PoliRev Case Pool
PoliRev Case Pool
CASE POOL
Respondents:
● Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) - As President And Commander-In-Chief
● Eduardo Ermita - Executive Secretary
● Hon. Avelino Cruz Ii - Secretary Of National Defense
● General Generoso Senga - Chief Of Staff, Armed Forces Of The Philippines
● Director General Arturo Lomibao - Chief, Philippine National Police
Petitioner: Cacho-Olivares Et Al - Niñez Cacho-Olivares And Tribune Publishing Co., Inc.
Respondent:
● Honorable Secretary Eduardo Ermita
● Honorable Director General Arturo C. Lomibao
Respondent:
● Eduardo R. Ermita - Executive Secretary
● Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. - Secretary, Dnd
● Ronaldo V. Puno - Secretary, Dilg
● Generoso Senga - Afp Chief Of Staff
● Arturo Lomibao - Chief Pnp, Respondents.
Petitioner: KMU Et Al - Kilusang Mayo Uno, Represented By Its Chairperson Elmer C. Labog And
Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, National Federation Of Labor Unions – Kilusang Mayo Uno
(Naflu-Kmu), Represented By Its National President, Joselito V. Ustarez, Antonio C. Pascual, Salvador T.
Carranza, Emilia P. Dapulang, Martin Custodio, Jr., And Roque M. Tan
Respondents:
● Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo - As President And Commander-In-Chief
● Eduardo Ermita - Executive Secretary
● General Generoso Senga - Chief Of Staff, Armed Forces Of The Philippines
● Director General Arturo Lomibao - Chief, Philippine National Police
Respondents:
● Eduardo Ermita - Executive Secretary
● General Generoso Senga - Chief Of Staff, Armed Forces Of The Philippines
● Director General Arturo Lomibao - Chief, Philippine National Police
Petitioner: Cadiz Et Al - Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Feliciano M. Bautista, Romulo R. Rivera, Jose Amor M.
Amorado, Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, Felimon C. Abelita Iii, Manuel P. Legaspi, J.B. Jovy C. Bernabe, Bernard
L. Dagcuta, Rogelio V. Garcia And Integrated Bar Of The Philippines (Ibp), Petitioners,
Respondents:
● Eduardo Ermita - Executive Secretary
● Director General Arturo Lomibao - Director - General, Philippine National Police
● General Generoso Senga - Chief Of Staff, Armed Forces Of The Philippines
Respondents:
● Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo - As President And Commander-In-Chief
● Director General Arturo Lomibao - Director - General, Philippine National Police
● General Generoso Senga - Chief Of Staff, Armed Forces Of The Philippines
● Eduardo Ermita - Executive Secretary
Facts:
● PP 1021 - Declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist
○ Whereas Clause
■ Sec. 18, Art. 7 and Sec 17, Art 12 of Constition, PP 1017 was issued
■ GO 5 and 6 which were issued on the basis of PP 1017, AFP and PNP were
directed to such
■ AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts
lawless violence and rebellion
● Solicitor General (OSG) - specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 and
significantly, there was no refutation from petitioner’s counsels
○ OSG argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the
President in determining the necessity of calling out Armed forces
○ None of the Petitioners have shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases
○ It is not respondent’s task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation
○ Respondent narrated the facts:
■ January 17, 2006 - Members of the Magdalo Group indicted in Oakwood Mutiny,
escaped their detention cell, they vowed to remain defiant and to elucidate arrest
at all cost and called upon the poeple to show and proclaim our displeasure at
the sham regime
■ February 17, 2006 - “OPLAN HACKLE I” - detailed plans for bombings and
attacks during the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Alumni Homecoming (PMA
Homecoming). THe plot was to assassinate targets including some cabinet
members and PGMA. Upon advice of the security, PGMA had not attend PMA
Homecoming. Next day, a bomb was found at PMA parade ground.
■ February 21, 2006 - Lt. San Juan was recaptured in Communist safehouse and
found in his possession were 2 flash disks containing the minutes of the
meetings between members of Magdalo group and NPA
■ February 23, 2006 - PNP Chief Lomibao inercepted information that members of
PNP-Special Action Force (SAF) were planning to deflect.
● Congressman Cojuanco and mid-level government officials plotted
moves to bring down the PGMA’s Administration
■ B/Gen Lim and Brigade Commander Querubin confided to Gen. Senga (AFP)
that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass
and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests
● Respondents - claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sited in Bulacan
and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for such proclamations and orders
○ So is the raid of an army outpost in benguet
○ Also directive of the Communist Party of PH (CPP) ordering its front organizations to join
5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 from provinces
DOCTRINE:
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C.
Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.
Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various
directions, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his
family.
FACTS:
A petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode
of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor
may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or
agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect. llcd
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his
family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified
by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.
The petitioners finally contend that the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits
prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law
has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel
may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be
legislation to that effect.
Respondents on the other hand argue for the primacy of the right of the State to
national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 4.
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5.
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from
returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has
international precedents. Other dictators such as Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, etc.
Finally, the respondents believe that the right to return to one's country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of
the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the
right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international
law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys
a different protection under the International
ISSUE: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by t he Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
ot the right to travel from
Yes. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is n
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to
travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our
well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution,is part of the law of the land
[Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great
branches of government. As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it
does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches
on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing
power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress,
the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to
address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23]. LLphil
inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the
framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers
and no other? Are these enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"?
Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically
enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated
powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius."
. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and
balances. LexLib
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce
the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever
powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is
only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do
not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise ofspecific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers
of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy."
[Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase
Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do
anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand
[See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to
take care that the laws are faithfully executed
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external
and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems
of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President
commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed
forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in
order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the
Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective
adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not question the
President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals
to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely
similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on
the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. Llcd
Note:
The President is granted residual powers because there has been no clearly defined
limitation on his authority. Also, as the President, she has the duty to do everything within
her power, granted by the law, to protect the people. Within the context of an impending
threat to national security and Philippines’ vulnerable economic situation, it is to the
President’s power to prevent anything that will harm the country, especially the return of
the Marcoses.
FACTS
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said
candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured.
Two days thereafter, Proc. 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of
habeas corpus stating that "lawless elements" had "entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and
banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an
armed insurrection and rebellion". Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have
been arrested without a warrant.
Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment to the original proclamation by postulating the said
lawless elements "have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces
together for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed
insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly
constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an
entirely new one ...." Moreover, the third ‘whereas clause’ in the original proclamation was, likewise,
amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by their acts of rebellion and insurrection," have
created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State.
In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in arms
to overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawless elements "are actually
engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their purpose.
Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces
and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities (mostly in
Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and
sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No.
889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof,
however it became moot and academic since it was amended.
Petitioners however contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations
stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of
an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's
alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist
forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE
(1.) Does the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus belong to the President, and is his decision final and conclusive upon the courts
and upon all other persons, pursuant to the view taken in Barcelon v. Baker, and reiterated in Montenegro
v. Castañeda
(2.) Whether or not Proc. 889 is substantively valid
HELD
(1.) Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying
our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of
powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of
checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege,
but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is,
in turn, constitutionally supreme.
The President has authority to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, subject to judicial
review. The Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to
determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is
neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights
and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights
establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto.
It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when the
public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period
the necessity for such suspension shall exist."
For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus
circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its
existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors
and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the
limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by
the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may,
within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions
thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage
in such a wasteful exercise in futility.
(2.)
Yes. Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two conditions must concur for
the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit:
(A.) There must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant to Par. 2, Section 10 of Art. VII of
the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof," and
(B.) "Public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.
The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and there is
actually a state of rebellion and that "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in
order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the
State."
As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in
the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at
incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective.
As per said information and reports — the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control
nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making
Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are, accordingly, about
thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the Malayang
Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the
Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang
Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the
KM had two hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which
seventy-three (73) were in the Greater Manila Area, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central
Luzon, forty-two (42) in the Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party
had recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in
violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions
were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations; that the violent
demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed agitators; that the
number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970; and that
twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons
and the injury of many more. (Please see full text for more information as to the casualties/event caused
by CPP)
The Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his
discretion when he then concluded that public safety and national security required the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with violent demonstrations
staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance and
cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing or water mains and conduits, as
well as electric power plants and installations — a possibility which, no matter how remote, he was bound
to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest.
Lingahan (4) Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27
2. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and
fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory
that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and
complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Consequently
ISSUE/s:
[1] WoN the President has the power to deport aliens and if such power is validly delegated to the
Deportation Board. –YES.
[2] WoN the authority to deport aliens includes the power to order the arrest of such aliens. –YES. BUT
only when there is already an ORDER OF DEPORTATION
RULING:
[1]
● Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of Immigration the power to effect the
arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners, but
such power was not intended to be delimited to the Immigration Commissioner as Sec. 69 of the
Administrative Code, although not expressly conferring such power, lays down the procedure for
such deportation proceedings for the President.
● Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in 2 ways:
○ By order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and
○ By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
● And although the charges against Qua Chee Gan are not enumerated in CA No. 613, the act of
profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank
regulations, which is tantamount to economic sabotage, is a ground for deportation under the
provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
[2]
● Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien charged in deportation proceedings shall file a bond
with the Commissioner of Immigration in order to secure their appearance.
○ However, the same did not authorize the arrest of the alien pending investigation.
● It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal
charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien
complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for
his provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the
Chairman of the Board.
● However, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's
power to deport is predicated, does NOT provide for the exercise of the power to arrest.
● Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of
the Constitution: “...no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce...”
● Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the requirement — "to be determined by the judge" —
to any public officer who may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and
thereafter issue the warrant of arrest.
● Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is necessary to carry into effect the power of
deportation is valid only when there is already an order of deportation.
○ However, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested.
○ It is enough that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the
investigation, as was authorized in EO69.
DISPOSITIVE
● rder No. 398 insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of
Executive
O
arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe
the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
● rder of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and
The
o
the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
Rafael (5) Go Tek v. Deportation Board, 79 SCRA 17
G.R. No. L-23846 September 9, 1977
Ponente: J. Aquino
Doctrine: Conviction of a crime is not necessary to warrant deportation. The State has the
inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive
in his full discretion "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic
tranquility of the nation.”
Facts: On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint for deportation
against Chinese national Go Tek. It was alleged that certain agents of the NBI searched an office located
at 1439 O' Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the
"Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States" and that among those arrested thereat was
Go Tek, an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit. It was
further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's possession and that, therefore, he had
violated Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code (illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank
notes) and rendered himself an undesirable alien. The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should
recommend to the President of the Philippines the immediate deportation of Go Tek as an undesirable
alien.
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the filing of the case was premature
because a conviction is necessary in order that he may be lawfully deported; and that the President may
deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law. The Deportation Board denied Go Tek’s motion,
ruling that a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite before the State may exercise its right to deport an
undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact-finding body whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or dismiss a
deportation proceeding.
Go Tek then filed in the CFI of Manila a petition for prohibition against the Board. The court
granted the writ of prohibition and ordered the Board to desist from taking cognizance of the complaint
against Go Tek. The court, citing the obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case, held that mere possession
of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law; that before an alien
may be deported, a conviction (for a crime involving moral turpitude and a sentence of imprisonment for a
term of one year or more) is necessary; and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense
punished in Article 168, the deportation proceeding was premature. IAC affirmed. Hence, this appeal by
the Deportation Board to the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding although the alien has
not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.
