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Geoff Waite Nietzsches Corpse Aesthetics Politics Prophecy or The Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life 2 PDF
Geoff Waite Nietzsches Corpse Aesthetics Politics Prophecy or The Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life 2 PDF
NIETZSCHE'S CORPS/E
Aesthetics, Politics, Prophecy, or,
Geoff Waite
There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body does not die,
unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to point in
the opposite direction. —Benedict de Spinoza, 1675
Prologue xi
Epilogue 391
Too Much Nietzsche 391 The Toilet Was Full of Nietzsche 391
Nietzsche in Dormancy 392 Caput mortuum, or, The Industrialists of
the Corps/e 392 Mao III 392 On the Dead Burying Their
Dead 393 Nietzsche's Last Words 394 TheLastWord 395
Afofef 397
Jw/fca: 555
Plate 2. MzckTmscy,Derrida Queries de Man, 1990, oil on canvas, 83% X 55
inches. Collection of Michael andJudy Ovitz, Los Angeles. Courtesy CurtMarcus Gallery,
New Tork, ©Mark Tansey.
Prologue
What if this were true literally—this claim bringing into fateful constel-
lation Nietzsche and communism and nothing else besides? How could
we know this today, when communism exists no longer . . . or has not
yet really existed? Unlike Nietzsche. For whether or not the living
movement is dead, the dead man, the corpse, definitely lives on —as
corpus and as corps. Put as another question: If the term "postmodern"
ought to be replaced by "post-Nietzschean"2 if the precontemporary
and the contemporary alike are fundamentally, hegemonically Nietz-
schean, then what about the postpostmodern, postcontemporary fu-
ture? Asking this question, consider the possibility that Nietzsche's—
relative —success and communism's —apparent—failure are global
events intimately imbricated.
This book proposes, in terms minted in another context by Fredric
Jameson, that the extensive albeit—in the global scheme of things —
comparatively "isolated landscape" of "Nietzscheanism" can serve "al-
legorically" to access the geopolitical aesthetic "in the present age of a
multinational global corporate network."3 This landscape requires il-
lumination by a "conspiratorial hypothesis" in order to make it visible
in its full complexity and effectivity. But neither the New World Order
of "late capitalism" nor "Nietzscheanism" can be "represented" or even
"perceived" strictly speaking, since totalities of this empirical extent
and simultaneous level of abstraction can never be fully represented or
perceived, only mapped and triangulated with other forces. In these
matters there is no "closure" at the end of the twentieth century—
sooner a "closure-effect."4 On the macrolevel of the history of con-
sciousness, Nietzscheanism must be mapped by triangulating it in the
one direction with the ostensible "victory of capitalism" and in the
other direction with the "defeat of communism." On the microlevel
Nietzscheanism must be mapped by triangulating Nietzsche's recep-
tion by Nietzscheans across the ideological spectrum with his pub-
lished and unpublished writings, showing that Nietzsche programmed
his reception in unconscious, subliminal ways to produce what will
here be called "Nietzsche/anism" and "Nietzsche's corps/e." While
mapping contemporary literary theory and philosophy, the ultimate
adversary here is stronger than Nietzscheanism, and nothing less than
neocapitalist totality en marche.
If, as Jameson argues, "it is indeed the new world system, the third
stage of capitalism, which is for us the absent totality, Spinoza's God
or Nature, the ultimate (indeed perhaps the only) referent, the true
ground of Being of our time," then "only by way of itsfitfulcontempla-
tion can its future, and our own, be somehow disclosed."5 Slavoj &izek,
too, notes that "it seems as if today we live in an age of new Spinozism:
the ideology of late capitalism is, at least in some of its fundamental
forms, 'Spinozist' " 6 Whereas for the Slovene &izek, Spinozism is "the
ideology of late capitalism," the North American Jameson takes a mid-
dle ground between this position and the communist Antonio Negri's
more elaborated one that Spinoza is "the savage anomaly" both of his
time but also for ours.7 But another referent and synonym in the over-
views of Jameson, &izek, and Negri is not "Spinoza" but "Nietzsche."
His is the name that comes quicker to mind and lips.
It is widely thought that Nietzsche was a proper follower of Spinoza,
the greatest modern Spinozist, even that the two names are synony-
mous. This is the position held, for example, throughout the later work
of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, indeed its philosophical core.8 For
his part, Negri aligns himself against "triumphant capitalism" in a ge-
nealogy of "radical democracy": namely, "the line that in the modern
«r era goes from Machiavelli and Spinoza to Marx, and in the contempo-
£ rary period from Nietzsche and Heidegger to Foucault and Deleuze."9
^ This book stands shoulder to shoulder with this Negrian genealogy
g with two major exceptions. It argues that the names Heidegger and
« Nietzsche must be radically excised from the lists. And the same goes
^ for Louis Althusser's depiction of his own "materialist" lineage: "Epi-
2 curus, Spinoza, Marx, of course, Nietzsche . . Heidegger."10 Even the
2
greatest communist philosopher must be extracted from Nietzsche's
web. Following Althusser and Negri, it is indeed necessary to pit Spi-
noza—the "savage anomaly"—against capitalism both at its inception
and perhaps nearer its termination; but this entails also pitting oneself
against Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism. Taking the possibility that Nietz-
sche's position may indeed be the only one outside of communism
literally11 requires neo-Spinozist work of "fitful contemplation": that
is, hypothesis and polemic, speculation and science, argument and
passion.
In response to "the death of socialism," The Mekons sing their "di-
nosaur's confession": "How can something really be dead when it
hasn't even happened? . this funeral is for the wrong corpse."12 The
Mekons' question and response, barely audible in the Society of the
Spectacle as it morphs toward a fully technocultural everyday, even
while retaining elements of a still remarkably modernist global mode
of capitalist production and consumption—Ulrike Meinhof aptly re-
ferred to Konsumterror—is equally rare in "high" literature and philos-
ophy.13 Nonetheless, paraphrasing Mike Davis, it is (still) possible to
argue that, although the project of communism may lie in ruins, the
best overlook is provided precisely from the ruins of alternative fu-
tures.14 In the phrase of dub musician Linton Kwesi Johnson, even if
most people (still) regard socialism as a "ghost," this need not prevent
others from seeing it (again) as a "seed."15 Alternatively, world com-
munism has always come into being at moments of counterrevolution
and defeat (as exemplified by the USSR and by Gramsci's Italy of the
early twenties). Born in defeat, communism never guarantees victory,
only ongoing struggle. As such, it may be the most realistic counter-
H
movement against Capital Triumphant in postcontemporary times, §
"when the proclaimed end of history has not terminated the problems g
that brought Communism into being as a political movement: the %
eradication of Hell from Earth, not the construction of Heaven upon o
CO
One need not accept this assertion (N.B.: first proclaimed by a right-
wing historian at Nietzsche's funeral to inaugurate the twentieth cen-
tury)29 as true absolutely in order to recognize the historical and so-
ciological truth that others accept it as true and act accordingly. As an
experiment, take the thesis that "Nietzsche's position is the only one
outside of communism" literally, on the principle that what is said
either is or is not meant, either is or is not to be taken at its word. If, as
Zizek and Jameson seem to concur, "nobody seriously considers possi-
ble alternatives to capitalism any longer,"30 then what is most needed
e<
g today is the point of view precisely of "nobody"—a point of view as
" old as Odysseus, as new as we can make it. In this sense the point of
g view of the book at hand is nobody's.
« Strange as it may seem, both to grasp — critically—celebrations of the
^ death of communism and to grasp —positively—the possibility of pre-
% paring a genuinely communist alternative to capitalism requires —as
a necessary if insufficient condition—the grasp of Nietzsche and Nietz-
scheanism. This multiple grasp cannot depend exclusively on empirical
work, no matter how important that also is; theoretical grasp is supple-
mentally required. In the resulting methodology, the term "grasp," like
all keywords, is used advisedly. "An object cannot be defined by its
immediately visible or sensuous appearance, it is necessary to make a
detour via its concept in order to grasp it (begreifen, to grasp, Begriff,
concept)." 31 By way of a linked series of more or less direct confron-
tations and detours, it is necessary to grasp—and thus to get "after"—
the adversarial "objects" and "concepts" that are Nietzsche, Nietz-
scheanism, and their interrelationship as the only position outside of
communism.
Incorporation as Adversary
called The Law of Nietzsche's Corps/e:" 'Give me your body and I will H
give you meaning, I will make you a name and a word in my dis- §
course.'" De Certeau continues, "the law would have no power if it >
were not able to support itself on the obscure desire to exchange one's ^
flesh for a glorious body, to be written, even if it means dying, and w
to be transformed into a recognized word."51 The corps/e is today £
a common theme in the visual arts in their turn to masochism and *<
11
abjection.52 But in philosophy the "recognized word" is "Nietzsche's
corps/e." In his Ethics Spinoza had entertained the thought that 'There
is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body does not die,
unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to point in the
opposite direction."53 Infine:the core of the corps as corpse; the core of
the corpse as corps. Ghost in the machine. Esprit de corps.
It may come as a surprise that Nietzsche did not necessarily reject the
notion of "life after death." As he formulated the problem privately:
"Life after death. — Whoever has grounds for believing in his 'life after
death' must learn to bear his 'death' during his life."54 The weight of this
aphorism is equally distributed on its two halves. Not only is this an
admonition to bear one's suffering—including one's "little deaths"—
in life stoically, "like a man"; it is also a way of thereby shaping one's
"life after death." Nietzsche pursued this train of thought further: "You
believe in your 'life after death'? Then you must learn during your life to
be dead. "5S Nietzsche's works are letters addressed from the dead to the
living. In his notes while composing Thus Spoke Zarathustray the word
Einverleibung appears in one context especially. Zarathustra's overall
goal is to induce readers to "incorporate opposites" that are depicted in
the text, with the specific aim of instilling in readers the notion that
all "human beings are only practice runs" in his "monstrous project"
to "show the sacrifices [or victims: Opfer] that are necessary to
breed . . . the higher man."56
The subtitle of Zarathustra3 A BookfarEveryone and No One> is crucial
to Nietzsche's construction or "breeding" of the modern and postmod-
ern self.57 On the one hand self must appear to be liberatory to and for
"everyone" or what Heidegger calls "Anyone" {dasMan) —in spite
and because of its being couched in a rhetoric that is Janus-faced: that
is, often only "appearing" to be stridently elitist so that readers can
think that it can be easily "deconstructed " This is an enormously pow-
erful rhetorical strategy since it gives the appearance of empowering
o? "every" reader as self-reflective and self-reflexive transcendental subject
g and agent. On the other hand, however, Nietzsche intended his writing
" to have an effect and affect that lies much deeper and is "authentic" or at
g least radically different. His elitism could not logically be a theme of his
% writing merely, it had also to be a rhetorical strategy. In his subtitle he
£ indicated the existence of this other mode of self in negative terms for
E "those in the know" (Machiavelli) in saying that Zarathustra was also
12
for " n o o n e " This "other" m o d e of self was produced in such a way
as t o be "present'* to readers "out of the know" only unconsciously,
subliminally, subcutaneously—so as t o control and manipulate their
thoughts and actions as far as possible. So it is that a properly esoteric,
intentional, "political" self and agent is produced by Nietzsche as sup-
plement t o the "phenomenological" or "existential" self and agent that
is exoterically produced. Again, this is not to say that Nietzsche was
entirely successful in producing exactly the political and social effects he
had in mind; this is t o argue that he may have been comparatively
successful in ways that—logically and by definition—no reader could
ever know for sure.
According to a dominant Western tradition, the h u m a n "self"—
formerly psyche or soul—is imaged as a "center" articulating "subject"
and "agent." From this self centripetal and centrifugal forces flow: "sub-
ject" invoking internal or psychological processes, and "agent" signal-
ing the issues of practice and ethico-political intervention in history.
This metaphor can be charted with the help of Spinoza's thesis that
there are "two enemies" of the human race on the plane of immanence:
"Hatred and Repentance." 58 As paraphrased by Gilles Deleuze, "all the
ways of humiliating and breaking life, all the forms of the negative have
two sources, one turned outward and the other inward, resentment
and bad conscience, hatred and guilt." 59 Nietzsche's powerful attacks'
against ressentiment are obviously directly related to this analysis, but
what is unrelated is his affirmation of hatred for many kinds of people.
Nowadays, in technocultural terms, humankind is arriving into a vid-
eodrome—perhaps morphing into a new cyborg self—that is at once
"beyond good and evil" and yet one in which we are uncannily and
H
sometimes murderously very much at home. In and against this arena £j
the Nietzschean self is constitutive of modernity and postmodernity °
alike as their unstated tertium quid. I n much of the Western tradition, ^
the h u m a n subject has been commonly held to be more a limit than a o
part of the world. In his Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus (1921), for exam- H
pie, Ludwig Wittgenstein adopts Arthur Schopenhauer's thesis that the g
subject or I — including its perceiving eye — is never itself an object of >
experience. For Schopenhauer, "We never know it, but it is precisely g
that which knows wherever there is knowledge." 60 For Wittgenstein, w
the I and eye are extensionless points: "The subject does not belong t o £
the world but it is a limit of the world. . . . From nothing in the field of *
13
sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye."*1 For its part,
the Nietzschean self (eye and I) can appear to be a single—albeit
self-deconstructing—subject, to adapt essentially one subject-position,
while in fact several are "interpellated" or "hailed" (Althusser). Alter-
natively, several subjects or subject-positions can be constructed in the
illusion, say, of democratic pluralism, while in fact only one Self is ever
actually being produced sub rosa. Nietzsche thought himself to be
influenced in his theory of self-subject-agent by Spinoza; and Deleuze
has accepted this belief at face value, claiming that Nietzsche is the
quintessential post/modern Spinozist philosopher. Yet in fact Spinoza
{pace Deleuze) was in no sense proto-Nietzschean, ideologically speak-
ing. The great political problem posed by Spinoza is why people con-
sent to, even fight to the death for, their own oppression—branding
this self-destructive willingness "superstition." Spinoza sought to de-
stroy such superstition, Nietzsche to exploit it. As £tienne Balibar has
pointed out, Spinoza's formula is "surprising" because "this inversion
of the natural conatus [energy, striving] of individuals goes so far as to
give substance, in the fury of mass movements of the desire for their
own death, to self-destruction"62 If the Spinozist anomaly is savage, it
is because "it is the radical expression of a historic transgression of every
ordering that is not freely constituted by the masses; it is the proposi-
tion of a horizon of freedom that is definable only as a horizon of
liberation."63 Nietzsche—who is an "anomaly" no longer but part of
our second nature —is also "savage" but against the masses in his
willingness to induce some of the multitude to will their own self/
destruction. Hence a philosophically coherent and politically eman-
cipatory philosophy must forge its way back to Spinoza past the Nietz-
schean self and only then, through communism, into the future.
Nietzsche's gradually-to-be-incorporated thought of Eternal Recur-
rence of the Same is thus intended to "break humanity in two" by keep-
ing slaves out of the know, elites in the know—a polarization that is
increasingly global.64 While writing Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche
a*
£ codified his doctrine of incorporation into a single abstract phrase,
^ understating but implying the human cost involved: "All beings [are]
g only rehearsals in the unification (incorporation) of opposites."65 In
w Nietzsche's terms, to read and/or rewrite his corpus may also mean to be
^ dead as the incorporation of his corpse, whether one knows it or not.
a Like his ancient Greeks (e.g., Pindar), Nietzsche believed that one lives
14
on in the hearts and minds of those who would speak about him and,
most especially, think his thoughts without being aware that they are
thinking his thoughts. When Nietzsche's reader has most thoroughly
incorporated a thought as he desired, then the thought will not appear
to stem from Nietzsche at all, but rather be the reader's own. As Nietz-
sche put this principle in a private, unpublished collection of short
aphorisms entitled "On the Doctrine of Style" (1882): 'The more
abstract the truth is that one wants to teach, the more one must first
seduce the senses to it. . . . It is not well-mannered and clever to take
away the easier objections of one's readers in advance. It is well-
mannered and very clever to allow one's readers themselves to utter our
ultimate wisdom."66 Nietzsche is the ultimate adversary of communists
because he designed his writing subliminally to program his readers to
act in ways and for a single ultimate purpose that in theory they (we)
can never fully grasp, and that works against the best interests of most
of them (us). This goal includes especially the "death" of communism:
that is, the perception, if not yet fact, that something that never existed,
could not exist, is dead.
