Mejia V Amazon
Mejia V Amazon
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to correct unlawful
employment practices, and to provide relief to Plaintiff Jorge Mejia who was adversely affected
by such practices. As alleged with greater specificity below, Defendant Amazon Logistics, Inc.
terminated Plaintiff Jorge Mejia’s employment in retaliation for him communicating with human
1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and
1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) and (3), and
within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
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PARTIES
4. Plaintiff, Jorge Mejia, was an employee of Defendant Amazon Logistics, Inc., and resides
in Broward County.
6. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been doing business in the State of
7. At all relevant times, Defendant has been an employer engaged in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
8. Plaintiff, Jorge Mejia (“Mejia”), has exhausted all the requisite administrative remedies
prior to bringing this action. Specifically, but not as a limitation, Plaintiff Mejia timely filed a
Pursuant to a work sharing agreement, the Charge was dual filed with the Florida Commission
9. Plaintiff Mejia received a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on January 26, 2018.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
10. Plaintiff Mejia began employment with Defendant during December 2014 as a Senior
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11. When Plaintiff Mejia began employment with Defendant, he was put on a “flexible”
schedule which means he was not given a set time to begin or end the work day.
12. As more Senior Human Resource Administrators were hired by Defendant, they too were
13. On or about October 1, 2017, Plaintiff Mejia, along with all Sr. HRA’s in the east coast
region for Defendant, were advised that they would be coded to a “fixed” schedule which meant
they would be given a set time to begin and end their work day.
14. However, after said announcement, it was noticed by Plaintiff Mejia that he was the only
15. The discriminatory treatment of being the only person put on a fixed schedule was
reflected in the records of the timekeeping software Defendant uses called MyTime.
16. The discriminatory treatment of being the only person put on a fixed schedule resulted in
17. Plaintiff Mejia was concerned about such an employment benefit being affected as he
was the only Sr. HRA in the east region officially coded to a fixed schedule.
18. Consequently, on or around October 10, 2017, during a one-on-one phone call Plaintiff
Mejia spoke to Senior Human Resources Business Partner Kristina Dudley about said concern.
19. As a result of Plaintiff Mejia going to upper management about his good faith belief that
discriminatory acts were taking place against him, Ms. Dudley began to seek a reason to
20. About a week after Plaintiff Mejia questioned why he was having his unpaid time
affected and why he was put on a fixed schedule, Ms. Dudley began to question Plaintiff Mejia’s
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21. Plaintiff Mejia started using the timeclocks as soon as he was told that it was mandatory,
22. On or about November 17, 2017, Ms. Dudley, with the permission of Regional Human
Resource Manager Bria Sullivan, terminated Plaintiff Mejia’s employment alleging that his
online punch-in times at the Amazon Logistics DMI2 Building don’t match his lenel (employee
23. However, it is common knowledge that there are multiple legal entry points at the
Amazon Logistics DMI2 Building as well as multiple AMZL buildings across the network where
employees do not need their badge to be scanned on a lenel device in order to enter the premises.
24. Unlike fulfillment centers and sort centers, which are highly secured buildings,
Defendant’s buildings have access points where employees can enter without the need of a
badge.
25. Further, working from home was common practice by other Sr. HRA’s, especially on
Saturdays. Yet, other Sr. HRA’s were not terminated for alleged improper online punch-ins.
26. Regarding lunch breaks, there were numerous times when Plaintiff Mejia had to eat
while working. Ms. Dudley was very aware of this and in many instances would watch him
work along her side without taking a meal break. Ms. Dudley often did this during Plaintiff
27. Also, it was common for Sr. HRA’s to take conference calls while outside the
Defendant’s office and still be paid for being part of said conference call as this was considered
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28. Regarding personal days, personal days by Sr. HRA’s did not require prior approval by
a manager. Only vacation time required twenty-four (24) hour notice. Nonetheless, Plaintiff
Mejia always provided as much notice as possible prior to taking any personal days.
29. Moreover, using another timekeeping program, MyTime Lite, was a common practice
for Sr. HRAs ever since Plaintiff Mejia started working with Defendant in December 2014, and
he was never told that using Mytime Lite was not allowed.
30. Ms. Dudley and Regional Human Resource Manager Bria Sullivan, while acting within
the scope of their employment with Defendant, terminated Plaintiff Mejia’s employment in
retaliation for him engaging in the protected activity of going to human resources about a
legitimate, good faith concern about his benefits and discriminatory behavior against him.
31. The reasons proffered by Defendant for Plaintiff Mejia’s discharge are pretextual and
are being used as a cover up for Defendant’s unlawful retaliation against Plaintiff Mejia.
32. Plaintiff Mejia’s punch-in timesheet accurately reflected the time he spent working for
Defendant.
33. Meanwhile, other lower level employees of Defendant that were investigated for the
same improper punch-in infraction and had actual proven fraudulent punch-in sheets were not
fired.
34. Plaintiff Mejia was never written up for poor performance issues while working for
Defendant.
35. Defendant has a system where write-ups are recorded. A first infraction results in a first
written notice until a third written notice is given for continued infractions which would then
lead to a termination.
36. Plaintiff Mejia never signed any write-ups for poor performance from Defendant.
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37. In addition, employees of Defendant with poor performance issues are placed on a PIP
(“Performance Improvement Plan”) or PIVOT which never took place for Plaintiff Mejia.
COUNT I
Retaliation
(Title VII of Civil Rights Act)
38. The allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 9 are re-alleged as if fully set forth
herein.
39. Plaintiff Mejia began employment with Defendant during December 2014 as a Senior
40. When Plaintiff Mejia began employment with Defendant, he was put on a “flexible”
schedule which means he was not given a set time to begin or end the work day.
41. As more Senior Human Resource Administrators were hired by Defendant, they too were
42. On or about October 1, 2017, Plaintiff Mejia, along with all Sr. HRA’s in the east coast
region for Defendant, were advised that they would be coded to a “fixed” schedule which meant
they would be given a set time to begin and end their work day.
43. However, after said announcement, it was noticed by Plaintiff Mejia that he was the only
44. The discriminatory treatment of being the only person put on a fixed schedule was
reflected in the records of the timekeeping software Defendant uses called MyTime.
45. The discriminatory treatment of being the only person put on a fixed schedule resulted in
46. Plaintiff Mejia was concerned about such an employment benefit being affected as he
was the only Sr. HRA in the east region officially coded to a fixed schedule.
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47. Consequently, on or around October 10, 2017, during a one-on-one phone call he spoke
to Senior Human Resources Business Partner Kristina Dudley about said concern.
48. As a result of Plaintiff Mejia going to Ms. Dudley about his good faith belief that
unlawful discriminatory acts were taking place against him, Ms. Dudley began to seek a reason
49. Plaintiff Mejia had a good faith, reasonable belief that Defendant was engaged in
unlawful employment practices when he was the only person coded to a fixed schedule which
50. About a week after Plaintiff Mejia questioned why he was having his unpaid time
affected and why he was put on a fixed schedule, Ms. Dudley began to question Plaintiff Mejia’s
51. Ms. Dudley, during all times material, never questioned the punching-in times of other
Sr. HRA’s.
52. Ms. Dudley and Regional Human Resource Manager Bria Sullivan, while acting within
the scope of their employment with Defendant, terminated Plaintiff Mejia’s employment on
November 17, 2017, in retaliation for him engaging in the protected activity of going to human
resources about a legitimate, good faith concern about his job benefits and discriminatory
53. Ms. Sullivan was aware that Plaintiff Mejia opposed being discriminated against
regarding UPT and scheduling prior to approving Plaintiff Mejia’s employment being
terminated.
54. The unlawful termination of Plaintiff Mejia’s employment is the adverse employment
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55. The reasons proffered by Defendant for Plaintiff Mejia’s discharge are pretextual and
are being used as a cover up for Defendant’s unlawful retaliation against Plaintiff Mejia.
Plaintiff Mejia’s punch-in timesheet accurately reflected the time he spent working for
Defendant.
56. Plaintiff Mejia was never written up for poor performance issues while working for
Defendant.
58. Plaintiff Mejia was qualified for his position as Senior HRA.
Mejia’s employment, Plaintiff Mejia has suffered the loss of income and the loss of fringe
60. Plaintiff Mejia has exhausted all the requisite administrative remedies prior to bringing
this action. Specifically, but not as a limitation, Plaintiff Mejia timely filed a Charge of
work sharing agreement, the Charge was dual filed with the Florida Commission on Human
Relations (“FCHR”).
61. Plaintiff Mejia received a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on January 26, 2018.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff Jorge Mejia demands judgment against Defendant for back pay,
front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.
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Plaintiff Jorge Mejia, by and through his counsel, demands trial by jury with regard to
Respectfully submitted,
/s
Nnamdi S. Jackson, Esq.
Fla. Bar No. 99804
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Jorge Mejia )
)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No. 0:18-cv-60933-XXXX
)
Amazon Logistics, Inc. )
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,
whose name and address are: Nnamdi S. Jackson.
2645 Executive Park Drive, suite 340
Weston, FL 33331.
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk