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MICHAEL A. GILBERT
York University
The main stream of formal and informal logic as well as more recent work in
discourse analysis provides a way of understanding certain arguments that
particularly lend themselves to rational analysis. I argue, however, that these,
and allied modes of analysis, be seen as heuristic models and not as the only
proper mode of argument. This article introduces three other modes of argumen-
tation that emphasize distinct aspects of human communication, but that, at the
same time, must be considered for the full understanding of argumentation.
These modes are (1) the emotional, which relates to the realm of feelings, (2) the
visceral, which stems from the area of the physical, and (3) the kisceral, which
covers the intuitive and non-sensory arenas. At its most extreme the view holds
that arguments may be given (almost) wholly within one mode and not be at all
susceptible to those methods of argument analysis previously used. A more
cautious statement allows that any interactive argument will (possibly) contain
elements from various modes, and that to attempt to reduce these all to the
rational is prejudiced reductionism.
personal and social&dquo; (p. 186), and, on the other, that &dquo;different tradi-
tions of knowing... offer differing patterns of inter-referentiality; ...
arguments are built upon these patterns&dquo; (p. 188). In other words,
Received 17 June 1992
I am indebted to various people for comments on this work, most especially Charles
Willard and Ralph Johnson. An earlier version of this article was presented to the
International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Amsterdam, 1989.
patterns of argument may differ from field to field, but the essential
patterns are less than wildly variant. It is still the &dquo;system of argu-
ment&dquo; that
guides and &dquo;argument-as-structure&dquo; that delineates hu-
man rationality (pp. 188-89).
Most definitions of argument involve instances that are spoken or
written by one person in order to effect some difference in another
person (Walton 1990, p. 411). Certainly, such examples form the most
obvious instances of argument. That is, the emphasis is invariably on
verbal reasoning as the core of the process. Beyond that, non-verbal
communication or contextual ramifications tend to be included only
insofar as they are linguistically explicable (O’Keefe 1982). Indeed, it
is only recently that attention has focused on argument as an interac-
tive enterprise occurring between persons. This has been exempli-
fied in work as varied as that of Brockriede (1975), Balthrop (1980),
Wenzel (1980), O’Keefe (1982), Willard (1983,1989), van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1989), and Jackson and Jacobs (1980), and has become
the key characteristic of contemporary argumentation theory. Still,
there seem to be two pervasive assumptions tying this new approach
to its roots. The first is that argument is essentially rational, where the
sense of &dquo;rational&dquo; is taken as &dquo;reasoned.&dquo; The second is that social
context, psychological motivation and other matters that impinge on
the argument process, are inherently peripheral to the notion of
&dquo;argument.&dquo;
These assumptions have remained well entrenched despite several
assaults on their legitimacy. One such assault comes from one of the
acknowledged founders of contemporary argumentation theory,
Chaim Perelman. Perelman argued, in The New Rhetoric (Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) and in numerous later works, that rhetoric
must be construed not as an ornamental art, but as that aspect of
argumentation geared toward persuasion. Persuasion is crucial, and
must be resurrected from its negative associations, because we cannot
use reason (i.e., &dquo;convincing&dquo;) to discern matters of opinion (i.e.,
gory of argument. So, if one can fail to argue rationally, this presum-
ably means that there are non-rational arguments, even though the
speaker does not like them. In this sense of the word, &dquo;rational&dquo; is
often used as an honorific, and, more importantly, as a way of negat-
ing and/or trivializing modes of argument not in keeping with one
arguer’s precepts. This sense requires the rational person to think in
a certain, generally logical, way and to adhere to standards of evi-
Example 1. John and Mary are having an argument about their vaca-
tion plans. Mary is frustrated by John’s repeatedly saying of her sug-
gestions, &dquo;We can’t afford that.&dquo; Finally, with some heat, she says, &dquo;It
doesn’t sound like we can afford anything.&dquo; John’s face clouds over; he
looks sad and embarrassed. He turns away forlornly, head hanging
down.
Altematively, might one not say that John’s move is not an argu-
mentative move, but that it ought not be an argumentative move.
(Burleson [19811 might be expected to say this.) But the fact is that
Mary must deal with John’s upset, that it may well direct her next
move, and that John’s response does provide her with potentially
valuable information about both his position and himself. Moreover,
if we say that John’s show of emotion is fallacious then we recognize
it as a component of an argument: insofar as fallacies are incorrect or
improper argument moves, they are, ipso facto, argument moves.
Wanting to investigate alternate modes does not imply that there
is something wrong with the logical mode. It is a basic, clear, and
valuable mode of argumentation vital to academic and commercial
enterprise. Given that most argumentation scholars are highly trained
in the logical mode, and value it above all others, it is hardly surpris-
168
Example 2. Harry held a finger over his lips to signal for silence. He
pointed to the door with his revolver. &dquo;He’s in there,&dquo; he said to Jane.
&dquo;How can you be sure?&dquo; she queried.
&dquo;He had to take the left or right door before, and they both lead into
that room there.&dquo;
&dquo;Okay, then,&dquo; Jane replied, &dquo;I’m ready when you are.&dquo;
The reasoning with which Harry reassures Jane is classically logi-
cal, and follows fairly closely the pattern known as v-Elimination or
Disjunctive Syllogism in a natural deduction system. The pattern is
as follows.
Example 3. AvB,A~C,Bi3C)-C
In (2), let A stand for &dquo;he took the right door,&dquo; B for &dquo;he took the
left door,&dquo; and C for &dquo;he’s in that room.&dquo; Without too much difficulty
we can see the connection between (2) and (3). This is helpful in
and pointing to the clock, the argument would still be in the same
mode. In other words, being verbal or non-verbal is not in itself either a
necessary or sufficient determination of mode.
It is now necessary to present examples of arguments in the three
alternative modes. These examples purport to show that there are
arguments where the sources of information, that is, warrant and
backing, and/or mode of presentation are essentially non-logical,
and, at the same time, are still dearly components of the argument.
Before presenting them, however, it is important to reiterate that no
claim is being made for exclusivity. It is unlikely that any argument is
purely in one mode, and it is practically certain that any argument can
be twisted out of its natural shape and into some arbitrary mode. This
said, an example of an argument from the emotional mode follows.
Example 5. Jill: But why should I marry you, Jack?
Jack: Because I love you as life itself.
Several points may be made about this example. First, some will
think Jack has a good reason, whereas others will find it a not very
compelling one. Needless to say, the strength of the reason is inde-
pendent of its mode. It might also be considered ethymematic: the argu-
ment is not essentially emotional, but merely relies on suppressed or
absent premises for its logical standing: &dquo;What Jack is really saying is
that he will be a good husband, and that he is devoted to Jill, and
that....&dquo; And, indeed, Jack may well assent to some such conjunction
if presented to him. But the fact that (5) can be paraphrased into a
logical argument does not make it one; it is an emotional one, its force
and persuasive power come almost entirely from its emotional aspect.
To try and construe it otherwise is to force a square peg into a round
hole. Jack’s argument, whether considered a good one or not, is
perfectly understood, and in order to understand it we do not reduce
it to logical terms. Note that there is here no objection to Jack’s having
made an argument there is a clear reason and claim, and in that
sense is perfectly logical. However, Jack’s reason is not logical; its
source is an introspection of his emotional state. By being aware of
this we are in a better position to analyze and judge the argument.
Consider the next example.
Example 6. Paula is sitting in Professor Tome’s office. She is pleading
for an &dquo;A&dquo; in his logic course. &dquo;Don’t you see,&dquo; she explains plaintively,
tears in her eyes, &dquo;if I don’t get an ’A’ in your course I won’t make
medical school, and my life will be ruined. I won’t have anything left
to live for.&dquo;
170
Mrs. Bums, like Mary in example (7), decided for various reasons
not to have a logical argument with Mr. Burns. She knew well enough
that continuing the argument on a verbal level would lead to naught
or worse. Nonetheless, it was important to her to persuade him that
he was, indeed, tense. Her argument was a directly visceral one,
communicated primarily by physical sensations which, in this case,
brought Mr. Burns to an awareness of his own state. Mrs. Bums could
have argued logically, and at some length, with Mr. Bums and still not
have made any persuasive progress. It was her choice of mode that
allowed her to persuade him she was right. This is not to say that a
logical argument could not have worked. Mrs. Burns might have said,
&dquo;Don’t be silly. Anyone who slams the door, snarls at his wife, and
storms about is tense.&dquo; And, Mr. Burns might have thought it over
and concurred, but I believe most of us would agree that Mrs. Bums’s
argument was the more effective.
One might, at this point, agree that Mrs. Bums’s technique was
effective, but at the same time claim that example (8) is not an
argument at all. But why not? There was disagreement and there was
communication. The communication was used to influence the dis-
agreement. Mrs. Burns intended, at least in part, to move Mr. Bums
from a position of disagreement to one of agreement. It is clearly an
attempt on Mrs. Bums part to get Mr. Bums to see the world from her
173
perspective and admit her insights. In fact, the only reason for deny-
ing its status as an argument is that it is not linguistic, and to do that
is to beg the entire question. Only by assuming in the first place that
all arguments are ultimately linguistic, or even &dquo;linguistically ex-
pressible,&dquo; to use O’Keefe’s (1982) expression, can one prove that
there are no non-linguistic arguments.
One more brief example in the visceral mode.
Example 9. Diane is about to reach for the window crank to open the
kitchen window.
&dquo;Don’t touch that!&dquo; Michael calls, &dquo;it’s broken.&dquo;
Diane looks at him skeptically, starts to turn the handle, then jumps
back as the window comes crashing down at her feet. She looks back
at Michael and says, &dquo;Hm, I guess you were right.&dquo;
The key to (10) is Lisa’s feeling, her unprocessed belief that the offer
they made will be accepted. One could explain this phenomenon by
appealing to explicit experiences and showing how the process Lisa
believes is her intuition is really a series of deductions based on her
business experience. Such an explanation might go a long way toward
comforting a positivist, but it does nothing to deal with the mode of
argument Lisa chose. Regardless of why Lisa actually came to her
conclusion, the reason she gives to Greg is kisceral. That is, it relies on
a form of non-logical communication that is a synthesis of experience
and insight. One further quick example:
NOTES
1. Clearly arguments can proceed non-verbally, compare Willard (1989, 96ff.). The
question is whether we must be able to verbalize them on demand.
2. I take the liberty of introducing a new term here in order to afford sufficient
breadth without at the same time using terminology generally in disrepute. That is, the
kisceral covers not only the intuitive but also, for those who indulge, the mystical,
religious, supernatural, and extra-sensory. "Kisceral" is chosen in order to have a
descriptive term that does not carry with it normative baggage, like, for example,
"mystical" or "extra-sensory."
3. By this I simply mean that the rationalist is usually very good at recasting any
purportedly non-rational experience into a rational one. Indeed, whole clubs of ra-
tionalists band together to do just this. A book entitled How We Know What Isn’t So, by
Gilovich (1991), for example, is completely devoted to an attack on such beliefs as ESP
and alternative medicine.
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