Pp. 7 Crim

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the
Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review
and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled
"Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with
the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the
pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife
constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,2 petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner
who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.4
Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage5 under Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the
filing of an Information6 against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was
filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a
Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez
Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order7 dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9,
1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner
went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders
dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.8 In an Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional
Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another
Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his
petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question
that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his
wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from
the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case,
the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the
criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage
is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the
courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be
suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared
void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the
subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be
convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action
as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must
appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for
purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an
absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes
of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision
read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile
spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14 where this
Court held that:
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that
fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling
that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
JAREN TIBONG y CULLA-AG,

Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 191000
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 15, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Jaren Tibong y Culla-ag (petitioner) was indicted for attempted rape allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 14th [sic][1] day of April 2006, at Betag, Municipality of La Trinidad,
Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and
attempt to rape [AAA[2]] while the latter was sleeping and therefore unconscious, by removing
the latters pajama and panty, and thereafter holding her vagina and fondling her breasts, and
endeavor to have sexual intercourse with her against her will and consent, thereby commencing in
the execution of the crime of rape but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced the felony as a consequence by reason that the offended party was awakened, defended
herself and escaped from him, which cause is not his spontaneous desistance, to the damage and
prejudice of the said [AAA].
That the accused and [AAA] are relatives within the 3rd civil degree.[3] (Underscoring supplied)
On April 17, 2006, then 18-year-old AAA, a college student at the Benguet State University, was
at the house owned by petitioners parents at Betag, La Trinidad, Benguet where she was boarding.
She occupied a room at the 3-bedroom basement.[4] One of the rooms was occupied by petitioner
and his wife. The third room was unoccupied.
From the account of AAA, the following transpired:
Days before the incident, petitioners wife left the house after a misunderstanding with him. Before
midnight of April 17,[5] 2006, petitioner arrived and repaired to the sofa at the basements living
room. AAA thereafter fell asleep but was awakened at about midnight as she felt someone was
undressing [her].[6] She saw petitioner, her first cousin (her father and his mother being siblings),
wearing only briefs and crouching over [her], on top of [her] bed, and pulling down her pajamas
and panties.[7] She asked appellant why he was doing that, to which he replied that [they] will
have sexual intercourse and keep it a secret. She retorted if he was not sickened about it, to which
he replied that she need not be bothered about their being cousins.[8]
Continuing, AAA narrated:
She resisted and pulled up her pajamas and panties, but appellant pulled them down to her knees
and mashed her breasts. He soon told her that they would watch a bold movie and apply what they
watched.[9] She struggled to free herself, but he forced her to lie down. She tried to shout for help,
but he covered her mouth.
AAA further recounted:
Petitioner thereafter went towards the compact disc (CD) player which was in front of the door of
[her] room to insert/play a CD. Finding the opportunity to escape, she grabbed her cell phone and
bag which were placed on top of a table at her bedside, ran out of the house after appellant failed
to restrain her, headed towards the highway, took a taxicab and proceeded to the house of her elder
brother BBB[10] in Bahong, La Trinidad where she sought refuge.
The following morning (April 18), AAA, accompanied by BBB and an uncle, reported the
incident to the La Trinidad Police Station where P03 Chona P. Bugnay took down her sworn
complaint.[11]
The presentation of prosecution witnesses BBB and P03 Chona Bugnay was dispensed with, the
defense having admitted the corroborative nature of their respective testimonies.
Upon the other hand, petitioner whose wife, as earlier reflected, left the house days before the
incident after a quarrel with him, denied the accusation. He claimed that in the afternoon of April
17, 2006 until past 1:00 A.M. of the following day (April 18), he was drinking liquor with his
friend Benny Malao (Malao) in three places first at his (petitioners) fathers house, then at
Maryland, and finally at Malaos boarding house, all located at La Trinidad; and on returning home
drunk early morning of April 18, he immediately went to sleep at the living room adjacent to
AAAs room.[12]
Branch 62 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet found petitioner guilty of
attempted rape, as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused must be, as he is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted rape.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no modifying circumstance established, he
is hereby imposed a penalty of imprisonment ranging from three (3) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years and six (6) months of prision mayor
medium, as maximum.
The accused is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant moral damages in the amount of
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners conviction, hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari, contending that the prosecution failed to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Petitioner cites Perez v. Court of Appeals[14] which held:
Petitioners acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her
breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly
obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner
actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants sexual organ. Rather, these acts
constitute acts of lasciviousness. x x x.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Insisting that there was no attempted rape, petitioner argues that AAA merely testified that he told
her that they would have sexual intercourse; and that this is not equivalent to carnal knowledge, or
even an attempt to have carnal knowledge, since there is no showing that he had commenced or
attempted to insert his penis into her sexual organ before she fled.[16]
Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a felony when the
offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex, under
any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article [referring to Article 335 on rape],
shall be punished by prision correccional.
While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally different. For
in rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element is
absent.[17]
Ironically, during the defenses cross examination of AAA, the existence of petitioners overt acts
showing his intent to lie with her was put to light. Consider the following testimony of AAA on
cross examination:
Atty. Santos [defense counsel, to witness AAA]:
xxxx
Q He did not try to insert his penis into your vagina, Madam Witness?
A He was trying to force it on me but I covered my vagina.
Q Is it not a fact that when he put down your pajama and underwear down to your knee, he was
still wearing his brief?
A Sir, his brief was already lowered down to the middle of his upper leg (witness was illustrating
by touching the middle of her upper legs).
Q When he tried to lie on top of you, you wrestled and you tried to run out from your room. Is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q And that was the time that when he opened the CD player, you took your cell phone and ran out
from your room?
A Yes, sir.
Q So in other words, Mr. Jaren Tibong had no chance of inserting his penis in your vagina because
you ran out of your room already. Correct?
A Yes, sir.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners acts, as narrated by AAA, far from being mere obscene or lewd, indisputably show that
he intended to have, and was bent on consummating, carnal knowledge of AAA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision[19] of October
12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 31644 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
Plaintiff-Appellee,
-versus-
RENATO DADULLA y
CAPANAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
G. R. No. 172321
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

BRION,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
February 9, 2011
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J:
A rapacious father who vented his lust on his own daughter without any qualms is allowed to
suffer the lesser penalty because of the failure of the criminal information to aver his relationship
with the victim. Even so, the Court condemns his most despicable crime.
The father is now before the Court to assail the decision promulgated on January 20, 2006 in C.A.-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01021, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) pronounced him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2304, imposing reclusion perpetua, and
of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 98-2305, thereby modifying the sentences handed
down by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272 (RTC), in Marikina City.[1]
The Charges
On January 28, 1998, the accused was charged in the RTC with rape and attempted rape through
separate informations, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK
That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of threats, force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
AAA,[2] against her will and consent.[3]
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and
attempt to have carnal knowledge of herein complainant one AAA, thus commencing the
commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of execution
that could have produced the crime of rape by reason of cause or causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance.[4]
Evidence of the Prosecution
In the evening of January 15, 1998, AAA, then sleeping in the bedroom that she and her five
younger siblings shared with their father, was roused from sleep by someone undressing her.[5] It
was her father. AAA resisted, but the accused, wielding a bladed weapon,[6] threatened to kill her
if she shouted.[7] The accused then forcibly kissed her on the lips, mashed her breasts, touched her
private parts, and had carnal knowledge of her. After her ordeal, she put on her garments and just
cried.[8] She recalled that her father had first sexually abused her on February 14, 1992.[9]
On January 22, 1998, AAA was again roused from sleep by her father touching her body. Noticing
that her shorts were already unzipped and unbuttoned, she zipped and buttoned them up and
covered herself with a blanket. But her father pulled the blanket away and tried to unzip her
shorts. However, she was able to go under the wooden bed to evade him. She resisted his attempts
to pull her out from under the bed by firmly holding on to the bed. She told him that she would not
get out from under the bed because what he was doing to her was bad.[10] Upon hearing her, he
stopped and withdrew, telling her to leave the house. He then went to sleep.[11] In the meanwhile,
BBB, AAAs younger sister, was awakened by what she thought was an argument between her
father and AAA. She heard him tell AAA: Tumigil ka na nang kaiiyak, wala ka nang pakinabang.
AAA just cried under the bed and did not say anything. BBB soon fell asleep,[12] but AAA could
not sleep and remained under the bed until morning when the accused left to ply his jeepney route.
[13]
Upon waking up, BBB saw her father as he was about to leave the house. She heard him telling
AAA to leave the house.[14] As soon as he had left, BBB approached the crying AAA and asked
what had happened to her. AAA related her ordeal and pleaded with BBB to help her.[15]
Together, they went to their uncle, CCC, to report the incident. CCC queried AAA whether she
wanted her father to be thrown in jail, and she replied in the affirmative. Thus, CCC requested his
wife to accompany AAA to the barangay to file a complaint. Later, AAA and CCCs wife went to
Camp Crame for the physical and genital examinations, which established that AAA had a deep
healed hymenal laceration at 5:00 oclock position.[16]
Evidence of the Defense
The accused denied molesting AAA. He narrated that on January 15, 1998, AAA and BBB left the
house at around 6:30 p.m. to watch television elsewhere and returned only at around 11:00 p.m.;
that on January 22, 1998, he scolded AAA for her failure to cook on time; that at around 4:00 a.m.
of January 23, 1998, he struck AAAs face with his fist (dinunggol sa mukha) and told her to leave
the house because he was slighted by AAAs laughing instead of answering his query of whether
she had understood why he had scolded her the previous night; and that AAA was no longer a
virgin due to her having been raped by Joel Cloma in 1992, and by another man in 1993.[17]
The RTC Decision
On March 24, 1999, the RTC found the accused guilty of rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK,
and imposed the death penalty, ordering him to pay to AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P20,000.00 as moral damages; and of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, and
imposed the indeterminate penalty of four years, nine months, and eleven days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to five years, four months, and twenty days, as maximum, ordering him
to pay to AAA P20,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors, to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 98-2304 DESPITE THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT PROPERLY INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ATTEMPTED
RAPE DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-2305.
Nonetheless, the CA disposed in its decision promulgated on January 20, 2006:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:
In Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y Capanas is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, in addition to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y Capanas, is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
The CA held that the correct penalty in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK was reclusion perpetua
because the accused was liable only for simple rape by virtue of the information not alleging any
qualifying circumstances; and that in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK the accused was guilty only
of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape, because his act of opening the zipper and buttons of
AAAs shorts, touching her, and pulling her from under the bed constituted only acts of
lasciviousness.
Ruling of the Court
We sustain the conviction but correct the award of civil liability.

I
Criminal Liabilities
The CA correctly determined the criminal liabilities in both cases.
To begin with, the finding and conclusion of the RTC that the totality of the evidence presented by
the State painted a convincing tale of AAAs harrowing experience at the hands of the accused are
well founded and supported by the records. Her unwavering testimonial account of the bestiality
of her own father towards her reflected her singular reliability. The CAs holding that a woman
would think twice before concocting a story of rape unless she was motivated by a desire to seek
justice for the wrong committed against her[18] was apt and valid. Indeed, her revelation of being
sexually assaulted by her own father several times could only proceed from innate sincerity, and
was entitled to credence in the absence of strong showing by the accused of grounds to disbelieve
her. Also, her immediate willingness to report to and face the police investigation and to undergo
the trouble and humiliation of a public trial was a badge of trustworthiness.
Secondly, the failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the information in
Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK precluded a finding of qualified rape against the accused. Section
8,[19] Rule 110 of the Rules of Court has expressly required that qualifying and aggravating
circumstances be specifically alleged in the information. Due to such requirement being pro reo,
the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even those charged with felonies
committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity of the 2000 revision of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement).[20]
The term aggravating circumstance is strictly construed when the appreciation of the modifying
circumstance can lead to the imposition of the maximum penalty of death.[21] Consequently, the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, even if established during trial, could not affect the
criminal penalty of the accused by virtue of its non-allegation in the information. The accused
could not be convicted of the graver offense of qualified rape, although proven, because
relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily included in the information.[22] Accordingly, the
accused was properly convicted by the CA for simple rape and justly punished with reclusion
perpetua.
Thirdly, it is notable that the RTC outrightly concluded that the crime committed on January 22,
1998 constituted attempted rape, after quoting the testimony of AAA and BBB. It offered no
analysis or discussion of why the accused was criminally liable for attempted rape. The omission
contravened Section 14,[23] Article VIII of the Constitution, as reiterated in Section 1,[24] Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, which enjoined that decisions should state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which they are based.[25]
Nonetheless, the omission did not invalidate or render ineffectual the conviction, for the CA in due
course reformed the RTCs error. In its disquisition on why the accused should be held liable for
acts of lasciviousness, instead of attempted rape, the CA explained the true nature of the crime of
the accused thus:
We likewise agree with accused-appellant that the court a quo erred in convicting him of
attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK. In connection with the incident that transpired
on January 22, 1998, Liza testified as follows:
Pros. Dela Pea:
Q: While you were sleeping in the evening on January 22, 1998, do you recall of any instance (sic)
or incident which awakened you?
Witness:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Again Miss Witness, tell us this incident that you are referring to?
A: While I was sleeping, I was awakened that my zipper was already opened and my buttons were
already loosened.
Q: And upon noticing that the zipper and the buttons of your short[s] are already loosened or
opened, what did you do?
A: I zipped it again and unbuttoned it.
Q: Was your father there on that night?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about your brother and sisters?
A: They were already asleep.
Q: Like on January 15, 1998, you slept, on January 22, 1998, you slept side by side with your
brothers and sisters and your father?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you notice the presence of your father when you said you were awakened on that night?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?

A: He was sitting and touching me, sir.
Q: How far was he from you?
A: He was near me.
Q: And upon seeing your father near you and the button and zipper of your short[s] was open,
what did you do?
A: I zipped and unbuttoned my short[s] and covered myself with blanket.
Q: Why did you cover yourself with blanket?
A: Because I do not want to see him beside me.
Q: Did you not ask your father to leave because you do not want to see him?
A: I told him.
Q: Did your father leave?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why dont you like your father beside you?
A: Because of these things he was doing to me.
Q: And after covering yourself with blanket, what transpired next?
A: He removed the blanket from me, sir.
Q: And after that, what happened?
A: He was forcibly opening my short[s].
Q: What did you do when your father was forcibly opening your short[s]?
A: I covered myself under the wooden bed.
Q: How wide is this wooden bed?
A: From that wall up to the rostrum.
Pros. Dela Pea:

About a distance of two meters in width. Why did you hide yourself under the wooden bed?
A: In order not to repeat what he was doing to me.
Q: After you hi[d] yourself under the wooden bed, what did your father did [sic] to you?
A: He held me on my hands and tried to pull me out under the wooden bed.
Q: And was your father able to pull you out under the wooden bed?
A: No sir.
The act of accused-appellant in opening the zipper and buttons of the shorts of Liza, touching her
and pulling her when she hid under the bed showed that he employed force on Liza and was
motivated by lewd designs. The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous.
It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried
in a wanton manner. Thus, the crime committed by accused-appellant is merely acts of
lasciviousness, which is included in rape. The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are:
(1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done: (a) by using
force and intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended
party is another person of either sex.[26]
According to People v. Collado,[27] the difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness lies in the intent of the perpetrator as deduced from his external acts. The intent
referred to is the intent to lie with a woman.[28] Attempted rape is committed when the touching
of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be acts
of lasciviousness.[29] Thus, the accuseds act of opening the zipper and buttons of AAAs shorts,
touching her, and trying to pull her from under the bed manifested lewd designs, not intent to lie
with her. The evidence to prove that a definite intent to lie with AAA motivated the accused was
plainly wanting, therefore, rendering him guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case
No. 98-2305-MK.
And, fourthly, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the RTC was erroneous for not being in
accord with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This impelled the CA to revise the indeterminate
penalty, rationalizing:
Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision
correccional. We impose the penalty in its medium period, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance alleged and proved. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper
penalty imposable is from six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months
of prision correccional, as maximum.[30]
We uphold the revision by the CA. The RTC fixed the minimum of the indeterminate penalty from
within prision correccional, when Section 1[31] of the Indeterminate Sentence Law expressly
required that the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower is arresto mayor.
II
Civil liability must be modified
Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,[32] the attendance of any aggravating circumstance
(generic, qualifying, or attendant) entitles the offended party to recover exemplary damages. Here,
relationship was the aggravating circumstance attendant in both cases. We need to award
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in rape and of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in acts of
lasciviousness.
Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the

information (albeit established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of
the accused, the established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or
nature
entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the
requirement of specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not
his civil liability. The Court has well explained this in People v. Catubig:[33]
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within
the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
That People v. Catubig was subsequent to the dates of the commission of the crimes charged did
not matter. Like any other judicial interpretation of an existing law, the ruling in People v. Catubig
settled the circumstances when Article 2230 of the Civil Code applied, thereby reflecting the
meaning and state of that legal provision. The retroactivity of the ruling vis--vis the accused could
not be challenged or be barred by virtue of its being civil, not penal, in effect.
WHEREFORE, the Decision promulgated on January 20, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01021 is
affirmed in all respects, subject to the modification that the civil liabilities include P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages for the rape (Criminal Case No. 98-2034-MK), and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages for the acts of lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. 98-2035-MK).
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 135667-70[1]. March 1, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO,

accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
TO TIE A CHILD of tender years spread-eagled to her bed to abuse her in the privacy of her home
is despicable enough; to encroach on her innocence unashamedly in front of her younger brother is
to descend to the deepest recesses of depravity. Thus the incorrigible lothario transgressed all
norms of decency, morality and rectitude when he molested his nine (9)-year old victim in the
presence of her six (6)-year old brother and severed all strands of gratefulness to her parents who
gave him food, shelter and livelihood for four (4) years.
Messeah is the daughter of Jose Noli Dumaoal, a seaman. His household was composed of his
wife Julie, and their three (3) children, Reggie, Messeah and Metheor. The accused Jessie Ventura
Collado, son of Jose Nolis cousin Benjamin, was living with them since 1989. While waiting for
an opportunity to become a seaman himself like his uncle Jose, Jessie served as the family driver.
Aside from driving Julie, Jessie would also drive the school service vehicle operated by the
Dumaoal spouses. Since Jose was almost always at sea and having no househelp, their children
were oftentimes left in the care of Jessie. But, instead of taking care of them as their surrogate
father, he took advantage of Messeah by sexually molesting her at home, and worse, even in the
presence of her younger brother.
The first of four (4) unfortunate occasions was on 27 April 1993 when Julie and her oldest son
Reggie went to Cubao. Messeah was resting in her bedroom upstairs when Jessie suddenly barged
into her room. "What are you doing here?" she demanded, knowing fully well that he was not
allowed upstairs without her parents permission. Jessie simply smiled and said, "Wala," and added
that her mother was not around to get mad at him. Then he left only to return after three (3) to five
(5) minutes with a straw rope in hand. Messeah asked him why he was holding the rope, and
Jessie told her to keep quiet and not to ask questions or else he would hurt her. Alarmed, Messeah
rushed to the window and screamed for her brother Metheor, but Jessie reached out to cover her
mouth with one hand while he closed the window with the other. She heard Metheor call out from
downstairs, "Whats going on?" but Jessie stopped her from answering.
Hearing no response from Messeah upstairs, Metheor went up to her room and discovered that
Jessie had tied Messeahs hands to the bed and was about to tie her feet down. Metheor asked,
"What are you doing to my Ate?" Messeah screamed to her brother to call for help from the
neighbors, but Jessie threatened to hurt him if he left the room. Jessie then moved the bed to block
the way to the door. At some point, he also punched Messeah on her right cheek. Jessie then parted
her legs and tied them apart, pulling down her garterized shorts and panties until her ankles. He
tried forcing his penis into her vagina, but when he failed in his attempt, he inserted it into her
anus instead.
Messeah felt pain in her anus and something sticky "like paste" flowed out from his penis. Her
vagina ached from Jessies earlier attempt to defile her. She saw Jessie close his eyes as though he
was enjoying himself. She cried out and Metheor, unable to bear what Jessie was doing to his
sister, told the older man, "Let my Ate go," and boxed him futilely with his baby fists. Jessie
punched Metheor in the stomach and the latter was rendered helpless by the pain. Jessie told
Messeah to dress up and threatened to set them and their house on fire if they said anything.
When Julie and Reggie arrived home in the afternoon she noticed that Messeahs cheek was red.
She asked her what was the matter, but Messeah saw Jessie listening close by and looking at her
with dagger eyes, so she simply lied and told her mother that she hurt herself while playing.
Metheor also gave their mother the same excuse. That night, although she knew that Jessie was no
longer on the second floor where she and her family slept, she could not muster enough courage to
tell her mother what happened because of Jessies threats.[2]
Because of this incident, Messeah asked her mother to buy a lock for her bedroom door, but her
mother passed the errand on to Jessie, who, predictably did not buy the lock. Messeah began to
hate Jessie and asked her mother to find another driver without however telling her what he did,
but her mother only told her that it would be difficult to find another one.
That was not the end of Messeahs ordeal. On 5 June 1993 Julie and Reggie went to the Marikina
public market, again leaving Messeah and Metheor alone with Jessie. Messeah was resting on the
sofa while Metheor was in the garage when Jessie grabbed Messeah and dragged her upstairs. She
screamed and Jessie tried to cover her mouth. She was crying as Jessie told her to take off her
shorts and panties, took off his shorts, pressed her legs apart with his two (2) legs, and rubbed his
penis against her thighs, until it touched her vagina. She told him to stop because she was hurting
but he did not heed her plea. The intimate encounter went on for some ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes. Metheor heard her screams for help, went upstairs and saw what Jessie was doing. He
told Jessie to let his sister go, but Jessie merely ignored him. Metheor went downstairs and got a
7" to 8"-inch breadknife which had a narrow point at the end. Metheor again told Jessie to let his
sister go, and threw the knife at Jessies back. Jessie felt the knife hit his back that left a reddish
mark, and let Messeah go. Before he left, he told the children that he would throw them into a
volcano if they told anybody about what happened.[3]
The third molestation happened on 7 July 1993. Again, only Metheor, Jessie and Messeah were at
home. Metheor was upstairs sleeping while Messeah was resting on the sofa when Jessie suddenly
entered the living room armed with a knife. Messeah called for her older brother twice, but Reggie
had already gone out. She only stopped when Jessie pointed the knife at her and threatened to stab
her if she shouted again. He then forced her to walk backwards to the kitchen where he told her
again to remove her shorts and panties. She resisted but Jessie insisted and even tried twice to stab
her if she did not comply. He used one of his hands to remove his shorts and briefs. He forced
Messeah to sit on a steel chair and told her to spread her legs. She sat with her legs closed together
but he got mad and threatened to stab her if she did not open her legs. She reluctantly opened her
legs slightly and Jessie spread them wider with his free hand as the other hand was holding the
knife. Jessie then told Messeah to sit at the edge of the steel chair, like before. He stood with one
hand holding on to her shoulder, the other holding the knife, and stood straddling her legs. He then
inserted his penis between her thighs and used his legs to press her thighs together (apart?). Then
he rubbed his penis against her thighs for some three (3) to five (5) minutes until it touched her
vagina. She could then feel something sticky coming out from his penis and reaching her vagina.
Although her hands were free, she could not slap, box or scratch him because she was afraid that
he might stab her as he threatened. Jessie only stopped when he heard a noise. It was Reggie
entering the gate. Jessie ordered Messeah to get dressed immediately. Although she did not want
to, Messeah stood up, got dressed, and met her brother in the living room. As she walked away,
Jessie, who had also put his clothes back on, threatened to kill her whole family and Messeah
knew that she could not get any help from her brother Reggie, who was only thirteen (13) years
old and no match for Jessie who was much older and bigger.[4]
In August 1993 Jose came home for his annual vacation, but Messeah and Metheor were too afraid
of Jessie and his threats that they did not tell their father about the ongoing abuse by Jessie. Once
Jessie even borrowed a video tape of the Vizconde Massacre and forced Messeah and Metheor to
watch it, telling them that the same thing would happen to them if they revealed to their parents
what he was doing to them.[5] Not even the arrival in May 1993 of Julies relative, Alipio Martin,
could prevent Jessie's sexual assaults as he always waited until he was alone in the house with the
children.
Jessie again took advantage of the situation on 17 October 1993 when everybody in the Dumaoal
household, except for the two (2) youngest children, were away from home. Messeahs parents had
gone shopping, while Reggie was playing computer with his friends at a neighbors house. Julies
parents, who were staying for a visit, were busy with other things. Her mother was at the parlor
having a cold wave, while her father was talking to a neighbor at the latters house some distance
away. Alipio was also out of the house and Metheor was playing in the garage. Messeah was
aware of how alone she was and felt afraid that she might be molested again, but she could not do
anything since the door of her room still had no lock. She had wanted to go to Cubao with her
parents but Jessie had convinced them to leave her and Metheor behind since they had been
invited to go to a birthday party. By the time they returned from the party, Jose and Julie had
already left for Cubao.
As Messeah was changing her clothes after coming from the party, Jessie again entered her room,
told her to remove her panty, and inserted his smallest finger (kalingkingan) into her vagina while
telling her to keep silent. He then removed his pants and briefs and went on top of her. This time,
he was not able to touch her vagina with his penis because Messeah cried and screamed and called
for Metheor who again went up and told Jessie, "Get away from my sister." Jessie stopped but
threatened to throw the children to the sharks if they told their parents what happened.[6]
That night Messeah learned from her father that he was about to board his ship again. The next
day, 18 October, she waited until Jessie left to drive the schoolbus to school. She was crying, and
it was only after some prompting that she told her mother, "Tinorotot ako ni Jessie."[7] Julie
brought her to Jose and asked her what she meant by "tinorotot." Messeah replied, "Jessie was
forcing his penis into [my] vagina." She also mentioned that Jessie had inserted his penis into her
anus, and that he had also inserted his finger into her vagina.[8]
Jose was shocked because he had treated Jessie as if he were his own child, and that morning, had
even told Jessie to make sure his papers were in order because he might be able to bring him along
with him to sea.[9] After promising Messeah that they would talk to Jessie, Jose and Julie brought
her to school, then went home and talked to Jessie, who denied everything. However, Jessie
looked pale, and told the Dumaoal spouses to just send him back to Paoay, Ilocos Norte. They
were not able to talk to Jessie further because it was time for him to fetch the other children from
school. The Dumaoal spouses went back to school where they found Messeah crying. When
Messeah saw them, she asked them why they did not stay with her so they could have protected
her. Apparently, Jessie had tried to bring her out of the school but was prevented from doing so by
the school guard. The Dumaoals asked the principals permission to bring her home. But before
going home, they went to church and again asked her what happened, and reminded her that no
one was supposed to tell a lie in church. Messeah insisted that she was telling the truth, and even
offered to draw Jessies penis for them. She also told them to talk to Metheor, who had witnessed
the incidents, and insisted that they confront Jessie before a policeman.
Since they did not know what to do, the Dumaoal spouses consulted a lawyer, as well as Jose's
uncle, Anastacio Dumaoal. The latter suggested that they talk to Jessie in the presence of Jessie's
father, Benjamin Collado. Since they did not know Benjamin's exact address in Valenzuela,
Bulacan, they left a message with his employer. Benjamin came on 22 October, and in the
presence of Benjamin, Anastacio, and Julie Dumaoal's father Geronimo Martin, the Dumaoal
spouses reached an agreement with Jessie whereby they would not press charges provided that he
kept away from the Dumaoal family, and not threaten, coerce or do harm to any of them. The
agreement was reduced to writing, and after signing the document, Jessie boarded a bus for Paoay.
Because of Jessie's threats, the Dumaoals were forced to transfer residence even though they did
not have money to spend for the purpose. Before All Saint's Day, Jose went to the province to visit
his parents' grave. While in Paoay, he learned from his cousin Josephine Collado, Jessie's aunt,
that Jessie only stayed in Paoay for four (4) days after which he returned to Manila. Jose hurriedly
returned to Manila and went to their former residence and learned from bystanders that Jessie had
been seen drinking in front of the house. When Messeah learned about this, she got angry and told
her father that he should have reported Jessie to the police since she had seen him lurking outside
her school. Since Jessie violated his undertaking, they decided to file complaints against him for
one (1) count of consummated rape and three (3) counts of acts of lasciviousness.
Jessie denied all the allegations against him and attacked instead the credibility of Messeah and
Metheor. But the trial court found accused-appellant Jessie Ventura Collado guilty of statutory
rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, it found him guilty
of three (3) counts of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6)
years of prision correctional in its maximum period for each count. It also ordered him to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00, and P100,000.00 for moral
damages.[10]
In his appeal, the accused Jessie Ventura Collado, aside from attacking the credibility of Messeah
and Metheor, insisted that Messeah clearly testified that there was no penetration whatsoever in
her vagina. But assuming arguendo that he was found guilty of acts of lasciviousness, the trial
court erred nonetheless in imposing a penalty that did not take into account the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
The trial court in its assailed Decision ruled that it found "Messeahs testimony of her harrowing
experience, although not absolutely consistent in all their details, to be still credible and thus
entitled to full faith and credit."[11] And we agree with the trial court in this regard. In People v.
Dado[12] the Court held that "assessing the credibility of witnesses is an area within the almost
exclusive province of a trial judge whose findings and conclusions are normally accorded great
weight and respect. In determining the credulity of testimony, significant focus is held to lie on the
deportment of, as well as the peculiar manner in which the declaration is made by the witness in
open court. Hardly can an appellate court come close to a trial court in making, from a mere
reading of the transcript of stenographic notes, that kind of evaluation."[13]
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3) counts of acts of
lasciviousness. We take exception however to its finding that statutory rape was committed by him
on 5 June 1993. A thorough evaluation of the records will show that accused-appellant Jessie
Ventura Collado should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness and not for consummated
rape.
It is clear from Messeahs testimony that when Jessie carried out his lecherous intent on 5 June
1993, he did not commit rape, consummated nor attempted, despite the victims testimony that he
succeeded in touching her genitalia with his private parts -
Q: And what happened when he brought you to your room?

