A Judge Cannot Judge His Own Case

(Significance of the principles of Natural Justice is nothing but keeping the Justice alive)
The principles of Natural Justice are very fundamental. They are regarded as very important part
of the legal and Judcial procedures. They are applicable not only to Judicial or Quasi Judicial
Bodies but also to the Administrative Bodies in its process of Judicial or Administrative Justice.
Nothing is to be done creating suspicious and improper interference with the cause of Justice.

It is a well known Rule that Justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly be
seen to be done. That means that Judges cannot be suspected. They are required to be above or
out of suspicion. Therefore, there arose a rule in Jurisprudence that No man (Judge) shall be a
Judge in his own cause. NEMO DEBUT CASE JUDEX IN PROPERIA CAUSA IN PROPRIA
CAUSA. Therefore, the first principle of Natural Justice consists of the Rule against Bias or
Intent.
In A.K. Kraipak V. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC A), the Supreme Court held that a person who
sits on a Committee for selection of candidates for certain job must not be a Candidate himself
for the Job. The logic is that Judges could be impartial and neutral. He must be free from any
controversy, suspicion of bias in rendering Justice.
Firstly, it is well settled that as regards pecuniary interest, the least pecuniary interest in the
subject matter of litigation will disqualify any person from acting as a Judge. A Judge or Lawyer
could not instigate the parties to come settlement between them by gaining pecuniary benefits
from both sides. It will be considered to be misconduct. Secondly, it is also well settled that
Personal Bias is against the Justice.
A number of circumstances may give rise to personal bias. If a Judge be a relative, friend or
business partner or associate he might have some personal grudge, enmity, professional rivalry
against such party. In view of these factors, there is very likelihood that the Judge may be biased
towards one party or prejudiced towards others. Thirdly, Official Bias is also very serious one.

An official appointed for acting as an Adjudicator cannot be disqualified from a mere official
loophole or policy weak in his role and responsibility. There shall be total application of minds
on his part or he shall not be acting under some one’s dictation instead of deciding the matter
independently. Then, out of these three bias, the first one (Pecuniary Bias) is very danger that it
can disqualify a person from acting as a Judge. But the remaining two is indeed needed to test
whether there is a real likelihood of Bias in the Judgment.

Dimes vs Grant Junction Canal, an english case was considered to be a classic example of the
application of the rule against pecuniary bias/interest. In the case, the suits were decreed by the
vice-chancellor and the appeals against those decrees were filed in the court of lord chancellor
cottenham. The appeals were dismissed by him and decrees were confirmed in favour of the
canal company in which he was a substantial shareholder. The court of lord chancellor,
qottenham agreed with the vice-chancellor and affirmed the decrees on merits. In fact, Lord
Cottonham’s decision was not in any way affected his interest as a shareholder in future. But, the
House of Lords quashed the decision of Lord Cottonham at the end.

In India, there is no general statutory provision which requires the adjudicatory authority to give
reasons for their decisions. However, on the basis of natural justice and some Constitutional
provisions, the Court has imposed a general obligation on the adjudicatory authorities to give
reasons for their decisions. It is now well established that the adjudicatory authority must give
reasons in support of its decisions. At present, the requirement to give reason is considered as
one virtue of the Principles of Natural Justice. If a particular statute requires the adjudicatory
authorities to give reasons for their decisions. In such reasons, if there is failure in giving reasons
(justification) for their decision by the adjudicator, it would be fatal to their decisions.

