Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989

CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO and for and in behalf of her minor
children, VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all surnamed STO. DOMINGO, respondents.

The City Legal Officer for petitioners.

Jose M. Castillo for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside: (a) the Decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court now Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on May 31, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No.
00613-R entitled Irene Sto. Domingo et al., v. City Court of Manila et al., modifying the decision of the
then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII 2 in Civil Case No. 121921 ordering the defendants
(herein petitioners,) to give plaintiffs (herein private respondents) the right to use a burial lot in the
North Cemetery corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon, to search the
remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and to bury the same in a substitute lot to be chosen by
the plaintiffs; and (b) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1985 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Brought on February 22, 1979 by the widow and children of the late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo, Sr. was this action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of
the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and
Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds
owned and operated by the City Government of Manila.

Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo and
father of the litigating minors, died on June 4,1971 and buried on June 6,1971 in Lot
No. 159, Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene
Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 per Official Receipt No.
61307 dated June 6, 1971 (see Exh. A) with an expiry date of June 6, 2021 (see Exh. A-1).
Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the said receipt which
appears to be regular on its face. Apart from the aforementioned receipt, no other
document was executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in question. In fact, the
 burial record for Block No. 194 of Manila North Cemetery (see Exh. 2) in which subject
Lot No. 159 is situated does not reflect the term of duration of the lease thereover in
favor of the Sto. Domingos.

Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, Series of
1975, dated March 6, 1975, of the City Mayor of Manila (See Exh. 1) prescribing uniform
procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use
and disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc., subject Lot No.
159 of Block 194 in which the mortal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were
laid to rest, was leased to the bereaved family for five (5) years only, subject lot was
certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for “exhumation”.

On the basis of such certification , the authorities of the North Cemetery then headed
by defendant Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal from subject
burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. , placed the bones and skull
in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery y
Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when
the plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and
dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone
marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant and disgusted over such a
sorrowful finding, Irene Sto. Domingo lost no time in inquiring from the officer-in-charge
of the North Cemetery, defendant Sergio Mallari, and was told that the remains of her
late husband had been taken from the burial lot in question which was given to another
lessee.

Irene Sto. Domingo was also informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased
husband in the warehouse of the cemetery where the exhumed remains from the
different burial lots of the North Cemetery are being kept until they are retrieved by
interested parties. But to the bereaved widow, what she was advised to do was simply
unacceptable. According to her, it was just impossible to locate the remains of her late
husband in a depository containing thousands upon thousands of sacks of human bones.
She did not want to run the risk of claiming for the wrong set of bones. She was even
offered another lot but was never appeased. She was too aggrieved that she came to
court for relief even before she could formally present her claims and demands to the
city government and to the other defendants named in the present complaint. (Decision,
Court of Appeals, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 34-55)

The trial court, on August 4, 1981, rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants to give plaintiffs the
right to make use of another single lot within the North Cemetery for a period of forty-
three (43) years four (4) months and eleven (11) days, corresponding to the unexpired
term of the fully paid lease sued upon; and to search without let up and with the use of
all means humanly possible, for the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and
thereafter, to bury the same in the substitute lot to be chosen by the plaintiffs pursuant
to this decision.
 For want of merit, defendant's counterclaim is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 31, 1984 rendered a decision (Rollo,
pp. 33-40) modifying the decision appealed from, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED

(is hereby modified) and another one is hereby entered:

1. Requiring in full force the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the
late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in
favor of plaintiffs hereunder;

2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally P10,000.00 for

breach of contract;

3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for

moral damages;

4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for

exemplary damages;

5. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P10,000.00 as

and for attorney's fees;

6. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, on the

foregoing amounts legal rate of interest computed from filing hereof until fully paid; and

7. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 40)

The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, this instant petition (Rollo, pp. 7-27) filed on July 27, 1985.

