EA at 46-50.
180
Section 404 EA at 2.
181
Id. at 50-51.
182
Id. at 58.
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According to the Section 404 EA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (“USFWS”)
objected to the proposed clearing and maintenance of a 30 foot ROW “within forested
wetlands due to their high ecological value.” 183 “[T]o avoid current and future forested
wetland loss form this precedent-setting proposal, the USFWS strongly opposes the
clearing of forested wetlands.” 184 The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
placing the pipeline in a location that “would add to the cumulative effect of ecologically
detrimental hydrologic alteration, and the pipeline would obstruct planned efforts to
restore hydrologic function.” 186 LDNR requested that the pipeline be installed “at a depth
at or below that of the adjacent natural swamp.” 187 The Corps responded that “[i]t was
In its discussion of the wetland impacts, the Corps notes that, in the permanent
pipeline ROW, “existing forested wetlands will be cleared of all tree stratum and hence
183
Id. at 6-8.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 9-11.
186
Id. at 12.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 46-50. According to the Corp, “it is expected that a typical ROW corridor will exist as more of a
scrub shrub habitat during its life span.” Id.
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“typical habitats” will be affected “throughout the Atchafalaya Basin.” 190 The Corps
recognizes that these “are important natural communities for the maintenance of water
quality, provid[e] a very productive habitat for a variety of fish and wildlife species and,
The Section 404 EA describes the functionality and value of the wetlands which
It is this value and functionality that is determinative of the nature and type of
to “successfully replace lost functions and services.” 194 “The district engineer must
practicable and capable of compensating for the aquatic resource functions that will be
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 48.
193
Id. at 68 (see discussion).
194
33 C.F.R. § 332.3(b)(1).
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lost as a result of the permitted activity.” 195 To that end, the regulations require that
compensatory mitigation “be commensurate with the amount and type of impact that is
The Corp concluded that 597.48 acres of wetlands will be impacted by the project,
of which, 142.03 acres will be permanently impacted. 197 The Corp identifies the
temporary conversion of wetlands as the “most prevalent” 198 and proceeds to provide a
“breakdown of the temporary impacts by workspace for the proposed ROW.” 199 The
Section 404 EA is, however, devoid of similar data for the 142 acres of wetlands which
will be permanently impacted, i.e., irretrievably lost. Labeling the temporary wetlands
impacts as the “most prevalent” does not dispense with the obligation to analyze the
permanent, albeit less “prevalent” losses. The Section 404 EA is lacking in any discussion
impacts to wetlands that [will] result from permit issuance.” 200 BBP purchased 65 acres
in-kind/in-basin and 163.8 acres out-of-kind/in basin 201 from the Bayou Fisher Mitigation
Bank. In total, BBP proposed to purchase 2019.2 mitigation bank credits for
195
Id.
196
33 C.F.R. § 332.3.
197
Section 404 EA at 63-64.
198
Id. at 63.
199
Id. at 63-64.
200
Id. at 65.
201
Id. at 68. Plaintiffs dispute that the mitigation bank is actually in-basin, but for the purposes of these
proceedings the Court accepts the Corps’ determination that the mitigation bank is “in-basin.”
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environmental impacts in the Atchafalaya Basin. 202 According to the Corps, 519.7 credits
were required to mitigate for impacts to Bottomland Hardwoods (BLH), and 1499 credits
were required to mitigate for impacts to Cypress/Tupelo swamp. Yet, only 434.5
Cypress/Tupelo swamp credits were actually purchased (1064.5 less than the number of
credits required) and 1584.7 of BLH credits were purchased. In a footnote, the Corps
discloses that “1064.7 BLH credits were purchased as out-of-kind/in-basin credits to offset
imposed, 204 the Corp concluded that the “effect” on the wetlands was “neutral as a result
of mitigative action.” 205 Despite this conclusion, there is not an iota of discussion,
analysis, or explanation how BLH credits mitigate the loss of function and value of the
environmental impacts. 206 However, there is precious little analysis of what “best
practices” will offset temporary impacts. The Court finds the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
O’Reilly particularly applicable to this case as the O’Reilly also held that no detail was
provided to demonstrate how “best practices” would work to mitigate lost function and
value.
