Paleth Digest
Paleth Digest
January 13,
2003]
FACTS:
Complainant claimed that he did not sign the board resolution nor did he attend a board meeting of
the corporation on the date stated therein (March 30, 1998), and therefore the signature purporting
to be his was a forgery. He alleged that the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
had in fact certified that it did not have a copy of the board resolution in question because
respondent had not submitted his notarial report for March 1998. Furthermore, according to
complainant, the records of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) showed
that Nobuyasu Nemoto was out of the country on March 30, 1998, having left the Philippines on
March 26, 1998 and having returned only on March 31, 1998. Hence, complainant claimed, it was
impossible for Nobuyasu Nemoto to have attended the supposed board meeting on March 30, 1998
and to have signed the resolution on the same date. Complainant charged that respondent
knowingly and maliciously notarized the said board resolution without the presence of the party
allegedly executing it.
ISSUE: Can a Jurat be signed even if the notary public is not present?
RULING:
It is necessary that a party to any document notarized by a notary public appear in person before
the latter and affirm the contents and truth of what are stated in the document.] The importance of
this requirement cannot be gainsaid. The acknowledgement of a document is not an empty
meaningless act. By it a private document is converted into a public document, making it admissible
in court without further proof of its authenticity. For this reason, it behooves every notary public
to see to it that this requirement is observed and that formalities for the acknowledgment of
documents are complied with.
In this case, Nobuyasu Nemoto, who was allegedly a signatory to a resolution of a corporation,
allegedly notarized by respondent, could not have signed the document on March 30, 1998, the date
indicated therein, since he was not then in the Philippines. Respondent’s explanation that Nemoto
actually signed the document on March 31, 1998, after arriving from Japan, cannot be
accepted. Documents must speak the truth if their integrity is to be preserved. That is what a
notary public vouches for when he states in the jurat that the parties have appeared before him at
the time and in the place he (the notary public) states and that the document is then a free act and
deed. It is for this reason that public documents are given full faith and credit, at least as to their
due execution.
[Adm. Case No. 5831. January 13, 2003]
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The second complaint alleged similar facts involving Citimotors, Inc. as the
payee of another promissory note in which Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe, as
makers, obligated themselves solidarily to pay the former P674,640.00 in
monthly installments. The promissory note was secured by a chattel mortgage
on a Mitsubishi L-300 Exceed Montone Van (1997 model), which BPI-FSB, as
holder of the said promissory note, sought to foreclose due to the makers failure
to comply with its terms and conditions. [2]
In his answer dated June 6, 2001, respondent Cabredo admitted that his
secretary, Rose Tria, had indeed received P51,161.00 from Esphar, but
claimed that Tria failed to inform him about it. It was only when he read Esphars
first demand letter dated March 21, 2000 that he learned for the first time about
the receipt of the money. Respondent claimed that he failed to get complainants
demand letters of March 24, 2000 and January 5, 2001 because of lapses on
the part of his staff. He thus shifted the blame on his staff.
7. It is quite unfortunate that this incident happened all thru the fault of the law firm
personnel. In spite of respondents candid, honest and sincere desire to faithfully and
religiously serve good clients, [his efforts have been] rendered inutile by lapses of his
staff;
8. Respondent believes that complainant Cesar A. Espiritu would not have resorted to
this present action had the firm personnel been vigilant enough to inform respondent
of this matter.
Considering that this is the fifth (5th) time that the respondent has failed to appear
despite notice, the undersigned Commissioner has no option but to decide the case on
the basis of the pleadings submitted. It must be noted that despite receipt of the Orders
of the Commission, the respondent Atty. Juan Cabredo IV has failed to appear before
the Commission on Bar Discipline.
This case is deemed submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the
parties. [7]
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
a lawyer should be very scrupulous. Money or other trust property of the client
coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by the latter and
accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be
commingled with his own or be used by him. [11]
In this case, respondent claims that he did not know about the receipt by his
secretary on the amount of P51,161.00 received from Esphar until he read the
first demand letter of the company, which stated:
Due to your failure to make an interbank deposit as what we have agreed upon
yesterday, March 20, 2000, we are sending bearer, MRS. MARITESS
ALEJANDRINO, to collect the amount of P51,161.00 representing payment intended
for BPI FAMILY BANK which was coursed through your office per your instruction.
We are hoping that you will not fail to return the money through bearer hereof. Her
specimen signature is shown below for identification purposes.
Thank you.
(signed)
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
(signed)
MARITESS ALEJANDRINO
However, even after receiving this notice and two other demand letters,
respondent never returned the money of complainant nor paid it to the
bank. Indeed, it is improbable that respondents secretary failed to inform
complainant about the receipt of such a substantial sum of money. In failing to
account for the money of his client, respondent violated not only the Code of
Professional Responsibility but also his oath to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his clients. Like judges, lawyers must not only be proper but they
[12]
must also appear to be so. This way, the peoples faith in the justice system
would remain unshaken. [13]
handle money given to them in trust by their clients and the necessary
consequences for violation thereof. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides,
for one year for failing to return P1,500.00 belonging to his client despite
numerous demands.In Castillo v. Taguines, a lawyer failed to deliver to his
[16]
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The records sufficiently establish that Vicente Fernandez (father of complainant) filed
Civil Case No. 3726 (hereinafter referred to as the first case) in the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City on October 10, 1985 against Cresencia Dahildahil (common
law wife of Ko Chun) involving Lots 3, 4, and 5 all of Bacolod Cadastre covered by
TCT No. 29264 of the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City. The action was for
recovery of possession and sum of money.
The case suffered considerable delay due to one reason or another stated in the trial
courts decision of February 24, 1997. Finally, after eleven (11) long years of
litigation, the trial court resolved the main issue that plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence to prove his ownership of Lot 3, 4, and 5, Block 1, evidenced by TCT No.
29264 (page 18 Decision; Annex A of Complainants Position Paper) and ordered the
defendant Dahildahil to return possession of the property to plaintiff.
The decision was appealed by Dahildahil to the Court of Appeals. But, later, she
abandoned her appeal (CA G.R. No. 56999) and did not pursue it on the advice of
herein respondent (Comment of Respondent dated August 5, 1999). Consequently, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal which dismissal became final on October 3,
1998.
On October 26, 1998, or 23 days after the dismissal of the appeal, Civil Case No. 98-
10520 (hereinafter referred to as the second case) was instituted by Dahildahils
children against the heirs of Vicente Fernandez, including the complainant, for
cancellation of title of the same property litigated in Civil Case No. 3726 (first case)
and adjudged by the court as belonging to Vicente Fernandez, upon the advice of
herein respondent (Respondents Position Paper on page 2).
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that [the] plaintiffs in the second case
(children of Dahildahil by the late Ko Chun) merely adopted as their cause of action
the defense put up by their mother in the first case.
....
When the final judgment in the first case (Civil Case No. 3726) was being executed
by the prevailing party, the defendant Dahildahil, thru respondent, vigorously opposed
the move on the ground that the pendency of the second case (Civil Case No. 98-
10520) poses a civil prejudicial question which must be resolved before any further
proceedings, or execution, can be taken in the first case.
With equal vigor, the trial court rejected this position. It ruled that precisely there
being identity of parties plaintiffs and defendants in Civil Case No. 98-10520 (second
case) are mere successors-in-interest of the parties at bar; [as the] cause[s] of action
and subject matter [of the two cases are the same], the finding of this Court having
become final and executory, res judicata sets in and Civil Case No. 98-10520 is barred
by prior judgment (Resolution dated August 19, 1999; Annex A of the Supplemental
Reply).
....
Once more the trial court repudiated this feeble stand of the respondent and [denied
Dahildahils Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ of Execution].
Under the Revised Rules of Court, a lawyer shall counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. (Rule 138, Sec. 20, C)
The persistent obstruction engineered by the respondent to the execution of the final
judgment in the first case coupled with his filing of the second case which was
primarily intended to relitigate the settled issue of ownership of subject property is
clearly transgressive of this rule.
....
The Resolution of August 19, 1999 (which resolve[d] respondents motion to quash
writ of execution in the first case) and the Order of December 9, 1999 (which
resolve[d] the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent of the August 19, 1999
resolution) as well as the Order dated August 3, 2000 (which resolve[d] the motion to
dismiss and the Opposition thereto filed in the second case), discussed thoroughly the
doctrine of res judicata. Unfortunately, however, the respondent did not benefit from
the lessons therein.
Likewise clear in the judgment dated February 24, 1997 (first case) is the trial courts
resolution of the question of who is the true owner of Lot No. 3, Block 1, Lot 4, Block
1 and Lot 5, Block 1 evidenced by TCT No. T-29264, the plaintiff (Vicente
Fernandez, herein complainants father) or the late Ko Chun (father of respondents
client who are plaintiffs in the second case) (on page 3).
....
The issue of true ownership, therefore, of the lots in question is no longer debatable.
....
From all of the foregoing, it is not unreasonable to conclude and hold that respondent
indeed availed of unfair means to unduly delay the termination of the first and second
cases which achieve[d] his objective of prolonging the enjoyment of the property by
his clients gratis et amore and to the detriment and prejudice of the complainant.
Stated in another way, the respondent misused the rules of procedure to impede the
noble ends of justice.
Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file . . . briefs,
let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing
pointless [cases] that only add to the workload of the judiciary . . . which is
burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should
advise them when a case should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter
the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law
or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not
deserve the attention of the courts. [4]
Second. Respondents contention that Civil Case No. 98-10520 is not barred
by the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 3726 because the two involved different
parties and causes of action have no legal basis. The doctrine of res judicata
applies not only to the same parties but also to their successors-in-interest. In [5]
this case, the respective heirs of the parties in Civil Case No. 3726, became the
parties in Civil Case No. 98-10520, which concerned the same parcels of land
and the same title subject of litigation in Civil Case No.
3726. Furthermore, as the IBP investigating commissioner noted, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-10520 merely adopted the defense raised by their
mother Cresencia Dahildahil in Civil Case No. 3726, i.e., their natural father, Ko
Chun, had purchased the parcels of land in question from a certain Venancio
Lim but had them titled in the name of Vicente Fernandez, his nephew, because
of the prohibition of ownership of real estate by aliens. Thus, the complaint in
Civil Case No. 98-10520 alleged:
2. That the plaintiffs are the son[s] and daughter of spouses Ko Chun and Cresencia
Dahildahil, said spouses not [being] legally married[.] Plaintiffs are Filipino citizens,
while the defendants are the children of spouses Vicente Fernandez and Venancia
Chua Fernandez;
3. That in the month of August 1965 Ko Chun purchased Lot 3 Block 1, Lot 4 Block 1
and Lot 5 Block 1 from the original owner Venancio Lim for the sum of P65,000.00[.]
Ko Chun being a Chinese citizen put the title of the property in the name of Vicente
Fernandez, . . a relative of Ko Chun. [6]
On the other hand, as the trial court stated in its decision in Civil Case No.
3726:
In her answer with counterclaim, defendant alleges inter alia: That subject properties
Lot 3, Block 1, Lot 4 Blk. 1 and Lot 5 Blk. 1 all situated in the City of Bacolod, . . .
are actually owned by her husband Ko Chun or his estate. The money paid for the
acquisition of said lots came from the exclusive and personal funds of the Ko
Chun. However, since the late Ko Chun at the time of the acquisition of said
properties was a Chinese citizen, he placed the title of said properties in the name of
the plaintiff, Vicente K. Fernandez, in order to circumvent or do away with the
constitutional prohibition against aliens, who are disqualified from acquiring
properties in the Philippines . . .
[7]
In its decision in Civil Case No. 3726, the trial court declared Vicente K.
Fernandez to be the owner of the parcels of land in question. The trial court
said:
After going over the version of the plaintiff [Vicente Fernandez] as supported by the
testimonial evidence of his witnesses as well as his documentary evidence and the
version of the defendant [Cresencia Dahildahil], supported by the testimonial
evidence of her witnesses as well as her documentary evidence, this Court is inclined
to give plaintiffs version more credit and weight.
....
All told, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to prove his ownership of Lots 3,
4, and 5, Block 1, evidenced by TCT No. T-29264.
While on the other hand, the evidence presented by defendant falls short of
establishing the ownership of her [late] husband [Ko Chun] of Lots 3, 4, and 5, Block
1, evidenced by TCT No. T-29264. [8]
the practice of law for a period of one year for trying to frustrate the execution
of a judgment through the filing of frivolous appeals and resort to other dilatory
tactics. We find it appropriate for the same penalty to be meted out to
respondent in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the IBP Investigating Commissioner as
approved by the IBP Board of Governors, finding respondent Atty. Dionisio C.
Isidto guilty of violation of Rules 10.03, 12.03, and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED and respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with WARNING that
commission of any or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. Let copies
of the Decision be entered in his record as an attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1469. January 13, 2003]
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.,
Echague, Isabela. The criminal complaint against complainant and the other
[2]
accused alleged:
That on or about July 2, 2001 at Barangay Gumbaoan, Echague, Isabela and within
the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspired and
confederated [and] made certification as barangay officials of this barangay, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wrote THAT UNDERSIGNED IS
NOT A LAW ABIDING MEMBER OF THIS BARANGAY AND [HAS] MANY
BAD RECORDS AND [IS] FACING PENDING CASES IN COURT and which
words tend to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt over the person of the
undersigned and his family to the damage and prejudice of the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(original signed)
JEFFREY ILORETA
Complainant
On August 14, 2001, Atty. Marcelino J. Alzate, Branch Clerk of Court of MTC
of Echague, issued a subpoena requiring complainant and his co-accused to
[3]
appear before the court on September 5, 2001, at 8:30 in the morning, for
preliminary investigation. On August 28, 2001, the accused moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that in cases of libel, except for the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor, only a municipal trial court judge in the capital town
of the province can conduct a preliminary investigation. Since Echague is not
the capital town of Isabela, respondent had no authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation in this case. [4]
including herein complainant, were arrested while they were attending the
hearing of a case in court. The following day, September 6, 2001, they filed a
motion for the reduction of their bail to P4,000.00, which respondent granted on
the same day. After posting their bail bond in the reduced amount, the accused
were ordered released. In his affidavit dated September 12, 2001, complainant
alleged that he suffered anxiety and was deeply prejudiced because of his
arrest.
On September 19, 2001, respondent issued an order recalling the warrant
of arrest he had issued and remanded the records of the case to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor for the holding of a preliminary investigation. In his
order, respondent stated: [6]
The accused stand charged of the crime of Libel by means of writings defined and
penalized under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code which carries a penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, hence within the
jurisdiction of first level courts pursuant to [B.P. Blg.] 129, as amended.
Moreover, pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code on General Provisions
relative to the crime of Libel, jurisdiction to try Libel cases rests with the Regional
Trial Court and the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Provincial or
City Fiscal of the province or city, or by the Municipal Court of the City or Capital of
the Province where such action may be instituted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the Records of the case be forwarded to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of the Preliminary Investigation.
The Warrant Of Arrest earlier issued by this Court and the bailbonds posted by all of
the accused are hereby set aside and/or cancelled having been issued/ordered beyond
the Courts jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO P. PINE
Acting Judge
facts. He explains that he is saddled with work and, therefore, is liable to make
mistakes. He claims that as soon as he realized his error, he lost no time to
correct it by remanding the case to the Prosecutors Office, which has
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases, and ordering the
release of the accused. His comment reads:
Your Honor, I only have Wednesdays and Thursdays of every week to attend to cases
before the MTC of Echague, Isabela. I conduct preliminary
examinations/investigations in the morning of every Wednesdays and make
Resolutions and/or Decisions in the afternoon. I hear Civil Cases in the morning of
every Thursdays and hear Criminal Cases in the afternoon. Considering the number of
cases (which were already considerably reduced) pending with this Court which I
have to attend to, plus the cases pending before the MCTC of Jones-San Agustin and
the MCTC of Ramon-San Isidro which I also handle, not to mention four (4) special
cases assigned to me before the MTC of Cordon, Isabela. I am vulnerable to
committing lapses and/or mistakes. At any rate, the mistake has already been
corrected with the issuance of the Order dated September 19, 2001, Annex A
hereof. Practically, the complaint has become moot and academic and the complainant
was not damaged because he was ordered released on the same day he submitted
himself to the Court and posted his reduced bail which was later returned to him.
Your Honor, I humbly beg for leniency and understanding even as I promise to be
more vigilant next time.
(original signed)
RENATO P. PINE
Acting Judge
In its report, dated August 9, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) recommends that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter and that respondent judge be fined in the amount of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos for gross ignorance of the law for conducting a preliminary
investigation on the case. Citing the legal maxim ignorance of the law excuses
no one, the OCA rejects respondents explanation and notes that the fact that
the accused moved to dismiss the case should have put him on guard that the
said case was erroneously filed in his sala.
The recommendation is well taken.
Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code indeed provides that preliminary
investigations of libel cases shall be conducted by the provincial or city
prosecutor of the province or city or by the municipal court of the city or capital
of the province in which the criminal action may be filed. In this case, the MTC
of Echague, over which respondent presides, is not a municipal trial court of the
city or of the capital of the province and, therefore, has no jurisdiction to conduct
the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 5807. This is a matter which
respondent, as presiding judge, ought to know. In Dumo v. Perez, this Court
[8]
said that although judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly
or administratively for every erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him
in good faith, it is imperative that they should have basic knowledge of the
law. The jurisdiction of the court over which one presides is such basic
matter. To be able to render justice and to maintain public confidence in the
legal system, judges must keep abreast of the laws and jurisprudence. Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Obviously, they
cannot live up to this expectation if they act in a case without jurisdiction through
ignorance.
In Cacayoren v. Suller, the respondent judge was fined P3,000.00 in each
[9]
case filed against him for misapplying the rulings of the Court by taking
cognizance of an action for damages based on malicious prosecution even if
there was as yet no acquittal nor final dismissal rendered by the court in the
criminal cases. In Ubando-Paras v. Fernandez, the respondent judge was
[10]
fined P5,000.00 for ordering the release of an accused in a criminal case even
though he had paid the bail bond merely by means of a check and did not post
a cash bond. In Bajet v. Areola, the respondent judge issued an order
[11]
decide before his retirement from the service seven (7) criminal cases and three
(3) civil cases within the 90-day reglementary period. The OCA recommended
a fine of P5,000.00 to be imposed on the respondent but the Court lowered it
to P2,000.00. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Quizon, the Court[13]
fined P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law for issuing orders impleading the
owners of the motor vehicle as the accused in a criminal case for reckless
imprudence instituted as a result of a vehicular accident involving the said
vehicle.
In the case at bar, respondents liability is somewhat mitigated by his candor
in admitting his mistake and promptly correcting it. Apparently, he did not
appreciate the point of law raised when his authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation in the libel case was first questioned. But, as soon as he realized
his mistake, he lost no time in declaring himself without jurisdiction to continue
acting in the case and immediately ordered the release of complainant and his
co-accused. A fine of P5,000.00, as recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator, would thus appear to be an appropriate sanction to impose on
respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato P. Pine of the Municipal Trial
Court of Echague, Isabela, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) with ADMONITION to be more assiduous in the study of cases and
the applicable statute and jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
[A.C. No. 5843. January 14, 2003]
RESOLUTION
Puno, J.:
On January 19,1999, complainant Jeno A. Pilapil filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Cebu Chapter a complaint against respondent Atty. Gerardo Carillo for
negligence in the performance of his duties as counsel.
The Complaint alleged that Pilapil filed a labor case against Visayan Electric
Company. He was represented by Atty. Carillo. In December 1996, after they received an
adverse ruling from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Pilapil and Atty.
Carillo decided to elevate the case to the Supreme Court on certiorari. In January 1997,
Pilapil made a follow up with Atty. Carillo regarding his case, and the latter told him that
he was already preparing the petition. Pilapil, nonetheless, reminded Atty. Carillo of the
60-day period within which to file the petition. Atty. Carillo assured him that there was
nothing to worry about. Pilapil continued to make follow-ups with Atty. Carillo for one year,
but the latter would always give him the same answer. Atty. Carillo informed Pilapil to wait
as he was still working on the petition. Atty. Carillo eventually admitted to Pilapil that when
he went to the Supreme Court, he was told that the Court would not entertain the petition
unless they give a valid reason why it was not filed on time. Atty. Carillo thus instructed
Pilapil to secure a medical certificate from his family doctor to be used as justification for
the late filing of the petition. When the doctor refused to issue a medical certificate, Atty.
Carillo advised Pilapil to go to a doctor whom he personally knows. But he was still unable
to secure a medical certificate. Hence, Pilapil filed this complaint against Atty. Carillo.[1]
On March 18, 1999, the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines ordered the respondent to submit an answer to the complaint within six (6)
days from notice. A copy of the order was received by respondents agent on April 5,
1999.[2]
On May 7, 1999, the Commission on Bar Discipline received a copy of the motion for
extension of time to submit an answer dated April 14, 1999 filed by respondent. [3]
On May 13, 1999, respondent having failed to file his answer within the period given,
Pilapil filed a motion to declare respondent in default and to submit the case for resolution
based on the documents and pleadings submitted.[4]
The case was set for hearing at the IBP on July 21, 2000.[5]
On June 19, 2000, complainant filed a motion for the transfer of the venue of the
hearing since both parties reside in Cebu City. In the alternative, complainant prayed that
the case be resolved based on the pleadings and documents filed. [6] The IBP required
respondent to comment on the motion within ten (10) days from notice. [7]
On January 12, 2001, the Commission on Bar Discipline, granting complainants
motion for the transfer of the venue of the hearing, forwarded the records of the case to
the Board of Governors for appropriate action.[8]
The records show that respondent did not file an answer to the complaint as
previously required by the IBP. Hence, on July 24, 2002, the IBP, through Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan, submitted its Report and Recommendation. It recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It made the following
observation:
The records of this case show that respondent has not filed his Answer despite his
earlier motion requesting for time within which to file such Answer. On the other
hand, the letter-complaint of complainant is straightforward in its allegation that
respondent, who was complainants lawyer in a labor case he filed against Visayas
Electric, failed to file a petition for certiorari of the adverse decision rendered in said
case.
We agree with the observation and recommendation of the IBP. Respondents failure
to file an answer to the complaint despite notice from the IBP amounts to an admission
of the allegations therein. Furthermore, respondents stubborn refusal to submit the
required answer despite the lapse of considerable length of time, as his failure to file the
petition for certiorari relative to complainants labor case, is clear evidence of negligence
on his part. Respondent did not even offer an explanation for his omission. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that every lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.[10] It further states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.[11] Thus, we uphold the recommendation of the IBP finding respondent liable for his
negligence in handling complainants suit against Visayan Electric Company which had
been entrusted to him as counsel.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished on the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC. January 16, 2003]
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
Judges, like ordinary mortals, are subject to human limitations. At times, the
great tides of perturbing and overwhelming emotions engulf
them. Notwithstanding so, they are expected to be cerebral men who can[1]
Badoy?, and Unorthodox Behavior Analyze Badoy, Erap Lawyers ask SC.
[5] [6]
Acting on the media reports, this Court directed Justice Badoy to show
cause why he should not be administratively charged with conduct unbecoming
a Justice of the Sandiganbayan. [7]
In his compliance, Justice Badoy alleged that three days prior to the
[8]
incident, he could not find his Resolution ordering that former President Estrada
be detained at Fort Sto. Domingo.So he requested the National Bureau of
Investigation to conduct an investigation, but to no avail. Thus, on November
29, 2001, agitated that someone might have stolen the Resolution and claimed
that he (Justice Badoy) sold it for a fee, he decided to go to the GMA-7
Broadcast Station and report its loss, in order that the public may know he is
honest. In going there, he chose to ride in an ambulance because he felt very
sick and cold, intending to proceed to a hospital after the interview.
A.M No. SB-02-10-J is set on a different factual milieu, to wit:
Subsequent to the descent of former President Estrada from power, the
Office of the Ombudsman filed several criminal cases against him, his family,
and friends. One of them is Criminal Case No. 26558 wherein he, his son
Jose Jinggoy and Atty. Edward Serapio stand accused for violation of Republic
Act No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law. The case was raffled to the Third Division
of the Sandiganbayan composed of Justice Badoy, as Chairman, and Justices
Teresita Leonardo-De Castro and Ricardo M. Ilarde, now retired, as members.
On September 13, 2001, after the termination of a series of pre-trial
conference between the parties, the Sandiganbayan furnished them and their
counsel with a copy of the Pre-trial Order for their signatures. The defense
panel composed of Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag (lead counsel), Justice Serafin R.
Cuevas, Attys. Jose B. Flaminiano, Felix D. Carao, Jr., Cleofe V. Verzola, and
Delia H. Hermoso, refused to sign it on the grounds that: 1) there is no provision
in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring them to sign a Pre-trial
Order; 2) they were not given ample time to read it; and 3) it incorporates a
[9] [10]
statement that they admitted the existence of certain exhibits although there
was no such admission. [11]
wait for his turn, Atty. Saguisag persisted, prompting her to bang the gavel twice
and order him to stop arguing. This led Justice Badoy to order four Sheriffs to
[13]
Thereafter, Justice De Castro ruled in open court that the assailed portion
of the Pre-trial Order could be deleted. [15]
and set the trial proper on October 1, 3 and 4, 2001 and thereafter, every
Monday, Wednesday and Thursday of the week, all at 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon. [17]
Feeling aggrieved, former President Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and all their
counsel of record in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed the instant administrative
complaint charging Justices Badoy and De Castro with:
1) dishonesty and misrepresentation for incorporating in the Pre-trial
Order a statement that the defense admitted Plaintiffs Exhibit A up to Exhibit C-
45 and its submarkings as to its existence notwithstanding the fact that they did
not admit the same; [19]
of the plunder case three times a week, resulting in the revision of the trial
settings embodied in the courts Order dated September 14, 2001. Fourth, the
[26]
appointment of three (3) PAO lawyers was intended to provide the accused with
adequate legal assistance during the hearing. And fifth, they resolved the
accuseds three motions to quash only on July 9, 2001 because the parties last
pleading was filed only on July 5, 2001. [27]
For his part, Justice Badoy maintains that the Pre-trial Order has not
prejudiced the accused since they were not obliged to sign it and that they are
free to object to the presentation of any evidence during trial. He ordered Atty.
[28]
case three times a week, he stressed that the court was merely complying with
the Speedy Trial Act. And lastly, on the alleged late rulings, he explains:
[30]
Regarding the release of the Resolution of the undersigned on the Motion for
Recusation of the Estradas on the recusation issue. At the time, the undersigned had
no intention of releasing it yet in order to fine-tune the same further. However, he was
informed just before going out for the hearing that the Estradas were going to use the
pendency of their Motion for Recusation as a reason, again, to ask for the
postponement of the setting for that day, one of their several motions for
postponement.
xxxxxx
The undersigned stated that, with every Justice having 100% load and 100%
staff, with the plunder case (equivalent easily to 500%), the undersigned now had
a load of 600% but with his support staff remaining in the same level. That is
why he asked for additional staff. (Emphasis supplied)
[31]
At the outset, it must be stressed that the retirement of Justice Badoy from
[32]
the Judiciary does not divest this Court of its jurisdiction over these
cases. In Perez vs. Abiera, this Court ruled:
[33]
X x x. In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of
the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The
Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent
of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy
would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to
wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some
corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable
acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune
to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must
assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other
officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are
inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general
public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if
guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper
and imposable under the situation.
The fact that Justice Badoy, just three (3) weeks prior to the ambulance
incident, was strictly ordered by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., to cease
and desist from holding press conferences, issuing press statements, or giving
interviews to the media on any matter or incident related to the issues subject
of the controversy all the more punctuates his indiscretion.
[38]
and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Only in this
manner can each minimize occasions for delinquency and help attain
effectively the ends of justice. [40]
The conflict between the herein parties could have been avoided if only they
heeded the foregoing clarion call.
the fact that the Pre-trial Order states verbatim the Joint Stipulations of Facts
submitted by both parties. Furthermore, when complainants expressed their
objection to the inclusion of the assailed statement, respondents immediately
ordered its deletion. The transcript of stenographic notes is revealing, thus:
AJ BADOY:
The Court would appreciate if you can point out some grammatical errors.
Atty. Flaminiano:
Yes, Your Honor. I am going to do that.
On page 20, the last paragraph states: The defense admitted exhibit A up to
exhibit C-45 and its sub markings as to its existence but not as to the truth of
the content. In the very first place there never was any admission made by the
defense as even to the existence of the document. And the sentence also we
believe not grammatically appropriate. It should be their sub markings or as
to their existence because this involved several documents, Your Honors.
AJ DE CASTRO:
That portion may be deleted.
Atty. Flaminiano:
Well, Im not sure about it. Your Honor. I only pointed that there is a need for us to
go over page by page because we got a copy only after there was an incident
xxxxxx
OMB Desierto:
We can have this deleted.
Atty. Flaminiano:
But there are several others.
AJ DE CASTRO:
What are those?
OMB Desierto:
After one (1) hour they should be able to determine that. After all Your Honor, I would
like to emphasize the fact that the Joint Stipulation of Facts were signedstipulations
which we had a week ago were signed by the parties, by the counsels for the
accused. And now, the things that are reflected here, are found in this Pre-trial
Order. If there is any delineation from what stipulated then and were signed
by the counsels for the defense and also the prosecution, then we can correct
that, but it cannot be possible major changes will have to be made in the Pre-
trial Order since this is only copied anyway from the Joint Stipulation of
Facts. If there are such thing as that particular sentence which should be
objectionable to the defense, the prosecution is ready to agree to its deletion.
xxxxxx
AJ DE CASTRO:
You know what we did here is simply copy verbatim every document that we found
on record pertaining to the Pre-trial conference. We did not add. We did not
subtract. So, anything that you will state now will simply be corrections of some
clerical errors, that is all. Giving you enough time to go over.[44] (Emphasis supplied)
sign it. A party who participates in the pre-trial conference and who signs the
Joint Stipulation of Facts is expected to sign the Pre-trial Order. If a party
believes that the Pre-trial Order is not an honest representation of what
transpired in the pre-trial conference, then he must specify his objections
thereto and the court may modify it to prevent injustice. This was what
respondents exactly did when complainants pointed out the assailed statement
in the Pre-trial Order.
II
intention. For gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should
be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard
of well-known legal rules. We find no evidence to prove complainants charges
[47]
Precisely, judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being
arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the court.Respondent judge could very well have
cited complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by
banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously walking out of
the courtroom.
It has been consistently stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those
who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and
courtesy. In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A
judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A
judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the
litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
In Echano vs. Sunga, respondent judge, during the course of an argument
[50]
in his sala, lost his cool and called the sheriff to take away the arguing
attorney. And when the attorney kept on talking, respondent judge
countered, Submitted, Buntalin kita dian. This Court admonished him to be
more prudent and restrained in his behavior.
For his part, pursuant to Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Saguisag should have observed the respect due to
respondent magistrates for the maintenance of the courts supreme
importance. Upon being ordered to stop arguing simultaneously with Justice
Cuevas, he should have complied and behaved accordingly. Had he done so,
he would not have been ordered to leave the courtroom. Indeed, he failed to
comport himself in a manner required of an officer of the court.
III
The setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times a week is in order,
not only because the case is of national concern, but more importantly, because
the accused are presently detained. Contrary to complainants assertions, the
[51]
continuous trial is in accordance with the mandate of the law. This Court, in
Administrative Circular No. 3-90 dated January 31, 1990, ordered all trial courts
to adopt the mandatory continuous trial system in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 4 dated September 22, 1988 and Circular No. 1-89
dated January 19, 1989. It was adopted precisely to minimize delay in the
processing of cases. This delay was attributed to the common practice of
piecemeal trial wherein cases are set for trial one day at a time and thereafter
the hearing is postponed to another date or dates until all the parties have
finished their presentation of evidence. Section 2 of Rule 119 of the Revised
[52]
The court shall, after consultations with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trial on weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial.In no case shall the entire period exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized
by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
the good of the service demands more toil and less idleness, and the limitations
imposed by law are aimed to cut indolence and not the other way around. [54]
IV
Our minds cannot sit easy with regard to the charge of violation of the
accuseds right to counsel. A PAO lawyer is considered as independent counsel
within the contemplation of the Constitution considering that he is not a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. In People
vs. Bacor, we ruled that the assistance of a PAO lawyer satisfies the
[55]
Likewise, we find that both Justice Badoy and Justice De Castro failed to
exhibit judicial temperament. Such conduct deserves admonition.
One last word. The members of the bench and the bar ought to be reminded
that the people expect from them a sense of shared responsibility in the
administration of justice a crucial factor in the speedy and fair disposition of
cases. Each of them must do his share for in the last analysis the quality of
justice meted out by the courts cannot be higher than the quality of the lawyers
practicing in the courts and of the judges who have been selected from among
them.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Retired), is
hereby FINED in the sum of P13,000.00 for conduct unbecoming a Justice
and for delay in issuing an Order, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
tolerant of counsels demeanors which do not detract from the dignity and
solemnity of the court proceedings.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents records with this
Court.
SO ORDERED.
[A. C. No. 5811. January 20, 2003]
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
cost so much. Respondent replied that filing fees are based on a certain
percentage of the price of the property and the amount of child support prayed
for. A demand letter to vacate the premises of the condominium dated 4 March
1999 was then prepared by respondent and mailed to Mr. Fauni on 8 March
1999. [4]
In the interim, complainant made several follow-ups with respondent
inquiring particularly as to whether the ejectment case had already been
filed. Through a telephone conversation with respondent on 7 April 1999,
complainant found out that the ejectment case had not been filed yet by
respondent. Agitated by the information, complainant immediately went to
respondent's residence. An altercation between respondent and complainant
took place. After serious exchange of words, respondent returned to
complainant all of her documents. No amount of money was, however, returned
by respondent to complainant despite the latters demand for its return.
Aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainant filed on 30 June 1999
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline,
the instant complaint for gross misconduct against respondent. [5]
refuge behind his claim that he did not file the ejectment case because he had
not yet received the registry return card. The records reveal that despite Atty.
Manuels receipt of the registry return card on 24 March 1999, he still did not
[10]
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
respondent failed to account and return the P10,000 for the filing fees despite
complainants repeated demands.
We find untenable respondents claim that since complainant was already in
arrears with his fees, it was proper for him to apply the filing fees to his attorneys
fees. It has been held that an attorneys lien is not an excuse for a lawyers non-
rendition of accounting. And while a lawyer is allowed to apply so much of the
[14]
clients funds as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
the lawyer is however under the obligation to promptly thereafter notify his
client. Nothing on record supports respondents claim that complainant was
[15]
adequately notified as to the application of the P10,000 (for the filing fees) to
her arrears.
Besides, the receipt dated 4 March 1999 states that:
In the event that whatever is left of the P10,000 after the filing of the ejectment case is
insufficient for the filing fee in the other collection case, the said balance shall be
applied to the installment due for the retainer agreement. [16]
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls
for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish
the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be sufficient sanction
[18]
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
From that time on, complainant Sencio regularly contacted the respondent
to update herself of the status of the case. The respondent kept on assuring her
that everything would be alright. Finally, however, complainant discovered that
the respondent did not file any case, a fact which the respondent admitted. The
latter promised to return to the complainant the money he had received from
her.
The complainant returned several times to respondents house and even
patiently waited for him outside his house to get back her money. The
respondent, however, did not return to her the money. He still did not file the
case in court either.
In its Order of 19 November 1999, the Commission on Bar Discipline,
[3]
When the case was called for hearing on 16 July 2001, the respondent did
not appear despite due notice. Fortunately for him, the counsel for the
complainant was not available for the presentation of evidence. The hearing
was reset to 7 September 2001, and the respondent was directed to be present
at such hearing. The Commission reiterated the warning in its Order of 29 May
[5]
2001. But, on that date the respondent failed again to appear. The hearing was
[6]
then reset to 24 October 2001 but was later cancelled and reset to 14 December
2001. [7]
Again, despite due notice, the respondent did not appear for the hearing on
14 December 2001. Commissioner Wilfredo E.J. E. Reyes, who took charge of
the investigation, received the evidence for the complainant. In his Report and
Recommendation, he found the respondent guilty of the violation of Canons 16,
17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months and be ordered to return to the complainant the amount of P12,000.
In its Resolution No. XV-2002-410 dated 3 August 2002, the Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commisioner Reyes.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the Commission, as approved
and adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP. The breach of respondents
sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards he was strictly to honor and
observe has been sufficiently established.
Needless to state, a lawyer-client relationship existed between the
respondent and the complainant. As such, the respondent, under Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, owed fidelity to the cause of his
client. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task
with dedication and care; less than that, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. In
[8]
failing to file the case he undertook to handle, the respondent violated Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 18.03 thereof,
which provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Likewise, in not returning the money to the complainant after a demand
therefor was made following his failure to file the case, the respondent violated
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03
thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money
belonging to his client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. [9]
We also frown upon the attitude of the respondent in not answering the
complaint and in deliberately disregarding the orders and notices of the IBP on
many occasions. This attitude showed a character or disposition which stains
the nobility of the legal profession. He chose not to appear at the scheduled
hearings despite due notice and the warnings. Section 30, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court specifically provides:
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On June 13, 1998, Judge Antonio E. Arbis of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 48, Bacolod City, retired compulsorily. Accordingly, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) sent an audit team to Bacolod City to conduct a
judicial audit and physical inventory of cases pending in the said court.
On September 13, 1999, the judicial audit team submitted a Report to the
OCA stating that Judge Arbis decided nine (9) criminal cases and eight (8) civil
cases (enumerated below) before he retired but he promulgated the decisions
after his retirement.
1. 10449 1. 1703
2. 11243 2. 5707
3. 12438 3. 6022
4. 12601 4. 6374
5. 12602 5. 6435
6. 12810 6. 7094
7. 13592 7. 7134
9. 93-15248
Likewise, Judge Arbis failed to render his decisions within the reglementary
period in the following cases: Criminal Cases Nos. 5160, 5161, 10425, 10426,
10449, 11243, 12438, 12601, 12602, 12810, 13592, 93-15235, 93-15248 and
95-17079, and Civil Cases Nos. 1684, 3605, 4086, 7419.
When directed by this Court to submit his comment, Judge Arbis explained
that on June 11, 1998, or two days before his compulsory retirement on June
13, 1998, he signed his decisions in the nine (9) criminal cases enumerated
above. Consequently, he had no more time to issue the notices of promulgation.
On his failure to decide seasonably the following cases, he gave the
corresponding reasons:
1. Criminal Cases Nos. 5034, 5035 and 5036 records show that on June 10,
1998, or three (3) days before his compulsory retirement, he issued an
order requiring the parties to submit their memoranda;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 5160 and 5161 he inherited these cases from Judge
Romeo J. Hibionada. The records were not submitted by the Clerk of
Court. Neither were these cases considered submitted for decision in the
latters monthly report;
3. Criminal Cases Nos. 10425 and 10426 the records of these cases were not
submitted to him;
4. Civil Case No. 1684 the transcript of stenographic notes was submitted to
him only after he retired from the service on June 13, 1998;
5. Civil Case No. 3605 this case cannot be considered submitted for decision
as of June 13, 1998. On October 6, 1995, he issued an order directing the
Clerk of Court to furnish the new counsel for the defendants pleadings,
notices and orders relative to the case. Since then, no action has been taken
by any of the parties;
6. Civil Case No. 4086 he inherited this case from Judge Romeo J.
Hibionada. The Clerk of Court did not refer the same to him for resolution
or decision; and
7. Civil Case No. 7419 this case was not listed in the monthly report of cases
submitted for decision.
In a Resolution dated February 22, 2000, this Court referred the judicial
audit team Report to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In his Memorandum dated May 16, 2000 addressed to the Chief Justice,
Justice Benipayo stated that the nine (9) criminal cases (enumerated above)
decided by Judge Arbis had been submitted for decision for more than one (1)
year prior to his retirement on June 13, 1998. In fact, one of the cases, Criminal
Case No. 11243, was submitted for decision as early as August 15, 1994. Had
Judge Arbis decided those cases within the reglementary period, then he could
have promulgated his decisions before his retirement.
Justice Benipayo recommended that for failure of Judge Arbis to render his
decisions within the ninety-day reglementary period in the following cases:
Criminal Cases Nos. 5160, 5161, 10425, 10426, 10449, 11243, 12438, 12601,
12602, 12810, 13592, 93-15235, 93-15248 and 95-17079, and Civil Cases Nos.
1684, 3605, 4086, 7419, he should be held administratively liable and fined
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to be deducted from the seventy-five
thousand pesos (P75,000.00) which was withheld from his retirement benefits
per this Courts Resolution dated January 26, 1999.
Pursuant to the Resolution of this Court dated June 26, 2000, Judge Arbis
filed a Manifestation dated August 29, 2000 that he is submitting this case for
decision based on the pleadings filed.
We agree with the findings and recommended penalty of the former Court
Administrator.