A: He told me to take off my shorts as well as my panty.
Q: Then what happened after that?
A: And while my legs were apart, he pressed them apart.
Q: Now, you said that Jessie pressed your legs apart, with what part of his body did he press your
legs apart?
A: With his two legs, sir.
Q: And after he pressed your legs apart, what did he do?
A: He rubbed his penis between my thighs.
Q: Near your private part?
A: Yes, sir, near my private part x x x x
Q: You said that kinukuskos, or he was rubbing his penis near your vagina, what happened when
he was rubbing his penis near your vagina?
A: I told him dont, because I was hurt, because he is pressing his legs on my legs.
Q: And what did he do?
A: He told me to shut up.
Q: And what did he do after he told you to shut up?
A: He continued what he was doing.
Q: And what was he exactly doing at that time?
A: Rubbing his penis near my vagina.
Q: How near was it to your vagina?
A: It touches my vagina (emphasis supplied)
Q: If you can calculate the time, how long did it last?
A: Maybe 10 - 15 minutes.[14]
Nowhere can we find from the foregoing any indication that accused-appellant successfully
penetrated at least the labia of the victim; neither can we glean therein any grain of intent on his
part to invade Messeahs privities. The victim only said in her testimony that Jessie initially
"pressed her legs apart with his two (2) legs, and rubbed his penis against her thighs, until it
touched her vagina." Further, Messeah might have told the accused-appellant to "stop because she
was hurting" yet she did so only because "he was pressing his legs on her legs." She did not
mention having felt pain in her vagina. As narrated by Messeah, "the intimate encounter went on
for some 10-15 minutes." If accused-appellant was penetrating her or trying to penetrate her for
such a considerable period, she should have likewise cried out in anguish for the pain in her sex
organ. To compare, she cried out in pain when accused-appellant tried forcing his penis into her
vagina and anus during the first incident.
We recall that during the first incident of 27 April 1993, accused-appellant tried forcing his penis
into her vagina, but when he failed in his first attempt, he inserted it into her anus instead. This
could have been attempted rape, or even consummated rape but the Complaint filed was only for
acts of lasciviousness. Thus, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of attempted or consummated
rape. Noteworthy is that the victim was already in a spread-eagle position yet he was unsuccessful
in his attempt to defile her. By then he must have realized that it was difficult to penetrate his
victims sex organ such that during the second incident of 5 June 1993, he merely "rubbed his penis
between her thighs" although in the process "touched her vagina."
We recall further that during the third incident of 7 July 1993, accused-appellant "inserted his
penis between her thighs and used his legs to press her thighs together, then he rubbed his penis
against her thighs for some three (3) to five (5) minutes until it touched her vagina and she felt
something sticky coming out of his penis." As in the second incident, there was no showing he
inserted his penis into her labias, much less tried to do so. This recourse to a "simulated means" of
achieving orgasm is another manifestation of his realization of, or resignation to, the difficulty of
penetrating his preys sex organ.
In according significance to the word "touched," it would be instructive to revisit our ruling in
People v. Campuhan[15] where we said -
x x x Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the
victims vagina, or the mons pubis x x x x There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the
penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof for the accused to be convicted of consummated rape x x x x
x x x Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e. touching of either
the labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
In other words, "touching" of the female organ will result in consummated rape if the penis slid
into or touched either labia of the pudendum. Anything short of that will only result in either
attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. Significantly, People v. Campuhan did not set a
demarcation line separating attempted rape from acts of lasciviousness. The difference lies in the
intent of the perpetrator deducible from his external acts. Thus when the "touching" of the vagina
by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed. Otherwise, it is
merely acts of lasciviousness.
Inasmuch as the touching of the victims organ by the penis of accused-appellant on 5 June 1993
was but a mere incident of the "rubbing against or between the victims thighs" which in no way
manifests an act preliminary to sexual intercourse, accused-appellant should only be convicted of
acts of lasciviousness instead of consummated rape.
Messeah's testimony regarding the other acts of lasciviousness committed against her person on
different instances by Jessie is also credible, more so when we consider how Metheor's testimony
corroborated the appalling tale of molestation and assault. Messeah told the trial court how on
several occasions Jessie had inserted his penis into her anus, and also his smallest finger into her
vagina, and how he straddled her legs between his legs with his penis pressed between her thighs.
The defense tried to show that it was impossible for a man to have inserted his penis into the anus
of a young girl tied spread-eagle to the bed with her garterized shorts and panties pulled down to
her ankles, but the garter would stretch to allow the victims legs to spread far apart and Jessies
beastly act would not have been a physical impossibility. Further, Messeah testified that both her
anus and vagina hurt during the first incident,[16] which could only have resulted from the
penetration.
On his part, Metheor testified as to how he heard his sister scream for his help, how he saw her
tied down on the bed like an animal, how he twice saw Jessie lie on top of his sister, first on 27
April 1993, and again on 5 June 1993, and how Jessie pushed and threatened him if he ever said a
word about what he had seen.[17] He also told the court how on 17 October 1993, he saw Jessie
insert his smallest finger into Messeahs vagina.[18]
Neither Messeah nor Metheor had any motive to implicate Jessie except to stop the abuses. It
should be noted that these are children forced to live in fear for a long time, and had suffered
many indignities at the hands of Jessie. In fact, in his desire to prevent Jessie from hurting his
sister, young Metheor repeatedly tried to push Jessie away from his sister's helpless body by
punching him and even attempting to stab him with a bread knife, the only weapon he could
handle.
Messeahs failure to reveal the sexual abuses to her mother does not taint her credibility. Her
silence was impelled by both fear for her life and shame for the degradation that had befallen her.
It is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest
threat against her life. Silence is not an odd behavior of a rape victim.[19] In fact, the burden of
keeping such a secret took its toll on her health. Jose Noli testified that when he arrived for a
vacation in August 1993, he noticed that his children looked blank and pale, especially Messeah
who looked thin, complained of dizziness and headaches and sometimes threw up. He and his wife
had brought Messeah to several doctors, before one finally diagnosed Messeah as suffering from
nervous breakdown and psychological trauma.[20]
The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially when it comes
from the mouth of a credible witness.[21] Jessie's alibi that he was driving the family car on the
disputed occasions cannot stand up to his positive identification as the perpetrator of the crime by
both Messeah and Metheor.
Neither can we believe Jessie's allegation that Julie only wanted him out of their house because
she favored her own relative over him. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the
humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for her child's defilement.[22]
Furthermore, it is highly improbable that a rape victim and her family would publicly disclose the
incident and thus sully their honor and reputation in the community unless the charge is true.[23]
In fact, if Julie only wanted Jessie out of her house,[24] then why would the Dumaoal family file
the complaints against him only on 13 April 1994, when it is clear that he had already left the
household as early as 22 October 1993. Neither does this explain why the Dumaoal spouses felt
compelled to change residences in such a short period of time. As Jose Noli testified, they made
the move even before All Saints Day,[25] which shows that they left their familiar surroundings
and uprooted their family all within ten (10) days just so they could ensure Messeahs safety.
Moreover, we agree with the Solicitor General that the only reason why the Dumaoal spouses
agreed to let Jessie go home to the province instead of filing charges against him was because they
were "torn between seeking justice for their daughter and preserving her and the familys
reputation. There was also the Christian desire to forgive and give a blood kin a new chance at life
knowing the gravity of the penalty that would be meted out to him. To interpret their actuation any
other way would be most unfair to parents who are equally suffering with what befell their only
daughter."[26]
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the trial court failed to consider the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law when it imposed the penalty of "imprisonment of six (6) years of
prision correccional in its maximum period."
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty provided by Art. 336 of The
Revised Penal Code is prision correccional the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years. With the presence of one (1) generic aggravating circumstance, i.e., obvious
ungratefulness, the maximum shall be taken from the maximum period of the imposable penalty,
which is, four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, while the minimum shall
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is, arresto mayor the range of which is one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267, finding
accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO guilty of Statutory Rape in G.R. No. 135667
(Crim. Case No. 106257) and three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in G.R. Nos. 135668 - 70
(Crim. Cases Nos. 106258-106260) is MODIFIED as follows:
In G.R. No. 135667 (Crim. Case No. 106257), accused-appellant is found guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness (instead of Statutory Rape) under Art. 336 of The Revised Penal Code, aggravated
by obvious ungratefulness. In G.R. Nos. 135668-70 (Crim. Cases Nos. 106258-106260), accused-
appellant is likewise found guilty of three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness under the same Art.
336, also aggravated by obvious ungratefulness in each count.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO is

sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto
mayor maximum as minimum, to four (4) years six (6) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional maximum as maximum, in each count of Acts of Lasciviousness. Accused-appellant
is further directed to pay the private complainant Messeah M. Dumaoal P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P40,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, in each of the four
(4) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 128159-62. July 14, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HIPOLITO PASCUA, appellant.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision dated November 14, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, Branch 38, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.
The appellant was charged with four counts of rape in separate informations which read:
CRIM. CASE NO. L-5409
That on or about the 27th day of January, 1996 in the evening, in barangay Calvo, municipality of
Mangatarem, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Liza Paragas, a 12-year old
minor inside his house against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659.
That on or about the 6th day of August 1995 in the evening, in barangay Calvo, municipality of
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Liza Paragas, a 12-year old
That on or about the 20th day of January 1996 in the evening, in barangay Calvo, municipality of
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Anna Paragas, a 12-year old
That on or about the month of August 1995 in the evening, in barangay Calvo, municipality of
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Anna Paragas, a 12-year old
CONTRARY to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659.[1]
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. Thereupon, joint trial of the cases
ensued.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
Private complainants Liza and Anna, both surnamed Paragas, are twins born on July 12, 1983. The
appellant was their neighbor in Calvo, Mangatarem, Pangasinan. Liza and Anna considered
appellant as their grandfather although he was not related to them.
On August 6, 1995, private complainants were playing near the house of the appellant when the
latter called Liza and instructed her to buy juice at the store. Liza obeyed. After she returned from
the store, the appellant ordered Liza to go inside his house and lie down on the floor. Appellant
then removed Lizas pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and
made push and pull movements. Liza tried to scream but appellant threatened to kill her.
After the sexual intercourse, the appellant gave Liza P10 and warned her not to reveal the incident
to her mother. Liza then went home but did not tell her mother what happened for fear that her
mother would punish her.
The same thing happened on January 27, 1996 when Liza was called by the appellant as she was
passing by his house. Once Liza was inside, she was forced to lie down by the appellant who then
removed her pants and underwear. Appellant went on top of Liza and inserted his penis into her
vagina before making push and pull movements. Liza was not able to shout because appellant
again threatened to kill her. After her ordeal, the appellant gave Liza P5 and reminded her not to
tell her mother what happened. So Liza went home without telling her mother that she was
sexually abused by the appellant.
Lizas twin sister, Anna, suffered the same fate at the hands of the appellant. Sometime in August
1995, while Anna was playing with her cousins, the appellant called her and asked her to go inside
his house. As soon as Anna entered his house, the appellant closed the door, removed Annas pants
and underwear, and made her lie down on the floor. Thereafter, the appellant inserted his penis
into Annas vagina and ravished her. Anna felt pain but could not shout as appellant threatened to
kill her. The appellant also warned her not to tell her mother about the incident. Thus, when Anna
went home, she did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her.
On January 20, 1996, Anna was on her way home after buying charcoal from the store when the
appellant called her anew. As soon as Anna was inside appellants house, the latter told her to
remove her pants and underwear but Anna refused. So appellant himself forcibly removed Annas
clothes and went on top of her before inserting his penis into her vagina. Again, Anna was not able
to shout because she was afraid that the appellant would kill her. As in the prior incident, Anna did
not tell her mother that the appellant molested her.
Private complainants mother, Leticia Paragas, learned of her daughters ordeal through her older
daughter, Rosalina, who, in turn, came to know of the rape incidents from the appellants
granddaughter. Apparently the granddaughter witnessed the appellant as he was raping Liza and
told Rosalina about it.
Upon learning what the appellant had done to her daughters, Leticia confronted them. Liza and
Anna were initially reluctant to talk but upon further questioning, they finally revealed that the
appellant had sexually abused them. Leticia wasted no time in reporting the matter to their
barangay chairman and to the police before whom she filed criminal complaints against the
appellant. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Mangatarem District Hospital where the victims were
examined by Dr. Athena Merrera.
The medico-legal examination conducted on Liza disclosed that she had lacerations at the 3, 4, 5
and 9 oclock positions which were caused by the insertion of a hard object like the erect penis of a
man. On the other hand, the medical findings on Anna showed that she had lacerations at the 2, 3,
7, 8, 9 and 10 oclock positions which were also caused by the insertion of a hard object such as an
erect penis. These lacerations suffered by both victims were determined to have been inflicted
several weeks or months before the examination on February 14, 1996.
At the trial, appellant Hipolito Pascua and his granddaughter, Joy Javier, testified for the defense.
The appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with private complainants but insisted that Liza
and Anna freely consented to the repeated sexual acts in exchange for money ranging from P5 to
P10. On several occasions, Liza and Anna allegedly visited him at home asking for money and
sexual satisfaction. In fact, it was private complainants supposed persistence which drove him to
accede to their demands to have sex, even if he was having difficulty achieving erection as he was
suffering from hernia. Thus, there was never an instance when the appellant forced or threatened
private complainants into having sexual intercourse with him.
Joy Javier declared that she often saw private complainants at the house of the appellant. At one
time, she asked Anna if she had sexual intercourse with the appellant to which Anna nodded. She
even warned both Liza and Anna that if they continued to go to appellants house, their mother
would know about it. However, despite said warning, she still saw private complainants at the
house of the appellant almost everyday.
On November 14, 1996, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
Wherefore, in the light of all the considerations discussed above, the court hereby renders
judgment in the above-entitled cases as follows:
In Criminal Case Nos. L-5409 and L-5410, the court hereby finds and holds the accused, Hipolito
Pascua, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape on two (2) counts as charged in the
informations filed against him, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, and conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby
sentences said accused in each case to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
costs.
The court further directs the accused to indemnify the offended party, Liza Paragas, the sum of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in each case or a total of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In Criminal Cases Nos. L-5411 and L-5412, the court likewise finds and holds the accused
Hipolito Pascua, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape on two (2) counts as
charged in the informations filed against him, defined and penalized under the provisions of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, and conformable thereto,
pursuant to law, hereby sentences the said accused in each case to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the costs.
The court likewise directs the accused to indemnify the offended party, Anna Paragas, the sum of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in each case or a total of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Insisting on his innocence, the appellant claims in his appeal that he is not guilty of rape because
private complainants voluntarily submitted to his sexual desires. The appellant even postulates
that, if there should at all be any liability on his part, it should only be for simple seduction.
After an exhaustive review, we find ourselves unable to agree with appellants reasoning. The
appellants defense that the victims consented to his lascivious desires is simply too preposterous to
deserve serious consideration. The same is not only revolting but goes against established norms.
No young child in her right mind will consent to have sexual intercourse with a 65-year-old man,
specially one whom she considers her grandfather. The appellant desperately tries to portray
private complainants as sex-starved maniacs who, at the tender age of 12, persistently demanded
sex with him. Further, his story that private complainants would even go naked on top of him was
nothing but a yarn that offends sensibilities and Filipino values. Indeed, after admitting that he had
carnal knowledge of private complainants on several occasions, the appellant assumed the burden
of proving his defense by substantial evidence. The record shows that, other than his self-serving
assertions, the appellant had nothing to support his claim that private complainants were teenagers
of loose morals and that the repeated acts of sexual intercourse were consensual.
It is culturally instinctive for young and decent Filipinas to protect their honor and obtain justice
for the wicked acts committed on them. Thus, it is difficult to believe that private complainants
would fabricate a tale of defloration, allow the embarrassing examination of their private parts,
reveal the shame to the small rural town where they grew up and permit themselves to be
subjected to a humiliating public trial if they had not in fact been really ravished. When the
offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16, as in this case, courts are inclined to
lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability
but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by court trial if their accusation
were not true.[3]
We entertain no doubt that Liza and Anna told the truth. Their testimony was clear that they never
consented to the rape. Their declarations during the trial were simple, straightforward and
unflawed by any inconsistency or contradiction. A candid and honest narration by the victim of
how she was abused must be given full faith and credit for they contain earmarks of credibility.[4]
In this case, the trial court found these badges of truth to be present in the following testimony of
Liza Paragas:
FISCAL:
Q Where were you by that time when you were ordered by the accused to lie down on the
flooring?
WITNESS:
A I was in his house, sir.
Q Now, what transpired after you were ordered to lie down?
A He removed my pants and my underwear, sir.
Q After removing your pants and underwear, what transpired next?
A Then, he went on top of me, sir.
Q What happened next after the accused went on top of you?
A Then, he made a (sic) push and pull movements, sir.
COURT:
Coitus movement.
FISCAL:
Q What did the accused do when he made this coitus movement?
WITNESS:
A He insert (sic) his penis on (sic) my vagina, sir.
Q When he insert (sic) his penis inside your vagina, can you tell if you shouted?
A He warned me not to shout or else he will kill me, sir.
Q At what point and time when the accused threaten (sic) you that he will kill you if you will
shout, before he place (sic) his penis inside your vagina or after he placed already his penis inside
your vagina?
A Before inserting his penis on (sic) my vagina, sir.
Q How long a time did the accused make this coitus movement as his penis was inside your
vagina?
A For five (5) minutes, sir.[5]
It is clear from the foregoing testimony that private complainants tried to scream but the appellant
prevented them by threatening to kill them. Also, after each rape incident, private complainants
were warned by the appellant not to tell their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a
rape victim is not required to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need not
be irresistible; it need only be present and so long as it brings about the desired result, all
considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.[6] Indeed, physical
resistance need not be established in rape when, as in this case, intimidation was used on the
victim and she submitted to the rapists lust for fear of her life or her personal safety. Jurisprudence
holds that even though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical forces, he
so overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance through fear of greater
harm, the consummation of unlawful intercourse by the man is rape.[7] Without question, the
prosecution was able to prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by the appellant on
the two victims to satisfy his lust.
Equally untenable is the argument of the appellant that, if he is at all liable for anything, it should
only be for simple seduction. Under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code, to constitute
seduction, there must in all cases be some deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should
have yielded because of this promise or inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts
of sexual intercourse with the private complainants were in exchange for money. He declared that,
prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would promise them P20. However, aside
from his bare testimony, the appellant presented no proof that private complainants consent was
secured by means of such promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money given by the
appellant to private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him. Rather, it
was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody discovered his dastardly acts.
The evidence for the prosecution was more than enough to show that the element of voluntariness
on the part of private complainants was totally absent. Liza and Annas respective testimonies
established that the appellant had sexual intercourse with them without their consent and against
their will. Considering that the victims accounts of what the appellant did to them were absolutely
credible and believable, the trial court correctly convicted the appellant of several crimes of rape
against the 12-year-old twins, Liza and Anna Paragas.
The Court finds the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on the appellant for each count of rape
committed against private complainants to be in accord with law. The award of moral damages in
the amount of P50,000 for each offense, or a total of P100,000 for each victim, is also correct
because, under prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages are mandatory in rape cases involving
young girls between 12 and 19 years of age, taking into account the immeasurable havoc wrought
on their youthful psyche.[8] The trial court, however, failed to award civil indemnity which is
automatically granted to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the
commission of the rape. Hence, an additional P50,000 for each count of rape, or a total of
P100,000, should be given each private complainant as civil indemnity.
WHEREFORE, except for the MODIFICATION awarding private complainants an additional
amount of P100,000 each as civil indemnity, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 130640. June 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SHAREFF ALI EL AKHTAR, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103,[1] in Criminal Case No. Q-96-67171,
convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Rape and sentenced him to death by lethal injection.
The case is now before us on automatic review.
Accused-appellant is a 30 year old Libyan national, a student of Oriental Institute in its electronic
technicians course, a resident of Lagro Subdivision, Quezon City,[2] and married to a Filipina
nurse working in Libya[3] with whom he has a one-and-a-half year old son.
Complainant is Gina Rozon y Freo, aged 17, having been born on May 30, 1979[4] in Sta.
Barbara, Bulusan, Sorsogon. At the time of the alleged offense she was newly graduated from high
school. Her complaint told of a harrowing tale of abduction, starting from the Lagro Post Office
and ending in her alleged detention for ten days at appellants house where he forced her to take
drugged drinks, while he repeatedly abused her.
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and on record are as follows:
Prior to the incident, complainant was on vacation and staying with her aunt, Francia. Her aunts
family occupied the second floor of an apartment unit in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.[5]
Appellant and his son occupied the ground floor. Being neighbors, Gina and appellant became
acquainted with each other.[6] However, on July 14, 1996, appellant transferred to another house
in Lagro Subdivision, Quezon City.
In the morning of July 17, 1996, complainant asked permission from her aunt to mail a letter at the
Lagro Post Office.[7] By chance, she saw appellant walking behind her.[8] Suddenly, appellant
grabbed her hand,[9] placed his right arm on her back and pushed her inside a waiting tricycle that
was parked some meters away from the paradahan of tricycles.[10] While holding complainant
with one arm, he barricaded the tricycle door with his other hand. The tricycle sped off.[11]
Complainant was overcome by nervousness and was unable to shout for help.[12] The tricycle
driver stopped in front of a house in Lagro Subdivision. Appellant asked complainant to step down
and pushed open the gate of the house and asked her to get inside. He pushed her towards a chair,
then padlocked the room.[13] Appellant got a glass of softdrink and forced Gina to drink it.
Thereafter, Gina became drowsy and fell asleep.[14] She woke up the next morning and stood up.
To her utter shock, she saw herself completely naked in bed, feeling weak and her vagina in pain.
[15] She saw plenty of blood on the bedsheet. Because she was still feeling weak, she fell down on
the bed.[16] Appellant later entered the room and asked if she was all right. She pleaded with him
to let her go home. Appellant did not respond, but stood up and changed the bedsheets. He then
left and locked the door. After about an hour, appellant came back and brought with him macaroni
and orange juice. Complainant noticed some white sediments floating on the orange juice, but
appellant told her they were vitamins and forced her to drink the juice. This caused her to fall
asleep again for a long time. When she woke up afterwards, she was naked again and her vagina
was in pain. Appellant was inside the room sitting on a chair. Complainant got the bedsheet to
cover her body, and appellant went out of the room. Complainant opened the window jalousies in
the hope of calling the attention of the neighbors but appellant, who was outside fetching water,
saw her and went back to the room with a kitchen knife. Appellant pushed a cabinet to cover the
window and threatened to kill her if the neighbors saw her. Drained, she sat on the bed. Appellant
went out and came back with some juice and forced her to drink again, causing her to fall asleep
once more. When she woke up, she tried to open the bedroom door, but it was locked.[17] She
went back to the bed and again fell asleep. Thereafter, appellant came into the room and fed her
Jollibee chicken chili wings with rice.[18] Appellant changed his clothes and went out.[19] She
then attempted to go out of the room but appellant was outside, in the sala. Appellant pulled her
back to the room, then poked a knife at her, threatening to kill her if she went out of the room
again.[20] Appellant then asked her to drink two types of medicine, one was Propan and the other
a white tablet.[21] She did not want to drink the white tablet but appellant pushed it inside her
mouth for her to swallow it. Then she fell asleep and when she woke up, her private part was in
renewed pain (Mahapding-mahapdi at nanghihina).[22] During her incarceration in the house of
appellant, he asked her to take a bath around three times and dressed her in his clothes.[23] She
became so weak (hinang-hina) that she could hardly shout for help. Nor could she go to the
comfort room without being carried by appellant.[24] When she urinated, her private part was
painful and when she checked it, she saw a big wound.[25]
At one point, appellant went inside the room and told complainant that her aunt was outside, but
threatened her not to shout, otherwise, he would kill her.[26] She was then shaking with fear.[27]
Appellant changed his clothes and went out. When he came back, he told her that if her aunt came
back, he would also kill her aunt.[28]
When complainant failed to return home on July 17, 1996, her aunt (Francia) became worried. She
called up their relatives asking for her, but no one knew her whereabouts.[29] Francia told her
husband, Joseph, about her suspicion that appellant might have something to do with complainants
disappearance because the aunt had seen him suspiciously looking at their house prior thereto.
Joseph and a brother of complainant immediately went to appellants house in Lagro.[30] They saw
that the doors and windows of appellants house were padlocked,[31] so they knocked on the main
door. Appellant peeped through the windows and told them to enter through the side door.[32]
They informed him about complainants disappearance, but he denied any knowledge regarding
her whereabouts. They nonetheless noticed that the house was in disarray. One of the rooms was
padlocked. Suspecting that complainant was inside the padlocked room, they insisted on getting
inside, but appellant warned them against intruding into his privacy. Fearing that they would be
accused of trespassing, they immediately left, but reported complainants disappearance to the
nearby Lagro police station. They also reported their suspicion about appellants possible
involvement in her disappearance.[33] The police were alerted and together with complainants
relatives, they went to appellants house, but no one opened the door.[34]
On the tenth day of her abduction (July 26, 1996), appellant informed her that there were
policemen outside. For reasons known only to appellant, he immediately got some love letters
from his cabinet. He ordered her to copy them on several pieces of paper and affix her signature in
every letter to make it appear that the same were her love letters to him. She complied, literally at
knife-point. Only then did appellant release her.[35] Appellant waited until there were no people
outside the house, then he hailed a cab and brought complainant somewhere in Blumentritt,
Manila, where he hailed another taxi. He boarded her in the taxi, paid the fare, and instructed the
driver to bring her to Lagro. He told her that he would be going to the embassy.[36]
Though still very weak, complainant went to her brother, Arnold, who worked in a barber shop in
Lagro and told him what happened. He then went to fetch their uncle for help. Together, they went
home to the aunts house in San Jose del Monte, where they arrived at around 8:00 in the evening.
The aunt asked complainant what happened and where she had been, but she merely cried and
cried and cried. When asked during the trial to describe complainants appearance at that time, the
aunt said that she looked dazed and very tired. (Pagod na pagod, mga mata ay maga at parang
wala sa sarili.) Complainant still felt very weak but she narrated to her relatives her ordeal. The
following morning, accompanied with her aunt and uncle, complainant reported the incident to the
Lagro police station.[37] Then, they went to the NBI for her medical examination.
On August 2, 1996, complainant filed charges against appellant for the crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape committed as follows:
The undersigned complainant accuses SHAREFF ALI EL AKHTAR of the crime of FORCIBLE
ABDUCTION WITH RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of July 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, an Arab National, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd
design forcibly abduct one GINA ROZON Y FREO, a minor, 17 years of age, a student, by
forcing her to board a tricycle along Assession Road, Post Office, Barangay Pasong Putik, Quezon
City, and brought her to his apartment also at Lagro, Quezon City, where accused locked her, then
made her drink Coke, a softdrink, that made her feel dizzy and thereafter accused sexually abused
her repeatedly up to the time she was released on July 26, 1996, all against her will and without
her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said GINA ROZON Y FREO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 30, 1996.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment.[38]
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: complainant herself, her aunt
Francia Rozon, her uncle Joseph Rozon, and Dr. Erlinda R. Marfil, the Chief Psychiatrist of the
National Bureau of Investigation.
The defense presented the appellant and his counsel, Atty. Manuel de Jesus. Appellants version of
the incident, as set out in his Brief, is as follows:[39]
[O]n July 17, 1996 - the date of the supposed forcible abduction with rape - he was in the Libyan
Embassy where he repaired the Embassys television set (t.v.) (tsn, pp. 8-12, April 10, 1997). It was
a certain Mr. Aghila Gheldan, head of the Consular section, who requested him to do such work.
He left his residence at the Lagro Subdivision at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, and finished
the repair at about 6:00 oclock in the evening. (tsn, pp. 4-9, April 17, 1997). Appellant also
submitted a Certification dated August 19, 1996, signed by aforementioned Mr. Gheldan, that the
accused has visited the Bureau (referring to the Libyan Peoples Bureau, or the Libyan Embassy)
twice (d), dated July 12 and July 17, 1996 respectively) Exh. 36, p. 86, records).
Appellant also testified that before he transferred residence to Lagro Subdivision, Quezon City on
July 14, 1996, he lived in the ground floor of an apartment in Pecsonville Subdivision, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan. The complainant lived with her aunt Francia Rozon in the second floor of the
same apartment and it was in that apartment that appellant came to know complainant since
September 3, 1995 (TSN, pp. 10-11, April 10, 1997; pp. 30-32, April 24, 1997). Appellant
likewise claimed that the complainant is his girlfriend and that as a consequence of that
relationship, he had had several sexual contacts with her prior to his transfer to the Lagro
Subdivision. As evidence of that relationship, he submitted several love letters which were signed
by the complainant (TSN, pp. 10-16, 22, April 10, 1997; Exhibits 3 to 35, inclusive, pp. 196-A to
231, folder of exhibits). Asked why Gina filed the case against him, he answered that Auntie and
Uncle discovered our relations and Gina was compelled to file this case, and they were asking
P500,000 from me in order to drop the case (TSN, pp. 21-22, April 10, 1997).
On July 24, 1997, after due trial, the trial court rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the court renders judgment finding accused SHAREFF ALI AKHTAR GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape charged in this case and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection.
On the civil aspect, the accused is ordered to pay GINA ROZON y FREO the sum of P50,000.00
as compensatory damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
In his bid for acquittal, appellant now makes the following assignment of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT NOTWITHSTANDING ITS IMPROBABILITIES
AND INCONSISTENCIES WITH ORDINARY HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND EXPERIENCE,
THEREBY IMPAIRING HER OWN CREDIBILITY AS WELL.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MANIFESTING BIAS AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AND THEREBY TOTALLY DISREGARDING HIS DEFENSES.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE AND IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF DEATH, INSTEAD OF ACQUITTING
HIM.
Appellant assails the credibility of the complainant considering her conduct during the alleged
abduction wherein she did not even resist nor shout for help from the tricycle driver or the other
people around the highly-populated area of Lagro during her alleged captivity inside his house. He
stresses that she made no strong efforts to thwart him from making her drink the supposedly
drugged softdrinks or juice. He contends that they already had prior sexual relations since they
were sweethearts.
It is well settled doctrine that in a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility becomes the
single most important issue. Thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof.[40] Assessing the credibility of the witnesses is a function that
is best discharged by trial courts.[41] Factual findings of trial courts are accorded the highest
respect unless it is shown that certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which if
considered could affect the result of the case.[42] After a thorough review of the records of the
case, we see no reason to depart from this rule.
Complainants failure to ask for help when she was abducted, or to escape from appellants house
during her detention, should not be construed as a manifestation of consent to the acts done by
appellant. For her life was on the line. Against the armed threats and physical abuses of appellant,
she had no defense. Moreover, at a time of grave peril, to shout could literally be to court disaster.
Her silence was born out of fear for her safety, to say the least, not a sign of approval.
Behavioral psychology, moreover, teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly.
[43] There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. The
workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. This Court
indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has
been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim
depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted by any modicum of
doubt.[44] Thus, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether or not a woman
involuntary succumbed to the lust of an accused,[45] particularly where accused employed drugs
in order to render the woman unconscious during coitus.
In People v. Santiago, 197 SCRA 556, 566-567 (1991), we ruled that-
The appellants submission that the victim failed to raise an outcry or offer serious resistance when
she was abducted and later raped has no merit. The suggestion of the victim that she was drugged
after drinking the lemon juice given by the appellant explains why the victim was unable to resist
the accused effectively or make an outcry. While no chemical test was undertaken to concretely
prove that the juice she drank actually contained drugs, the fact remains uncontroverted as
appellant did not even take the witness stand in order to deny that after the victim drank the lemon
juice already prepared for her, she began to feel weak and dizzy. x x x. It is clear that the acts of
appellant were deliberately done to deprive the victim of reason and the will to resist his sexual
assault. The effect is thus similar to that of violence in overcoming resistance with which she
could very well have successfully thwarted the lustful act. Appellant undoubtedly had clearly
committed the crime charged by depriving complainant of reason to be able to have carnal
knowledge of her without the latter having in least shown any sign of consent. (People v. Bautista,
No. L-49778, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 483). In a rape of a woman deprived of reason or who
is unconscious, the victim has no will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real
opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse.
Moreover, the physical examination of her person supports the testimony of the victim that she has
been raped. The medico-legal report dated July 26, 1996, by Dr. Floreto D. Arzala, Jr. of National
Bureau of Investigation reveals that, while there were no extra-genital physical injuries on
complainant, recent genital trauma was present (Exhibit C). After the examination, the medico-
legal officer told complainant that her private part had lacerations (Maraming gasgas at mga
sugat.) whereupon she again burst into tears.[46] Physical injuries such as bruises or bleeding tend
to confirm the fact that a violent assault did take place.[47] Further, after the medico-legal
department of the NBI had referred complainant to the Psychiatric Section of the NBI for a neuro-
psychiatric examination on December 6, 1996, witness Dra. Erlinda Marfil testified that as a result
of said examination, she concluded that complainant was suffering from post-traumatic stress
reaction as a result of what happened to her person.[48]
Appellant claims that on the day of the abduction, July 17, 1996, he was at the Libyan embassy
fixing a television set. He even presented a certification that he indeed visited the embassy on said
date. However, this proferred defense of alibi could not overcome the overwhelming evidence
against him. Alibi is inherently a weak defense whose value loses a lot when time and distance do
not make the imputed offense impossible of commission. In this case, more than a certification of
an embassy visit is needed to overthrow the positive evidence on hand.
Appellant makes much of the love letters allegedly sent by complainant to him with her
protestations of love and devotion. Complainants testimony negated this contrived posture known
as the sweetheart defense. Even assuming that appellant and complainant were lovers, however,
this fact alone would not negate the commission of rape, especially where coitus occurred when
the woman was drugged. We have repeatedly declared that a love affair does not justify rape, for
the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will.[49] A man does not have an unbridled
license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires.[50] By asserting the existence of such a
relationship, appellant seeks to prove that the victim willingly participated in the sexual act. But
she did not. Complainant was just a former neighbor, not a lover of the appellant. The evidence in
this case clearly shows that she could not resist the sexual assault upon her person because she
was made to drink liquids which rendered her unconscious and a defenseless prey to the repeated
sexual assault of appellant. The situation in this case does not speak of consensual love but of
criminal lust which could not be disguised by the so-called sweetheart defense.
While appellant was charged with the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, he was convicted
by the trial court of the crime of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
woman under any of the following circumstances:
(1) By using force or intimidation;
(2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. x x x
As to the crime committed by the appellant, we have held that forcible abduction is absorbed in
the crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to rape the victim.[51] As can be gleaned
from the testimony of complainant, she was raped by appellant no less than three times. The first
rape occurred as follows:[52]
FISCAL RAMOS: After that what else did he do?