Let the dead bury their own dead, indeed; and if they cannot do the
job, the trick, then let the living do it for them—but on living terms. 67
But to bury Nietzsche is not going to be easy, perhaps not possible. It
requires hard labor—labor of the kind defined by Marx as "the living,
form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things, their temporality, as
their formation by living time."68 It also requires hard combat of a
particular kind: namely, "to imagine and explore seemingly fantastic
potentials in any situation, while at the same time giving equal consid-
H
eration to prosaic and practical aspects " to develop "an attitude at once £j
probing and impersonal, remote and alert."69 In postindustrial times, g
however, the problem in grasping or combating the Nietzschean adver- ^
sary is that "he" has become android, a "psychoplasmic brood" or 0
CO
J§ twentieth century when one of the masks of political failure and paral-
w ysis is an eager avowal of the transformative force and cultural cen-
g trality of technological innovation" (p. 59). For the vast majority of the
w world's population in the immediate or even distant future, the event—
£ or hope and fear—of being "on-line" is not merely premature but
fc likely impossible. At a time when other kinds of attempt to subtend
16
Nietzsche to a technocultural problematic are already well under way,
it is particularly important to argue that his work is also one of the many
masks of political failure and paralysis. Merely to equate Nietzsche with
HDTV, VR, or L.A. and leave it at that is to mask in particular the fact
that what is most characteristic of the global situation is not reducible
to any technological innovation. Instead it is part and parcel of "an
intensifying process of global polarization, segregation, and impover-
ishment" — all of which is visible not only in political and economic
terms but also "in the phenomenon of radically dissimilar perceptual
and cognitive Ufeworlds" (p. 59; emphasis added). And precisely here
it is crucial to show that Nietzsche was a firm and consistent advocate
of nothing so much as polarization in all walks and modes of life. Wit-
ness his persistent, seductive appeal to archaic notions of "pathos of
distance" {Pathos der Distanz) and "order of rank" (Rangordung).
Nietzschean polarization thus overrides any distinction not only be-
tween the postmodern and the modern but also between them and the
premodern. But polarization also opens up the possibility, the neces-
sity, of struggle. As Negri has interpreted Marx on "catastrophism":
Capitalist growth may indeed urge the compression of its quantity, it can
indeed mnltiply the productive force of labor, but after all the surplus value
that can be extorted is limited: there is still the rigidity of necessary labor
(necessary part of the labor day) to constitute the limit to valorization. . . .
[T]he quantity of value of the necessary part of the working day is not only
more and more rigid but also tends towards higher values and therefore
tends to diminish—subjectively, actively—the surplus labor that can be ex-
torted. The sum of necessary labor is rigid and it is precisely on this rigidity
H
that are based the possibilities for a higher valorization on the part of the g
class,fora self-valorization of the working class and the proletariat. In sum, for ®
this Marx, the devaluation of labor power, in that it is a compression of the £
necessary part of the labor day, not only is not indefinite, but is, on the o
Co
contrary, limited and reversible. Necessary labor can valorize itself autono- H
mously, the world of needs can and must expand. There emerges an aspect of §
the law of the tendency of the profit rate to decline which combines the >
proportionality of the decrease of value of capital with the independent ^
valorization of the proletariat. The law of the tendency to decline represents, w
therefore, one of the most lucid Marxist intuitions of the intensification ofthe £
class struggle in the course of capitalist development.76 *
17
Bearing Crarys caveat and Negri's hope in mind, the possibility and
plausibility of a link between—modern and premodern—philosophy
and—postmodern—technoculture makes it possible to theorize a link
between the "death" of communism and the triumph of NTetzschean-
ism. The first link is suggested by remarks of Jameson: "in the new
dimensionality of postmodern cultural space, ideas of the older concep-
tual type have lost their autonomy and become something like by-
products and after-images flung up on the screen of the mind and of
social production by the culturalization of daily life. The dissolution of
philosophy today then reflects this modification in the status of ideas
(and ideology), which itself retroactively unmasks any number of tradi-
tional philosophical 'concepts* as having been just such consciousness-
symptoms all the while, that could not be identified as such in the
culturally impoverished, pre-media, and residually 'natural' human so-
cieties (or modes of production) of the past. . . . Or are we to draw the
more sober conclusion that all abstract philosophical concepts were
always 'media concepts' in some deeper way without our being aware of
it?"77 This critical probe is salutary at a time when even revolutionary
Marxists are speaking of "the general deflation of philosophy that is so
striking a feature of late twentieth-century intellectual life"78 — as if the
real question were ever the "dissolution" "deflation" or "inflation" of
something called "philosophy," as opposed to its many, more or less
perceptible, sociocultural embodiments.79 Jameson's line of inquiry is
also salutary at a time when a defining feature of postmodernism is
increasingly becoming the conflation of "high" or "avant-garde philos-
ophy" with "popular" or "junk culture"; or, more exactly stated, at a
time when philosophy in the form oiNietzscheanism is being incorpo-
rated into junk culture in high-tech alloys such as "Avant-Pop." It goes
without saying that, were he physically alive today, Nietzsche would
likely wax indignant against junk culture, much as he did against the
nascent culture industry of his late nineteenth century.80 It also ought to
"S? go without saying, however, that secretly he desired nothing more than
^ to see his own version of high philosophy and social transformation
^ occupying—prophylactically when not aggressively—every nook and
g cranny of ^possible future societies and cultures.
» Just as it is crucial to bring problems concerning the definition and
& periodization of Nietzsche/anism up to technocultural and technoso-
55 cial speed, however, it is important to keep open the question of how
18
"new" this speed actually is, how "postmodern" and "postcontempo-
rary" the future capitalist mode of production is really. The thesis that a
postindustrial, postideological economy is totally, globally, irreversibly
superseding the hammer of traditional industry and the sickle of agri-
culture has long been a right-wing argument (e.g., Daniel Bell in the
early 1970s).81 As such it tends to serve, either immediately or as a
kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, the interests of late or neocapitalism. It
seems at least theoretically possible—not to mention politically vital—
to argue that what is happening around the world may be less a post-
industrial break with the past than the continuing industrialization
of premodern, precapitalist enclaves. Nonetheless, in the words of
Fourth-International communist Ernest Mandel (writing at the same
time as Bell), "industrialization of the sphere of reproduction consti-
tutes the apex" of late or neocapitalist development.82 For Mandel,
the incept date of "late capitalism" was the immediate postwar period
(1945), the ending of the "long wave" of postwar economic expan-
sion occurred with the "second slump" (1974-1975), and he warned
against overestimating the multinational component of contemporary
capitalism at the cost of underestimating continuing interimperialist
rivalries. But for Mandel, as paraphrased by Davis, the "hypertrophic
expansion of the financial sector is not a new, higher stage of capital-
ism—even in America speculators cannot go on endlessly building
postmodernist skyscrapers for other speculators to buy—but a morbid
symptom of the financial overaccumulation prolonged by the weakness
of the U.S. labor movement and productive capital's fear of a gen-
eral collapse"; finally, "the crucial point about contemporary capitalist
structures of accumulation [is] that they are symptoms of global crisis,
H
not signs of the triumph of capitalism's irresistible drive to expand."83 jj§
Davis's own position with regard to Mandel's thesis—at least during o
the mid-1980s—highlights the way momentary upturns in the econ- •<
omy—Reaganomics and the Contract with America—"dramatically o
CO
"v> The "attempt" to art (for good or evil) begins always already
§ "within" thought; it is "implied" in it.12S
«
M Regarding several of the most intentional writers of previous
<o times, I suspect that even centuries later they are being ironical
^ with their most believing devotees and disciples. Shakespeare
E has so infinitely many depths, ruses, and intentions; ought
34
he not also have had the intention to conceal ensnaring nooses
in his works for the most creative artists of posterity, in order
to deceive them so that they, before they realize it themselves,
have to believe they are virtually like Shakespeare? Certainly,
he could likely be far more intentional also in this
retrospect than one surmises.126
Corps/e
Put in global and historical perspective, and with this caveat, the case of
Nietzsche/anism is obviously one example inter alia inter pares. But the
distinction of Nietzsche/anism and Nietzsche's corps/e is not merely
relative but also a matter of magnitude {quanta) and of kind (quala).
Here a particular distinction between theory and historical practice
needs to be drawn.
In theory it is possible—indeed desirable—to substitute for "Nietz-
sche" any number of proper or improper names into that structural
causality that is intellectual and social history. Think of any proper
name "X" & its assumed movement, period, or genre "x": "Jesus"
or "Reverend Moon" & "Christianity" or "religion"; "Velazquez" or
"Bach" & "culture of the baroque"; "James Yorke" & "chaos theory";
"Machiavelli" &"machiavellianism" or "political philosophy"; "Freud"
or "Juliet Mitchell" & "psychoanalysis"; "Cavour" & "moderate poli-
tics"; "Ghandi" & "politics"; "Levi-Strauss" & "anthropology"; "Valie
Export" or "Alfred Hitchcock" or "Chris. Marker" or "Derek Jarman"
& "cinema"; "Shakespeare" or "David Wojnarowicz" & "world litera-
H
ture"; "Georg Cantor" & "mathematics"; "Ranke" & "historiogra- g
phy"; "Gabriel Garda Marquez" & "the novel"; "Kiyoshi Miki" & g
"the Kyoto school" or "philosophy"; "Patti Smith" or "Beethoven" & S
"music"; "Manfredo Tafuri" & "architecture"; "Langston Hughes" or o
"Sylvia Plath" or "Aime* Cesaire" or "Mahmoud Darwish" & "poetry"; |
"Fernando Pessoa" or "Jackson Pollock" & "modernism"; "Marx" or g
"Tosaka Jun" & "Marxism"; "Stalin" or "Pol Pot" or "Gramsci" or >
"Althusser" & "communism," and so forth. Each case indudes the en- §
tire, interactive history of the reception or appropriation of these peo- w
pie or categories, both in professional scholarship and more popularly. £
And, in each case, the theory of the corps/e should be applied. *<
57
Yet Nietzsche/anism is distinct in historical practice from many, if not
all, of these other examples. This relative but real distinction has two
aspects: qualitative and quantitative. Nietzsche's conscious mastery of
the modes of multiple causality, in the form of a proleptic rhetorical
gesture that was designed to handicap the posthumous incorporation
of his written corpus by informing it more or less surreptitiously,
was — independent of its actual success — qualitatively greater around
the world than that of most other writers, thinkers, politicans, or artists
in history. All things considered, this impact has been remarkably posi-
tive and uncritical. Second, and as important, the quantitative extent of
this impact on intellectuals and the intelligentsia has in fact proven to
be greater than that of Nietzsche's major rivals, both beginning in
his own historical conjuncture and continuing in today's—when his
corps/e is more alive than ever.
Kant's famous image (with its ultimate source in Plato) that meta- H
physics is a "batdefield" (Kampjplatz) to argue that "A philosophy does g
not make its appearance in the world as Minerva appeared to the so- >
ciety of Gods and men. It exists only in so far as it occupies a position, ^
and it occupies this position only in so far as it has conquered it in the w
thick of an already occupied and bloody world. It therefore exists only £
in so far as this conflict has made it something distinct, and this distinc- x
59
tive character can be won and imposed only in an indirect way, by a
detour involving ceaseless study of other, existing positions."196 More
specifically, Althusser noted: "No, philosophy is not, as the young
Marx still wanted it, on this point a faithful disciple of Hegel, 'the self
awareness of an historical epoch'; rather, it is the site of a class struggle
[le lieu d'une lutte de classe] that repeats itself and that reaches it most
approximate forms at certain moments of history and in certain think-
ers: for us, above all, Epicurus, Machiavelli, Spinoza, Rousseau, and
Hegel, authentic precursors of Marx."197
But in mostfieldssooner or later one encounters a position always
already occupied by Nietzscbe/cmism. Althusser has succincdy para-
phrased three basic concepts of Spinoza and Machiavelli that bear di-
recdy on this phenomenon: that is, on Nietzsche as "cause" and Nietz-
scheanism as "effect." In specific, Althusser highlights two Spinozist
concepts: first, the theory of "third-level knowledge," that is, knowl-
edge of a case that is simultaneously "singular and universal" precisely
as Nietzsche/anism is or strives to be; and, second, the theory of the
way it is that thought, or rather "thinking with the body," comes to be
"reconstituted" or "embodied"—both in oneself and in the work of
others. Finally, there is Machiavelli's "astonishing" and "radical" idea to
the effect that Chance (Fortuna) "is in essence no more than the void,
and par excellence the interior void of the Prince, which foregrounds,
in the equilibrium and play of his passions, his role as fox, allowing him
to introduce a crucial distance between these passions and the Prince-
qua-Subject, so that being can appear as nonbeing and nonbeing as be-
ing"198 With these three concepts, mediated by Althusser, we catch a
deep insight into the world of Nietzsche's corps/e and its battlefield.
In the direct aftershock of World War II, Wittgenstein defined phi-
losophy as "a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by
means of language [Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhex-
ung unsres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache] ,"199 Wittingly
or not, his definition is informed by a disturbing ambivalence, insofar
cu
^ as it is rather unclear whether "the means of language" serve our "un-
° derstanding" or rather its "bewitchment" and hence, appropriately
g enough, this definition of philosophy not only constates but also per-
» forms its certain bellicosity. Be this ambivalence as it may, also relevant
g for the case of Nietzsche/anism is a philosopheme of the later Wittgen-
2 stein. What entraps us, even more profoundly than language, is "an
60 image" or "a picture" (ein Bild) deeper within it. "A picture held us
captive. And we could n o t get outside it, for it lay in o u r language and
language seemed t o repeat it t o us inexorably." 200 "Nietzsche" is "a
picture" or "an image" — n o t an "idea" which could be effectively com-
bated by logic—in this Wittgensteinian sense: namely, an image inex-
orably lying—in both senses of the word—in/visibly and in/audibly
within contemporary language, including at least initially any language
with which one attempts to dissociate oneself from the "bewitchment"
of Nietzsche's corps/e. And the notion that Nietzsche's work, by itself,
is the "battlefield" {Schlacbtfeld) o n which the intellectual and creative
life of modernity must be contested had been claimed in p r e - W o r l d
War I G e r m a n y 2 0 1
T h e distincdy Nietzschean tradition of thinking about polemics has
long traced—or rather produced—its self-legitimating genealogy to
the pre-Socratic philosophers. Philosophical "origins" — and the pos-
sibility of return or turning, rupture and reintegration that they log-
ically entail—are claimed by the sophisticated Nietzschean tradition in
Parmenides' slogan, "the same thing exists for thinking and for being,"
but, precisely for this reason, also potential conflict between t h e m (tb
gar auto noein estin te km einai); in Empedocles' slogan about the on-
tological interaction between Love and Strife, t o the effect that "things
never cease from shifting continually— at one time or another coming
together, through Love [Pbildteti], into one, yet each borne apart, at
another time, from the others through Strife [Neikeos]"; and especially
in H e r a d i t u s ' slogan—often alluded to by Nietzsche—that "war is
father of all things [pdlemospdnton men pater esti] " 202 According t o this
agonistic view of the world, peace forever brings disunity, war unity—a
thesis related to the simple observation of everyday life that "a Frosty
H
Dairy Dessert™ [Heraclitus himself knew only kykeon: an apparendy [j;
savory mixture of wine, barley, and cheese] begins to separate if it is n o t g
stirred," 203 or quickly consumed. 5
Heidegger among mortals strove hardest t o recapture what he took o
t o be the premetaphysical, preproductivist instant of pre-Socratic think- H
ing. For him, the only authentic philosophico-military polemic would §
be "a confrontational act of setting one thing apart from another" (pd- >
lemos as Aus-einander-setzung)^ but so that the master thinker/leader ^
might bring these things together, uniting and engaging them in the w
more proper and noble battle royal that is profound thinking: namely, £
disclosive of Being. In this context, Heidegger says that Heraclitian *<
pdlemos and logos "are the same thing." This is to say, in part, that any 61
capacity "to bind together" — including but not only by means of more
or less systematic speech or discourse—is always radically combative as
well as combinative. Pdlemos is further imagined by this tradition and by
Heidegger himself as the cosmological, ontoiogical, but also political
principle. It is both unalterable and determining—at once ultimately
beyond human control and yet decisive in organizing any human so-
ciety, but especially one authentically open to the way things supposedly
really are.204 So it is that, for Heidegger, polemic—as a way of "reveal-
ing*' (deichnumai) and also "producing" (poiein)— is originary: cos-
mologically and ontologically, but also socioeconomically and politi-
cally, since after its inception polemic is "carried on by creators, poets,
thinkers, statesmen" 205 Because Heidegger is the dominant Nietz-
schean philosopher of the twentieth century, his grasp of polemics needs
to be pursued to its lair.
Heidegger's combative, political-ontological way of thinking pre-
sumes to see the radically "conflictual way" it is that Truth (even Being
Itself, which is not but rather happens, "events" or "advents") "trag-
ically" reveals itself as aUtheia: that is, discloses itself in the fundamental
"mutation in the essential way to be of truth," which is "the techni-
city of modern technique" and which we in our fallen, post-Platonic,
mathematico-productivist age commonly reify as "technology"206 Very
roughly it can be said that, according to Heidegger, originary—pre-
Platonic—Truth (Greek aUtheia) is composed ofthe privative a- and a
verb lethein, "to conceal" but also, more sinisterly—as Heidegger's
readers almost never seem to grasp—"to dissemble," "to purloin," "to
make esoteric."207 And as it is with epistemological matters of truth and
falsity, so is it also with ontoiogical matters of being and nonbeing (not
to mention also aesthetic, erotic, moral, and political questions) —all
have exo/esoteric dimensionality.