The grounds relied upon for this petition are as follows:

THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES

AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR GOOD FAITH AND THEIR
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT TO THE REMOVAL OF THE SKELETAL REMAINS OF
THE LATE VIVENCIO STO. DOMINGO, SR. FROM THE SUBJECT BURIAL LOT.
 II

THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS HEREIN

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ALLEGED TORTS OF THEIR SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEE, INSPITE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 409
(REVISED CHARTER OF MANILA) AND OTHER APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
SUBJECT EXEMPTING THE PETITIONERS FROM DAMAGES FROM THE MALFEASANCE OR
MISFEASANCE OF THEIR OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, IF THERE BE ANY IN THIS CASE.
(Brief for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 93-94)

In the resolution dated November 13, 1985 (,Rollo, p. 84), the petition was given due course.

The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a
governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila. The resolution of this issue
is essential to the determination of the liability for damages of the petitioner city.

Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or
purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude
that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is
immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees.
Further Section 4, Article I of the Revised Charter of Manila exempts the city from liability for damages or
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other
city officer, to enforce the provision of its charter or any other laws, or ordinance, or from negligence of
said Mayor, Municipal Board or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions. They allege that the Revised Charter of Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by the
Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law.

Private respondents on the other hand maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease
which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The city
and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.

Private respondents' contention is well-taken.

Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the
faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with
law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its
powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate,
private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the
powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and
political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the
community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal
Corporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has ... a public character as regards
the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote
local necessities and conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 [1978]). In
connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its “public or
governmental capacity”, and “private or proprietary capacity”. The New Civil Code divides such
properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates
the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or
municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws
(Article 424; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).

Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to “proprietary functions” the
settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex
delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).

The Court further stressed:

Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort....

xxx xxx xxx

The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for
the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his
employment, by which another who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal
corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within tile operation of this rule
of law, and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite
elements of liability co-exist. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The Court added:

... while the following are corporate or proprietary in character, viz: municipal
waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries
and fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among
others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a “proprietary character”.
(Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansvulle, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N.E. 2nd 952, 954 cited in
Torio v. Fontanilla, supra) (Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of
August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904 (Petition, Rollo pp. 20-21 Compilation of the Ordinances of the City
of Manila). The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer (Ibid.,
Sec. 3189), the order and police of the cemetery (Ibid., See. 319), the opening of graves, niches, or
tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are under the charge
and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the
procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery
through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore
no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its
proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor
of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between
them. (Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11 [1 987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual
provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the
contract. (Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 635 [1987]).
Noteworthy are the findings of the Court of Appeals as to the harrowing experience of private
respondents and their wounded feelings upon discovery that the remains of their loved one were
exhumed without their knowledge and consent, as said Court declared:

It has been fully established that the appellants, in spite or perhaps because, of their
lowly station in life have found great consolation in their bereavement from the loss of
their family head, by visiting his grave on special or even ordinary occasions, but
particularly on All Saints Day, in keeping with the deep, beautiful and Catholic Filipino
tradition of revering the memory of their dead. It would have been but fair and
equitable that they were notified of the intention of the city government to transfer the
skeletal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo to give them an opportunity to
demand the faithful fulfillment of their contract, or at least to prepare and make
provisions for said transfer in order that they would not lose track of the remains of their
beloved dead, as what has actually happened on this case. We understand fully what the
family of the deceased must have felt when on All Saints Day of 1978, they found a new
marker on the grave they were to visit, only to be told to locate their beloved dead
among thousands of skeletal remains which to them was desecration and an impossible
task. Even the lower court recognized this when it stated in its decision thus:

All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for
the unfortunate happening complained of and untimely desecration of
the resting place and remains of their deceased dearly beloved, it finds
the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basis. Under
the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most that plaintiffs ran
ask for is the replacement of subject lot with another lot of equal size
and similar location in the North Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs
can make use of without paying any rental to the city government for a
period of forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11) days
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued
upon as of January 25, 1978 when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo, Sr. were prematurely removed from the disputed lot; and to
require the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the
late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot
adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder. (Decision, Intermediate
Appellate Court, p. 7, Rollo, p. 39)

As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the
North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in the receipt
duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government, there is
nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease. (Decision,
Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 3, Rollo, pp. 5-6).

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City of Manila is liable
for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract
of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5,
series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6,
1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was
certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in
full force and effect.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.