COMPLAINANT: He forced me to drink the coke. He inserted the mouth of the bottle inside my
mouth so I could drink it maam (sic).
Q: Were you able to drink the coke?
A: Yes, because he was forcing me to drink it.
Q: After that, how did you feel?
A: I fell asleep, walang malay po.
Q: After that, when did you regain your senses?
A: When I woke up it was already the next morning, maam.
Q: And what did you do when you wake up (sic) the following morning?
A: I was trying to remember the room where I am, maam.
Q: Did you finally come to your senses?
A: Yes, and I became afraid, maam.
Q: Why?
A: Because I know I was not in the house of my auntie when I woke up.
Q: What did you do?
A: I stood up from the bed and I felt that my private part was aching.
Q: What private part?
A: My vagina was aching.
Q: How did you find yourself when you wake up?
A: I was naked, completely naked when I woke up.
Q: What did you see in your vagina, you said it was painful, what did you see if any?
A: I saw plenty of blood on the bedsheet when I stood up, sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: Because I was feeling weak, I fell down.
Q: Where did you fall down?
A: On the bed, maam.
Q: Thereafter, what else if anything, happened?
A: He went inside, maam.
Q: After that, what did he do?
A: He asked me if I am okay.
Q: What did you tell him?
A: I pleaded with him to allow me to go home, maam.
Q: What did he say?
A: He did not speak or say anything, maam.
From the testimony of the complainant, the second rape occurred as follows:[53]
FISCAL RAMOS: After one hour what happened next?

COMPLAINANT: The accused went inside the bedroom bringing with him food to eat.
Q: What did you do?
A: He brought with him macaroni with plenty of pepper that is why I did not eat it.
Q: After that what else happened?
A: That same time he also asked me to drink softdrinks.
Q: How did he tell you to drink softdrinks?
A: He told me that is vitamins and asked me to take it.
Q: Did you take it?
A: Yes, because he was forcing me to take it, maam.
Q: Is that in a bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind?
A: Glass, maam.
Q: Is it Coca-cola or what?
A: Glass bottle, maam.
Q: What color, is that?
A: Color orange.
Q: And he said, he told you its vitamins, what is that he told you vitamins?
A: That orange colored liquid, there was something floating colored white and I asked him about it
and he said thats vitamins.
Q: Did you drink that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After that, how did you feel?
A: I fell asleep, maam.
Q: Did you regain your senses again after that?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Would you know what time was that when you wake up after getting another sleep?
Q: Do you have wrist watch?
A: None sir,
Q: No clock there?
A: No clock, maam.
Q: What time was that when you woke up again?
A: It took a long time before I woke up again.
Q: When you woke up, what happened?
A: I saw I was naked again, maam.
Q: And how about your private part, what did you feel?
A: It was painful, maam.
The third rape occurred as follows:[54]
FISCAL RAMOS: After that what else happened after he went out of the bedroom?
COMPLAINANT: He returned and asked me to drink two types of medicines.
Q: What medicine?
A: I know the other one is vitamins, but the other one I dont know, but its a tablet colored white.
Q: Why do you know the other one as vitamins?
A: I saw in the packet the name of the vitamins, maam.
Q: What is the name?
A: Propan, maam.
Q: He came in bringing those two tablets, what did he do with it?
A: He asked me to drink them.
Q: How did he ask you to drink the white tablet?
A: I did not want to drink the white tablet, but he pushed it inside my mouth, maam.
Q: After that, what else happened?
A: I fell asleep again. When I woke up I was again naked, maam.
Q: How about your body, was there anything unusual upon your body when you woke up?
A: Mahapding-mahapdi at nanghi-hina.
Q: What is that part of your body which you said mahapding-mahapdi?
A: My vagina, sir.
In this connection, Section 3 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that-
SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. - When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information, and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict
the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for
each and everyone of them setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each case.
Appellant should therefore be held responsible for as many rapes as were committed by him
which were duly proven during trial.
As to the proper penalty, the trial court imposed the supreme penalty on death on the appellant for
the following reason:
And since it appears that Shareff did not hesistate twice to threaten Gina with a kitchen knife
during her detention and likewise Gina being a minor was forced by the accused to drink certain
liquids to render her unconscious thereby adding ignominy to her long ordeal, the penalty should
be imposed in the maximum.
However, we find that appellant was convicted under Article 335, No. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, wherein the penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua.
Appellant used the knife not to consummate the crime of rape but to threaten Gina not to leave the
bedroom where she was locked up. Hence, we find appellant herein guilty of three (3) counts of
simple rape.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Shareff Ali El
Akhtar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that the death sentence imposed by the court a quo is hereby reduced to
reclusion perpetua for each of the three counts of rape, and that appellant is hereby ordered to pay
complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages for each
count of rape.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 139338. May 28, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LITO EGAN alias AKIAO, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The universal puff about love being free, doubtless a stale statement, remains a useful piece of
legal advice yet for the roaming lothario, to stress that money in all its forms, the dowry included,
is not the legitimate consideration for passion and affection which ordinarily spring from courtship
and requited love, nor does it endow a license to subject the object of his affection to lewd desires,
as the 36-year old Manobo would have now realized.
Lito Egan alias Akiao, thirty-six (36) years old, was an avid admirer of a twelve (12)-year old girl
named Lenie T. Camad.[1] Since both the accused and Lenie were members of the Manobo
indigenous cultural community in Mindanao and residents of Sitio Salaysay, Marilog, Davao City,
[2] he had convenient access to courting her but his love was instantly and decidedly spurned.[3]
Between despair and the impossibility of a passionate affair, his unreciprocated love would soon
become the frailty of his distressed mind. He was convicted of forcible abduction with rape of
Lenie and was meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay her the amounts of
P30,000.00 for moral damages and P20,000.00 for exemplary damages.[4] The Decision was
seasonably appealed to this Court.[5]
On 6 January 1997 Lenie and her cousin Jessica Silona[6] were fetching water at a deep well
several meters from Lenies house in Sitio Salaysay. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the
accused appeared from nowhere and forcibly dragged and pushed Lenie towards Sitio Dalag,
Arakan, Cotabato.[7] He threatened to kill her if she resisted.[8] Before leaving the site of the
deep well, he likewise terrorized Jessica by brandishing his hunting knife which forced the girl to
scamper for safety.[9] About 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Jessica was able to report to Lenies
father, Palmones Camad, the abduction of his daughter.[10] Palmones immediately borrowed the
horse of a neighbor and together with a friend proceeded to Sitio Dalag to look for Lenie.[11]
They sought the help of the barangay captain of Sitio Dalag and then returned to Sitio Salaysay to
rest for the night. For their part, the accused and Lenie stayed that same night in a house in Sitio
Dalag.[12]
On 7 January 1997 accused Lito Egan forced Lenie to escort him to Sitio Sayawan, Miokan,
Arakan, Cotabato, still threatening to kill her if she shouted or resisted,[13] and there stayed in the
house of a sister of Lito.[14] It was in this place where under the cover of darkness and desolation
he allegedly raped Lenie.[15] (She would however change her recollection of the alleged rape
when she later testified that the crime had happened on 6 January 1997 at the house where they
lodged in Sitio Dalag and that no other incidents of rape subsequently took place).[16] On the
same day, Palmones Camad continued the search for his daughter in Miokan.[17] With the help of
village elders, he was able to talk to Datu Salimbag Paguyan of Sitio Sayawan who confirmed that
Lenie and Lito were seen in the sitio.[18] As Palmones was running out of daily provisions, he
returned to Sitio Salaysay.[19] Thereafter, the mission to rescue Lenie was continued by the three
(3) datus of Sitio Salaysay[20] who, like potentates of a sovereign kingdom, interceded in his
behalf with the Datu of Sitio Sayawan for Lenie's safe release.
For four (4) months[21] the datus attempted a customary settlement of the abduction in
accordance with Manobo traditions.[22] It appears that the accused agreed to give two (2) horses
to the family of Lenie in exchange for her hand in marriage.[23] Since the accused however
reneged on his promise to give two (2) horses,[24] Palmones thus insisted on the unconditional
return of his daughter to his custody.[25] Neither did the accused appear before the datus of Sitio
Salaysay when he was asked to explain himself before them.[26] Since the amicable settlement
was not realized, the accused forcibly relocated Lenie to Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where
she was eventually rescued on 15 May 1997.[27]
Lenie lost no time in denouncing the accused and exposing to her village elders the disgrace that
had befallen her.[28] She and her father also reported the crime at the police station in Lamundao,
Marilog, Davao City.[29] She was turned over to the Balay Dangupan, a shelter house of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development,[30] which helped her in obtaining a medico-legal
examination[31] and executing the necessary affidavit-complaint against accused Lito Egan.[32]
On 12 August 1997 the Information for forcible abduction with rape was filed against the accused.
[33] On 9 July 1998,after several warrants of arrest and attempts to arrest him, he was finally
arrested at Arakan, Cotabato.[34] On 28 July 1998 he pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[35]
When trial ensued, the accused tried to prove that he and Lenie had actually been living together
under Manobo rites in the house of her father Palmones Camad since 2 September 1996 after
giving dowry or, in the indigenous language, bagay[36] to Lenie's family consisting of one (1)
horse, two (2) pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay and P2,000.00.[37] It was also his allegation that after
the dowry had been offered and accepted, Palmones demanded one (1) wild horse from him,
which forced him and Lenie, who he claimed voluntarily went with him, to depart on 1 January
1997 for Sitio Dalag, Arakan, Cotabato, to capture one.[38] They allegedly stayed in Sitio Dalag at
the house of Lenie's aunt, Imbing Camad, until 7 January 1997 when it was evident that they could
not find any horse there.[39] He further averred that they went to Sitio Sayawan, Miokan, Arakan,
Cotabato, to seek the help of Datu Salimbag Paguyan who fortunately had one (1) wild horse in
his stable.[40] The accused allegedly delivered the horse to heed Palmones' command but was
again refused when Lenie's father increased the number of horses he was asking from one (1) to
two (2).[41] The accused concluded that because he failed to deliver two (2) wild horses which
Palmones required, the instant case was filed against him.[42] The accused finally posited that
Lenie was aware of the entire situation as she in fact helped him do household chores during their
tryst and that she could have shouted or complained to call people's attention while they were
walking or when they stayed in populated communities such as Sitio Dalag and Sitio Sayawan, or
that she could even have escaped to her father if she really wanted to do so.[43] To prove that he
and Lenie were destined for marriage, accused presented a letter dated 4 February 1997 (Exh. "2")
addressed to one Apo Boyilon Awe and written by Berting Bayaan purportedly detailing the
delivery of two (2) horses to Palmones.[44]
On 5 May 1999 the trial court rejected the defenses of accused Lito Egan and convicted him of
forcible abduction with rape;[45] hence, this appeal.
The only issue before us is the calibration of the competing evidence for the prosecution and the
defense - verily, our resolution would hinge on whose version is more credible, more plausible and
more trustworthy considering the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime
charged.
Accused-appellant Lito Egan was charged with forcible abduction with rape of twelve (12)-year
old Lenie T. Camad. Although from the records it appears that Lenie was less than twelve (12)
years old as shown by her birth certificate (Exh. "B")[46] when the abduction took place on 6
January 1997 and the alleged rape was perpetrated a day after, the criminal liability of accused-
appellant would nevertheless be confined only to the crime alleged in the Information. Hence, a
judgment of conviction is proper only where the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape -
x x x x Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of forcible
abduction. The elements of forcible abduction are (a) that the person abducted is a woman,
regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (b) that the abduction is against her will; and, (c)
that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, Art. 335 of the same Code defines the
crime of rape and provides for its penalty. The elements of rape pertinent to this case are: (a) that
the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and, (b) that such act is accomplished by using
force or intimidation.[47]
All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. The victim, who is a young girl,
was taken against her will as shown by the fact that at knife-point she was dragged and taken by
accused-appellant to a place far from her abode. At her tender age, Lenie could not be expected to
physically resist considering the fact that even her companion, Jessica Silona, had to run home to
escape accused-appellant's wrath as he brandished a hunting knife. Fear gripped and paralyzed
Lenie into helplessness as she was manhandled by accused-appellant who was armed and twenty-
four (24) years her senior. What we held in People v. Rapisora[48] could be said in the case at bar
-
Appellant would urge the Court to ignore the testimony of complainant for her alleged failure to
call for help. In People vs. Akhtar, similarly involving the crime of forcible abduction with rape,
the same contention was raised. This Court, rejecting the proposition made by the alleged
offender, held that '[c]omplainant's failure to ask for help when she was abducted, or to escape
from appellant's house during her detention, should not be construed as a manifestation of consent
to the acts done by appellant. For her life was on the line. Against the armed threats and physical
abuses of appellant, she had no defense. Moreover, at a time of grave peril, to shout could literally
be to court disaster. Her silence was born out of fear for her safety, to say the least, not a sign of
approval' x x x x This Court, in several cases, has observed that behavioral psychology would
indicate that most people, confronted by unusual events, react dissimilarly to like situations.
Intimidation, more subjective than not, is peculiarly addressed to the mind of the person against
whom it may be employed, and its presence is basically incapable of being tested by any hard and
fast rule. Intimidation is normally best viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the
victim at the time and occasion of the crime.
The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was done con
miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. The word lewd is defined as
obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has
relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton manner.[49] Such lewd designs
were established by the prurient and lustful acts which accused-appellant displayed towards the
victim after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that while Lenie
was then a naive twelve (12)-year old, accused-appellant was thirty-six (36) years old and
although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the world than she.[50]
Given the straightforward and candid testimony of Lenie and her father Palmones as well as the
absence of any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant, the logical conclusion is that
there was no improper motive on their part, and their respective testimonies as to facts proving
forcible abduction are worthy of full faith and credit.[51] We generally sustain the factual findings
of the trial court on account of its strategic access to circumstances decisive of the question of
credibility as it saw and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner
of testifying. In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from the rule since no fact or
circumstance of weight and influence proving that accused-appellant had abducted Lenie against
her will and with lewd designs has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted by the court a quo.[52] Significantly, accused-appellant has not even challenged the
unequivocal pronouncement of the trial court that the complainant testified in a spontaneous and
straightforward manner which thus leaves no doubt in the mind of this Court that she was telling
the truth and that her declarations were positive, clear and convincing. The best that he could do to
assail the conviction was, unfortunately, to state mere speculations of inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses without however substantiating by specific examples
such conjecture. We have no doubt that his studied silence on the evaluation of evidentiary matters
unmistakably preserves the integrity of the decision of the trial court.
Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been engaged under Manobo
rituals to marry each other and that her companionship was willful and voluntary. Proof of this, he
said, was the alleged dowry of one (1) horse, two (2) pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and P2,000.00,
with two (2) wild horses forthcoming, he had given her father in exchange for her hand in
marriage. In moving from one place to another to look for the horses which the old man Palmones
had demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize his matrimonial aspiration with Lenie.
The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accused-appellant which in reality is
simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If they were, surely, Lenie would not have
jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having held her against her will and molesting
her and, on top of it all, by filing a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie could have
easily told her father after the latter had successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing
untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her normal reaction would have been to
cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with whom she had a passionate affair. But, on the
contrary, Lenie lost no time in denouncing accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the
authorities the disgrace that had befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father would
not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety by searching for the couple for four
(4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her from captivity and seeking the intervention of the
datus in resolving the matter.
Neither was accused-appellant able to present any convincing evidence to substantiate his claim,
like love letters, notes and other symbols of affection attesting to a consensual relationship.[53] In
fact, none of the persons he and Lenie supposedly lived with during the period that he was
allegedly looking for two (2) wild horses could corroborate his claim of engagement under the
traditions of the Manobos. Imbing Camad was not summoned to testify and Datu Salimbag
Paguyan who took the supposed couple under custody would even admit in his testimony that he
knew nothing about the relationship between them.[54] Furthermore, Exh. "2," the letter which
allegedly details the matrimonial offer of accused-appellant to Lenie, is inadmissible and
otherwise barren of probative value. For one, the letter is hearsay being as it is an out-of-court
statement of a person who did not testify; moreover, it was not authenticated during the trial by
either its author or its recipient. Nor is it in any manner conclusive of any wedding plans prior to
the abduction of Lenie on 6 January 1997, as Exh. "2" is explicitly dated 4 February 1997 and
significantly coincides with the attempts of the several datus to rescue Lenie from the hands of
accused-appellant. Indubitably, all that was done and said in the letter with reference to marrying
the girl was clearly an afterthought.[55]
Verily it is evident that accused-appellant was a rejected suitor of Lenie with no hope of having
her in marriage and whose persistent offers of love and marriage had been decidedly spurned. It
was in the sleepy mid-afternoon of 6 January 1997 when he took the girl by force and at that time
no marriage was proved to have been offered by accused-appellant much less considered by Lenie
or her elders. The accused dragged the victim to walk with him and to proceed to unknown
destinations by warning her of a present and grave danger to her life should she refuse. In the
night which followed, he forcibly embraced, kissed, and handled her against her will. No
protestation of noble intentions can obviate the conclusion that all these acts proved lewd designs.
To be sure, several acts of accused-appellant would betray his criminal intentions. For one he
offered in evidence, partly through Exh. "2" and to a degree by his testimony, the settlement which
he together with Datu Salimbag Paguyan tried to broker with the family of Lenie to suppress the
criminal act he had done. The putative agreement was for the accused to deliver a horse to Lenie's
father to settle the matter amicably but the agreement did not push through. Since this offer of
compromise was sponsored by accused-appellant himself, it clearly amounts to an implied
admission of guilt which remains uncontested.[56] Moreover, if he were truly engaged to marry
the victim he would not have eluded arrest for one (1) year and dodged several warrants for his
arrest. The flight of accused-appellant indubitably proves an awareness of guilt and a
consciousness that he had no tenable defense to the crime charged. [57]
Nonetheless even assuming that the accused and the complainant were engaged by virtue of the
dowry he had offered, this fact alone would not negate the commission of forcible abduction. An
indigenous ritual of betrothal, like any other love affair, does not justify forcibly banishing the
beloved against her will with the intention of molesting her. It is likewise well-settled that the
giving of money does not beget an unbridled license to subject the assumed fiance to carnal
desires. By asserting the existence of such relationship, the accused seeks to prove that the victim
willingly participated in the act. But, as shown above, she certainly did not. Lenie was a Manobo
with whom the accused ardently fell in love but was never her lover. The evidence clearly does not
speak of consensual love but of criminal lust which could not be disguised by the so-called
sweetheart defense or its variant as in the instant case. Finally, as held in People v. Crisostomo,
[58] the intention to marry may constitute unchaste designs not by itself but by the concurring
circumstances which may vitiate such an intention, as in the case of abduction of a minor with the
latter's consent, in which the male knows that she cannot legally consent to the marriage and yet
he elopes with her. In the case at bar, there is no denying the fact that Lenie was incapacitated to
marry accused-appellant under Manobo or Christian rites since she was still a minor[59] thereby
demonstrating the existence of lewd designs.
Coming now to the charge of rape, we rule that although the prosecution has proved that Lenie
was sexually abused, the evidence proffered is inadequate to establish carnal knowledge. Indeed
the victim could only guarantee that "[the accused] had his penis placed between my legs," the gist
of which may refer to things both incriminatory or non-incriminatory of rape although equally
perverse -
Q: The following day, January 7, 1997, where did Lito Egan bring you?
A: To a certain place called [Miokan] x x x x
Q: During that night, that night when on the second day, where Lito Egan brought you? Where did
you sleep?
A: In a certain uninhabited house.
Q: What did Lito Egan do to you if any?
A: He removed my panty.
Q: What else?
A: Including my short pants.
Q: After removing your short pants, what did Lito Egan do?
xxx
A: He placed himself on top of me.
Q: What happened when he placed himself on top of you?
A: I kept on crying
Q: You said, he placed himself on top of you, please tell us what exactly happened?
A: He had his penis placed between my legs.
Q: What did you feel because of that?
A: I felt pain x x x x
Q: What was your reaction when Lito Egan placed himself on top of you as well as his penis
placed in your private parts?
[Defense Counsel]: The question is misleading. Complainant said, not on her private parts but
only on her legs.
A: I felt pain.
Q: What did you do when at that time when he placed himself on top of you?
A: I kept on moving my body.
Q: And what was the result of your opposition?
A: I felt great pain x x x x[60]
Sexual abuse cannot be equated with rape.[61] In the case at bar, there is no evidence of entrance
or introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum. Lenie's testimony did not
establish that there was penetration by the sex organ of the accused or that he tried to penetrate
her. The doctor who examined Lenie's vagina on 28 May 1997 would in fact admit upon
questioning of the trial judge that "there was no interlabia contact."[62] The medico-legal report
would then reflect our statement in People v. Tayag[63] "that considering the age of the victim and
the condition of her hymen, there should be laceration if there was penetration by an adult male
sex organ" when it reported that the hymen was still intact and impenetrable without causing the
least hymenal injury. The medico-legal report concluded that there were no evident signs of
extragenital physical injuries on the body of the subject at the time of the examination, and her
hymen was intact with her orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration
by an average-sized male organ in erection without causing hymenal injury.[64]
While it is true that Lenie subsequently testified that there was "intercourse" between her and the
accused-appellant, her testimony cannot be accorded such credence as to outweigh her original
declarations. For one, there is an irreconcilable contradiction between her two (2) testimonies as to
the place and date of the alleged rape. While initially she declared that the alleged rape took place
in Miokan on 7 January 1997 she thereafter changed this statement with the allegation that the
rape occurred in Sitio Dalag on 6 January 1997. Significantly, the testimony that there was
"intercourse" between her and accused-appellant was elicited through leading questions of the trial
judge after Lenie had placed on record that accused-appellant after undressing and kissing her and
touching her nipples did nothing more.
As we have held in People v. Tayag,[65] speculations and probabilities cannot take the place of
proof required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and suspicion, no
matter how strong, must not sway judgment. Courts cannot function to supply missing links in the
prosecution evidence which otherwise insufficiently proves carnal knowledge. "Criminal cases are
decided not on the basis of the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence
mustered by the prosecution. This is founded on the presumption of innocence accorded to every
accused."[66] In the case at bar, the ambivalent declarations of the victim are testaments to
prosecutorial inadequacy. Thus instead of clarifying what she meant by "[the accused] had his
penis placed between my legs," the prosecution would itself testify through misleading question
that her answer meant that the accused-appellant placed his penis into her private part, to which
defense counsel correctly objected and would thereafter leave such important matter hanging by
the thread.
Even if we have to assume that Lenies statement, "[the accused-appellant] had his penis placed
between my legs," meant that the penis was "placed in her private part" as the prosecution
inappropriately sought to introduce, the statement would still be speculative as to whether the
penis of accused-appellant in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately
conclude that rape was committed. The ambiguity in the case at bar would in fact be even more
uncertain than those we have come across and declared unanimously as insufficient to prove
carnal knowledge. In People v. Francisco[67] we found the testimony of the victim that "(h)indi po
sa butas pero sa aking pepe lang" to be inconclusive as it was "shrouded in ambiguity," and further
declared -
The prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the precise degree of culpability of the
accused. It must demonstrate in sufficient detail the manner by which the crime was perpetrated.
Certainly, the testimony of the victim to the effect that the accused repeatedly poked her vagina
and that she felt pain as a consequence thereof, would not be enough to warrant the conclusion
that a consummated rape had indeed been committed. The quantum of evidence in criminal cases
requires more than that.
Prior to Francisco, we ruled in People v. Tolentino[68] that the testimony, "binundul-bundol ang
kanyang ari," did not conclusively prove that rape was committed to the exclusion of other
offenses and further held that "this testimony is subject to different interpretations and will not
lead to the conclusion that [the accused's] intent was to have carnal knowledge of her." No
consummated rape took place in People v. Arce[69] on account of the victims claim that the
accused "attempted to touch her vagina with his penis or 'idinidikit yung ari niya.'" In these cases
where the victim herself, as Lenie in the instant case, failed to state for the record that there was
insertion of the penis into her vagina, rape was deemed not to have been committed. Together with
the absolutely non-incriminating medical certificate, which is the only corroborative evidence
available, the likelihood for the consummation of rape in the instant case was nil. In People v.
Campuhan[70] we held -
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all
respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted
or even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused
in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was
consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from consummated rape
will significantly disappear.
Under the circumstances, the criminal liability of accused-appellant is only for forcible abduction
under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code. The sexual abuse which accused-appellant forced upon
Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in forcible abduction and is thus absorbed therein. The
indecent molestation cannot form the other half of a complex crime[71] since the record does not
show that the principal purpose of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity
and that her abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the same.[72] Surely it would
not have been the case that accused-appellant would touch Lenie only once during her four (4)-
month captivity, as she herself admitted, if his chief or primordial intention had been to lay with
her. Instead, what we discern from the evidence is that the intent to seduce the girl forms part and
parcel of her forcible abduction and shares equal importance with the other element of the crime
which was to remove the victim from her home or from whatever familiar place she may be and to
take her to some other.[73] Stated otherwise, the intention of accused-appellant as the evidence
shows was not only to seduce the victim but also to separate her from her family, especially from
her father Palmones, clearly tell-tale signs of forcible abduction -
Both the civil and the common law authorities agree in the conclusion that the crime of abduction
is one sumamente grave y odioso (highly serious and detestable). The penal law regarding
abduction, says the supreme court of Spain, was intended to punish the offense against public
morality and the insult to the family of the abducted girl. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain
of November 30, 1876; June 19, 1891; and June 15, 1895; U. S. vs. Bernabe [1912], 23 Phil.,
154.) The abduction statutes, say the American authorities, were intended for the preservation of
the peace of the home and the virtue of inexperienced females, and to save the members of the
family from sorrow and disgrace. (People vs. Fowler [1891], 88 Cal., 136; State vs. Overstreet
[1890], 43 Kan., 299; People vs. Bristol [1871], 23 Mich., 118; State vs. Chisenhall [1890], 106 N.
C., 676; Rex vs. Pigot, 12 Modern 516, 88 Reprint, 1488.) The three elements in the crime
punished by article 445 of the Penal Code are: (1) That the person abducted be a woman; (2) that
the abduction must have been against the will of the woman; and (3) that the abduction must have
been for lewd or unchaste designs. (5 Viada, Codigo Penal, 143; U. S. vs. Borromeo [1912], 23
Phil., 279)[74] (underscoring supplied).
Verily the single sexual abuse of Lenie although accused-appellant had other opportunities to do
so was itself the external manifestation of his lewd design, and hence he could not be punished for
it either separately or as part of a complex crime. The overt acts in the case at bar are clearly
unlike the actus reus in a complex crime of forcible abduction with rape where the preparatory
sexual advances upon the victim constitute the lewd designs which consummate the forcible
abduction with the ensuing rape transpiring as another crime (although rape is itself the grossest
manifestation of lewd designs) that may no longer be absorbed in but must be complexed with
forcible abduction. As further illustrated by Prof. Luis B. Reyes
The act of appellant in grabbing the victim while she was walking towards barrio San Agustin, and
dragging her into the cornfields, some 40 meters away from the footpath, where by means of force
he tried to have sexual intercourse with her but did not perform all the acts necessary to
consummate such purpose, only constitutes abduction and not abduction complexed with
attempted rape, because said appellant took away the victim for the purpose of corrupting her. In
other words, the attempt to rape her is absorbed by the abduction, being the element of lewd
design of the latter.[75]
In People v. Tayag[76] where there was insufficient evidence to prove carnal knowledge despite a
charge of forcible abduction with rape, we convicted the accused only of forcible abduction -
Although the prosecution has proven that Lazel was sexually abused, the evidence proffered is
inadequate to prove she was raped x x x x Accused-appellant is not, however, off the hook. The
prosecution proved the crime of forcible abduction. It established that accused-appellant took
Lazel against her will and with lewd designs. The word "lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful,
indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral
impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton manner. The medico-legal finding and Lazel's
testimony although insufficient to prove rape, buttress the conclusion that accused-appellant had
lewd designs when he abducted Lazel. Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code defines and punishes
forcible abduction x x x x IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision convicting accused-appellant of
forcible abduction with rape is modified. Accused-appellant is convicted for forcible abduction
and is sentenced to suffer 12 years of prision mayor to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal and to pay the victim P30,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.
Significantly, we cannot consider any aggravating circumstance since under Sec. 8 of Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective 1 December 2000 but applicable to the instant
case,[77] the complaint or information must not only state the designation of the offense given by
statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, but also "specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances." The Information against accused-appellant does not specify any of
the circumstances which would have aggravated the offense charged or its penalty.
In hindsight, one may say that the instant case is all about love extending beyond the realm of law
and morality. The titillation which this abstraction brings forth, however, should not gloss over the
fact that a young innocent girl was ruthlessly torn from the side of her family, overpowered by
superior strength, her cries for help stifled, and rushed to an unknown house and there defiled.
Certainly, there is something more to be endured by her than mere physical pain although that may
not be inconsiderable. In justifying the penalty imposed upon such misguided act, even if it was
done purportedly to soothe the indignity of an unrequited love, we said in United States v.
Borromeo:[78] "[W]hen such an occurrence ceases to be a reality to her and becomes a memory, if
it ever does, she may derive no comfort, no pride, no satisfaction by recalling it. Shame, misery,
mortification, are her lot. Nor can she, if she would, banish the dreadful occurrence from her
thoughts. The story has spread like wildfire. Pitying looks, pointing fingers, and morbid stares
remind her everywhere she goes of her terrible experience x x x x In the case of the girl, the
effects are permanent and far-reaching. Time may lessen but can never annul her sufferings. Nor is
she the only sufferer. Her whole family, to a lesser degree, shares in her humiliation."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo convicting accused-appellant LITO EGAN alias
Akiao of forcible abduction with rape is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is instead declared guilty
of Forcible Abduction only under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term ranging from six (6) years, two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 as
fixed by the court a quo to be paid to private complainant Lenie T. Camad. Costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 138401. July 11, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERRY LINING and LIAN

