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People vs. Dela Cruz
People vs. Dela Cruz
L-5790 April 17, 1953 first offense, and shall be permanently barred for the second
or succeeding offenses.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
PABLO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant. cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." The prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
Claro M. Recto for appellant. punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount,
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Felixberto and apply to punishment which never existed in America of which
Milambiling for appellee. public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172),
for instance those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory,
burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the
BENGZON, J.:
like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and imprisonment
would not thus be within the prohibition.
Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling
price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first
However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition
instance of Manila, to imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of
applies as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in
five thousand pesos plus costs. He was also barred from engaging in
nature, may be so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction.
wholesale and retail business for five years.
(15 Am. Jur., p. 178.) These authorities explain, nevertheless, that to
justify a court's declaration of conflict with the Constitution, the prison
In this appeal he argues that the trial judge erred: (a) in not holding that term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock
the charge was fabricated; (b) in imposing a punishment wholly the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper
disproportionate to the offense and therefore unconstitutional and (c) under the circumstances (lb.). And seldom has a sentence been
in not invalidating Republic Act No. 509 in so far as it prescribed declared to be cruel and unusual solely on account of its duration (15
excessive penalties. Am. Jur., p. 179).
The evidence shows that in the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Because it expressly enjoins the imposition of "excessive fines" the
Bernardo, Jr. went to the defendant's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and Constitution might have contemplated the latter school of thought
purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty assessing punishments not only by their character but also by their
centavos. As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was duration or extent. And yet, having applied "excessive" to fines, and
not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City "cruel and unusual" to punishment did it not intend to distinguish
Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution, because "excessive" from "cruel" or "unusual"? And then, it has been heretofore
Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509) the practice that when a court finds the penalty to be "clearly
fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity. excessive" it enforces the law but makes a recommendation to the
Chief Executive for clemency (Art. 5 Revised Penal Code). Did the
The record is now before us, and from a reading thereof, we find it Constitutional Convention intend to stop that practice? Or is that article
difficult to accept appellants contention that the charge had no unconstitutional?
foundation in fact. The People's case has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. So far as the writer of this opinion has been able to ascertain, these
questions have not been definitely passed upon by this court, 1 although
And his argument based on the principles of entrapment, may not be in U.S. vs. Borromeo, 23 Phil., 279 it was said that the prohibition of the
upheld, because he was selling to the public, i.e., to anybody who Philippine Bill on punishments refer not only to the mode but to
would come to his store to buy his commodities, and no special the extent thereto.
circumstances are shown to support the claim that he was led or
induced to commit the offense. For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually
holding, that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine
However, appellant's extensive discussion of his two propositions about Constitution.
the penalty, deserves serious consideration.
But that brings up again two opposing theories. On one side we are told
Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows: the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the courts'
decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur.,
SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months "Criminal Law" sec. 526). On the other, authorities are not lacking to
nor more than twelve years or a fine of not less than two the effect that the fundamental prohibition likewise restricts the judge's
thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos, or both, power and authority (State vs. Ross 55 Or. 450, 104 Pac. 596; State vs.
shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article, Whitaker, 48 La. Am. 527, 19 So. 457). (See also U.S. vs. Borromeo, 23
goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price Phil., 279.)
fixed by the president; . . . .
In other words, and referring to the penalty provided in Republic Act
In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, No. 509, under the first theory the section would violate the
corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of any Constitution, if the penalty is excessive under any and all circumstances,
violation of this Act or of any rule or regulations issued by the the minimum being entirely out of proportion to the kind of offenses
president pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the prescribed. If it is not, the imposition by the judge of a stiff penalty —
wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a but within the limits of the section — will not be deemed
unconstitutional.2 The second theory would contrast the penalty
1
imposed by the court with the gravity of the particular crime or
misdemeanor, and if notable disparity results, it would apply the
constitutional brake, even if the statute would, under other
circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive.
Now therefore, if we adopt the first doctrine the present issue would
be: Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too
excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings
established in the Executive Order? Obviously a negative answer must
be returned, because in overstepping the price barriers he might derive,
in some instances, profits amounting to thousands of pesos. Therefore
under that doctrine, the penalty imposed in this case would not be
susceptible of valid attack, it being within the statutory limits.
Under the second theory the inquiry should be: Is five years and five
thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a
ten-centavo profit to the accused? Many of us do not regard such
punishment unusual and cruel, remembering the national policy against
profiteering in the matter of foodstuffs affecting the people's health,
the need of stopping speculation in such essentials and of safeguarding
public welfare in times of food scarcity or similar stress. In our opinion
the damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains
obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean
others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of
price controls.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista
Angelo, JJ., concur.