No less than our Constitution mandates lower courts to resolve or decide
[2]
cases within three (3) months after they have been submitted for
decision. Moreover, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that a judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods. Verily, this Court has incessantly
admonished members of the bench to administer justice without undue delay,
for justice delayed is justice denied. The present clogged dockets in all levels
of our judicial system cannot be cleared, unless every magistrate earnestly,
painstakingly and faithfully complies with the mandate of the law. Undue delay
in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice which, in turn, brings
the courts into disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of the
public in the judiciary. Hence, the failure of judges to render judgment within
[3]
the required period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions on them. [4]
The flimsy excuse proffered by Judge Arbis that the undecided cases were
never brought to his attention before he compulsorily retired on June 13, 1998
deserves scant consideration.Rule 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires judges to manage their dockets in such a manner that the
work of their courts is accomplished with reasonable dispatch. It should be
emphasized that the responsibility of making a physical inventory of cases
primarily rests on the presiding judge. He is provided with a court staff, and a
branch clerk of court who shall take steps to meet the requirements of
Administrative Circular No. 10-94. [5]
Moreover, a judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or
resolution, and he is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may
act on them without undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient
recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the
flow of cases and their speedy disposition. A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel since proper and
efficient court management is his responsibility. Court personnel are not the
[6]
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
praying that appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent for representing
conflicting interests.
Complainant is a Filipino by birth who had acquired American
citizenship. He resides at 15856 N. 15th Way, Phoenix, Arizona 85022,
U.S.A. Respondent is a practicing lawyer based in Cebu City.
On November 28, 1983, complainant engaged the professional services of
respondent through his attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, to represent him
in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta, Susana Uy Trazo, petitioner before
[2]
Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of money
against complainant, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and
entitled, Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Abaqueta and Casiano
Gerona. Respondent signed the Complaint as counsel for plaintiff Milagros
[6]
Plaintiff and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal owners of those certain
parcels of land, more particularly as follows
The parcels of land referred to as conjugal property of complainant and
Milagros Yap-Abaqueta are the very same parcels of land in Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R which respondent, as lawyer of complainant, alleged
as the sole and exclusive properties of complainant. In short, respondent lawyer
made allegations in Civil Case No. CEB-11453 which were contrary to and in
direct conflict with his averments as counsel for complainant in Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R.
Complainant further averred that respondent admitted he was never
authorized by the former to appear as counsel for complainants ex-wife in Civil
Case No. CEB-11453; that respondent failed to indicate in the Complaint the
true and correct address of herein complainant, which respondent knew as far
back as August 2, 1990, when he wrote a letter to the complainant at the said
address. Consequently, complainant failed to receive summons and was
[7]
declared in default in Civil Case No. CEB-11453. While the order of default was
eventually set aside, complainant incurred expenses to travel to the Philippines,
which were conservatively estimated at $10,000.00. He argues that
respondents conduct constitute professional misconduct and malpractice as
well as trifling with court processes.
In his defense, respondent claims in his Answer that he always acted in
[8]
good faith in his professional relationship with complainant in spite of the fact
that they have not personally met. He based the matters he wrote in the
Complaint on information and documents supplied by Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig,
complainants sister-in-law and attorney-in-fact, indicating that he was sole and
exclusive owner of the properties. This was sometime in November 1983. No
affidavit of adjudication was ever furnished respondent by complainant and this
was apparently suppressed because it would show that the properties formed
part of the estate.
Eight years later, in November 1991, long after Special Proceedings No.
3971-R was settled and the attorney-client relationship between complainant
and respondent was terminated, Mrs. Milagros Abaqueta through Mrs. Baclig,
engaged his services to file Civil Case No. CEB-11453. Mrs. Baclig presented
to him a deed of absolute sale dated July 7, 1975, showing that the properties
[9]
subject hereof were not complainants exclusive property but his conjugal
property with his wife, the same having been acquired during the subsistence
of their marriage.Thus, in all good faith, respondent alleged in the complaint
that said properties were conjugal assets of the spouses.
Respondent further pointed out that his law firm handles on the average
eighty new court cases annually and personally interviews four or five clients,
prospective clients and/or witnesses daily except Saturdays and Sundays. It
regularly closes to the public at 7:00 p.m., but work continues sometimes until
8:30 p.m. This has been going on for the last twenty-five years out of
respondents thirty-three years of private practice. The absence of personal
contact with complainant and the lapse of eight years resulted in the oversight
and/or lapse of respondents memory that complainant was a former
client. Furthermore, the caption of the Special Proceeding was not in the name
of complainant but was entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Bonifacia
Payahay Abaqueta.
Respondent expressed regret over the oversight and averred that
immediately after discovering that he formerly represented complainant in
Special Proceeding No. 3971-R, he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for
plaintiff, which was granted by the trial court. He denied any malice in his acts
[10]
averred that respondents conduct was geared towards insuring a court victory
for Milagros Yap in Civil Case No. CEB-11453, wherein he deliberately stated
that complainants address was 9203 Riverside Lodge Drive, Houston, Texas,
77083, U.S.A., when he knew fully well that complainants true and correct
address was c/o V.A. Hospital, 7th Street & Italian School Road, Phoenix,
Arizona, 85013, U.S.A. By falsely stating and concealing his true and correct
address, respondent eventually succeeded in obtaining a default judgment in
favor of his client.
During the pendency of these proceedings before the IBP, it appeared that
respondents son got married to the daughter of IBP National President Arthur
D. Lim. Thus, Atty. Lim inhibited himself from participating in the resolution of
the case. Subsequently, a Resolution was issued requiring the IBP to elevate
[12]
the entire records of the case within thirty (30) days from notice. [13]
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client,
it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it
for the other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
[14]
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer
[18]
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
[19]
diligence and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and
[20]
devotion. [21]
reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client which is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Indeed, as we stated
[23]
months before the filing of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 does not by itself prove
malice on the part of respondent. A new address was furnished by Milagros
Yap Abaqueta days before the complaint was filed. Respondent had no reason
to doubt the correctness of the address of the complainant given to him by
Milagros Yap Abaqueta considering that she was complainants wife.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Bernardito A. Florido is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for Three (3) months. He is further ADMONISHED to exercise
greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients
and the court. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1471. January 22, 2003]
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Once again, we find occasion to reiterate this Courts mandate that every
judge should dispose of his courts business promptly. Delay in resolving
motions is inexcusable and should not be condoned. [1]
In his complaint, complainant alleged that on July 29, 1999, he filed with the
MTCC a "Motion to Correct and Re-mark Exhibits of the Prosecution" in
Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-CR-19 and 98-07-CR-20. Presiding Judge Marino
S. Buban, respondent, resolved the motion only on March 20, 2000, or almost
eight (8) months from the date it was filed. He deliberately failed to resolve the
motion within the prescribed period of ninety (90) days because he begrudged
complainant's filing of an administrative charge and several motions for his
inhibition.Respondents delay in resolving the motion violated the relevant
provisions of the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore,
respondent committed falsification by stating in his Certificates of Service from
October 1999 to February 2000 that he has no pending motions submitted for
resolution.
In his comment, respondent judge admitted he incurred delay in resolving
[3]
within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and
the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. Further, such delay
[5]
Furthermore, Rule 3.09, Canon 3 of the same Code requires every judge to
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business.Respondent fell short of this mandate. He also failed to
comply with this Courts Circular No. 13 dated July 31, 1987 which directs all
judges to closely supervise court personnel. [11]
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
On 02 August 2000, complainants Lina Villarosa and her son Jose Villarosa
filed before this Court a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Osmondo
Pomperada, charging him with deceit and gross misconduct.
In her affidavit-complaint, Mrs. Villarosa alleged that sometime in 1994 her
late husband, Isidro Villarosa, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their
son, Jose Villarosa, over their property in Barangay Dulao, Bago City, covered
by TCT No. T-18480, specifically described to be -
A parcel of land (Lot 1110-N. Psd-064502-023179), being a portion of Lot 1110, Cad.
40, Bago Cadastre), situated in the Barrio of Talotog, City of Bago, Prov. Of Negros
Occ., Island of Negros, bounded on the NE. and SE. along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-
11-12 by Lot 1112, Cad. 40 Bago Cadastre; on the SE., along line 12-13 by Lot 1110-
S; on the NW., along lines 13-14-15 by 1110-0; along lines 15-16-17 by Lot 1110-J;
by Lot 1110-M, all of the subd. Survey; along lines 18-1 by Lot 111. x x x; containing
an area of ONE HUNDRED FORTY NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT (149,728) SQUARE METERS, more or less.
Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at
the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly
dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry
should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating
the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the
case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex
parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite
reasonable notice.Hereunder are some of the pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court on this matter; viz.:
`x x x x x x x x x
`x x x x x x x x x
`The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the
date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors
upon prior application.
`Willful failure to refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the
Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of Court. The corresponding
charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which
shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in
accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the
Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15)
days from its commencement.Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a
like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.
The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared
from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their just
due. Obviously, these requirements cannot be taken lightly.
several persons went to his office and requested him to prepare and notarize a
Deed of Sale involving a parcel of land. He made the necessary inquiries about
their personal circumstances and other matters related to the Deed of Sale. He
then instructed his clerk to prepare the instrument and when this was done, he
explained to the parties the nature and the consequence of their written acts in
the dialects they were conversant with. He claims that since he did not
personally know the vendor, he asked the vendor to produce any authentic
document, i.e. residence certificate, the number of which appeared on the Deed
of Sale, for identification purposes. He further states that it was only after
satisfying himself that the persons before him were indeed the parties to the
Deed of Sale, that he affixed his signature on the Deed.
Complainant originally filed the charges before the Office of the
Ombudsman in Mindanao. In a resolution dated January 27, 2000, the Deputy
[6]
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for proper action and disposition
considering that the Supreme Court exercises administrative supervision over
court employees. On November 24, 1999, the Court Administrator required
respondent to file his comment to the complaint-affidavit. [9]
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of
documents connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties
[Borne v. Mayo, Adm. Matter No. 1765-CFI, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA
314; Penera v. Dalocanog, Adm. Matter No. 2113-MJ, April 22, 1981, 104 SCRA
193.] They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which
bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges. xxx
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities
which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges
assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the
capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a
regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of
the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos,
Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be
made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public
in such municipality or circuit.[11]
MTC and MCTC Judges may act as notaries public ex-officio even in
municipalities where there are other lawyers or notaries, provided that the
documents so notarized are connected with their official functions and duties. In
municipalities where there are no other lawyers or notaries, they may participate
in the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and
other acts of conveyances, which bear no direct relation to the performance of
their functions as judges, provided that the following requirements are met: (1)
all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over
to the municipal treasurer; and, (2) a certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit.
Both the Deputy Ombudsman and the OCA find that respondent judge in
this case was not negligent in administering the oath, considering that he first
ascertained the identities of the parties to the Deed. However, we must inquire
whether he complied with the two-fold requirement of SC Circular No. 1-90. In
his comment, he avers that there are no lawyers holding office or residing
[12]
within his territorial jurisdiction. But no certification attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public was made in the documents he notarized. Hence,
respondent failed to satisfy a requisite imposed by Circular No. 1-
90. Additionally, he also failed to indicate that the notarial fees he received for
[13]
that transaction and had received for the other oaths he has administered had
been turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat.
While we believe that respondent judge truly acted in good faith when he
notarized the subject Deed of Sale and that he had no financial interest in the
said transaction, we are nevertheless constrained to impose upon him the
appropriate sanction for failing to strictly observe the requirements of SC
Circular No. 1-90. In this regard, to be aware of this Circular as well as observe
what it requires is incumbent upon him. His failure to do so shows his lack of
diligence in fulfilling his duty and keeping abreast with developments in law and
jurisprudence.This much, we must stress, is expected of a judge, considering
that the study of law and procedure is a continuous process.
Finally, it must also be emphasized that a judge must conduct himself in a
manner that is beyond reproach and suspicion. Any hint of impropriety must
[14]
be avoided at all cost. Judges are enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct to
regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with
their judicial duties.
[15]
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This administrative matter stems from the letter-complaint dated June 24,
1999, of Vicente A. Pichon charging Judge Lucilo Rallos of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tagum City, Branch 1, with incompetence for his failure to
promptly decide Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-41, both entitled People of the
Philippines v. Narciso Labasano, et al., and Criminal Case No. 7842,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Pureza Labasano. All these cases are for
Estafa. Pichon, who is the private complainant in the aforesaid cases, averred
that they were submitted for decision way back in October 1995 but remained
unacted upon by respondent judge despite repeated follow-ups.
In his comment, respondent judge states that he has neither the power nor
authority to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42. He alleges that he did not
preside over any stage of the trial of said criminal cases. Relying on
Administrative Circular No. 3-94, he submits these criminal cases should be
[1]
decided by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio, the former presiding judge of the RTC
of Tagum City, Branch 1, because it was to her that said cases were submitted
for decision. Respondent also cites Adm. Order No. 49-99 dated June 7, 1999,
which revoked Judge Reyes-Carpios designation as Acting Presiding Judge,
RTC of Manila, Branch 17, and directed her to return to her official station at
RTC of Tagum City, Branch 1, not later than June 15, 1999, to resume there
her regular duties.
As found by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Criminal Cases
Nos. 7840-42 were originally heard by Judge Marcial L. Fernandez (now retired)
who presided over the reception of the prosecutions evidence. Said cases were
then heard by Judge Bernardo V. Saludares, who granted the prosecution
fifteen (15) days within which to formally offer its evidence and who scheduled
the reception of the evidence for the defense.
On December 1, 1993, Judge Saludares ordered the admission in evidence
of the prosecutions documentary exhibits.
When Judge Reyes-Carpio assumed office as Presiding Judge, RTC,
Tagum, Branch 1, she presided over the reception of evidence for the defense.