SALVACION, accused.
GERRY LINING, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Gerry Lining and Lian Salvacion were both charged with the crime of Abduction with Rape under
an Information that read:
That on or about the 5th day of October, 1997, at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more or less, in sitio
Buho, Barangay Mabuslot, municipality of Pinamalayan, province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and acting in common accord, with lewd and unchaste design, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with threat and intimidation with use of a deadly
weapon, forcibly abduct one Emelina Ornos, a 15-year-old girl, towards an unoccupied house and
thereat and pursuant to their criminal conspiracy and motivated with lustful desire, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lay with and had carnal knowledge one after the other of said victim
against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, use of deadly
weapon and abuse of superior strength are attendant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Accused Lian Salvacion remained at large and trial proceeded against Gerry Lining alone, who
entered a plea of Not Guilty.
Gleaned from the questioned decision of the trial court, as well as the records of the case, the facts
are as follows:
On October 4, 1997, at around 12:30 in the afternoon, Emelina Ornos, then fifteen (15) years old,
[2] requested permission from her parents to visit her aunt Josephine at Sitio Buho, Barangay
Nabuslot, Pinamalayan Oriental Mindoro where she was supposed to spend the night.[3] She
arrived at her aunts house at around one oclock in the afternoon.[4] While in her aunts house,
Emelina was invited by one Sajer to a dance party to be held at the barangay basketball court.[5]
Emelina accepted the invitation and at around seven oclock in the evening of the same day, she
went to the party, accompanied by her aunt.[6] Josephine then left Emelina at the party, telling her
that she had to go home but she would return later to fetch her.[7] Josephines house was about 500
meters away from the barangay basketball court.[8]
At around 12:30 in the morning, the party ended but Josephine still had not returned.[9] Emelina
decided to go home alone. On her way to her aunts house, Emelina was accosted by Gerry Lining
and Lian Salvacion, both of whom were known to her since they were her former neighbors.[10]
Lining poked a kitchen knife at Emelinas breast and the two held her hands. Emelina was dragged
towards the ricefield and was forcibly carried to an unoccupied house owned by Mila Salvacion.
[11]
Inside the house, Lining removed Emelinas t-shirt, pants and undergarments. She was pushed to
the floor and while Salvacion was holding her hands and kissing her, Lining inserted his penis
inside her vagina.[12] Emelina shouted and tried to ward off her attackers, but to no avail.[13] One
Russel heard her cries and tried to help her but he left when told not to interfere (Huwag kang
makialam).[14] After Lining had satisfied his lust, he held Emelinas hands and kissed her while
Salvacion in turn inserted his penis inside her vagina.[15] Thereafter, the two directed Emelina to
put on her clothes. The accused then looked for a vehicle to transport Emelina to Barangay
Maningcol. Emelina saw an opportunity to escape, and she returned to her aunts house.[16]
However, because of fear, as the accused threatened her that she would be killed if she would
reveal what they did to her, she did not tell her aunt what transpired. [17] She next went to the
house of her friend Evelyn Saguid where Gerry Selda, a friend of her father, saw her crying. She
told him about the rape incident and Selda accompanied her to the barangay captain.[18] However,
since the barangay captain was not in his house, Selda brought Emelina to the Chief of Police,
Commander Amador Mogol.[19] Emelina's statements were taken at the police station and she
was subjected to a medical examination.[20] The Chief of Police immediately ordered the arrest of
Lining but Salvacion was able to escape.
Dr. Adelaido Malaluan, the Municipal Health Officer of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, who
conducted the medical examination on Emelina on October 6, 1997,[21] reported the following
findings:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL -
Fairly developed, fairly nourished, coherent and ambulatory, breast and conical with brownish
areola, right breast with contusion on nipple inner part measuring 1.5 cm., abdomen is flat and
soft.
Contusions on antero-lateral part of the neck left and right area.
GENITALIA:
There is scantly distribution of pubic hair, Labia Majora are full, cervex and coaptated, there is
superficial fresh erosion along the vaginal wall, with healed laceration 6, 8 and 9 oclock on the
part of the hymen. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the
examining finger and the virgin-sized speculum. Tinea cruris is also noted on the inguinal region.
LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
Negative for Spermatozoa.
REMARKS:
SUBJECT IS IN NON-VIRGIN STATE PHYSICALLY.[22]
Dr. Malaluan testified that Emelinas contusions could have been caused by a blunt object, a
forcible kiss or a bite,[23] and that the fresh erosion along the vaginal canal could have been
caused by an erect penis.[24]
Accused Lining denied the accusations against him and disputed the findings of the trial court. He
alleged that in the morning of October 4, 1997, his brother-in-law Artemio Salvacion invited him
to attend a barangay dance in Nabuslot.[25] Later that afternoon, he fetched Ildefonso Magararu
and together, they went to the house of Artemio, arriving thereat at about eight oclock in the
evening where they also met Russel Bolquerin, Allan Salvacion and Lian Salvacion.[26] However,
Lining was not able to attend the dance party because Artemio requested him to look after the
palay in his house. Instead, he and Ildefonso had some beer and pulutan in the house of Artemio.
[27]
At around 12:00 midnight, after they had finished their drinks and when Artemio returned from
the dance, Ildefonso requested Lining to accompany him on his way home because of his poor
eyesight. Thus, Ildefonso, Allan, Lian, Russel and Lining proceeded to Barangay Palayan, about
one and a half (1-) kilometers away.[28] Since it was raining when they arrived at Palayan, the
group spent the night in Ildefonsos house and only returned to the house of Artemio at around five
oclock in the morning.[29] Lining then decided to proceed and sleep in the house of Mila
Salvacion where the police later apprehended him.[30]
Artemio Salvacion, brother-in-law of Lining and father of Lian, as well as Ildefonso Magararu,
corroborated the testimony of Lining.
Salvacion declared before the court that Lining did not attend the dance and stayed in his house
until about one oclock in the morning when he joined Lian, Allan and Russel in bringing Ildefonso
home.[31] When asked where his son Lian was, Salvacion stated that he left the house because he
got a job and had not returned since. He disclaimed any knowledge of the whereabouts of his son
who, according to him, had not written any letter nor sent any money since he left.[32]
Ildefonso Magararu confirmed that the group of Lining accompanied him home and stayed in his
house from one-thirty to around five oclock the morning of October 5, 1997.[33]
After trial, the court found Gerry Lining guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of forcible
abduction with rape, and for another count of rape. It ruled:
ACCORDINGLY, accused GERRY LINING is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt,
as principal of the complex crime of ABDUCTION WITH RAPE and another count of RAPE and
is hereby sentenced to TWO (2) DEATH penalties.
Additionally, accused is ordered to indemnify Emelina Ornos the amount of P50,000.00.
In so far as the accused at large LIAN SALVACION is concerned, let the records of this case be
sent to the archives without prejudice to its being revived upon his arrest.
SO ORDERED.[34]
Before this Court, accused-appellant alleges:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT INDEED HAD CARNAL

KNOWLEDGE WITH PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, THE TRIAL COURT, NONETHELESS,
ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON HIM THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.[35]
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds no reason to reverse the findings
of the trial court.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that the factual findings of the trial court deserves respect, if
not finality, since the trial judge had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses as they testify.[36] The straightforward and candid testimony of Emelina Ornos, who
was crying as she recalled her ordeal before the trial court, is certainly more credible than the
testimonies of the defense witnesses. Emelina testified:
Q. While you were on your way going home that night, what happened? Please tell us.
A. Lian Salvacion and Gerry Lining accompanied me (sinabayan) sir.
Q. And at that time, do you know personally this Gerry Lining and Lian Salvacion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you know personally Gerry Lining?
A. Because Gerry Lining is a kumpadre of my father, sir.
Q. How about Lian Salvacion, under what circumstance did you come to know him?
A. They were my former neighbors at Buho, sir.
Q. Tell us: Did you reside formerly at Buho?
A. Yes, sir.
FISCAL (Continuing):
Q. When you were already going home and (these) two accused were in company with you, what
happened? Tell us if there is any.
A. Gerry Lining poked a kitchen knife at my breast, sir.
Q. After poking that kitchen knife on your neck, what else did Gerry Lining and Lian Salvacion
do, if any?
A. They held my both hands, sir.
Q. And after holding both your hands, what else did they do?
A. Kinaladkad po nila ako.
FISCAL (Manifesting):
The witness-complainant is again shedding tears and crying.
Q. When they dragged you, towards what direction were you brought?
A. To the ricefield, sir.
Q. And ultimately, where were you brought?
A. In the house where there was no occupant, owned by Mila Salvacion, sir.
Q. How far was that house from the place where you were first poked with a knife by Gerry
Lining?
A. Very far, sir.
Q. And after dragging you towards that house, will you please tell the Court if you were ultimately
brought inside the house?
A. They undressed me sir. (Hinubaran ako ng kamiseta)
Q. Who among the two actually undressed you?
A. Gerry Lining, sir.
Q. At that time, what were you wearing?
A. I was wearing T-shirt and pants, sir.
Q. Who removed that pants and T-shirts?
A. Gerry Lining, sir.
Q. And how about your panty and your bra, who removed the same?
A. Gerry Lining also, sir.
Q. And after removing everything from you and when you were already totally undressed, what
did Gerry Lining do?
A. He pushed me towards the floor, sir.
Q. And when you are (sic) already lying on the floor, what else transpired? What did Gerry Lining
do?
A. He placed himself on top of me sir. (Sumapaw na po siya)
Q. After placing himself on top of you, what was Lian Salvacion doing?
A. He was holding my two hands and kissing me, sir.
Q. You said that Gerry Lining placed himself on top of you; after he placed himself on top of you,
what else did he do?
Witness:
A. Ako po ay inaayod ng inaayod.
Q. When you stated that, what do you mean?
A. Inayod po ako ng inayod.
Q. What did you feel when he was already making that kayod motion?
A. I felt pain on my vagina, sir.
Q. Why did you feel pain in your vagina when he was making that pumping motion?
A. Because it was painful, sir.
Q. What was causing the pain in your vagina?
A. His penis, sir.
Q. At the time that he was making that pumping motion, where was his penis?
A. Inside my vagina, sir.
Q. After a short while making that pumping motion, what happened next?
A. I felt something hot, sir.
Q. And thereafter, what did Gerry Lining do?
A. After that, Gerry Lining held my both hands, sir.
Q. And while Gerry Lining, this time, holding your both hands, what happened next?
A. Lian placed himself on top of me, sir.
Q. What is the surname of this Lian?
A. Lian Salvacion, sir.
Q. While Gerry Lining, this Gerry Lining, this time was holding both your hands and Lian
Salvacion placed himself on top of you, what else transpired?
A. Inayod din po ako ng inayod.
Q. What did you feel when Lian Salvacion was doing this pumping motion?
A. I felt also a hot thing, sir.
Q. Where did you feel that:
A. Inside my vagina, sir.
Q. At the time that Lian Salvacion was making that pumping motion, what actually was Gerry
Lining doing?
A. He was kissing me also, sir.
Q. And at the same time, what was he doing with your both hands?
A. He was squeezing my hands, sir.
Q. And after something had came out of Lian Salvacion inside your vagina, according to you,
what else transpired?
Witness:
A. They required me to dress up, sir.
Q. Did you comply?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after that, where were you brought?
A. After that, they were looking for a vehicle to hide me at Maningcol, sir.
Q. While they were looking for vehicle, what did you do if any?
A. I escaped from the place, sir.
Q. Where did you go when you escaped?
A. To the house of auntie Josephine, sir.
Q. Thereafter, were you able to talk with Josephine?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because I was afraid of telling that happened to me, sir.
Q. Why were afraid of revealing these things that happened to you that night, to your Auntie
Josephine?
A. Because at that time, I was very much afraid, sir.
FISCAL:
May it be made of record that the witness is crying. At this juncture, may we respectfully request
for a recess, your honor and we will continue after the witness regain composure.
COURT:
We resume at exactly 9:30.

xxx
Note: Trial resumed at 10:00 oclock A.M.
COURT:
This is a continuation of the direct-examination of Emelina Ornos. Proceed.
FISCAL (Continuing his direct-examination):
Q. During all the time that you were being raped, by either of the accused, Gerry Lining and Lian
Salvacion, what were you doing?
A. I shouted and tried to fight, sir.
Q. How long did you shout while you were ganged up and raped by the two?
A. Quite a long time, sir. I cannot remember anymore.
Q. For how many hours more or less were you held by the two in that unoccupied house?
A. More or less four (4) hours, sir.
Q. What time more or less were you able to leave that morning?
A. 4:30 oclock in the morning, sir.
Q. Was it already dawn?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You stated that while the two were looking for a vehicle with which to take you to Maningcol,
you were able to escape and according to you you went to the house of your Auntie Josephine and
you were not able to reveal what happened to you, to your Auntie Josephine. My question is, were
you not able to reveal what happened to you to your Auntie Josephine?
A. Because they threatened me not to reveal this matter because I will be killed.[37]
Accused-appellant has nothing to offer other than alibi. Unfortunately for him, alibi is weak in
face of the positive identification by the victim of the perpetrator of the offense.[38] Further, the
testimonies of accused-appellant and the other witnesses for the defense are not consistent on
some material points. Accused-appellant testified that he was not able to attend the dance party
because his brother-in-law Artemio Salvacion asked him to look after the palay.[39] On the other
hand, Artemio Salvacion testified that Lining did not attend the party upon the request of Elding
(Magararu) who would not attend as he was only wearing shorts.[40] Lining and Magararu
testified that when they arrived at Artemios house, the beer and the pulutan were already on the
table.[41] In contrast, Artemio testified that Lining requested for a case of beer and pulutan, and
that Lining, Elding (Magararu), Lian (Salvacion), Russel and Allan were already in his house
when he brought the beer and pulutan inside.[42] These inconsistencies only added doubt on the
mind of the Court regarding the veracity of the statements of the defense witnesses.
The non-presentation of Russel to prove that he saw Emelina being raped does not weaken the
cause of the prosecution since his testimony would at best only be corroborative. In rape cases,
corroborative testimony is not absolutely necessary.[43] The lone testimony of the victim may
suffice to convict the rapist.[44] The Court notes that neither the defense presented Russel to
contradict the testimony of Emelina and to bolster the claim that accused-appellant never left the
house of Artemio.
The medical finding that the victim was already a non-virgin, nor the fact that she had sexual
relations before, would not matter. Even a woman of loose morals could still be a victim of rape,
for the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her will and without her
consent.[45] Neither the absence of physical injuries negates the fact of rape since proof of
physical injury is not an element of rape.[46] In the same way, the absence of spermatozoa does
not mean that the rape did not take place.[47] The absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of the
victim does not destroy the finding of rape since ejaculation is never an element thereof.[48]
Nevertheless, accused-appellant could only be convicted for the crime of rape, instead of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Indeed, it would appear from the records that the
main objective of the accused when the victim was taken to the house of Mila Salvacion was to
rape her. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape.[49]
The Court sustains the trial court in not appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity.
The mere fact that the rape was committed at nighttime does not make nocturnity an aggravating
circumstance.[50] Further, the fact that the accused took turns in holding Emelinas hands while
the other was raping her would not warrant the appreciation of abuse of superior strength. In
People vs. Quianola,[51] the Court ruled that the law[52] should be deemed to have already
considered this circumstance in qualifying the crime to its 'heinous' character rendering in the
context abuse of superior strength as an inherent element thereof.[53] The Court could not
separately appreciate as aggravating circumstance the use of a knife in the commission of the
crime of rape, as there was no evidence that the knife was used to subdue Emelina while the rape
was being committed. The testimony of Emelina showed that the accused poked a knife at her
when they accosted her.[54] However, Emelina was taken by the accused to another place,
particularly, to the house of Mila Salvacion. The testimony on the acts of rape no longer
mentioned the knife, not even to threaten Emelina to submission. She only recalled that the
accused took turns in raping her and that one would hold her hands while the other would perform
the act of rape.
Where the rape is committed by two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion
perpetua to death; however, where there is no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission
of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied.[55] Anent the award of damages, the Court
sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victim and, in addition, grants a
separate award of P50,000.00 as moral damages founded on the victims shame, mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation which rape necessarily brings to the
offended party.[56]
Finally, it should be stressed that one who clearly concurred with the criminal design of another
and performed overt acts which led to the multiple rape committed is a co-conspirator.[57] For this
reason, accused-appellant is deemed a co-conspirator for the act of rape committed by his co-
accused Lian Salvacion and should accordingly be penalized therefor.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant GERRY LINING is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

two (2) counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.
Accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay Emelina Ornos the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape. Costs againsst accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
ERLAND SABADLAB y
BAYQUEL,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 175924
Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
*PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 14, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On October 28, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, in Makati City pronounced
Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel guilty of forcible abduction with rape committed against AAA,[1] a
16-year old domestic helper, and penalized him with reclusion perpetua.[2] On April 26, 2006, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction and the penalty, but modified the civil damages.[3]
Hence, Sabadlab appeals.
Antecedents
Both the RTC and the CA agreed on the factual antecedents.
AAA was then walking at around noon of March 12, 2002 on Dapitan Street in Makati City,
proceeding towards MA Montessori to fetch her employers son who was studying there. Suddenly,
a man (later identified as Sabadlab) grabbed her by the shoulder and ordered her to go with him.
She recognized him to be the man who had persistently greeted her every time she had bought
pandesal at 5 oclock am near her employers house in the past two weeks. Alarmed, she refused to
do his bidding, but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat. Two other men whom she did not
recognize joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into the backseat of a parked car, and one
of Sabadlabs cohorts blindfolded her with a handkerchief. The car moved forward, and stopped
after twenty minutes of travel. Still blindfolded, she was brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that
he would remove her clothes. Sabadlab then undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One
of them tied her hands behind her back. Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck
downwards. Although blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling
out his name as he was kissing her body. Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands
still tied behind her back. Sabadlab raped her in that position. The others took their turns in raping
her after Sabadlab. To prevent her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with
crumpled newspapers. The three ravished her again and again, that she could not remember the
number of times they did so.
At around 3:00 oclock pm, Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by car back to
Dapitan Street, but let her go only after sternly warning that they would surely kill her if she told
anyone about the rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her ward. She
waited there until 5:30 pm.
Upon her arrival at the house, AAAs employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck. AAA at first
lied about the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes because her irritated employer
slapped and boxed her on the stomach to force her to disclose.
On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to report the rapes.
AAA underwent medico-legal examination later that day at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame Quezon City. The results of the medico-legal examination were embodied in Medico-Legal
Report No. M-797-02 issued by medico-legal officer Dr. Mary Ann P. Gajardo, viz:
PHYSICAL INJURIES:
1. Ecchymosis, right mandibular region, measuring 2.5 x 2.5 cm, 8 cms from the anterior midline.
2. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 6 cms right of the anterior midline.
3. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 4.5 cms left of the anterior midline.
4. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 4 cms right of the posterior midline.
5. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 4.5 x 3 cms, 4 cms left of the posterior midline.
6. Ecchymosis, right breast, measuring 4 x 3.5 cms. 10 cms from the anterior midline.
7. Ecchymosis, sternal region, measuring 9 x 3 cms, bissecting the anterior midline.
8. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 9 cms from the anterior midline.
9. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 3 cms, 11 cms from the anterior midline.
10. Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 3.5 x 0.5 cms. 14 cms from the posterior midline
GENITAL:
PUBIC HAIR: Moderate
LABIA MAJORA: Full, convex and slightly gaping.
LABIA MINORA: Pinkish brown slightly hypertrophied labia minora in between.
HYMEN: Presence of shallow fresh lacerations at 7 oclock position and deep fresh lacerations at 6
and 9 oclock position. Congested.
POSTERIOIR FOURCHETTE: Abraded/Congested
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE: Offers strong resistance upon introduction of the examiners
index finger.
VAGINAL CANAL: Narrow with prominent rugosities.
CERVIX: Soft and close
PERIURETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS: Negative for spermatozoa and negative for gram
(-) diploxocci.
CONCLUSION: Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. Barring unforeseen
complications, it is estimated that the above injuries will heal within 3-5 days.[4]
Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to the vicinity where she had usually bought pandesal to
look for the suspects. She spotted Sabadlab in one of the nearby restaurants and pointed to him.
The policemen apprehended Sabadlab and brought him to the station, where he gave his name as
Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel. That was her first time to know the name of Sabadlab.
These antecedents impelled the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati to immediately charge
Sabadlab and two John Does with forcible abduction with rape via the information dated March
13, 2002, alleging:
That on or about the 12th day of March of 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two (2) John
Does whose names and whereabouts are still unknown, with lewd designs and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry
away AAA, 16 years of age, against her will from Dapitan St., Barangay Guadalupe, Makati City
and brought her to an undisclosed place, where accused by means of force, violence and
intimidation had carnal knowledge of complainant against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
In his defense, Sabadlab denied the charge and asserted alibi, claiming that on March 12, 2002, he
was at Billiard M where he worked as a spotter; that he stayed there until noon, leaving the place
only to have lunch; and that he returned to Billiard M at 12:30 pm and stayed there until he was
arrested at 7:00 pm of March 12, 2002. Frederick Dionisio and Nathaniel Salvacion corroborated
Sabadlabs alibi.
As stated, the RTC convicted Sabadlab for forcible abduction with rape as charged based on
AAAs positive identification of him as one of the rapists, observing that her physical injuries and
fresh hymenal lacerations were consistent with her account of the rapes, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of forcible abduction with rape charged in this
case, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the
costs.
On the civil aspect, the accused is ordered to pay AAA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) as MORAL DAMAGES.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal in the CA, Sabadlab assigned the following errors,[7] to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE HIGHLY INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Nonetheless, the CA sustained his conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua, holding that
the supposed inconsistencies referred to trivial matters or innocent lapses that did not affect the
credibility of AAA as a witness but were instead badges of veracity or manifestations of
truthfulness of the material points of her testimony. The CA thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the RTC
dated October 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
1. The award of moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00;
2. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED;
3. Appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may
appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration on August 2, 2006, Sabadlab is now before the
Court to seek the final review.
In addition to the arguments and submissions made in his appellants brief in the CA, Sabadlab
indicates in his supplemental brief[9] that AAAs version was ambiguous and implausible, and
conflicted with human experience as borne by the following, namely: (a) the State did not present
any torn apparel; (b) no bodily injuries were shown to prove that AAA had resisted the sexual
intercourse; (c) AAA did not cry for help; and (d) AAA did not escape despite several
opportunities to do so. He contends, moreover, that the States evidence established only simple
seduction.[10]
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
First of all, Sabadlab continues to assail the credibility of AAAs recollections. We understand why
he does so, because the credibility of the victims testimony is a primordial consideration in rape.
[11] Yet, because both the RTC and the CA unanimously regarded AAA as a credible and
spontaneous witness, he has now to present clear and persuasive reasons to convince us to reverse
both lower courts determination of credibility and to resolve the appeal his way.
Our review reveals, however, that Sabadlab has not tendered any clear and persuasive reasons that
may warrant the reversal or modification of the findings of both lower courts on the credibility of
AAA and his criminal liability. The supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or
collateral matters that the CA precisely held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of
truthfulness due to their tendency of demonstrating that the testimony had not been rehearsed or
concocted. It is also basic that inconsistencies bearing on minor details or collateral matters should
not adversely affect the substance of the witness declaration, veracity, or weight of testimony.[12]
The only inconsistencies that might have discredited the victims credible testimony were those
that affected or related to the elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true herein.
The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For one, the matter of
who of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling, because her confusion
did not alter the fact that she had been really blindfolded and rendered naked. Nor did the failure
to produce any torn apparel of AAA disprove the crime charged, it being without dispute that the
tearing of the victims apparel was not necessary in the commission of the crime charged. In fact,
she did not even state that her clothes had been torn when Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her.
Verily, details and matters that did not detract from the commission of the crime did not diminish
her credibility.
We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and of
weighing their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he
derives while the witnesses testify before him.[13] The demeanor on the witness chair of persons
sworn to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is a significant element of judicial adjudication
because it can draw the line between fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant pauses,
their quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes, their modest blushes
or guilty blanches - all these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth or lying in their teeth.
[14] As the final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the age-old norm to accord the
utmost respect to the findings and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses reached by the trial
judge on account of his unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and on account of his
personal access to the various indicia available but not reflected in the record.[15]
Secondly, AAAs recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive identification of the
rapists, particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too, that her trustworthiness in
identifying Sabadlab as one of the rapists rested on her recognition of him as the man who had
frequently flirted with her at the store where she had usually bought pandesal for her employers
table. As such, the identification of him as one of the rapists became impervious to doubt.
Thirdly, AAAs failure to shout for help and her failure to escape were not factors that should
diminish credibility due to their being plausibly explained, the first by the fact that her mouth had
been stuffed by Sabadlab with crumpled newspaper, preventing her from making any outcry, and
the second by the fact that the culprits had blindfolded her and had also tied her hands behind her
back.
And, lastly, Sabadlabs allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries was actually
contrary to the medical certification showing her several physical injuries and the penetration of
her female organ.[16] This should debunk without difficulty his submission that she did not offer
any resistance to the sexual assaults she suffered. Her resistance to Sabadlabs order for her to go
with him was immediately stifled by his poking of the gun at her throat and by appearance of his
two cohorts. At any rate, it is notable that among the amendments of the law on rape introduced
under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is Section 266-D, which adverts to the
degree of resistance that the victim may put up against the rapist, viz:
Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of
rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render
her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the
acts punished under Article 266-A.
We next deal with the characterization of the crime as forcible abduction with rape. The principal
objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing
her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from the successive
acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as
to expose her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck
down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that order). Although forcible abduction was
seemingly committed,[17] we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances,
the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.[18]
The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly prescribed. Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,[19] respectively define and punish
simple rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
Although the CA deleted the RTCs award of exemplary damages because of the absence of
aggravating circumstance (sic),[20] we reinstate the award in view of the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. The Civil
Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil
liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.[21] The
Civil Code allows such damages to be awarded by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[22] Present here
was the need for exemplarity. Thus, the CA should have recognized the entitlement to exemplary
damages of AAA on account of the attendance of use of a deadly weapon. It was of no moment
that the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the information. As fittingly
explained in People v. Catubig:[23]
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within
the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the Court grants the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the
civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and the moral damages of P50,000.00 the CA awarded to AAA.
Sabadlab is further liable for interest of 6% per annum on all the civil damages.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 26, 2006,
with the MODIFICATION that ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL is: (a) DECLARED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE as defined under Article 266-A
and as penalized with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353; and (b) ORDERED TO PAY to the victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest of
6% per annum on each of the amounts reckoned from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 138086. January 25, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONDE RAPISORA y ESTRADA,

accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 214,[1] convicting Conde E. Rapisora of the complex crime of
"Forcible Abduction with Rape" and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
Rapisora was indicted in an information that read:
"That on or about the 5th day of August, 1997, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a
knife, and pretending to be a relative of the private complainant and against the will of Irene
Hermo y Cajipe and with lewd design, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abduct and carry away said Irene Hermo y Cajipe, a seventeen year old girl, while she was
walking along Shaw Boulevard, this City and thereafter forced her to ride in a taxi and brought her
to a Filipinas Walk Inn and while inside, accused with lewd design and at the same time, poking a
knife at her, hence, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said Irene Hermo y Cajipe, a minor, against her will
and consent for several times."[2]
The accused entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge. Evidence was thereupon adduced by,
respectively, the prosecution and the defense.
The trial court gave a resum of the evidence given at the trial, starting with that submitted by the
prosecution.
"At about 11:30 a.m. of August 5, 1997, Irene Hermo y Cajipe, a 17 year old household helper of
Susana Dy, was walking along the corner of Pinagtipunan St. and Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong
City after coming from Aling Naty's store where she bought vegetables, when Conde Rapisora y
Estrella, the accused in this case, approached and told her `you're here' (nandito ka pala) to which
she replied `who are you?' Conde Rapisora introduced himself that he is her Tito Andy. He told her
that she could not remember him anymore because she was still small when her mother left her to
his care. Few minutes later, Conde Rapisora called a taxicab then dragged and forced Irene Hermo
to board the same. She did not, however, resist because he poked a knife on her side (pp. 10-11
TSN Jan. 20, 1998).
"They were seated at the rear passenger seat with Conde Rapisora seated on her right side with his
knife poked on her right side. He warned her to keep quiet. He also told her that she had grown
bigger and his wife, her Ate Karen, would be very happy to see her since they will be going to
their place (pp. 11-13 TSN, ibid).
"Irene Hermo noticed that they alighted in Sta Mesa near a motel. He instructed her to hold his
waist so that his wife Karen will be very happy. He brought her to a house with a green painted
gate and a store in front (p. 14 TSN, ibid).
"Reaching the store, the accused got the key inside. She waited for the accused and after he had
returned they went inside the house. Irene Hermo thought that it was his house. They entered a
room, which according to the accused is the room of his wife Karen. While they were about to
enter a room, the accused called up the name of Karen, then he opened it and suddenly pushed
Irene inside. He poked his knife at her and told her not to shout and resist (pp. 15-16 TSN, ibid).
"Accused ordered her to remove her clothes but when she resisted, he undressed her. He also
removed his clothes and told her to lie in bed. He ordered her to spread her legs which the victim
obeyed. He forced his penis to enter her vagina but it could not get in because she was moving
(malikot). So he inserted his finger. He ordered the victim to masturbate him and when his penis
hardened, the accused rammed it into her vagina (pp. 17-18 TSN, ibid).
"She recalled that the accused inserted his penis to her vagina six (6) times. The accused then
placed his hardened penis inside her mouth, licked her vagina, sucked her breast and placed her
tongue insider her ears. She was shouting but the accused placed a towel on her mouth.
"Thereafter a roomboy knocked on the door and told the accused that it was already time.
"The accused immediately put on his clothes and left the room leaving behind the victim. She put
on her clothes too and went out and hurriedly left the place. The accused chased her and told her
that she [would] take her home, but she declined his offer. She [ran] and took a passenger jeep (pp.
23-24, TSN, ibid)."[3]
Rapisora did not deny that he was with Irene in the morning of 05 August 1997 and that the two
proceeded to and stayed awhile at the Filipinas Walk-in Motel. He claimed, however, that private
complainant had consented to it all. The trial court summed up Rapisora's version of the case.
"The accused, who was a member of the Mandaluyong Fire Department since 1995 until August 5,
1997, x x x claimed that he first met the victim in the morning of August 1, 1997 at Market Place
Shopping Mall, Mandaluyong City which is infront of Kalentong Fire Station where he was
assigned. They chanced upon each other while they were both viewing the still pictures displayed
outside the moviehouse of the shopping mall. Allegedly, the victim introduced herself to him as
Jocelyn and a cashier in a grocery in Shaw Boulevard. He gave his name as Andy Villanueva.
They had a beautiful conversation wherein the victim even kidded him that he looked like actor
Andy Poe (pp. 5-12 TSN March 18, 1998).
"They again met on August 3, 1997 at the same shopping mall at about 8:00 o'clock in the
morning. It was his day-off and the victim was there to buy something. The only thing they talked
about was that they agreed to see each other on August 5, 1997 in front of that shopping mall (pp.
14-16 TSN, ibid).
"So, on August 5, 1997 about 10:00 in the morning, the accused was already standing in front of
the shopping mall waiting for the victim, who arrived past 10:00 in the morning. The accused
noticed that while the victim was approaching him, she was looking for something in her pocket.
He asked her what was that she was looking for, and the victim told him that she lost her P300.00
in her pocket. She then suggested that they looked for her money by going back to the route taken
by her which was from Kalentong to Shaw Boulevard to see if her money had dropped on the
ground. He alleged that while they were walking along Kalentong, the victim was holding his
hand and was not also looking for her lost money.
"Later, the victim told him if he can help her pay that missing money but the accused asked her
when is she going to pay him. The victim answered, later, and when he asked what time, she
merely kept quiet.
"They went back to the shopping mall, took a snack and watched a movie.
"Inside the moviehouse they sat beside each other. She leaned on his chest, kissed and embraced
each other. As he inserted his finger on her private parts her legs spread and she embraced him
tightly. She then uttered, `slowly only' (`dahan dahan lang daw'). He then noticed that her hand
was going down to his pants until she got hold of his penis. She unzipped his pants, held his penis
and asked him if she could place it in her mouth (pp. 22-30 TSN, ibid).
"The accused told him that it could not be because of the chair (`hindi pwede kasi nakaharang and
silya') so he invited her to go somewhere else. It was the victim who suggested that they go to a
place in Sta. Mesa which is near the place where she previously worked. She asked the accused if
he had money and when the latter answered in the affirmative they boarded a taxi and proceeded
to Filipinas Walk-in Motel.
"While they were inside the taxicab the victim reminded him of the P300.00 she will borrow from
him. So the accused took out his wallet and showed him his money. While he was opening his
wallet she saw his I.D. and she immediately grabbed it. It was then that the victim knew his real
name (pp. 31-35 TSN, ibid).
"They checked-in at the motel at about 1:00 in the afternoon. As soon as they entered the room,
the victim immediately took off her clothes because the accused told her to take a bath first. While
she was removing her panty the accused saw that she had her menstruation. Since the comfort
room was outside the room, the victim did not take a bath anymore. Meanwhile, it was during this
moment when the victim revealed her name and worked (pp. 36-39 TSN, ibid).
"The accused refused to have sexual intercourse with the victim because of her menstruation. So
the victim instead placed herself on top of him, kissed his body, held his penis and placed it inside
her mouth. After he reached his climax, he hurriedly went to the comfort room to wash himself
(pp. 40-44 TSN, ibid).
"Thereafter, the victim put her clothes on and hurriedly left the room leaving the accused
behind."[4]
The trial court gave no weight to the narration of the accused, describing it as a fantastic fallacy[5]
and as having "merely showed his sexual perversity.[6] Convicting the accused, the trial court
pronounced a death sentence on him.
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, CONDE RAPISORA Y ESTRADA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape, as defined and penalized under
Article 335 (as amended by R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8353) and Article 342 in relation to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DEATH, with the accessory
penalties of the law, to indemnify the private complainant, IRENE HERMO in the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
"Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."[7]
Accused-appellant, praying for an acquittal and a reversal of the judgment rendered by the trial
court, came up with the following assignment of errors:
"I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
IMPLAUSIBLE TESTIMONY OF IRENE HERMO.
"II.THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE.
"III.THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT."[8]
The court a quo has accorded full credit to the testimony of Irene, "a simple and unsophisticated
girl," finding it to be a straightforward, clear and x x x good account" of how she has been
"beastly attacked by the accused.[9] The long standing rule, consistently upheld by jurisprudential
holdings, is that the assignment of values to the testimony of witnesses must aptly be left to the
trial court, it being considered to be in the best position to discharge that function. Invariably, its
findings on this issue are given the highest degree of respect and, absent strong cogent reasons to
warrant otherwise, will not ordinarily be disturbed on appeal.[10]
Appellant would urge the Court to ignore the testimony of complainant for her alleged failure to
call for help. In People vs. Akhtar,[11] similarly involving the crime of forcible abduction with
rape, the same contention was raised. This Court, rejecting the proposition made by the alleged
offender, held that -
Complainants failure to ask for help when she was abducted, or to escape from appellants house
during her detention, should not be construed as a manifestation of consent to the acts done by
appellant. For her life was on the line. Against the armed threats and physical abuses of appellant,
she had no defense. Moreover, at a time of grave peril, to shout could literally be to court disaster.
Her silence was born out of fear for her safety, to say the least, not a sign of approval.[12]
Almost exactly could be said in the case at bar. Private complainant, Irene Hermo, testified:
"ATTY. FERRER:
Did you not think to call your employer Susana Dy?
"A I told him that I have to go home because I still have to cook, Sir.
"Q And even if you have an obligation to cook you still went with him?
"A He forced me, Sir.
"Q How did he force you?
"A He hold me and according to him we will go to their house, Sir.
"Q And you did not try to free yourself before you enter the taxi?
"A I was afraid of the knife, Sir.
"Q You did not make an outcry?
"A No, Sir.
"Q And you did not attempt to free yourself before you boarded the taxi?
"A I tried to resist but he drag me inside the taxi, Sir.
"Q How did you resist him before you boarded that taxi?
"A He was holding my arm, Sir.
"Q You did not forcibly free yourself?
"A No, Sir.
"Q Once you were inside the taxi did you not protested to the driver?
"A I was afraid of the knife that was pointed at my side, Sir.
"Q Conde was not saying any word while he was pointing the knife to your side inside the taxi?
"A He told me that once we reach their house Auntie Karen will be happy because I am already
big, Sir.
"Q Did you not complain to the driver of the alleged poking?
"A No, Sir. I was afraid he might harm me."[13]
When the incident happened, Irene, a frail and weak girl, was only sixteen years old and just an
elementary graduate. Rapisora, thirty-six years old and a government employee at the Bureau of
Fire Protection in Mandaluyong City, was described by the trial judge as being husky, muscular
and stronger (in built) than the complainant." Asked during the cross-examination why she did not
try to flee when she was left alone for about two minutes at the entrance of the motel, Irene could
only utter, wala akong maisip."[14]
This Court, in several cases, has observed that behavioral psychology would indicate that most
people, confronted by unusual events, react dissimilarly to like situations.[15] Intimidation, more
subjective than not, is peculiarly addressed to the mind of the person against whom it may be
employed, and its presence is basically incapable of being tested by any hard and fast rule.
Intimidation is normally best viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at
the time and occasion of the crime.[16]
For his second and third assigned errors, Rapisora argued that the complainant did not offer even
the slightest resistance to the bestial desire of the accused-appellant[17] and, to support this claim,
cited the fact that the medical report showed no findings of any external physical injury on her
body. The report on the medical examination conducted on the complainant indeed concluded that
there was no evident sign of extragenital physical injury," albeit adding the phrase, "healing
hymenal laceration present.[18] The medico-legal officer, Dr. Alvin A. David, who conducted the
examination explained that laceration due to sexual intercourse would, under normal
circumstances, be apparent only within the first 48 hours immediately following the act. This
finding would be consistent with the testimony of Irene that she was raped two days prior to the
time that she could undergo the physical examination.
Physical resistance, in any case, need not be established in rape cases when threats and
intimidation are employed and the victim ultimately gives up to the unwanted embrace of her
rapist.[19] Even when a man lays no hand on a woman, yet if by the array of physical forces he so
overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance through fear of greater harm,
the consummation of unlawful intercourse by the man would still be nothing less than rape.[20]
Rapisora cowed Irene into silence and submission from the time of abduction until the
consummation of the rape. While they were in the taxicab, Rapisora was poking a knife at her
side. Inside the motel room, accused-appellant once more threatened Irene with the weapon,
ordering her neither to resist nor to shout. When Irene made a loud cry because she could no
longer stand the pain of her assailants abuses, Rapisora unmindfully shoved a towel into her
mouth to mute her cries.
The way Irene acted after the incident would show consistency in her story. From the motel, she
immediately went to her employer and recounted the incident. Irene also told her aunt, who later
arrived, about what the accused had done to her. She, together with her aunt, then went back to the
Filipinas Walk-in Motel and inquired from the motel roomboys about the identity of the accused.
Irene and her aunt were informed that the man had been frequenting the place. Forthwith, they
reported the matter at the Mandaluyong City police station. The following day, they proceeded to
the National Bureau of Investigation for the medical examination of Irene but since there was no
physician available at the time, she was examined only the following day. Four days later, Irene
was informed that a man was arrested and detained at the Western Police District jail for an
incident similar to what had befallen her at the Filipinas Walk-in Motel. Accompanied by her
uncle, she immediately repaired to the police station and there personally identified the accused to
be the person who had abducted and raped her.
The conduct of the woman immediately after an alleged sexual assault can be crucial in
establishing the truth or falsity of her charge.[21] For instance, the victim's instant willingness, as
well as courage, to face interrogation and medical examination could be a mute but eloquent proof
of the truth of her claim.[22]
The Court is satisfied that the trial court has correctly evaluated the evidence and been right in
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The crime committed, however, is not the
complex crime of "forcible abduction with rape." Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of
rape if the real objective of the accused is but to rape the victim,[23] a fact that is here clearly
evident given the circumstances of the case.
The information against the accused has charged him with multiple rape, at least six times
according to the trial court in its findings. Section 3, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court[24] provides
that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, and the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them x x x.
Rapisora can thus be held responsible for as many rapes as might have been committed by him
which are duly proven at the trial.
The rapes have been committed with the use of a deadly weapon, a knife, for which Republic Act
7659 prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance shown, appellant should only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, not
death, for each of the six counts of rape.
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, an award of P50,000.00 moral damages should be

awarded to the victim for each of the offenses established in addition to the P50,000.00 civil
indemnity already ordered by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 214, in Criminal Case No. 115-H-MD finding accused-appellant Conde Rapisora y
Estrada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of rape but MODIFIES the death penalty
imposed by it on said accused-appellant by reducing it to reclusion perpetua for each count and to
pay the victim, Irene Hermo y Cajipe, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of moral damages, in
addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court, for each count of rape, or a
grand total of P600,000.00 damages.
SO ORDERED.
_------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila;
and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage
started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where
their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where
the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A.
de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to
Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of
Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A
similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already
been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the
entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in
said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending
before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is,
petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to
be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted
herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing
the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance
with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict
law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the
requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise
its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of
the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the
State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the
power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil
actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that
the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness
therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as
to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia
with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has
the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that
the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when
the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of
such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time
the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing
of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed
a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of
such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be
one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of
the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of
a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled
to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal
judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage
from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no
longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the
purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The
same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was
effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 137354. July 6, 2000]
SALVADOR M. DE VERA, petitioner, vs. HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge,

Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City; and EVALUATION AND INVESTIGATION
BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
"It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool
for a client."
In Re: Joaquin Borromeo

241 SCRA 408 (1995)
The case is a petition for certiorari and mandamus[1] assailing the Evaluation Report of the
Evaluation and Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, dated October 2, 1998 referring
petitioners complaint to the Supreme Court and its Memorandum, dated January 4, 1999,[2]
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
We state the relevant facts.
Petitioner is not a member of the bar. Possessing some awareness of legal principles and
procedures, he represents himself in this petition.
On August 28, 1996, petitioner instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City a special civil
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the municipal trial court from proceeding
with a complaint for ejectment against petitioner.[3] When the Judge originally assigned to the
case inhibited himself, the case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo.[4]
On July 9, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners application for a temporary restraining order.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The court denied the same on September 1, 1998.[5]
On September 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-
complaint[6] against Judge Pelayo, accusing him of violating Articles 206[7] and 207[8] of the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019.[9]
On October 2, 1998, Associate Graft Investigation Officer, Erlinda S. Rojas submitted an

Evaluation Report recommending referral of petitioners complaint to the Supreme Court. Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo L. Apotadera approved the recommendation.[10] We quote the decretal
portion of the report:[11]
"FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and in accordance with the ruling in Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221
SCRA 464, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be referred to the Supreme
Court for appropriate action. The same is hereby considered CLOSED and TERMINATED insofar
as this Office is concerned."
On October 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the case to the Court Administrator,
Supreme Court.[12]
On November 6, 1998, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Evaluation Report.
On January 4, 1999, the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration.[13]
Hence, this petition.[14]
The issue is whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed
against a judge of the regional trial court in connection with his handling of cases before the court.
Petitioner criticizes the jurisprudence[15] cited by the Office of the Ombudsman as erroneous and
not applicable to his complaint. He insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge
against a judge, it was within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme Court to resolve
whether a crime was committed and the judge prosecuted therefor.
The petition can not succeed.
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman did not
exercise his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
hostility.[16] There was no evasion of positive duty. Neither was there a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by law.[17]
We agree with the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion
warranting the writs prayed for.[18] The issues have been settled in the case of In Re: Joaquin
Borromeo.[19] There, we laid down the rule that before a civil or criminal action against a judge
for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 (knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be
entertained, there must first be "a final and authoritative judicial declaration" that the decision or
order in question is indeed "unjust." The pronouncement may result from either:[20]
(a).....an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the
judgment; or
(b).....an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for
promulgating an unjust judgment or order.
Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case
is also an exclusive judicial function.[21]
"To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation
service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order
or decision -- whether final and executory or not -- and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the
basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That
prerogative belongs to the courts alone (underscoring ours)."[22]
This having been said, we find that the Ombudsman acted in accordance with law and
jurisprudence when he referred the cases against Judge Pelayo to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction committed by the respondent, we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Evaluation
Report of the Evaluation and Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman dated October 2,
1998 and its memorandum, dated January 4, 1999, in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. MTJ-92-643
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
This is a complaint filed by Louis Vuitton, S.A., presented by counsel, Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
Peña and Nolasco Law Office, against Judge Francisco Diaz Villanueva the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 36, on the ground that the latter knowingly rendered a manifestly
unjust judgment.
This Court finds the following facts as relevant:
In Criminal Case No. XXXVI-62431, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose V. Rosario",
Louis Vuitton, S.A. accused the latter of unfair competition as defined by paragraph 1 of Article
189, Revised Penal Code. The information stated:
"x x x the above named accused, as owner/proprietor of Manila COD Department Store x x x did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture, distribute, sell and offer for sale
lady's bags, should (sic) bags, wallets, purses and other similar goods made of leather with the
labels, trademarks and logo of 'LOUIS VUITTON' and 'LV', which are exclusive trademarks
owned and registered with the Philippine Patent Office in the name of private complainant LOUIS
VUITTON S.A. x x x thus, giving to them the general appearance of goods or products of said
private complainant, or such appearance which would be likely to induce the public to believe that
said goods offered are those of private complainant, in unfair competition and for the purpose of
deceiving or defrauding it of its legitimate trade or the public in general x x x."[1]
On February 8, 1991, before judgment, prosecution filed the Prosecution's Memorandum with
Motion found in Annex "A" of the Complaint, where the prosecution prayed:
"Premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the accused Jose V. Rosario be declared
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having committed the offense described in the criminal
information against him.
In the alternative, if the accused cannot be held responsible for the criminal information against
him, it is respectfully moved that the accused be committed to answer for the proper offense of
"giving other persons (the supposed concessionaire) a chance or opportunity to commit unfair
competition" (Section 1, Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code in conjunction with Rule 119 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure)."[2]
The trial court summarized its factual findings as follows:
"From the records of the case, the evidence presented and the arguments advanced by the parties,
the Court finds that the complaining witness in this case is the representative and attorney-in-fact,
counsel of Louis Vuitton, S.A. French Company with business address at Paris, France; that
private complainant is suing the accused for the protection of the trade mark Louis Vuitton and the
L.V. logo which are duly registered with the Philippine Patent Office; that on May 10, 1989, Atty.
Felino Padlan of the Quasha Law Office brought a letter to the COD informing the latter to cease
and desist from selling leather articles bearing the trade marks Louis Vuitton and L.V. logo as the
same is the registered trade marks belonging to the private complainant which has not authorized
any person in the Philippines to sell such articles; that on August 4, 1989, prosecution witness,
Miguel Domingo bought at the COD ladies' bag bearing the trade mark and logo of Louis Vuitton
x x x; that again on September 6, 1989, said Mr. Domingo again bought from the same store a
wallet with a trade mark and logo of Louis Vuitton x x x; that on September 28, 1989, the NBI,
upon the request of the Quasha Law Firm applied for a Search Warrant at the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Quezon City; that the application was granted and the Search Warrant was issued against
COD and was enforced on the same date; that from the implementation of the said Search
Warrant, about seventy-two (72) leather products were seized; that the accused signed the
inventory of the seized articles.
The accused, on the other hand, claimed: that he is not the manufacturer or seller of the seized
articles; that the said articles were sold in the store by a concessionaire by the name of Erlinda Tan
who is doing business under the name of Hi-Tech bags and wallets."[3]
In acquitting the accused, the trial court gave the following reasons:
"From all the foregoing, considering that the accused denied being the manufacturer or seller of
the seized articles, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that said articles are owned and
being sold by the accused. The prosecution relied as their evidence against the accused the
inventory which was signed by him (accused) with a notation under his signature
"owner/representative". An examination of the inventory x x x would show that the same was a
prepared form of the NBI and that the accused was made to sign only on the space on the
typewritten word owner/representative. Aside from this, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to show that there is a link between the manufacturer of the seized goods and the
accused. Further, when the case was filed with the Prosecutor's Office, it stated the name of the
accused as the owner of the COD, but from the evidence presented, it appears that the accused is
not the owner but the stockholder and the executive-vice president thereof.
The prosecution evidence show that long before the raid of September 28, 1989, surveys have
been caused to be made by the Quasha Law Firm, not only at the COD but also in other
department stores as far as Baguio City and Cebu City; that these seized products were being sold
not only at COD but also in some big deparmtnet(sic) store such as Cash and Carry. They could
have easily verified from the Securities and Exchange Commission who the actual officers of the
COD [are] to be charged, but the prosecution did not do this and relied only on the inventory of
the seized goods prepared by the NBI agents with the typewritten word owner/representative.
With respect to the seized goods, the test of unfair competition is whether the goods have been
made to appear that will likely deceive the ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care. The seized
goods which were marked as exhibits and presented to the Court would easily show that there was
no attempt on the part of the manufacturer or seller to pass these goods as products of Louis
Vuitton. From the price tags attached to a seized bag, it could be seen that the article carried a
price tag of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN (P147.00) PESOS, whereas, upon examination of
the expert witness presented by the prosecution, he testified that a genuine bag of Louis Vuitton
would cost about FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00 PESOS to FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS. It is apparent that the seized articles did not come close to the appearance of a genuine
Louis Vuitton product. Further, the buckle of the bag also carries the logo of Gucci, another trade
mark. From the appearance of all the seized goods, it is very apparent that these goods were
roughly done. The quality and textures of the materials used are of low quality that an ordinary
purchases(sic) exercising ordinary [care] will easily determine that they were locally
manufactured and will not pass as a (sic) genuine Louis Vuitton products. From these, the Court
finds that the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of unfair competition, to wit:
a. That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer
or dealer;
b. That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrapping of
their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature of their a (sic)
appearance.
These elements, to the mind of the Court are absent in this case.
Further finally, the prosecution filed this case against accused Jose V. Rosario in his personal
capacity and not as an officer of the Manila COD Department Store, which is a corporation, and
has a separate legal personality."[4]
In the complaint, complainant pointed out that the respondent Judge did not consider the motion
of February 11, 1990. This omission of respondent judge allegedly constituted a clear and gross
violation of his ministerial duty in order to allow the accused to escape criminal liability.
Furthermore, complainant claimed that the respondent judge's failure to resolve the motion
exposed his gross ignorance of the law. Section 11, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure states:
Section 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense.-- When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause
to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper
information charged.
Complainant also assailed respondent judge's findings that there was no unfair competition
because the elements of the crime were not met, and that the seized articles did not come close to
the appearance of a genuine Louis Vuitton product, the counterfeit items having been poorly done.
According to complainant, in making such conclusions, respondent judge ignored the ruling in
Converse Rubber Corp. vs. Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co., Inc.,[5] that "the statute on unfair
competition extends protection to the goodwill of a manufacturer or dealer".
Thirdly, complainant criticized respondent judge for his failure to consider the alleged lack of
credibility of Felix Lizardo, the lone witness for the defense, in rendering the assailed decision.
Lastly, complainant pointed out that respondent judge violated the constitutional mandate that
decisions should be rendered within three (3) months from submission of the case. It appeared that
the decision was dated June 28, 1991 but it was promulgated only on October 25, 1991.
In response to the forgoing accusations, respondent judge set forth in his comment that:
1. The evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the conclusion that Jose V.
Rosario was quilty beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence did not prove all the elements of the
offense charged. He added that in deciding criminal cases, the trial court relies not on the
weakness of the accused's evidence but on the strength of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution.
2. His alleged failure to act on the motion was due to the prosecutor's failure to point out to the
court before judgment was rendered that a mistake was made in charging the proper offense. He
also added that the prosecutor's evidence did not also manifest this mistake.
Citing the conclusion of the Prosecution's Memorandum with Motion of the complainant,
respondent judge averred that the private prosecutor himself, instead of showing to the court that
the proper offense was not charged, clearly indicated that no such mistake was committed. The
cited statement says;
"It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution has fairly proven that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of having committed the offense outlined in the criminal Information
against him. x x x."[6]
3. The prayer contained in the Prosecution's Memorandum with Motion should have been placed
in a proper pleading. He also said that the private prosecutor should have conferred with public
prosecutor if the former believed that the proper offense of giving other persons a chance to
commit unfair competition would be charged against Rosario. The failure of both public and
private prosecutors to take the appropriate action provided no reason for respondent judge to
commit the accused to answer for the proper information.
The sole issue for consideration of this Court is whether or not respondent judge is guilty of
knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment.
The Revised Penal Code holds a judge liable for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust
judgment. Article 204 thereof provides:
Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a case submitted to him for decision
shall be punished x x x.
The law requires that the (a) offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to
him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust.[7] In some
administrative cases[8] decided by this Court, We have ruled that in order to hold a judge liable, it
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
In this case, We are constrained to hold that complainant failed to substantiate its claims that
respondent judge rendered an unjust judgment knowingly. It merely relied on the failure of
respondent judge to mention the motion in the decision, on his alleged reliance on the testimony of
defense witness and on the delay in the promulgation of the case.
But they are not enough to show that the judgment was unjust and was maliciously rendered.
A judgment is said to be unjust when it is contrary to the standards of conduct prescribed by law.
[9] The test to determine whether an order or judgment is unjust may be inferred from the
circumstances that it is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence.[10]
The decision herein rests on two legal grounds: first, that there was no unfair competition because
the elements of the crime were not sufficiently proven; second, that Jose V. Rosario who was
accused as owner/proprietor of COD was not properly charged as his personality is distinct from
that of the COD's.
In holding that there was no unfair competition, the respondent judge said that "the seized articles
did not come close to the appearance of a genuine Louis Vuitton product".[11] His pronouncement
obviously had in mind the test to determine unfair competition which this Court had laid down in
the case of U.S. vs. Manuel,[12] to wit:
"x x x whether certain goods have been clothed with an appearance which is likely to deceive the
ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care, x x x."
In so finding that the seized products did not come close to the appearance of genuine Louis
Vuittons because they were poorly done, the court considered not only their appearance but other
factors as well, such as the price differences between the real and the fake products. Complainant,
on the other hand, alleged that they were good workmanship. But, this Court is not in a position to
review the evidence and thereafter conclude that the imitation was poorly or excellently done. The
findings of fact of the trial court, if supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the Supreme
Court.[13] Even on the assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of evidence,
he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable for his judicial action.[14]
The second ground which was relied upon by the trial court in acquitting the accused finds basis in
the well-settled doctrine that a corporation has a distinct personality from that of its
stockholders/owners. A corporation is vested by law with a personality of its own, separate and
distinct from that of its stockholders and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs.
[15] Furthermore, Section 23 of the Corporation Code provides:
x x x the corporate powers of all corporations formed under this code shall be exercised, all
business conducted, and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the Board of
Directors x x x.
This decision is assailed to be unjust mainly because it did not consider the Prosecution's
Memorandum with Motion and Motion for Early Resolution filed by private prosecutor, herein
complainant, on February 8, 1991 and February 11, 1991, respectively. According to complainant,
had respondent judge taken the former motion into account, he would not have acquitted the
accused, Jose V. Rosario. Instead, he would have been held guilty for giving others an opportunity
to engage in unfair competition as prescribed by Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent judge's judgment cannot be rendered unjust by this alone.
In the first place, it would not have made any difference because Jose v. Rosario was charged as
owner/proprietor. COD is not a single proprietorship but one that is run and owned by a
corporation, Rosario Bros., Inc., of which the accused is a stockholder and Executive Vice-
President. A stockholder generally does not have a hand in the management of the corporate
affairs. On the other hand, the Vice-President has no inherent power to bind the corporation.[16]
As a general rule, his duties must be specified in the by-laws.[17] In the criminal case, the
information did not specify his duties as Executive Vice-President. The trial court had no basis for
holding that as such, the accused entered into a contract with the concessionaire thereby giving the
latter an opportunity to practice unfair competition. Whereas, Section 23 of the Corporation Code
is explicit that the directors, acting as a body, exercise corporate powers and conduct the
corporation's business. The board has the sole power and responsibility to decide whether a
corporation should enter into any contract or perform any act.[18] The amendment of the charge,
as proposed by the private prosecutor, would not in any way affect the application of the doctrine
that the corporation has a personality distinct from that of its owners.
Moreover, the finding of the trial court that there is no unfair competition renders the
consideration of the motions insignificant. If there was no unfair competition, so would there be
no offense of giving others an opportunity to engage in unfair competition since there was no
unfair competition to begin with.
Herein complainant also failed to prove malice and deliberate intent on the part of respondent
judge to perpetrate an unjustice. We hereby quote the decision of this Honorable Court in Sta.
Maria vs. Ubay,[19] stating that:
"x x x complainant failed to show any unmistakable indication that bad faith motivated the alleged
unjust actuations of the respondent judge x x x. Absent, thus, any positive evidence on record that
the respondent judge rendered judgment in question with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice, the x x x charge of the complainant must fall."
In Mendoza vs. Villaluz,[20] this Court has also held:
"x x x it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits provided he acts in good
faith, that in the absence of malice or any wrongful conduct x x x the judge cannot be held
administratively responsible x x x for "no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment," and "to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders assuming that he
has erred, would be nothing short of harassment or would make his position unbearable"."
This pronouncement has been reiterated by Us in the case of Miranda vs. Judge Manalastas,[21]
where We said:
"Well established is the rule that mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and
patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered
an unjust decision, are irrelevant and immaterial in administrative proceedings against him. No
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice is
infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is that he follows the rules prescribed to
ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom and bear on
the issues presented, and on the basis of the conclusions he find established, with only his
conscience and knowledge of the law to guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly. x x x. If in the
mind of the respondent, the evidence for the defense was entitled to more weight and credence, he
cannot be held to account administratively for the result of his ratiocination. For that is the very
essence of judicial inquiry: otherwise the burdens of judicial office will be intolerable."
(underscoring supplied).
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official
acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.[22] In Pabalan vs. Guevarra,[23]
the Supreme Court spoke of the rationale for this immunity. We held, thus:
"x x x "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." This concept of judicial
immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary."
Still, complainant wants Us to apply the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine as applied by this Court in the
cases of People vs. Valenzuela;[24] Cathay Pacific Airways vs. Romillo;[25] In Re: Wenceslao
Laureta;[26] and Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Capistrano.[27]
That doctrine, however, is not applicable to the case at bar. In similar administrative cases
separately filed against Judge Liwag[28] and Judge Dizon,[29] We have ruled that:
"In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the assailed decisions, an
inexplicable grave error bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring
about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak (sic) an injustice against a
hapless party. The facts themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such a character as to
give rise to a strong inference that evil intent was present. Such intent, in short, was clearly
deducible from what was already of record. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not except or
dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It
merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or
are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative the strong
inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment
as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary.
Thus, when asked to explain the clearly gross ignorance of law or the grave misconduct
irresistibly reflecting on their integrity, the respondent Judges were completely unable to give any
credible explanation or to raise reasonable doubt x x x." (underscoring supplied).
Thus, even granting that res ipsa loquitur is appreciable, complainant still has to present proof of
malice and bad faith. Respondent judge, on the other hand, may raise good faith as a defense. That
good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains to be the
law.[30] He is also given the chance to explain his acts and if such explanation is credible, the
court may absolve him of the charge.
In this case, We find that the facts and the explanation rendered by Judge Villanueva justify his
absolution from the charge. However, while he is held to be not guilty, he should avoid acts which
tend to cast doubt on his integrity. Moreover, his delay in the promulgation of this case deserves a
reprimand from this Court as it is contrary to the mandate of our Constitution which enshrines the
right of the litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Considering the delay in the promulgation of the decision of this case by respondent judge, a
reprimand is in order.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. 595-CFI. December 11, 1978.]
QUINTIN STA. MARIA, Complainant, v. HON. ALBERTO UBAY, Respondent.
CASTRO, J.:
On October 15, 1973, Quintin R. Sta. Maria (hereinafter referred to as the complainant), attorney-
in-fact of the defendant Valeriana R. Sta. Maria in Civil Case C-2052 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, filed with the Supreme Court a letter-complaint against the Honorable Alberto Q. Ubay
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent Judge), in whose sala the said case fell, imputing to the
latter (1) violation of the provisions of subsection 1, section 11 of Article X of the 1973
Constitution, in that he promulgated his decision in Civil Case C-2052 more than three months
from the date of the submission of the case for decision; (2) violation of the provisions of Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code, in that he knowingly rendered an unjust judgment by
promulgating a decision in Civil Case C-2052 contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court in
previous related proceedings involving the same parties and (3) falsification, by antedating his
decision in Civil Case C-2052 in order to make it appear that he rendered the same within the
statutory three-month period. The complainant also charges the respondent Judge with "putting
every obstacle to the approval of the Record on Appeal [in Civil Case C-2052] in spite of lack of
opposition duly filed on time." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Subsequently, in another letter-complaint dated November 15, 1973, the complainant charged
Atty. Paz G. Palanca, Branch Clerk of Court of the respondent Judge’s sala, with infidelity in the
custody of judicial records and, likewise, with "putting all obstacles to the approval of the Record
on Appeal" in Civil Case C-2052. 1 Then, the complainant, in response to a letter dated November
8, 1973 of the Assistant to the Judicial Consultant informing him that his charges could not be
given due course unless sworn to, submitted an affidavit dated November 24, 1973 wherein he
attested to the truth of the allegations in his previous letter-complaint. He also submitted
documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations.
The letter-complaints were indorsed by the Assistant to the Judicial Consultant to the respondent
Judge for comment. In compliance, the respondent Judge submitted his comments in a Second
Indorsement dated January 16, 1974, with the following annexes: (1) a certification of Atty.
Palanca that the respondent Judge filed with her office on July 14, 1973 the decision in Civil Case
C-2052 "with instruction to withhold its promulgation until he could check on the questions
involved in the case," and that the "said decision was promulgated on August 8, 1973, upon his
order;" and (2) copies of the certificates of the respondent Judge as to work completed for the
months of July and August, 1973. Atty. Palanca likewise submitted her comments on the second
letter-complaint in a Third Indorsement dated January 17, 1974, with the affidavit of Juanito Alejo
(an employee of the court a quo in charge of receiving pleadings relative to the circumstances
surrounding the receipt of a pleading of the defendants in Civil Case C-2052, which pleading the
complainant alleged Atty. Palanca lost or concealed, appended as an annex.
The complainant subsequently submitted two letters, both dated July 8, 1974, wherein he
commented on the exculpatory explanations profferred by the respondent Judge and Atty. Palanca
in their respective comments on his charges. In one of these letters, he charges Atty. Palanca, for
the first time, with a violation of the provisions not only of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act No.
1379) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) but also of the Civil
Service Law and the tenets of the New Society.
Parenthetically, the complainant, in both of the aforementioned letters, mentions that the Second
Indorsement of the respondent Judge "is very much ante dated" for, although it bears the date
January 16, 1974, "it was actually filed with the Records Control Center of the Supreme Court on
June 21, 1974," and that, in a similar vein. The Third Indorsement of Atty. Palanca," [a]lthough it
is dated January 17, 1974, .. appears to have been filed on June 21, 1974 with the Records Control
Center of the Supreme Court." Suffice it to state, simply to set the complainant aright, that the
record shows January 18, 1974 as the definitive date of receipt by the Court of the respondent
Judge’s Second Indorsement commenting on the complainant’s allegations as well of his Fourth
Indorsement transmitting Atty. Palanca’s Third Indorsement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A careful reading of the allegations in the letter-complaints, the comments thereon, and the
documents presented, makes it quite evident that the cumbersome time-consuming procedure of
investigation need not be resorted to. The letter-complaints, the indorsements and the various
documents — all part of the record — provide ample basis for a resolution of the complainant’s
charges against both the respondent Judge and Atty. Palanca.
I. The complainant predicates his first charge against the respondent Judge on the provisions of
subsection 1, section 11 of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, which subsection
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 11. (1) Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a
case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen
months for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all other inferior courts."cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent the first recusation, the record reveals the following facts: Civil Case C-2052, then pending
in the sala of the respondent Judge, was submitted for decision on April 17, 1973; (2) the decision
in Civil Case C-2052 was signed by the respondent Judge on July 14, 1973; (3) the said decision
was filed by the respondent Judge with Atty. Palanca, Branch Clerk of Court, on the same day —
July 14, 1973 — with instructions to withhold the promulgation thereof "in order that certain
aspects of the said decision may still be mulled over;" and (4) the said decision was finally
promulgated on August 8, 1973.
The complainant proffers the proposition that the date of the promulgation of the decision should
be considered" as the date when the case shall be deemed to have been decided." He argues that
since the decision in Civil Case C-2052 was promulgated only on August 8, 1973, the said case
must be considered to have been decided only on that date or 113 days after April 17, 1973, far
beyond the three-month period fixed by the 1973 Constitution. The fact that the said case was
reported to have been disposed of by the respondent Judge only in his report of filed and decided
cases for the month of August 1973, the complainant avers, bolsters his contention.
In answer, the respondent Judge insists that Civil Case C-2052 should be considered decided as of
the time he signed and filed the decision therein with the Branch Clerk of Court on July 14, 1973,
and not on the date it was promulgated on August 8, 1973. Hence, he vehemently states, the case
was decided well within the period contemplated.
Both the complainant and the respondent Judge agree that a case should be considered as decided
at the time of the rendition of the judgment therein. Their disagreement relates to the question on
when a judgment should be considered as rendered. The complainant maintains that a judgment
should be considered as rendered at the time of the promulgation thereof; the respondent Judge
contends differently.
On the matter, there exists no need for an extended discussion. For, in Ago v. Court of Appeals, Et.
Al. 2 and subsequent cases, 3 this Court, in clear, definite and terse terms, stated that "it is the
filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court that constitutes signed decision with the clerk
of court that constitutes rendition." More emphatically, the Court ruled thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is only when the judgment signed by the judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it
becomes a valid and binding judgment."cralaw virtua1aw library
This rule constitutes but an application of the procedural principle spelled out by the provisions of
section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, which section reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments. — All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be
in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In the case at bar, the decision in Civil Case C-2052 was signed by the respondent Judge on July
14, 1973 and filed on same day with the Branch Clerk of Court. These facts the documents in the
record, particularly the copy of the decision in Civil Case C-2052 and the certification dated
January 16, 1974 submitted by the Branch Clerk of Court, substantiate. Following the Ago rule on
rendition of judgments, no other conclusion can follow except that the respondent Judge rendered
his decision in Civil Case C-2052 well within the three-month period fixed by the 1973
Constitution. The circumstance that the promulgation of the decision was deferred to a later date
upon instructions of the respondent Judge "in order that certain aspects of the said decision may
still be mulled over" does not alter the fact that the said decision was actually rendered on July 14,
1973. The same observation applies to the circumstance that the said decision was included in the
respondent Judge’s report of filed and decided cases for the month of August
1973.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Anent the suspension of the promulgation of the decision in Civil Case C-2052 upon instructions
of the respondent Judge "in order that certain aspects of the said decision may still be mulled
over," there can be no valid objection thereto. Indeed, courts have the inherent power to amend
and control their processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. 4
Certainly," [a] judge has an inherent right, while his judgment is still under his control, to correct
errors, mistakes, or injustices. After the judgment becomes final, of course, he loses his right to
change or modify it in the slightest degree, except for the purpose of correcting clerical errors." 5
To deprive the judge of power to amend his own judgment to make it conformable to law and
justice, before the expiration of the statutory period for appeal, would limit his power without
authority of statute, in disregard of sound rules of practice and in violation of the provisions of the
Rules of Court.chanrobles law library
The charge, therefore, that the respondent Judge violated the provisions of subsection 1, section 11
of Article X of the 1973 Constitution fails in the face of the finding that the respondent Judge
rendered his decision in Civil Case C-2052 on July 14, 1973, well within the period of three
months set by the 1973 Constitution.
The Court deems it proper to confine itself to a discussion only of, in the first instance, whether or
not the respondent Judge rendered his decision within the three month period stated by the 1973
Constitution. Finding that he did, the Court deems it unnecessary to treat the question relating to
whether the provisions of subsection 1, section 11 of Article X of the 1973 Constitution should be
characterized as directory or mandatory.
II. The complainant bases his second charge against the respondent Judge on the provisions of
Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, which article reads;
"Art. 204.Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. — Any judgment who shall knowingly render an
unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual absolute disqualification."cralaw virtua1aw library
The complainant alleges that the respondent Judge promulgated a decision in Civil Case C-2052
contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the following previous related proceedings
involving the same parties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Associate Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. v. Banzon and Balmaceda, L-23971, November 29,
1968 (26 SCRA 268);
2. Philippine National Bank v. Sta. Maria, Et Al., L-24765, August 29, 1969 (29 SCRA 303);
and
3. Banzon and Balmaceda v. Hon. Fernando Cruz, Et Al., L-31789, June 29, 1972 (45 SCRA
475).
The complainant states that the respondent Judge, "in awarding to the plaintiffs (in Civil Case C-
2052) in toto what they prayed for in their complaint and amended complaint did so in bad faith
and with full knowledge that said plaintiffs are not entitled thereto."cralaw virtua1aw library
To dispose of the second charge, the Court reiterates the rule that" [i]n order that a judge may be
held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the
judgment is unjust in the sense that it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and
the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice." 6
The rule requires that the judgment should be unjust for being contrary to law and for not being
supported by the evidence. In the case at bar, to determine whether or not the decision of the
respondent Judge in Civil Case C-2052 constitutes an unjust judgment would involve more than a
mere cursory reading of the decision itself or its comparison with this Court’s decisions invoked
by the complainant. To delve into the different factors bearing on the issues raised in Civil Case C-
2052 considered by the respondent Judge in arriving at his conclusions set forth in the decision in
question for purposes of ascertaining the factual, legal and jurisprudential bases of the said
decision, would be tantamount to pre-empting the Court of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction
over the case, considering that the same is pending before it. Indeed, this Court stated in Gohol v.
Hon. Riodique 7 that "only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a trial judge’s
alleged errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering
an unjust decision be levelled against a trial judge." For, through an appeal, an aggrieved party can
always point out, for rectification by the appellate court, the errors in the alleged unjust judgment
affecting him. The rule also requires that the judgment should be rendered by the judge with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. In the case at bar, the complainant failed to show
any unmistakable indication that bad faith motivated the alleged unjust actuations of the
respondent judge in Civil Case C-2052. Absent, thus, any positive evidence on record that the
respondent Judge rendered the judgment in question with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice, the second charge of the complainant must fall.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
III. The complainant charges the respondent Judge with falsification by antedating his decision in
Civil Case C-2052 in order to make it appear that he rendered the same within the three-month
period set by the 1973 Constitution. Presumably for this reason, the complainant alleges, the
respondent Judge had not, as of October 15, 1973, submitted his Certificates of Service and
Monthly Reports for July and August, 1973.
In view of the conclusion arrived at that the respondent Judge rendered his decision in Civil Case
C-2052 well within the three month period fixed by the 1973 Constitution, this charge must
perforce be rejected. In addition, the copies of the Certificates of Service of the respondent Judge
for the months of July and August 1973 (filed with and received by the Judicial Reports Section,
Office of the Executive Officer, per the dates stamped thereon, on August 2, 1973 and September
4, 1973, respectively) 8 as well as the copies of the report of cases filed and disposed of for the
months of July and August, 1973 (likewise filed with and received by the Judicial Reports Section,
same Office, per the dates stamped thereon, on August 2, 1973 and September 4, 1973,
respectively) 9 completely belie the complainant’s assertion that the respondent Judge had not, as
of October 15, 1973, submitted the said documents to the Court.
IV. The complainant also charges the respondent Judge and Atty. Palanca with "putting every
obstacle to the approval of the Record on Appeal" in Civil Case C-2052 "in spite of lack of
opposition duly filed on time." In simpler terms, the complainant alleges that the respondent Judge
and Atty. Palanca delayed the approval of the Record on Appeal for, although the Record on
Appeal was filed on August 28, 1973, the hearing thereon was set for September 8, 1973, the
adverse party was furnished a copy thereof on August 28, 1973, and no objection was interposed
thereto within five days from August 28, 1973, the respondent Judge acted on the said Record only
"until after forty-four (44) days from September 8, 1973 as shown by the Order dated October 22,
1973 directing the defendants to amend their Record on Appeal."cralaw virtua1aw library
In explanation, Atty. Palanca states that on September 7, 1973 (the day before the date set for the
hearing on the Record on Appeal), the counsel for the plaintiffs filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Time to Proofread and Check Record on Appeal." This motion the court a quo granted in an
Order dated September 8, 1973, with notice thereof served on the counsel for the defendants on
September 19, 1973.
Atty. Palanca also states that on September 15, 1973, the counsel for the plaintiffs filed an
"Opposition to ‘Record on Appeal’," which opposition the counsel for the defendants countered
with a reply filed on September 17, 1973. On the same day, the counsel for the defendants also
filed an "Ex-parte Motion to Approve Record on Appeal and Disregard Opposition." On October
22, 1973, the court a quo ordered the amendments of the defendants’ Record on Appeal. The
counsel for the defendants sought the reconsideration of this order on October 31, 1973. At the
hearing on the said motion on November 3, 1973, the court a quo approved the Record on Appeal
after the counsel for the defendants effected the corrections and deletions in open court.
The Court finds the explanation for the delay in the approval of the Record on Appeal in Civil
Case C-2052 more than satisfactory. Consequently, the complainant has no valid cause to charge
the respondent Judge and Atty. Palanca with "putting every obstacle" to the approval of the said
Record on Appeal.
Another charge against Atty. Palanca relates to infidelity in the custody of Judicial records for the
loss or misplacement of a pleading, "Notice of Hearing of Application for Damages in Accordance
with Section 20 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court," allegedly filed by the counsel for the
defendants on January 16, 1973. A copy of this pleading which the counsel for the defendants
exhibited at the hearing on November 3, 1973 the court a quo ordered included in the Record on
Appeal after due authentication.
Atty. Palanca makes no denial either of the loss or the misplacement of the pleading in question.
However, Atty. Palanca submits, more in avoidance of an explanation rather than in disclaimer of
the said loss or misplacement, an affidavit of the court employee charged with the task of
receiving pleadings, Juanito Alejo, which affidavit narrates the circumstances surrounding the
receipt of the pleading in question, the subsequent discovery of its loss or misplacement, and the
consequent efforts to locate the same.
To dispose of the charge of infidelity in the custody of judicial records, the Court deems it
unnecessary to probe the minutiae of the circumstances attendant to the loss or misplacement of
the pleading in question. Even if the loss or misplacement of the said pleading could be attributed
to Alejo, Atty. Palanca cannot be fully exonerated for she was remiss in the supervision of her
subordinate. Atty. Palanca cannot be held entirely blameless for she failed to exercise proper
supervision over her subordinate. 10
The complainant also ascribes to Atty. Palanca violation of the provisions not only of the Anti-
Graft Law or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but as well the Civil Service Law and the
tenets of the New Society. However, the complainant fails to specify the provisions of the said law
which he accuses Atty. Palanca of violating. Also, this charge the complainant mentioned for the
first time in one of his letters dated July 8, 1974, wherein he commented on the explanation of
Atty. Palanca relating to his earlier charges. In addition, the complainant omits to particularize
allegations to support this charge.
The Court finds that this charge deserves no serious consideration. The complainant not only fails
to allege with particularity and clarity the fact complained of as constituting the violation of the
provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Civil Service Law and
tenets of the New Society, but also has failed to substantiate his ambiguous charge.
ACCORDINGLY, Atty. Paz G. Palanca is hereby admonished to exercise closer supervision over
her subordinates in the performance of their duties, with the warning that the same or similar
inaction in the future will be dealt with more severely. Finding no sufficient basis to warrant
further proceedings relative to the charges against the Honorable Alberto Q. Ubay and the other
charges against Atty. Palanca, the same charges are hereby dismissed.chanrobles law library : red
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, concur.
G.R. No. 333-CJ November 24, 1976