In 1943-1944, for example, Heidegger took from Heraclitus' phrase
that "nature loves to conceal itself" (phusis kruptesthaiphiei) the funda-
mental lesson that Being Itself as phusis "is the play of emergence in self-
(U
£* concealment, playing that hides in the act of emancipating that which
^ emerges into the open. " 208 The supreme import in terms of the
£j history of philosophy or metaphysics of this claim for Heidegger is
% succincdy formulated by Stanley Rosen. After citing Heidegger's inter-
£ pretation of the Heraclitian play of concealment and unconcealment in
Z and as phusis, Rosen paraphrases Heidegger's overarching position:
62 "Plato initiates the shift in attention from awareness of Being as the
play of presence and absence to a conception of Being as pure or gen-
uine (ontds on) presence, namely, as the presence of the look, that by
which we identify what a thing is: the idea. From this point on, philos-
ophy is defined by the Platonic standard"209 Until Heidegger, or at
least until his preparation for "another way of thinking" But it is equally
important to note that—in Heidegger's own view, though he would
never say so exactly—Being Itself must obey the logically prior law of
the exo/esoteric. It is this iron law—unrepeatable and unappealable —
that also propels the thought of Nietzsche, no matter what compara-
tively superficial difference might separate him from Heidegger.
Heideggerian Truth qua unconcealment is not the negative obverse
of untruth qua concealment, mere linguistic proximity aside. What is—
or can fo—unconcealed are things, entities, objects, and technologies
perceptible by the senses, and hence generally the exoteric world that
the Greeks called aesthetics or aistheton.210 By crucial contrast, what
pertains to concealment is Being qua Being specifically and absolutely.
Hence, (esoteric) Truth and (exoteric) untruth are not only asym-
metrically balanced but also opposed—ludically and militarily—in ir-
reconcilable fashion. Their primal relationship —such as the eventful
isomorphic relationship within Being Itself between expropriation and
appropriation that Heidegger calls Enteyfnis/Ereijpiis—is endlessly bel-
ligerent. Compare also, crucially, apokryptein, "to conceal," with apd-
kalyptein, "to uncover"; in this conceptual world, ultimately it takes
apocalypse to decode cryptograms, to expose apocrypha. But this bel-
ligerency obtains not just with Heidegger's vision oiontology—the way
things are — but also with his vision of political ontology—the way things
ought to be. With regard to the way things ought to be —and in this
H
proleptic sense always already are—Heidegger was opportunistic. His [jj
description of polemics could be and was normally adjusted according g
t o historical contingencies. But he preferred t o keep his views as secret, E<
as esoteric as possible . . . and hence maximally preparatory for ever- o
renewable "other beginnings" and "another thinking" in the future.211 H
It was from Nietzsche most direcdy that Heidegger inherited this en- g
tire problematic. >
Living at a more preliminary stage of modern industrial, technologi- £;
cal, and political development, the young Nietzsche had launched his w
*
own bellicose intellectual and social itinerary by speaking of "the Di- £
onysian worldview," of truth us pathos, and of deepest thinking in terms *.
*<
of "tragedy" and "tragic ages" "struggle" and "war," agon and pd- 63
lemos212 Later, in "On Reading and Writing*' Zarathustra teaches that
"wisdom is a woman: she loves only a warrior"—desiring him "cou-
rageous, unconcerned, mocking, brutally violent."213 Among other
things, Wisdom "is just asking to be raped"—date raped, as it were. On
the Genealogy of Morals was Nietzsche's most rigorous, sustained, and
interesting work by the standards of Anglo-American analytic philoso-
phy; it bore the subtitled Polemic.214 According to Heidegger, but only
when his own Nietzschean and national-socialist political ontology
was in disarray, Nietzsche, like one tendency of national socialism, sold
out this more authentic, properly agonistic, and warlike vision to a less
authentic, historically contingent, productivist Will to Power; though
Heidegger continued to share with Nietzsche the same fascoid social
agenda and the same base commitment to esoteric speech and sublimi-
nal influence.
Aware of this sophisticated tradition of polemic, and of its subtle
internal quibbling, it is nevertheless important to engage Nietzsche's
corps/e with polemics of a comparatively commonsense, common,
and base sort: a form of struggle that has no intention of uniting what
ought not to be joined except in maximally communal and globally
egalitarian combat. Gandhi was right: They started it their way, let us
strive to finish it in ours, using their bad conscience, if they have one,
against them. In this effort do not forget, as Heidegger and Nietzsche
knew intimately, that Heraclitus' oft-cited slogan "war is father of all
things" (Fr. 53) reads in full: "War is father of all things, king of all, and
some he shows as gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others
free [pdlemos ponton men pater estiy pdnton dk basileus, kal tous theous
ddeixe tous de anthrdpous, tous men doulous epoiese tons de eleutherous']
once, let women and men bury the gods, and the slaves the slavemas-
ters. Let us try to bury Nietzsche's corps/e. In this effort, the baser,
slam-dance polemic pays tribute to Bertolt Brecht's affirmation of the
necessity sometimes for "crude-and-lewd thinking" or "mindfuck" {das
0? plumpe Denken) .21S For there are excellent reasons to mistrust radically
g the underlying intent behind the sophisticated wing of the Nietzscheo-
^ Heideggerian tradition, and its mindfuck, or, as Gramsci might say,
g "rape of the intelligence."216
o
£ Related to "polemics" is "hyj
"hypothesis." Nietzsche's own esoteric take on
hypothesis characteristically involves social and rhetorical — beyond
64
merely epistemological or thematic—considerations. Specifically, hy-
pothesis has to do with his project in Thus Spoke Zarathustra to produce
a text for an increasingly secular and modern age that would have an at
least equivalent power to the one enjoyed by the Bible in previous pre-
modern times — reversing most but not all of its effects. What Nietz-
sche wanted most to preserve was the capacity of the Bible, indeed
religion generally, for social cohesion and the maintenance of hier-
archy. In this vein, Nietzsche wrote to himself: "—just as lower hu-
mans looked up to God, it is appropriate that someday we look up to my
Overman, "217 He continued: "—the contradiction of atheism and the-
ism is not: "truth' or 'untruth,' but rather that we no longer allow our-
selves a hypothesis that we gladly allow others to have (and more!) [.]
Piety is the only bearable form of common people: our desire is that the
people [das Volkj becomes religious, so that we do not experience
nausea when facing it: as now, when the appearance of the masses is
nauseating."218 Nietzschean hypotheses, in other words, are not merely
pragmatic tools in any abstract sense; instead, they are part of an over-
arching polemic and pragmatic intent that is to function differendy for
two basic groups—the elite and the masses, "us" and "them"—whose
absolute social difference is thereby to be perpetuated. This properly,
quintessentially Nietzschean perspective cannot be exposed enough
today, under postmodern global conditions in which the discrepancy
between hyperrich and hyperpoor escalates by the hour.
It should go without saying that what is therefore at stake is not only
an ^interpretation^ of Nietzsche but also (in words that have been used
to describe the "influence" of Spinoza on Althusser) "an intervention in
the relationship offerees that governs his text, taking the side of certain t-3
hypotheses against others, pushing these hypotheses to extreme con- ^
elusions, towards the dismanding of a theoretical apparatus."219 In any o
case, the adversary is bigger and more extensive than just one tributary £
of the Nietzschean current in Europe and the United States. (Though o
GO
influence on the Left were matters this simple, and their complexity H
is trivialized by the originally Lukacsian—later dissenting left-liberal §
and social democratic—slogan "Actor Hider, Thinker Nietzsche." The >
phrase "Wiederkehr eines Philosophen: Tatar Hitler, Denker Nietzsche [ re-
turn of a philosopher: actor (even murderer) Hitler, thinker Nietz- w<
*
sche]" was emblazoned on the cover of the influential liberal West £
German weekly Der Spiegel in June 1981. This Lukacsian slogan was *
71
superimposed over a drawing of Hitler's head, shoulder, and hand
anachronistically brandishing a modern Walter PPK pistol—all mor-
phing from Nietzsche's hair, shoulder, and head, the last supported, as
on Auguste Rodin's The Thinker, on his clenchedfist.246A more appro-
priately complex image of the alleged relationship between Nietzsche
and national socialism was produced by Joseph Beuys (1921-1986).
Sonnenfinsternis und Corona (solar eclipse and corona, 1978) is a two-
tier vertical montage: the top three-quarters is a photo-reproduction of
Hans Olde's etching in 1889 of the totally insane but docile, hugely
mustached Nietzsche staring "heroically" into space; the bottom quar-
ter reproduces a photograph taken of a trashed interior urban space. A
shelf has crashed down upon a table, along with a broken picture
frame, and so on. Outside — across the street and visible through huge
windows—one sees a business-district building with the names of two
"Jewish"firms:"Bab & Fleischer" and "Julius Kaufmann." The original
photograph was taken November 9, 1938, the night of the first sys-
tematic Nazi pogroms {Reichskristallnacht). But sprayed diagonally
across Beuys's black-and-white montage are two patterns of white
disks—or, alternatively, holes—each edged slighdy in brownish-red oil
paint. They evoke a complex set of references, reinforced by Beuys's
double title: the eclipse of one (celestial) body by another and the
corona or crown worn in classical antiquity to distinguish important
personages or victors to show their proximity to the gods. Beuys thus
articulates the philosopher, Nazism, and public collaboration with bar-
barism. Finally, the holes can be read as having been made by bullets, as
someone having taken aim to destroy four images: Olde's hagiographic
and obscurantist image of Nietzsche; evidence of the pogroms; the
connection between the two; and, not least, Beuys's own composite
picture.247
Nietzsche—like Heidegger later—was not a "nationalist" or a "so-
cialist" or a "racist" or even an "imperialist" in any conventional or
(H
vulgar senses of these terms, even though there are certainly aspects of
g these tendencies in his thinking. And his quite duplicitous doctrine of
£ relativism—which, to say the least, did nothing to restrain his own
g concept and use ofpower—gives no firm or sufficient grounds for resist-
« ing imperialist national socialism or fascism. The "fascoid" refers to
^ four things primarily: (1) to a combative political ontology based on
E more or less permanent overt and covert warfare against democratic
72
values in general and against the possibility of radical democracy in
particular; (2) to an unquestioned commitment to some form of
"Leader Principle" (i.e., strong—predominandy male—leaders and
neo-aristocratic elites as the real motor of history, able to function,
when need be, under the guise of individual rights, anarchism, liber-
tarianism, populism, even social democracy—but theoretically By Any
Means Necessary); (3) to a concomitant, enthusiastic socioeconomic
commitment—not necessarily capitalist, but certainly capitalist if need
be—to the maintenance of a gullible, pliable, and—if at all possible—
willing workforce, up to and including slave labor; and (4) to a con-
sciously manipulative, duplicitous practice of writing, speaking, and
acting grounded in esotericism and other strategies of speaking to two
audiences at once—those in the know, and those out of the know who
are to be kept out of the know. The Nietzschean fascoid, too, is a "real
movement" that is profoundly anticommunist, both historically and
right now, independent of the question of whether it is literally "the
only position outside of communism."
How the fascoid articulates itself to the term "liberalism"—in both
its neoliberal and neoconservative variants—is a particularly difficult
and crucial question, even more than the fascoid's equally likely but less
subde—and hence more easily combated—articulation with more
overt forms of National Socialism or national socialism, Fascism or
fascism. Nietzsche's own, often critical, position with regard to liberal-
ism was obviously determined by the versions available to him in Eu-
rope and especially Germany in the 1870s and 1880s, including, at the
end of his sane life, his embrace of the program of the short-term (one-
hundred-day) "liberal" Emperor Friedrich III (1851-1888), and so
H
forth.248 But the fascoid-liberal articulation will be defined more fully *
from a Gramscian perspective in the last main section of this book. °
Precisely because communism is, among other things, "the real £
movement which abolishes the present state of the things," it is re- o
quired to operate in untimely, isolated, preliminary, preparatory fash- £
ion to bury Nietzsche's corps/e: that is, it works far more in terms of §
theory and superstructure than of economics and practice. Whereas >
generally "in discussing a problem, we should startfromreality and not ^
from definitions" as Mao taught, and whereas especially "Marxism w
teaches that in our approach to a problem we should start from objec- £
tive facts, not from abstract definitions," the actual reality of Nietzsche- x
73
anism —"the facts at present" — is that it has become virtually indis-
tinguishable from such "abstractions" as cyberspace as well as from less
technological everyday life as it is still more normally lived by most of
the globe.249 And though this book is part analysis of the resulting
virtual reality, it is also pzrt performance. This is to say that it attempts to
take seriously the compact or nexus between philology and enactment,
"fact" and "fiction" "philosophy" and "literature" that Nietzsche de-
cisively, seminally reformulated, retooled, remobilized. But then this
nexus must be radically turned against him. This is not to assume,
however, that philosophical performance is necessarily subversive, nor
is the gesture of "[descending] into evil in order to defeat it from
within."250 Sooner it is the case that "performativity describes the rela-
tion of being implicated in that which one opposes, this turning of
power against itself to produce alternative modalities of power to es-
tablish a kind of political contestation that is not a 'pure' opposition, a
'transcendence' of contemporary relations of power, but a difficult la-
bor of forging a future from resources inevitably impure "251 Which
does not, however, preclude the heuristic possibility that a pure break
with Nietzsche/anism might occur.
As for Nietzsche himself, he has been taken both too seriously and
not seriously enough. Too seriously, in light of the hyperbolic, quasi-
mythic, and a priori nature of the claims often made about his absolute
significance for "us" including the "Left" — claims that are best taken
at face value, initially, for the sake of eventual counterargument; not
seriously enough, because these claims remain ignorant not so much
about what his basically horrific ideas "really were"—though this igno-
rance, too, remains a big problem—but of how he intended to imple-
ment them with language and in society.
Exacdy like Sherlock Holmes's Watson, "readers" of Nietzsche-
Moriarty look, but they—quite literally—do not see; and if and when
they do see, they do not observe. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle appears to
«* have been one of the early readers of Nietzsche and, in spite of his
g bourgeois opposition to him, to have modeled both Sherlock Holmes
^ and Prof Moriarty—Holmes's equal —on him.252 Alternatively—in
g posdinguistic, cyberpunk parlance — Nietzschean viewers have become
So what they perceive—without knowing what it is they perceive and how
£ it works. The consequences of this particular dialectic of insight and
25 blindness are grave as well as "comic," in the complex senses of the
74
term. Nietzsche's ideas should be viewed, in part, not only in a pro-
tocyborg context but also as profoundly fascoid-liberal. To repeat, they
are not stricdy Nazi or fascist. But this is fascoid-liberalism of no com-
mon garden variety, either, and of a type not yet grasped by the vast,
productive, and comparatively lucrative Nietzsche Industry, at least not
as it most commonly presents itself.
Arguably the constitutive paradox of post/modern intellectual, artis-
tic, and political life—thinking with Gramsci of all women and men
as intellectuals, artists, philosophers—is that Nietzsche seems to attack
nothing more vehemendy than democracy, socialism, feminism, popu-
lar culture, and the Left in general. Yet nowhere and at no other time
has he enjoyed a warmer, more uncritical—hence more masochistic—
welcome than today from precisely this same Left—warmer and more
uncritically than ever even on the Center or the Right. And so is in-
cepted and reproduced the Left-Nietzschean corps.
What must never be forgotten, however, is that this paradoxi-
cal situation arose—in part—because it was self-proclaimed "anti-
Nietzscheans" holding power in East Bloc countries who helped make
Nietzsche/anism appear as a progressive, viable alternative to Actually
Existing Socialism and "communism" there and elsewhere around the
world. This was sometimes done—unforgettably, unforgivably, and
counterproductively—by suppressing, even criminalizing free debate
about Nietzsche's thought and writing. 253 But this brutal fact unfortu-
nately cannot fully explain the phenomenon of Left-Nietzscheanism,
and especially not in the capitalist world, where the existence of an
extensive, complex—albeit lopsided toward the Right—discussion of
Nietzsche in the former East Bloc is still virtually unknown, and where
H
an elaborate Left-Nietzscheanism was firmly in place long before Sta- *
lin or even the incomparable October Revolution, both of which are o
now—for opposing but related reasons—of unfortunately distant col- 5
lective memory. In addition to moral and legal questions associated o
with the atrocities committed by Stalinism and its equivalents, there is H
the intimsigcntphilosophical fact that these crimes were committed not §
only against human beings but also against fundamental communist >
principles. As Althusser showed in i962,—definitively, to the extent that §
such matters can ever be so decided—what he called "the overdetermina- w
tion of any contradiction and of any constitutive element of a society" means £
two things that bear direcdy on Stalinism. First, "a revolution in the *
75
structure does not ipso facto modify the existing superstructures and
particularly the ideologies at one blow (as it would if the economic was
the sole determinantfactor), for they have sufficient of their own consis-
tency to survive beyond their immediate life context, even to recreate, to
'secrete' substitute conditions of existence temporarily''254 Applied
to Nietzsche/anism, Althusser's thesis means that we must expect—
"predict" even—Nietzscheanism to continue to live on after any revo-
lution, *f that revolution occurs at the level of structure and nowhere
else. And so Nietzsche/anism did in fact live on, "even" in the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites, as one of Nietzsche's
corps/es—theoretically one of the most significant viruses possible.
