Professional Documents
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Collateral Attack - Title
Collateral Attack - Title
171209
DECALENG (substituted by his
heirs)[1] and JULIA WANAY
DECALENG,
Petitioners,
- versus -
- versus - Promulgated:
PHILIPPINE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH, represented by RT. June 27, 2012
REV. ROBERT O. LONGID,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
Pending action before the Court is G.R. No. 171209, a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[2] dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution[3] dated January 18, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49978.
On February 18, 1992, PEC-EDNP filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 36, a Complaint for Accion
Reinvindicatoria and Accion Publiciana against Ambrosio Decaleng and Fabian
Lopez (Lopez), docketed as Civil Case No. 797.
PEC-EDNP asserted that the U.S. Episcopal Church donated the Ken-geka
property, among other real properties, to the PEC by virtue of a Deed of
Donation[8]executed on April 24, 1974. Around the second quarter of 1989,
Ambrosio Decaleng entered and cultivated a portion of about 1,635 square meters
of the Ken-geka property despite the protestations of PEC-EDNP representatives.[9]
All points referred to are indicated on the plan and marked on the ground as
follows: points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, by P.L.S. cyl. Conc. Mons; and point 6, by X
on stone mon.[11]
PEC-EDNP contended that Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez refused to vacate the
portions of Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties that they are
occupying.Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez claimed to be the owners of said
portions, but PEC-EDNP maintained that such claim is illegal and baseless in fact
and in law.PEC-EDNP likewise challenged the sale of Portion 2 of Ken-gedeng by
Ambrosio Decaleng to Lopez for being unlawful and void.
Before Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez could file their answer to the
complaint of PEC-EDNP, the RTC issued an Order[14] dated March 20, 1992,
suspending further proceedings in Civil Case No. 797 until the parties have
conducted a relocation survey of the properties in question, as agreed upon in open
court. The RTC issued another Order[15] of even date requesting the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office-Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), Sabangan, Mountain
Province, to provide said trial court with a Geodetic Engineer to help in the re-
survey of the area subject of the case.
The relocation survey ordered by the RTC was conducted on September 17,
1992.
The spouses Decaleng and Lopez jointly filed their Answer to Amended
Complaint[20] on March 1, 1993, essentially reiterating the allegations in the earlier
Answer filed by Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez, but increasing their claim for
reimbursement of litigation expenses to P85,000.00. Maguen filed her Answer to
Summons/Complaint[21] on March 2, 1993, in which she wrote that she was not
interested to appear before the RTC for her deceased father, Kapis, from whom she
inherited one of the lots that bound the PEC-EDNP property; and that PEC-EDNP
should have pursued its complaint a long time ago when the concerned boundary
owners were still alive. Madadsec and Bawing did not submit any answer but the
RTC, in an Order[22] dated April 27, 1993, denied the Motion to Declare
Defendants in Default[23] filed by PEC-EDNP and ruled that the Answer to
Amended Complaint of spouses Decaleng and Lopez shall be deemed to also be
the answer of Madadsec and Bawing.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision[24] on January 20, 1995 finding
that:
Re that 1,635 square meters lot at Ken-geka (Exhs. C-1 and C-2), the mere
supposed xerox copy of a reputed OCT No. 1 purportedly including the portion
within its borders, allegedly registered in the name of the plaintiff Church (Exh.
A), does not reasonably confirm the fact of its absolute ownership of the said
portion (Reyes vs Borbon, 50 Phil. 79). Neither does the purported xerox copy of
a putative deed of donation (Exh. B), sans the original, substantially show that
said plaintiff acquired dominion over that particular parcel in issue via gratuitous
grant as a mode of acquiring ownership (Art. 712, Par. 2, NCC; Paras, Civil Code,
Vol. II, 1981 Ed., (b) p. 92). By itself, the plaintiffs survey plans of the premises
coupled with its unpaid tax declarations (Exhs. BB, CC, E, F and G) is
insufficient and inc[onc]lusive to prove ownership ad/or possession of the
proponent of the subject area (Acua vs City of Manila, [9] Phil. 225; Dadivas vs
Bunayon, 54 Phil. 632). While it appears that the Church is the possessor for
almost a century of the greater part of that tract of land embraced in its survey
plan of P1-115 (Exh. C), it cannot be deemed to be in constructive possession of
that portion now in question, considering that said plaintiff never materially
occupied or exercised control over the same and that it has been in the adverse
possession of the Decalengs for quite sometime (Art. 531, NCC; Rosales vs
Director of Lands, 51 Phil 502). In effect, dominion over the portion have not
passed to the plaintiff by operation of law by virtue of long and actual possession
as a title or a mode of acquiring ownership (Art. 712, Par. 2, NCC; Nolan v.