2. Whether the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground
which is not specified in Section 37 of the Immigration Law
Ruling:
1. Yes.
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to
public welfare is absolute and unqualified. There is no legal or constitutional provision defining the power
to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive "full discretion to
determine whether an alien’s residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security,
welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also
devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory." Thus, an executive order for
deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case. An acquittal, for example, of
an alien in a criminal proceeding does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings.
Conviction of a crime is not necessary to warrant deportation. Otherwise, the power of the President will
be unduly limited.
2. Yes.
Under existing laws, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected not only (1) by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under Section 37 of
the Immigration Law, but also (2) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code.
This is because the State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens, and such power
may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and
domestic tranquility of the nation."
Note:
The Deportation Board is composed of the Undersecretary of Justice as chairman, the Solicitor General,
and a representative of the Secretary of National Defense. The decision of the Deportation Board is
merely recommendatory. The Chief Executive has to approve the board’s recommendation. Abuses or
harassments committed by the prosecutor or by the Board should first be brought to his attention.
Rafael (6) Philippine Bar Association v. Comelec, 140 SCRA 455 (Qualifications of the President)
G.R. No. 72915. December 19, 1985.
Ponente: Clerk of Court Gloria C. Paras (En Banc Resolution)
Doctrine: Section 9 of Article VII provides that a special election is called for only when a vacancy
is created by death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation. The Constitution
does not prohibit the President from tendering a (conditional) resignation that is not immediately
effective.
Facts: PBA, Liberal Party and several other petitioners respectively filed their petitions for prohibition
against the enforcement of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 which calls for special national elections on
February 7, 1986 (Snap Elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. The
11 petitions were consolidated by the court. The law was enacted following the letter of Pres. Marcos to
the Batasang Pambansa that he was "irrevocably vacating the position of Pres. effective only when the
election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as Pres. by taking his oath of office ten
days after his proclamation."
It is alleged that BP 883 is in conflict with the Constitution because it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the special election. The principal ground for the challenge to
the validity of the statute was that the conditional resignation of the President did not create a vacancy
required by Art. VII, Sec. 9 (now Art. VII, Sec. 8) which authorized the calling of a special election.
Issue/s:
1. Whether BP 883 is constitutional.
2. Whether the Court should restrain the holding of the SNAP Elections.
Dissenting Opinions:
J. Gutierrez, J. Alampay – BP 883 is unconstitutional. A special election may not be called for just any
purpose or on any occasion. It becomes necessary only when a vacancy is created by death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation. The vacancy must be real and in esse (in actual existence),
not a parody or shadow of the real thing. It must be actual and permanent. I find Section 9 of Article VII
clear and intelligibly simple. Any layman reading it can easily grasp its meaning and understand the
contingencies for which it was intended.
J. Dela Fuente, J. Patajo - BP 883 is unconstitutional for it contravenes the intent, letter and spirit of the
succession provision – Section 9 of Article VII of the Constitution. Resignation must be one resulting in a
permanent vacancy – actual or in esse, not merely prospective or inchoate or contingent – as of the time
of the special election, whereupon the Batasan Speaker shall take over the vacated office until a new
President shall have been elected, proclaimed and qualified by taking his oath of office.
While a President or an elective office is allowed by the Constitution or law to submit himself for
re-election to the same office without vacating it, this generally refers to a regular election, not a special
election called precisely to fill up an existing permanent vacancy in the elective office, The adequate
vehicle for the so-called snap elections is a referendum. The other option is a constitutional amendment
incorporating the features of BP 883, to be submitted to the people for ratification.
Monzon (7) Free Telephone Workers’ Union v.Minister of Labor and Employment. 108 SCRA 757
(Control Power)
G.R. No. L-58184 October 30, 1981
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, and THE PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY,
respondents.
Doctrine : "All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and
the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be
deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise. There is a provision, of course, on the Prime Minister, but the Constitution is explicit
that while he shall be the head of the Cabinet, it is the President who nominates him from among
the members of the Batasang Pambansa, thereafter being "elected by a majority of all the
members thereof. He is primarily, therefore, a Presidential choice. He need not even come from
its elected members. He is responsible, along with the Cabinet, to the Batasang Pambansa for the
program of government but as "approved by the President. Any other member of the Cabinet or
the Executive Committee may be removed at the discretion of the President. Even the duration of
his term then depends on the Presidential pleasure.
Facts : On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair
labor practices which are : Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct; Illegal
terminations and suspensions of our officers and members as a result of the implementation of
said Code of Conduct; and unconfirmation of call sick leaves and its automatic treatment as
Absence Without Official Leave of Absence (AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in violation
of our Collective Bargaining Agreement.
After which came the notification to the Ministry that there was compliance with the
two-thirds strike vote and other formal requirements of the law and Implementing Rules. Several
conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its willingness to
have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in the
meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the
approval of private respondent.
Respondent certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission for
compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondent's establishment.
Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the
controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition
were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension apparently the
principal cause of the labor dispute. At this stage, as mentioned, it would be premature to discuss
the merits, or lack of it, of such claim, the matter being properly for the Ministry of Labor to
determine.
Issue : W/N there is an undue delegation of legislative power
Doctrine: The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is
not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded
the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from
the list of officers that needed confirmation from the Commission
On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups whom the
President shall appoint:
Dissenting:
Gutierrez, JR: I agree with the intervenor that all provisions of the Constitution on
appointments must be read together. In providing for the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Section 9, Article
VIII), the Ombudsman and his deputies (Section 9, Article XI), the Vice President
as a member of cabinet (Section 3, Article VII) and, of course, those who by law
the President alone may appoint, the Constitution clearly provides no need for
confirmation. This can only mean that all other appointments need confirmation.
Where there is no need for confirmation or where there is an alternative process
to confirmation, the Constitution expressly so declares. Without such a
declaration, there must be confirmation.
The 1973 Constitution dispensed with confirmation by a Commission on
Appointments because the government it set up was supposed to be a
parliamentary one. The Prime Minister, as head of government, was constantly
accountable to the legislature
(Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.R. No. L-79974, [December 17, 1987], 240 PHIL
|||
505-546)
Carido (9) Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989
G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989
DOCTRINE: The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments
are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The
President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in
Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers of
government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.”
FACTS:
On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Bautista as permanent Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the
confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President)
may be authorized by law to appoint." . Bautista took her oath of office on December 22, 1988 to Chief
Justice Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as such.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista
requesting for her presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on January 19. Bautista
then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained that her
position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of
Sarmiento vs Mison.
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because
of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post. In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of
Bautista. COA considered Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin
invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR
should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be subsequently removed as
well. Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the
latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.
RULING:
1. No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution
in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the
CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA
because they are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law
to appoint.” The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order
No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in nature
and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without the
participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is done
without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latter’s
approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the
chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was
the incumbent CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position
of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR
are always permanent and cannot be ad interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the CHR may
be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional.
Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of
7 years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the
president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause
and with the observance of due process.
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only
to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
Betguen (10) Aytona v. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1
● Facts: On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R.
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the
corresponding oath. On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado
Macapagal assumed office, and on December 31, 1961, he issued A. O. No. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia after December
13, 1961. On January 1, 1962, President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both
appointed exercised the powers of their office, although Castillo informed Aytona of his title
thereto. However, the next day and thereafter, Aytona was definitely prevented from holding
office in the Central Bank.
● Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the powers
of Governor of the Central Bank. He claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the
post, and therefore, the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void, because
the position was then occupied by him. Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been
revoked by A. O. No. 2 of Macapagal.
●
● Issue: The issue is whether the new President had power to issue the order of
cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past President, even after the
appointees had already qualified.
●
Held: No, it is not valid. The record shows that President Garcia sent to the Commission on
Appointments, which was not then in session, submitting “for confirmation” ad interim appointments for
several positions. Another communication of President Garcia bearing the same date, submitted a list of
ad interim appointments of another several appointments. A third communication likewise dated
December 29, 1961, addressed to the Commission on Appointments another list of ad interim
appointments for several positions. There were other appointments thus submitted by President Garcia
on that date, December 29, 1961. All in all, about 350 “midnight” or “last minute” appointments.
The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee’s qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments
in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of
the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions
irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
After the proclamation of then Pres. Macapagal, precedent President Garcia administration was
no more than a “care-taker” administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President, and he should not do acts which ought to know, would embarrass or
obstruct the policies of his successor. An ad interim appointment is exercised by the president as he’s
special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous
consultation with the members of the Commission on Appointments or by thereafter explaining to them
the reason such selection. It is expected that the President should exercise double care in extending
such appointments. In the case at bar, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night,
President Garcia exercised double care; and therefore, such appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit
of the constitutional provision granting the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments
Garcia’s appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set
to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his
appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was grounded on
bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered
but also justice, fairness and righteousness
DOCTRINE : In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the
appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being the regular course of
business. The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered by,
Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked.
FACTS: Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career official in the Bureau of Lands. He started working there as a
Junior Computer in the course of 38 years service, from February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960, and
attained the position of Acting Director, through regular and successive promotions, in
accordance with civil service rules. On June 17, 1961, he was designated Acting Director of the
same Bureau, and on December 13, 1961 was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim
Director. He qualified by taking the oath of office on the December 23, 1961. His appointment was
on December 26, 1961, transmitted to the Commission on Appointments, and on May 14, 1962,
petitioner's ad interim appointment as Director of Lands was confirmed by the Commission. On
November 14, 1962 he received a letter from Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources of the Macapagal administration, informing him that pursuant to a letter from
the Assistant Executive Secretary Bernal, served on Jorge on November 13, his appointment was
among those revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of President Diosdado Macapagal; that the
position of Director of Lands was considered vacant; and that Jorge was designated Acting
Director of Lands, effective November 13, 1962. Upon learning that Mayor, an outsider, had been
designate by the President to be Acting Director of Lands Jorge protested (in a letter of November
16, 1962) to the Secretary of Agriculture informing the latter that he would stand on his rights, and
issued office circulars claiming to be the legally appointed Director of Lands. Finally, on
September 2, 1963, he instituted the present proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapaga operated as a valid
revocation of Jorge's ad interim appointment.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Nicanor G. Jorge is declared to be the duly appointed, confirmed,
and qualified Director of Lands.
Petitioner Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on
record that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same
day. It is a matter of contemporary history, of which SC may take judicial cognizance, that the
session ended late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours. In
the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the appointment of
Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being the regular course of business. The
appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order
No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments, and thereafter, the office never became vacant.
In common with the Gillera appointment sustained by the SC, Jorge's appointment is featured by
a recognition of his tenure by the Macapagal administration itself, since he was allowed to hold
and discharge undisturbed his duties as de jure Director of Lands for nearly eleven months and it
was only in mid-November of 1962 that the attempt was actually made to demote him and appoint
a rank outsider in his place in the person of respondent Mayor.
If anyone is entitled to the protection of the civil service provisions of the Constitution,
particularly those against removals without lawful cause, it must be the officers who, like Jorge,
entered the Civil Service in their youth, bent on making a career out of it, gave it the best years of
their lives and grew gray therein in the hope and expectation that they would eventually attain the
upper reaches and levels of the official hierarchy, not through political patronage, but through
loyalty, merit, and faithful and unremitting toil.
WHEREFORE, the writs applied for are granted, the petitioner Nicanor G. Jorge is declared to be
the duly appointed, confirmed, and qualified Director of Lands, the respondent, Jovencio Q.
Mayor, is required to turn over said office to the petitioner and to desist from holding self out as
"Acting Director of Lands".
Gutierrez (12) Quimsing v. Tajanglangit, 10 SCRA 446
DOCTRINE:
Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, and this shall be a final
disposition of such a motion. Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to
the President of the Philippines before the expiration of the period for its reconsideration, or while a
motion for reconsideration is pending.
FACTS:
On May 20, 1960, Godofredo Quimsing was designated Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City. On December
20, 1961, and while such incumbent of the office, he was extended by then President Garcia an
ad-interim appointment to the same position. Quimsing took his oath of office before the City Mayor of
Iloilo on December 28, 1961, and continued discharging the functions of Chief of Police of said city.
At the session of the Commission on Appointments on May 16, 1962, the appointment of Quimsing,
among others was confirmed. On the following day, however, at the session of said body , Senator Puyat
moved for the reconsideration of all appointments previously confirmed, manifesting at the same time that
said "motion for reconsideration be laid on the table." Furthermore, he moved for the adjournment of the
session of the Commission sine die. There being no objection, said motion was approved and the session
was adjourn.
On June 11, 1962, President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of
Iloilo City and the latter took his oath and tried to discharge the functions of the office on June 13, 1962.
On July 12, 1962, the present petition was filed for the reason already stated above.
Respondent Tajanglangit, in his answer, claimed among others, that petitioner's ad-interim appointment
was a nullity in view of the President's Administrative Order No. 2, withdrawing, cancelling, or recalling
ad-interim appointments extended after December 13, 1961; and that the alleged confirmation of
petitioner's ad-interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments did not also produce any effect,
because the same had been the subject of a motion for reconsideration and no further action has been
taken on said appointment until the present time.
It is evident that respondent's designation as Acting Chief of Police of the City of Iloilo was made on the
assumption that petitioner's occupancy thereof was illegal. This brings us to the question of the validity
and effect of the ad-interim appointment extended to petitioner Quimsing on December 20, 1961 and the
confirmation thereof and subsequent action taken by the Commission on Appointments.
Respondent Tajanglangit, in resisting the claim of petitioner Quimsing, invokes the President's
Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1962 and the ruling of this Court on the Aytona v. Castillo case. In
the various cases decided by this Court after the Aytona v. Castillo case, the matter of the validity of
appointments made after December 13, 1961 by former Administrative Order No. 2 (which was never
upheld by this Court) but, on the basis of the nature, character and merit of the individual appointments
and the particular circumstances surrounding the same. In other words, this Court did not declare that all
the ad-interim appointments made by the mere fact that the same were extended after said date nor that
they automatically come within the category of the "midnight" appointments, the validity of which were
doubted and which gave rise to the ruling in the Aytona case cited by respondent.
In the present case, petitioner Quimsing admittedly had been occupying the position in controversy, in an
acting capacity since May 20, 1960, and discharging the functions thereof. Clearly, it cannot be said that
the ad-interim appointment extended to him on December 20, 1961, by virtue of which he took his oath of
office on December 28, 1961 was one of those hurried designations that brought about the "scramble" on
the 29th and 30th of December, 1961, where the outgoing Chief Executive perhaps did not have the
opportunity to consider the merits and qualifications of the hundreds of nominees to the positions to which
they were respectively being appointed. The ad-interim appointment of petitioner, whose qualification is
not questioned except for the fact that it was made only December 20, 1961, cannot be considered as
among those "midnight" appointments the validity of which this Court declared to be, at least, doubtful to
entitle the appointees to the equitable relief of quo warranto.
Respondent, however, contends that petitioner's appointment was not lawfully confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments in view of the motion for reconsideration of such confirmation, which has,
to the present, remained unacted upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Quimsing’s appointment was not lawfully confirmed, because of the motion for
reconsideration of his confirmation, which has, to the present, remained unacted upon
HELD:
The appointment of respondent Eduardo Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo City, which
was not vacant, was null and void.
The revised rules of the Commission on Appointments, insofar as pertinent to the issue thus raised,
provide:
SEC. 21. Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a
member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members
present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted
anew to the Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on
the table, and this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.
SEC. 22. Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to the
President of the Philippines before the expiration of the period for its reconsideration, or while a
motion for reconsideration is pending.
As stated before, the motion of Senator Puyat, for reconsideration of the confirmations made the day
before, among which was herein petitioner's, was coupled with prayer, not for a resubmission of said
appointments anew, but for the laying of the motion (for reconsideration) on the table. Under the
aforequoted Section 21 of the rules of said body the "laying on the table" of the motion shall be the final
disposition thereof. In other words, no further action need be taken by the Commission thereon. It is as if
no motion for reconsideration was filed at all.
From Section 22 of the said rules, the Commission on Appointments may either confirm or disapprove an
appointment, and notice of such action shall not be conveyed to the President while a motion for
reconsideration is pending. It has been established here that on July 19, 1962, notice of the confirmation
of Quimsing's appointment was delivered to Malacañang. This action by the Commission on
Appointments supports the conclusion that the laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does not
have the effect of withholding the effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of
the appointment. In fact, it is recognition that the appointment was confirmed.
Estrella (13) People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
People v. Vera
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
Doctrine: The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The
pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and
complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule
or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it.
Facts:
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted,
that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of
First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of
the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the
Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition
for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to
the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on
April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the
said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in
their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act
No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private
prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act
No. 4221.