202
Id. at 63-64, Chart 2.
203
Id. at 68.
204
Mitigation bank credits
205
Id. at 52 (see chart).
206
Section 404 EA at 26, 28.
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Section 404 EA fails to
demonstrate that the chosen mitigation measures effectively address and remediate the
adverse impacts such that a FONSI was proper. As stated by the O’Reilly court, “the EA
provides only cursory detail as to what those measures are and how they serve to reduce
measures is not self-evident … the EA does not provide a rational basis for determining
that the Corps has adequately complied with NEPA.” 207 The Court further finds the
207
O’Reilly, 477 F.3d at 234.
208
Id. at 234.
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Corps failed to sufficiently
justify its reliance on mitigation in reaching the FONSI. There is simply no assurance in
the EAs that the mitigation plan will be successful in accomplishing the restorative goals
of the CWA. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits regarding
mitigation.
Plaintiffs contend the Corps improperly ignored the long history of noncompliance
with Corps permit conditions for other pipelines that have resulted in irreparable
ecological damage to the Basin. 209 Equally problematic, according to Plaintiffs, is that the
Corps ignored the oil and gas industry’s extensive record of noncompliance with Corps’
pipeline permits. Plaintiffs contend that the past pipeline construction has left spoil banks
across much of the Basin which have been devastating to its ecology and hydrology. 210
Further, virtually every commenter who participated in the permit process raised
this history of noncompliance as a reason either to deny the permit or to conduct a full
EIS. The Corps can only forgo such an analysis if compliance with the permit conditions
is assured to occur. Being “hopeful” that compliance will occur is insufficient grounds to
excuse the preparation of an EIS. 211 “[S]uch hope does not provide a sufficient basis on
which to rest a § 404 permit and FONSI.” 212 Because the Corps illegally dismissed
209
Rec. Doc. No. 15-1 at 25.
210
Id. at 31 (citing Exh. 3 at 3-6; Meche Decl. ¶¶14-17; see also Bd. of Comm’rs of the S.E. La. Flood Prot.
Auth. V. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC, 29 F.Supp.3d 808, 816 (E.D. La. 2014)).
211
See Friends of Back Bay v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 681 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2012).
212
Rec. Doc. No. 15-1 at 32 (citing Friends of Back Bay, 681 F.3d at 588).
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historic noncompliance as irrelevant to the current permit, Plaintiffs argue this is a failure
to consider “all factors” which bear on the public interest determination. Plaintiffs also
maintain that Energy Transfer Partners (“ETP”), Bayou Bridge’s parent company, is out
of compliance on another pipeline in the very same Basin and has an egregious history
of violating environmental standards. 213 In sum, Plaintiffs claim it is undisputed that the
Corps has granted many pipeline permits that prohibit spoil banks in the Basin; however,
these terms have been routinely violated, and the Corps has failed to enforce those permit
conditions. The Corps’ NEPA and CWA analysis doesn’t say a single word about
noncompliance, nor does the permit propose anything different than what the Corps has
The Corps rejects Plaintiffs’ arguments and claims it properly relied on mandatory
permit conditions and project design features in assessing impacts. The Corps did not
need to consider the possibility of non-compliance because the conditions are mandatory,
and the Corps has regulatory power to enforce them. The Corps reasonably relied on
those conditions and its regulatory power to enforce them in reaching its finding of no
significant impact. Further, Plaintiffs’ argument is contrary to Fifth Circuit case law and is
speculative. Here, the permit issued by the Corps contains several mandatory conditions
that, if not followed, allow the Corps to invoke suspension, modification, and revocation
213
Id. at 34 (citing Exhibit 22; Eustis Decl. at ¶¶ 22, 26, 55; Wilson Decl. ¶¶ 31-34; Exhibit 33 at 2).
