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Ecfr 169 - Putins Hydra Inside The Russian Intelligence Services 1513 PDF
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PUTIN’S HYDRA:
INSIDE RUSSIA’S
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
Mark Galeotti
of legislators. Furthermore, many of the people closest to illicit movement of funds that lies behind these activities.
Putin hail from the ranks of the Chekists (veterans of the By showing that aggression abroad has major costs,
security agencies, after the first Bolshevik political police, Europe can push the intelligence services to take a more
the Cheka) or siloviki (“men of force” from the military, cautious approach.
security, and intelligence services). This is especially
important given that many of the formal institutions of The “warriors of the secret battlefield”
Russian foreign and security policy making – the Foreign
and Defence Ministries, the Security Council (SB), the Modern Russia has an array of intelligence and security
cabinet – have become nothing more than executive agencies. In Soviet times, there were essentially only
agencies where policies are announced and applied, two: the KGB, which handled everything from foreign
not discussed and decided. Instead, decisions are made espionage to domestic security, and the Main Intelligence
informally by Putin and his confidants and cronies. Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff, which handled
military intelligence. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the
The Soviet KGB security service was powerful and willing initial plan was to dismember the KGB, but Yeltsin began to
to use espionage, destabilisation, and subversion, but backtrack as he encountered growing political resistance,
was tightly controlled by a political leadership ultimately thanks to the influence of KGB veterans who opposed
committed to the status quo. Under Boris Yeltsin in the reform. This was reinforced when another ex-KGB officer,
1990s, the state was weak, but the intelligence agencies Vladimir Putin, rose to the presidency in 1999-2000 after a
doubly so. The agencies began renewing their powers during brief stint as director of the Federal Security Service (FSB).
Putin’s first terms as president, but his policy was one of
pragmatic accommodation with the West. Broadly speaking, there are four main agencies within
Russia’s intelligence community. The most powerful is still
Since Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, though, the the FSB, whose domestic security remit has increasingly
regime has unleashed increasingly powerful intelligence extended to certain external activities, including
agencies in campaigns of domestic repression and external assassination. Not only does the Service have the closest
destabilisation, appearing to genuinely want to revise the historical ties to Putin, but its current director, Alexander
structures of the international order. Bortnikov, and his predecessor, Nikolai Patrushev (now
chair of the Security Council) are personally close to the
This is unlikely to change any time soon. It is therefore president. The FSB is also heavily involved in cyber security
essential to look at these agencies in detail, exploring not and offensive information operations of every kind.
only their missions but their strengths and weaknesses, and
their position within the Putin system. This paper analyses External intelligence gathering is primarily the domain
the modus operandi and role of the agencies – the brutal of the Foreign Intelligence Service and the GRU. 3 Both
competition between them, their forays into crime, and their operate a mix of human intelligence officers under
willingness to take extreme measures, even targeted killings. diplomatic cover, inside embassies but outside the
diplomatic chain of command, and covert officers, or
The paper rejects the widely held belief that the intelligence “illegals”. There are crucial distinctions in their missions
agencies are the power behind the throne in Moscow. Their and organisational cultures. The Foreign Intelligence
lack of unity and common goals, and their dependence Service is quite traditional, not least in its penchant for
on Putin, mean that they should be considered as merely long-term, deep-cover spy rings, inherited from the KGB,
another branch of the elite. Meanwhile, the highly and often of questionable cost-effectiveness.
personalised systems for evaluating intelligence and
transmitting it to the president damage its quality and The GRU’s aggressive and risk-taking culture reflects its
impact on policy. While the agencies should by no means military background and its broad portfolio of assets, which
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be discounted, what emerges is that for all their apparent include substantial electronic, satellite, and battlefield
effectiveness, they have serious weaknesses. reconnaissance capabilities, and Spetsnaz (special forces).
Though part of the General Staff apparatus, it enjoys a
Unlike the hydra with its single controlling intellect, the degree of operational autonomy and its chief can brief the
agencies are often divided, competitive, and poorly tasked. president directly.
They are certainly not in charge of the Kremlin, but nor is
the Kremlin wholly adept at managing them. The Federal Protection Service (FSO), which incorporates
May 2016
Union governments to adopt a zero-tolerance attitude unexpected directions, including watching the security
to Russian intelligence operations in Europe, enhancing community itself.
capacity sharing and counterintelligence and tracking the 3 Within the General Staff itself, the GRU is sometimes known simply (and confusingly) as
2 the Main Administration, but GRU is much more widely used, including by Putin.
Roles of Russia’s intelligence community
Political Economic Military Active Counter Political Law
intelligence intelligence intelligence measures -intelligence security enforcement
Soviet KGB
Main role
Subsidiary role
The wider security apparatus includes a whole range of Russia is characterised by division, duplication, and deep
other services. The Interior Ministry (MVD) is responsible institutional rivalry.
not just for regular policing but also undercover operations
against serious and organised crime, including terrorists and The new nobility4
extremists — which in practice often also means peaceful
dissidents — along with the Investigatory Committee (SK) On the surface, this intelligence and security community
and the Prosecutor General’s Office (GP). The Federal Anti- may look broadly familiar to Europeans. However, there
Drug Service (FSKN), which carries out limited operational are institutional and cultural characteristics that, especially
intelligence gathering in Afghanistan and Central Asia, when combined with the nature of decision-making within
and the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAK), a the Russian system, mean that these agencies and the “new
coordinating body convened by the director of the FSB, nobility” who work in them — to use former security chief
complete the main security services. Patrushev’s words — have a distinctive operational culture
of their own.5
The new National Guard, announced in April 2016, is not
an intelligence agency but a public security force – a type Overlapping responsibilities
of Praetorian Guard that answers directly to the president.
As such, it is not covered in this paper – although, given the If the Soviet leaders tried to create efficiency and
empire-building habits of Russian agencies, that does not manageability by bringing nearly all security responsibilities
preclude it from seeking to acquire such a role in the future. under one agency, the KGB, their successors have adopted
Its creation does have wider implications: the FSKN has the opposite approach, resulting in numerous and growing
been subordinated to the Interior Ministry, and the domestic overlaps between these agencies.
security agencies are warily watching this new rival in case 4 This section develops ideas raised in my article “Putin’s Spies and Security Men: His
Strongest Allies, His Greatest Weakness”, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 173, 12 October
it seeks to expand its mandate. It offers a case study of one 2015.
of this paper’s main theses: that the security community in 5 “Direktor federalnoi sluzhby bezopasnosti Rossii Nikolai Patrushev”, Komsomolskaya
Pravda, 20 December 2000. 3
PUTIN'S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
In Ukraine, for example, before the fall of President Viktor Likewise, GRU officer Colonel Viktor Ilyushin was
Yanukovych in 2014, the Foreign Intelligence Service expelled from France in 2014, in part for seeking to gather
operated there as if it was a foreign country, but so did the compromising information – kompromat – on President
FSB, as if it was not. The GRU had penetrated Ukraine’s François Hollande’s personal life, the kind of political
security structures and was deeply embedded in Crimea, operation that would usually be the responsibility of the
home of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Even the Interior Ministry Foreign Intelligence Service or even the FSB.9 Indeed, the
exerted influence over Kyiv’s law enforcement structures. FSB has steadily expanded its political operations and
None appear seriously to have anticipated the outcome of their aggressiveness in the Baltic states and to an extent
the Maidan uprising (although an Interior Ministry source in Nordic Europe, rivaling even the GRU and the Foreign
told me that, a month before the uprising, they were warning Intelligence Service.10
that the regime’s mishandling of the protests had created a
near-irreversible situation). This competition can be a strength. It means that the agencies
are often aggressive, imaginative, and entrepreneurial. It
Nonetheless, when Yanukovych fled to Russia, it was the also means a degree of planned redundancy. In theory,
hapless Foreign Intelligence Service that bore the brunt of it should provide multiple, independent perspectives. As
Putin’s wrath, and sacrificial sackings and demotions ensued journalist Yulia Latynina put it, “The war between the
(this was confirmed by Source F).6 Through deft footwork, security services is our ‘separation of powers’. Some of them
the FSB managed to escape blame even though Colonel whisper into the president’s right ear, others into the left.”11
General Sergei Beseda, of the FSB department tasked with As will be discussed later, though, the political realities of
operations in former Soviet republics, had visited Kyiv late Putinism tend to militate against that.
just ten days before Yanukovych’s flight. Indeed, it used
the opportunity to claim primacy over future intelligence There are also serious drawbacks. The urge for quick
operations in Ukraine.7 results often encourages agencies to seize the low-hanging
fruit. More to the point, as discussed later, the need to
This is the same principle of “competitive intelligence” please the Kremlin inevitably competes with the integrity
adopted by the United States intelligence community but of the information gathering and analytic processes, which
with a strong admixture of bloody-fanged social Darwinism. are vital if intelligence is to be of true value. Coordination
The blurring of boundaries encourages regular direct and and intelligence sharing is often limited and require direct
indirect turf wars, and not just over the usual bureaucratic “manual control” in the form of the intervention of Putin or
prizes of responsibilities, funding, and access to the his representatives.
leadership but also business opportunities for officers, and
sometimes outright survival. It was clearly a matter of utmost importance that the 2014
Sochi Winter Olympics proceed smoothly and safely, for
The Federal Agency for Government Communications example. One of Putin’s trusted fixers, Deputy Prime
and Information (FAPSI) discovered this to its cost in Minister Dmitry Kozak, managed the event. He convened
2003 when an alliance of the FSB, the Foreign Intelligence a joint taskforce chaired by Oleg Syromolotov, veteran
Service, and the GRU led to its cannibalisation, but this is head of the FSB’s Counterintelligence Directorate, and
only the most extreme example. “Silovik wars” have raged including a first deputy interior minister and the deputy
on-and-off since 2004. Most recently, a successful bid by the head of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee. The need
FSB to put its own man in charge of the Interior Ministry’s for such high-power representatives from the key services
economic crime and corruption directorate in 2014 saw the was precisely because the normal level of coordination
mysterious death of its deputy chief. While being questioned would have been inadequate. The government made clear
by the Investigatory Committee, he apparently managed to that the officials’ futures depended on positive results
evade his guards and leap from a sixth-floor window.8 and intelligence sharing. As Source B – the FSB insider –
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the use of blackmail and coercion by the FSB to recruit assets. “Several cases of Russian
7 Andrei Soldatov, “The True Role of the FSB in the Ukrainian Crisis”, Moscow Times, 15 intelligence agents forcing Latvian residents to cooperate with them noticed last year”,
April 2014, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-true-role- LETA, 29 March 2016, available at http://www.leta.lv/eng/home/important/50C67943-
of-the-fsb-in-the-ukrainian-crisis/498072.html. 3C10-48FA-AECA-E5A9A47AD81A/.
8 Joshua Yaffa, “The Double Sting”, The New Yorker, 27 July 2015, available at http:// 11 Yuliya Latynina, “Bol’shoi brat slyshit tebya”, Novaya Gazeta, 11 October 2007,
4 www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/27/the-double-sting. available at http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/33686.html.
Wartime mindset Monetising security
Russia’s agencies regard themselves as not just sources For all their belief in their role as defenders of the state,
of intelligence for decision-makers and advocates for many officers still eagerly exploit the legal and illegal
particular policies, but also as instruments of direct action. economic opportunities at their disposal. Corruption
This is especially evident within the GRU, which has remains endemic within the state apparatus, and the
established its reputation as a service willing to operate additional lack of transparency and control makes this a
in highly unstable regions and through questionable and particular problem in the agencies.
dangerous proxies and agents, from arms dealers such
as Viktor Bout (in US prison since 2010) to the gangster- This is all the more serious considering the formidable
warlords, militias, and mercenaries of the Donbas.12 As a assets that security and intelligence officers have at their
former GRU officer put it, “not all of us were Spetsnaz, but disposal. They can use or, even more productively, threaten
we like to think we all are like Spetsnaz.” to use force or legal powers and have access to sensitive,
dangerous, or simply bankable information. As a result,
However, the emphasis on coercive methods, active there are many tales of businesspeople being forced to pay
operations, taking chances, and risking international protection – or, more often, to hand over a share of their
opprobrium reflects a wartime mindset across the agencies. enterprise – to security officers (especially from the FSB).