Issue:
1) Whether Act No. 442 encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive
2) Whether Act No. 442 (Probation Law) is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power
Held:
1) No. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law,
in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in
the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and
remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII,
sec. 11, subsec. 6.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same.
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under
the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on
probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the
probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been
terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found
that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during
the period of probation, remains in legal custody — subject to the control of the probation officer
and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation
and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon
him.
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive.
The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full
and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.
2) Yes. The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by
the Jones Law and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution. The Philippine
Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating
that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. The rule, however, which
forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions.
An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to
delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select.
Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Doubtless,
also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of
article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that “The National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues.” And
section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that “In times of war or other national
emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
a declared national policy.”
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned. The
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of
the legislature.
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may
be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers
and administrative boards.
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the
provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the
Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We
do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not,
by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or
guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a“roving commission” which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the
legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In
other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the
provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to
decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
Abon (14) Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ
vs.
ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners
of the Fourteenth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission
DOCTRINE: There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of
a criminal act before a court of Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him
the benefits of amnesty; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused,
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
FACTS:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners against the respondents who
composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether
or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.
An information for the crime of murder was filed against petitioners with the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga. Because Barrioquinto was then at large, the information was dismissed
and a separate criminal case was instituted against him. Jimenez was tried with other accused
and sentenced to life imprisonment. Within the time for appeal, Jimenez became aware of
Proclamation No. 8, date September 7, 1946, granting amnesty to all persons who have committed
offenses in furtherance of the resistance against the Japanese, and decided to submit his case to
the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission. Barrioquinto, having been apprehended, did the same.
Meanwhile, after the preliminary hearing had started, the Commission issued on January 9, 1947,
an order for the return of the cases of petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
without deciding whether or not they are entitled to amnesty, because Barrioquinto stated in his
testimony that it was Hipolito Tolentino who fired at and killed the offended party.
The Commission,then, issued the order upon the thesis that, for any person to invoke the benefits
of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is required that he should first admit having committed the
offensive act for which he is prosecuted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to have their applications heared and decided
by the Amnesty Commission without having first admitted that they have committed the crime
charged against them. (YES)
HELD:
Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the
application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless amnesty of petitioners
Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and
finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation
No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is
not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed
the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is
sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea
of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against
him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For,
whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged,
the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. since the Amnesty Proclamation is a
public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of
the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their
province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or
not, if the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented either by the
complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest
that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which has the force of a law, not only
as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable
offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal.
Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evidence, has
committed an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty thereof, so also and a
fortiori they can not convict a person considered by law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero,
for having rendered invaluable services to the nation inn committing such an act.
There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal
act before a court of Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits
of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he
is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial,
the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case
in criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the
offense committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense made by
an accused simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not
guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons a ding in the war efforts of the
enemy, and not for purely political motives.
Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto that the offended party or
victim was shot and killed by Agapito Hipolito , does not necessarily bar the respondents from
finding, after the summary hearing of the witnesses for the complaints and the accused, directed
in the said Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are
responsible for the killing of the victim, either as principals by cooperation, inducement or
conspiration, or as accessories before as well as after the fact, but that they are entitled to the
benefits of amnesty, because they were members of the same group of guerrilleros who killed the
victim in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of
the enemy.
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong
conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from
pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while
amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does ""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence"
article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed
no offense.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
1. J. Perfecto
Concurring:
Petitioners are entitled to have their applications for amnesty heard and decided by respondent
14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission.
To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission only
the following elements are essential: First, that he is charged or may be charged with ab offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, except those against chastity or for purely personal
motives; second, that he committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy; and
third, that it was committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when the area
where the offense was committed was actually liberated from enemy control and occupation.
If these three elements are present in a case brought before a Guerrillas Amnesty Commission,
the latter cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the proclamation. There is nothing in the
proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit having executed the acts
constituting the offense with which he is charged or be charged.
2. J. Tuason
Dissenting:
The decision proceeds on the assumption that the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission refused to hear
and decide the application for amnesty of the present petitioners. I think this is a mistake. There
are examinations of records, hearing and decisions.
The pleadings and annexes show that hearing was held on the 9th of January, 19947 in which the
two petitioners and their counsel were present, and one of them, Barrioquinto, testified and that it
was after that hearing, on the same date, that the Commission denied their petition in a written
order and directed the clerk to return the "expedientes" to the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga for its final action.
Commission acted in the manner contemplated by Proclamation No. 8 of the President. The return
of the papers to the court merely follow the procedure provided in the proclamation, which
stipulates "that any case now pending on which may be filed in the future a Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission decides as not within the terms of the amnesty shall proceed in accordance with the
usual legal procedure in the courts without regard to this proclamation."
The proclamation does not prescribe any specific mode of hearing. That the Commission shall
examine the facts and circumstance surrounding each case is all that is provided for. In its
discretion, the Commission may, if it deems necessary, hear the witnesses both for the
complainant and the accused. The hearing does not have to be formal; it may be summary,
according tot he proclamation. This privilege, discretionary with the Commission, was afforded
the accused as far as the nature of their defense permitted.
The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentalities acting for and in behalf of the
President. They are not courts; they are not performing judicial function, and this Court has no
appellate jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions.
Rakim (15) Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368
FACTS:
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael
Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit
Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was
issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to
exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by
Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds
[from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds
to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF
TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already
inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became
inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946,
and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special
session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect
to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the
Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President)
may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or
repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new
legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is
lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
Sanchez (16) Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351
Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279, (October 31, 1961), 113 PHIL
333-340
Ponente: J. Concepcion
Facts
Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic
imported from Japan and Hong Kong which were seized by the Bureau of Customs and subjected to
forfeiture proceedings as none of the shipments had the certificate required by Central Bank Circular Nos.
44 and 45 for its release, thus a violation of section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code. Executive
Order No. 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive
agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states,
among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar.
In this case, the said items imported by Eastern Sea Trading from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
Issue/ Contention
Eastern Sea Trading contended among others that the seizure and forfeiture of the goods
imported from Japan cannot be justified under Executive Order No. 328, not only because the same
seeks to implement an executive agreement — extending the effectivity of our Trade and Financial
Agreements with Japan — which (executive agreement), it believed, is of dubious validity (the Senate had
not concurred in the making of said such).
he Collector of Customs rendered a decision declaring the goods forfeited to the Government.
T
Upon seeking review before the Court of Tax Appeals by Respondent, the said court reversed the
decision. Hence, the present petition of the Commissioner of Customs for review of the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals.
Ruling
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
affirming that of the Commissioner of Customs, with costs against respondent-appellee, Eastern
Sea Trading.
The Court of Tax Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement sought to
be implemented by Executive Order No. 328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the
making of said executive agreement.
The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the
making of "treaties" (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are,
however, distinct and different from "executive agreements", which may be validly entered into
without such concurrence.
"Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of
our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial
and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these
has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx
"International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties.
But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
xxx xxx xxx
"Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and
constitutionality of executive agreements entered into without Senate approval."
In this connection, Francis B. Sayre, former U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, said in his work
on "The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts":
"Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions.
They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated 'agreements' or 'protocols'.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise
— begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to
discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time.
Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreements
act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to
show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they
are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes
of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping
profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of
them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies
declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while
still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any legislation." (39 Columbia Law Review, pp.
651, 755.)
The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus patent. In fact, the so-called Parity Rights
provided for in the Ordinance Appended to our Constitution were, prior thereto, the subject of an
executive agreement, made without the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of the Senate of the United
States.
Fernando (17) In re Bermudez, SC GR 76180, October 24, 1986
DOCTRINE: Lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action are valid grounds for the
dismissal of petition. It is proper in case at bar. The Supreme Court has no original
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
FACTS:
Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the validity of the first paragraph of
Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as
follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Bermudez claims that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers, he then asks
the Court “to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to
who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President
Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President
Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to as the “incumbent president”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.
HELD:
No. Bermudez’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is
manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge
that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and
Vice-President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their
term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the
second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of
May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said
1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President
Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by the
Supreme Court which held that: “Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted
the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the present government.
Separate Opinions
As to lack of cause of action, the petitioner’s prayer for a declaration as to who were
elected President and Vice President in the February 7, 1986 elections should be
addressed not to this Court but to other departments of government constitutionally
burdened with the task of making that declaration.
BENGZON, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The stay of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, ordered in Proclamation No. 210, is in accordance
with the powers expressly vested in the President by the Constitution. However, the word "sedition" in
Proclamation No. 210 should be deemed a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a
whole.
The president has power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety
requires it, in cases of (1) invasion, (2) insurrection, (3) rebellion, or (4) imminent danger thereof. The
official declaration that "there is actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country"
amply justifies the suspension of the writ.
FACTS:
· About five o'clock in the morning of October 18, 1950, Maximino Montenegro was arrested with otherat
the Samanillo Bldg. Manila, by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion,
insurrection or sedition.
· So far as the record discloses, he is still under arrest in the custody by respondents.
· October 22, 1950, The President issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
· On October 21, 1950, Maximino's father, the petitioner, submitted this application for a writ of habeas
corpus seeking the release of his son.
· Opposing the writ, respondents admitted having the body of Maximino, but questioned judicial authority
to go further in the matter, invoking the above-mentioned proclamation.
· Petitioner replied that such proclamation was void, and that, anyway, it did not apply to his son, who
had been arrested before its promulgation.
· CFI denied the release prayed for.
· Hence this appeal
ISSUE:
1.) The proclamation is unconstitutional "because it partakes of a bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law;
and unlawfully includes sedition which under the Constitution is not a ground for suspension";
2.) Whether the petition must be granted
RULING:
1.) NO. The argument is devoid of merit. The prohibition applies only to statutes.
· The stay of the writ was ordered in accordance with the powers expressly vested in the
President by the Constitution, such order must be deemed an exception to the general
prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder — supposing there is a conflict
between the prohibition and the suspension.
· It was erroneous to include those accused of sedition among the persons as to whom
suspension of the writ is decreed.
· Under the Constitution the only grounds for suspension of the privilege of the writ are "invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof.
· The inclusion of sedition does not invalidate the entire proclamation; and it is immaterial in this
case, inasmuch as the petitioner's descendant is confined in jail not only for sedition, but for the
graver offense of rebellion and insurrection.
· Without doing violence to the presidential directive, but in obedience to the supreme law of
the land, the word "sedition" in Proclamation No. 210 should be deemed a mistake or
surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole.
2.) NO. The authority to decide whenever the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension
belongs to the President and "his decision is final and conclusive" upon the courts and
upon all other persons (Barcelon vs. Baker).
· Whereas the Executive branch of the Government is enabled thru its civil and military branches to
obtain information about peace and order from every quarter and corner of the nation, the judicial
department, with its very limited machinery can not be in better position to ascertain or evaluate the
conditions prevailing in the Archipelago (Justice Johnson, Barcelon vs. Baker).
· But even supposing the President's appraisal of the situation is merely prima facie, we see
that petitioner in this litigation has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which
the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive and Legislative Departments of our Government.
· The Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus except when the
public safety requires it, in cases of (1) invasion (2) insurrection or (3) rebellion.
· Article VII Section 10 authorizes the President to suspend the privilege, when public safety requires it,
in cases of (1) invasion (2) insurrection or (3) rebellion or (4) imminent danger thereof.
· "Imminent danger," is no cause for suspension under the Bill of Rights. It is under Article VII.
· Is the prohibition of suspension in the bill of rights to be interpreted as limiting Legislative
powers only — not executive measures under section VII? Has article VII (sec. 10) pro tanto
modified the bill of rights in the same manner that a subsequent section of a statue modifies a
previous one?
· The difference between the two constitutional provisions would seem to be: whereas the bill
of rights impliedly denies suspension in case of imminent dangers of invasion etc., article VII
sec. 10 expressly authorizes the President to suspend when there is imminent danger of
invasion etc.
· xxx it was said that if two provisions of a written constitutions are irreconcilably repugnant, that which
is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred xxx
· xxx So, even assuming the two clauses discuss are repugnant, the latter must prevail. Xxx
· The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion under article VII may not correctly be placed in doubt.
· The order of suspension affects the power of the court's and operates immediately on all
petitions therein pending at the time of its promulgation.
· A proclamation of the President suspending the writ of habeas corpus was held valid and
efficient in law to suspend all proceedings pending upon habeas corpus, which was issued
and served prior to the date of the proclamation.
Hernandez (19) (Barcelona v. Baker, Jr., G.R. No. 2808, [September 30, 1905], 5 PHIL 87-120
The writ was suspended with a view to averting the commission of crimes, particularly those affecting public peace, by
depriving criminals of the privilege of the writ.
It would not be lawful, however, to violate the provisions of the Penal Code under the pretext that the writ has been suspended.
It would not be lawful to rob or commit any other trespass upon the person, rights, or property of citizens. The detention of Felix
Barcelon is not due to the commission of any crime. It is an actual trespass upon his liberty and personal safety, committed by
the police authorities, which under no circumstances can be excused or justified by the temporary suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The fundamental laws of Spain, a monarchy, the spirit and principles of which are the basis of our Penal Code, and the
provisional law for its application, do not contain any provision in regard to the privilege of habeas corpus, but they contain
provisions which guarantee to the citizen his individual rights. The supreme court of Spain has held that not even where
constitutional guaranties are suspended can the executive authority order that a person be detained, except for crime or for
branch of the public peace. (Judgment of the 15th of March, 1877.)
Barcelon, the petitioner in this case, is neither a rebel nor a criminal; therefore his detention is illegal.
For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinions that the petition for habeas corpus should be denied, and that criminal
proceedings should be instituted for the crime of illegal detention, defined and punished in article 200 of the Penal Code, and
that it is the duty of the judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas to proceed against those responsible
for said crime.
"This nation, as experience has proved, can not always remain at peace, and has no right to expect that it will always have
wise humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of
liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln."
The effect of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and as it seems to me its manifest purpose, is to allow the
Government to commit an illegal act. It allows it to imprison a person who has committed no offense, and for whose arrest and
detention no warrant has been issued by any competent court, and it leaves that person without redress at the time for this
unlawful act. In the case at bar it appears from the return of the respondents that Barcelon is deprived of his liberty without due
process of law in violation of a provision of this same act of Congress.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was given to protect the citizen from such arbitrary and illegal acts of either the
executive or the legislative power; the latter, that department which according to Madison in No. 47 of The Federalist, "is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."
Is it probable that the people, in adopting the Constitution, intended to give up to these departments of the Government against
which they needed protection perhaps the most important right which could furnish that protection?
I do not think that the authors of the Constitution or the authors of the act of Congress intended to so place this right in the
hands of these two departments that whether it should or should not be enjoyed by the citizens would depend exclusively upon
their will and pleasure.
Garingo (20) Drilon v. Senate, GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Lazaro (21) Tecson v. Comelec, SC GR 161434, March 3, 2004
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus
Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according
to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first,
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
b. Whether or not FPJ is guilty of material misrepresentation in stating that he is a natural-born
citizen in his COC.
HELD:
· Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship
of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
· But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48]
must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
Bucoy (22) Orosa v. Roa, SC GR No. 140423, July 14, 2006
Jose Luis Angel Orosa VS Alberto Roa
G.R. No. 140423
July 14, 2006
Ponente: J. Garcia
Doctrine: Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise,
his decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary
of Justice should be to the President.
Facts: >Petitioner Orosa filed a complaint against herein Respondent Roa with the crime of libel. Both
petitioner and respondent are dentist by profession.
>The complaint, stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa" written
by respondent and published in the March-April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post, a bi-monthly
publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc.
>In gist, the article delved into the possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a licensure
examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees, manipulating the examinations or the results
thereof to enable his children to top the same.
>In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged that the article in question is defamatory as it besmirched his
honor and reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board examinations held in May
1994.
>Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article constitutes a "fair and accurate report on a
matter of both public and social concern." He averred that the article in question was not written with
malice but with a sincere desire to contribute to the improvement of the integrity of professional
examinations.
>After preliminary investigation, Pasig City Prosecutor Noel Paz issued a Resolution, dismissing
petitioner's complaint. (that it was a bona fide communication and made without malice)
> Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ): set aside the findings of the City Prosecutor
of Pasig and directing the latter to file an information for libel against respondent.
> Respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice: Reversed the resolution of the DOJ and directed
the city prosecutor of pasig to withdraw the information filed with RTC.
>Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, petitioner went to CA on a
petition for review under Rule 43.
> CA dismissed petitioner’s Petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a proper
mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to withdraw an
information in a criminal case?
Held: NO.
>As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of
Rule 43. There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is
deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over
executive departments, bureaus and offices. This power of control, which even Congress cannot limit, let
alone withdraw, means the power of the Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what
a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and heads of line agencies, had done in the performance of
their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
>Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his decision is
subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should
be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
>The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or
is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to
the courts. Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate; subject to defined
exception, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party fail to exhaust
administrative remedies.