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The Corps maintains that both EAs respond to Plaintiffs’ comments regarding
possible spoil bank impacts. In light of the permit’s extensive conditions, the permittees’
repeated assurance of compliance with those terms and industry best practices, as well
as the Corps’ own regulatory authority to enforce the permit’s conditions, it was
reasonable for the Corps to consider the permits mitigation requirements in reaching a
FONSI. Unlike the Friends of Back Bay case, the Corps is not merely “hopeful” that the
permittee will adhere to the conditions in the permit – the Corps enjoys the regulatory
authority to enforce those conditions should the permittee fail to uphold them, through
actions up to and including revocation of the permit and recommending civil enforcement.
The Corps cites to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in State of Louisiana v. Lee:
unremediated spoil banks, including potential impacts from noncompliance by BBP. The
Corps cites to both EAs where the Corps referenced historical spoil banks from past
projects in analyzing cumulative impacts. 215 The Corps contends nothing more was
214
758 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1985).
215
See Section 404 EA at 50; Section 408 EA at 119.
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required under NEPA. Further, the Corps contends the law is clear that Plaintiffs cannot
BBP contends under both NEPA and the CWA, the Corps’ analysis is limited to the
impacts of this pipeline. 216 Thus, the Corps addressed and rejected Plaintiffs’ concern
regarding the alleged noncompliance of other pipelines. In the Section 404 EA, the Corps
noted these complaints and BBP’s response to these concerns that the right of way must
in the Section 404 EA is the fact that several pipelines about which Plaintiffs complain
pre-date the CWA and Section 404 permitting; thus, they are not out of compliance. 218
BBP contends the Corps resolved this dispute, explaining that it “has considered
comments received from the public in response to the Public Notice and Public Hearing.
[the Corps] has determined that the concerns presented and falling within the Corps
special permit conditions.” 219 Thus, rather than ignoring Plaintiffs’ concerns, the record
216
NEPA is concerned with the environmental impact of the “proposed action.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C). The
relevant factors under the CWA concern the impacts at “specified disposal cites.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
217
Section 404 EA at 23, 25, 28, 29, 36, 38, 40, 45, 51, 53, 55, 57, & 63. Likewise, the Section 408 EA
mentions BBP’s obligation to restore the right-of-way to “pre-construction contours” at least nine times.
Section 408 EA at 56, 57, 63, 65, 81, 98, 119, 122.
218
Section 404 EA at 23.
219
Id. at 30.
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reflects that the Corps addressed Plaintiffs’ concerns and explained that they could be
addressed through permit conditions which were included in the permit. 220
Having thoroughly read and considered the EAs and the Section 404 permit
conditions placed on BBP, the Court finds that the Corps failed to sufficiently consider
and address past noncompliance and cumulative effects in relation to this proposed
project. The EA acknowledges that, “in the past, many actions were taken with little
consideration [of] project related impacts on wetlands.” 222 The Corps concedes that
“[s]imilar CEMVN permits for the period 1970-present has authorized impacts to
220
BBP also argues that Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that BBP will not abide by these permit
conditions. Plaintiffs’ argument is entirely based on the behavior of other companies. Further, the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion in In re Louisiana Crawfish Producers, 852 F.3d 456, 463-65 (5th Cir. 2017) confirms that
ETP had not created the allegedly out-of-compliance spoil banks, and Plaintiffs’ non-compliance argument
is unsupported.
221
O’Reilly, 477 F.3d at 234-235.
222
Section 404 EA at 50-51.
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numerous acres of wetlands.” 223 The Section 404 EA categorizes this project as “very
large” when “compared to other pipeline activities within the watersheds” 224 and describes
“this project [as] larger in function and size when compared to the extent of other wetlands
contribute cumulatively to wetland alteration and loss.” 225 The Corps further anticipates
resource.” 226 Considering past environmental impacts, the size and significance of the
proposed project, and projections that “authorizations will continue to increase,” the Corps
concern. 227
In short, the Corps concedes in the Section 404 EA that this project will “contribute
cumulatively to wetland alteration and loss.” 228 Despite this finding, the EA provides
utterly no analysis of permit conditions or mitigation that address this admitted cumulative
effect. The EA merely concludes, without any analysis, that “[i]t is anticipated that through
the efforts taken to avoid and minimize effects on the project site wetlands and the
223
Id. at 58.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 50-51.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 58.
228
Id. at 50-51.