ERLINDA PABALAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE DONATO M. GUEVARRA, City Judge, City Court of Manila, Branch VIII, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
As an aftermath of the acquittal of Sgt. Cesar Mallari of the Manila Police in Criminal Case No. F-
149450 for Slight Physical Injuries, the complainant, Erlinda Pabalan, in a letter-complaint dated
December 3, 1972 to the Secretary of National Defense, charge respondent City Judge with having
knowingly rendered an unjust judgment and/or with ignorance of the law or through inexcusable
negligence.
The matter was referred to the Secretary of Justice, and on December 21, 1972, respondent City
Judge was directed to submit his comment to the charges within seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt thereof. In his comment of January 12, 1973, the respondent denied the afore-mentioned
charges, citing portions of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in support of his
denial.
After a careful consideration of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings, We find
the complaint filed against respondent City Judge Donato M. Guevarra of Manila to be without
merit. Thus, the record shows that complainant's allegation, that respondent City Judge prevented
the private prosecutor from cross-examining defense witness Pat. Gelvas of the Manila
Metropolitan Police Force, is without factual basis. Similarly, the claim of Complainant that
respondent "displayed sheer ignorance of the law" in sustaining "nonsensical" objections of the
defense during the hearing of August 16, 1972, is likewise not true. Thus, the Technical Staff of
the Office of the Chief Justice submitted the following report on this matter:
Pertinent portions of the transcript appearing on page 35
Q And there was no reason at all why this incident should anger Erlinda Pabalan or was there?
ATTY. JIMENEZ: (counsel for the defense)
Misleading, your Honor. "No eason at all why this incident should anger. . ."that is misleading.
ATTY. DE LEON:
The question is very clear itself.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
It is misleading the witness, there is no testimony hat Erlinda Pabalan got angry.
COURT:
Objection sustained.
From the foregoing quoted portions, respondent averred that —
The question is improper. It asks for an opinion of the witness. The "reason" asked was to explain
why Erlinda Pabalan should be angry. The witness would be incompetent to testify on what
incident should anger another person. * * *
The questioned portions of the transcript appearing on page 39 are:
Q And Erlinda Pabalan gladly told Sgt. Mallari that they are going to remove heir wares?
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
We object more particularly to the inclusion of the word, gladly'. That is a conclusion, it injects the
word "gladly". The question is a conclusion and asking for an opinion of the witness especially
with the word gladly'.
COURT:
Relative term, modify your question.
On this, respondent's view is that —
This is a loaded question,* * * It is not even a question. It is a statement of act. It asks for a
conclusion or opinion of the witness. * *
Pages 41 to 43 (August 16, 1972 transcript) have the following questioned portions:
Q Now, from the incident which you yourself have witnessed from the moment that you and Sgt.
Mallari approached Erlinda Pabalan, together with the permit up to and until the time that you
were furnished or you were able to have a xerox copy of the permit, there was no incident that
would cause Erlinda Pabalan to be angry, is it not?
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
We object to the question, Your Honor, because the question as framed is asking for a conclusion
or opinion of the witness in the evaluation of the witness.
ATTY. DE LEON:
The witness was present, Your Honor.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Let's not outdo the Judge in the evaluation of the incident of he case because your question is
asking the evaluation of the case.
ATTY. DE LEON:
If Your Honor please, during the whole incident he was present and he could have witnessed as he
is now testifying that the only ncident that took place were those narrated by him, we are only
asking a summation as to the incident to have occurred.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Asking a summation of the evaluation of the incident, we eave that to the Court. We believe that
this witness not be asked that question, t asks already for a conclusion.
COURT:
Objection sustained.
As regards the foregoing, respondent said:
Again this calls for an opinion of the witness on a fact that he would be ncompetent to testify on.
It would be Pabalan who would be competent on what incident will anger her, and no other.* * *
The questioned portions of the transcript appearing on pages 45 to 47 of the ranscript read as
follows:
Q In other words, you were still there when Erlinda Concepcion made a esponse to the bad words
supposedly uttered by Erlinda Pabalan
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
At this juncture, I would be constrained to object, on the ground that it is misleading, Apparently,
the sequence of the questioning of the counsel is incompatible of what the witness stated.* * *
ATTY. DE LEON:
My last question, if Your Honor please, to the witness was whether he immediately left after
Erlinda Pabalan supposedly uttered bad words. To a subsequent question, he said and heard
Erlinda Concepcion made a response, why are you pointing at me.
COURT:
And he also mentioned at the spur of the moment only.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
He heard Erlinda Pabalan . .
COURT:
I believe that is already answered by the witness when he stated that Erlinda Concepcion answered
why she was being pointed to and Erlinda Pabalan uttered bad words and then he left.
Respondents comment on this reads thus —
The court did not make a ruling. It only made an observation, which observations borne out by the
records. And counsel, without waiting for a ruling, proceeded with other questions. Note that the
question was proceeded by the phrase "in other words". Which means that the witness already
stated a fact said n one way, and counsel wanted him to state it in his own manner.
The third instance assigned by complainant purporting to prove respondent's sheer ignorance of
the law appears on pages 51 and 52 of the August 16, 1972 transcript which is as follows:
Q Did you then see at the premises Erlinda Concepcion?
COURT:
What would be the materiality of the series of questions?
ATTY. DE LEON:
It would be material considering that they alleged this Erlinda Concepcion could be the cause of
the injury, if Your Honor please.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
There is no evidence to that effect, if Your Honor please.
COURT:
You are trying to inject on the record, there is no evidence that it was Erlinda Concepcion who
caused the injury.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
The witness testified that there was an altercation and that here was an incident between
Concepcion and Pabalan
COURT:
There was, but there was no fight between the 2 people.
ATTY DE LEON:
All right, I submit, Your Honor.
On this, respondent's comment reads thus —
* * *Imagine attributing to the judge the libelous charge of gross ignorance because the judge
blocked counsel's crossexamination of the witness on the testimony of another (Erlinda
Concepcion) given during the preliminary investigation of the case! It is elementary that a witness
cannot be cross- examined on the testimony of another, much more when the testimony was given
in another proceeding * * *
Even so, the court only asked counsel about the materiality of the series of the questions asked, to
which counsel responded that "it would be material considering that they alleged this Erlinda
Concepcion could be the cause of the injury." COULD BE is not even a fact — it is an Idea
existing in counsel's mind, and not in the records of the proceedings at that stage. There was no
evidence YET at this stage that the injury to Pabalan was caused by Erlinda Concepcion (see
records). It was natural for the court therefore to be surprised and inquire about the materiality of
the series of questions on facts that existed only in counsel's mind.
In order that a Judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment adverted to is unjust as being contrary to law or
as not supported by the evidence, and the same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice. We find no evidence in the record that the judgment is unjust as being contrary
to law, or is not supported by the evidence, or that the same was rendered with conscious and
deliberate intent to commit an injustice.
The whole thrust of complainant's accusations is predicated upon her contention that respondent
erred in his appraisal of the evidence. We find no basis of such contention. Even on the
assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be held
administratively or civilly liable for his judicial action, A judicial officer cannot be called to
account in a civil action for acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial function, however
erroneous. In the words of Alzua and Analot v. Johnson, 1 * * * it is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officers in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself." This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of
public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary. 2 This
principle is of universal application and applies to all grades of judicial officer from the highest
judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court. 3
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint against respondent City Judge Donato M.
Guevarra is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
[A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673. August 11, 2004]
EDUARDO P. DIEGO, complainant, vs. JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Regional Trial

Court, Dagupan City, Branch 43, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for
allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in
gross ignorance of the law.
The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as follows:
a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos.
In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil
status of single;
b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a Decree of Divorce and purportedly
issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas (247th
Judicial District), it was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore
existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and
Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce.
c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein
complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish
priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and adopted
the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.[1]
After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on February
24, 1999, the dispositive part of which stated:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the STATE to prove accuseds guilt beyond whisper of doubt, the
COURT hereby orders her ACQUITTAL with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused.
Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any
malicious intent. The combined testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed
at convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her
previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she
was legally free to contract the second marriage with Manuel P. Diego.
In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned, thus:
While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond between Jorge de Perio and the
accused are not yet annulled, it remains undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in the
Family District Court of Harris County, Texas, 247th Judicial District, effective February 15,
1978.
xxx
The CHARGE filed against the accused is categorized as Mala en se (sic) which requires the
indispensable presence of criminal intent/dolo.
The felony on BIGAMY as defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code explicitly mandates
that it must be committed with criminal intent. In other words, there must be an unquestionable
demonstration on the part of the perpetrator that he/she criminally, willfully and unlawfully
contracted a second marriage despite knowledge that his/her first marriage is still existing.
As borne out by the evidence adduced, the accused contracted the second marriage after she was
informed and furnished of the Divorce Decree which was granted by the Family District Court of
Harris County Texas in her favor.
As an ordinary laywoman accused being a recipient of a divorce decree, she entertains the
impression that she can contract a subsequent marriage which she did when she married the late
Manuel Diego.
To the honest evaluation of the Court the act complained of against the accused is not patently
illegal for the reason that she acted in good faith believing that her marriage was already annulled
by a foreign judgment.[3]
Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly
against the law and contrary to the evidence. He questions the evidentiary weight and
admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for the finding of good faith. In addition,
complainant stresses that the evidence on record negates respondent Judges finding of good faith
on the part of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to impose sanctions upon
respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts amount to knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.
In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the criminal culpability of
the accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge does not dispute that
the second marriage was bigamous because at the time it was contracted, the first marriage was
still subsisting since divorce is not recognized in our country and because the accuseds first
husband was still alive. Respondent Judge, however, maintains that what was controlling was
whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that her
first marriage had been severed and she could marry again. According to respondent Judge, the
same is a state of mind personal to the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law
should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should
not be confused with criminal intent.
By separate manifestations, both parties agreed to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings.
The Disputed Decision
A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge had been less than
circumspect in his study of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case.
In his comment, respondent Judge stated: That the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the honest
belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact.
This Court, in People v. Bitdu,[4] carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact, which could
be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not
excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability. Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had
obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in contracting her
second marriage she was not committing any violation of the law, and that she had no criminal
intent, the same does not justify her act. This Court further stated therein that with respect to the
contention that the accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that
she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation
of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.[5]
Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger, [6]
where it was held that the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the
Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.
These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or not respondent Judge should be
held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of
the law.
Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article
204[7] of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is
unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently,
willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as
it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.[8]
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to
him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust.[9] This
Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust
and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a
defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law.[10]
As held in Alforte v. Santos,[11] even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she
still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be
proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint.[12]
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, Maozca v. Domagas,[13] is instructive. Therein
respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law resulting in a manifestly unjust
judgment for granting a demurrer to the evidence in a bigamy case. The grant of the demurrer to
the evidence was based on the judges finding of good faith on the part of the accused, anchored
upon a document denominated as a Separation of Property with Renunciation of Rights. This
Court stated that said act of the judge exhibited ignorance of the law, and accordingly he was fined
in the amount of P5,000.
Also, in Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr.,[14] where therein respondent judge was given a reprimand with a
stern warning of a more severe penalty should the same or similar act be committed in the future,
this Court explained:
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can
be infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident
bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross
ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice,
corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he
is accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory
prerogatives.
Furthermore, in Wingarts v. Mejia,[15] where therein respondent judge, although absolved of any
guilt for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, was still imposed sanctions by
this Court, thus:
In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately penalized for his regrettably erroneous
action in connection with Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedly stressed that a
municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public
he serves, and he must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity. Any
kind of failure in the discharge of this grave responsibility cannot be countenanced, in order to
maintain the faith of the public in the judiciary, especially on the level of courts to which most of
them resort for redress.[16]
Applying these precedents to the present case, the error committed by respondent Judge being
gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action.
Penalty
After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded with a stern warning of a more severe
penalty in the future.
The act of respondent Judge in rendering the decision in question took place on February 24, 1999
or before the effectivity, on October 1, 2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which classified gross
ignorance of the law as a serious charge and penalized the offense with a fine of not less than
P20,000 but not more than P40,000.
Applying the rule as then prevailing,[17] and in line with applicable jurisprudence,[18] the
sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine in the amount of P10,000.
WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1524. January 26, 2000]
LUCIA F. LAYOLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE BASILIO R. GABO, Jr., respondent. ALEX
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is an administrative case initiated by the sworn affidavit-complaint[1] of Lucia F. Layola,

dated 12 August 1997, charging Presiding Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. of Branch 11 of the Regional
Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, with a violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019,[2] for issuing an
unjust interlocutory order, and with gross ignorance of the law. Complainant sent said affidavit-
complaint to Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, BGen. Manuel B. Casaclang (Ret.), of the
Office of the Ombudsman who, in turn, indorsed the same affidavit-complaint to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
As culled by the OCA,[3] the facts that matter are as follows:
"On June 4, 1996, herein complainant Lucia F. Layola filed a complaint with the Office of the
Deputy of the Ombudsman for the Military, charging SPO2 Leopoldo M. German and PO2
Tomasito H. Gagui, members of the Santa Maria Police Station, Santa Maria, Bulacan, with
homicide for the death of complainant's son."
"On January 24, 1997, a resolution was handed down by the Ombudsman Investigator
recommending the indictment for murder of SPO2 German and PO2 Gagui. The corresponding
information for murder was drafted and thereafter, the case was indorsed to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan for filing with the appropriate court. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 209-M-97 and raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo,[sic] RTC, Branch
11, Malolos, Bulacan." Korte
"Sometime in March, 1997, a petition to take custody of accused SPO2 Leopoldo M. German was
filed by the Chief of Police of the Sta. Maria Police Station based on the following grounds:
1. "that pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree 971, Presidential Decree 1184 and
Executive Order No. 106, police personnel who are charged of any crime before any court of
justice may be placed under the custody of his immediate superior officers upon request, [who
shall] be responsible for the appearance of [such] police officer x x x during trials and when
needed by the court; and
2. "that the x x x case is service connected and within the ambit of the above provisions of P.D.
971, 1184 and E. O. No. 106, because the offense imputed against [the accused] stemmed from the
death of Pablo Loyola [sic], a violator of the law, who was then inside the cell of the Municipal
Jail of Sta. Maria, Bulacan." Sclaw
"Respondent Judge, relying on the provisions of law cited in the petition for custody, resolved to
grant the petition through an order dated April 7, 1997."
"A motion for reconsideration of the abovementioned order was filed by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military, bringing to respondent's attention the applicable and relevant laws.
However, the said motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated June 25, 1997."
To repeat; respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. stands charged with a violation of Section 3 (e),
R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and with gross ignorance of the law.
According to the complainant the respondent judge directed that accused SPO2 German be held in
the custody of his immediate superior, the Chief of Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an order sans
any legal and factual basis, instead of ordering the arrest of the said accused being indicted for
murder, a heinous and non-bailable crime. Thereafter, respondent judge denied the motion for
reconsideration interposed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. Sclex
Asked to comment by the Court Administrator in the latter's first indorsement, .dated October 27,
1997, the respondent judge, tried to justify his action; pointing out that:
"1. The questioned order dated April 7, 1997 was issued in the light of the Comment of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, to whose office the prosecution of the case was indorsed by the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. Said Comment by the prosecutor interposes no
objection to the release of the accused to the custody of the petitioner Chief of Police, on the
ground that from the records of the case, accused's "indictment was based on circumstantial
evidence", hence, not so strong as to deprive the accused of his right to bail."
"2. The motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned order filed by the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military "did not raise strong arguments on why the order should be modified, "hence, the
denial of said motion." Xlaw
"3. The disputed order is now the subject of a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
initiated by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military."
The OCA found the charges of violating Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019 and of issuing an unjust
interlocutory order, barren of merit but respondent judge was adjudged guilty of gross ignorance
of the law.
As regards the charge of violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the
OCA stressed that the important element of the offense, which is damage or injury to the
complainant, or manifest partiality shown to any party, is anemic of evidentiary support. There is
no allegation of any injury suffered by the complainant as a result of the conduct or actuation of
the respondent judge, nor was there any showing of undue benefit or advantage given to the
adverse party under the orders complained of.
With respect to the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in connection with the
denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration of the order granting the petition of
the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take custody of accused SPO2 German, the OCA found
such a charge to be unfounded. Xsc
Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: 1) that the offender is
a judge; 2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he knowingly renders unjust
interlocutory order or decree; or b) he renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree
through inexcusable negligence or ignorance.[4]
The OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned order knowing it
to be unjust; and neither is there any proof of conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
Sdaadsc
As to the propriety of the act of respondent judge in releasing accused SPO2 German to the
custody of the immediate superior instead of ordering the arrest of said accused, the OCA found
respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law for failing to conduct a summary
proceeding to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against subject accused was strong,
considering that the charge of murder is a non-bailable offense.
Thus, the OCA recommended:
1. That Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr., RTC, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan be FINED P20,000 for
granting bail in a capital offense without a hearing, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely;
2. That the charges of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) and issuance of an unjust interlocutory order be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The aforestated recommendation of OCA is sustainable. Scmis

