G.R. No. 193161. August 22, 2011.

DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, petitioner, vs. MARGARITA

AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREÑO,
respondents.

Probate Proceedings; Special Administrators; The

appointment of a special administrator is an interlocutory or
preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of
administration in a testate or intestate proceeding.—In Philippine
Business Bank v. Chua, 634 SCRA 635 (2010), the Court stated
what an interlocutory order is: Conversely, an order that does not
finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights
and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that
other things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory”,
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules x x x. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable,
as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
The Court has considered an appointment of a special
administrator as an interlocutory or preliminary order to the
main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or
intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v. Ocampo, 623 SCRA 559
(2010), the Court succinctly held, “The appointment or removal of
special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory
and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.”
Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; A petition for
certiorari will lie without the prior filing of a motion for
reconsideration where the issue raised is one purely of law or
where public interest is involved.—As properly noted by
petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is
required before a decision may be appealed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, there must be no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
such as a motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioner argues that respondent’s
failure to move for the reconsideration of the Order
 _______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

735

VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 735

Manungas vs. Loreto

dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an appeal from it. Such general

rule, however, admits of exceptions as explained in Delos Reyes v.
Flores, 614 SCRA 270 (2010): We have held in a litany of cases
that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and mandamus are
available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another
adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error. x x x
However, there are several exceptions where a petition for
certiorari will lie without the prior filing of a motion for
reconsideration, to wit: x x x x i. where the issue raised is
one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Probate Proceedings; Special Administrators; Jurisprudence
teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies
within the discretion of the court.—The fact that Diosdado is an
heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he
is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of
the Estate of Manungas. Jurisprudence teaches us that the
appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion
of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-
Gabriel, 474 SCRA 747 (2005), it was stated that: It is well settled
that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of
certain persons to the appointment of administrator under
Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes
for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of
Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection
or removal of special administrator. x  x  x As the law does not
say who shall be appointed as special administrator and
the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or
court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not
whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
Same; Same; While the trial court has the discretion to
appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives
of equity, justice and legal principles; There is no logical reason to
appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a
stranger to the deceased, and to do so would be tantamount to
grave abuse of discretion.—While the trial court has the discretion
to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such
discretion must be exercised

736

736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manungas vs. Loreto

with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal

principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the
role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a
regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of
the Rules: Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator.
—Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of
the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executors or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable
and other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased
unless so ordered by the court. Given this duty on the part of the
special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate
for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would
ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may
use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no
logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate
and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Apolinario B. Veruasa for petitioner.
  Joel D. Bancale for respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

seeks the reversal of the April 30, 2009 Decision1 and July
21, 2010
 _______________
1  Rollo, pp. 22-36. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson and
concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Michael P.
Elbinias.

737

VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 737

Manungas vs. Loreto

Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP

No. 74531-MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto and
Florencia Avila Parreño v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting
Presiding Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and
Diosdado Salinas (Manungas). The CA Decision set aside
as null and void the Order dated November 4, 20023 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City,
Davao del Norte, in Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Engracia
N. Vda de Manungas, Diosdado Manungas, petitioner,
wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of respondent
Florencia Avila Parreño (Parreño) as the special
administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas and
appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas Manungas
(Diosdado) in her stead.

The Facts

Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino

Manungas. They had no children. Instead, they adopted
Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino
Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila
predeceased his adoptive mother.4 Avila was survived by
his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for
Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in the intestate
estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she
was the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no
other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas
except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she
acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino Manungas.5
Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights and
Participation on October 29, 1980, renouncing her rights
over the separate prop-

_______________
2 Id., at pp. 50-51.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 113-114. Penned by Judge Erasto D. Salcedo.
 4 Rollo, p. 23.
5 Id.

738

738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manungas vs. Loreto

erty of her husband in favor of Engracia Manungas.

Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas
distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and
Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.6
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City,
appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the
Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her
incompetent aunt.7
Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted
Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the spouses Diosdado
Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal
detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) in Panabo City. In their answer, the spouses Salinas
claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino
Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond the
reglementary period and was not considered by the MTC.
Thus, the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of
Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the
premises and to restore possession to Engracia Manungas.
The Decision was appealed by the spouses Salinas to the
RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the
Decision of the MTC.8 On appeal to this Court, defendants’
petition was denied for having been filed out of time in a
Resolution which became final on April 20, 1998.9
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in
his favor before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao.
He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino

_______________
6 Id., at p. 24.
7 Id., at p. 25.
8 Id., at p. 25.
9 Id., at pp. 25-26.

739
 VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 739
Manungas vs. Loreto

Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas.10 The petition

was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and
Parreño alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an
administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that he
was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia
Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or
her estate and that he was in fact a debtor of the estate
having been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP
177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil
Case No. 5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an
Order appointing Parreño as the administrator of the
Estate of Manungas, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A. Parreño

is hereby appointed as Special Administrator of the property of
the late Engracia N. Vda. de Manungas. The Special
Administrator is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of
P200,000.00 pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 81.
SO ORDERED.”11

Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a

Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction.12 In his motion, Diosdado argued that Parreño’s
appointment as special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian
of the latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia
Manungas’ death, concluding that her appointment as
special administrator was without basis. He added that
Parreño was not fit to become a special administrator
having already been fined by the court for failing to render
a timely accounting of Engracia Manungas’ property as her
judicial guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that Parreño is a
mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas,
while he is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.

_______________
10 Id., at p. 26.
11 Id., at p. 28.
12 Id.

740

740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manungas vs. Loreto
 On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order
reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its earlier
appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate
of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special
Administrator.13
Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to
the CA. The CA issued its assailed April 30, 2009 Decision
finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas and appointing
Diosdado instead. The CA further reinstated Parreño as
the special administrator of the estate. The dispositive
portion reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

GRANTED. The Order dated November 4, 2002 setting aside the
appointment of Florencia Parreño as special administrator of the
estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas, and denying the
property bond posted by Florencia Parreño [is] hereby declared
NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by
Public Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Tagum City, Davao del Norte with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.”14

Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for

Reconsideration dated May 15, 200915 which the CA denied
in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
Hence, We have this petition.

The Issues

Diosdado raises the following issues:

_______________
13 Id., at p. 29.
14 Id., at p. 35.
15 Id., at pp. 37-46.

741

VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 741

Manungas vs. Loreto

“The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that

certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available.16
 The Court a Quo in denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration grossly violated the rule that once a decision or
order is final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable.17
The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to
annul the appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as
judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of
Florencia Parreño as special administrator.18
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course to
oppositors’ petition that is flawed.”19

The Court’s Ruling

The petition must be denied.

The RTC Order dated November 4,
2002 is an interlocutory order
The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around
the issue of whether the RTC Order dated November 4,
2002 is an interlocutory order.
Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court
that Certiorari cannot be the substitute for a lost appeal,
Parreño should have appealed the RTC Order dated
November 4, 2002 to the CA through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Diosdado
contends that the Order dated November 4, 2002 became
final and executory, Parreño having failed to file the
petition within the reglementary period; thus, the Order
cannot be the subject of review even by this Court.
However, Diosdado’s position as-

_______________
16 Id., at p. 4.
17 Id., at p. 6.
18 Id.
19 Id., at p. 9.

742

742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manungas vs. Loreto

sumes that the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is a

final order instead of an interlocutory order.
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,20 the Court stated
what an interlocutory order is:

“Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of

the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating
the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates
that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
“interlocutory”, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a final judgment or order, which
is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may
not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that
may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the
case.”

The Court has considered an appointment of a special

administrator as an interlocutory or preliminary order to
the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a
testate or intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,21
the Court succinctly held, “The appointment or removal of
special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.”
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order
dated November 4, 2002 is clearly an interlocutory order.
As such, the order cannot be the subject of an appeal under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The
proper remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. Thus, Section 1(c) of Rule 41 states:

“Section 1. Subject of appeal.

  An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

_______________
20 G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 635, 648.
21 G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 559, 571.

743

VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 743

Manungas vs. Loreto

 
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.”
 Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of
review by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the CA. Respondents filed the petition well within the
prescribed period under this rule.
There was no necessity to file a
motion for reconsideration
As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that
a motion for reconsideration is required before a decision
may be appealed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Under the rule, there must be no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
such as a motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of
a petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioner argues that
respondent’s failure to move for the reconsideration of the
Order dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an appeal from it.
Such general rule, however, admits of exceptions as
explained in Delos Reyes v. Flores:22

“We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary

remedies of certiorari and mandamus are available only when
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration. The
writ of certiorari does not lie where another adequate remedy is
available for the correction of the error. x x x However, there
are several exceptions where a petition for certiorari will
lie without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration,
to wit:

_______________
22 G.R. No. 168726, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 270, 277-278.

744

744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manungas vs. Loreto

 
xxxx
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The instant case is clearly an exception to the general

rule. An examination of the issues raised by respondents in
appealing the Order dated November 4, 2002, reveals that
the issues are only questions of law. Ergo, there is no need
for a motion for reconsideration.
In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a
petition for certiorari despite the existence of an appeal or
other appropriate remedy in several instances, including
when the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed order.23
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the
reconsideration of the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC,
a petition for certiorari may still prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order
that:

“After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised

by both petitioner and oppositors, this Court finds merit in the
contention of petitioner. In the case of Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children precludes
succession by collateral relatives to his estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas inherits the latter’s property by
operation of law;

_______________
23 Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 161838, April
7, 2010, 617 SCRA 491, 502.

745

VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 745

Manungas vs. Loreto

 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order appointing
Florencia Parreño as special administrator of the estate of the
late Engracia Vda. de Manungas is ordered set aside.”

Such reasoning is a non sequitur.

The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of
Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or
even qualified to become the special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a
special administrator lies within the discretion of the court.
In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel,24
it was stated that:

“It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior

or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of
administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or
administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2,
Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special
administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be
appointed as special administrator and the qualifications
the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion
in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion
which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to
reason, justice or equity.” (Emphasis supplied; citation
omitted.)

This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where

the Court ruled that:

“While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest

of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint
special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for
the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or
removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The
probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based
on grounds

_______________
24 G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 759-760.

746

746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manungas vs. Loreto

other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such

that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or
unfitness and the application of the order of preference under
Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular
administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is
exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason,
equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher
courts is unwarranted.”25 (Emphasis supplied.)

While the trial court has the discretion to appoint

anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the
directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may,
therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a
special administrator is to preserve the estate until a
regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules:

“Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator.—Such

special administrator shall take possession and charge of the
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executors or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable
and other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased
unless so ordered by the court.”

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator,

it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint
someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual
distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that
such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court
may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning,
still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a
debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the
deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.

_______________
25 Supra note 21.

747

VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 747

Manungas vs. Loreto

 
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing
the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with grave abuse of
discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special
administrator of Engracia Manungas’ estate:

“In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment
of Florencia Avila Parreño as Special Administrator on the
ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s contention that he is the
illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence
on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late
Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the
latter’s estate. On the other hand, Florencia, who is a former
Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is
also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and
preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she
would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s
estate. Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the
appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as special
administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but
also a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court
exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious
manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.”26 (Emphasis supplied.)

To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is

the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered
that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the
subject of intestate proceedings that have long been
terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with
the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.27 With the
termination of the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of
Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia
Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the
Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the
estate and would have no interest in preserv-

_______________
26 Rollo, p. 35.
27 Id., at p. 24.

748

748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manungas vs. Loreto

ing its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its

special administrator. The trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly
set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4,
2002 Order of the trial court, reversing its May 15, 2002
Order and appointing Diosdado as the special
administrator of Engracia Manungas’ estate, the May 15,
2002 Order is necessarily reinstated and Parreño’s
appointment as special administrator is revived.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
CA’s April 30, 2009 Decision and July 21, 2010 Resolution
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN declaring as null and void
the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC in Special
Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED. Consequently, the
Order dated May 15, 2002 of the RTC is hereby
REINSTATED and Florencia Avila Parreño is
 REINSTATED as the special administrator of the estate of
Engracia Manungas.
SO ORDERED.

Peralta, Abad, Mendoza and Sereno,** JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.—When appointed, a special administrator is not

regarded as an agent or representative of the parties
suggesting the appointment. (Ocampo vs. Ocampo, 623
SCRA 559 [2010])
——o0o——

_______________
**  Additional member per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.

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