229
For the reasons stated, the Court finds that the Corp failed to meaningfully analyze how the proposed
mitigation “functionally compensates” for the impacts.
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unavoidable remaining impacts, permit issuance will not result in substantial direct,
The Court finds that the Section 404 EA provides insufficient information to
conclude that the Corps took a “hard look” at past, present, and future cumulative
measures would significantly reduce these effects. Thus, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits regarding the Corps’ failure to adequately consider
and address the cumulative impacts of the project. The Corps’ and BBP’s myopic view
that they are only required to consider the impacts of this singular project is not consistent
Finally, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must also establish that
their substantial injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom they seek to
enjoin and that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. This
requires a balancing of harms to the parties, which involves an evaluation of the severity
of the impact on the defendant should the temporary injunction be granted and the
hardship that would occur to the plaintiff if the injunction should be denied. In addition, the
court must consider whether an injunction would injure the public interest. However, there
is no need to weigh relative hardships which a preliminary injunction or the lack of one
230
Section 404 EA at 51.
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might cause the parties unless the plaintiff can show some likelihood of ultimate
success. 231
Plaintiffs contend the Corps relied on an arbitrary and unlawful balancing in which
the benefits of operating the crude oil pipeline were expressly weighed, while the risks of
such operations were ignored. 232 Although the Corps repeatedly touts the benefits of
operating the pipeline, the Corps explicitly weighed the benefits of operating a crude oil
pipeline while explicitly refusing to consider the risks. Such a one-sided comparison
violates NEPA. 233 In Sierra Club v. Sigler, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a Corps EIS for a
port project that “painted a rosy picture” of the economic benefits but totally ignored the
risk of oil spills associated with the benefits. 234 Plaintiffs argue that, here, the Corps
ignored the considerable economic benefits put at risk by this project such as impacts on
tourism and travel revenues, impacts to ecosystems such as flood control, and the cultural
and heritage values of “a centuries-old way of life in the Basin under siege.” 235 Without
considering these impacts, the Corps “tipped the scales” in favor of project approval, in
violation of NEPA. 236 Plaintiffs posit that this “sham” analysis also violates the CWA which
prohibits impacts to wetlands unless the Corps finds that “the benefits of the proposed
alteration outweigh the damage to the wetlands resource.” 237 The Corps cannot properly
231
Seatrain Int'l, 518 F.2d at 180.
232
Rec. Doc. No. 15-1 at 25.
233
Id. at 42.
234
Id. at 43 (quoting Sigler, 695 F.2d at 976).
235
Id. (citing Meche Decl.)
236
Id.
237
Id. at 44 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(4)).
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weigh the benefits against the harm when it refuses to consider the harm.
Thus, Plaintiffs contend that the balance of harms weighs in favor of an injunction.
Further, there is no harm at all to the Corps from an injunction vacating a permit while this
case proceeds. 238 While an injunction could delay the schedule for this project, it is well-
established that temporary economic harm does not outweigh permanent environmental
degradation such as loss of forests – especially ancient trees – or damage to wetlands. 239
Further, Plaintiffs ask this Court to temporarily enjoin the Corps to withdraw the Permit
within the Atchafalaya Basin only – construction outside the Basin could proceed within
As to the public interest, Plaintiffs state that, “[t]he public interest is always served
by requiring compliance with Congressional statutes.” 241 The public interest is best
served by granting the preliminary injunction and having the Corps address “the public’s
expressed environmental concerns” and comply with the requirements of NEPA and the
CWA prior to the construction of the project. Further, federal and state legislatures have
prioritized the protection and restoration of the Atchafalaya Basin through multiple
projects, reflecting the strong public interest in protecting and recovering this special
place. It is also in the public interest to preserve the unique cypress swamps of the
238
Rec. Doc. No. 15-1 at 47.
239
Id. (see string cite)
240
Id. at 48.
241
Id. at 49 (quoting ADT v. Capital Connect, Inc., 145 F.Supp.3d 671, 700 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
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Atchafalaya, especially where the evidence before the Court is such that forests are
likelihood and impact of oil spills, the beneficial effects of project design limitations and
compensatory mitigation, and potential floodplain impacts. The Corps also properly
declined, in the absence of credible supporting evidence, to base its review on the
presumptions that BBP would violate the requirements of its Section 404 permit and that
the Corps would entirely decline to enforce the CWA with respect to the project.