Second, still following Althusser, "the new society produced by the
Revolution may itself ensure the survival, that is, the reactivation, of older
elements through both the forms of its new superstructures and specific
(national and international) 'circumstances'" (pp. 115-116). And this
second Althusserian thesis, too, is exacdy confirmed in the case of
Nietzsche/anism. For nowhere today is there more vitality in Nietz-
sche's corps/e—there is equal vitality in many other places —than in
the^m^rUSSR.
The truly uncanny—virtually global—paradox of Left-Nietzschean-
ism can only be grasped as such —namely, as an apparent contradic-
tion—by means of substantial infusions of scholarly and philological
labor. This includes sustained, sometimes even respectful attention to
what John Locke called "philosophical underlaborers," to secondary
literature more or less like one's own; and it includes taking seriously
the disquieting possibility that every bit, every microchip of critical
writing contains within itself—like it or not—a program for all crit-
icism: criticism's more or less rational or demented categorical impera-
tive, so to speak. And so it is that a counter-Nietzschean—and thus
quasi-megalomaniac—gesture must provide a map of the major ten-
dencies of contemporary philosophical, literary, literary-critical, and
"5" popular-cultural theory and practice by means of reference to their
^ Nietzsche/anism. Philological and scholarly work and their method-
w ological precautions are untimely, no longer much in fashion nowa-
•£ days. And the specific problem they confront in the case of Nietzsche's
w esoteric semiotic is that esotericism in its strictest and most logical form
£ would leave no trace for philology to read. By itself, philology is never
55 sufficient. Nonetheless, its labor—in the form of sometimes heavy
76
endnotes —is required to help steer and, when need be, anchor the
performative, hegemonic, cyberspatial navigations (Greek kybemetes
meant "navigator"; hegemonikon meant "directive faculty of the soul'*)
that take place "above" the more "base" labors, and in opposition to
Nietzsche's own scholarly and not so scholarly, more or less hidden
agendas.
As offensive as it may sound to current aesthetic and academic ears
alike, the ideal mixture of a democratic offensive against Nietzsche and
Nietzscheanism might be exacdy half text, half endnotes. The concept is
Gramscian: two different kinds of text working together as a "bloc" —
vanguard and base recruiting from one another—for a single destruc-
tive and constructive end. The reader should also be warned—and has
noted already—that it is committed to at least two "postmodern" rhe-
torical techniques, demanding the extensive use of two things. First,
there is pastiche—often long quotations—as a way of rivaling or paral-
leling the postmodern "schiz."255 This use is intended to complicate
more or less parodically the notion of authorship and ownership but
also to give the reader the chance to read texts against the grain of this
one book's views. Second, there are various forms of apparently paren-
thetical remarks — or rather remarks set off by dashes — as a way of
qualifying, critiquing, or extending arguments.256 If all these might
appear in the abstract to be "Nietzschean" strategies, now they are
turned against Nietzsche's corps/e. There are several important/bmtf/-
technological as well as politico-ideological aspects of endnote-pastiche.
Technologically speaking, pastiche is a representation—limited in this
case to the medium of print—of what in computerese is called hyper-
text; actual hypertexts can include visual and audio materials. In the H
words of Michael Heim, hypertext software is "nonsequential writing *
with free user movement," "a dynamic referencing system in which all O
texts are interrelated," where endnotes "enfold subordinate parts of the E<
*3
system as well as the references to other books," and where "all texts are o
virtually coresident. The whole notion of a primary and a secondary H
text, of originals and their references, collapses "257 But while this col- §
lapse may actually occur in electronic media—though this is certainly >
debatable—this not quite what is supposed to occur, even metaphori- ^
cally, in Nietzsche's Corps/e qua book; nor, much more important, is this w
collapse what really occurs in Nietzsche's corps/e qua historical phe- £
nomenon and movement. Heim suggests that in "magnetic code there *
77
are n o originals, n o primary, independently existing documents. All
texts are virtually present and available for immediate access. T h e origi-
nal text is merely the text accessed at the moment, the current center of
focus" (p. 35). But note that this possibility—taken here already in
H e i m as actuality—is also a weak and unwitting description of struc-
tural causality, of Nietzsche/anism. Nietzsche's intention, embodied in
the hypertext of his written corpus, lives o n in embodied concealment,
indwelling its effects silently and invisibly—virtually identical with
them as corps/e, perhaps, but as yet never quite really, totally identical.
The possibility that we might publicly access Nietzsche's original, pri-
mary, esoteric text or hypertext is not denied by the principle of struc-
tural causality. Rather, it is kept open methodologically by a form of
pastiche porous to critical commentary. If it is true of computer soft-
ware generally that, in Heim's words, "it hides within it specific notions
about h o w we d o and how w e should think within a digital environ-
m e n t " (pp. 5 3 - 5 4 ) , then w e had better begin to access that software
Nietzsche/anism that has been surgically implanted in us by reading
Nietzsche's corpus—so as t o access all that is hidden in and by Nietz-
sche's corps/e. But Nietzsche's own medium was writing, and we must
(also) be able to read him.
For the ideological purposes at hand, pastiche is the rhetorical equiv-
alent of communal, communist response to problems falsely posed to
look as if individual, singular responses would be sufficient. This is also
to say that pastiche is the rhetorical wing of what in political theory is
called—though, alas, seldom in actuality is—"democratic centralism":
namely, maximum disagreement in camera; maximum solidarity in
praxis. This analogy, too, is derived from Gramsci, w h o defined "philol-
ogy" (which includes, as its initial operation, the precise accumulation
of different, accurately established "texts") as "the methodological ex-
pression of the importance of particular facts understood as definite
and specific 'individualities.'" Trained as a philologist, Gramsci had in
mind a rejection of all types of merely "sociological" and "historical"
PH
^ approaches to complex topics — including especially approaches claim-
® ing to be "historical materialist" and "Marxist"—whenever they culmi-
jjj nate only in driving yet another wedge between the experiences of
w lived, conflicted everyday life—and in this sense obliterate "facts" and
£ "individualities"—by means of the cold wedge of abstract, impersonal
ss "laws." But Gramsci also had in mind, even more unusually and admi-
78
rably, n o t only an equation of "philology" a n d communist scholar-
ship but also of "philology" and communist action within but also be-
yond the academy. For Gramsci, a truly democratic communist party,
or "collective organism" must come t o its knowledges and practices
"through 'active and conscious co-participation,' through 'compas-
sionality,' through experience of immediate particulars, through a sys-
tem which one could call 'living philology.' "258 This may be the highest
possible standard against which to judge any text.
There is obviously nothing easy about grasping such notions o r their
deployment, such attempts to articulate the science of "philology" in all
senses of the w o r d with political "intervention" And particularly there
is nothing easy about such attempts in a postcontemporary, Nietz-
schean culture that has long ago lost its taste for "philology" Widely
forgotten today is the fact that Nietzsche himself was trained not as a
philosopher or literary theorist but as a. philologist, and that in certain
circumstances he explicitly favored the "text" over its "explanation."
Further ignored is the likelihood—indeed the logical requirement—that
he incorporated his training as a textual critic into his own politico-
rhetorical practice. 259 But, as the young Gramsci emphasized in 1918 to
fellow communists: "In order to be easy we would have had t o falsify
and impoverish a debate which hinged o n concepts of the utmost
importance, o n the most fundamental and precious substance of our
spirit. D o i n g that is n o t being easy: it amounts to fraud, like the wine
merchant w h o passes off coloured water as Barolo o r Lambnisco. A
concept which is difficult in itself cannot be made easy when it is ex-
pressed without becoming vulgarized. And pretending that this vul-
garization is still the same concept is t o act like trivial demagogues,
H
tricksters in logic and propaganda." 2 6 0 I t is in these Gramscian terms, gj
then, that one must attempt t o grasp Nietzsche/ anism—all its new g
wine in old bottles. To this end, one also joins that tradition of un- E<
easy materialist-communist thought extending from Spinoza through o
Gramsci and Althusser to Negri, which insists that "philology" and H
"militant politics" are profoundly related terms.261 And because the §
corps/e always has to do with death, the fight against it must be fero- >
cious as well as anexact. §
This tradition is pitted in a sometimes life-and-death struggle with w
pi
another, vaster and more powerful tradition that encompasses, in the j£
Jewish-Christian-Islamic variant at least, Scriptural interpretation. This *
79
tradition encompasses the veritable Scripture Industry that the Nietz-
sche Industry has become. But the drift of the "hermeneutic" tradition,
in Warren Montagus paraphrase, is "based on a fundamental denial of
objective material existence" of the texts in question, in so far as it seeks
meaning "beneath" or "behind" or "above" texts or "between" texts
and readers; and hence "its very reason for being is to explain away
the antagonisms and inconsistencies that the text all too openly dis-
plays"262 One of Nietzsche's own key notions, emerging from his ear-
liest reflections on "the birth of tragedy out of the spirit of music," was
that the Greeks appeared "superficial" only because they had the "good
taste" to withhold their deeper (read: more esoteric) sense of "depth"
But Nietzsche used many decorous euphemisms (e.g., The Dionysian,
The Apollinian, The Socratic) to conceal the precise social consequences
that he intended, today, to emerge from the interaction between this
particular metaphoric of "surface" and "depth."263
This surface/depth metaphoric is the most basic formant (Lefeb-
vre) already of Nietzsche's first book, The Birth of Tragedy Out of the
Spirit ofMusic (1872). A decade and a half later —having completed
Thus Spoke Zamthustra and as part of his attempt to republish all his
previous work with new guides for the perplexed—Nietzsche reissued
this book under the revised tide The Birth of Tragedy, or, Hellenism and
Pessimism (1886). He now added a new preface modestly entitled "At-
tempt at a Self-Criticism" in which he staked out some critical distance
between himself and his earlier mentors, most notably Wagner and
Schopenhauer. In fact, however, this preface constitutes the—ulti-
mately very successful—attempt to guide certain kinds of reader away
from its rhetorical excesses, to the extent that these might blow the
cover off the most subtle layers of Nietzsche's own underlying elitist
political and social agenda, which remained essentially the same as
before. In both its versions The Birth of Tragedy showed two aspects to
the world, thefirstof which has been accepted at face value, the other
"5* roundly ignored. The first argued, famously, that "the existence of
g the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" ("Attempt at a
^ Self-Criticism," 5) —a remark all the more extreme given the strong
g Lutheran sense of "justification" which entails the absolute priority
» of faith. Since there is apparendy no room for morality in this post-
£ Schopenhauerian ontology "beyond good and evil," Nietzsche's read-
1-1
than themselves. Instead, they congeal into objects which can be inves- 3
tigated." On the other hand the Hobbesian and Spinozist positions on §
the radically self-contradictory character of Scripture appear politi- >
cally and ideologically at odds. For Hobbes, "the radical absence of or- g
ganic unity necessitates the mediating function of the Sovereign who, w*
through the institution of the established church, will bring textual £
conflicts and antagonisms into an artificial unity possessed finally of a «*
81
(artificial) meaning. Hobbes therefore needs mystery. He must sus-
pend his search for an interpretive method in Leviathan at this point be-
cause to proceed any further towards a rationality proper to Scripture
would undercut the very authority whose existence the mystery of
Scripture justifies and makes necessary."269 The Nietzsche Industry—
especially its supposedly "left-wing" "hermeneutic" and "deconstruc-
tive" branches—functions more or less "ironically," more or less against
its own intentions, precisely as a mediating "Sovereign" in this Hobbes-
ian sense. Fetishizing and mystifying the imagined "polysemy" (herme-
neutics) or "undecidability" (deconstruction) of Nietzsche's text only
allows the latter's impact to be all the more socially effective surrep-
titiously. In contrast to Hobbes, "Spinoza, enemy of mysteries and
opponent of servitude, was free from the constraints that prevented
Hobbes from developing a method of reading proper to Scripture."
"Rather than attempt to distort" any of the "counterposed doctrines"
that one finds in any text—Scriptural or Nietzschean — "into agree-
ment through a hermeneutic procedure (which adds to the text what it
claims to discover in it), Spinozism accepts the contradiction as irre-
ducible and proceeds to explain it by seeking its cause."270 This is a
properly materialist and communist philological procedure for reading
Nietzsche and the many apparent "contradictions" in his texts.
Morphing the communist problematic thus defined back into a
more traditional metaphoric, one result is a piece of "masonry," as
described by Bataille. "The work of the mason, who assembles, is the
work that matters. Thus the adjoining bricks, in a book, should not
be less visible than the new brick, which is the book. What is of-
fered the reader, in fact, cannot be an element, but must be the en-
semble in which it is inserted: it is the whole human assemblage and
edifice, which must be, not just a pile of scraps, but rather a self-
consciousness."271 Or rather, in the present case, a possible, alter-
native self- and collective-consciousness must be pitted against the
dominant "self "-consciousness — really an unacknowledged collective-
ft
* consciousness—that already exists as a profoundly anticommunist
w Nietzsche/anism. Hence the necessity for a premodernist and post-
g postmodernist—and properly communist—methodology of pastiche.
w And, as such, a postcontemporary intervention.
£ Pastiche or not, communist or not, some type of performative pro-
Z cedure is necessary alongside the scholarly and philological in order to
82
grasp Nietzsche. It is no longer enough merely to talk about him—pro
or con, seriously or playfully. This is because his influence—by his
design —has never been merely rational or logical in nature and hence
is not wholly susceptible to reasoned, "clear and distinct" definition,
argument, or scholarly demolition alone. In Hegelian terms, the aim of
any philosophic act "by itself is a lifeless universal, just as the guiding
tendency is a mere drive that as yet lacks an actual existence; and the
bare result is the corpse [Leichnam] which has left the guiding tendency
behind it."272 What counts more in this system (according to Left-
Hegelians, in opposition to their right-wing counterparts who an-
nounce and desire "the end of history") is the movement of thought
and its effectivity. On the other side of the same token, however,
this book is non- or anti-Hegelian in its refusal to respect Hegel's
own—contradictory—insistence that philosophical logic never con-
flate "speculative" and "ratiocinative methods."273
It would have been impossible for Nietzsche to become a post-
Enlightenment thinker of such consequence had he merely constated
and not also successfully enacted his attack on Reason because of its
egalitarian impulsion. This is certainly not to say that Enlightenment
had no ideological deformations or totalitarian impulsions. But it is
to say that Nietzsche's corpse would not have lived on as corpus had
he merely produced rhetorical acts by himself and not also resulting
actions by subsequent others. In such matters it is less content than
form that matters. As Nietzsche's contemporary Emile Zola exclaimed:
"Form! Form is the great crime."274 "Whatever is formal instead of
thematic always contains the possibility of its future tradition within
itself."275 In the Nietzschean way of waging warfare, "the secret is no
H
longer a content held within a form of interiority; rather, it becomes a §
form identified with the form of exteriority which is always external to °
itself"276 The secret of Nietzsche's future-oriented warfare must not be ^
reduced to his common, obvious thematicization of war and violence, o
CO
for this is mere content, mere signified. The secret subsists, much more H
paradoxically, as a form of exteriority in which an affective charge of g
violence is produced that logically entails but is not fully conflatable >
with any signifier, including "warfare," just as what Deleuze and Guat- ^
tari call "the war machine" is not reducible to any particular manifesta- w
tion of war, nor to any state apparatus that thinks it can contain it. "To £
place thought in an immediate relation with the outside, with the x
83
forces of the outside, in short to make thought a war machine, is a
strange undertaking whose precise procedures can be studied in Nietz-
sche (the aphorism, for example, is very different from the maxim, for a
maxim, in the republic of letters, is like an organic State act or sovereign
judgment, whereas an aphorism always awaits its meaning from a new
external force, a final force that must conquer or subjugate it, utilize
it) ."277 And so, like most Left-Nietzscheans, Deleuze and Guattari rush
on to utilize Nietzsche without having studied his precise procedures.
One might refer here also to the "rhetoric of the empty secret" as a
fundamental category of post-turn-of-the-century discourse. The struc-
ture of the "empty secret" — as opposed to that of the "public" or "open
secret"—embraces "the cluster of apercus and intuitions that seems
distinctively to signify 'modernism* (at least, male high modernism)"
and further "delineates a space bounded by hollowness, a self-reference
that refers back to—though it differsfrom—nineteenth-centurypara-
noid solipsism, and a split between content or thematics on the one
hand and structure on the other that is stressed in favor of structure and
at the expense of thematics."278 But this formulation of the perennial
"form/content" paradigm, which shadows so many attempts to define
the "esoteric/exoteric" distinction, leaves open the question of what
the full political point of the empty secrets of modernism might be. As
Jaques Derrick noted in a Nietzschean fashion, "form fascinates when
one no longer has theforceto comprehendforcefromwithin itself."279
Images of extracting "rational kernels" from "mystical shells" —or
vice versa: mystical kernelsfromrational shells—have bedeviled histor-
ical materialism since Marx and Engels, and are hardly any improve-
ment.280 In any case, it is a grave mistake to reduce the Nietzsche/an
esoteric to "content," the exoteric to "form " But how, then, did Nietz-
sche think that people would actually be produced by means of his
writing; what are our precise functions to be in the social hierarchy;
and to what degree might these have been proleptically programmed?
If form is a kind of crime, perhaps this is why Nietzsche was fascinated
PH
£ by criminals, on occasion declaring himself to be one. This assertion,
" too, must be grasped literally,
£ Nietzsche was almost a philological "cynic" in Peter Sloterdijk's
« meaning of the term in his Critique of Cynical Reason (1983). "Nietz-
g sche's decisive self-characterization" Sloterdijk writes, "often over-
1-1
E looked, is that of a 'cynic' \Gyniker\; with this, next to Marx, the most
84 momentous thinker of the century, Nietzsche's 'cynicism* [Cynismus]
offers a modified approach to 'saying the truth': It is one of strategy and
tactics, suspicion and disinhibition, pragmatics and instrumentalism—
all this in the hands of a political ego that thinks first and foremost
about itself, an ego that is inwardly adroit and outwardly armored."281
Sloterdijk's formulation is characteristically at once right, wrong, and
imprecise. It is right in its stress on ihe pragmatic aspect of Nietzsche,
leaving aside the rather ambiguous comparison or conflation with
Marx, who was arguably not a cynic in this sense. It is wrong because
Nietzsche's political ego did not think primarily or exclusively of itself
but rather of its replication in the future, its embodiment in and as
corps/e. Finally, it is imprecise because Sloterdijk, who is something of a
Left-Nietzschean himself, fails to account for how Nietzsche intended
this proleptically projected corps/e to be produced—to be steeled for
combat by being at once "inwardly adroit and outwardly armored."282
The philological difficulty that the Left—that Left-Nietzscheanism—
has always had in settling accounts with Nietzsche can be glimpsed
nowhere more clearly than in an analysis advanced by Horkheimer in
1933, in his essay "Materialism and Morality."283 This was one of the
most significant attempts to bring neo-Kantian and Marxist analysis to
bear on a critical contemporary historical moment, and established the
basic position on Nietzsche that was to inform Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment (1944), coauthored with Adorno but with Horkheimer's take on
Nietzsche dominating. In "Materialism and Morality" Horkheimer at-
tempted to take the measure of Nietzsche's demolition of moral values
in order to democratize what Horkheimer thought of as Nietzsche's
elitist aspect, not essence. Horkheimer argued critically and naively that
Nietzsche had merely "failed to recognize that the characterization of
H
the present which he so detested derives precisely from the dearth of *
propitious conditionsforsociety at large. With the spread of reason that g
he feared, with its application to all of the relationships of society, those £
characteristics — which in truth rest upon the concentration of all the o
instincts on private advantage—must be transformed, as must ideas and ^
indeed drives themselves" (pp.30-31). With this quintessentially neo- §
Enlightenment end in sight, Horkheimer appealed—with the help of >
Freud as well as Kant and Marx—to an edified Nietzsche, clarified of his ^
elitist "dross." A dominant trend of Left-Nietzscheanism informs this «
tack. What is so problematic here is less the naively optimistic imperial- £
ism of Horkheimer's claim for Reason—a claim long since abandoned *<
by most Left-Nietzscheans —than the concomitant triple imputation 85
concerning Nietzsche: first, that he somehow "failed" to give Reason,
and hence democracy, its due; second, that he himself would have rec-
ognized this failure for what it was, rectifying it as soon as he had been
shown the light; and, finally, that, when he had done so, Nietzsche
would have been on "our" side, in this case the side of radical democracy
and Enlightenment against the Fascist Eclipse of Reason. Obscured by
this assumption is that Nietzsche was operating all along in terms of an-
other kind of Reason, one that would preserve another kind of society —
for the few—precisely by transforming a corps of his readers — includ-
ing Horkheimer and the rest of critical theory—in ways inaccessible to
Reason alone. This transformation entails persisting in the belief that
Nietzsche is basically on "our" side. When in fact he is not.
In Nietzsche's own words, in his Gay Science (1882), "young men"
are "explosives": "Therefore, subde seducers know the art of getting
them to expect explosions and not to see the reasons behind the politi-
cal cause: One does not recruit powder kegs with reasons!"284 Since
post-Enlightenment recruitment is exactly a matter of subtle seduction,
there is no good reason why Nietzsche would do more—in public—
than say that his "gay science" exists in principle. But, reasonably
enough on logical and pragmatic grounds, he never says—up front or
even quite in private—how exactly he would put this science to work to
recruit his young Marines, his Few Good Men, his fellow demolition
experts. It may be impossible ever to answer this question adequately
because, for Nietzsche, it is ultimately a matter of esotericism and
logographic necessity; but it is still possible to ask it.
With regard to the post-Enlightenment implications of Nietzsche's
writing on all his readers, Bataille was right in 1937: "When Nietzsche
said he wanted to be understood infiftyyears, he could not have meant
it in only the intellectual sense. That for which he lived and exalted
himself demands that life, joy, and death be brought into play, and not
the tired attention of the intellect. This must be stated simply and with
To an awareness of one's own involvement. Tilt is vain and unbeat-
LJ
en
g able to try to address those who have at their disposal only a feigned
® comprehension of the teachings of Nietzsche."285 Not to mention a
g comprehension based exclusively on his exoteric themes.
o
N
^ Certainly there is good reason to be intolerant, angry, or bored with
86
S any reading of Nietzsche that attends only to the thematic, locutwnary,
and hence exoteric—and translated—level of his work and not also to
its illocutionary andperhcutionavy, and hence more esoteric, dimension.
Thematic reading—at times under the guise offixatingon "the ques-
tion of style"—finds in Nietzsche's works only always "contradictions"
that can be more or less easily deconstructed; and, for precisely this
reason, thematic reading has long been a bankrupt response, and it
makes no difference whether it flows from the pen of an Adorno and
Horkheimer, a Habermas or Sloterdijk, a Gadamer or Foucault, a De-
leuze, a Rorty, or—appearances to the contrary—a Derrida.
Following J. L. Austin's philosophy of "speech acts" and what Brecht
might have called "social gest," distinctions must be made between
three discursive events.286 These can be. analytically distinct but are
often empirically intertwined: (i) The "performance of an act o/saying
something." Locution: "He said, 'Eternal Recurrence of the Same will
divide us into two castes: a higher noble and a lower base' "—meaning
by "divide" divide, and referring by "us" to us. (2) The "perfonnance of
an act in saying something." JUocutUm: "He urged us to divide into two
castes after incorporating into ourselves the doctrine of Eternal Recur-
rence of the Same." And (3) saying something that produces "certain
consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the
audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons." Perbcution: "We have
been persuaded to divide ourselves into two castes." Better yet, at the
maximum level of effectivity—which will later be called the properly
Nietzschean Channel 4—the prophylactic quotation marks disappear:
We have divided ourselves into two basic castes but we neither say nor
know that we have. And so the statement "We have divided ourselves
into two basic castes" is never in fact uttered, even thought. But lived.
H
The perlocutionary system of Nietzsche's corps/e is thus related to £5
what has been called "vivification," a way of making vivid that is always g
slighdy in excess of cognition. <cVivification is not identical to per- £
suasiveness, though it may be an essential part of it"; it is a way of o
CO
Whenever Nietzsche has shouted "Hey, you there!" all heads tend to
»• snap round on their neural stalks. When telecommunication systems
* rather more advanced than verbal calls and whisdes are informed by
w Nietzsche/anism, heads don't even have to turn, can't turn.* For in-
w
B
o
£ *The earliest versions of Nietzschean interpellation were no less spectacular, for all
pq their apparent lack of technological sophistication. During the heyday of the Nietzsche
S5 Archive in Weimar before Nietzsche's death in 1900 — or is it 2000?—his sister Elisabeth
92
stance, in direct interfaces between cathode ray tubes and eye stalks,
including already nascent technologies enabling people born blind to
see by having their optic nerves hardwired to TV and video. So it is
always already—paradoxically and uncannily—that one is made to ac-
cept the "humanist" delusion that the origin of messages lies deep
within "human nature"—within ourselves qua creating, rebelling, pro-
gramming subjects (natura naturans: substance and cause) rather than
qua created, programmed, mentally and socially subjected subject-
formations (natura naturata: effect, mode, and medium) ,298 The truth
of the matter likely is that "we" and "nature" are both. But whenever
"natura naturata wins a total hegemony over natura naturans," Negri
asks rhetorically: "What could be the work of the devil if not this?"299
It is necessary to add—pace Lukacs and various Stalinists — that
Nietzsche/anism is not—never was, likely never will be—"the domi-
nant ideology of the ruling class," no matter how many self-described
"Nietzscheans" are near, at, or in centers of power in capitalist coun-
tries or in the few socialist countries still in existence. The reason Nietz-
sche's corps/e could not have this role is hardly due to any lack of desire
on Nietzsche's part to be dominant. Rather, there is no such thing as
"the dominant ideology of the rulers," not even "capitalist." Elaborating
a central thesis of Althusser, £tienne Balibar explains: "The dominant
ideology in a given society is a specific universalization of the imaginary
of the dominated: what it elaborates are such notions as Justice, Liberty
and Equality, Effort and Happiness, etc., which draw their potential
universal meaning from their belonging to the imaginary of the indi-
viduals who live the masses' or the people's conditions."300 It is this
multiplex ideology—in an "everyday" aspect that is increasingly tech-
H
nocultural—that Nietzsche/anism most successfully informs, direcdy §
or indirectly. And it does so either negatively, by closing off effective O
options to capitalism, or, more positively, by transforming even the £
possibility of collective revolt against capitalism into various ostensibly o
Forster-Nietzsche staged dinner parties in the Villa Silberblick which housed both the ^
Oft
madman and the Archive, later a Nazi think tank. The dinners were served in an elab- ^
orately Ctoyz&Jugendstil (art nouveau) room, at the end of which was a drawn curtain. ^
After dessert the curtain was paned to reveal Nietzsche, draped in a togalike outfit sitting ^
in the chair where he had been all during the meal. The guests spontaneously stood and >
applauded the dully staring, corpselike, but still-living philosopher. *
93
"individual*' agendas. Political economy before Marx, in other words.
To expose this "everyday" aspect of Nietzsche's corps/e becomes all the
more pressing if, as Balibar also points out (againpace Lukacs), "No
class is the absolute 'Subject of History' but there is no doubt that only
the masses really 'make history,' i.e., only they can produce politi-
cal changes" (p. 13). Finally, Balibar (following Gramsci) makes an-
other basic point that bears directly on all current obituaries for the
"death" of communism: "a fatalistic view of the revolutionary condi-
tions merely reflects the 'subordinate' position of a divided working
class" (p. 16). Nietzsche can be viewed—at least theoretically and ex hy-
pothesi—zs having esoterically effected this globally disastrous division
and our incapacity to perceive it or do much about it. Certainly this was
his illocutionary desire, his social gest. And the joke is on us.
Subconscious, subcutaneous influence—whereby the Sublime be-
comes subliminal and vice versa—involves techniques of employing
and deploying language not as a linguistic or even semiotextual system
per se, but rather in its imag-inary and aural-musical potential for sua-
sion, reception, and self/deception. It is in this sense only that Althus-
ser —indeed all consistent communism—proposes that ideology is
never fully conscious, nor even subconscious, but unconscious. These
techniques or technologies are exactly appropriate ways of waging war
in a world that today is simultaneously preliterate and postliterate, but
no longer—perhaps never again—significantly or predominantly liter-
ate. The fantasy of posthumous, subconscious influence and transfor-
mation—which is what "politics" has always been about at least since
Aristotle, whenever the term means more than yet another academic
mantra chanted to ward off, repress, and suppress more radical thought
or action—has enjoyed a long, complex, sometimes bizarre history.
The empirical impossibility of controlling the future appropriation of
one's writing absolutely is often overridden by two factors: (1) by the
empirical possibility of exerting at least weak performative control over
"5" this appropriation, and (2) by the theoretical dream of exerting total
^ control. This possibility and this dream were further encouraged in
2 Nietzsche's case by the thought of Eternal Recurrence of the Same,
£ which suggests that the future will be essentially similar if not literally
$ identical to the past and the present. The phantasmagorias of idealism
£ help overdetermine ideological, political, economic, artistic, theoret-
ic ical, and other practices. And few philosophers or artists or critics
94
or other people have taken this im/possible fantasy of posthumous,
sub-rosa effectivity more seriously—and have been more successful,
comparatively speaking, in realizing it—than has the Nietzsche who
developed both his esoteric semiotics and his rhetorico-politics of
euthanasia—his "process of weeding out"—accordingly.
lates that these days one is really "talking about" or "reading" Marx 3
himself very rarely, Nietzsche mainly §
The possibility of a philologically informed intervention that would >
be at once postcontemporary and communist must confront the fact ^
that Althusser's relationship to the nexus appears remarkably positive w
and uncritical at first glance. "However paradoxical it may seem" Al- £
thusser wrote in Reading Capital (1965), "I venture to suggest that our x
99
age threatens one day to appear in the history of human culture as
marked by the most dramatic and difficult trial of all, the discovery of
and training in the meaning of the 'simplest' acts of existence: seeing,
listening, speaking, reading—the acts which relate people to their
works, and to those works thrown in their faces, their 'absences of
works.' And contrary to all today's reigning appearances, we do not
owe these staggering knowledges to psychology, which is built on the
absence of a concept of them, but to a few people: Marx, Nietzsche and
Freud."307 In "Freud and Lacan" (also 1965), Althusser granted the
troika similar distinction: "To my knowledge, the nineteenth century
saw the birth of two or three children that were not expected: Marx,
Nietzsche and Freud. 'Natural' children, in the sense that nature of-
fends customs, principles, morality and good breeding: nature is the
rule violated, the unmarried mother, hence the absence of a legal father.
Western Reason makes a fatherless child pay heavily. Marx, Nietzsche
and Freud had to foot the terrible bill of survival: a price compounded
of exclusion, condemnation, insult, poverty, hunger and death, or
madness. I speak only of them (other unfortunates might be men-
tioned who lived their death sentences in colour, sound and poetry). I
speak only of them because they were the births of sciences or of crit-
icism."308 Nevertheless, and any personal persecution aside, it is clear
from his overall argument that Althusser regulates Nietzsche to the
realm of "criticism," not "science." For in "Freud and Lacan" just as in
Reading Capital, Nietzsche quickly drops out of Althusser's extended
comparisons of Freud and Marx. For whatever reason, and external
pressures from the French Communist Party likely contributed, Nietz-
scheanism turns out to be refreshingly and atypically absent in Al-
thusser in two respects: from his published work, and, more important
at the end of the day, compared to the standard ofthe times.
In private, however, Althusser—even Althusser—was haunted by a
certain uncanny presence of Nietzsche. According to Derrida, conver-
sations at Althusser's bedside before he died in 1990 turned as much to
e*
^ Nietzsche and Heidegger as to Marx and Lenin, though the gist is not
£ recorded.309 In Althusser's two remarkable attempts at objective "self-
jj2 analysis " the presence of Nietzsche is felt in three related ways: existen-
S tiatty (both men were diagnosed as having dementiapraecox and both
g suffered from the symptoms of manic depression and hypomania);
Z thematicaUy (the appeal to "will to power" to take control of one's life
100
and to produce knowledge); and to some extent stylistically (repeated
slippage from real to imagined or screen memories, experimentation
with hyperbolic formulations) .31° Althusser had begun reading Nietz-
sche with interest already during the time of his incarceration in a Ger-
an prison camp in World War II.311 It was in the stalag that Althusser
was "metamorphosed" not into a Nietzschean but rather "from a royal-
ist caterpillar into a communist butterfly."312 Nonetheless, Althusser
was also deeply moved—to the point of partial identification— by the
figure of Nietzsche as a tragic, solitary philosopher. This uncanny, un-
published relationship is made clear in an unrequited letter to Lacan in
1963, after the latter had not responded to an earlier letter in which
Althusser had attempted to establish deeper levels of philosophical
and human contact.313 But, as his conversations and letters with Mexi-
can philosopher Fernanda Navarro make clear, Althusser struggled
with Nietzsche, and with Heidegger, particularly hard in 1984 during
his confinement as criminally insane. He did come to terms with Hei-
degger, he said, whom he concluded was "an extraordinary historian
and interpreter of philosophy" and "a sort of unctuously refined cure."