The Order passed in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice, .i.e impartial (no bias), just,
fair and heard and reasons is void. When the reasons for the decisions are not given to the person
concerned or reasons are not given to the Court, the order will be quashed and the authority is
directed by the Court to examine the matter afresh. Reasons are for the benefit of the parties
concerned and therefore they should be communicated to the person concerned and they
(reasons) should not be confined to the case record in the Court only. They are not personnel. In
such a way, the Justice /Judges are the very divine institution.
A. K Kraipak Case
I ASSIGNMENT ONI A. K KRAIPAK vs UNION OF INDIAI (A Case Study)I III AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE OF A. K KRAIPAK VS UNION OF INDIA: INTRODUCTION:
Kraipak vs Union of India is regarded as an epoch making decision as it demolishes the artificial
and conceptualistic distinction between administrative and quasi judicial function as well as
delinked natural justice from quasi judicial.
In this case the court asserted that natural justice could be applied to the so called administrative
function as well, for the rules of natural justice aim at securing justice, or to prevent miscarriage
of justice, and the basic aim is to arrived at a just decision. kraipak's case had a profound impact
on the growth of administrative law in india. The liberal judicial trend in favour of applying
natural justice got strengthened as a result of the kraipak's decision. Facts of the case :
In 1966, a service called The Indian Forest Service was constituted, the selection for which was
to be made from among the officers serving in the forest department of the state. Section 3 of the
All India Services Act, 1951 provides that the Central Government shall after consulting the
Government of the States concerned to make rules for the regulation of recruitment and the
conditions of the service of persons appointed to those All India Services. In pursuance of the
power given under Section 3. Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules. 1966 were made.
The Rule 4(1) of the above mentioned Rules empowers the Central Government to recruit to the
service any person from amongst the members of the State Forest Service adjudged suitable in
accordance with such regulations as the Central Government may make in consultation with
State Governments and the Commission. " Now the regulation 3 of Indian Forest Service (Initial
Recruitment) Regulations. 1956 framed under Rule 4(1) of the Indian Forest Service
(Recruitment) Rules, 1966 provided for the Constitution of a Special Selection Board consisting
of: 1.
The Chairman of UPSC or his nominee. 2. Inspector General of Forests of the Government of
India. 3. Joint Secretary. UCH. 4. Chief Secretary of the concerned State Government 5. Chief
Conservator of Forest of the concerned State Government. The selection Board was to be headed
by the Chief Conservator of the Forest of the State while the final selections were to be made by
the Union Public Service Commission (U. P. S. C).
In the State of Jammu and Kashmir, a Naquishbund was appointed as the acting Chief
Conservator of forest and was olso a member of the selection board for recommending the names
of officers for All India Forest Service was formed, The Board recommended the names of the
persons including Naquishbund. The selections as finally made by the board were accepted by
the Commission. On the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, the impugned list was
published. Even After review Basu, Baig and Kaulwho were supersede by naquishbund for chief
conservator of forest were not selected.
It must be noted that Naquishbund was also one of the candidates for All India Forest Service.
Though he did not sit in the selection board at the time his name was considered for selection but
he did sit in the board when the names of Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered for selection and
was also involved while preparing the list of selected candidates . Aggrieved, The Gazetted
Officers Association, brought a petition to the Court challenging that the selections in question
were made in contravention of the Principles of Natural Justice.
Arguments Advanced : The petitioners as well as the respondents raised arguments with respect
to the nature of the power conferred on the selection board. The petitioners contended that Rule 4
as well as Regulation S prescribes that the selections should be made after 'adjudging' the
suitability of the officers belonging to the State service. The word 'adjudge the meaning of which
is 'to judge or decide indicates that the power conferred on the selection board was a quasi-
judicial power.
It was contended on their behalf that such a power is a judicial power not an administrative one
and it has to be exercised in accordance with the well accepted Rules of Natural Justice, the
violation of which has been rightly claimed. Naquishbund, being a candidate for Indian Forest
Service cannot be an adjudicator of the same. On the other hand, the learned Attorney General on
behalf of the respondents argued that the power exercised by the selection board is not a quasi-
judicial power but an administrative power.
To support this contention, it was further admitted that the proceedings before the selection board
were not quasi-judicial because the board was not required to decide about any 'right'. The duty
of the board was merely to select officers who in its opinion were suitable for Indian Forest
Service. He interpreted the word 'adjudge as being 'found worthy of selection. It was also
contended by the learned Attorney General that after all the selection board was only a
recommendatory body. Its recommendations had first to be perused by the Home Ministry and
then by the U.
P. S. C The final recommendations were made by the U. P. S. C Therefore, grievances of the
petitioners have no real basis. Keeping in mind the validity of the administrative actions taken,
all that has to be seen is whether the final decision is just or not And finally, in the form of
arguendo, it was also contended by the learned Attorney General that the mere fact that one of
the members of the board was biased against some of the petitioners cannot vitiate the whole
selection process Analyzing the Judgment.
A five judge bench of the Apex Court held that the selections made by the selection committee
were in violation of principles of natural justice. The Court found the power exercised by the
Selection Board as an administrative one and tested the validity of the selections on that basis. It
held that the concept of rule of law would lose its importance if the instrumentalities of the State
are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. Also, it is a
must to charge dministrative authorities with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and
just manner in a Welfare State like India, where the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is
increasing at a rapid rate. In the words of Ilegde, J. - 'The requirement of acting judicially in
essence is nothing but to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures
which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which
facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. It further observed that the dividing line between
an administrative power and quasi-judicial power is being gradually obliterated. The Court held
that the basic principle of nemo judex in causa sua was violated by appointing Naquishbund as a
member of the selection board. Though he did not participate in the deliberations of the board
when his name was being considered yet the very fad that he was a member of the selection
board had a significant impact on the decision of the selection board and he participated in the
deliberations when the claims Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered.
Under such circumstances, the Court could not believe that Naquishbund could have been
unbiased, the Court observed that the question is not whether Naquishbund was actually biased
or not. The real question is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely
to have been biased. Further the Court observed that the question is not whether Naquishbund
was actually biased or not The real question is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing
that he was likely to have been biased, earlier in Manaklal's case the Court had made it clear that
the test was not actual bias but a reasonable apprehension of bias.
It held that it is difficult to prove the state of mind. Therefore in deciding the question of bias
ordinary course of human conduct is taken into consideration. Owing to this, the Court observed
that there was a personal interest on part of Naquishbund to keep out his rivals in order to secure
his position without further challenge and so he cannot said to be impartial, fair and just while
making the selection. Conclusion
It held that it is difficult to prove the state of mind. Therefore in deciding the question of bias
ordinary course of human conduct is taken into consideration. Owing to this the Court observed
that there was a personal interest on part of Naquishbund to keep out his rivals in order to secure
his position without further challenge and so he cannot said to be impartial, fair and just while
making the selection. Conclusion
Therefore what emerges from this case is that although the Courts are making distinctions
between the Quasi-Judicial and Administrative powers but at the same time there is one common
element of fair procedure in both the cases which can be referred to as the 'duty to act fairly'.
This duty arises from the same general principles, as do the rules of natural justice. The case of A
K Kraipak v. Union of India is a landmark judgement in the development of administrative law
in India and has strengthened the rule of law in this country.
Hedge, J. observed that °If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of
justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative inquiries".
In the words of Krishna lyer, J. - °Once we understand the soul of the rule as fairplay in action -
and it is so- we must hold that it extends to both the fields. After all administrative power in a
democratic set-up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot
degenerate into unilateral injustice."