It is a settled doctrine that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be established beyond cavil that the judgment adverted to is unjust, contrary to
law or unsupported by the evidence, and that the same was rendered with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice.[5] In other words, the quantum of proof required to hold respondent
judge guilty for alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the Revised
Penal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill or
hurdle the test of moral certainty and does not suffice to convict.[6] Here, the allegations of the
complaint-affidavit are unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be pronounced guilty
on the basis of bare allegations. There has to be evidence on which conviction can be anchored.
The evidence must truly be beyond reasonable doubt. Missc
On the matter of gross ignorance of the law, records on hand decisively warrant a finding against
the respondent. Section 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution."
Respondent judge was acting upon a case of murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Murder being a capital offense, respondent judge should have been mindful that bail cannot be
allowed as a matter of right. In the case of Baylon vs. Sison,[7] it was succinctly held,
"Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the court, in cases involving capital
offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the
evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not
there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt
against the accused. It follows that any order issued in the absence of the requisite evidence is not
a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.[8] Sc
In the case of Cortes vs. Catral,[9] the Court held:
"x x x. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, it may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the heating. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and
since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, x xx"
The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
exercised in determining whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. In other words,
discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process,
that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the
absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.[10] Granting bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing is gross ignorance of the
law.[11] Misspped
That the prosecutor interposed no objection to the release of the accused to the custody of the
petitioner Chief of Police, on the ground that from the records of the case, accused's "indictment
was based on circumstantial evidence," did not and should not excuse respondent judge from his
judicial duty to conduct a summary proceeding to determine the strength of evidence against the
accused, as to entitle him to post bail. What is more, as the Information itself categorically states
that no bail is recommended for accused,[12] the respondent judge should have been alerted to
conduct a summary hearing. Spped
Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, i.e., that the Court may impose its authority upon erring
judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law, or
misconduct, is obviously applicable in the instant case.[13]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Basilio R. Gabo GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P20,000.00, with the stern warning that a commission of
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charges of graft and corruption under Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and of issuing unjust
interlocutory order are DISMISSED for lack of merit and for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 144142. August 23, 2001]
YOLANDA AGUIRRE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner Yolanda Aguirre filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and
set aside the Decision, dated November 25, 1999, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20436 which affirmed her conviction for violation of the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P.
Blg. 22).[1] She likewise assails the Resolution, dated May 31, 2000, of the appellate court
denying her motion for reconsideration.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cebu City found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22 upon three separate informations filed against her. Except for the
dates and the amounts involved, these informations uniformly read as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of February 1993 (CBU-32174), 4th day of February (CBU-32175),
and on the 9th day of February 1996 (CBU-32176), and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, knowing at the time of issue of the check he/she does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, with
deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then and there issue or draw BPI
Family Bank Check No. 5102553 dated February 2, 1993 in the amount of P40,000.00 (CBU-
32174), BPI Family Bank Check No. 5102554 dated February 4, 1993 in the amount of P50,000.
[00] (CBU-32175), and BPI Family Bank Check No. 5102557 dated February 9, 1993 in the
amount of P225,703.10 (CBU-32176), all payable to Dinah Wei which check was issued in
payment of an obligation of said accused, but when presented with said bank, the same was
dishonored for reason of account closed and despite notice and demands made to redeem or make
good said check, said accused failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to
do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Dinah Wei in the amounts of P40,000.00, P50,000.00
and P225,703.10 respectively, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
At her arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Since they involved
substantially similar facts, the cases were consolidated. Trial ensued. The prosecution presented
Dinah Wei, the private complainant, who basically testified that she knew petitioner because she
(private complainant) used to supply rice to petitioner. Some time in 1992, petitioner and private
complainant had a transaction where petitioner would buy rice from private complainant in the
amount of P600,000.00. The purchase price was payable by petitioner within fifteen (15) days. In
payment thereof, petitioner issued to private complainant the subject checks: BPI Family Bank
Check No. 5102557 (Exhibit A), BPI Family Bank Check No. 5102554 (Exhibit B) and BPI
Family Bank Check No. 5102553 (Exhibit C).[3]
When private complainant presented the checks for payment, however, they were dishonored. The
back of the checks each bore the stamp account closed (Exhibits A-1, B-1 and C-1, respectively).
Private complainant immediately went to petitioner to inform her about the dishonor and
demanded that she pay the amounts of the checks. Despite her promise, petitioner never paid
private complainant.[4]
When it was her turn to adduce evidence, petitioner continuously moved for the postponement of
the hearings. Thereafter, the trial court declared petitioner to have waived her right to present
evidence in her defense. On July 15, 1996, the trial court then rendered judgment finding
petitioner guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused YOLANDA AGUIRRE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and said accused is hereby sentence [sic] to suffer the imprisonment of
separate one (1) year in CBU-32174, and another separate one (1) year imprisonment in CBU-
32175 and another separate one (1) year in CBU-32176.
Accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant, DINAH WEI, the following amounts:
(1) The sum of P40,000.00 in CBU-32174, the sum of P50,000.00 in CBU-32175, and the sum of
P225,703.10 in CBU-32176 plus legal interest of 6% per annum thereon respectively from the
filing of said information until fully paid;
(2) The sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner appealed her conviction to the CA. In essence, she claims that she was deprived of due
process when the trial court declared that her right to present evidence as deemed waived,
forfeited and abandoned. The appellate court, however, found no merit in the appeal. The CA
declared that petitioner was not deprived of due process because she was given ample opportunity
to present her evidence. The CA thus affirmed petitioners conviction:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.[6]
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner now comes to this Court solely
alleging that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 13TH DIVISION, ERRED IN AFFIRMING EN

TOTO THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 20, CEBU CITY, IN
DECLARING THE HEREIN PETITIONER TO HAVE WAIVED, FORFEITED AND
ABANDONED HER RIGHT TO ADDUCE/PRESENT EVIDENCE.[7]
Petitioners contention does not persuade.
Contrary to petitioners claim, the records show that she was given ample opportunity by the trial
court to present her evidence. As found by the CA:
A careful review of the records of the case evidently show that the trial court duly afforded
accused-appellant her right to present evidence. The trial court in view of the absence of either
appellant or her counsel granted the motions of her counsel for continuance to enable the defense
to present its evidence. The prosecution rested its case as early as April 20, 1995 but accused-
appellant continuously requested postponement of hearing. It was only on February 9, 1996, when
the trial court was constrained to declare the right of the accused to present evidence as deemed
waived, forfeited or abandoned due to the non-appearance of appellant or her counsel. Accused-
appellant did not file any motion or pleading to have said order reconsidered. As aptly pointed out
by the Solicitor General, if it were true that appellant wanted to present her evidence, she should
have taken advantage of the ample opportunity to present, to be heard and to testify in open court
with the assistance of her counsel. She cannot now claim that she was denied her right to be
present and present her evidence.[8]
The essential requirements of due process in this jurisdiction are well-established:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial authority to hear and determine the
matter before it;
(2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or property which is
the subject of the proceeding;
(3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.[9]
Applying the above test, the Court finds that petitioner in this case cannot feign denial of due
process because she had been given the opportunity to present her side.[10]
The liability of petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been duly established by the trial court
in this wise:
After a careful and judicious study of the evidence adduced in this case, the prosecution was able
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the commission of violations of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in the above-entitled criminal cases. It has been duly established that
accused Yolanda Aguirre issued those three (3) BPI Family Checks (marked as Exhibits A, B and
C) in payment of her obligation to pay the rice which private complainant sold to her. When
presented for payment all of said checks were all dishonored for reason of accounts closed as
shown in the validations at the back of said checks pointing to the fact that the same were
dishonored for account closed (marked as Exhibits A-1, B-1 and C-1). Despite demands from the
accused by private complainant, Dinah Wei, for the former to replenish said dishonored checks,
the said accused simply promised to pay her said amounts covered by those bum checks but she
did not pay Dinah Wei after all.
Clearly then the accused in issuing those checks which consequently bounced or dishonored for
reason of their having accounts closed violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 which provides among
other things:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check
to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment,which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit xxx, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court. xxx.
And the Supreme Court had ruled and held that what the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. (Cruz vs. Court of
Appeals, 233 SCRA 301). All the elements, therefore, of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
are all present in the instant criminal cases and for which the accused is solely liable, to wit: [a]
the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; [2] the knowledge
of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and [3]
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment. (Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 639).
Significantly, petitioner does not question the foregoing findings and conclusions of the trial court.
In any case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the settled rule that factual findings
of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence on
record and carry more weight when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case.[11]
However, there is need to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner in view of the Courts rulings
in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals[12] and Lim vs. People of the Philippines[13] that:
[I]t would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of
discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the
social order.[14]
Absent showing that petitioner acted in bad faith, the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment in
this case is proper. The imposition of fine equivalent to the value of the subject checks is an
appropriate penalty to be imposed on petitioner. Under B.P. Blg. 22 1, par. 1, the fine that may be
imposed is not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the check which fine shall in no
case exceed two hundred thousand pesos. Thus, in lieu of imprisonment, petitioner shall pay the
fine for each violation in the amounts of P40,000.00 (Crim. Case No. CBU-32174), P50,000.00
(Crim. Case (Crim. Case No. CBU-32175) and P200,000.00 (Crim. Case No. 32176), respectively.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20436 is AFFIRMED
with modification that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted. Instead, petitioner is ORDERED
to pay the fine for each violation in the amounts of P40,000.00 (Crim. Case No. CBU-32174),
P50,000.00 (Crim. Case No. CBU-32175) and P200,000.00 (Crim. Case No. CBU-32176),
respectively.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 156685. July 27, 2004]
NAZARIO N. MARIFOSQUE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which assails the decision dated September 23, 2002 and the Resolution dated January 3, 2003 of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 17030 finding petitioner Nazario Marifosque guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined and penalized under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Petitioner was charged with direct bribery in an Information which reads:
That on or about October 13, 1990 in Legazpi City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused a public officer being a qualified member of the
Police Force of Legazpi City, now under the Philippine National Police, taking advantage of his
official/public position and committing the crime herein charged in relation to his office, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand, obtain and/or receive directly from Yu Su
Pong[1] and Hian Hian Sy[2] the total amount of FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS
(P5,800.00) Philippine Currency in consideration for his recovery from alleged robbers, eighteen
Shellane gas filled cylinder/s tanks, to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victims in
the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The antecedent facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On October 13, 1990 at around 5:00 in the afternoon, Hian Hian Yu Sy and her husband, Arsenio
Sy, went to the office of Captain Alberto Salvo, Chief of the Intelligence and Operating Division
stationed at the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in Region 5, to report the robbery of Shellane
tanks at the gasoline station of her father, Yu So Pong, and the alleged extortion attempt by
petitioner, Police Sergeant Narciso Marifosque, in exchange for the recovery of the lost items.
Captain Salvo and his men set up a plan to entrap the petitioner. Hian Hian Yu Sy prepared the
pay-off money in the amount of P4,800.00 and listed down the serial numbers of the bills. The
pay-off was scheduled at 7:00 in the evening of that day in Golden Grace Department Store which
was owned by Yu So Pong. At around 6:15 p.m., Captain Calvo and his men arrived at the target
area and strategically positioned themselves outside the Golden Grace Department Store to await
the arrival of the suspect. Shortly thereafter, petitioner Marifosque arrived on board a tricycle. He
went inside the store and demanded the money from Hian Hian Yu Sy and Yu So Pong. The latter
handed to him the marked money, which was wrapped in a newspaper. When petitioner stepped
out of the store, Arsenio Sy gave the pre-arranged signal, whereupon the arresting operatives
swooped down upon the suspect and arrested him.
Hian Hian Yu Sy testified that petitioner demanded the amount of P7,200.00 but she bargained for
P4,800.00 only because that was all she had at the time. She proposed that petitioner return the
following morning to pick up the balance.
By way of defense, petitioner Marifosque testified that in the morning of October 13, 1990, a
police asset came to his house and reported that he witnessed a robbery at the gasoline station of
Yu So Pong. Petitioner went to the gasoline station of Yu So Pong and relayed to him the
information. Thereafter, petitioner and Yu So Pong proceeded to the police station to report the
robbery to the desk officer, PFC Jesus Fernandez, who then dispatched petitioner and a certain Pat.
Garcia to conduct an investigation. As they were leaving the police station, the asset approached
petitioner asking if he could get P350.00 per cylinder tank as his reward. Petitioner relayed the
message to Yu So Pong, who said he was amenable if that [was] the only way to recover the
cylinders and to apprehend the robbers.[4] Based on information furnished by the asset, the police
investigators proceeded to the house of Edgardo Arnaldo in San Roque Legazpi City, where they
found the stolen gas tanks. The group loaded the gas tanks into the vehicle. Meanwhile, Arnaldo
arrived. Petitioner did not arrest him at that time because he promised to lead them to the other
stolen cylinder tanks.[5] The group returned to the police station where petitioner made a written
report of the recovery of the gas tanks.
Elmer Arnaldo testified that he worked as an asset of the Legazpi City police force and
occasionally received rewards from the police for any information of the criminal activities. On
October 13, 1990 at around 4:00 in the morning, he went out to buy bread and saw three
individuals stealing gas cylinder tanks in the nearby gasoline station. He later visited petitioner
and reported to him the robbery. He went back to his house to feed the chickens. Sometime
thereafter, he dropped by the police station to discuss with petitioner the reward of P350.00 per
cylinder tank recovered. Petitioner gave him 1,000.00 and told him to return at 6:00 p.m. for the
remainder. At 7:00 p.m., he and petitioner went to the store of Yu So Pong to collect the balance of
the reward money. Petitioner went inside the store and Arnaldo, who was left outside, saw a
woman giving him a folded newspaper. Suddenly, armed men apprehended the petitioner, so he
ran away.
On September 23, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct
bribery, the dispositive portion of which reads:[6]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and considering that the agreed act, which did not
constitute a crime, was executed, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused NAZARIO
MARIFOSQUE Y NUEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery,
defined and penalized under the second paragraph of Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended. The accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 3 years 6
months and 5 days of Prision Correccional medium and maximum periods as the Minimum and 7
years, 8 months and 9 days of Prision Mayor minimum and medium periods as the Maximum
considering that there is no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance and a fine in the amount of
THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00). The accused shall also suffer the penalty of special
temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.[7]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner interposes the present appeal raising
the following issues:
I
THE ACT OF PETITIONER RECEIPT OF THE SUMS OF MONEY FOR DELIVERY TO HIS
ASSET DOES NOT CONSITUTE AN OFFENSE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER
SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 210 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED.
II
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF DIRECT BRIBERY. [8]
In the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do
not demonstrate with certainty that the receipt of the alleged bribe money constitutes the act
punishable by the offense as defined by the Revised Penal Code. He draws attention to the
following findings of fact by the appellate court, namely: (1) that he was not the one who asked
for reward from private complainant Yu So Pong but the asset; and (2) that Hian Hian Yu Sy had
no direct knowledge of the alleged transaction, i.e., the demand for money in consideration of the
return/recovery of twenty-one Shellane gas tanks, between private complainant Yu So Pong and
the accused.
In the second assigned error, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt because there was no competent evidence to prove that the amount was
really intended for him and not for his asset. He anchors his defense on the fact that: (1) he merely
relayed to Yu So Pong the assets request for a reward money; and (2) Yu So Pong was agreeable to
the request. He further contends that the act of receiving money for the asset is not one of those
punishable under the law as direct bribery.
Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point to his guilt and
malicious intent.
First, petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his daughter at
the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously gave P1,000.00 to his asset, which
purportedly represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not corroborated by his asset.
When he was arrested and interrogated at Camp Ibalon, he made no attempt to present his asset to
explain and justify his receipt of the reward money. Instead, he accepted his arrest and
investigation with an air of resignation, which is characteristic of a culprit who is caught red-
handed. Captain Calvo, one of the arresting CIS officers, testified that petitioner attempted to give
back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest him.[9] This was a clear showing
that he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction. Had he been engaged in a legitimate
deal, he would have faced courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the
violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. Instead, he meekly
submitted to the indignity of arrest and went along the eventual investigation with the docility of a
man at a loss for a satisfactory explanation.
Second, petitioners solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident betrays an
intention not altogether altruistic. On the contrary, it denotes a corrupt desire on his part to obtain
pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. At the time petitioner was notified by his asset of
the robbery incident, he was no longer on duty, having been assigned to the night shift the day
before. He was too overzealous to meet with Yu So Pong although the case was already assigned
to another police investigator. His justification that he wanted to encourage the victim to pursue
the case against the robbers rings hollow and untrue. It is clearly an afterthought. As shown in the
testimony of prosecution witness Hian Hian Yu Sy, petitioner met with Yu So Pong for no apparent
reason than to demand money. There was no mention of any attempt by him to investigate, much
less encourage the victims to file charges against the malefactors. More telling is petitioners
persistence in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer
complaining about the P1,000.00 he supposedly received earlier, thus:
Pros. Agcaoili:
Since the asset was not complaining at the time, you should not have gone back anymore to Yu So
Pong?
Accused Marifosque:
Why would I not go back? My purpose was to encourage him to pursue the matter. If he would not
pursue this matter, then we would be the laughing stock of the thieves we arrested and then we
cannot charge them.
Q. So Mr. Witness, you went to Yu So Pong after you received the P1,000.00 without any
intention to receive additional amount for the asset, am I right?
A: No, maam. That was not the purpose. In fact, Yu So Pong had told me earlier to see him again
in order to prepare for the cash and to see if an additional amount would be needed for my asset.
[10]
While petitioner supposedly supports the reward system, yet he denied that he previously gave
incentives to the assets for the recovery of stolen items, to wit:
PJ:
Sometimes you would ask for reward for your assets?
A: I myself voluntarily give them a reward.
Q: That is not the question. The question is, in the past when you would recover stolen articles,
would you ask the owner of the articles to give some incentive or tip to your assets?
A: That has not happened, your Honor.
PJ:
Next question.
Pros. Agcaoili:
And, in fact, Mr. Witness, you did not give any incentive to your asset on that incident that
happened in the house of Yu So Pong which is the subject matter of this case?
A. For that particular case alone, Mr. Yu so Pong gave me something and I gave it to my asset.
xxxxxxxxx
Pros. Agcaoili
In fact, Mr. Witness, you said that these tips were just given as an incentive?
A I would be the one to give the incentives to my asset. But in that particular instance, the
P1,000.00 which Mr. Yu So Pong gave me, I turned it over to my own asset.
Q To your own assessment, Mr. Witness, is P1,000.00 not enough to serve as an incentive to your
asset?
A I do not know whether P1,000.00 is enough or not. The fact, is, that was the amount I got from
Yu So Pong which I gave to my asset.
PJ:
Was the asset complaining that was not enough?
A. No, Your Honor.[11]
Third, the conduct of the petitioner during the recovery of the stolen articles leaves much to be
desired. He did not apprehend Edgardo Arnaldo or invite him for investigation although the
cylinder tanks were found in his possession. His flimsy excuse that the latter promised to deliver
additional cylinder tanks is unworthy of credence considering that, as a police officer with years of
experience, he should have known that the proper action, under the circumstances, was to at least
invite him to the police precinct for investigation. Curiously, the prime suspect Edgardo Arnaldo
turned out to be the brother of petitioners police asset who, we recall, directed the police officers
to the location of the stashed articles. This strange coincidence may well indicate a conspiracy
between the petitioner and the thieves to steal from the victim and later cash in on the recovery of
the lost items.
In the final analysis, this case boils down to an issue of credibility. In this regard, the prosecution
witnesses gave clear and straightforward testimonies. The Sandiganbayan did not err in giving full
weight and credence to their version of the events. Petitioners conviction must be affirmed.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given
in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the
exercise of his functions as a public officer.
There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the contemplation of Article 203 of
the Revised Penal Code, which includes all persons who, by direct provision of law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its
branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class. At the
time of the incident, petitioner was a police sergeant assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station.
He directly received the bribe money from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in
exchange for the recovery of the stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime
within the meaning of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The act of receiving money was
connected with his duty as a police officer.
The instant case falls within the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code,
which is quoted hereunder:
Art. 210. Direct Bribery. Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime,
in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than three
times the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the
same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in
the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer
the penalties of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the
value of such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain
from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not less
than three times the value of the gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the
penalty of special temporary disqualification.
While the Sandiganbayan imposed the correct prison term in applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the amount of the fine is erroneous. Paragraph 1 of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to paragraph 2 thereof, provides that if the act does not constitute a crime, the fine shall
not be less than three times the value of the amount received. Evidence shows that petitioner
received an aggregate amount of P5,800.00.[12] He should therefore be ordered to pay a fine not
less than 3 times its value. Accordingly, a fine of P18,000.00 is deemed reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 17030, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Direct Bribery and imposing upon him the indeterminate prison term of 3 years, 6
months, and 5 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months, and 9 days of
prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine is increased
to P18,000.00.
In addition, petitioner shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-65952 July 31, 1984

LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Dakila F. Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not the
preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or
transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The factual background is as follows:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of
Quezon City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the
petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner
demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the
National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise
the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half
thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads as follows:
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for Violation of
Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then and
still is an Assistant City Fiscal of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, detailed as the Investigating
Fiscal in the case of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus THOMAS N. TAN, docketed as I.S.
No. 82-2964, for Qualified Theft, taking advantage of his official position and with grave abuse of
authority, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and request from
Thomas N. Tan the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency, and
actually received from said Thomas N. Tan the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00)
Philippine Currency, in consideration for a favorable resolution by dismissing the abovementioned
case, wherein said accused has to intervene in his official capacity as such Investigating Fiscal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.
(SGD.) EDGARDO C. LABELLA
Special Prosecutor
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt,
as Principal in the Information, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS
and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as maximum; to
suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law; and, to pay costs.
Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in the entrapment operations, and which was
fully recovered from the accused, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) shall be returned to private
complainant Thomas N. Tan, and the other half, to the National Bureau of Investigation, National
Capital Region.
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition.
The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual question. The latter is to the
effect that the Sandiganbayan convicted him on the weakness of his defense and not on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence. This claim is not meritorious not only because it is not for
Us to review the factual findings of the court a quo but also because a reading of its decision
shows that it explicitly stated the facts establishing the guilt of the petitioner and the competence
of the witnesses who testified against him.
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner
can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) ...
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.
The petitioner states:
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery
defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a
violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of Direct
Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included
in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as
amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused is a public officer; in consideration of
P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the
petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary
investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the
criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his
office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery.
(Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used thereof is
not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds
of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending with the
government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in the "Definition of
Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the
expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and
other party wherein the public officer would intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a
transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A
transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and
this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan
to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code
because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been
reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim
deprivation of the right to be informed.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that
the petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of
Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58889 July 31, 1986