Even before the worsening of relations with the West, they
appear genuinely to have felt that Russia was under serious, These officers may also have contacts within the regular
even existential threat, which demanded extreme responses. underworld that can be leveraged or with whom they can
join forces. This reflects the general blending of money,
There are three complementary aspects to this mindset, crime, and political power in Russia, but is also a by-product
best illustrated by three quotations. The first is that “if of a marked willingness to use criminals as instruments
the West loses, we gain.” This zero-sum perspective, of state security. There is, for example, ample evidence of
reminiscent of the Cold War, comes from a group of Russian hackers being granted a degree of dispensation
Foreign Intelligence Service officers, as recounted second so long as, when called on, they attack targets of the FSB’s
hand by a Russian academic. choice, from foreign states to liberal websites.13
The second is that “Russia is at risk”, as expressed by Source Likewise, the Kohver incident in Estonia revolved around the
B, an FSB officer, in 2014 (before Crimea). When pressed, kidnapped agent’s investigation of a cross-border cigarette-
he pointed to the Maidan uprising, which he genuinely smuggling ring. It is implausible that a corrupt local FSB
believes was a CIA operation. This intelligent, well-travelled official would send an elite squad into another country and
individual asserted that there was a concerted Western trigger a diplomatic incident just to protect a criminal sideline
drive to force regime change on Russia through political — or at least do this and get away with it. It is more likely
subversion and to undermine Russia’s distinctive historical, that this was a joint venture in which the FSB, which has
religious, and social identity in order to weaken resistance to numerous and no doubt expensive political operations in
a global US-led hegemony. the Baltic region, facilitated an organised crime venture in
return for a share of the profits.14 This money, generated in
The third is “better action than inaction”, which Source F Europe, becomes operational funds with no direct, provable
recounted hearing in a meeting with Foreign Intelligence connection to Moscow, ideal for bankrolling a useful political
Service officers. Source A, the former insider, agreed that organisation here, bribing an official there.
although the agencies could be as bureaucratic as any Russian
institution, there was a clear bias towards risk-taking, However, the more agencies are involved in such activities,
especially given the competitive environment in which they the harder it is to be sure that the tail is not wagging the dog.
operate. Whether this is cause or effect, part of the process An interesting case in point relates to the GRU’s tasking of
has been the diminution of the power of the Foreign Ministry their Canadian agent. Along with the usual fare of military,
(MID) and its capacity to curb overseas operations with political, and economic information, he was asked to use
potential negative political repercussions. The FSB’s cross- his position at a military intelligence centre to find out what
border raid to kidnap Estonian security officer Eston Kohver information the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had on
in 2014, for example, seems to have been conducted with Russian gangsters operating in Canada.15 Russian as well
minimal consultation with the Foreign Ministry. as Canadian interlocutors have separately suggested that
this was not driven by strategic GRU tasking so much as
someone within the chain of command realising that such
information might be of commercial value to the gangsters.
13 Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov, “The Kremlin and the hackers: partners in crime?”,
od:Russia, 25 April 2012, available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/irina-
borogan-andrei-soldatov/kremlin-and-hackers-partners-in-crime.
14 Three of the smugglers were subsequently convicted on espionage charges in Estonia.
15 Leslie MacKinnon, “Spy Delisle's guilty plea preserves Navy secrets”, CBCNews, 11
12 I explore this further in “Putin’s Secret Weapon”, Foreign Policy, 7 July 2014, available October 2012, available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/spy-delisle-s-guilty-plea-
at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/07/putins-secret-weapon/. preserves-navy-secrets-1.1143658. 5
PUTIN'S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
In other words, state assets were hijacked for criminal ends refused its more ambitious empire-building plans, which
rather than vice versa. would see it absorb agencies such as the federal anti-drug
agency or even the Foreign Intelligence Service, putting
The overall result is a culture of corruption that permeates it on track to form some kind of KGB 2.0. As an insider,
the agencies. It is hard to reach a definitive assessment of he is presumably well aware of the danger in giving any
how far this undermines their operational capacity, but it one agency too much power. Instead, he plays agencies off
does appear to influence even top-level decision-making. In against each other, encouraging rivalries such as between
2014, for example, Investigatory Committee chief Alexander the Foreign Intelligence Service and GRU, or Prosecutor
Bastrykin persuaded Putin to introduce a bill allowing General’s Office and Investigatory Committee, up to the
criminal cases for tax crimes to be opened without consulting point at which they become inconvenient.
the tax authorities, creating sweeping new powers that are
more useful for extortion than for policing.16 Likewise, the Likewise, the agencies must appear to be pulling their
2014 struggle over the Interior Ministry’s economic crime weight. Following the 2008 Georgian war, the GRU found
unit was almost certainly as much because this generates itself in increasing disfavour. Its Spetsnaz special forces
rents as for any political reason. had acquitted themselves well, but the government felt
that the wider intelligence aspects of the conflict had been
The highest roof of all mishandled. Dated information led to air strikes wasted
on empty and closed airstrips, the Georgians fought better
Ultimately, the security and intelligence community as a than GRU analyses had led the Kremlin to believe, and
whole enjoys the favour of Putin. At the 2015 celebration communications intercepts failed.
of the annual Day of Security Service Personnel, he called
them “strong and courageous people, true professionals The agency’s rivals gathered. The Foreign Intelligence Service
who are reliably protecting Russia’s sovereignty and sought to assert primacy in the field of foreign intelligence,
national integrity and the lives of our citizens, who are the FSB cast hungry eyes at the portion of FAPSI’s radio-
ready to perform the most complicated, responsible, and electronic capacities that the GRU had acquired in 2003,
dangerous assignments.”17 This favour is neither uncritical and even comrades within the military capitalised on the
nor unconditional, nor just a matter of sentiment. Rather, it situation. In 2010, the Kremlin reassigned the Spetsnaz to
reflects a shared perception of Russia’s situation and goals, regular military commands19 and cut the central GRU staff
and a pragmatic political alliance. by a thousand officers.20
The agencies have all done well under him, seeing their budgets, Rumours circulated that military intelligence would be
powers, and profiles grow. When the FSB was forced to absorb downgraded from a main directorate of the General Staff to a
a 10 percent headcount reduction in 2015 in response to the regular one. Beyond the blow to its prestige, this would have
financial crisis, it was a shock to an organisation that had seen dramatically affected its autonomy, not least by removing
its budget increase in real terms every year since 1999, even its chief access to the president. In the end, Igor Sergun,
through the 2008-2009 rouble crisis.18 who headed the GRU from December 2011 until his death
in late 2015, managed to turn around the agency’s fortunes
Their relative political muscle has also increased. Since through a combination of luck and a keen awareness of what
Putin’s return in 2012, for example, the balance of power has goes down well in the Kremlin.21 But it was a lesson in how
shifted, and the spies appear far more willing to throw their an agency’s future depends on performance, or at least on
weight around, both in Moscow and in the embassies. The the leadership’s perception of its performance.