Jalandoni, 23 Phil. 299).
Anent those two (2) separate parcels at Ken-gedeng (Exhs. D-2, D-3, D-4,
D-5), the survey plans and tax declarations in the name of the plaintiff and
predecessors in interest (Exhs. X, DD, G, H, I) do not by themselves confer
dominion of the proponent over the afore-mentioned parcels, albeit the same are
included within the coverage of the documents. To be sure, the Church is the
exclusive and continuous possessor, probably since 1902, of the south-eastern
portion of the surveyed area where its building are erected and the surroundings
thereof improved (Exhs. X, X-1 to X-6). This fact in conjunction with its said
survey plans and tax declarations may prove ownership of the plaintiff of the
premises mentioned (Alamo vs Ignacio, L-16434, Feb. 28, 1962). It cannot
however be presumed, much less adjudged that the Church has constructive
possession of the subject two separate parcels absent any showing that it
materially occupied, and exercised control over said parcels at any given time in
the same manner as it developed the rest of the portions within the plans and tax
declarations. Not to mention the fact that the former lots have been all along in the
adverse possession of the defendants. Hence, by law, the plaintiff Church did not
acquire ownership and/or possession of those disputed lots at Ken-gedeng.
PEC-EDNP filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 49978.
While the case was pending before the Court of Appeals, Atty. Paul P.
Sagayo, Jr. (Sagayo) and Atty. Floyd P. Lalwet (Lalwet) entered their appearance
as counsels for PEC-EDNP on March 28, 1996. In the Notice of Appearance[28] and
subsequent pleadings[29] filed by Attys. Sagayo and Lalwet, they included the
following names as defendants: Simeon Dapliyan (Dapliyan), Gayagay,[30] Nicolas
Imperial (Imperial), Juana Ullocan (Ullocan), and Mary Tudlong (Tudlong).
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on August 26, 2005, overturning
the appealed RTC Decision because it was based on misplaced premises and
contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals declared PEC-EDNP the
true and real owner of the Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties.
The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
(2) Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them
to vacate the premises and surrender the peaceful possession thereof to
the plaintiff or its duly authorized representative; and to refrain from
further encroaching upon the plaintiffs properties.
Therefore, only the spouses Decalengs Petition in G.R. No. 171209 is still
pending action by this Court.
The case at bar falls under one of the exceptions, as the factual conclusions
of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are in conflict with each other. Thus, the
Court must necessarily return to the evidence on record and make its own
evaluation thereof.
The Court finds that PEC-EDNP was able to successfully prove both
requisites by preponderance of evidence, both documentary and testimonial.
The Court quotes with approval the following observations of the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated August 26, 2005:
The spouses Decaleng attempt to raise doubts as to the title of PEC-EDNP over the
Ken-geka property by insisting that (1) PEC-EDNP failed to present the original
copies of Certificate of Title No. 1 and the Deed of Donation dated April 24, 1974
during the trial before the RTC; and (2) Certificate of Title No. 1 does not exist
based on the Certification dated July 20, 1992 of Register of Deeds Angela Dailay-
Papa (Dailay-Papa) of the Mountain Province.