NATHANIEL S. MANIPON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division composed of HON. BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ as
Acting Presiding Justice and HON. BUENAVENTURA J. GUERRERO and HON. MOISES C.
KALLOS, as Associate Justices, respondents.
Guillermo B. Bandonill for petitioner.
FERNAN, J.:
This is a case of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S.
Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery, sentenced him to four months and twenty days of arresto
mayor with temporary special disqualification for eight years and one day and a fine of P2,000.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
judgment of conviction. The Court dismissed the petition, "the question raised being factual and
for lack of merit." 1 However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its
resolution and gave due course to the petition. 2
The facts of this case are as follows:
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and
Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor dated October 31,
1979 directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or his deputy to execute the decision of the labor arbiter
in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79 entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et al" and
to make a return within thirty (30) days from said date. 3 The labor arbiter's decision ordered
Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay Longog
Tabek and the other judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with interest, as the balance of
their work contract. 4
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a notice to the Commercial Bank
and Trust branch [Comtrust] in Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. 5 The
bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor
arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under
execution.
On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished
account. Manipon told Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn.
However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the Office of the National Intelligence
and Security Authority [NISA] in Baguio City, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the
withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." 6 Dominguez interpreted this to mean
that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and
they arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided
the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to entrap
Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were
able to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then authenticated, xeroxed and dusted with
fluorescent powder. 7
Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1979, Dominguez went to Comtrust
as planned. Manipon showed up with two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto Flora and
Baltazar Pacis. Manipon delivered his letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. 8 Then
Dominguez prepared a withdrawal slip for P2,500.00. 9 As soon as Dominguez received the
money from the teller, he took out P300.00 therefrom added it to the P 700.00 in marked bills and
handed the total amount of P l,000.00 to Manipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked
over to his car and drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked down Session Road.
Moments later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them, seized the P1,000.00 from the left breast
pocket of Manipon and thereafter brought them to Camp Dangwa for questioning. Manipon was
subjected to an ultraviolet light test and found positive for fluorescent powder. However, after
executing a certification relative to the money recovered, he refused to give any statement. 10 He
filed his sheriff's return unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days. 11
Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 46 for having
demanded and received P l,000.00 from Dominguez, a private individual, for a favor extended by
him to the latter, i.e., by not enforcing the garnishment order issued to Comtrust which was his
official duty. However, in an amended information dated February 16, 1981, the charge was
changed to direct bribery under the Revised Penal Code. 12
Manipon was released on bail. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. 13
In his brief, Manipon contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery, in
not giving credence to the defense theory that there was novation of the money judgment and in
admitting illegally-obtained evidence.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given
in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or act relates to the
exercise of his functions as a public officer.14 The promise of a public officer to perform an act or
to refrain from doing it may be express or implied. 15
It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime Manipon was the deputy sheriff
of the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio assigned to implement the execution order
issued in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is also not disputed that Manipon garnished the
bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust and that he lifted the same on December 28, 1979 after
which he received P l,000.00 from Dominguez.
It is the theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon collected from Dominguez on
December 28, 1979 was not a bribe but a payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment under
execution to which the judgment creditors headed by Longog Tabek had agreed.
Manipon narrates that during his meeting with Dominguez at the NISA office on December 27,
1979, Dominguez requested Manipon to convey to the creditors that he was only willing to pay for
the time being a partial amount of P1,000.00, the balance of P 1,720. 00 to be paid after the New
Year. 16 So he visited Longog Tabek who was the "lead man." Tabek, an illiterate, consented to
the lesser amount because he needed money badly. 17 His arrangements with Tabek and
Dominguez were all verbal. At that time he found no reason to have some written memorandum
for his own protection.
At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00 Manipon made a move to hand him a
temporary receipt but Dominguez brushed it aside and said he was in a
hurry. 18
Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He said that in 1978
he and Flora had levied execution against several vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act which the
latter had openly resented. 19
The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court's mind that
Manipon is guilty of the crime charged.
It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a final judgment,
no one took the bother of putting it down on paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that
there was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet did he not also claim
that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to
alter the judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was the
labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution? Manipon could not give satisfactory
explanations because there was no such agreement in the first place.
The temporary receipt 20 adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
is a last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the alleged agreement for the trial payment of the
judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was not
interested in getting said temporary receipt because precisely that was the proof he needed to show
that he had partially complied with his legal obligation.
The testimonies of Crisanto Flora and Longog Tabek are of no help either to the defense. Flora is
Manipon's co-sheriff and is therefore biased. On the other hand, Tabek, on several occasions on
the witness stand, answered with obvious hesitation, betraying himself to be a rehearsed witness.
While he claimed that he was the supposed headman of the other creditors, he could not present
any authority that would allow him to speak for them, let alone agree to receive a lesser amount in
their behalf. He even admitted that he did not know their names. 21
Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early as
November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he
did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the payment by the bank of the
garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment
under execution. His lame excuse was that he was very busy in the sheriff's office, attending to
voluminous exhibits and court proceedings. That was also the same excuse he gave for not
informing the labor arbiter of the novation. In fact he candidly admitted that he never
communicated with the NLRC concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only
on February 20, 1980 although by its express terms, it was returnable within thirty days from
October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly, Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a
consideration for lifting the garnishment order.
Manipon was also asked about the affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation. 23
That affidavit contained two annexes but the temporary receipt which he allegedly prepared on
December 28, 1979 was not included. He said he misplaced it in his office and found it only
several weeks after he had made the affidavit. 24 This leads us to strongly suspect there was
actually no temporary receipt at all at the time of payment on December 28 and that it was
concocted by the defense as a last-ditch effort to make the authorities believe that what had
transpired was not a payoff but a legitimate partial satisfaction of a judgment debt.
In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. In this regard, the prosecution witnesses have
acquitted themselves welt The Sandiganbayan did not err in giving weight and credence to their
version instead of Manipon's. Indeed, Manipon's guilt for the crime of direct bribery has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally seized
because there was no valid March warrant and therefore inadmissible.
The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this
jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, and 3)
seizure of evidence in plain view. 25
In the case at bar, the records show that at about 2:00 p.m. on December 28,1979, NISA Sub-
Station Commander Colonel Luisito Sanchez held a final briefing among his men and some
operatives from the Benguet Philippine Constabulary concerning the planned entrapment. He had
earlier received word from Dominguez that the lifting of the garnishment would be effected that
afternoon and he informed them that Manipon was asking money from Dominguez. 26 As Colonel
Sanchez earlier testified, part of the money to be withdrawn after lifting the garnishment was to be
given to the accused 27 for agreeing to lift the order of garnishment. After the briefing which
lasted from ten to fifteen minutes, they an headed for the Comtrust bank.
NISA Agent Caesar Murla stationed himself near the door of the bank so that he could observe
what transpired inside the bank. 28 He testified that he saw Dominguez give the marked money to
Manipon which the latter accepted and counted. Upon seeing Manipon take the money from
Dominguez, Agent Murla gave a signal to some of the agents positioned nearby by placing his
right hand on his head to indicate that the money had changed hands. Immediately thereafter,
Dominguez left the bank, Manipon placed the money in his left breast pocket and followed suit.
As Manipon walked past Murla on his way out, the latter gave another signal by putting his hand
on his left breast to indicate that Manipon had placed the money in his left breast pocket. 29
Upon noticing the second signal, the NISA agents and the PC operatives approached Manipon and
his two companions. After Identifying themselves as peace officers, they retrieved the P l,000.00
from Manipon. Through it all, Manipon remained amazingly silent and voiced no protest. 30
The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon would therefore fall within the first
exception. The search was made as an incident to a lawful arrest, in accordance with our
pronouncement in Moreno v. Ago Chi 12 Phil. 439, reiterated in Alvero v. Dizon 76 Phil. 637, to
wit:
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon
his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which
might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be
used in evidence in the trial of the case.
The evident purpose of this exception is both to protect the arresting officer against physical harm
from the person being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon and also to prevent
the person arrested from destroying evidence within his
reach. 31
Since the other issues raised by Manipon are factual they need not be discuss here.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is denied for lack of merit, with costs
against petitioner-accused Nathaniel Manipon, Jr. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated
September 30, 1981 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75160 March 18, 1988
LEONOR FORMILLEZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for review of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan.
The records of the case disclose that petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government
service for around 20 years. She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982. Her
duties include the processing of the appointment papers of employees.
On the other hand, a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA from February, 1978
up to March, 1985. Her appointment was coterminous with a project of the NIA. On December 31,
1983, her appointment wag terminated. This notwithstanding, she continued working for the NIA
pursuant to the verbal instructions of the regional director of the Administration.
Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a renewed
appointment; that when she approached the regional director about the matter she was advised to
see the petitioner who was to determine the employees to be appointed or promoted; and that the
petitioner refused to attend to her appointment papers unless the latter were given some money.
On February 27, 1984, Mrs. Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
authorities in the province. The PC officials told her that steps were to be taken to entrap the
petitioner. The entrapment equipment consisted of marked paper money bills worth P100.00. The
PC officials concerned were colleagues of the husband of Mrs. Mutia in the PC.
The first attempt to entrap the petitioner was on February 28, 1984. The plan did not materialize as
the petitioner did not show up at the designated rendezvous at the NIA building canteen.
The second attempt was on February 29,1984, this time with results. That morning, the petitioner
and Mrs. Mutia met in their service bus on their way to work. The two women supposedly agreed
to meet at the canteen later that morning at 9:00 o'clock. Thereafter, Mrs. Mutia notified the PC
authorities who were to arrange the entrapment. The PC soldiers involved in the arrangement were
Identified as Sergeants Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio Labong.
Everyone who was to participate in the entrapment was ready. Mrs. Mutia went to see the
petitioner in her office after which the two of them proceeded to the canteen. Some of their
officemates — Mrs. Florida Sevilla and a certain Mrs. Dimaano — joined them in the canteen.
They occupied two squareshaped tables joined together. The petitioner sat at the head of the table
with Mrs. Mutia seated at her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner's) right and Mrs. Sevilla at
the right of Mrs. Dimaano. Sergeants Bonjoc and Labong sat at another table while Sergeant
Abanes was alone in still another table. The latter brought along a camera in order to take
photographs of the entrapment. The marked money was folded altogether.
Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking their snacks, she handed the marked
money bills under the table with her right hand to the petitioner who received the same with her
left hand. At that moment, Sergeant Bonjoc approached the petitioner and held her hand holding
the money bills. Sergeant Abanes brought out his camera and took photo. graphs of the sequence
of events. He was able to take seven photographs. 1
The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the entrapment. She was
brought to the PC crime laboratory in the locality where she was found positive for ultra-violet
powder. In the presence of the corporate counsel of the NW the petitioner denied accepting any
bribe money from Mrs. Mutia.
The case was brought to the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9634.
Arraigned on January 1 0, 1985, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and went to trial on
May 13, 1985.
In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution argued that the entrapment arranged
by the PC operatives was n because the petitioner was asking money from Mrs. Mutia in
consideration for having the appointment papers of the latter facilitated. On the other hand, the
petitioner maintains her innocence — that there was no entrapment; the scenario was but a scheme
set up by Mrs. Mutia and her husband's colleagues in the PC. The petitioner denies having
accepted the supposed bribe money.
The Sandiganbayan relying on the theory of the prosecution observed in a decision promulgated
on July 14, 1986, 2 as follows —
Upon consideration of the evidence. We find the p petitions version credible.
Two days before the entrapment, Mrs. Mutia complained to the PC authorities about the inaction
of the on her appointment papers due to her failure to give Mm money. She executed a sworn
statement to that effect, ... It was the PC who planned the entrapment and supplied the marked
money. Sgt. Efren Abanes who dusted the money bills with fluoresence powder and who was a
member of the entrapment team, witnessed the delivery and receipt of the money by the accused
and the complainant and he saw how the folded money was handed by Mrs. Mutia with her right
hand underneath the table and received by the with her left hand. That was also how Mrs. Mutia
described the manner she delivered the money to the accused — the money bills were rolled
winch she handed to with her right hand underneath the table. Although Sgt. Abanes had a camera
with him to photograph the entrapment, he could not prematurely expose the camera to allow a
shot of the actual giving of the money lest the notice his presence and intention and thereby thwart
the operation. But after the money had been delivered and received, he immediately took out his
camera and snapped pictures, one of them depicting the accused held by Sgt. Bonjoc and Labong
on the left hand ..., and another showing the accused also held on the left hand by one of the PC
men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia, drinking from a glass ...
The fact that Mrs. Mutia's husband is a PC -An himself does not detract from the credibility of
Sgt. Abanes who took part in the Sgt. Abanes entrapment, took pictures, and testified about the
incident in court. Sets. Abanes Bonjoc and Labong were not the only public authorities privy to
the operation. Capt. Pedro Pates was the one to whom Mrs. Mutia reported the accused demand
for money; it was he who broached the Idea of entrapping the accused; and it was Mador
Fernando Pace who supplied the money and caused it to be marked with powder. It is
inconceivable that an these commissioned and non-commissioned officers had lent themselves to
take part in an unholy cabal of falsely incriminating a female government employee on the mere
urging of one of their associates.
Just as unreasonable is the insinuation that Mrs. Mutia had inveigled the accused to the canteen
and resorted to the insidious machination of planting money in her hand in a simulated entrapment
simply because she thought the accused was not helping her in her application for appointment to
a regular item.
Mrs. Florida Sevilla's presence on the same table with the complainant and the accused may be
conceded. But her testimony that she did not see anything that took place between the complainant
and the accused before the PC operative pounced upon the accused, and the latter angrily asked
the complainant what she was trying to do to her, does not improve the cause of the defense. As
portrayed by the accused, she was at the head of the rectangular table with the complainant at her
left: Mrs. Dimaano at her right, and Mrs. Sevilla next to Mrs. Dimaano. Since the money,
according to the complainant and Sgt. Abanes was handed to and received by the accused
underneath the table, it is not surprising that Mrs. Sevilla who was two seats away from the
accused did not see it. 3
The respondent court ruled that the crime committed by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as
defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as
defined under Article 211 of the same code. Citing the case of People v. Abesamis, 4 the
respondent court was of the opinion that she could be convicted for Indirect Bribery under the
Information for Direct Bribery to which she pleaded and entered into trial inasmuch as it is the
allegation of facts rather than the denomination of the offense by the provincial fiscal that
determines the crime charged.
Thus, the respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery and sentenced her to four
months of arresto mayor, suspension from public office, profession or calling, including the right
of suffrage, and public censure.
On August 23, 1986, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant Petition for
Review. The thrust of the Petition is that the conclusions reached by the Sandiganbayan are not
supported by the evidence. Moreover, the petitioner disputes the applicability and/or correctness
of the ruling of this Court in People v. Abesamis relied upon by the respondent court.
As instructed by this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Comment on the
Petition. In opposing the Petition, the Solicitor General maintains that only questions of law may
be raised in the instant case and the respondent court did not commit any error of law. The
Solicitor General also stresses therein that the findings of fact made by the Sandiganbayan are
supported by the evidence on record and deserve full faith and credit. The Solicitor General adds
that the question of credibility is addressed mainly to the trier of facts, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan.
The parties submitted subsequent pleadings in support of their stand. Thereafter, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
We find merit in the Petition.
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the procedure through which cases originating
from the Sandiganbayan are elevated to this Court.5 Under Section 7 thereof, the decisions and
final orders of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court has ruled that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, subject to certain rare exceptions. 6
Simply stated, one way 7 through which a decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan can be
elevated to the Supreme Court is a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general rule, only
questions of law may be raised therein. The Solicitor General cites the case of Peñaverde v.
Sandiganbayan 8 in support of this view.
Going now to the question of law raised in the instant Petition, We believe that the ruling in
People v. Abesamis, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, is authority for the view that the
allegation of facts, not the denomination of the offense by the prosecutor, determines the crime
charged. Anent the argument on the correctness of the ruling, the petitioner had not succeeded in
showing any cogent basis for reversing or modifying the same.
The remaining argument that the judgment of conviction is not supported by the evidence raises a
question of fact inasmuch as the resolution of the issue would require this Court to sort out and re-
examine the evidence presented in the trial. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Peñaverde v.
Sandiganbayan, the Solicitor General moves for the denial of the Petition. The Solicitor General
adds that the credibility of witnesses is a matter better left to the appreciation of the trial court, in
this case, the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition of this character.
The general rule admits exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact made by the trial
court overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result
of the case. This observation was made by this court in Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the
Solicitor General, to wit —
With respect to the allegation that there was error on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan in
concluding that petitioners conspired in the commission of the offense, suffice it to say that the
basis of its finding was the credibility of witnesses. Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree
No. 1606, in relation to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are entitled to great respect and only questions of laws (sic) may be raised to the
Supreme Court. Besides, well settled is the rule that the findings of (the) trial court on credibility
of witnesses will not be disturbed unless much findings overlook certain facts of substance and
value which, if considered might affect (the) results of (the) case. 9
We believe that the exception to the general rule calls for application in this case.
The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution is that before the accused may be
convicted of any crime, his guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, if there are
substantial facts which were overlooked by the trial court but which could alter the results of the
case in favor of the accused, then such facts should be carefully taken into account by the
reviewing tribunal.
In the case before Us, there are substantial facts and circumstances Which appear to be favorable
to the accused but which were not carefully considered by the Sandiganbayan. The failure to do so
is most unfortunate considering that the Sandiganbayan is the first and last recourse of the accused
before her case reaches the Supreme Court where findings of fact are generally conclusive and
binding.
The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code 10
is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There
must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider
the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or
pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act
to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect
bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame
up public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other
property.
Did the petitioner accept the supposed bribe money?
The Sandiganbayan noted that the photographs of the entrapment show that the petitioner was
accosted by the PC soldiers after she accepted the marked money. Against the evidence of the pro
petition that the money was handed to petitioner by Mrs. Mutia under the table is the assertion of
petitioner that it was when she stood up that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand
which she did not know to be money and when she saw that it was money she threw it away. 11
An examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately after the passing
of the money shows that the petitioner was standing up when the PC agents apprehended her. This
corroborates petitioner's story. There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated which should
be her position immediately after the money was handed to her under the table, which should be
the case according to the version of the prosecution.12 None of the photographs show the
petitioner in the process of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to her. Two of
the seven photographs that were taken outside the canteen appear to be of no relevance to the
operation.
As the petitioner was admittedly handed the money, this explains why she was positive for ultra-
violet powder. It is possible that she intended to keep the supposed bribe money or may have had
no intention to accept the same. These possibilities exist but We are not certain.
However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano were present around the table in
the canteen with the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to the
petitioner. There were other persons in the premises like the PC agents whose Identities petitioner
possibly did not know. Under the circumstances and in such a public place it is not probable that
petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. If
the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the
petitioner would not have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated she
did not see the alleged passing of the money. She could not have seen the money as it was passed
on under the table or when, as petitioner said it was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up.
What Mrs. Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to leave the canteen, two (2) men
approached petitioner, one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, "What
are you trying to do to me?" 13 The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty conscience.
Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to support a judgment of conviction, Moral
certainty is a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to
act upon a given matter. 14 Without this standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt of
the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
With all these circumstances taken into account altogether, We are left at a loss as to the guilt of
the accused. Overlooked by the Sandiganbayan, these facts and circumstances make out a good
case for the petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court holds that the guilt of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 9634 has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. She is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
9634 is hereby SET ASIDE. The petitioner Leonor Formilleza is hereby ACQUITTED on the
basis of reasonable doubt. We make no pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 170122
G.R. No. 171381
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 12, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner
Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief. In the first petition for mandamus and/or
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the August 5,
2005 Order,[1] as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or
to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines
against the petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution[2] of the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
and/or quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture case involving the same parties but for
different properties.
The Facts
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP
143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children
Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and
acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act
No. (RA) 1379,[3] filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the
forfeiture of those properties. This petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually
raffled to the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.
Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP
202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth Division of
the SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also referred to as
Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged
the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April
5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99.
Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the
SB. The plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same
properties identified in both forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of
detention. Per the Sheriffs Return[4] dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly served on
respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB issued a writ of attachment in favor of
the Republic, an issuance which Gen. Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack of
jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with a motion to
expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the OMBs motion, the Garcias interposed an
opposition in which they manifested that they have meanwhile repaired to the Court on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment SB issued in which case the SB
should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution[5] of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared the same
motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The same resolution
declared the Garcias in default.
Another resolution[6] denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer, and
set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to the
prohibited pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation of
Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different divisions of the
SB, contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249.[7]
On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is
not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case
of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on,
inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of
jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid
possible double jeopardy entanglements.
By Order[8] of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants having been
declared in default which has yet to be lifted.
It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her first special
civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the following
issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion x x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and August 26 2005 that
merely Noted without action, hence refused to resolve petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to
quash by virtue of petitioners prior default in that:
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division could not have
acquired jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her childrens] x x x persons, much less make them
become the true parties-litigants, contestants or legal adversaries in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has
not validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners [and her childrens] x x x persons, they could
not possibly be declared in default, nor can a valid judgment by default be rendered against them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from challenging the [SB]
4th Divisions lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I as the same can be raised
anytime, even after final judgment. In the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and
all proceedings before the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the first
challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction raised therein had already been passed upon by [the
SB 4th Divisions] resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds relied
upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26, 2005 were entirely
different, separate and distinct from the grounds set forth in petitioners manifestation and motion
[to consolidate] dated April 15, 2005 that was denied by it per its resolution of May 20, 2005.
D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case against petitioner that mandates the automatic
forfeiture of the subject properties in forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any
conviction for plunder.
E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the
plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA, any penal
conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the Philippines x x x.
G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter
of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements, and to avoid possible conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter
of forfeiture as a penal sanction.[9] (Emphasis added.)
With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were taken after
the petition for Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return of July 13,
2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP
Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the
summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving
the same, but with the following qualifying note: Im receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan
Paolo & Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic).
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a motion
to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on
the subject matter thereof which is now covered by the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for alternative service of
summons. The motion for alternative service would be repeated in another motion of August 25,
2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioners motion to
dismiss and/or to quash and the Republics motion for alternative service of summons.
On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration.[10]
From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the instant petition for
certiorari, docketed as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4th Division acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated
November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January 24, 2006 denying petitioners motion to dismiss
and/or to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the [SB] ought to
have dismissed forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioners person x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the automatic
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth Division has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the
plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter
of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements and worse conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the matter
of forfeiture as a penal sanction.[11] (Emphasis added.)
Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were
consolidated.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the question of
jurisdiction and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitionerand her three sons for that matterconsidering that, first,
vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have
been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the plunder caseCrim. Case No.
28107has already been filed and pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of
the SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb

the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196
Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against the
Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case
No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th
Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the
forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double
jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these premises,
petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its
separate motions to dismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the
plunder case on the foregoing ground.
Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her pleadings,
let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379,
albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan[12]
involving no less than petitioners husband questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.
Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus
depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the
assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the
corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB
4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,[13] the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not
arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully
acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a public officer or employee [acquires]
during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary x
x x and to his other lawful income x x x.[14] Such amount of property is then presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired.[15] Thus if the respondent [public official] is unable to
show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the
court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the
property aforesaid shall become property of the State.[16] x x x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the
jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate
family and business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 3[17] the filing of forfeiture suits under
RA 1379 which will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,[18] interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on
Good Government to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in
Nature while the Latter Is Criminal
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of
action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of
plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for
plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of
the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine,
by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his
legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly
formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of
RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the
respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.[19]
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements
should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy,
as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,[20] suggesting
that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379
are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be
proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by
the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between the
plunder case and the subject forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension about the likelihood of
conflicting decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of forfeiture as
a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division where the
plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in conflict with the decision
by this division on the forfeiture case. They refer to a situation where this Courts Second Division
may exonerate the respondents in the plunder case while the Fourth Division grant the petition for
forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to a conflict.
After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and circumstances separate
and distinct from that in the forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases, there is no causal
connection in the facts sought to be established and the issues sought to be addressed. As a result,
the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the other.
There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the forfeiture of
the subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder case will apply only to
those ill-gotten wealth not recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the
assumption that the information on plunder and the petition for forfeiture cover the same set of
properties.[21]
RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379
Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing Forfeitures I
and II with her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or
impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act
of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On
the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public
official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his
salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the
properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts
should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject. To
be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court perceives no
irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over
the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is
merit in petitioners contention.
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements
of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its
decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under
the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.[22]
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally
on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who
acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted
service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through
Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons
were invalid for being irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,[23] we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the
sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being so much time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or
duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to
the other party.[24] Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for
personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants
house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place of
business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was
made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply
with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons.
Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was
made not at petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen.
Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted
service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief.[25] In the instant case, the
Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons since
the improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner
and her children) voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various
pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot
subscribe to the Republics views.
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction

Is Not Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily
before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted
rulemeans is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in
which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to
improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she
voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I:
(a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion
for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to
dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for
special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and
that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident
substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner
never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their
attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative
defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon
her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in
the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or
equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals[26] applies to the instant case.
Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the
courtchallenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant
invokes other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to
jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to
cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such
defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of
summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children.
And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three
children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in
default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For
the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew
summons or alias summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and
her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-1597 March 1, 1978

EXECUTIVE JUDGE OSCAR R. VICTORIANO, CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, complainant,
vs.
ABRAHAM B. ALVIOR, CLERK III, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, CFI NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an administrative charge against Abraham B. Alvior, Clerk III, Administrative Staff, Office
of the Clerk of Court, CFI Negros Occidental(hereinafter referred to as complainant) in a
memorandum dated December 8, 1976.
The records of this case reveal that:
On July 28, 1976, upon instruction of Atty. Aquiles G. Java, officer-in-charge of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, respondent prepared and signed
Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV) No. 443, requisitioning various office supplies for use of the
administrative staff of the Court of First Instance. Said voucher, which was presented to and
approved by Atty. Aquiles G. Java, was thereafter filed with the Office of the Provincial Canvass
Committee. The latter body failed to act immediately on the matter due to the absence of a
complete description opposite the items. As per testimony of Nelson Villaroza, Rural
Development Technician of the Provincial Barangay Secretariat assigned to the Provincial
Canvass Committee with specific duty to examine items or articles delivered as to quantity,
quality, specifications and prices thereof, when RIV 443 was delivered to his office in July, 1976,
he could not take any action thereon as there was no specification of the items in the voucher.
Villaroza thereupon informed respondent through a certain Mr. Caponpon of the omissions.
Villaroza further declared that someone got back the voucher for respondent sometime in the
second week of October, and that subsequently, the said voucher was brought back to him
(Villaroza) on October 19, 1976 by one Genaro Garbanzos, duly accomplished, together with the
different requests for quotations already fined up, namely: request for quotation for Gella & Sons,
for Lopue's Mercantile Company, for Ernado Commercial, and for Twin Supply.
After confirming the fact of delivery of the items covered by subject requisition voucher by
Ernado Commerce and the signing of the Abstract Quotation of Price, an inspection was made,
and it was discovered that the 100 bundles of braided abaca twine (item No. 4) were overpriced at
P12.00 per unit; and that as a result, Atty. Java was directed to inquire from the office of the
Provincial Governor how such overpricing could have been sanctioned by the Provincial Canvass
Committee.
Accordingly, the civil security unit of the office of the pro. provincial Governor of Negros
Occidental conducted an investigation and submitted its written report dated November 22, 1976,
finding that a possible substitution of inferior quality abaca twine may have been effected by
Genaro Garbanzos (a representative or middleman of Ernado Commercial, in whose favor the
award was made), and requesting appropriate action with respect to herein respondent, who
connived with the former (Genaro Garbanzos) in the commission of the fraud.
On the basis of the abovementioned report, Executive Judge Oscar R. Victorians, CFI Negros
Occidental in a memorandum dated December 8, 1976, initiated an administrative charge against
respondent for dishonesty, neglect of duty and mis-conduct in office, giving him a period of five
(5) days from receipt within which to show cause in writing why he should not be disciplined for
his involvement in the transaction, with option to have a formal administrative investigation.
Respondent filed a written answer and requested for a formal administrative hearing, which Judge
Victoriano conducted from January 17 until March 1, 1977.
In his answer, respondent denied having had any participation in the canvass of prices of the items
covered by such requisition and issue voucher, claiming that it is the duty of the Provincial
Canvass Committee to determine the reasonableness of the prices; that the abaca twine delivered
by Garbanzos and accepted by him conformed to the specification in RIV 443 which he submitted
and with a sample he had presented to Garbanzos before the delivery, and hence, there was no
substitution; that all the items were first inspected and accepted by the representative of the
Commission on Audit before they were received by him; and that the charge of his having
received P 200.00 Garbanzos is absolutely false.
Investigation by Judge Victoriano revealed that Genaro Garbanzos manipulated the canvass to
insure that Ernado Commercial which he represented would be declared the lowest bidder.
Garbanzos admitted that respondent gave him the requisition and issue voucher after his assistance
was requested together with the blank forms of the requests for quotations asking him to make the
canvass of prices. He then placed the prices of the various items on the request for quotation for
Ernado Commercial and signed it in behalf of Ernado Commercial. He asked for the prices of the
items from Lopue's Mercantile Company which he placed on the request for quotation and had it
signed by one of the salesgirls. He did the same thing with respect to the request for quotation of
Gella & Sons. After filling up the requests for quotation, he left them on the table of Villaroza.
Villaroza declared along the same lines, stating that on the third week of October, 1976 the
requisition and issue voucher was returned to his office by Garbanzos with some of the items
already complete with specifications and attached thereto were the requests for quotations of
Lopue's Mercantile Company, Gella & Sons, Twin Supply, and Ernado Commercial, as well as the
abstract of quotation of prices. He affixed his initial on the requests for quotations for Gella &
Sons and Lopue's Mercantile Company and on the abstract of quotations which would indicate
that the prices were exact and reasonable for the items although the presence of his initials did not
mean that he was the one who had canvassed the prices of the various items. Ramonito Padilla,
also a member of the Provincial Canvass Committee as representative of the Provincial Governor,
declared that the requests for quotations were referred to him by Villaroza, after which he called
respondent Alvior who allegedly informed him that he was the one who had made the canvass.
Relying on respondent Alvior, who explained to him that the requisition was urgently needed, he
(Padilla) directed Villaroza to scrutinize the prices based on previous quotations on file in the
office. As the canvass was allegedly done by respondent who represented the requisitioner, a
member of the Provincial Committee on Canvass, and considering that according to respondent
the items had already been delivered, he (Padilla) decided to affix his signature on the request for
quotations as well as on the abstract of quotations.
Investigation further revealed that Ramon Mayoga, Assistant Chief of Division, Office of the
Provincial Auditor, stated that between 11:00 and 12:00 o'clock in the morning of October 25,
1976. Garbanzos requested him to inspect the items covered by RIV 443. The requisition and issue
voucher, the requests for quotations, the certificate of acceptance, the abstract of bids on quotation
of prices and taxpayer's certificate were presented to him, and on the basis of these documents, he
inspected the items in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the presence of respondent Alvior and
Genaro Garbanzos and found them to be in order as to specifications, quality and quantity. He then
certified on the requisition and issue voucher and on the invoice of Ernado Commercial that the
items had been inspected as shown by the stamp mark duly initialed by him. The same stamp mark
appears on the certificate of acceptance signed by respondent Alvior. He did not, however, check
on the reasonableness or the propriety of the prices as he claims that this was the duty of the
Provincial Canvass Committee, After the delivery of the items, Garbanzos prepared the provincial
voucher for the amount of P4,128.00 in payment of the supplies delivered by Ernado Commerce
duly approved by Branch Clerk of Court Antonio Pura, since at that time the officer- in-charge,
Atty. Aquiles G. Java, was in Manila.
Considering the foregoing findings of facts, Judge Victoriano made the following conclusions and
recommendations:
1. There is no clear nor direct evidence of collusion or connivance between Genaro Garbanzos
and respondent Abraham Alvior or Ramonito Padilla and Nelson Villaroza of the Provincial
Canvass Committee or Ramon Mayoga of the office of the Provincial Auditor in the overpricing
of the abaca twine from which Garbanzos admittedly obtained an "overprice" of P800.00 on that
item alone;
2. There was definite laxity bordering on negligence on the part of the Provincial Canvass
Committee of Negros Occidental, particularly Ramonito Padilla as representative of the Provincial
Government nor, and Nelson Villaroza, detailed as Canvasser, and Ramon Mayoga, Assistant
Division Chief, Office of the Provincial Auditor of Negros Occidental with duty to inspect
deliveries of supplies, which made possible and/or facilitated the subject "overpricing" of the
abaca twine. It is recommended that a copy of this report be authorized by the Supreme Court to
be furnished the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Auditor of Negros Occidental for such
remedial and disciplinary measures they may doom proper to take warranted by the circumstances.
3. Respondent Abraham Alvior was likewise negligent or neglectful of duty to a lesser degree in
soliciting the assistance of Genaro Garbanzos, a private person having no official connection with
the provincial government, and who represented a competing bidder or supplier, to facilitate or
expected approval of the requisition, and in accepting delivery of the abaca twine notwithstanding
he was chargeable with knowledge that the price of the article was excessive or exorbitant. He is
also chargeable with misconduct in office for having received money from Genaro Garbanzos as
token of gratitude in connection with performance of official duty. The charge of dishonesty is not
borne out by the evidence.
Considering that evidence is wanting that he connived with Garbanzos in the overpricing of the
subject abaca twine and that he may have been impelled only by a desire to expedite early
approval and acquisition of the supplies subject of the requisition urgently needed by the office of
the Clerk of Court, and considering that this is the first instance of official misfeasance or
malfeasance incurred by respondent who has thus far been in the government service for fifteen
(15) years, it is believed — and the undersigned so recommends — that a penalty of suspension
for thirty (30) days without pay would be sufficient with admonition that in the future he should
observe greater care and prudence in the discharge of his official duties.
4. With respect to Genaro Garbanzos and Ernado Commercial, it is recommended that they be
permanently debarred from transacting business with the provincial government in the matter of
procurement of supplies and materials, without prejudice to considering the possible prosecution
of Genaro Garbanzos under existing law for fraudulent and illegal acts committed by him (pp. 23-
26, rec.).
WE agree with the findings of Judge Victoriano but not without modification. Indeed, the
overpricing of the abaca twine by Garbanzos could not have been perpetrated were it not for the
laxity or negligence of the Provincial Canvass Committee, particularly Ramonito Padilla and
Nelson Villaroza. This is apparent from Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 526 which makes it
incumbent on members of the Canvass Committee to personally undertake the canvass of prices.
The procedure observed by Garbanzos, therefore, was not only highly irregular but clearly
contrary to law.
Respondent Alvior's responsibility, however, is more serious than mere negligence. Respondent
herein should be held liable for gross neglect of duty notwithstanding that the evidence is wanting
as to direct connivance between him and Garbanzos. This is also a clear case of misconduct in
office as well as dishonesty, which warrant a criminal prosecution for indirect bribery under
Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code.
Anent respondent's gross neglect of duty, even as arguendo that respondent had no. actual
participation in the canvass and thus, had nothing to do with the manipulation of the price
quotations effected by Garbanzos, there is not a scintilla of doubt that it was not proper for him
(respondent Alvior) as requisitioner to have solicited the assistance of Garbanzos to facilitate the
approval of the requisition, thereby affording the latter the opportunity to manipulate the prices to
insure that Ernado Commercial, which he represented, would be declared the lowest bidder.
Moreover, respondent Alvior perused the requests for quotations and even signed the abstract of
bids which admittedly showed the prices of the items as awarded to Ernado Commercial. He could
not have failed to notice that the unit price of the abaca twine described as "big" was patently
excessive at P12.00 per unit for each bundle of the braided type, which he actually received. He
could not have shut his eyes to the reality that is the apparent overpricing of the abaca twine on the
mere excuse that the primary responsibility for determination of the reasonableness of the price
lies with the Canvass Committee. Respondent could have either refused acceptance of the items,
or at the very least, he could have called the attention of either the Provincial Auditor or the
Canvass Committee, His failure to resort to either manifested not the slightest concern for the
interests of the government.
The charge against respondent Alvior for misconduct in office for having received money, in
connection with the performance of his official duty, from Garbanzos, as token of the latter's
gratitude, is clearly meritorious. Respondent's acceptance of money under the circumstances is a
dishonest act. In his report. after conducting the investigation (pp. 21-22), Judge Victoriano stated:
... That he was chargeable with knowledge that Garbanzos would realize no little profit from the
transaction must also be assumed. For Garbanzos declared under oath that he gave respondent
P200.00 in token of his gratitude. He was grateful because respondent gave him the opportunity to
make such a big profit when requested to help facilitate or expedite the requisition. Or, probably
because respondent did not make any fuss regarding the price of the abaca twine. At any rate, it
was improper for respondent to have received any gift or any amount from Garbanzos in
connection with the performance of official duties. Respondent vehemently insists that no credit
should be accorded Garbanzos' testimony on this score. But the record shows no plausible reason
or motive why Garbanzos would wittingly make such imputation against respondent if it were not
true, considering that in the course of his testimony he also made damaging admissions against
himself. The suggestion that Garbanzos tried to implicate respondent in an attempt to save himself
can hardly merit credence. For, as already adverted to, his having admitted giving sums of money
as part of his "rapport", not only to respondent but also to Villaroza and Mayoga, equally implicate
him and places him in a bad light. There is no evidence of misunderstanding, previous altercation,
or differences between respondent and Garbanzos as to constitute sufficient motive for the latter to
incriminate him. On the contrary, Garbanzos gave the amount to respondent impelled by a feeling
of gratitude for him.
Being a public officer, and having accepted a gift in the form of money which was offered to him
by reason of his office, herein respondent Alvior is chargeable with indirect bribery punishable
under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. The fact that the evidence is wanting as to direct
connivance between Alvior and Garbanzos is of no moment since in indirect bribery "it is not
necessary that the officer should do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough
that he accepts gifts offered to him by reason of his office" (See: L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal
Code, Book II [Rev. Ed. 1971], p. 309; emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT ABRAHAM B. ALVIOR IS HEREBY DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT PRIVILEGES AND WITH
PREJUDICE TO RE- INSTATEMENT IN THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AS
WELL AS IN ANY GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY OR AGENCY INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.
A COPY OF THIS DECISION IS LIKEWISE HEREBY FURNISHED:
(A) THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
REGARDING THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF RESPONDENT ALVIOR FOR
INDIRECT BRIBERY;
(B) THE HONORABLE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AS WELL AS THE PROVINCIAL
AUDITOR, PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, FOR WHATEVER REMEDIAL AND
DISCIPLINARY MEASURES THEY MAY DEEM PROPER TO TAKE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES; AND
(C) THE RECORDS SECTION TO BE ENTERED IN THE 201 FILE OF RESPONDENT
ABRAHAM B. ALVIOR.
SO ORDERED

Pp. 7 Crim

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pp. 7 Crim

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,

JAREN TIBONG y CULLA-AG,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the account of AAA, the following transpired:

Continuing, AAA narrated:

AAA further recounted:

Petitioner cites Perez v. Court of Appeals[14] which held:

Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK

Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK

Evidence of the Prosecution

Evidence of the Defense

The RTC Decision

On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors, to wit:

Nonetheless, the CA disposed in its decision promulgated on January 20, 2006:

Ruling of the Court

We sustain the conviction but correct the award of civil liability.

The CA correctly determined the criminal liabilities in both cases.

Pros. Dela Pea:

A: I zipped it again and unbuttoned it.

Q: Was your father there on that night?

Q: What about your brother and sisters?

A: They were already asleep.

Q: What was he doing?

Q: How far was he from you?

A: He was near me.

A: I zipped and unbuttoned my short[s] and covered myself with blanket.

Q: Why did you cover yourself with blanket?

A: Because I do not want to see him beside me.

Q: Did your father leave?

Q: Why dont you like your father beside you?

A: Because of these things he was doing to me.

Q: And after covering yourself with blanket, what transpired next?

A: He removed the blanket from me, sir.

Q: And after that, what happened?

A: He was forcibly opening my short[s].

A: I covered myself under the wooden bed.

Q: How wide is this wooden bed?

A: From that wall up to the rostrum.

Pros. Dela Pea:

A: In order not to repeat what he was doing to me.

Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the

[G.R. Nos. 135667-70[1]. March 1, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO,

Q: And what happened when he brought you to your room?

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO is

G.R. Nos. 128159-62. July 14, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HIPOLITO PASCUA, appellant.

[G.R. No. 130640. June 21, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SHAREFF ALI EL AKHTAR, accused-

In People v. Santiago, 197 SCRA 556, 566-567 (1991), we ruled that-

FISCAL RAMOS: After that what else did he do?

FISCAL RAMOS: After one hour what happened next?

Costs against appellant.

[G.R. No. 139338. May 28, 2002]

[G.R. No. 138401. July 11, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERRY LINING and LIAN

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL -