Villagracia vs. Firth (5th) Shari'a District Court, 723 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014
Villagracia vs. Firth (5th) Shari'a District Court, 723 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014
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* THIRD DIVISION.
551
Civil Law; Property; Ownership; When ownership is acquired
over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and
enjoy it.—When ownership is acquired over a particular property,
the owner has the right to possess and enjoy it. If the owner is
dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of action
to recover its possession from the dispossessor. When the property
involved is real, such as land, the action to recover it is a real
action; otherwise, the action is a personal action. In such actions,
the parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts
to validly take cognizance of them.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Under Rule 9,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the
pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the
claim; Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority
under the law to decide Roldan’s action because not all of the
parties involved in the action are Muslims.—When it became
apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case.
Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall
dismiss the claim: Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.
—Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under
the law to decide Roldan’s action because not all of the parties
involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction
over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. All its proceedings
in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Shari’a District Courts; In real
actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is
no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such
real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws
of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the
Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action.
—In real
552
553
554
555
LEONEN, J.:
Shari’a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real
actions where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
This is a petition for certiorari with application for
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to set aside the Fifth (5th) Shari’a District
Court’s decision1 dated June 11, 2008 and order2 dated
May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200.
The facts as established from the pleadings of the
parties are as follows:
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-
square-meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang,
Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres
Cañete. On March 3, 1996, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s
name.3 At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia
occupied the parcel of land.4
By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na
Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration
Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land.5
On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land
surveyed. In a report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup
found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by
Roldan’s certificate of title.6
To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan
initiated barangay conciliation proceedings before the
Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang,
Shariff Kabun-
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1 Rollo, pp. 18-19.
2 Id., at pp. 22-23.
3 Id., at p. 42.
4 Id., at p. 6.
5 Id., at p. 43.
6 Id., at p. 19.
556
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7 Id.
8 Id., at pp. 38-41.
9 Id., at p. 44.
10 Id., at p. 18.
11 Id., at pp. 18-19.
12 Id., at p. 28.
13 Id., at p. 33.
557
injunction.14 In his petition for relief from judgment,
Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that
Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and
proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that
he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court set aside the decision dated June 11, 2008 on
the ground of mistake.16
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that
Vivencio “intentionally [waived] his right to defend
himself.”17 It noted that he was duly served with summons
and had notice of the following: Roldan’s motion to present
evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s
decision dated June 11, 2008, and the writ of execution.
However, Vivencio only went to court “when he lost his
right to assail the decision via certiorari.”18
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14 Id., at pp. 33-36.
15 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 155, par. (2) provides:
ART. 155. Jurisdiction.—The Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over:
x x x x
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims
or have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes
relating to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts, (mut’a); and
(g) Restitution of marital rights.
16 Rollo, p. 33.
17 Id., at p. 23.
18 Id., at p. 22.
558
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19 Id., at p. 23.
20 Id.
21 Id., at pp. 22-23.
22 Id., at p. 4.
23 Id., at pp. 2-44.
24 Muslim Code, Art. 143, par. (2)(b) provides:
ART. 143. Original jurisdiction.—x x x x
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court
shall have original jurisdiction over:
x x x x
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d)
wherein the parties involved are
559
Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which
shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit
Court.
25 Rollo, pp. 8-10.
26 Id., at pp. 45-46.
27 Id., at pp. 70-72.
28 Id., at pp. 27-30.
29 Id., at p. 27.
30 Id.
560
Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had
jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of possession,
Roldan argued that the proceedings before it were valid.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on him
of summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he
“effectively waived his right to participate in the
proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a District Court]”32 and
he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced:
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31 Id., at pp. 27-28.
32 Id., at p. 28.
561
mons, notices and other court processes when the SDC Spl.
Case No. 07-200 was filed and heard in the Fifth (5th) Shariah
District Court, Cotabato City, but petitioner (respondent
below) intentionally or without known reason, ignore the
proceedings;
5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is
whether or not herein petitioner (respondent below) has
effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings
below and had lost his right to appeal via Certiorari; and the
issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court
has jurisdiction over an action where one of the parties is a
non-Muslim;
6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City
acquired jurisdiction over the case and that the same Court
had correctly ruled that herein petitioner (respondent)
intentionally waived his right to defend himself including his
right to appeal via certiorari;
7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah
District Court took cognizance of an action under its
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law
rules applied is not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws but the
Civil Code of the Philippines and the Revised Rules of
Procedure, hence the same would not prejudice the right of
herein petitioner (respondent below)[.]33
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33 Id., at pp. 28-29.
34 Id., at pp. 33-36.
35 Id., at p. 33.
562
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36 Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941) [Per J. Moran, En Banc].
37 Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407, 415; 469 SCRA
424, 426 (2005) [Per Acting CJ. Panganiban, Third Division].
38 Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25, 34-35; 118 SCRA 399, 406 (1982)
[Per J. Vasquez, First Division].
563
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39 Figueroa v. People, 580 Phil. 58, 78; 558 SCRA 63, 82 (2008) [Per J.
Nachura, Third Division], citing Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora
Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, G.R. No. 162890, November 22, 2005, 475
SCRA 743 [Per J. Callejo, Second Division].
40 Id.
41 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 175 provides:
ART. 175. How construed.—Any transaction whereby one person
delivers to another any real estate, plantation, orchard, or any fruit-
bearing property by virtue of sanda, sanla, arindao, or similar customary
contract, shall be construed as a mortgage (rihan) in accordance with
Muslim law.
42 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 143, par. 1(d) provides:
ART. 143. Original jurisdiction.—(1) The Shari’a District Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
x x x x
564
the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
x x x x
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(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties
are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their
relations[.]
x x x x
43 CIVIL CODE, Art. 428.
44 Id.
45 Id., Art. 415 provides:
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to
the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the
land or form an integral part of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a
way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material
or deterioration of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or
ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the
immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach them
permanently to the tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by
the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried
on for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding
places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves
them with the intention to have them perma-
565
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nently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the
animals in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms
part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by
their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights
over immovable property.
46 RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, Sec. 1 provides:
SEC. 1. Venue of real actions.—Actions affecting title to or possession
of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in
the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
47 RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, Sec. 2 provides:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions.—All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
566
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48 Rollo, p. 27.
49 Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614
SCRA 354, 369 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
50 G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354 [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
En Banc].
567
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court does
not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article
175 of the Muslim Code, customary contracts are construed
in accordance with Muslim law.51 Hence, Shari’a District
Courts apply Muslim law when resolving real actions
arising from customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to
Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to
apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District
Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general
application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the
Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the
action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of
Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from
customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular
courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction
arises only if the parties involved are Muslims. Considering
that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings
before it are void, regardless of the fact that it applied the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving
the action.
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines expressly prohibits non-Muslims from
participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are
instances when provisions in the Muslim Code apply to
non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code,52
provisions of
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51 MUSLIM CODe, Art. 175.
52 Id., Art. 13, par. (1) provides:
ART. 13. Application.—(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to
marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
568
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53 B. I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 258 (2011).
54 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 93 provides:
ART. 93. Disqualifications to succession.—The following shall be
disqualified to succeed:
x x x x
(c) Those who are so situated that they cannot inherit under Islamic
law.
55 Under Islamic law, a Muslim may not inherit from a non-Muslim,
and a non-Muslim may not inherit from a Muslim. This is based on the
Hadith of Muhammad that “the people belonging to two (different) faiths
do not inherit from each other.” See B. I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON
569
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58 Id., Art. 143(2)(b).
59 Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192289, January 8,
2013, 688 SCRA 129, 145 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc], citing Republic v.
Bantigue Point Development Corporation, G.R. No. 162322, March 14,
2012, 668 SCRA 158 [Per J. Sereno, Second Division]; Figueroa v. People
of the Philippines, 580 Phil. 58, 76; 558 SCRA 63, 70 (2008) [Per J.
Nachura, Third Division]; Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, 510 Phil. 637,
648; 474 SCRA 153, 163 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second
Division]; Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25, 35; 118 SCRA 399, 406
(1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].
60 Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407, 415; 469 SCRA
424, 426 (2005) [Per Acting CJ. Panganiban, Third Division].
61 580 Phil. 58, 76; 558 SCRA 63, 66-67 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third
Division].
570
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62 503 Phil. 288; 465 SCRA 320 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
63 Id., at p. 294; p. 326.
64 131 Phil. 556; 23 SCRA 29 (1968) [Per J. Dizon, En Banc].
571
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65 Id., at p. 563; p. 36.
66 Id., at p. 564; pp. 35-36.
67 Id., at pp. 563-564; p. 36.
572
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68 Id., at p. 565; p. 37.
69 Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25, 35; 118 SCRA 399, 407 (1982)
[Per J. Vasquez, First Division].
70 204 Phil. 25; 118 SCRA 399 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].
71 Id., at pp. 34-35; p. 406.
573
Thus, the court reiterated the “unquestionably accepted”72
rule that objections to a court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. This is because jurisdiction over the subject
matter is a “matter of law”73 and “may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the parties.”74
In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine
“must be applied with great care”;76 otherwise, the doctrine
“may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of
injustice”:77
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72 Id., at p. 34; p. 406.
73 Id.
74 Id., at pp. 34-35; id.
75 Figueroa v. People of the Philippines, 580 Phil. 58; 558 SCRA 63
(2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
76 Id., at p. 77; p. 82.
77 Id.
78 Id., at pp. 77-78; id.
574
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79 Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187,
198 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
80 Id., at p. 201.
81 RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Sec. 20.
82 Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187,
201 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
575
576
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91 Supra note 79.
92 Rollo, p. 40.
93 Supra note 85.
94 Id., at p. 451.
95 G.R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 344 [Per J. Leonardo-De
Castro, First Division].
96 Id., at p. 367.
577
97 AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ORGANIC ACT FOR THE
578
Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
shall continue to discharge their duties.101 All cases tried in
Shari’a Circuit Courts shall be appealable to Shari’a
District Courts.102
The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act
No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
tried in the Shari’a District Courts.103 It shall also exercise
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.104
The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final
and executory, without prejudice to the original and
appellate jurisdiction of this court.105
This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that
“until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall
have been organized,”107 decisions of the Shari’a District
Court shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals and
“shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in
any of the [Court of Appeals] stations preferably composed
of Muslim [Court of Appeals] Justices.”108 However,
considering that Tomawis was not yet promulgated when
Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari on August 6, 2009,
we take cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in
the exercise of our original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari.109
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101 Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
102 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 144(1).
103 Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Secs. 7 and 9.
104 Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 9.
105 Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 10.
106 G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354 [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
En Banc].
107 Id., at p. 361.
108 Id.
109 CONST., ART. VIII, Sec. 5(1).
579
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110 The singular form is “fatwa.”
111 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 166(1).
112 Id.
113 B. I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES, P. 855 (2011).
580