Foreign Intelligence Service and GRU “legals” – agents under
diplomatic cover – work within embassies, and their actions Strong left arms of the state
inevitably reflect on the Foreign Ministry. Both sources C
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and F observed that, in the earlier Putin presidencies, if their In Soviet times, just as ordinary citizens had to go na levoi,
actions caused undue embarrassment, Foreign Minister “on the left”, to get scarce goods or services through favours
Sergei Lavrov would “get someone in from Yasenevo [the or the black market, the leadership relied on the KGB
Foreign Intelligence Service headquarters] to shout at”, as to make up for weaknesses in the state apparatus, from
Source C put it. Even the General Staff reportedly had to assessing the public mood to trying to close the technology
apologise when GRU operations went wrong. gap with the West. Likewise, Putin’s intelligence services are
not only the overt and covert arms of state security, but also
May 2016
Yet this support is balanced by a keen sense of the political perform a variety of roles that are not necessarily under the
realities and contingent on the agencies delivering. For remit of these agencies in other countries.
all his ties to the FSB, for example, Putin has consistently
17 “Vladimir Putin attended gala reception to mark Security Agency Worker’s Day”, October 2010, available at http://rg.ru/2010/10/23/gru-specnaz-site.html.
Kremlin.ru, 19 December 2015, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ 20 Denis Tel’manov, “Nachal’nika GRU uvolyat po vykhode s bol’nichnogo”, Izvestiya, 27
news/50977. September 2011, available at http://izvestia.ru/news/501899.
18 “Aleksandr Bortnikov sokrashchaet FSB”, Fontanka, 11 February 2015, available at 21 See Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s secret weapon”, Foreign Policy, 7 July 2014, available at
6 http://www.fontanka.ru/2015/02/11/021/. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/07/putins-secret-weapon/.
Espionage At the most extreme end are targeted killings and direct
attacks, generally conducted by the GRU or FSB. Since the
As far back as 2010, the British Security Service (MI5) 2006 murder in London of defector Litvinenko, there has
warned that “the threat from Russian espionage continues been something of a fad for seeing Muscovite murderers
to be significant and is similar to the Cold War […] the behind every unexpected Russian death abroad, but the
number of Russian intelligence officers in London is at the main aim of such activity is generally to eliminate direct
same level as in Soviet times.”22 Since then, security services threats or to create chaos. Both the FSB and GRU, for
across Europe have been registering a continued uptick in example, have been implicated in assassinations of Chechen
the scale and aggressiveness of Russian operations. For rebels and their allies abroad.
example, the head of the Norwegian Police Security Service
warned that “Russian intelligence has the largest potential Likewise, Georgia before the 2008 war and Ukraine since
to damage Norwegian interests”, while Sweden’s security 2014 have seen killings and terrorist attacks aimed less at
service, SÄPO, has characterised Russian espionage as its specific individuals than at creating a climate of fear and
greatest challenge and warned of “preparation for military insecurity.26 This is meant to undermine public and political
operations against Sweden”.23 The Russians are engaging in will and to support a Russian narrative that these countries
massive and voracious intelligence-gathering campaigns, are falling into anarchy. Where guns or bombs are not
fuelled by still-substantial budgets and a Kremlin culture called for, sometimes a computer virus or directed denial-
that sees deceit and secret agendas even where none exist. of-service (DDOS) attack will work. As noted above, the
FSB is especially involved with launching cyber attacks or
The general consensus within European counterintelligence commissioning them from Russian hackers.
services appears to be that Russian collection operations are
not just highly active but also often extremely professional. There are also direct political operations aimed at
Tasking, though, appears less impressive. While the Foreign discrediting or co-opting specific individuals or groups, or
Intelligence Service and GRU have a strong sense of the undermining policies that Moscow dislikes. Again, these are
military and technical secrets they are meant to uncover, not as common as sometimes suspected, especially because
their political objectives are sometimes naïve, reflecting a they are difficult and carry a considerable risk of failure
questionable grasp of democratic political systems. and backlash. They have, however, been a feature of the
Eurasian political landscape. In Ukraine, for example, the
It was telling that one of the tasks assigned to the ring of deep FSB has been accused of involvement in the poisoning of
cover agents exposed in the US in 2010 was to penetrate Viktor Yushchenko during the 2004 presidential elections
think-tanks to uncover their agendas, as if that took more and was reportedly behind a forged document meant to
than a glance at their web pages.24 In other cases, agents derail a gas deal between Kyiv and Turkmenistan.27
have been tasked with gathering information that is readily
available through open sources. For example, according Far more common is the use of the intelligence agencies to
to the indictment against him, when Foreign Intelligence support political and other movements sympathetic to or
Service “illegal” agent Evgeny Buryakov was tasked with simply useful for Moscow. This has long been practised in
assessing the impact of economic sanctions on Russia, he countries Russia regards as within its sphere of influence —
simply conducted internet searches.25 for example, the FSB’s interference in Moldovan politics by
backing populist candidate Renato Usatii in 2014.28 However,
Active measures the Foreign Intelligence Service and FSB are now especially
active in Europe, and the organisations they support include
Perhaps the most striking of the agencies’ external operations anti-fracking environmental movements (which, however
are their “active measures”: everything from assassination genuine in their concerns, usefully maintain Moscow’s
to political subversion. While many countries’ intelligence gas markets), nationalist and anti-federal political groups,
agencies sometimes conduct such operations, the Russians Russian diaspora movements in the Baltics, and separatists
have put this at the centre of their concept of intelligence from Spain to Scotland.
work. They also more readily integrate other institutions
and individuals — from banks and charities to journalists They sometimes work through or in parallel with overt
and truck drivers — into their activities. agencies such as Rossotrudnichestvo (the Federal Agency
22 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Russian spies in UK ‘at cold war levels’, says MI5”, the for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots
Guardian, 29 June 2010, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/29/
russian-spies-cold-war-levels. Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian
23 “Russian spying can ‘damage’ Norway: PST”, the Local (Norway), 10 February 2016, Cooperation), charities, and even financial institutions, such
available at http://www.thelocal.no/20160210/russia-spying-seen-as-major-threat-to-
norway; SAPO Annual Report 2014, available at http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/downlo
ad/18.4c7cab6d1465fb27b01f1a/1426682274489/Arsbok2014_webb_slutgiltig.pdf; Lucy 26 The US government cable “Russian Active Measures in Georgia” of 20 July 2007 gives
Westcott, “Sweden labels Russia its biggest threat”, Newsweek, 18 March 2015, available an especially good account of operations there conducted by both the GRU and FSB as
at http://europe.newsweek.com/sweden-labels-russia-its-biggest-threat-314871?rm=eu. Moscow sought to provoke President Mikheil Saakashvili into making the first move,
24 Toby Harnden and Michele Walk, “Russian spy applied for jobs at think tanks with available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07TBILISI1732_a.html.
links to Obama”, the Telegraph, 8 July 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 27 Andrei Soldatov, “The True Role of the FSB in the Ukrainian Crisis”, Moscow Times, 15
news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7879850/Russian-spy-applied-for-jobs-at-think- April 2014, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-true-role-
tanks-with-links-to-Obama.html. of-the-fsb-in-the-ukrainian-crisis/498072.html.