xxxx
A Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its validity
can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. [59] A collateral
attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of
title is assailed as an incident in said action.[60]
In this case, the original complaint filed by PEC-EDNP before the RTC is
for accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria (for recovery of possession and
ownership) of the Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties. In said complaint, PEC-
EDNP alleged ownership of the Ken-geka property as evidenced by Certificate of
Title No. 1. In their defense, the spouses Decaleng raised issues as to the validity
of Certificate of Title No. 1 (by asserting in their Answer that Certificate of Title
No. 1 covered an area much larger than that actually owned by PEC-EDNP), and
as to the existence of Certificate of Title No. 1 (by presenting Mountain Province
Register of Deeds Dailay-Papas certification that Certificate of Title No. 1 does not
appear in the record of registered titles). Nevertheless, the spouses Decaleng only
sought the dismissal of the complaint of PEC-EDNP, plus the grant of their
counterclaim for the payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation
expenses, and attorneys fees; and they conspicuously did not pray for the
annulment or cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 1. Evidently, the spouses
Decalengs attack on the validity, as well as the existence of Certificate of Title No.
1 is only incidental to their defense against the accion publicianaand accion
reinvindicatoria instituted by PEC-EDNP, hence, merely collateral.
The Court stresses that PEC-EDNP submitted to the RTC the owners
duplicate certificate of Certificate of Title No. 1, which can be used in evidence
before Philippine courts in the same way as the original certificates in the
registration book. Section 47 of Act No. 496 clearly states:
In fact, in the present case, the Records Management Division Chief Jose C.
Mariano, for the Director of Lands, wrote a letter dated August 31, 1993 addressed
to the counsel for PEC-EDNP, giving the reason for the lack of records on the sales
patent for the Ken-geka property and Certificate of Title No. 1 issued to the U.S.
Episcopal Church:
In reply to your letter dated August 25, 1993, we regret to inform you
that we have no reconstituted records of pre-war sales application of the
Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the United States of America, which the basis of the issuance
of alleged Sales Patent No. 14 on February 18, 1915.It may be informed
further that all our pre-war records were burned and/or destroyed
when the Oriente Building where the Bureau of Lands was then
housed was razed by fire during the liberation
[63]
of Manila. (Emphasis supplied.)
The spouses Decaleng were similarly vague as to the basis of their title. The
evidence for the spouses Decaleng do not establish how their predecessors-in-
interest acquired the disputed properties and how long they and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in possession of the same.
While the spouses Decaleng testified that they inherited the properties in
Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng from their parents who, in turn, inherited the same from
their own parents, there still remains the question as to how the spouses Decalengs
predecessors-in-interest originally came into possession of the subject properties.
In their Answer before the RTC, the spouses Decaleng alleged possession of
their properties from time immemorial or, at least, certainly for more than 50
years. These two allegations actually proffer two different bases for title: the first
refers to a native title acquired through ancient possession of the land, which
means that the land never became public land at all; while the second denotes an
imperfect title acquired through the occupation of agricultural public land for the
requisite period. The evidence submitted by the spouses Decaleng did not support
either allegation.
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back
as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit
of the doubt. x x x.
From the testimonies of the spouses Decaleng and their witnesses, the Court
can glean actual possession of the properties in Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng by the
spouses Decaleng and their predecessors-in-interest only as far back as the
1920s.[66] This hardly constitutes possession since time immemorial judging by the
standard set by the Court in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands[67]:
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be
confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or
any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and
decrees promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or
by possessory information under the Mortgage Law (section 19, Act
496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest. (Carino vs. Insular
Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 594.) The applicant does not
come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his
first predecessor in interest began in 1880.[68] (Emphases supplied.)
Neither can the spouses Decaleng claim imperfect title to the properties in
Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng for such can only be acquired by possession of lands of
the public domain for the period required by law.[69] Because the spouses
Decaleng failed to provide and prove the necessary details on how and when their
predecessors-in-interest came to possess the disputed properties, there is no way
for the Court to determine whether or not said properties were still part of the
public domain when occupied by the spouses Decalengs predecessors-in-
interest. As the Court previously found herein, the Ken-geka property was already
covered by a Certificate of Title issued in the name of the U.S. Episcopal Church
(the predecessor-in-interest of PEC-EDNP) on February 18, 1915 and the Ken-
gedeng property had been in the possession under claim of title by the U.S.
Episcopal Church ever since its arrival in the Mountain Province in 1901.
SO ORDERED.