In an order dated April 19, 1995, Judge Reyes-Carpio directed the
admission in evidence of the documentary exhibits for the defense and
scheduled the reception of rebuttal evidence for the prosecution for May 25,
1995. The prosecution, however, did not present rebuttal evidence in Criminal
Cases Nos. 7840-42.
In an order dated August 25, 1995, respondent judge directed the
prosecution and defense to simultaneously submit their respective memoranda
within thirty (30) days. The parties complied with the directive.
On December 18, 1998, complainant requested for a certification regarding
the status of Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42 from the Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
RTC, Tagum City, Branch 1.
Mrs. Virginia R. Coloma-Rafael, Legal Researcher and OIC of RTC, Tagum
City, Branch 1, replied to said query, thus: The cases are now submitted for
decision and the records are already given to Judge Rallos for the preparation
of the decision and that the transcript of stenographic notes during the
proceedings has already been submitted therewith for his further perusal.
In its resolution dated August 16, 2000, the Third Division of this Court in
A.M. No. 00-7-322-RTC (Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
Regional Trial Court, Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Branches 1 and 2) required
respondent judge to decide the cases which were submitted to him for
decision/resolution when he was acting presiding judge of RTC, Tagum City,
Branch 1, including Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42.
In his supplemental letter-complaint dated October 20, 2000, complainant
Pichon averred that Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42 were decided by respondent
judge on September 25, 2000, in compliance with this Courts resolution of
August 16, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-7-322-RTC. Complainant declared that from
aforesaid resolution it was clear that Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42, among
others, were submitted for decision to respondent judge as early as 1995.
However, if not for the judicial audit conducted, respondent would have unduly
taken time in resolving those cases. Complainant then prayed that respondent
judge be administratively sanctioned for the inordinate delay.
The sole issue before us is whether respondent judge should be held
administratively liable for delay in deciding Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42.
Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.02 in [2]
relation to Canon 3, Rule 3.05 , judges are required to decide cases and
[3]
The raison detre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice, but also
in being able to do so seasonably. [6]
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
(a) If commenced by complaint On the basis of the complaint and the affidavits and
other evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for
being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in
custody.
Based on the foregoing provisions, it is manifest that respondent has subverted the
very nature of the Rule and defeated its objective of expediting the adjudication of
cases.
Respondent judge should have made a ruling immediately without waiting for 130
days to lapse considering that the accused failed to submit their counter-affidavits
within the 10-day reglementary period prescribed. As aptly explained in Gachon vs.
Devera, Jr. (274 SCRA 540 [1997]), the Rule on Summary Procedure was
promulgated for the purpose of achieving an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases. If any of the parties fails to submit the evidence and other
pleadings within the reglementary period, the court can not thereby extend its leniency
and wait for an indefinite time for him to comply, otherwise, a party can derail the
proceedings and defeat the purpose of the summary procedure by not filing the
affidavits required. Hence, the justification posed by respondent judge that his act of
admitting the counter-affidavits of accused despite being filed out of time does not
contravene the spirit of summary procedure because the same are not yet formally
offered as evidence for the trial, making complainants objection thereof premature, is
unequivocally a misapprehension of the rules. [4]
affidavits after 130 days from notice, respondent judge violated the Rule. He
should have observed that Section 12(b) of the Rule provides that the court
shall issue an order which shall require the accused to submit his counter-
affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses x x x not later than ten (10) days
from receipt of said order.Section 19(e) of the same Rule also provides that a
motion for extension to file affidavits is prohibited. Clearly, these provisions
are mandatory.
When the law or rule is clear, there is no room for interpretation and judges
have no option but to obey. [8]
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated January 15, 1999 filed with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, Winnie C. Lucente
and Alicia G. Domingo charged Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. with gross
misconduct, deceit, malpractice and crimes involving moral turpitude for
falsification of public documents.
Complainants alleged that respondent is the son of the late Atty. Cleto
Evangelista, who during his lifetime notarized a Deed of Quitclaim executed on
May 7, 1977 by Pedro, Juanito, Eufracia, Cresencia, Consuelo, Maria, all
surnamed Tan, and one Sabina Mascareas, in favor of Asuncion T. Yared and
Cynthia Yared Estudillo, involving Lot No. 5514 located in Salvacion, Ormoc
City; and a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 7, 1972 by Wenceslao
Magallanes and Apolonia Tan in favor of Salvador Estudillo and Cynthia Yared
Estudillo, involving Lot No. 1187-B located in Poblacion, Ormoc City. On
January 30, 1990, respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. issued certified true
copies of the said instruments. On the basis of the certified true copies of the
subject deeds, the Register of Deeds of Ormoc City issued on February 2, 1990
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23889 in favor of Asuncion T. Yared.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint interposing res
adjudicata, arguing that the allegations in the complaint raise the same issues
as those in the criminal case for falsification of public document filed against
him before the Ormoc City Prosecution Office, docketed as I.S. No. 98-178. He
also asserted that Civil Case No. B-1250 filed by complainants, among others,
against Asuncion T. Yared, et al., which was pending before Regional Trial
Court, Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14, for declaration of nullity of the quitclaim and
deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 23889, raised a prejudicial question in
the disbarment proceeding.
Respondent also contended that one Carmen Solidor together with
Francisco Aves came to their law office, Evangelista Law Office in Ormoc City,
Leyte, and asked him to certify true copies of the subject deeds. He acceded to
the request considering that the documents were notarized by his late father as
notary public. He alleged that he issued the assailed certification as a partner
of the law office.[1]
petitioners timely filed this motion for extension of time to file petition for review
on June 22, 2000, which was granted. Petitioners, however, failed to attach a
certified true copy of the assailed resolution. Moreover, only petitioner Winnie
C. Lucente executed the certification against forum shopping.
In A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held:
[3]
The appeal is impressed with merit. Records disclose that Atty. Cleto L.
Evangelista, Jr. admitted having certified true copies of the Deed of Quitclaim
executed on May 7, 1977 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January
7, 1972. His late father, Atty. Cleto P. Evangelista, notarized the subject deeds.
Section 245 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads:
Notarial Register. Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the
notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he
shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any parts thereof, to any person
applying for it and paying the legal fees therefor. x x x.
Sections 246 and 247 of the same Code also require the notary public to
forward his notarial register to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city wherein he exercises his office
for safekeeping.
By certifying true copies of the subject deeds, Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr.
engaged in an unlawful and deceitful conduct. He was not the notary public
before whom said documents were acknowledged and he was neither the
custodian of the original copies thereof. The Records Management and
Archives Office, Manila, certified that there was no copy on file of the Deed of
Quitclaim notarized by respondents father. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
[6]
of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
is broad enough to cover any form of misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
and personal capacity.
In this connection, we have consistently held that notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public,
the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored
[7]
that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof
of the authenticity thereof. For this reason, notaries public must observe with
[8]
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. [9]
argued that the instant disbarment case has been adjudicated in the criminal
case for falsification of public documents. Respondent was proceeded against
as a private individual in said case. In the present disbarment action, Atty. Cleto
L. Evangelista, Jr. is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts
plenary authority over members of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. is found guilty of
gross misconduct. Consequently, he is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that another
infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land as well as
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1476. February 4, 2003]
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
When complainant filed the Motion to Lift the Warrant of Arrest, a certain
Louie Macabeo, Clerk III, told him, Kung gusto mo tutulungan kita. Ibigay mo
sa akin ang telephone number mo. He further alleged that the clerk asked him
for P30,000.00. However, he did not give his telephone number, only his pager
number.
A week later, the clerk paged him to return his call, which he did. During
their telephone conversation, the clerk told him, Papaano na ang case mo.
Ilalabas ko na ba ang warrant? He answered, Teka, kakausapin ko muna ang
lawyer ko. Thereafter, he called up his lawyer, who advised him not to give in
to the extortion.
On August 14, 1997, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or
to lift order of arrest. Respondent judge denied the motion on August 21,
[5]
1997. On September 9, 1997, his counsel requested the Branch Clerk of Court
[6]
not to release the bench warrant because they will file a motion for
reconsideration of the August 21, 1997 Order. The following morning,
complainant was shocked when he was served the bench warrant by the
Western Police District Manila.
Consequently, at 1:20 in the afternoon of the same day, his counsel filed a
Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the August 21, 1997 Order and
[7]
asked the Branch Clerk of Court to calendar the hearing of the motion on the
same day at 2:00 oclock. His counsel waited patiently for the motion to be acted
upon. At 4:00 in the afternoon, respondent judge denied the motion. Thus,
[8]
complainant had to spend the night in detention when he failed to put up the
required bond. On the basis of the foregoing allegations, complainant prayed
that respondent judge together with his Clerk of Court and Clerk III be
administratively sanctioned for acting in concert to extort money from him.
Respondent judge filed his Comment on June 8, 1998 while respondents
Clerk III Luis Macabeo and Clerk of Court Zenaida Reyes-Macabeo submitted
their Comment on June 10, 1998.
Respondent Judge Quilala explained that after posting the reduced bailbond
as recommended by the Manila Public Prosecutors Office, arraignment of
accused Ang for violation of BP 22 was scheduled on June 30, 1997. Neither
Ang nor his counsel, however appeared during the arraignment, thus he issued
the order for his arrest on the same day.
On August 14, 1997, Ang through counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or to Lift Order of Arrest, stating that he did not attend the arraignment
because he was indisposed.The motion was denied by respondent judge on
the ground that the reason alleged by Ang for non-appearance was flimsy. He
also ordered that the total bailbond of P338,000.00 as recommended by the
prosecution, pursuant to the Latest Bailbond Guide of the Department of Justice
be reinstated. Ang, nevertheless failed to post the required bond. As a result,
[9]
the police served the warrant against him in the morning of September 10,
1997. At 2:00 in the afternoon, Ang filed a Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the August 21, 1997 Order, without showing proper receipt
thereof by the Office of the Prosecutor of Manila. Despite said procedural
defect, he gave due course to the motion. He, nonetheless, denied said motion
for lack of merit. Thereafter, he inhibited from hearing the BP 22 cases.
Both Clerk of Court Zenaida Reyes-Macabeo and her husband Clerk III
Louie Macabeo vehemently denied the charges filed against them. Zenaida
claimed that the administrative case was filed because of the respondent judges
refusal to grant complainants motion. She released the bench warrant after
Judge Quilala signed the same because she had no control over the processes
issued by the judge. She did not calendar Angs Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration filed at 1:20 in the afternoon of September 10, 1997 because
the hearings of the motions on criminal cases are scheduled only in the
morning.
Respondent Louie Macabeo claimed that it was impossible for him to
demand money from Ang whom he just met. Being an ordinary clerk, he could
not assure the accused that the respondent judge would act favorably on his
motion. He denied having talked to him on the telephone on August 14, 1997
or the week after. He could not have promised to delay the release of the
warrant of arrest since it had been issued as early as August 10, 1997.
Upon referral of the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, the latter recommended the dismissal of the administrative case
against the respondents. The Office of the Court Administrator found that there
was nothing irregular in the conduct of the respondent judge in denying the
motions for reconsideration, the same being in accordance with the Rules.
There was also no concrete evidence that respondents indeed acted in
concerted effort to commit extortion.
We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator.
The settled doctrine is that judges are not liable to respond in a civil action
for damages, and are not otherwise administratively responsible for what they
may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal
powers and jurisdiction. Certain it is that a judge may not be held
[10]
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. More importantly, the
[12]
error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident
bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
[13]
operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes. [15]
While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith
in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from
unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.[16]
In the instant case, respondent judge denied the first motion for
reconsideration for complainants failure to attend the scheduled arraignment on
the ground that he was indisposed to attend the same. Respondent judges
action was within his own judicial discretion. Any error therein that a dissatisfied
litigant may raise would be merely an error of judgment, for which the judge
may not be held administratively liable.
The second urgent motion for reconsideration dated September 10, 1997
was likewise correctly denied. First, the motion does not contain proof of service
on the Prosecutors Office, in disregard of the 3-day notice rule. Second, the
motion has no legal basis considering that the reinstatement of the original bond
in the amount of P338,000.00 is proper. The bond was recommended by the
prosecution and was earlier approved by the trial court, pursuant to the latest
Bailbond Guide issued by the Secretary of the Department of Justice.
The record does not show that respondent judge was moved by ill-will or
bad faith in rendering the adverse judgment, or that his ruling was manifestly
unjust. Complainant has not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that impropriety
attended the issuance of the subject resolutions. Bad faith is not presumed and
he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. [17]
The alleged error of the respondent judge was not gross, and the record is
bereft of any showing of deliberate or malicious intent on the part of respondent
judge to cause prejudice to any party.
As regards the charge of extortion, no proof was presented by the
complainant against the officers of the court. Therefore, the dismissal of the
administrative charge against them is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative complaint
against Judge Reinato G. Quilala, Clerk of Court Zenaida Reyes-Macabeo and
Clerk III Louie Macabeo, MeTC, Branch 26, Manila is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1449. February 5, 2003]
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The Court has consistently impressed upon members of the bench that the noble office
of a judge is to render justice not only impartially, but expeditiously as well, under the
time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied.
Being designated as acting presiding judge in another sala is not a valid justification
for the unreasonable delay in the rendition of judgment in Civil Case No. 311. If
respondent could not comply with the 3-month reglementary period, he should have
asked for an extension of time within which to decide the case. He never did.
That his docket is crowded is likewise a lame excuse, and will not exculpate him from
administrative sanction. Respondent should have adopted a proper and efficient court
management technique since he is the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions. Respondent, however, has been remiss in his duty
and responsibility as court manager by failing to adopt a system of court management
which resulted in his failure to decide the subject case within the reglementary period.
We agree with the recommendation of the OCA. No less than the 1987
Constitution requires that cases at the trial court level be resolved within three
(3) months from the date they are submitted for decision, that is, upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by
the court itself.
[1]
Respondent judge admitted that the last pleading in Criminal Case No. 311
which was complainants memorandum was filed on January 5, 2000. Under the
law, respondent judge is required to resolve the case within three (3) months or
until April 5, 2000. Respondent judge, however, issued the decision only on
November 27, 2000, seven (7) months after the deadline.As submitted by the
OCA, the seven-month delay in the resolution of the case constitutes gross
inefficiency for which respondent judge is administratively liable. The delay is
inexcusable, especially since respondent judge admitted that he had
commenced writing the decision immediately after the case was submitted for
decision. He, however, failed to release it on time because it was kept inside
his office cabinet and totally slipped his mind until his office clerk belatedly
called his attention to the status of Civil Case No. 311. This is a clear indication
of poor management of the courts docket. Respondent judge has the duty to
keep track of the development of the cases pending before his sala and to take
note of the cases which are ripe for decision or resolution and to ensure that
said cases are resolved promptly. Canon 3, Rule 3.08 and Rule 3.09 of the
[2] [3]
to his obligation to resolve the case and cannot be deemed sufficient excuse
for his failure to do so. It is the duty of a judge to dispose of the courts business
[6]
promptly and decide cases within the period fixed by law. If he feels that for
valid reasons, he could not meet the three-month limit, he may seek from this
Court an extension of time within which to render a decision.Respondent judge
failed to do so.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide
cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice
denied. A judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer
justice. Hence, respondent judges inability to render judgment within the three-
[7]
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ejectment from a parcel of land at F. Varona St., Tondo, Manila, after he refused
to pay rent.
Subsequently, respondent entered his appearance as counsel for herein
complainant, as defendant in the MeTC, after he paid respondent an
acceptance fee of P20,000.00.Complainant further alleged that while the case
was pending thereat respondent demanded and was paid
another P30,000.00. However, judgment was rendered ordering complainant to
vacate the premises and to pay plaintiffs therein P87,000.00 as back rentals.
Feeling aggrieved, complainant appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. For the appeal, complainant gave respondent another P30,000.00 for
[3]
On the part of the plaintiffs in the MeTC, they moved for the immediate
execution of the judgment being appealed from. On 17 March 1997 the
Regional Trial Court issued an Orderdirecting defendant-appellant Pablito
Santos to file his memorandum/brief within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof.
Several months later, respondent was reproached by the RTC for not
complying with its 17 March 1997 Order. Respondent had to plead that he be
given another chance to file his appellants memorandum as his attention was
focused on matters pertaining on (sic) the submission of pleadings thereafter
needed to be filed in reply to Plaintiffs manifestation and motion. His arguments
however were not sustained.
On 18 August 1997 the RTC granted the motion for a writ of execution upon
finding that defendant therein, complainant herein, did not put up a supersedeas
bond to stay the execution of the judgment. In its Order, the RTC also
disregarded complainants opposition to resolve the motion and considered
counsels excuse for not filing his memorandum as a feeble attempt to extricate
himself (herein respondent Lazaro) from his blunder which is not excusable. [5]
Respondent denied the charges against him. He argued that his failure to
file the memorandum/brief was not deliberate as he is morally and legally
convinced that he may be able to present his clients valid cause or claim over
the disputed property in a hearing called for the purpose. He alleged that he
could have orally argued complainants case before the trial court had he been
given the opportunity to do so. According to him, complainant rudely terminated
his services even before he could explain his legal strategy for winning the
appeal. Moreover, complainants allegation that he milked him dry was far from
the truth since complainant actually gave him only P10,000.00 contrary to
their agreement that he would be remunerated with P30,000.00 for his legal
services. Lastly, respondent claimed that complainant tried to
extort P200,000.00 from him in exchange for the withdrawal of his disbarment
complaint against him. [6]
This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 August 2002 the IBP
[7]
justifying its recommendation, the IBP completely relied on the findings of the
trial court -
From the facts obtaining and the evidence presented, we find the Order dated 18
August 1997 of the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 31, says it all with regard to the inexcusable negligence committed by
respondent in handling the case of complainant, to wit:
The record reveals that defendants counsel failed to file any motion for extension to
file his memorandum/brief. This being the case, defendants counsel was of the
thinking that he could get out of his predicament by pleading that his attention was
focused on matters pertaining on the submission of pleadings thereafter needed to be
filed in reply to plaintiffs manifestation and motion, thus his failure to file defendants
memorandum/brief. However, this is farthest from the truth because he already knew
on March 31, 1997 that he was required to file his memorandum/brief not later than
thirty (30) days from that date. The foregoing narration does not speak well of the
stance taken by defendants counsel. [9]
explanation that his attention was focused on matters pertaining on (sic) the
submission of pleadings thereafter needed to be filed in reply to plaintiffs
manifestation and motion is too ludicrous to be believed. His stance, to quote
the trial court, was but a feeble attempt to extricate himself from his blunder
which is not excusable.
Respondents failure to exercise due diligence in attending to the interest of
complainant caused the latter material prejudice. As a lawyer, respondent was
wanting in the exercise of reasonable care demanded of every member of the
Bar; his measure of diligence is several notches below the standard required of
his office.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ALVARO BERNABE LAZARO is found
GUILTY of negligence in protecting the interest of his client, complainant Pablito
Santos, in Civil Case No. 97-82452, of the RTC of Manila, and is accordingly
SUSPENDED from the practice of law, not for six (6) months as recommended
by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
but for one (1) year effective from date of his receipt of this Resolution.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty.
Alvaro Bernabe Lazaro in the Bar Confidants Office, another copy furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and copies thereof circulated in all the courts
of the country.
Respondent Atty. Alvaro Bernabe Lazaro is DIRECTED to inform this Court
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of the date of his receipt of
this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. MARIA ELISSA F. VELEZ, complainant, vs. Judge RODRIGO R.
FLORES, MTC-Branch 2, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
with the Office of Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga on June 13, 2000. The
Complaint was then endorsed by Judge Sunga to the Office of Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. It was later referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to
[2]
Atty. Velez narrated in her Complaint that she had filed, on behalf of her
client-parents, an ejectment case against Jaime Mendoza, Florante Salonga,
Eduardo Vital and Ernesto Romero. Because of their failure to reach an
amicable settlement during the preliminary conference, the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. They did so on December 9,
1999, after which the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On March 14, 2000, complainant moved ex-parte for the early resolution of [4]
the case within thirty days from receipt of her Motion. She argued that three
months had already elapsed since the parties filed their respective position
papers. She filed a second Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution on April 24,
[5]
2000.
On May 2 and May 9, 2000, complainant personally followed up her motions
with Ramoncito Serrano, Clerk of Court of Branch 2, but to no avail. On May
23, 2000, she attended the hearing of the three criminal cases before the sala
of respondent Judge. As she was preparing to leave, he summoned her and
told her that he was very busy, but would render his decision soon. Then, in a
low, conspiratorial tone, he allegedly said, [C]an you consider giving to me x x
x your offer of financial assistance to the defendants? (Baka p[w]ede mo na
lang ibigay sa akin iyong offer mo sa mga kalaban ninyo?) She pretended not
to have heard anything, gave him a blank stare, and immediately left the court
premises.
On May 31, 2000, complainant again followed up the case with Clerk of
Court Serrano. Told that respondent Judge had not yet arrived, she proceeded
to another court to wait. Serrano followed her there and asked her to go to the
sala of respondent, who wanted to talk to her. The Judge allegedly told her that
the Decision would be finished either on June 3 or June 5, 2000 at the latest.
He also said, within hearing distance of his staff, that she should try giving
financial assistance to the defendants. He then asked her to repeat the offer
her parents had made to each defendant. Complying with his request, she said
that her parents had offered P5,000 to each of the four defendants, so that they
would peacefully vacate the lot. She allegedly gathered from his tone and
demeanor that he was expecting her to give to him, instead of to the defendants,
the full amount of P20,000.
On two separate occasions, the secretary of complainant phoned the office
of respondent Judge to inquire whether a decision had already been rendered.
One of the staff members in Branch 2, a certain Max, informed her that although
it had not yet been signed, it had already been drafted by respondent Judge on
June 5, 2000. A certain Cindy gave her the same information, except for the
date, which was supposedly June 9, 2000.
Immediately thereafter, complainant manifested in writing that she would
bring the matter to the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
And when she found out that there was no draft decision filed with the records
of the case, she proceeded to the Office of Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga,
before whom she narrated the foregoing facts.
Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the Sworn Complaint
to respondent Judge for comment. [6]
In his Comment dated August 24, 2000, respondent averred that he had
[7]
already promulgated his Decision on the ejectment case on June 13, 2000. He
said that he had tried his best to render the Decision at the earliest possible
time, but that a delay in its promulgation ensued because of his clogged court
docket. This fact had supposedly been acknowledged even by complainant in
her first Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution. He further argued that the delay,
which was not undue, had also been brought about by his research on
applicable jurisprudence. These, according to him, were strong and justifiable
reason[s] for [his] failure to decide the case within the reglementary period of
ninety days.[8]
support her claim that the ejectment case was not the first time Judge Flores
asked for money from [her]. She attached a letter dated December 19, 1997
[13]
addressed to a certain Tita Eliza, who complainant claimed was actually she.
The letter, she said, was proof that respondent Judge had interceded for the
amicable settlement of a collection case she was handling. In return for his
intercession, he allegedly demanded from her P5,000 and a bottle of Fundador
brandy. [14]
culpability for the P5,000 pay-off. According to him, the letter was actually a
proof that he and Atty. Velez were on good terms at the time, as evidenced by
the salutation Dear Tita Eliza and his affectionate closing remark Your nephew.
He alleged that the lawyer had filed the administrative Complaint, simply to get
back at him for the delayed promulgation of his Decision on the ejectment case.
Lastly, he denied receiving the bottle of Fundador brandy, claiming he was
diabetic and was not allowed to take hard drinks.
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation, Executive Judge Ala-
[16]
Firstly, Atty. Velez has nothing to gain from accusing Judge Flores with corrupt
practices. At the time Atty. Velez filed the administrative complaint on June 13, 2000,
she did not know that the judge had already rendered a decision on the same day. To
her mind then, she was taking a big risk in making the accusation due to the pending
case. Moreover, aside from the ejectment case, Atty. Velez had four (4) other criminal
cases pending with Judge Flores at that time. She was very much vulnerable to
retaliation from Judge Flores but she came out with her allegations of corruption
nonetheless. Hence, the probabilities strongly suggest that Atty. Velez was motivated
by her desire to speak the truth. Assuming for arguments sake that the administrative
complaint was a tactic to secure a favorable ruling, Atty. Velez could have withdrawn
or abandoned the case after she got a favorable ruling in the ejectment case. Yet, her
efforts did not wane and she even filed a Supplemental Affidavit to bolster her
allegations more than a year after filing the complaint. It would be difficult to sustain
such x x x single-minded zeal if Atty. Velez were only after personal advantage.
Second, although the December 1997 letter of judge Flores to Atty. Velez does not
conclusively prove that Judge Flores demanded or received money from Atty. Velez,
it raises disturbing questions on the judges motives and conduct. Contrary to the
judges explanation, the letter does not merely establish the good relations between the
parties at that time. The undersigned sees in the letter an attempt to conceal his
motives with the false statement suggesting that they are relatives when in fact they
are not. It may be a way to mislead anyone who chances upon the letter and sanitize
its contents. Being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless enough to
document his extortion activities on paper. But the letter was a lapse in judgment
since it raises questions on respondents conduct and reinforces the truth of
complainants allegations.
Third, even without conclusively establishing that Judge Flores demanded money, the
December 19, 1997 letter nonetheless shows that the judge was interceding on behalf
of a litigant, in a case pending before another judge. x x x As a judge, respondent must
be the first to protect and uphold the integrity of his profession by shielding his
colleagues from pressure by litigants. Instead, respondent, aware of his influence or
perhaps ascendancy over some of his colleagues, allowed himself to be used by
litigants to pressure a judge. Indeed, efforts to [reach a compromise in] a case are
laudable but incumbent judges should not undertake them because it tarnishes their
image and raises suspicions that they are doing so out of financial considerations. x x
x.
[17]
or received any money from complainant in connection with the ejectment case,
his administrative culpability was sufficiently demonstrated by evidence that he
had interceded in the collection case involving complainants grandmother and
the Punzalan spouses.
This Court concurs in the findings of the investigating Judge and the OCA.
Judicial indolence is considered gross negligence or inefficiency, and gross
[19] [20]
dereliction of duty. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
[21]
requires that judges dispose of court business promptly and decide cases within
the periods prescribed by law. [22]
clarify certain material facts, it may during that period require the parties to
submit affidavits or other pieces of evidence within ten (10) days. Judgment
shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory
affidavits or upon the expiration of the period for their filing. [24]
A Judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the
court commits a serious misconduct. This Court condemns such act in the
strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by one
[29]
charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it
quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts. [30]
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Under Rule 2.04
[31]
of the same Code, Judges must refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency. It is significant to stress that they are held to higher standards of
integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and
confidence. They should bring honor to the judiciary. The influence-peddling
[32]
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
referred the two complaints to respondent Judge, requiring him to answer within
ten days from receipt. In his Answer dated September 13, 1999, respondent
[4]
In his Comments dated November 15, 1999 and November 19, 1999,
respondent Judge vigorously denied the charges. He claimed that the
provisional dismissals in both cases were in accordance with law and procedure
and issued so as to give complainant the opportunity to pursue his case by
securing the services of another counsel because of the repeated failure of
complainants counsel to appear and participate in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation. [8]
In its Report dated June 5, 2000, the OCA adopted the findings of Judge
Gonzales but recommended to this Court that respondent Judge be fined in the
amount of P10,000.00, instead of simple admonition. It observed that the rules
governing the procedure for conducting preliminary investigations are not new
and are quite simple that these are not difficult to follow and, therefore, to not
know a law which is elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [10]
In his letter dated August 28, 2000, Judge Gonzales clarified that the case
referred to him by the Court for investigation is the very same case filed in his
court by herein complainant.Thus, to avoid duplication of work, he is adopting
his investigation report dated December 27, 1999 as his report in compliance
with the resolution of the Court dated July 5, 2000. [12]
In its Memorandum dated August 28, 2000, the OCA reiterated the
conclusions in its report dated June 5, 2000 finding respondent Judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law and recommending that he be fined in the amount
of P10,000.00.
The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA to be well taken.
On the matter of the alleged inaction of respondent Judge on complainants
motion to revive Criminal Cases Nos. 5316 and 5288, the Court finds that such
allegation is negated by the Joint Order issued by Judge Jesusa Mylene C.
Suba-Isip denying the same for insufficiency of evidence. Furthermore, it
[15]
appears that respondent Judge was indeed on vacation leave from October 2
to October 31 2000, per verification with the Leave Division, Supreme Court.
The root cause of the complaints is the unfamiliarity of respondent Judge
with the rules on preliminary investigation.
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as
other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be
sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized
to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating
officer shall either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the
inquiry or issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the
complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents. He shall have the right to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he
may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so
desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter
may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence, for the study of
law is a never-ending and ceaseless process. [20]
No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be
faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, [21]
One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the law and
procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know,
excuses no one, especially respondent Judge who has been a judge since
[23]
January 24, 1983 or for sixteen years. Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire
[24]
tenetur non excusat. When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to be
[25]
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October
1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge which
carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine of
more than Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos but not exceeding Forty
Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos. However, considering that the incident took
place on April 21, 1999 which is before A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC took effect, we are
constrained to agree with the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Vinci G. Gozum is found guilty of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED the amount of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1479. February 17, 2003]
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
x x x complainant remained firm in his assertion that respondent asked to meet with
him a number of times at Arks Restaurant in Marilao, Bulacan. During these
meetings, the respondent repeatedly asked for the amount of P100,000 for the
acquittal of complainants daughter in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-17285, 95-17286 and
95-17287. He refused to come across and instead asked respondent to promulgate the
decision which the latter continuously delayed. One of these meetings took place on
October 5, 2000, as shown by the Arks Restaurant receipt with Invoice No. 1575
(Exh. A), where complainant was accompanied by his other daughter, Dr. Carmelita
Cea-Mallari.
The undersigned had observed closely the demeanor of complainant when the latter
testified during the investigation. Complainant did so in a straightforward and
categorical manner. He was credible and was consistent with the narrations contained
in the Complaint-Affidavit dated January 22, 2001 which he filed with the OCA. In
fact, respondent himself testified that he knew complainant to be a man of principle.
[2]
The wheels of justice would run smoothly not only if the judiciary is purged
of the debilitating presence of recreant judges, but also importantly, if the
members who perform their functions conscientiously are not hampered by
groundless and vexatious charges. In its attempt to cleanse the Aegean stables,
so to speak, this Court must tread on with utmost circumspection and prudence
to make sure that only the guilty is denounced and the innocent absolved. Thus,
any administrative complaint leveled against a judge, such as the instant case,
must always be examined with a discriminating eye for the consequential
effects are by their very nature highly penal where the respondent stands to
face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. With this in mind, we carefully
evaluated the evidence on record and have come to the conclusion that the
complainant has not veritably proved his case.
In his Affidavit-Complaint, complainant adamantly asserted that he and
respondent judge, at the latters instigation, met a number of times at the Arks
Restaurant, and that during one of these conferences respondent solicited
P100,000.00 from him in exchange for the acquittal of the accused, his
daughter, in Crim. Cases Nos. 95-17285, 95-17286 and 95-17287. In
corroboration, complainant presented a receipt dated 5 October 2000 indicating
the food items which were supposedly ordered by respondent. Complainants
daughter, Dr. Carmelita Cea-Mallari, was also made to testify about her alleged
presence at the meeting between complainant and respondent at the Arks
Restaurant to discuss the criminal cases of accused Alicia Cea Tecson.
We are not persuaded. Other than the oral testimony of complainant and
that of his daughter, there is no extant proof adequately showing that several
meetings had indeed transpired between the contending parties. The receipt,
which is purportedly a proof of the alleged 5 October 2000 meeting, cannot be
given any evidentiary weight since it does not indicate the identity of the
individual or individuals to whom it was issued, or of the person or persons who
might have ordered the food items therein enumerated. If indeed the several
meetings occurred at the Arks Restaurant, which is a public place, complainant
could have easily gathered enough extrinsic evidence, such as the testimonies
of waiters, restaurant employees, or other disinterested witnesses, rather than
rely merely on his uncorroborated oral testimony, or on a receipt which is a
dubious piece of documentary evidence. Dr. Carmelita Cea-Mallari merely
testified that she was in that meeting between her father, complainant herein,
and respondent judge, and faintly heard the figure P100,000.00 mentioned
while the two (2) were conversing. She did not even say who uttered that figure
and whether it was preceded by any demand from anybody. Moreover, if
respondent indeed made the corrupt overtures and even blatantly demanded
money from the complainant, his good sense would dictate that he report the
matter to the authorities and set up entrapment operations against the culprit.
Despite myriad opportunities, complainant failed to come up with a reliably
substantial proof to give flesh to his charges.
In Co v. Calimag where the factual backdrop is analogous to the instant
[3]
Firstly, there is no proof that said envelope was even handled by respondent,
complainant not having subjected the same to fingerprint analysis by experts. Without
the envelope, this case becomes a matter of Norma Carios word against that of
respondent.
In the same case, citing Castaos v. Escao Jr., we stressed the primordial
[4]
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Albert Uys affidavit-complaint alleges that he and his wife Carmen were
defendants in Civil Case No. 4701-V-95 pending in respondent Judge Osorio's
sala. On several occasions, respondent invited complainant to go to "Barracks,"
respondent's karaoke bar in Malabon. There, on different dates, respondent
asked complainant to give him a television set, an air-conditioner, and the
amounts of P20,000.00, P10,000.00, and US$1,000.00 needed by his second
family in Balagtas, Bulacan where his three children with one Inday Osorio
live.Complainant obliged, prompting him to mortgage his car and close his bank
accounts. As consideration for the appliances and money given by
complainant, respondent promised that he will win in Civil Case No. 4701-V-95.
On May 16, 1996, respondent judge issued an order unloading Civil Case
No. 4701-V-95 to another RTC judge on the ground that his court was
designated as a special court to hear and decide only heinous crimes. What is
surprising is that he did not unload Civil Case No. 4692-V-95, Alfredo Atienza
vs. Toyota (Cubao), Inc. Plaintiff here is respondents compadre.
On May 21, 1996, complainant wrote respondent demanding the return of
his money and appliances.
Subsequently, a uniformed policeman delivered to complainants house a
Metrobank check (No. 018382) in the name of Christian Osorio, respondents
son. The check, in the sum of P25,613.25, was intended as payment for the TV
set and the air- conditioning unit. It was received by complainant's sister-in-law,
Diana Uy.
Thereafter, complainant again wrote respondent another letter demanding
payment of the sums of P20,000.00, P10,000.00 and $1,000.00. In response,
respondent sent his compadre, Alfredo Atienza, to complainants house to
deliver another Metrobank check (No. 018388) in the amount of P30,000.00,
also in the name of Christian Osorio. It was received by complainant's wife,
Carmen Uy.
In his comment on the affidavit-complaint, respondent Judge Osorio
vehemently denied complainants imputations against him. He explained that it
is his son, Christian Osorio, who owns the karaoke bar Barracks. Complainant
is a disgruntled litigant and has an axe to grind against him considering that in
Civil Case No. 4701-V-95, he issued a writ of preliminary attachment resulting
in the sale at public auction of complainants vehicles and the garnishment of
his bank deposits. In order to obtain a favorable judgment, complainant
befriended Christian. In the process, complainant convinced Christian to add a
VIP room to his karaoke bar and offered to sell a TV set, an air-conditioning unit
and sound equipment worth P55,000.00, payable as the business
progresses. Later, Christian intimated to pay in part, but complainant said it was
not yet time to pay. He then requested Christian to convince his father to decide
the case in his favor. Christian agreed, informing his father of such request. This
prompted respondent to unload Civil Case No. 4701-V-95, using as reason the
designation of his sala by this Court as a special court to hear and decide
exclusively heinous crimes. He then advised his son to pay complainant for the
appliances.
Respondent judge further averred in his comment that being a widower, he
has no second family; that he has served the judiciary for more than thirty (30)
years with utmost honesty; and that he will not spoil and destroy the earned
credits of his career.
In a Resolution dated March 9, 1998, this Court referred this administrative
matter to then Court of Appeals Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. (now a member of
this Court) for investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting a hearing, Justice Callejo submitted his Report
recommending that the affidavit-complaint against respondent judge be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Justice Callejos findings are reproduced as follows:
Calibrating and assessing the evidence of the parties, the Investigating Justice is
convinced that the Complainant had decided to influence the Respondent to
resolve Civil Case No. 4701-V-95 in his favor but that he cannot contact the
Respondent personally as the latter made it a policy, in his Court, that no one can see
him in his Chambers. The Complainant then decided to use the son of the Respondent,
Christian Osorio, as a channel or vehicle to the Respondent and influence the latter in
resolving Civil Case No. 4701-V-95 in his favor. The Complainant managed to
convince Christian Osorio to convert a portion of his Karaoke Bar into a VIP
room and offered to supply Christian Osorio with an air-conditioner and television
unit as well as cash in the amount of P30,000.00 and US$1,000.00. Christian Osorio
knew no better. He took the bait and accepted the appliances and the cash amounts
from the Complainant. As it was, when the time was ripe, the Complainant sought the
help of Christian Osorio to talk with the Respondent to resolve Civil Case No. 4701-
V-95 in favor of the Complainant. However, when apprised by his son of the request
of the Complainant, sometime in April, 1996, the Respondent realized that the
Complainant managed to inveigle himself into the good graces of his son, Christian
Osorio, precisely to influence the Respondent in resolving Civil Case No. 4701-V-
95 in favor of the Complainant. But the Respondent was even caught in a bind
because if he inhibited himself from the case, he had to have a valid reason for so
doing. However, the Respondent cannot use, as a justification for his inhibition, the
attempt of the Complainant to influence the Respondent via his son, Christian Osorio,
as the same would place his son, in a bad light. However, when the Respondent
received Administrative Order No. 51-96of the Supreme Court, the Respondent used
the said Order as justification for unloading Civil Case No. 4701-V-95 to another
Branch of the Court, thus, preserving the integrity of the Court. On the other hand, the
complainant realized that all the appliances and cash money he gave to Christian
Osorio were for naught. He had to recover the appliances and cash money he gave to
Christian Osorio. However, if the Complainant filed a complaint against Christian
Osorio, he will thereby be rendering himself vulnerable to a charge of attempt to
corrupt a public rendering himself vulnerable to a charge of attempt to corrupt a
public officer, a felony under Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, to
compel Christian Osorio to refund to the Complainant the cash money he received
from the Complainant and recover the value of the appliances, he wrote the letters of
demand, Exhibits A and C, to the Respondent smugged that, to avert being charged
administratively by the Complainant, the Respondent will have to insist that his son,
Christian Osorio, complied with the demands of the Complainant. However, the
Complainant sent his letters of demand with the
notations Personal/Confidential written on the envelopes to insure that the staff of the
Respondent will not open the said envelopes thereby insuring that the Respondent will
not be able to charge the Complainant with libel. As it was, after the Complainant had
received the remittances of Christian Osorio, he did not anymore file any charges
against the Respondent. Although the Complainant failed to secure a favorable
judgment from the Respondent, in Civil Case No. 4701-V-95, however, he was able to
recover his investment with Christian Osorio. In fine, the Investigating Justice finds
and so declares that the Complainant failed to prove, with the requisite quantum of
evidence, his charge of Corruption against the Respondent.
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. 3019).
xxx
In Huggland vs. Lantin, this Court held that the culpability of respondent
[2]
judge for gross dishonesty must be established not just by substantial evidence
which suffices in administrative investigation (Section 5, Rule 133, Revised
Rules of Court), but by a clear preponderance of evidence.
In Layola vs. Gabo, Jr., this Court ruled that for a judge to be held liable for
[3]
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
The Facts
Complainant, together with her relatives, filed a case for the quieting of title
(docketed as Civil Case No. U-4601) against her niece Josephine Bergonia, as
well as Spouses Rodolfo and Remedios Parayno and their minor daughter
Gretchen.[6] After due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 49,[7] promulgated its Decision in favor of the Parayno
spouses and their daughter.[8] On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial
court[9] and the Decision became final and executory.[10]
Since the disputed land was still in the possession of complainant, the
Paraynos instituted Civil Case No. U-6061 to recover possession.[11] After the
Answer was filed, respondent became her counsel of record. After due trial,
Branch 48[12] of the same RTC rendered its Decision[13] ordering her to vacate
the premises and to surrender possession thereof to the Parayno spouses.
Thereafter, complainant appealed the RTC judgment to the CA.
Respondent, as counsel, received a Notice to File Brief[14] on December 17,
1997. Acting on his Motion for extension to file the appellants brief,[15] the CA in
its February 18, 1998 minute Resolution[16] granted him until March 17, 1998 to
do so. Even before the first extension had lapsed, however, he again filed an
Urgent Second Motion for extension to file brief,[17] praying that he be given until
April 16, 1998 to submit the required pleading. The CA again granted his
Second Motion.[18]Eventually, the deadline, which had already been extended
twice, lapsed without his filing the appellants brief. Hence, the CA, upon motion
of the appellees, dismissed the appeal in its June 25, 1998 Resolution.[19]
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so.
Expressly stated is the requirement to show good and sufficient cause for
requests of extension of time to file appellate briefs. Section 12 of Rule 44 of
the Rules of Court provides that an extension of time for the filing of a brief shall
not be allowed, except when there is good and sufficient cause, and only when
the motion is filed before the expiration of the extension sought.
From time to time, a request for extension becomes necessary when an
advocate needs more time to study the clients position. Generally, such request
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Lawyers who, for one reason
or another, decide to dispense with the filing of the required pleading, should
promptly manifest this intent to the court. It is necessary for them to do so in
order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case. Those who file motions for
extension in bad faith misuse the legal process, obstruct justice,[20] and thus
become liable to disciplinary action.[21]
A lawyer who requests an extension must do so in good faith and with a
genuine intent to file the required pleading within the extended period. In
granting the request, the court acts on the presumption that the applicant has a
justifiable reason for failing to comply with the period allowed. Without this
implied trust, the motion for extension will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay
or thwart the appealed decision. The motion will thus be regarded as a means
of preventing the judgment from attaining finality and execution and of enabling
the movant to trifle with procedure and mock the administration of justice.
In this case, respondent twice moved for an extension of time to file the
required appellants brief. In his first Motion, he alleged that he had a hectic daily
schedule of hearings and other pressures from work. In his next Motion, he
claimed he had acute arthritis and asthmatic attacks. The granting of his two
Motions implied that he had been given ample time either to finish researching
his case or to withdraw his appeal. Yet, he still failed to file the required brief. In
its June 25, 1998 Resolution, the CA noted that the appellees Motion to Dismiss
the appeal was filed only after forty (40) days from the expiration of the last
extension.
Respondent claims that he never planted false hopes in the mind of
complainant. Upon receiving the Decision in Civil Case No. U-6061, he
purportedly advised her that her chances of winning in the appellate court were
slim, because the ownership of the disputed land had already been adjudicated
to the other party in Civil Case No. U-4601. He avers that he tried to persuade
her to accept her defeat like a good soldier.
We are not persuaded. If, indeed, respondent failed to convince
complainant to drop her appeal, he should have just withdrawn his appearance.
Based on his arguments in his Opposition to the Motion for Execution and
Demolition, however, we do not believe that he even tried to convince her to
withdraw the appeal. We are inclined to believe that this excuse was merely an
afterthought to justify his negligence.
Moreover, respondent claims that after filing the Motions for Extension, he
surmised that the appeal would be useless, because he could not show
sufficient cause to reverse the Decision.
This justification is even more inexcusable. Respondent, should have
checked first if there was a good ground to support the appeal. If there was
none, he should have been forthright in his evaluation of the case.
Lawyers should fully familiarize themselves with the causes of their clients
before advising the latter on the soundness of litigating. If they find that the
intended suit is devoid of merit or that the pending action is defenseless,[22] they
should promptly inform and dissuade their clients accordingly.
Assuming that respondent indeed tried to persuade complainant to abandon
the appeal, he should have manifested to the CA that he had decided not to file
the appellants brief anymore, instead of just letting the period lapse. His
contention that he could not find the appropriate jurisprudence to support her
case is too flimsy to be credible. A competent and ethical lawyer would have at
least tried to persuade the CA with reason and logic.
Respondent alleges that complainant knew of the dismissal of the appeal.
That she had referred the Motion for Execution and Demolition to him for
comment allegedly showed that she had already given up her desire to pursue
her appeal. He pointed out that if she had indeed blamed his inexcusable
negligence for its dismissal, then she would not have referred that Motion to
him.
We are not convinced. Anyone would have done what complainant did,
because no one else would know the case better than ones lawyer. Contrary to
respondents allegation, we do not read any intention on her part to withdraw
the appeal, which showed that she wanted to oppose the execution of the
Decision.
We concur in the IBPs finding that respondent was negligent in the
performance of his duties as counsel for complainant, and that his negligence
was inexcusable. If indeed it was true that he found her case to be futile, he
should have just withdrawn the appeal, instead of filing several Motions for
extension to file the appellants brief.
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable
membership in the legal profession.[23] Lawyers are required to act with the
highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation
and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels
and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct
themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with
fidelity to the courts and their clients. Canon 18.03 of the Code requires that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith renders him liable.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera is hereby found guilty of violating
Canons 12 and 18 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from
receipt of this Decision. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4801. February 27, 2003]
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Complainant stated:
2. That I am constrained to file such disbarment case for the reason that the said
ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING in notarizing the attached document, Annexes A
and A-1, he made it appear that I together with my brother and sisters appeared before
him on July 2, 1997 when in truth and in fact we did not and in the said document
Atty. Alfredo Datingaling said, and I quote:
LUCILLE U. MAGBOO
JOVITA U. GALICIA
3. That aside from the fact that not one of us appeared before Notary Public Alfredo
Datingaling at Batangas City on July 2, 1997 and we have individual daily time
records as we are working in Metro Manila, we have signed each and every document
of Annexes A and A-1 before him as stated by him in his acknowledgement and
clearly page 1 which is Annex A has not been signed by any of us and the name
WENDY SUNSHINE UMALI refers to two persons which are my nieces, Wendy is
nine (9) years old and Sunshine is twelve (12) years old and both of them have no
legal personality to appear before a Notary Public to sign any legal document and
moreover RONALD REAGAN HERNANDEZ who appears to have a Residence
Certificate No. 8988196 is a son of Elvira Atienza and is only nine (9) years of age
and the first page, Annex A has been written on a different typewriter and inserted to
the document as the front page and allegedly signed on July 3, 1997 at Batangas City
ahead of the notarization of the document which was on July 2, 1997. In short, Atty.
Alfredo Datingaling falsified the whole document and he aggravated such act of
falsification when he notarized the same; that moreover, it refers to a parcel of land
which has never been agreed by the parties;
4. That for such acts of falsification, I have filed with the City Fiscals Office of
Batangas City a falsification case against Atty. Alfredo Datingaling and his clients,
Elvira Atienza, Bayani Melo and Apolonia Bonado. [2]
Complainant charged that despite knowledge of the falsity of the document,
respondent, as notary public for Batangas City, notarized it on July 3, 1997.
This Court required respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling to comment on the
administrative complaint filed against him. In his counter-affidavit dated March
2, 1998, respondent claimed that the complaint is baseless, out of focus, an
afterthought, childish and in the nature of self-indictment. Respondent denied
[3]
the allegations against him and claimed that complainant had signed the
documents on July 2, 1997 in Quezon City and had it notarized by respondent
the next day (July 3, 1997) in Batangas City. Respondent stated in his counter-
affidavit:
The document was already prepared when it was brought to my law office by Bayani
Melo and company who signed in our office on July 03, 1997. It was my secretary
who stamped my name as Notary Public on the bottom of the Acknowledgement
ready for my signature, but through inadvertence she overlooked that date July 02,
1997 thereof as the date of the actual notarization. It bears emphasis that such date
(July 02, 1997) was typewritten beforehand which could easily be reformed if the
parties so desire. So why does the complainant want to create trouble?
Explaining a little further, the negotiation or transaction between the group of Ronald
Hernandez represented by Bayani Melo on the one hand (my client), and the group of
Mena Umali Gerona on the other took place at the residence of Mena Umali Gerona
in Quezon City where the document in question was prepared on July 2, 1997, and the
parties agreed to meet each other in Batangas City, the following day July 3, 1997 for
purposes of notarization at the office of the Notary Public ATTY. ALFREDO R.
DATINGALING. [4]
Attached to the counter-affidavit were the affidavits of Bayani Melo and Matias
Magnaye (marked Annexes A and B, respectively), corroborating respondents
[5]
Page 1 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 reveals that it has that
blank space for the technical description of a parcel of land subject of their agreement;
it is undated; it is signed by Bayani Melo at the bottom but unsigned by Lucila Umali
Magboo and it has insertions and modifications thereon.
On the other hand, page 1 of the notarized copy of that consent to quarry reveals that
the technical description refers to two parcels of land located at Anilao, Mabini,
Batangas described in Tax Declaration No. 003-00097 and in the approved
plan/Application for Small Scale Mining Permit for Quarry; it is dated July 3, 1997, it
has two signatures of Bayani Melo and one signature of Ronald Reagan Hernandez
and it is also unsigned by Lucila Umali Magboo.
Page 2 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 shows the signatures of
Mena U. Gerona, Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda as well as the signatures of
witnesses Rosemarie, Matias, Geronimo and Apolonia before the acknowledgment
portion; a signature of Lucila N. Magboo at the acknowledgment portion; blank as to
the Notary Public and the Doc., Page No., Book No., and Series of.
Page 2 of the notarized copy of the Consent to Quarry bears the signatures of Mena,
Feliciano, and Aurelia as well as the witnesses before the acknowledgment portion; it
is dated July 2, 1997 and signed by Notary public A.R. Datingaling and it is docketed
as Doc. No. 3473, Page No. 67, Book No. XXVII, Series of 1997.
It has been also established that the said document was brought to Menas residence on
July 2, 1997 ready for signatures and in fact it was signed there by Mena, Feliciano,
Aurelia and Bayani Melo in the presence of those witnesses. After the signing of said
document, a copy was left with Mena and the other copies were brought by the group
of Bayani Melo, which copies were notarized by Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling on July
3, 1997. The issue now is whether the crime of falsification has been committed by
the respondents?
From the glaring dissimilarities between the copies of the document consent to quarry
and the testimony of the complainant and his brother Feliciano, the undersigned
honestly believes that indeed the crime of falsification had been committed by the
respondents in conspiracy with one another. The evidence is clear that Mena Umali
and her brother and sisters had not presented themselves or appeared before said
Notary Public for the acknowledgment of said document as their free act and
voluntary deed and that the lots described in the notarized document are different
from the lot they intended to be the subject of their agreement. From the unnotarized
copy dated July 2, 1997 which bears the proposed insertions/modifications, the land
intended to be described as the subject of that agreement is but a parcel of land while
in the notarized copy, it describes two parcels of land. Further, had the complainant
and her brother and sisters appeared before the Notary Public for notarization of said
document, then there is no reason why Lucila Magboo, Mena Umali, Feliciano Umali
and Aurelia Miranda would not be required to sign on the first page of the
document. In fact, Bayani Melo signed again the said document on the first page
while Ronald Reagan Hernandez who is already represented by Bayani Melo was
required to sign said document on the first page. Hence, there is sufficient ground to
hold respondents for trial for the said offense under I.S. No. 97-3353.
....
We are therefore of the impression that, to say the least, the respondent has not shown
qualities that endear him to the profession or the Bar. While complainants present
criminal case against the respondent may be pending, and he still enjoys the
presumption of innocence so far as Crim. Case No. 9426 (I.S. No. 97-3353) is
concerned, the fact remains that for purposes of this administrative complaint, the
evidence presented by the complainant considered vis--vis the unconvincing
explanation of the respondent, his silence and failure to file a rejoinder, and the
criminal cases filed against him, it is clear that Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, more particularly Canons 1 and 7.
We therefore recommend the suspension of Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling from the
practice of the profession for a period of one (1) year.
[7]
....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.
Rule 139-B, 12(c) does not mention motions for reconsideration, there is
nothing in its text or history which prohibits the filing of such motion. A motion
for reconsideration of a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors may be filed
within 15 days from notice to a party appealing. Indeed, the filing of such motion
before the Board is in fact encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a
matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering
the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through
a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence. [10]
Be that as it may and considering that the motion for reconsideration was
filed after the records of this case had been forwarded to this Court, we have
decided to treat the motion as a petition for review within the contemplation of
Rule 139-B, 12 (b).
After due consideration of respondents motion for reconsideration, we find
the motion to be without merit.
First. As regards the charge of falsification of a public document filed against
respondent, the records show that as of the date of filing of respondents Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration on September 16, 2002, the same is still pending
trial before Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Batangas City. Respondent [11]
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a
respondent as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment [13]
criminal case is not necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an
administrative proceeding. As we have held in Calub v. Suller, the dismissal
[15]
Respondent had a duty to require the persons claiming to have executed the
document to appear personally before him and to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated in the document. If the parties were represented by
other persons, their representatives names should appear in the said
documents as the ones who had executed the same and the latter should be
required to affirm their acts. Respondent failed to do this.
[17]
Court suspended respondents commission as a notary public for one year for
notarizing the verification of a motion to dismiss when the fact was that three of
the affiants had not appeared before him and for notarizing the same instrument
of which he had been one of the signatories. In accordance with that case, the
suspension of respondent from his commission as notary public for one year
would be proper.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling is found guilty of
violation of Act No. 2103, 1(a) and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission
as notary public for a period of one (1) year, with WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with
more severely. The charge of falsifying a public document is DISMISSED
without prejudice to the filing of an administrative case for the same act should
the evidence warrant such action.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1427. February 27, 2003]
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
evidence showing that the respondent judge acted in bad faith, ill-will, or malice
reduces the charges against him into a mere indictment. Charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. [2]
Well to remember as investigating officer the respondent judge is given the
latitude to determine if there exists probable cause that would warrant either the
filing of the corresponding information or the outright dismissal of the
case. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since it must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in a given case, its existence depends to a large degree on the findings or
opinion of the judge conducting the investigation.
Mere allegations in the complaint must be supported by evidence to prove
that a judge has overstepped the parameters of his official prerogative. Here,
we find that complainant has failed to present any evidence to corroborate his
assertion that respondent judge is guilty of committing irregularities in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation.
Section 3 (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that
[3]
less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
[6]
Coming now to the recommended penalty by the OCA, the amount ofP2,000
does not appear to be commensurate with respondents infraction. Setting
excessive bail evinces disregard of pertinent rules and regulations. Considering
that bail involves a basic right of the accused, this Court finds that a higher
penalty should be imposed. Thus, the fine should be set at P5,000 as more[13]