Remedial Law Handouts
Remedial Law Handouts
LAW
POINTERS IN REMEDIAL LAW
1. How do you appeal a dismissal of a criminal case without violating the right of the
accused against double jeopardy?
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is
equivalent to an acquittal. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant
amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Hence, the Republic may only assail an
acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: Accordingly,
a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer to
evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the
narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016)
6. Are the rules strictly applied in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the late Ferdinand
Marcos and his family?
This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and
properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees. Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding
technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth: In all the
alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution.
This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But
substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms
or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades
have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten
wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there
is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it
be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and
annoying procedural sidetracks. (Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673
January 11, 2016)
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8. Are the documents collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigation considered
public documents for purposes of applying Rule 132 of the Rules of Court?
No. Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, 665 SCRA 367 (2012), this court held that
mere collection of documents by the PCGG does not make such documents public
documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: The fact that these documents
were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them per se
public records referred to in the quoted rule. Petitioner presented as witness its records
officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and private documents had
been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the
Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However,
given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a
credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, “[i]f the writings have
subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.” Witnesses can
testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived
from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained
custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda
submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still
classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally
prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing
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the affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
(Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016)
9. What is the rule on issues raised for the first time during appeal?
This Court has already established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not
raised in the proceedings below ought not to be considered by a reviewing court. Points
of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court are
barred by estoppel. The rule becomes crucial in this particular case. Here, DAR is the most
competent agency that can make a factual determination regarding the Notice of
Acquisition and its effect on the Conversion Order long issued by Secretary Garilao. As it
stands, none of the DAR Secretaries was ever given the opportunity to dwell on this issue.
On the contrary, Secretary Pagdanganan issued an Order on 13 August 2003 ruling that
Secretary Braganza’s Order affirming the conversion had become final. (Ayala Land, Inc.
vs. Castillo, 780 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 178110 January 12, 2016)
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053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory
resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of
Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot be
claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to
the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of
clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will
not convert this petition to one for quo warranto. (Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr., 780 SCRA 81,
G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016)
14. What is the exception to the rule on extrajudicial foreclosures regarding the one (1)
year period to redeem the foreclosed property?
When it comes to extrajudicial foreclosures, the law grants mortgagors or their
successors-in-interest an opportunity to redeem the property within one year from the
date of the sale. The one-year period has been jurisprudentially held to be counted from
the registration of the foreclosure sale with the Register of Deeds. An exception to this
rule has been carved out by Congress for juridical mortgagors. Section 47 of the General
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Banking Law of 2000 shortens the redemption period to within three months after the
foreclosure sale or until the registration of the certificate of sale, whichever comes first.
The General Banking Law of 2000 came into law on 13 June 2000. If the redemption
period expires and the mortgagors or their successors-in-interest fail to redeem the
foreclosed property, the title thereto is consolidated in the purchaser. The consolidation
confirms the purchaser as the owner of the property; concurrently, the mortgagor — for
failure to exercise the right of redemption within the period — loses all interest in the
property. (Cahayag vs. Commercial Credit Corporation, 780 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 168078,
G.R. No. 168357 January 13, 2016)
15. What is the exception to the rule that evidence not offered will not be admitted?
Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial court so long
as the following requirements obtain: (1) the evidence is duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and (2) the evidence is incorporated into the records of the case. The exception
does not apply to the case of Baldoza. While she duly identified the Contract to Sell during
her direct examination, which was duly recorded, Exhibit “L” was not incorporated into
the records. (Cahayag vs. Commercial Credit Corporation, 780 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 168078,
G.R. No. 168357 January 13, 2016)
16. How are issues raised in previous pleadings but not included in memorandum of appeal
treated?
Equally important is the fact that petitioners failed to include the issue over Exhibit “L” in
any of the Memoranda they filed with us. The omission is fatal. Issues raised in previous
pleadings but not included in the memorandum are deemed waived or abandoned (A.M.
No. 99-2-04-SC). As they are “a summation of the parties’ previous pleadings, the
memoranda alone may be considered by the Court in deciding or resolving the petition.”
Thus, even as the issue was raised in the Petition, the Court may not consider it in
resolving the case on the ground of failure of petitioners to include the issue in the
Memorandum. They have either waived or abandoned it. (Cahayag vs. Commercial Credit
Corporation, 780 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 168078, G.R. No. 168357 January 13, 2016)
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answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. (Alba, Jr.
vs. Malapajo, 780 SCRA 534, G.R. No. 198752 January 13, 2016)
18. Can errors in the decision rendered by a collegial body be imputed to a specific justice
or judge belonging to the collegial body?
The Sandiganbayan ruling was a collegial decision, with Justice Hernandez as the ponente,
and Associate Justices Quiroz and Cornejo as the concurring magistrates. It bears stressing
that in a collegial court, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule.
Umali cannot impute what he perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of law to one
specific Justice only. (Re: Verified Complaint dated July 13, 2015 of Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. vs.
Hernandez, 784 SCRA 483, I.P.I. No. 15-35-SB-J February 23, 2016)
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21. Is the decision of a division of Court of Appeals binding on other Court of Appeals
division?
We note that the decision being relied on by petitioners was rendered merely by another
division of the Court of Appeals, and not this Court. We have previously settled that the
decision of a division of the Court of Appeals is not binding on a co-division. We held: In
the case at bar, this Court holds that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals in not giving due deference to the decision of its co-division. As correctly pointed
out by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, the decision of its co-division is
not binding on its other division. Further, it must be stressed that judicial decisions that
form part of our legal system are only the decisions of the Supreme Court. Moreover, at
the time petitioners made the aforesaid Manifestation, the Decision dated 14 December
2007 in C.A.--G.R. S.P. No. 96717 of the Special Tenth Division was still on appeal before
this Court. Therefore, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
for not giving due deference to the said Decision of its co-division, and its actuation
cannot be considered grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction. (Agustin-Se vs. Office of the President, 783 SCRA 213, G.R. No. 207355
February 3, 2016)
22. When can a judge dismiss a case for lack of probable cause?
A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged. Applying the standard set forth in De Los
Santos-Dio v. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614 (2013), the evidence on record herein does
not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence of probable cause against petitioners.
Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the prosecution was able to
establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4(a) and (e) in
relation to Sections 6(a) and (c) of RA 9208. As it appears from the records, petitioners
recruited and hired the AAA Group and, consequently, maintained them under their
employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. In view of this, probable
cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest. (Young vs. People, 783 SCRA 286, G.R. No.
213910 February 3, 2016)
23. What is the doctrine of immutability of judgment and what are the exceptions?
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
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and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of
the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court
has the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of
substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (Bigler vs.
People, 785 SCRA 479, G.R. No. 210972 March 2, 2016)
24. Can the Supreme Court correct the penalties imposed in a criminal case despite the
finality of the judgment?
In a catena of similar cases where the accused failed to perfect their appeal on their
respective judgments of conviction, the Court corrected the penalties imposed,
notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of
penalty prescribed by law. There is thus, no reason to deprive herein petitioner of the
relief afforded the accused in the aforesaid similar cases. Verily, a sentence which
imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the
maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the
defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess. (Bigler
vs. People, 785 SCRA 479, G.R. No. 210972 March 2, 2016)
25. How should appeals in criminal cases treated by the appellate courts?
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law. (People vs. Comboy, 785 SCRA 512, G.R. No. 218399 March 2, 2016)
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legislative function in this case. Moreover, We do not view that the procedural rules on
standing should be waived on the ground that the issues raised in this petition are of
transcendental importance. To consider a matter as one of transcendental importance, all
of the following must concur: (1) the public character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
the questions being raised. As will be shown in the discussion below, elements (2) and (3)
are obviously lacking in this case. (Rosales vs. Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), 788
SCRA 292, G.R. No. 201852 April 5, 2016)
27. What is the rule to follow in case of the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari?
Since the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original concurrent jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, the rule on hierarchy of courts determines the venue of
recourses to these courts. In original petitions for certiorari, this Court will not directly
entertain special civil action unless the redress desired cannot be obtained elsewhere
based on exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify immediate resort to this
Court, which We found none in the present case that likewise involves factual questions.
Time and again, it has been held that this Court is not a trier of fact. Glaringly, petitioners
did not comply with the rule that “there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Since petitioners assail the validity of the ERC
issuances and seeks to declare them as unconstitutional, a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules is the appropriate remedy. Under the Rules, any person whose
rights are affected by any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
(Rosales vs. Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), 788 SCRA 292, G.R. No. 201852 April 5,
2016)
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extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage are satisfied before the clerk of court, as the ex
officio sheriff, goes ahead with the public auction of the mortgaged property. Necessarily,
the orders of the executive judge in such proceedings, whether they be to allow or
disallow the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, are not issued in the exercise of a
judicial function but in the exercise of his administrative function to supervise the
ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court as Ex Officio Sheriff in the conduct of an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. (Jonsay vs. Solidbank Corporation [now Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company], 788 SCRA 552, G.R. No. 206459 April 6, 2016)
30. What are the requirements for an action to quiet title to prosper?
The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of
possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000), an action for
quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit: x x x
Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure “. . . an adjudication that a
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claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so
that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from
any danger of hostile claim.” In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, “. . .
not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he
who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he
could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and
even to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x.” (Emphasis in the original) In our
jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein. Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
He need not be in possession of said property. (Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa vs. Heirs
of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 187633 April 4, 2016)
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prosecutor, or in this case, the investigating officers of the Officenof the Ombudsman,
may err or even abuse the discretion lodged in them by law, such error or abuse alone
does not render their act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari.” The requirement for judicial intrusion is still for the petitioner to
show clearly that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Joson, in this case, failed to do so. On the contrary, the
record reveals that the Ombudsman carefully perused and studied the documents and
meticulously weighed the evidence submitted by the parties before issuing the assailed
joint resolution and joint order which strongly negated any averment that they were
issued capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, or in a despotic manner. (Joson vs. Office of
the Ombudsman, 788 SCRA 647, G.R. Nos. 210220-21 April 6, 2016)
34. What is the scope of the party-intervenor’s right to appeal the decisions of the court
which rejected its motion for intervention?
With the consequent denial of its intervention and dismissal of its complaint-in-
intervention in Civil Case No. 666-I, petitioner should have appealed such denial. “[A]n
order denying a motion for intervention is appealable. Where the lower court’s denial of
a motion for intervention amounts to a final order, an appeal is the proper remedy x x x.”
Having failed to take and prosecute such appeal, petitioner acquired no right to
participate in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 666-I, even question the judgment of the
RTC consequently rendered in said case. “A prospective intervenor’s right to appeal
applies only to the denial of his intervention. Not being a party to the case, a person
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whose intervention the court denied has no standing to question the decision of the
court[, but] only the trial court’s orders denying his intervention x x x, not the decision
itself.” (Republic vs. Heirs of Diego Lim, 788 SCRA 61, G.R. No. 195611 April 4, 2016)
35. What is the rule regarding the parties who refused to appeal a decision?
With respect to the Lim and Josefat heirs, they are precluded from seeking a reversal of
the herein assailed judgment. As mere respondents in the present Petition, this Court
cannot grant the affirmative relief theyseek as they did not themselves file a petition
questioning the appellate court’s decision. “It is a fundamental principle that a party who
does not appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, is not entitled to any affirmative relief. An
appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to
maintain the judgment, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or
claim affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.” “As a general rule, a party who has
not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the
ones granted in the appealed decision. The reason for this rule is that since parties did not
appeal from the decision or resolution, they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication.” These pronouncements are especially significant considering that the CA
ruled that the Lim and Josefat heirs have no legal standing to maintain and prosecute Civil
Case No. 666-I; indeed, their Comment should have been stricken off the record as a
necessary consequence of the appellate court’s pronouncement, which they failed to
question and is now binding as to them. (Republic vs. Heirs of Diego Lim, 788 SCRA 61,
G.R. No. 195611 April 4, 2016)
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restrained by the appellate court. (Golden Cane Furniture Manufacturing Corporation vs.
Steelpro Philippines, Inc., 788 SCRA 82, G.R. No. 198222 April 4, 2016)
38. What is the rule in determining the sufficiency of a motion to postpone pretrial?
Pretrial answers the call for the speedy disposition of cases. Under Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, the counsels and the parties are mandated to appear at pretrial. Their
nonappearance may be excused only if there is a valid cause or if a representative
appears on their behalf. If the defendant fails to appear, the RTC may allow the plaintiff to
present evidence ex parte and may render judgment based on it. This Court has ruled that
a motion for postponement is a privilege and not a right. The movant should not assume
that his motion would be granted. In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to
postpone the pretrial, the court must take into account two factors: (a) the reason given,
and (b) the merits of the movant’s case. (Vergara vs. Otadoy, Jr., 788 SCRA 35, G.R. No.
192320 April 4, 2016)
39. Is it the ministerial duty of the court to issue writ of possession to the buyer in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale?
Possession being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the
other attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of right. This is why Section 7 of Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to issue
a writ of possession to the new owner upon a mere ex parte motion. Section 7 reads: Sec.
7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court
of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is
situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in
an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to
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indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be
made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral
proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property
registered under the Mortgage Law or under Section 194 of the Administrative Code, or
of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of
any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of
court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph 11 of
Section 114 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2866, and the court shall, upon
approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the
province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
(Gallent, Sr. vs. Velasquez, 788 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 203949, G.R. No. 205071 April 6, 2016)
40. Which has greater probative value? The affidavit or the testimony of a witness in
court?
Generally, whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits
taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably
incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and
sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness
may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate
recollection of the subject. (People vs. Vargas, 788 SCRA 617, G.R. No. 208446 April 6,
2016)
41. How will a slight doubt as to the identity of the accused affect a criminal case?
The deficiency in the proof submitted by the prosecution cannot be ignored. A slight
doubt created in the identity of the perpetrators of the crime should be resolved in favor
of the accused. As succinctly put by the Court in People v. Fernandez, 385 SCRA 224
(2002): It is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt
has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence. Hence, despite the Court’s
support of ardent crusaders waging all-out war against felons on the loose, when the
People’s evidence fails to prove indubitably the accused’s authorship of the crime of
which they stand accused, it is the Court’s duty — and the accused’s right — to proclaim
their innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order. (People vs. Vargas, 788 SCRA 617, G.R.
No. 208446 April 6, 2016)
42. Can there be a finding of probable cause based on opinion and belief?
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In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of discretion, attention must
be drawn to the context of its ruling — that, is: preliminary investigation is merely an
inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that
a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for
it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, “a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.” In
Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), “[p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing
a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof. The term does not mean ‘actual or positive cause’ nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not
require an inquiry x x x whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
(Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R.
Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R. Nos. 213475-76 March
15, 2016)
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Criminal Procedure].” (Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R.
Nos. 213163-78, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R.
Nos. 213475-76 March 15, 2016)
45. Is the res inter alios acta rule strictly applied in preliminary investigation?
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on
their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the
parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a
technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary
investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman’s
appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical
rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation “as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay.” This is because “such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.” Applying the same logic,
and with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the
testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles
siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case
law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation,” as in this case.
(Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R.
Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R. Nos. 213475-76 March
15, 2016)
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not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or
not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The
judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds
no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. (Reyes vs.
Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R. Nos.
213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R. Nos. 213475-76 March 15,
2016)
47. If the court orders the prosecutor to present additional evidence, is this order
mandatory?
The Court in Mendoza v. People, 722 SCRA 647 (2014), clarified that the trial court (or the
Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information
before it, namely to: (a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; (b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence in case of doubt as to the existence
of probable cause. The Court went on to elaborate that “the option to order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory” and reiterated that “the
court’s first option x x x is for it to ‘immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause.’” Verily, when a criminal Information is filed
before the trial court, the judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitled
to make his own assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether there is
probable cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with the trial; or in the
absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal case. This is in line with
the fundamental doctrine that “once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.” Nevertheless, the Court, in Mendoza
cautions the trial courts in proceeding with dismissals of this nature: Although
jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in
dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the
evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely
fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the
other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with
arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served. (Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787
SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos.
213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R. Nos. 213475-76 March 15, 2016)
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48. Can a court which has no jurisdiction over the principal case acquire jurisdiction
over the complaint-in-intervention?
No. We shall discuss the principal issue of whether the intervention is proper in this case.
A Complaint-in-Intervention is merely an incident of the main action. In the case of Asian
Terminals, Inc. v. Bautista-Ricafort, 505 SCRA 748 (2006), we expounded that
“intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never an
independent action, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily results in the
dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention. Likewise, a court which has no jurisdiction over
the principal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-intervention. Intervention
presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of
intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action.” In this case, the RTC had
already acquired jurisdiction upon filing of the complaint. The re-raffling of the case is
more administrative than it is judicial. By directing the re-raffling of the case to all the
RTCs, the Complaint-in-Intervention should be refiled in the court where the principal
action is assigned. (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Campa, Jr., 787 SCRA 476, G.R. No.
185979 March 16, 2016)
49. Can a party assail a judicially approved agreement if it was based on erroneous
understanding of the law?
The RTC, after finding the August 19, 2003 compromise agreement to be in order and not
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy, issued the October 20, 2003
order approving the compromise agreement. With this stamp of judicial approval, the
compromise agreement became more than a mere contract of the parties. The judicially
approved agreement was thereby turned into a final judgment, immutable and
unalterable, regardless of whether or not it rested on erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and regardless of whether the change would be by the court that rendered it or the
highest court of the land. This doctrine of immutability is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, for, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. The doctrine
exists for the reason that every litigation must come to an end at some time, for it is
necessary for the proper enforcement of the rule of law and the administration of justice
that once a judgment attains finality, the winning party should not be denied the
favorable result. Clearly, the element of public policy and public interest has diluted the
purely private interest of the parties before the compromise agreement was approved by
the trial court. (Tung Hui Chung vs. Shih Chiu Huang, 787 SCRA 55, G.R. No. 170679 March
9, 2016)
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Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the guidelines: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Decided cases expound that the circumstantial
evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt. (People
vs. Urzais, 789 SCRA 386, G.R. No. 207662 April 13, 2016)
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which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. Nonetheless, this doctrine may be
relaxed in order to serve substantial justice in case compelling circumstances that clearly
warrant the exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction are extant. Thus, like any other rule,
it has exceptions, such as: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause, no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable. After all, the rules of procedure intend to promote the ends of justice,
thus, their strict and rigid application must always be eschewed when it would subvert its
primary objective. (Navarra vs. Liongson, 790 SCRA 155, G.R. No. 217930 April 18, 2016)
53. What should the court do if there are two conflicting judgments in one case?
Where a certain case comprises two or more conflicting judgments which are final and
executory, the Court, in the case of Collantes v. Court of Appeals, 517 SCRA 561 (2007),
offered three (3) options in resolving the same. First, the court may opt to require the
parties to assert their claims anew; second, to determine which judgment came first; and
third, to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort.
(Navarra vs. Liongson, 790 SCRA 155, G.R. No. 217930 April 18, 2016)
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absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of
rationalization can offset it. Bodoy’s act of surreptitiously withdrawing Php60,000.00 from
the trial court’s bank account without any stamp of authority constitutes dishonesty,
which is defined as follows: [T]he disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack
of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
(Gubatanga vs. Bodoy, 790 SCRA 205, A.M. No. P-16-3447 April 19, 2016)
56. What is the difference between the declaration of default for failure to file
responsive pleading within the reglementary period and failure to appear during
pretrial?
Counsel apparently confuses a declaration of default under Section 3 of Rule 9 with the
effect of failure to appear under Section 5 of Rule 18. Failure to file a responsive pleading
within the reglementary period is the sole ground for an order of default under Rule 9. On
the other hand, under Rule 18, failure of the defendant to appear at the pretrial
conference results in the plaintiff being allowed to present evidence ex parte. The
difference is that a declaration of default under Rule 9 allows the Court to proceed to
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant; while the
effect of default under Rule 18 allows the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and for
the Court to render judgment on the basis thereof. The lower court may have declared
defendants therein as in default; however, it did not issue an order of default, rather, it
ordered the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte in accordance with the Rules. In any
case, the Castros could have availed themselves of appropriate legal remedies when the
CA failed to resolve the issue, but they did not. They cannot now resurrect the issue
through a Comment before this Court. (Paramount Life & General Insurance Corporation
vs. Castro, 790 SCRA 363, G.R. No. 195728, G.R. No. 211329 April 19, 2016)
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58. Does partial payment of the appeal fee toll the running of the prescriptive
period?
Verily, the payment of appeal docket fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It is
mandatory as it is required in all appealed cases, otherwise, the Court does not acquire
the authority to hear and decide the appeal. The failure to pay or even the partial
payment of the appeal fees does not toll the running of the prescriptive period, hence,
will not prevent the judgment from becoming final and executory. (National Transmission
Corporation vs. Heirs of Teodulo Ebesa, 785 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 186102 February 24, 2016)
60. Is the three-day notice rule under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 mandatory?
Proceeding now to whether PAF violated the three-day notice rule relative to its motion
to dismiss filed before the RTC, it has been repeatedly held that the three (3)-day notice
requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as
mandatory for being an integral component of procedural due process. Just like any other
rule, however, this Court has permitted its relaxation subject, of course, to certain
conditions. Jurisprudence provides that for liberality to be applied, it must be assured that
the adverse party has been afforded the opportunity to be heard through pleadings filed
in opposition to the motion. In such a way, the purpose behind the three-day notice rule
is deemed realized. (Magellan Aerospace Corporation vs. Philippine Air Force, 785 SCRA
221, G.R. No. 216566 February 24, 2016)
61. Is the non-inclusion of the amount of the property fatal in determining the
jurisdiction of the court?
The noninclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the property, however, is
not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax declaration (Annex “N” in the
complaint) of the property in question showing that it has an assessed value of
P215,320.00. It must be emphasized that annexes to a complaint are deemed part of, and
should be considered together with the complaint. In Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd., 528 SCRA 321 (2007), this Court ruled that in determining
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the sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should also consider the attachments to
the complaint, thus: We have ruled that a complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency of cause of action if it appears clearly from the complaint and its
attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The converse is also true. The complaint
may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its
annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Hence, being an annex to BSP’s
complaint, the tax declaration showing the assessed value of the property is deemed a
part of the complaint and should be considered together with it in determining that the
RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction. (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Legaspi, 785 SCRA
466, G.R. No. 205966 March 2, 2016)
62. Can a court take judicial notice of its acts in the previous case?
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of
another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court,
and of public records on file in the same court. Since a copy of the tax declaration, which
is a public record, was attached to the complaint, the same document is already
considered as on file with the court, thus, the court can now take judicial notice of such.
(Bankgo Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Legaspi, 785 SCRA 466, G.R. No. 205966 March 2, 2016)
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