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Villenavs - People Cabacang
Villenavs - People Cabacang
People
Facts:
Petitioners Police Inspector Edward Garrick Villena and Police Officer Percival Doroja, together with PO2
Nicomedes Lambas, PO3 Dan Fermalino, Police Chief Inspector Jovem C. Bocalbos, PO3 Reynaldo
Macalinao, PO1 Alvaro Yumang, and Imelda Borcelis, were indicted for the crime of robbery (extortion)
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 202, Las Piñas City. After arraignment, where the accused all pled
not guilty, and pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Petitioners failed to appear before the trial court to adduce
evidence in their defense. It was only PO3 Macalinao who appeared before the court to present his
evidence. RTC rendered its decision convicting petitioners, together with PO2 Lambas, PO3 Fermalino, PO3
Macalinao, and PO1 Yumang, of the crime charged. During the promulgation of judgment, petitioners again
failed to appear despite proper notices to them at their addresses of record. In the absence of petitioners,
the promulgation was made pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the RTC issued warrants of arrest against them.
Petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. William F. delos Santos, filed their separate notices of appeal
before the RTC. In the said notices, they explained that they failed to attend the promulgation of judgment
because they did not receive any notice thereof because they were transferred to another police station.
RTC: denied the notices of appeal on two grounds: first, that the accused had the obligation to inform the
Court of the changes in their address in order that the orders, notices and other court processes may be
properly sent to them. In any case, the counsels on record for the accused Macalinao, Doroja and Villena
were duly notified of the scheduled hearings and promulgation of judgment; second, they have lost their
standing in court and unless they surrender or submit to the jurisdiction of the court, they are deemed to
have waived any right to seek relief from the court because of their non-appearance.
Subsequently, PO3 Macalinao filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Reconsider the order of the RTC.
Petitioners likewise filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration. It was only Macalinao’s petition to which the
court acted favorably noting the fact that the latter had been consistently attending the hearings and that he
submitted the proper documents proving that he was transferred to a different police station.
Court of Appeals: no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC in its denial of their respective notices of appeal since
they already contained the required manifestation and information as to the cause of their non-appearance
on the scheduled promulgation on September 3, 2007, i.e., lack of notice
Held:
While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal and that the trial court
thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal
could validly avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in court. In this case, petitioners have
lost their standing in court by their unjustified failure to appear during the trial and, more importantly, during
the promulgation of judgment of conviction, and to surrender to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners contend that their act of filing notices of appeal was already substantial compliance with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. We differ.
Applying the aforecited provision, the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction shall lose the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment by (a) the filing of
a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule
122). However, the Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in court in order to avail of these
remedies by: (a) his surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies,
stating therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment. If the
trial court finds that his absence was for a justifiable cause, the accused shall be allowed to avail of the said
remedies within 15 days from notice or order finding his absence justified and allowing him the available
remedies against the judgment of conviction.
Thus, petitioners mere filing of notices of appeal through their new counsel, therein only explaining their
absence during the promulgation of judgment, cannot be considered an act of surrender, despite the fact
that said notices were filed within 15 days from September 28, 2007, the purported date when their new
counsel personally secured a copy of the judgment of conviction from the RTC. The term surrender under
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a convicted accused
physically and voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer the
consequences of the verdict against him. The filing of notices of appeal cannot suffice as a physical and
voluntary submission of petitioners to the RTCs jurisdiction. It is only upon petitioners valid surrender, and
only after proper motion, that they can avail of the remedy of appeal. Absent compliance with these
requirements, their notices of appeal, the initiatory step to appeal from their conviction, were properly denied
due course.
Even if petitioners notices of appeal were given due course, the CA would only be constrained to dismiss
their appeal. This is because petitioners, who had standing warrants of arrest but did not move to have them
lifted, are considered fugitives from justice. Since it is safe to assume that they were out on bail during trial,
petitioners were deemed to have jumped bail when they failed to appear at the promulgation of their
sentence. This is a ground for dismissal of an appeal under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. Once
an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in the case of petitioners), or flees
to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
What is more, the judgment of conviction against petitioners had already acquired finality. Under Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, they had only 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment within
which to surrender and to file the required motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies against the
judgment. As the judgment was promulgated on September 3, 2007, petitioners had only until September
18, 2007 to comply with the mandatory requirements of the said rule.
This Court has invariably ruled that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost
WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103224 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.