25 “US v. Evgeny Buryakov, Et Al Complaint”, 26 January 2015, available at https://www. 28 See, for example, “FSB şi Patria lui Renato Usatîi”, Ziarul de gardā, 27 November
justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/01/26/buryakov_ 2014, available at http://www.zdg.md/editia-print/investigatii/fsb-si-patria-lui-renato-
et_al_complaint.pdf. usatii. 7
PUTIN'S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
as the Russian banks that loaned millions of euros to French As Putin loses his old basis for legitimacy – his capacity
nationalist Marine Le Pen’s Front National.29 It is often to guarantee steadily improving standards of living – he
difficult to tell where the activities of the agencies end and is seeking to shore up his position with a narrative of
other Russian institutions begin, but this is not necessarily foreign threats and external triumphs. The agencies play a
a meaningful distinction: to the Kremlin, the tools in its box crucial role not just in supporting the narrative but also in
are interchangeable. conducting operations against enemies of the state, both
real and constructed. Counterterrorism has long been a
Economic assets priority across the services and is often conducted abroad,
from monitoring and if need be eliminating ringleaders and
Even before the current economic crisis, the Kremlin thought supporters, through to interdicting sources of finance and
— as naively as the Soviets in the 1970s and early 1980s — recruits. As the potential source of terrorism shifts from
that intelligence capacity could somehow be converted into the North Caucasus to Russian Muslims elsewhere and
business success and technological growth. Central Asian migrant workers, the services are scrambling
to acquire new human sources and analytic capabilities.
So far, the nature of the sanctions and Russia’s continued
access to markets elsewhere in the world means that the At the same time, many of the agencies are consumed with
agencies have not adopted the classic role of sanctions- identifying and suppressing dissidents and government
busters, although clearly many of their political operations critics. Well-known figures such as liberal nationalist Alexei
in Europe in particular are directed towards undermining Navalny and communist Sergei Udaltsov have been the focus
support for continued sanctions. Rather, the economic of intensive campaigns by the FSB, Investigatory Committee,
mission of the Foreign Intelligence Service in particular and the Interior Ministry’s “E Service” (for “Extremism”).
is to support strategic Russian businesses clinching However, there is a wider national and international effort to
deals abroad, such as the Czech Temelín nuclear reactor prevent criticism of the regime from spreading, whether by
contract. 30 This could involve anything from seeking leaning on individuals — the FSB is reviving the KGB tactic
to compromise, coerce, or suborn those involved in of the “prophylactic chat” meant to intimidate without the
allocating contracts, to gaining access to tenders and other need for prosecution — or by interfering with the free flow of
commercially sensitive information. information. This involves measures including pressurising
remaining independent media outlets such as Dozhd TV and
Meanwhile, the GRU and Foreign Intelligence Service using trolls to spam critical voices on the internet.
continue to seek to acquire details and examples of
technology denied them by export controls or that is beyond As the economic crisis leads to a rising tide of small-
Russian capabilities. In 2012, for example, the FBI broke scale labour protests, the agencies are not only directly
a ring that was using a Texas-based export company to monitoring attempts to organise strikes but also stepping
illegally export high-tech microelectronics with military up long-running efforts to track public opinion and head off
uses to Russia.31 Likewise, Germany has identified Foreign any generalised unrest. The Interior Ministry and FSB are at
Intelligence Service operations intended to steal renewable the forefront, but the FSO, true to its broad interpretation of
energy technologies.32 its role, is also active. It runs its own opinion polls and sits
on a multi-agency task force identifying potential hotspots
Political control and dispensing targeted financial subsidies.33
Every external operation is first and foremost a domestic one: Overall, Russia’s intelligence and security communities are
the single most important role of the agencies is to secure extremely active in their operations and unusually broad in
the regime. So it was under the tsars, then the Bolsheviks, their responsibilities. They are directly wired into a much
and now the new Russians: defending not a constitutional wider array of state activities than in the West and have
www.ecfr.eu
order but a particular incumbent. This means carrying out revived their Soviet-era role as the multi-purpose Swiss
operations to prevent foreign “interference” as the Kremlin Army Knife of the Kremlin. What is less clear, though, is
sees it, as well as dividing strategic rivals such as the EU. how far this is of their own volition, and how far it is because
they are available and trusted, and cannot say no. Did the
Foreign Intelligence Service, for example, really want to get
involved in the Czech nuclear reactor contract? Do people
29 Anton Shekhovtsov, “Russia and Front National: Following the Money”, the really join the FSO to parse opinion poll data? In other
May 2016
Interpreter, 3 May 2015, available at http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-and-front- words, are the agencies Putin’s boyars, or his serfs?
national-following-the-money/.
30 BIS (Czech counterintelligence), Annual Report of the Security Information Service
for 2014 (2015)
31 “Russian Agent and 10 Other Members of Procurement Network for Russian Military
and Intelligence Operating in the U.S. and Russia Indicted in New York”, FBI, 3 October
2012, available at https://www.fbi.gov/houston/press-releases/2012/russian-agent-
ECFR/169
and-10-other-members-of-procurement-network-for-russian-military-and-intelligence-
operating-in-the-u.s.-and-russia-indicted-in-new-york.
32 Dirk Banse, “Putins Konjunkturprogramm: Russische Agenten spionieren deutsche
Energie-Unternehmen aus”, Welt am Sonntag, 21 June 2009, available at http://www. 33 “Vladimir Putin’s Bodyguards Also Do Economic Stimulus”, Bloomberg, 9 December
welt.de/wams_print/article3965455/Putins-Konjunkturprogramm-Russische-Agenten- 2015, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-09/tea-farming-
8 spionieren-deutsche-Energie-Unternehmen-aus.html. in-siberia-how-putin-s-guards-help-ward-off-unrest.
Russia’s intelligence architecture
9
Spookocracy?
PUTIN'S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
36 “Putin reveals secrets of Russia’s Crimea takeover plot”, BBC, 9 March 2015, available as the opportunity arises to make money or avoid blame.
at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226.
Bureaucratic struggles outweigh wider sectoral interests.
37 Daniel Treisman, “Putin’s Silovarchs”, Orbis, Winter 2007, available at http://www.
sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/siloct06.pdf. For example, though the Prosecutor General’s Office seems
38 Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy”, Post-Soviet Affairs, to have supported Bastrykin’s attempt to revise the legal
19, 4 (2003) and “The Sovietization of Russian Politics”, Post-Soviet Affairs, 25, 4 (2009).
ECFR/169
39 Bettina Renz, “Putin’s Militocracy? An Alternative Interpretation of Siloviki in 41 Mark Galeotti, “What Putin’s Security Appointments Say About How Russia Works”,
Contemporary Russian Politics”, Europe-Asia Studies, 58, 6 (2006); David and Sharon War On The Rocks, 9 February 2016, available at http://warontherocks.com/2016/02/
Rivera, “Is Russia a militocracy? Conceptual issues and extant findings regarding elite what-putins-security-appointments-say-about-how-russia-works/.
militarization”, Post-Soviet Affairs, 30, 1 (2014). 42 Denis Volkov, “Russian Elite Opinion After Crimea”, Carnegie Moscow Center, 23
40 See, for example, Andrei Illarionov’s “The Siloviki in Charge”, Journal of Democracy, March 2016, available at http://carnegie.ru/2016/03/23/russian-elite-opinion-after-
10 20, 2 (2009). crimea/ivsf.
system in principle, it instead concentrated on persuading scope for external validation of intelligence findings, such as
Putin to introduce a bill reinstating its supervisory powers the US National Security Advisor, a well-informed outsider
over the Investigatory Committee.43 responsible to the president and independent of the agencies.
Under Putin, policy has swung in directions congenial to In Russia, the institutions of intelligence management — as
the security community as a whole and reflects many of with so many other aspects of the formal political structure
the attitudes they hold. However, this is more likely to be — have been hollowed out and represent structures for the
because policy is shaped in the image of Putin the KGB dissemination of policy from the Kremlin rather than the
veteran, and because of other, broader issues, such as the management of information into it. Most of the agencies
elite’s troubles adjusting to the loss of great power status, are directly subordinate to the president, the rest indirectly.
and genuine differences in expectations between Moscow In practice, the Presidential Administration – rather than
and the West. A liberal and reformist minority has largely the Security Council – has become the main organ through
been forced out of the centre ground of politics, but there is which intelligence materials reach the president, and
no evidence that this was at the hands of the Chekists. tasking is communicated to the agencies. The characters of
these gatekeepers and their relationship to the president are
Instead, the agencies have prospered because – and when – crucial in this most personalised of political systems.
they are useful to the Kremlin. Putin funds the FSB lavishly
because he wants an instrument of political control, not The three primary gatekeepers are the Security Council
because they control him or he fears them. He supports the and its secretary, Nikolai Patrushev, the Presidential
Foreign Intelligence Service and GRU because he wants Administration, and its head, Presidential Chief of Staff
intelligence information and “left hand” covert operations. Sergei Ivanov, and, more informally and less extensively,
Evgeny Murov, the outgoing head of the FSO.
After successfully managing security at Sochi, for example,
Syromolotov was moved from the FSB to become deputy The Security Council
foreign minister for counterterrorism. Despite feverish
speculation at the time, this was not a creeping takeover The Security Council brings together representatives of all
of the Foreign Ministry by the FSB, and still less a Foreign security-related agencies, and is often presented as a kind
Ministry land grab of FSB responsibilities. Rather, it reflected of parallel cabinet. However, in practice it is a consultative
the Kremlin’s hope that, in the post-Crimea, post-sanctions rather than decision-making body. It has an unwieldy 30
world, counterterrorism was one area where Russia could members – including Putin — and is not used for meaningful
make a case for being a valuable partner to the West. debate. Rather, it is a managerial forum that hears reports,
announces decisions, and resolves technical questions over
The most useful and most accurate way to think about coordination and jurisdiction. The most important aspect
the agencies is not as a distinct bloc seeking to control of the council’s activities is the work of Secretary Patrushev
the Kremlin. Rather, this is a collection of institutions, and his secretariat from their offices near the Kremlin.
individuals, and factions engaging in the policy process.
They buy their way in through personal connections, Patrushev is one of Putin’s closest client-allies. Another
political weight, and – most frequently – by being useful veteran of the KGB and its successor agencies, he was
and having attractive ideas. In this respect, they are simply Putin’s choice to follow him as director of the FSB, before
part of an elite, alongside the military, financial interests, becoming Security Council secretary in 2008. Patrushev has
defence industrialists, and all the other seemingly coherent shaped the role to suit his inclinations and Putin’s needs.
but, in practice, disparate elements of the modern Russian In essence, he is the intelligence and security community’s
political scene. It is therefore important to explore the ways representative and overseer.
in which the agencies are controlled and the ways in which
they seek to influence policy. He ensures that the agencies carry out the will of the
Kremlin, arbitrating disputes not serious enough to go to
Gatekeepers to the presidency Putin, and knocking heads together. It is also his place to
articulate their views to the leadership. For example, in 2012
Many intelligence systems involve a single entity charged with he surprised many by suggesting in an interview that mass
evaluating, collating, and assessing different perspectives. In anti-government protests “attest to the free activity of our
the US, for example, the director of national intelligence has citizens [...] they are participating in the process of working
an oversight role and is responsible for the President’s Daily out the most important national decisions”.44 According to
Brief, while it is customary for representatives of different Interior Ministry sources, he was speaking in part to signal
services to sit in the same meeting, from the White House to the leadership that the ministry did not want to be used
Situation Room down. In the United Kingdom, the Cabinet indiscriminately against peaceful protesters.
Office coordinates intelligence activity and manages the
process that seeks to create consensus in the form of Joint
Intelligence Committee papers. Furthermore, there is often 44 Viktor Baranets and Aleksandr Kots, “‘Ran’shie glavnym razdrazhitelem byla Moskva,
43 “‘Putin poruchil Prokurature nadzirat’ za Sledstvennym komitetom”, News.ru, 23 teper’ Pekin”, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 17 February 2012, available at http://www.kp.ru/
December 2014, available at http://www.newsru.com/russia/23dec2014/sled.html. daily/25836/2809802/. 11
PUTIN'S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
Unapologetically hawkish, his public utterances range from Intelligence materials are only one of the inputs it assesses,
the infamous assertion that the US “would much rather that triages, and packages for senior policymakers, primarily the
Russia did not exist at all”, to his statement that “assurances president. In some ways it is closer to the British Cabinet
by some Western leaders that NATO is a purely defensive Office, but apart from the huge differences in culture
alliance set up to safeguard global security are simply meant between a civil service agency used to regular changes in
to disguise its aggressive nature.”45 According to Source C, government and one beholden to a specific and lasting
“if you want him to forward a report, it has to be couched in regime, it also handles intelligence very differently. There
the most extreme language possible.” is no single central department, such as the British Joint
Intelligence Committee secretariat. Rather, several of its
This matters because the role of his secretariat is to provide divisions draw on and even task intelligence activity.
analytic support, disseminate information, and draft
documents for the Security Council and for the president, The agencies themselves appear to have no direct traction
as well as to monitor the implementation of presidential on the way their materials are used. Rather, Presidential
instructions. In particular, it has a central role in the Administration officials — most of whom have no
periodic revision of Russia’s National Security Strategy. It intelligence background — decide what information will
has the right to request and receive information and reports be passed around and up the chain of command and how
from any government body, including the military and to incorporate materials into their briefings and reports.
intelligence agencies. As a result, it is one of the crucial The sense from those privy to its inner workings is that,
conduits of information to the Kremlin, with the power to as a result, the use of these materials is often driven by
support or withhold. political considerations.
Although the secretariat — and its expert committees — Given that Putin is notoriously suspicious of being led by his
drafts policy, it is relatively small. When Putin first came officials, there is also an imperative to cite multiple sources,
to power, it had around 200 staff, and there is little reason and thus a highly-classified cable from an agency may be
to believe that there has been any dramatic increase. By juxtaposed with, and implicitly given similar weight to,
contrast, the British Cabinet Office has some 2,000 staff, a newspaper report or a paper from a think-tank (which,
and the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence as will be discussed below, may well have been written to
(ODNI) has over 1,600. In other words, this is at best a “big order). As a result, the true “value added” of intelligence
picture” agency, unable to do more than flag up particular reporting is often likely to be missed or wasted.
reports as worth consideration for the president’s desk.
Briefing the boss
The Presidential Administration
Overall, then, the day-to-day products of Russia’s intelligence
The Presidential Administration is the president’s executive activities often appear to flow through structures — the
office, responsible for everything from drafting laws to Security Council and Presidential Administration — which
briefing the press, monitoring government activity, and exert a degree of control over what actually makes it to the
overseeing presidential representatives to the regions. Kremlin. However, this is only one of the ways that the
Given the hyper-presidentialism of the Putin system (or intelligence community interacts with the president and
maybe hyper-personalism, as it is about the dominance of those closest to him.
the man, rather than the office), it is unsurprising that this
is an extremely important institution. Although there are The Foreign Intelligence Service and the FSB both produce
opportunities for representatives of key agencies to brief daily reports analogous to the US President’s Daily Brief. This
Putin in person or through submissions, the overwhelming gives them a degree of unfiltered access, whether in written
majority of analytic and intelligence materials that reach form or in person. The GRU and FSO also send regular reports
www.ecfr.eu
him come through the Presidential Administration. directly to the president. However, there is a key point of
distinction. Each service briefs the president individually; it is
It is not coincidental that the head of this increasingly very rare for there to be any direct comparison or discussion
powerful agency is again a hawkish KGB veteran. A former between them, except as brokered through the Presidential
Security Council secretary, Sergei Ivanov also served in the Administration and Security Council. There are some formal
Foreign Intelligence Service and FSB, and has a close personal and informal sessions at which the heads of multiple services
relationship with Putin. Although much more circumspect may be present for policy discussions, but anecdotal data
May 2016
than Patrushev in his public statements, Ivanov’s views are suggests that even this is rare. Using the publicly accessible
similar and he too sets the tone within his organisation. listings of Putin’s official meetings, Michael Rochlitz and
Andrei Soldatov found that on average 14 percent of his
However, the Presidential Administration is not primarily meetings in 2000-2007 were with siloviki (broadly defined),
an intelligence-oriented organisation but a political one. but only around 5.5 percent in 2008-2015.46
ECFR/169
Services such as the Foreign Intelligence Service and the “Those who are clever and industrious I appoint to the
GRU are rather less able to tell their story (beyond the General Staff. Use can under certain circumstances be
gung-ho tales of Spetsnaz glory found in magazines and made of those who are stupid and lazy. The man who
the military’s Zvezda TV channel), so instead encourage is clever and lazy qualifies for the highest leadership
TV series and films talking up the exploits of Russian spies, posts. He has the requisite nerves and the mental
both current and historical. Beyond that, though, they also clarity for difficult decisions. But whoever is stupid and
support the array of Russian think-tanks that play an under- industrious must be got rid of, for he is too dangerous.”
researched part in the policy process.
In much the same way, one can consider the implications
One that has become infamous is the Russian Institute of having intelligence agencies that are aggressive
for Strategic Studies (RISI). Headed by former Foreign or defensive, and well or badly managed. Defensive
Intelligence Service Lt. General Leonid Reshetnikov, this is intelligence agencies that are badly managed do little
an expansive organisation with 12 branch offices, a journal, harm in times of peace but offer no protection in hostile
and even the “Riss-TV” channel to get its message out. conditions. Defensive and well-managed ones present
Although it has not technically been part of the Foreign a strong shield against enemies. Aggressive ones are
Intelligence Service since 2009, Source F describes it as formidable instruments of statecraft when well managed
“the service’s PR arm”. From warning against Sweden but dangerously counterproductive when not.
and Finland joining NATO to damning the “terrorists”
of Ukraine, its position is in step with official policy and There can be little question about the aggressiveness of
Foreign Intelligence Service analysis.52 the Russian intelligence community. A more important
question is how well they are managed, not just in terms
There are an array of little-known policy shops, from the of day-to-day control but in terms of tasking, the extent to
Institute of Strategic Studies and Analysis (ISOA), headed which intelligence is properly analysed and fed into policy,
by former KGB Major General Vagif Guseynov to the and how the agencies fit into a sensible wider strategy.