Further, the Corps claims it devoted a significant amount of time and attention to
petroleum releases from the proposed project. 243 While the Corps did refer to the
expertise of the PHMSA in the area of pipeline regulation, safety and operation, the Corps
did so by looking to the databases of pipeline safety and release information that PHMSA
compiles, and closely examining the pipeline modeling and Risk Assessment that were
The Corps maintains that it did consider potential temporary and permanent
and recreational hunting and fishing. With respect to the flood plain, the Corps found that
the project design parameters would minimize impacts such that they would be minor and
242
Id. at 49-50.
243
See Section 404 EA , Part 1.A.
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during construction. 244 For the same reason, the Corps also found that impacts to
commercial and recreational fishing and hunting would be temporary during actual
construction activity, and then only within the construction foot print. 245 Once construction
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the Corps argues that it did consider their
comments regarding alleged permit noncompliance; however, the Corps did not choose
to base its public interest review on a worst case scenario in which BBP ignores the Permit
requirements and the Corps subsequently refuses to enforce them. The particular Permit
and there is a strong public interest in the certainty and reliability of permits granted by
the Corps. The ability of the Corps to fulfill those policies depends to some extent on the
certainty that its permits represent. Thus, the Corps contends that a preliminary injunction
clouding the permits issued to BBP could set precedent harmful to the public interest.
BBP contends it will suffer certain harm from a delay of the project at a cost of
more than $950,000 per day, or $25 million per month. Cessation of all construction
activities is alleged to cost more than $1.675 million per day, or $44 million per month.
Cessation would also force BBP’s contractors to lay off or furlough hundreds of workers.
244
Section 408 EA at 63.
245
Id. at 128.
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The work of suppliers, subcontractors, and vendors would also be brought to a halt,
causing significant adverse impacts on the local economy and tax base. 246
The Court has considered the Parties’ arguments and finds that the balance of
harms and public interest considerations support a preliminary injunction in this case.
The Court is mindful of the importance of local employment and the economic benefits
this project may yield. However, the Court finds Intervenors’ evidence of the monetary
losses not supported by underlying data. The claimed financial losses are not supported
by specific details or analysis justifying the vast amounts presented. Moreover, this
injunction would only apply to the construction in the Basin, leaving a substantial area
The Supreme Court has stated that, “[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can
of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance
of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.” 247
balancing the harms for an injunction. In fact, because damage to the environment is
injunction.” 248 The Court finds the temporary delay in reaping economic benefits does
246
The position of Intervenor Stupp also focuses on the alleged economic harm to its business, employees,
and the local economy if the Court granted a preliminary injunction.
247
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
248
OVEC, 528 F.Supp.2d at 631.
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not outweigh the permanent harm to the environment that has been established as a
result of the pipeline construction. The Court also notes that economic harm to BBP as
a result of temporary cessation of work in the confines of the Basin can be ameliorated
with construction scheduling and diversion of efforts to construction efforts along the other
90 percent of the ROW not affected by the Court’s injunction. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the balance of harms and the public interest in the environment weighs in favor of an
injunction.
IV. BOND
Plaintiffs have asked the Court to waive the bond requirement in this case given
their non-profit status as public interest plaintiffs. The Corps does not appear to oppose
this request; however, BBP maintains that there is no reason in this case to excuse the
bond requirement. BBP contends Plaintiffs have significant resources, more than enough
to pay a bond, and BBP will suffer financial harm if the project is delayed. BBP cites the
Seventh Circuit’s holding that “nonprofit entities should pay their way, reimbursing the
preliminary injunctions later dissolved.” 249 BBP claims that Plaintiff Sierra Club
contribute to a bond. BBP argues that the years required to litigate this matter are likely
249
Habitat Educ. Ctr. V. U.S. Forest Serv., 607 F.3d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 2010).
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In response, Plaintiffs contend that, in the event the Court should impose a bond,
it should be nominal because the public interest plaintiffs in this case do not have the
funds to pay a substantial bond and would be forced to withdraw their request for a
preliminary injunction – effectively denying them the relief to which they are entitled.
Plaintiffs claim that three of them are small, local non-profit organizations with one to
thirteen staff members and mostly restricted funds that are not available for anything other
than the specific work for which they were raised. For example, for its crude oil-related
work, Sierra Club has to apply to a separate entity, Sierra Club Foundation, for restricted
grants. Its total budget 2017 was $140,000, and all that money is currently devoted to
the Club’s advocacy work and therefore unavailable. Plaintiff also challenges BBP’s
“grossly inflat[ed]” potential injuries and argues that any economic loss to BBP would be
BBP’s fault. 250 Further, Plaintiffs’ injunction request extends only through the Basin, not
to other areas where the pipeline would operate. As such, the Court should either
dispense with the bond or require only a nominal bond consistent with governing law.
Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 65(c) provides that a bond must be posted before a federal court
may issue an interlocutory injunction and that the enjoined defendant may recover on the
bond if a court later determines that it was “wrongfully enjoined.” This bond requirement
serves two functions: “(1) it assures the enjoined party that it may readily collect damages
from the funds posted or the surety provided in the event that it was wrongfully enjoined,
250
Rec. Doc. No. 65 at 34.
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without further litigation and without regard to the possible insolvency of the assured, 251
and (2) it provides the plaintiff with notice of the maximum extent of its potential liability,
since the amount of the bond ‘is the limit of the damages the defendant can obtain for a
wrongful injunction, ... provided the plaintiff was acting in good faith.’” 252
The Fifth Circuit has held that, “[w]hile a district court's failure to require the posting
of a bond or other security constitutes grounds for reversal of the injunction, 253 some
courts have waived the security requirement when they have found that the plaintiff was
financially responsible 254 or was very likely to succeed on the merits. 255 Indeed, the Fifth
Circuit has also stated: “In holding that the amount of security required pursuant to Rule
65(c) ‘is a matter for the discretion of the trial court,’ 256 we have ruled that the court “may
The Court has considered the arguments of all Parties. The Court hereby Orders
that Plaintiffs shall, in accordance with Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
provide security in the amount of $10,000.00. The Court finds that security in the amount
of $10,000.00 is reasonable considering that the Plaintiffs are mostly non-profit agencies
251
Continuum Co., Inc. v. Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1989)(citing Coyne–Delany v. Capital
Development Bd., 717 F.2d 385, 391 (7th Cir.1983)).
252
Id. (quoting Coyne–Delany, 717 F.2d at 391).
253
Id. (citing 11 Wright & Miller Federal Practice & Procedure § 2954, p. 524).
254
Id. (citing Monroe Div. Litton Business Sys. Inc. v. De Bari, 562 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir.1977); Continental
Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782–83 (10th Cir.1964)).
255
Id. (citing Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir.1972)).
256
Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1996)(quoting Corrigan Dispatch Company v.
Casa Guzman, 569 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir.1978); see also City of Atlanta v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority, 636 F.2d 1084, 1094 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 1981). But see Continuum Company, Inc. v.
Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir.), reconsidered on other grounds, 883 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.1989).
257
Id. (quoting Corrigan Dispatch, 569 F.2d at 303).
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with limited resources, and the injunctive relief ordered is confined to construction
activities in the Atchafalaya Basin, which is a small portion of the right of way permitted.
Hence, the Court finds that the permittee can ameliorate the costs of the preliminary
V. CONCLUSION
For the oral and written reasons assigned, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction 258 relative to the construction of the permitted Right of
Way within the Atchafalaya Basin, and Defendant and Intervenors are hereby ENJOINED
from taking any further action on the project within the Atchafalaya Basin, in order to
prevent further irreparable harm until this matter can be tried on the merits. It is further
ORDERED that the Plaintiffs shall post a bond of $10,000.00 forthwith; and it is further
ORDERED that this Order shall be valid until final disposition of this case on the merits.
BBP’s Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal 259 is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
258
Rec. Doc. No. 15.
259
Rec. Doc. No. 83.
44142
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