Institute of Political Studies (headed by Sergei Markov,
persona non grata in both Estonia and Ukraine for his In many ways, the Ukrainian conflict encapsulates this
views), which often have close relationships with one or issue. In both Crimea and the Donbas, the Russians often
more of the agencies. The Presidential Administration displayed extremely good intelligence on a tactical level,
often commissions reports from these think-tanks with with accurate assessments of Ukrainian troop positions,
specific recommendations in mind. the willingness of individual officers to fight, and when
government forces were preparing an attack. Furthermore,
the agencies have deployed a range of active measures, from
terrorist attacks and cyber intrusions to disinformation
campaigns and political dirty tricks.
www.ecfr.eu
Recommendation 3: Follow the money and on the information at its disposal. The better European
starve the hydra authorities understand the sources, biases, and limitations
of that information, the more accurately they can predict
The more Russian operations revolve around active Russian actions.
measures, the more they involve money that has to be spent
or donated. Just as Europe’s governments should make Recommendation 5: But keep a sense of balance
counterintelligence more central to protecting themselves
from the current Russian challenge, they should also focus Despite all the above, this is not a new Cold War. The
more on addressing the capacity of its state and intelligence Russians do not pose a long-term geopolitical challenge to
structures (along with gangsters, kleptocrats, and tax the West, and Europe’s governments should think ahead
dodgers) to freely move their money around and hide its to rebuilding relations with Russia in the inevitable post-
sources and beneficiaries. This has been asserted again and Putin era. There is room for greater basic awareness of
again with no success, but it may gain traction now that it the problems, including ensuring that European visitors
can be framed in terms of national security rather than mere to Russia are less vulnerable to recruitment. 57 Russian
law enforcement. students, entrepreneurs, tourists, and workers in Europe
will inevitably include some intelligence officers. However,
Countries such as Latvia, long vulnerable to the penetration they are also potential assets for Europe, not so much for
of their financial systems by questionable Russian money, recruitment as spies (though that will happen) but as cultural
are making real progress in tackling this. Nonetheless, contacts, to minimise the Kremlin’s efforts to portray its
small nations with substantial amounts of Russian money current imperial designs as some kind of defensive campaign
within their borders should make tracking finances a greater against a hostile West.
priority, such as Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria.
While the overwhelming majority of the funds may well be Russia, ultimately, is a declining, middle-rank power,
legal, or at least unconnected with intelligence activity, the currently able to seem to exert disproportionate influence
Kremlin’s capacity to move money into and through Europe through the concentration of scarce resources and
– or generate funds there – to support active measures is an political control and a willingness to break the rules of
important problem. Governments should ensure that major international behaviour. This will not last, though, and the
financial hubs such as London, Luxembourg, and Frankfurt mismanagement of its intelligence agencies is a metaphor
are more assiduously policed, or more tightly self-regulated. for its general inability in the longer term to cope with the
practical limitations of its position.
Recommendation 4: Understand the beast
Europe needs to find the right balance between protecting
European authorities have a wealth of tactical knowledge itself from Russian intelligence activity and deterring
and expertise about Russia’s intelligence operations and Kremlin adventurism, and alienating the Russian
services. Much of this is shared through the EU, NATO, population. In spite of all the official propaganda, Russians
and through bilateral and other channels, but governments are still culturally aligned with the West and are in the future
should work to expand this. However, there is less of a likely to seek to emulate its social, legal, economic, and
clear sense of the political context in which the agencies political progress.
operate, which affects wider discussions about responses
and counter-measures. In other words, there is often a good
understanding of what the Russian intelligence services do
but much less sense of why, or of its effect on policy.
between agencies – but, more importantly, it would provide 57 Norway’s Police Security Service (PST), for example, has warned that Norwegians
an additional source of insight into Russian policymaking. are “too naïve” when in Russia and thus vulnerable to being blackmailed or co-opted.
Ellen Omland and Mari Reisjō, “PST advarer mot russiske sexfeller”, NRK, 9 November
The Kremlin is a rational actor, but its decisions are based 2015, available at http://www.nrk.no/norge/pst-advarer_-nordmenn-lures-i-russisk-
16 honningfelle-1.12641490.
17
Abbreviations A methodological note
PUTIN'S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
GP General’naya prokuratura, Prosecutor General’s Source A is a former Russian intelligence officer who worked
Office within the analytic divisions of foreign intelligence, first the
KGB and then its post-Soviet counterparts.
GRU Glavnoe razvedyvatel’noe upravlenie, Main
Intelligence Directorate Source B is a serving colonel within the FSB, whose career
includes stints in economic security and counterintelligence.
KGB Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, Committee
for State Security Source C is a foreign policy expert who has worked within
the government apparatus under Putin and in the process
MID Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, Foreign Ministry handled intelligence materials. He claims never to have been
an intelligence officer, although his career trajectory hints
MVD Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del, Interior Ministry otherwise.
NAK Natsionalnyi antiterroristicheskii komitet, National Source D is a journalist who has had extensive contacts with
Anti-Terrorism Committee the domestic security side of the intelligence community, and
who has a close relative working within the FSB.
SB Sovet bezopasnosti, Security Council
Source E is a retired Baltic counterintelligence officer who
SBP Sluzhba bezopasnosti prezidenta, Presidential previously worked within the KGB.
Security Service
Source F is a Russian academic with close links to the
SK Sledstvennyi komitet, Investigatory Committee Foreign Ministry who retains good connections with the
Foreign Intelligence Service and has a close family connection
SVR Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki, Foreign Intelligence to an official within the Security Council secretariat.
Service
www.ecfr.eu
18
About the author Acknowledgements
Mark Galeotti is a widely-published specialist in Russian First of all, I would like to thank ECFR for supporting a project
security issues — from political-military affairs to the murkier that quite literally could not have been conducted without
understrata of crime and intelligence services — who has spending time in Russia. Beyond that, particular thanks to
been teaching, researching, and writing in his native UK, the Anna Arutunyan, Michael Rochlitz, Ekaterina Schulmann,
US, and Russia. and Davron Yuldashev for their ideas and assistance, and all
the unnamed sources willing to talk to me on these arcane
Educated at Cambridge University and the London School topics over the years. They cannot take the blame for anything
of Economics, he has been head of the history department that I have written, though.
at Keele University, professor of global affairs at the New
York University Center for Global Affairs, and a visiting ECFR would also like to thank the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
faculty member at Rutgers-Newark, MGIMO (Russia), and of Finland for its support. This paper represents only the
Charles University (Czech Republic). He now divides his time views of the author and not those of the Ministry.
between Prague and London as director of the consultancy
Mayak Intelligence.
19
ABOUT ECFR
PUTIN'S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
•A
physical presence in the main EU member states.
Uniquely among European think-tanks, ECFR has offices
in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw,
allowing the organisation to channel the opinions and
perspectives of a wide range of EU member states. Our pan-
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in European capitals, and provides a platform for research,
debate, advocacy and communications.
•D
eveloping contagious ideas that get people talking.
ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished
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its authors.