Nietzsche, whom Althusser regarded as having "edified philosophy
with his critique of language and signification" and whom he found
(a la Freud) to have anticipated aspects of his own work in this re-
gard, he found comparatively easier to grasp.314 None of this would
be particularly significant, were not Althusser arguably the only hope
of communist philosophy and Nietzsche the only position outside of
communism.
Be all this as it may, the absence of detailed and explicit critical
discussion of Nietzsche in Althusser's published work has done com- H
munist philosophy no good, indeed has unwittingly given Nietzsche's §
corps/e considerable aid and abetment. To appropriate Althusser's o
own metaphor of the father, one might say that this is one reason £
Nietzsche has become a father figure to precisely those contemporary o
intellectuals who would deny the Father and his non et nom—whether 3
explicitly or implicitly — by failing to settle accounts with "him." This §
problematic is familiar, of course, to all those who struggle to under- >
stand the power not only of Nietzsche but also of Freud and Marx, ^
indeed of the monotheistic God, over disciples: that is, one ends up by w
*
idolizing the God or a god (Marx, Freud, Nietzsche) who, in principle £
at least, began by prohibiting idolatry and precisely for that reason at- B x
101
tracted the disciples. The problem is that Nietzsche has become more
influential than either Freud or Marx in this regard as well.
Althusser notwithstanding, the notebooks of philologist Nietzsche
indicate that he did not say in public what he intended to say, could
have said differently had he wished, but chose not to say in order to
have maximum subconscious, subcutaneous effect. It is in this one
absolutely crucial respect that Friedrich Nietzsche differs radically from
the remainder of the troika — though less from Sigmund Freud than
from Karl Marx.
The problem of duplicity in the case of the supposedly radically
honest and self-analyzed Freud is not merely personal, thinking of his
hanky-panky with Dora and Her Sisters.315 It is also institutional.
It was as a direct result of the defections of [Alfred] Adler, [C. G. ] Jung, and
[Wilhelm] Stekel that Ernest Jones proposed the institution in 1912 of a
"strictly secret" committee of loyal adherents who could be charged with
safe-guarding the future of psychoanalysis. The principle inspiration for this
idea, as Jones tells us in his biography of Freud, was his acquaintance with
"stories of Charlemagne's paladins from boyhood, and many secret societies
from literature " The committee's appointed tasks were to share the burden
of replying to Freud's critics; to direct the ever-widening movement accord-
ing to a "preconcerted plan" (which included controlling the International
Association and its publishing house); and, in Freud's own words, to "de-
fend the cause against personalities and accidents when I am no more."
Freud presented each committee member with a special gold ring upon
which was mounted an antique Greek intaglio from his private collection.
The committee remained a secret organization until 1927, when it was
merged with the official board of the International Organization.316
act: "Professors are meant to be eaten with salsa, piccante. " 326 In this H
spirit, it is necessary to brew up some red-hot sauce in which others §
may really cook Nietzsche/anism's goose, some day. Some of that spirit >
flows from Pasolini who wrote perhaps the most fitting epitaph to the >
very existence and concept of the Marx-Nietzsche-Freud nexus. "It has w
been said that I have three heroes: Christ, Marx, and Freud. This is £
reducing everything to formulae. In truth, my only hero is reality. " 327 *
105
One might quibble, as Pasolini implies, about the inclusion of any im/
proper names in such lists. If there is one demand, however, it is to
remove Nietzsche's name from them, as Pasolini did in his own way. As
early as 1967 he wrote: "I'm no longer really so interested in the subject
of the research of Freud and Marx. . I want to stress the fact that
now, at ageforty-five,I've emerged from the wilderness of Freudian
and Marxian dogma. But where have Igot to go?"32* This is a difficult —
today perhaps even impossible—question to answer. At least Pasolini,
unlike so many transformed others, did not answer: 'To Nietzsche!"329
The fundamental points so far are two: that Nietzsche was unlike Freud
and especially Marx in the matter of theorizing and practicing conspir-
atorial esotericism, and that this fact has been missed completely by the
elaborate history of the Marx-Nietzsche-Freud nexus. The Big Three
have been compared and contrasted, when not conflated, only either
thematically — for example, for their imagined decentering of the hu-
man subject in terms, respectively, ofpolitical economy, ofpower quanta,
and of the unconscious and its everyday symptoms—or in terms of their
approaches to interpretation, but not their iUocutionary practices. Follow-
ing the work in the mid-1940s and early 1950s of the rather hetero-
geneous group called the Frankfurt School (which, though influenced
profoundly by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, never articulated the nexus
as such)™ explicit hermeneutic-thematic analysis of the nexus was re/
inaugurated by Paul Ricoeur in 1961. Ricoeur famously depicted Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud as "masters of the school of suspicion" in oppo-
sition to a hermeneutics of "interpretation as recollection of mean-
ing."331 This was Ricoeur's way of taking his partial distance from the
hermeneutic tradition influenced by Heidegger, insofar as the latter
had inadequately incorporated Marx and Freud while fully incorporat-
ing Nietzsche. Yet if Nietzsche was an esoteric writer, then Ricoeur's
easy attribution to him of "suspicion" is one of the most misguided
categories to describe what Nietzsche intended. At most this could
c*
% describe how the reader should approach his work. Nonetheless, Ri-
^ coeur's naive fantasy set the table for many subsequent roundtable and
£ cocktail discussions of the troika. Thus, when Hans-Georg Gadamer,
« in his programmatic 1962 essay, 'The Philosophical Foimdations of
^ the Twentieth Century," dismissed—implicidy and not by name—the
Z principle of structural causality for being an insignificant aspea of
106
the history of philosophy, this dismissal—which constituted one of the
foundational acts of philosophical hermeneutics — again appealed, ex-
plicitly, to Nietzsche as the most significant member of the Marx-
Nietzsche-Freud nexus. For Gadamer, Nietzsche was "the great, fateful
figure who fundamentally altered the task of the critique of subjective
spirit for our century." Gadamer then asserted: "If we are concerned
with Nietzsche's real and epoch-making significance, . . . we do not
have to decide whether philosophy is the expression of an event or the
cause of it. For his criticism aims at the final and most radical alienation
that comes upon usfromout of ourselves—the alienation ofconsciousness
itself. Consciousness and self-consciousness do not give unambiguous
testimony that what they think they mean is not perhaps a masking or
distorting of what is really in them. Nietzsche hammered this home in
modern thought in such fashion that we now recognize it everywhere,
and not merely in the excessive, self-destructive and disillusioning way
in which Nietzsche tears one mask after anotherfromthe I, until finally
no more masks remain —and also no more I."332 Immediately, Gada-
mer proceeded to map Nietzsche onto Marx and Freud: "We think not
only of the plurality of masks, represented mythologically by Dionysus,
the god of masks, but also of the critique of ideology that, since Marx,
has been applied increasingly to religious, philosophical, and world-
orienting convictions that are held with unconditional passion. Above
all, we think of the psychology of the unconscious, of Freud, whose
interpretation of psychological phenomena is dominated by his insight
that there can be powerful contradictions in man's psychic life between
conscious intention and unconscious desire and being and that in any
case what we believe ourselves to be doing is in no way identical with
H
what is in fact transpiring in our human being" (pp. 116-117). But §
this today commonplace view—both of Nietzsche and of what might 0
distinguish him from Freud and Marx—makes any firm theoretical ^
or practical grasp of Nietzsche/anism and Nietzsche's corps/e simply o
impossible.333 H
Also in 1962 appeared—wholly independent of Gadamer's herme- §
neutic intervention—Deleuze's very influential book in France, Nietz- >
sche and Philosophy, in which Nietzsche was portrayed as a profoundly §
non- or antidialectical thinker—and hence, implicitly at least, anti- w
Freudian and anti-Marxist.334 This thesis was to be constitutive for the £
poststructuralist or "French" appropriation of Nietzsche; but it must K
107
be revised, certainly, in terms of Nietzsche's intent, his willingness to
use all forms of dialectical incorporation when it suits his pleasure.335
Furthermore—as Deleuze, Foucault, and Paolo Caruso at the time and
as Peter Dews more recently have all stressed—it is insufficiently un-
derstood that so-called poststructuralism never really developed, be-
ginning in the early 1960s, as a negative, reactive response to structuralism
More properly still, however, poststructuralism must be defined as the
overwhelmingly positive, assimilative embrace of Nietzsche.336 And it is
such that it persists today.337
In 1967 literary critic and theorist Paul de Man, just then coming on
the scene, appeared to attack the Marx-Nietzsche-Freud nexus in an
early attempt to deconstruct what he called "the demystifiers" by com-
paring them rather unfavorably to the European romantics, notably to
his own great troika: Jean-Jacques Rousseau-Friedrich Holderlin-
William Wordsworth. A year earlier, at the seminal "Structuralist Con-
troversy" conference attended by de Man, philosopher Jean Hyppolite
had attempted, against all odds and unsuccessfully, to use Hegel to
hold back the tidal wave of the Marx-Nietzsche-Freud nexus. Hyp-
polite suggested that the nexus had merely "written the criticism" of
what remains a basic Hegelian problematic.338 Within that year, de
Man was writing: "Our great demystifiers, Freud, Marx, and Nietz-
sche, are much more naive than their romantic predecessors, especially
in their belief that the demystification can become a praxis beneficial to
the personality or to the society."339 In other words, de Man at once
accepted the neo-Hegelian critique of the centrality of the nexus while
denying to that same critique any salvific power of its own. On the one
hand this nihilist and quietist position on the nexus was hardly widely
shared; on the other de Man himself very quickly came to reverse
himself on Nietzsche. For complex reasons, neither Freud nor Marx
were ever significant touchstones to him, but Nietzsche was soon ele-
vated by de Man to the status of a "romantic" in his positive, hyper-
bolic, deconstructive sense of the term: namely, a producer of radically
e*
g self-referential, cognitively transcendental, but at the same time self-
M effacing, "literary" or "allegorical" texts that rigorously and perpetually
>jj deconstrua any affirmative claim made on behalf of what has remained
« for too many de Manians mere "empiricity" "personality" "history"
£ and "society." The irrevocable turn to Nietzsche by de Man meant that
Z a great opportunity for radically deconstructing the Marx-Nietzsche-
108 Freud nexus was lost.
Now, within the parameters of this ubiquitous pro-Nietzschean bias
or problematic —firmly entrenched in European thought already by
the early 1960s at least—only three basic "logical" responses to Nietz-
sche seemed possible: affirmation, rejection, or an ostensibly neutral
and/or synthetic stance. Heidegger's position is the great exception,
being too complex for reduction to such schematization. The first,
affirmative, valorization of the nexus was that of Michel Foucault—
beginning around 1964, though he had encountered Nietzsche in ear-
nest over a decade earlier,340 According to Foucault, Nietzsche's "semi-
ology"—in ways anticipating Freud's and surpassing Marx's —had
been precociously pitted with exemplary and definitive force against
all structuralism and phenomenology. Both of which vainly, power-
trippingly search as they do for "deep" "first," or "communicating"
structures.341 Henceforth Nietzsche would remain by far the most im-
portant member of the troika for Foucault, who also had absolutely no
interest in reading Nietzsche in any philologically exacting or accurate
way, including with regard to the problem of esotericism. In one of the
interviews conducted soon before his death, Foucault looked back: "I
have never been too concerned about people who say: 'You are bor-
rowing ideas from Nietzsche; well Nietzsche was used by the Nazis,
therefore , '; but, on the other hand, I have always been concerned
with linking together as tightly as possible the historical and theoretical
analysis of power relations, institutions, and knowledge to the move-
ments, critiques, and experiences that call them into question in real-
ity"342 None of Foucault's august and supposedly diverse body of in-
terviewers —Paul Rabinow, Charles Taylor, Martin Jay, Richard Rorty,
and Leo Lowenthal—pressed Foucault to wonder whether the ques-
H
tioning he rightly demanded might be more radical were it not so £3
uncontested^ "Nietzschean." But then the interviewers are themselves g
members of the corps/e. 5
Turning the Foucauldian valorization on its "dialectical" head, Jur- o
CO
gen Habermas took the rejective position, nearly unique within the 3
txajeaory of Frankfurt School Western Marxism. Earlier Adorno and §
Horkheimer had sucked Marx-Nietzsche-Freud into one more or less >
positive breath, beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, as would Marcuse ^
for the next generation. Habermas's lame spin on this aspect of his w
philosophical inheritance was to say that Nietzsche represented the £
culmination of a dominant tendency of post-Enlightenment thought — *
if not of this thought in its entirety—because, like negative dialectics 109
of the Adornoan stamp, "Nietzsche—and this puts him above all
others—denies the critical power of reflection with and only with the
means of reflection itself."3*3 The resemblance between this thesis and
that of Ricoeur or Gadamer is due to the common source in Heidegger.
(And thus is light also shed on Sloterdijk's subsequent attempt, in the
early 1980s, to use the concept "critique of cynical reason" to rescue the
best of critical theory, to go beyond the naivete of Habermas, and
to sublate the Marx-Nietzsche-Freud nexus by what Sloterdijk, in a
move more naive than anything in Habermas, embraced as "Left-
Heideggerianism"344 Thinking he had dispatched Nietzsche in 1968 —
of all years — Habermas prompdy delivered himself of the opinion that
"Nietzsche is no longer contagious."345 A decade and a half later, he had
to admit in an interview that this claim had been "mistaken," at least
with regard to the French reception of Nietzsche.346
In the event, within the decade in France, by 1977-1978, the quickly
mediatized and commodified "New Philosopher" Andre Glucksmann,
a lapsed student of Althusser and former '68er, was excoriating Marx
and Nietzsche, and even "a certain Freud," as totalitarian Maitrespen-
seurs.347 By contrast, the second foundational treatise of "new philoso-
phy" published the same year, Bernard-Henri Levy's Barbarism with a
Human Face (1977), was equally hostile to Marx, equally reticent to
engage Freud, and yet was at the same time also — symptomatically
enough for the underlying legitimation of neocapitalism that was and is
"new philosophy"—much more positively disposed to Nietzsche.348
At almost exacdy the same time, across the Rhein in Germany, Marx,
Freud, and Nietzsche were being analyzed by the quasi-renegade Cath-
olic theologian Hans Kung in Does God Exist? (1978) as the verita-
ble Trinitarian base of contemporary atheism and nihilism.349 Finally,
across the Channel in England, simultaneously and more neutrally,
Freud and Marx were being trivialized by a literary critic as the main,
implausibly polite "company" at a veritable Oxbridge high-table din-
ner given in Nietzsche's honor — as if by his own invitation.350 In sum,
£&< the philosopher Alex Callinicos, a Trotskyist and no friend of Nietz-
^ scheanism—though Trotsky is often accused of making too many con-
£ cessions to Nietzsche —is right to suggest that already by the late
« 1970s, largely for political reasons, Marxism had "lost the contest with
£ Nietzscheanism." The reasons mentioned by Callinicos include: "the
Z reflux of class struggle in the West after the great upturn of 1968-76,
110
the crisis of the Communist Parties, caught between "really existing
socialism' and a reinvigorated social democracy, the disintegration of
Maoism'5351
In the context of the relative Eurocentrism of the Marx-Nietzsche-
Freud nexus, Edward W. Said, in Culture and Imperialism (1993), is
not entirely unjustified to contrast the perspective of Frantz Fanon,
whom he regards as the intellectual descendent of the nexus. According
to Said: "The difference between Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche on the
one hand and Fanon's 'native intellectual' on the other is that the be-
lated colonial thinkerfixeshis predecessors geographically—they are of
the West—the better to liberate their energies from the cultural matrix
that produced them. By seeing them antithetically as intrinsic to the
colonial system and at the same time potentially at war with it, Fanon
performs an act of closure on the empire and announces a new era."352
The deep problem with Said's analysis, however, is not so much the
inclusion of Marx in the problematic of Eurocentrism—from which,
arguably, he took significandy more distance than either Freud or
Nietzsche—but rather the a priori assumption that Nietzsche's project
was liberatory at root and that it is possible, simply by contextualizing
and historicizing Nietzsche, to unlock that potential in a new era, as if
the old could thereby be left behind. Said's own basic and uncritical
"Nietzschean" non-Marxist orientation is well documented.353
Nowadays —the end of the twentieth century and the turn to the
twenty-first—it seems simply "obvious" to have reunions of the Central
Committee of a remarkably unified, democratically centralized Party of
left-liberalism: Marx (secretary of politics, though seldom of economics
any longer); Freud (secretary of everyday life, though rarely of social
H
pathology); and Nietzsche (secretary of virtually everything, especially §jj
aesthetics, though not in connection to other forms of power) .3S4 Note, g
however, that this same division of labor not only tacitly favors Nietz- ^
sche but also, as such, meshes remarkably well with the three major o
institutions, instances, or practices fundamental to any social forma- E
tion—the political, the economic, and the ideological — butparticularly g
to the production and reproduction of capital.355 >
>
<
In his painting Utopic (1987), Mark Tansey has inserted into a repre- £
sentation of Anna Freud's consultation room a Roman sculpture of a x
111
naked hermaphrodite reclining obliquely o n the analytic couch—both
major sexes fused as one body extending backward and forward in
perspectival depth and into history (see plate i ) . 3 W The sculpture can
be imagined t o be alive or dead: It is a corps/e. O n the wall behind the
nude—in a room otherwise decorated only with books and an oriental
rug and mysteriously illuminated by a brilliant white, shroudlike table-
cloth beneath dying flowers in a vase—are three portraits in descend-
ing order of size, as if they were establishing a peculiar vanishing
point: both spatially out of the u-topic, "no-where," twilight/dawn-
blue room, as well as temporally into the past/future. Appropriately,
Tansey creates by subtraction, producing images "by wiping or pulling
the paint away" 3 5 7 sc working against time across space." 358 N o n c h r o n o -
logically and monochronistically arranged in terms of biological birth,
the quasi-orthogonal of this high-modernist triptych interpellates the
postmodern viewing subject: a large Freud, of course; a smaller Marx,
snared in the pincers of his t w o greatest intellectual rivals; and finally
Nietzsche, the smallest, most distant, most dimly illuminated. And just
so. In the world of Nietzsche's corps/e, the truest and greatest degree of
influence and power is typically in inverse proportion to apparent size
and perspective. Whereas Freud and Marx seem t o make eye contact
with the viewer, Nietzsche does one of three things. Either he looks
back at the other men, his gaze boring through his predecessor Marx to
get at his successor Freud, informing their gaze ftom within—and
hence also the Nietzschean viewer's gaze at them. O r Nietzsche is ab-
sorbed into himself, and hence by extension ourselves, his visionary near-
blindness becoming our own. O r he casts his visual net into some un-
representable space and time other than the contemporaneous, into the
deep azure past and postcontemporary. In any case, the body exposed
t o view o n the couch of analytic desire is the embodiment, the incorpo-
ration of both Freud and Marx as Nietzsche's corps/e: as hermaphro-
dite, if n o t also as android, as cyborg. As "our" postcontemporaneity.
122
2 Channeling beyond
Interpretation
Aesthetics
i
See your reflection here, 3
o
O proud and foolish age 3
Who have abandoned the clear path carved out 139
For us by years of reawakened thought—
Who stumbling backward
Trumpet your retrogression as a gain.71
The scope of [Nietzsche's] influence cuts across the traditional lines of the-
ory and practice by which intellectuals and political activists are usually
divided. Furthermore, in apparent contradiction to Nietzsche's own asser-
tion that he does not write for the mob, his doctrines have been dissemi-
nated throughout the general public, and not the least among people who
have never heard of his name or read a page of his voluminous writings. It is
a remarkable fact that Nietzsche — a self-professed decadent, nihilist, atheist,
anti-Christ, opponent of academic philosophy, scourge of socialism, egali-
tarianism, and "the people," who espoused aristoctatic political and artistic
views, insisted upon a rank ordering of human beings, and went so far as to
0? advise men to carry a whip when they visit the women's quarters — is today
£ one of the highest authorities, if not the authority, for progressive liberals,
w existentialist and liberation theologians, professors, anarchist speculators,
2 left-wing critics of the Enlightenment and bourgeois society, propounders of
w egalitarianism and enemies of political and artistic elitism, the advance guard
^ of women's liberationists, and a multitude of contemporary movements,
S5 most if not all of which seem to have been castigated by Nietzsche's un-
146 paralleled rhetorical powers.10*
Notwithstanding the fact that Left-Nietzscheanism has now been
around for a full century, Rosen's formulation here is as close as anyone
has ever come to formulating the problematic of Nietzsche/anism.
Rosen is particularly precise in suggesting of Left-Nietzscheanism that
it exists in only "apparent contradiction" to Nietzsche's intentions.
Now, many otherwise very rational people have been impressed, if
not also taken in, by Nietzsche's illocutionary powers. Richard Rorty,
claiming Paul de Man for the "American Left" in 1989, quickly dismisses
what he calls "Nietzsche's occasional attempts to proclaim himself the
superman, and therefore entitled to neglect the needs of mere hu-
mans."105 Rorty then adds that "ftom my antiessentialistic angle, the
hallucinatory effects of Marxism, and of the post-Marxist combination
of de Man and Foucault currently being smoked by the American Cul-
tural Left, are just special cases of the hallucinatory effects of all essen-
tialistic thought" (p. 137). Rorty writes from a self-described "Ameri-
can" or "North Atlantic" position; and he is in solidarity—albeit a
sometimes skeptical and critical one —with other "American cultural
leftists" and their European inspirations—most notably Derrida and
Heidegger—all of whom, on both sides of the Atlantic, Rorty thinks
should abandon such popular notions of cultural periodization as "the
postmodern "According to Rorty, in the 1991 introduction to his Philo-
sophical Papers, this "term is so over-used that it is causing more trouble
than it is worth" and, as noted, he recommends replacing "postmod-
ernism" by "post-Nietzscheanism "106 For Rorty, an eminently sensible
man, "post-Nietzschean European philosophy and postpositivist ana-
lytic philosophy [ are ] converging to a single, pragmatist account of in- Q
quiry" (p. 3). Indeed—not entirely by chance at this moment of "our" j£
ttiumphant pax americana—Rorty imagines a global drift of philoso- w
phy toward the theory and practice of what he is pleased to dub "prag- 5
matic recontextualization." It is in this context, then, that Rorty down- w
plays what he regards as Nietzsche's and Heidegger's merely occasional, <<
merely hscist-"soundin£f" utterances as mere minor, momentary aberra- g
tions. Embarrassingly enough, these utterances are admitted to exist. g
But somehow they always end up being in/visible, unworthy of serious w
thought or worry. In "Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as *
Politics" (1986-1989), Rorty insists, in the face of considerable empiri- 3
cal evidence to the contrary, that "Heidegger was only accidentally a 3
Nazi"—a contingent political fact simply irrelevant to his enormous 3
philosophical importance and which can be purged by politely asking 147
both Heidegger and his great predecessor in this regard, Nietzsche, not
to take language quite so seriously.107 This recommendation is reminis-
cent of the 1950 agreement between Adorno, Horkheimer, and Gada-
mer that Nietzsche not be read "literally"—except of course when we
happen to like what he is saying. According to Rorty, this overserious-
ness is the main fault shared, though with rather different political
valences, by major contemporary post- and Left-Nietzschoids such as
Derrida and de Man.
Rorty's most complex arguments about Nietzsche and Heidegger
come in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) .108 Yet precisely here,
especially in the essay "Self-Creation and Affiliation: Proust, Nietzsche,
and Heidegger," is where Rorty splits post-Nietzschean philosophy—
or rather Nietzsche's corps/e—too neatly in binary twain. On the one
hand there is for Rorty what might be regarded as the phenomenon's
historical dimension. This, for Rorty, is merely contingent and, in the
case of post-Nietzscheanism, often suspect both in its grandiloquent
pretension and specific political recommendations. On the other hand
there is a properly philosophical dimension, which remains pathbreaking
and valid—even though modest in initial appearance from the perspec-
tive of Anglo-American argumentation. Rorty writes:
Now, these are incredible, un/canny, and above all deadly serious charges.
They implicate not only Nietzschoids — such as "Rorty"—and Nietz-
scheans — such as "Rosen" — but virtually all of us—if for no other rea-
son than they are likely impossible to prove or disprove apodeictically,
once and for all. There is no choice but to continue trying. But—if not
to "Rorty" and the "Left" or to "Rosen" and the "Right" - then where
else to turn? Standing on the shoulders of Nietzsche ought to launch a
chill up your spine.
Traditionally and commonly, there are only the three major "possibili-
ties," "decisions," or "choices" open to the "interpreter" The first two
are neady summarized by Virilio's question: "Do we represent the
construction, or construct the representation?"171 The third option, of
course, is that we do both, with several ways of proceeding. But does
one really have to be locked into this relentlessly triadic or "dialectical"
scheme? Nietzsche did not think so, producing according to his princi-
ples another medium, less susceptible to illumination, more conducive
to individual and collective incorporation.
Call the three main options Channels i, 2, and 3. This appellation is
related to but different from Barthes's theory of "the third" or "obtuse
meaning" and Althusser's three major epistemological schemata or
Generalities. It is also related to the theory of the "semantic rectangle"
elaborated by Greimas and Jameson beginning in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.172 In 1970 Barthes posited a "third meaning" beyond (1)
"an informational level" of "communication " which he says is "of no
further concern," and which corresponds roughly to Channel 1; and
(2) "the symbolic level" —whether the symbolism is referential, diege-
tic, personal, or historical — or "level of signification "173 "The symbolic
level" combines elements of Channels 1, 2, and 3. Barthes's "third
meaning" is "the level of significance" "Evident, erratic, obstinate" it is
virtually beyond definition—"it is not in the language system"—and,
as emotive supplement and excess, that which it "disturbs, sterilizes, is
metalanguage (criticism)" (pp. 318-322). It also "exceeds psychology,
anecdote, function, exceeds meaning without, however, coming down
to the obstinacy in presence shown by any human body" (p. 319). But
this last phrase begins to indicate why "the third meaning" is not quite
p<
^ Channel 4: that is, the way Nietzsche's corpse and corpus is incorporated
^ and embodied precisely as corps. Note that classical—that is, Freud-
Ejj ian —psychoanalysis is simply irrelevant on this terrain, insofar as it
£ maintains a binary distinction between two basic forms of identifica-
£ tion. In this case, either the subject is required to identify with Nietz-
z sche as other (heteropathology) or, alternatively, Nietzsche identifies
168
with the same subject as other by being ingested (idiopathology). In
and as corps/e, such distinctions are always already moot. Be this as it
may, elements of Barthes's "third meaning" could point to Channel 4, if
his theory and methodology were not so idealistic and impressionistic,
so reluctant to enter into the possibiUty of an exo/esoteric mode of
manipulation by design. There is also paradox in Barthes's suggestion
that "the third meaning" is beyond language, since his own essay, in-
deed all his rich critical writings, can be read, as its rendering into
language and since he persists in retaining the semantic and therefore
linguistic category "meaning" "obtuse" though it may be. Barthes re-
marks of "obtuse meaning" en passant that it "has something to do with
disguise," but he cannot mean tactically or strategically programmed
disguise, since he has already thrown intention out the window with
levels 1 and 2, and it has no place in level 3 either. Like Channel 4,
however, "obtuse meaning" eludes conscious detection as "the one 'too
many' the supplement that my intellection cannot succeed in absorb-
ing, at once persistent andfleeting,smooth and elusive" (p. 320). But
what is at stake in Channel 4 is not only "my intellection" in Barthes's
resolutely subjectivistic and narcissistic sense (Channel 1). The prop-
erly Nietzschean Channel 4 is also a problematic that is not only embod-
ied but collective. This is radically unlike Barthean "third meaning" in
that the latter does not "extend outside culture, knowledge, informa-
tion." Rather, "meaning" in Channel 4 strives to become all this. Nor
does "meaning" in Channel 4 belong so exclusively "to the family of
pun, buffoonery, useless expenditure" (p. 320). Channel 4 certainly can
take the form of "carnivalesque excess" but in ways that are ultimately g
deadly serious. In short, Barthes'sfinalallusion to Bataillean "expendi- jj
ture" needs to be rendered considerably more precise if it is to apply to w
Nietzsche's corps/e. 2
Althusser offers nothing if not precision. According to his theory of w
knowledge production, developed in the early 1960s, in terms of Gen- g
eralities, Generality I has to do with "concrete" facts. Like Channel 1, it g
"constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical practice will g
transform into specified 'concepts' that is, into that other 'concrete' w
generality (which I shall call Generality III) which is a knowledge."174 g
In the resulting system of "theoretical practice" (from which Althusser 3
later came to take critical distance), Generality II is theproblematzque d
which is "constituted by the corpus of concepts whose more or less %
169
contradictory unity constitutes the 'theory' of the science at the (histor-
ical) m o m e n t under consideration, the 'theory 5 that defines the field in .
which all the problems of the science must necessarily be posed." 175
Generalities II and III thus combine elements of Channels 2 and 3;
But—unlike Channel 2—Generality II is not a tool just lying around
for the use of an autonomous subject—though this is often precisely
how ideology makes it appear in the production of Generality III—but
rather a historically conditioned and conditioning structure function-
ing within and through the consciousness of more or less porous social
subjects. Analogously, Channel 2 — and the most powerful drift of Bar^
thes's "third meaning"—typically poses as "subjective" or "individual"
in ways that are in fact ideologically and economically determinate "in
the last instance." Yet Althusser—like t o o many other historical mate-
rialists, let alone materialist narcissists like Bardies — tends to deni-
grate the kind of intentional and surreptitious influence that Nietzsche's
Corps/e calls Channel 4 to ideological levels that are —in principle, if
not always in fact—discernible and disclosable to rational view. Once
again, the phenomenon of Nietzsche's corps/e requires grasping post-
Enlightenment mechanisms and illocutionary practices of domination
that are not reducible to rational illumination. In this matter, Althusser
effectively critiques elements of Barthes but not of Bataille, w h o will
take us closer to Nietzsche but not all the way.
Whatever name one gives them, three perennial "options" are en-
countered in dealing with any period of history, event, idea, author,
text, or artifactual remain. First, w e jack ourselves into the object of
study—go t o it, into it, merge with it, and perhaps—more or less
coincidentally—are changed by it. Channel 1 is that of the historian,
the historicist, the empiricist, the positivist, the enthusiast, the fan, the
bureaucrat, the hagiographer. Or, second, we jack the object into us—
letting the current of influence flow in the opposite direction. N o w we
bring the object to us, milking it, forcing or coaxing it to become one
«• with us more or less quickly, on what we imagine t o be "our own
g t e r m s " Channel 2 is reached through several different circuits (as is
£ Channel 1), and it doesn't really matter with what result: whether to
g the point of willful, more or less aggressive "misrecognition" or "mis-
S prision," where, for example, Nietzsche's name may remain, but trans-
g formed beyond "normal" recognition; or, alternatively, t o the point of
fc total absorption and "active forgetting," when Nietzsche's name be-
170
conies at most a "name-effect."176 In either case, however, Channel 2
is that of the "appropriation artist," the Bloomian "epigone"177 the
"original'* philosopher, the situationist or populist perhaps, and many
modes of more or less political Umjunktionierung or detournetnent. It is
also the moment when even the historicist scholar is pressed to be
"relevant," has to justify his or her interest in the historical past. For,
while all Channels may appear to be distinct analytically, empirically
they often coexist.
There's always some degree of static, of noise. The first two major
Channels— 1 and 2—tend to drift into, overlap, or override one an-
other, sometimes in confused or confusing ways. Feeble is any semiotic
theory, including Umberto Eco's in one of his moods, that sets out
to distinguish apodeictically between textual "interpretation"—as an
ideal reading situation posited as the proper relation between "model
author" and "model reader" or "textual strategy"—from more or less
inappropriate textual "use."178 Not only do historicists smuggle their
own ideological presuppositions and prejudices into their compar-
atively "objective" scholarship; but so also the more "subjectivist"
approach commonly depends, in unacknowledged ways, on tacit, a
priori historicist or positivist assumptions about what an author "really
meant" or what a historical period "really was" or "is."
So it is, then, that one seems logically to require a third, agnostic,
mediatory space—a Channel 3 somewhere in the no-man's-land be-
tween, above, or outside the other two. This is the Channel of inter-
pretation proper: that is, of hermeneutics ("the fusion of horizons");
of psychoanalytical transference ("working through" versus "acting g
out"—as if these terms were not mutually imbricated); of phenomeno- ^
logical or structuralist "reduction" (putting into brackets the question w
of the existence of the object of study); of liberal pluralism and of all £
bad Hegelian "mediation" or "dialectics" that seeks synthesis where w
there is or ought to be none. To offer a summation in good Hegelese, as g
glossed by Hyppolite: Channel 1 corresponds to "material thought bur- g
ied in content, actually egocentric, but unaware of its own involvement g
in the affair"; Channel 2 is "formal thought which builds up frameworks w
of relationship, for which the object reference becomes an unknowable £
nucleus and which must always seek its content outside"; and, finally, H
located in the Hegelian matrix between or beyond formal thought— S
rationalism—and material thought—empiricism—there is properly fc
171
"dialectical thought" or Channel 3: "the possibility of a style of narra-ll
tive in which the one who knows is himself involved in the thing t h a i |
is known" and vice versa.179 Note, however, that in the Hegelian sysllt
tern self/consciousness and exotericism are always privileged over and!
above the possibility of subliminal influence and esotericism. Including!
over what Hegel himself called "incorporation" And precisely fl&jpf
possibility—or actttal-virtuality—informs yet another channel beyondil
interpretation. This is Channel 4.
Today the maximally clear technical resolution—the highest pixel-1
plane —attainable in Channel 3 may seem to be not in philosophy^!!
literature, or literary theory but rather in terms, conceptually if not yet|!
actually, of cyberspace and virtual reality (VR). And hence the tran-1
sition to some unknown other Channel seems unnecessary. This ap-1
pearance is deceptive in three ways: philosophy, literature, and literary^
theory have always been powerful "technologies"; the hype about V R |
is overdetermined by exactly the same ideological hopes and fears that|
have accompanied the less technologically spectacular media; and in f
general one ought to be suspicious when one is told that a technology!
is definitive. Nonetheless, VR technologies are what teach many peo-
ple today an old truth that must be continually forgotten and then
remembered: namely, that "what we have made, makes us."180 Which is
also today "the postmodernist paradox": that is, "the perceiver literally
becomes the perceived" and vice versa. Takayuki Tatsumi gives the follow-
ing example regarding the relation between the cyberpunk novels of
William Gibson and Japan. "Gibson's Chiba City may have sprung
from his misperception of Japan, but it was this misperception that
encouraged Japanese readers to correcdy perceive the nature of post-
modernist Japan. In short, the moment we perceive cyberpunk stories
which misperceive Japan, we are already perceived correctly by cyber-
punk."181 "Nietzsche" can be substituted for "Gibson" in Tatsumi's
argument—and likely for "Tatsumi" himself—and "Nietzscheanism"
"5" for "Japan." And Nietzsche was well familiar with an earlier form of this
£* argument, developed by Schopenhauer, to the effect that when we
® transcend the strictures of the principle of sufficient reason (i.e., for
£ everything there is, there is a reason or ground why it is) "we no longer
8 consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, but
£ simply and solely the what. . . . [I]t is as though the object alone ex-
B isted without anyone to perceive it, and thus we are no longer able to
172
separate the perceiver from the perceived"182 To be sure, the allegedly
postmodern paradox collides with the objection that all the various
mechanisms of knowledge do not actually transform "the real object'*
but rather what Althusser calls "its perception into concepts and then
into a thought-concrete."183 Even in the post-Freudian system of La-
can, who influenced Althusser in this regard, the "Real" retains a cer-
tain excessive surplus status, however tenuous, just beyond the clutches
of either the "Symbolic" or the "Imaginary" Even cyberspace and VR
depend on remarkably traditional materials that must be mined or
manufactured (metal, plastic); even cybernauts are anchored in PR—
not just the hype of "public relations" but "Primary Reality." The cru-
cial point, however, is that in VR and its equivalents the appearance of
interaction with the Real is often precisely that—appearance only.
Thus, Channel 4 is (like) virtual reality up to a point. It, too, is a zone
interactive with but slighdy beyond either unmediated reality (viewed
in Channel 1), symbolized reality (Channel 2), or their interface (Chan-
nel 3). Yet, if it is beyond interpretation, Channel 4 still remains part of
Reality, one of its modes.
In this way, Nietzsche's corps/e under postmodern conditions is a
dominant form of "non/consensual hallucination" informing Channel
4, indeed in important respects is Channel 4. The paradox that to per-
ceive Neitzsche's corpse and corpus is to unwittingly become Nietzsche's
corps/e is a possibility worth taking literally. The "opposed" Channels
1 and 2 logically imply the existence of one another, and both are
the prerequisite for Channel 3 as their imagined "synthesis" In turn,
these three channels logically imply another channel beyond them—or £
rather, in Spinozist terms, one Channel of which all others are its at- g
tributes. Channel 4 stakes out certain claims to be this "Substance, w
God, or Nature." At its highest level of abstraction, Channel 4 is only 2
o
the hypothesis that a Channel exists beyond 1,2, and 3 — since these seem w
to cover all possible types of the production and consumption of infor- g
mation, communication, and meaning. Interpretation is like the He- ^
gelian system itself in that it dynamically enfolds even the most radical g
objections to itself into itself. By definition, Channel 4 cannot be fully w
defined in advance, since it involves levels of transmission beneath the £
threshold of consciousness, and hence beyond empirical—though not H
necessarily logical or hypothetical—"falsification" or "verification." d
In the premodem high-philosophical terms of Spinoza, as well as Z
173
David Cronenberg's postmodern, junk-cultural ones, the human body||
is modified or transformed by the very act of imaging an external body§tl
Spinoza argued in The Ethics that "The images of things are rnodifiealtf
tions of the human body''184 The idea of this modification — a crucial!
illustration of structural causality—involves the nature of one's owrilf
body as well as that of the external body "If . . . the nature of thelf
external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the idea we^f
form of the external body will involve a modification of our own bodyll
similar to the modification of the external body" (p. 148). This series of 1
reflections led Spinoza to his theory of compassion with others, indeed;!
with the multitude (multitudo). This move was a terrible anathema to §
Nietzsche. But in Spinozism the imaged and the imaging, natured ^
nature (natura naturata) and naturing nature {natura naturans), be-1
come alternating descriptions of the same process. And this hypothesis |
provides something like the formal "logic" or "ethic" of Nietzschean; t
Channel 4, even as Nietzsche's ideology is pitted against Spinoza's to the •%
death.
There exists only the constitutive process, for Spinoza, and no third, ;
neutral, stable, "hermeneutic," or "dialectical" site on which to stand
and cast light on it, nor any presumption to see or produce a politically ;
neutral dialectical synthesis. As put long after Spinoza by the idealist
philosopher Rente, though with different ideological valence, absolute
self-consciousness is "a power into which an eye is implanted." The
Nietzschean "I/eye" is thus always already "in-oculated" in larger con-
ceptual and social matrixes.185 Fichte's insight is also available in one of
the most popular forms of mass culture—detective fiction's "private
eye." In its most self-reflexive moments, as in the work of Paul Auster,
the postmodern detective/narrator notes that the term "private eye"
has three simultaneous meanings: "the letter 'i,' standing for 'investi-
gator'"; " T in the upper case, the tiny life-bud in the body of the
breathing self"; and "the physical eye of the writer, the eye of the man
who looks out from himself into the world and demands that the world
g reveal itself to him."186 And of course this same "eye/i/I" — Fichte's as
well as Auster's—is also "private" in the economic sense. Not only is it
part of the matrix of private property} but it is such without ever ade-
% quately seeing this fact. One of the most succinct definitions of "specia-
ls de" that of Guy Debord, is "capital accumulated until it becomes im-
fc age. "187 Precisely this insight is seldom available in any Channel, and
174
never for long. But the point for now is that, in terms of grasping how
^ietzsche/anism works, premodern Spinozism and postmodern cy-
berpunk suggest that a perennial possibility of "channeling" exists,
one relatively independent theoretically from empirical and histori-
cal contingencies yet informing them. And this Channel is beyond
interpretation.
And, though "death is not named" as such under these conditions, "it is
written in the discourse of life," of everyday life.239 It is here that Nietz-
sche's corps/e, his version of the king's two bodies, would reign su-
preme, all over the world. Which is not to say that Nietzsche's corps/e
is already victorious, only that it always strives to be.
This includes all Channels, all Worlds: "First," 'Third," and "Second"
in between. Writing of his hope for a resurgence of real communism,
Negri claims that "what has happened in the East is not foreign to us:
indeed we might say, 'de te fabula narratur.' For in the countries where
capitalism reigns idiotic and triumphant, corrupt and incapable of self-
criticism, arrogant and confused, here as well the subject who con-
stantly proposes to revolt is the same: the new productive subject,
intellectual and abstract, students, scientists, workers linked to ad-
vanced technologies, university workers, etc" 240 With the phrase de te
fabula narratur, Negri alludes to Marx's preface to the first German
edition of volume i of Capital: "If. . the German reader shrugs his
shoulders at the condition of the English industrial and agricultural
laborers, or in optimist fashion comforts himself with the thought that £
l
in Germany things are not nearly so bad, I must plainly tell him, de te ^
fabula narratur!' [ it's about you that the story's being told! ] " 241 From w
the perspective of Nietzsche's corps/e, however, the problem is that 2
Marx, in turn, was alluding to Horace (Sat. 1:12) and thus to a major w
194
3 Nietzsche's Esoteric
Semiotics
Nietzsche
Written over with the signs of the past, and even these signs
painted over with new signs: thus have you concealed yourselves
well from all semioticians!1
But simulacra are not only a game played with signs; they imply
social rapports and social power.2
Exoteric-Esoteric
These Good Europeans that we are: What distinguishes usfromthe Men of the
Fatherland? First, we are atheists and immoralists, but for the time being
[zunachst] we support the religions and morals of the herd instinct: for these
prepare a type of human that must one day fall into our hands, that must
desire our hands. Beyond Good and Evil, but we demand the unconditional
maintenance of the herd morality. We hold in reserve many types of philoso-
phy that need to be taught: Under some conditions the pessimistic type, as
hammer; a European Buddhism might perhaps be indispensable. We proba-
bly support the development and maturing of democratic institutions: They
enhance weakness of the will: We see in "Socialism" a goad that in the face of
comfort Position toward nations or peoples [Volkern]. Our prefer-
ences; we pay attention to the results of interbreeding. . . . By possessing a
disciplina voluntatis, we are in advance of our fellow men. All strength applied
to the development ofwill power, an art that allows us to wear masks, an art of
understanding beyond affects (also to think a "supra-European" manner on
occasion).120
After Derrida
This dismembered, fragmented body and body politic, with its modern
division of labor, was familiar to Rousseau, Schiller, Hegel, and Hol-
derlin. But it was Holderlin's epistolary novel Hyperion (1799) that
served as Nietzsche's most proximate source. In Hyperion's penulti-
mate letter to hisfriendBellarmin (the "good German") he writes: "It
is a hard word, and yet I say it anyway, because it is the truth. I can
imagine to myself no people that is more fragmented [zerrifiner] than
the German. You see manual laborers, but no human beings, thinkers,
but no human beings —Is it not a battle field [wie ein Schlachtfeld],
where hands and arms and all manner of limbs [Glieder] lie dismem-
bered [zerstuckelt] and under one another, while the shed blood of life
trickles away into the sand ?"1S0 The German socialist Arnold Ruge read
this passage in 1843 a n d was deeply moved. Lamenting what he per-
ceived to be the continuing, total absence of any sign of revolutionary
ferment among the Germans, their dominant mood one of servility and
submission to despotism still a half century after Holderlin, he copied
out the text and sent it to his friend Karl Marx. Marx was not entirely
impressed, calling it and Ruge's accompanying letter a "fine elegy, a
funeral song that sucks the breath away," but adding that for the pur-
's? poses at hand "there is absolutely nothing political about it."151 The
^ times were indeed problematic: 1843 was three years after Friedrich
" WUhelm IV had ascended the throne of Prussia and a year before his
2 namesake Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche would be born. But the com-
« munist Marx was intent to find signs of revolution where the socialist
^ Ruge could not. As he had written Ruge just two months earlier, there
B were manyfissuresin Friedrich WUhelm's "comedy of despotism" and
252 "ship of fools."152 Various stripes of European socialists, democrats,
and fascists have been less critically disposed to Holderlin's famous
image of fragmentation, absorbing it as gospel and as irrevocable fact.
The same passage made an even more powerful impression on Nietz-
sche. Like Marx, however, he was more concerned to do something
about the fragmentation, undertaking to "rewrite it politically," albeit
for his own purposes. These purposes Marx would have grasped and
combated in a way that leftists under Nietzsche's sway apparently can-
not.
Nietzsche incorporated Hyperion's diatribe against modernity at an
axial moment near the end of the second part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
in Zarathustra's speech "On Deliverance" ("Von der Erlosung"). This
text was to be crucial also to Heidegger as the central exhibit in his
deconstruction of "revenge" {Roche) in Nietzsche.153 Derrida men-
tions neither Holderlin nor Heidegger in this context; rather, Nietz-
sche's text allows him to weave his thread through an intricate laby-
rinth with at least three major parts: (i) the theme and structure of
philosophic and linguistic fragmentation; (2) the active-passive du-
plicity concealed in the pedagogy of listening suggested by the image of
the ear, actually one of several severed organs mentioned by Zarathus-
tra; and (3) the question of whether the name of the text's author,
''Nietzsche" understood biographicaUy or autobiographically, is re-
sponsible for his "teachings" and its often terrific and horrific conse-
quences. But before reading Derrida, if possible, read Nietzsche.
This passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra is cited at length less t o high-
light the degree of interface with Holderlin's Hyperion than t o con-
textualize Nietzsche's appropriation of it in order t o grasp its connec-
tion to what Zarathustra means by "deliverance." W h a t Nietzsche does
in terms of political ideology is t o deflect Holderlirfs "Swabian Jac-
obin" sentiments toward a cosmopolitan Right, transforming them
PH
g in the process for posterity. Nietzsche t h o u g h t a great deal of his o w n
^ text, reciting from it in Ecce Homo in an aura of mystery. 155 Yet at the
g same time, the passage remains remarkably concrete. Its uncanniness is
w partly due to Nietzsche's reference t o specific limbs of the b o d y — n o t
£ only the monstrous ear, b u t also the "mouth-piece": that is, the fore-
fc grounding of the m e d i u m t h r o u g h which messages, including " O n
254 Deliverance" are delivered.
Metonymies tend willy-nilly to convey a certain "realism-" or
"reality-effect" in relation to metaphoric uses of language.156 And meta-
phors and metonymies, Nietzsche noted in private, are the twin pha-
lanxes of "syntax" (a Greek root of which is "to draw up an army for
battle") —his "mobile army of metaphors and metonymies."157 This
was how Nietzsche had secretly defined the warfare of "truth and lie
in the extramoral sense" He referred to this key principle, originally
minted in 1873, only once in public: over ten years later and then
merely in passing as "an essay I have kept secret" 158 Thus he alerted a
few readers to the existence of a text about which he would say nothing
more to others. The consequences of such illocutionary warfare are
potentially exceptionally "cruel" whenever the need arises, as can be
seen reading not even between the lines another passage about "ears"
later in Thus Spoke Zamthustra:
B some level with other people's intentions is to suggest that one's own
260
are equally nonexistent or irrelevant. When it comes time for Derrick
to ask what he regards as the "political" question — "Has the 'great5
Nietzschean politics misfired or is it, rather, still to come in the wake of
a seismic convulsion of which National Socialism or fascism will turn
out to have been mere episodes?" (p. 31/99) —it is terribly unclear
whether Derrida's text "itself" (or he "himself"—if "he" still mean-
ingfully exists in this textual world) can exist without some assumptions
about what Nietzsche "wanted" "Nietzschean politics" to be, and how
it might operate "without knowing."
In the end, Derrida's textual-political rewriting fluctuates not be-
tween the three main channels of interpretation but between two sim-
ple antinomies: either gestures of anarchism incorporating Nietzsche's
Thus Spoke Zarathustra—"The State: here we have the main defendant
indicted in this trial" (p. 33/104)— or z duly helpless indecisionism
that is totally un-Nietzschean—"We are not, I believe, bound to de-
cide" (p. 32/101). With this last, defeatist remark,"we" are transfixed
before a sadomasochistic "choice": either terrorism — ultraleftist or
ultrarightist—or reflux from the Left into right-wing yuppiedom. As a
glance at how Nietzsche conceived the exoteric-esoteric distinction
reveals, in the Nietzschean world "we" are not supposed to "decide"
anything that really matters: namely, the breaking of humanity in half.
Derrida suggests that there can and will "always" be "a Nietzschean-
ism of the right and a Nietzscheanism of the left" (p. 32/102), but
apparently without our being able even to ask whether this "unde-
cidability" might have been preprogrammed in Nietzsche's own texts for
some more specific "political" reason, Derrida himself is not unin-
terested in this question, he just doesn't follow through in the case
of Nietzsche. Writing about one of Nietzsche's more protofascist-
sounding remarks, Derrida insists that he does "not aim to 'clear5 its
'author5 and neutralize or defuse either what might be troublesome
in it for democratic pedagogy or 'leftist' politics, or what served as
'language' for the most sinister rallying cries of National Socialism" £
o
(p. 23/81). But neutralization or defusing is exactly what Derrida H
helps accomplish, in spite of his attempt to elaborate: "On the contrary, 2
the greatest indecency is derigeurin this place. One may even wonder «
why it is not enough to say: 'Nietzsche did not think that,' 'he did not ^
want that5 or 'he would have surely vomited this,5 that there is falsifica- H
tion of the legacy and an interpretive mystification going on here. One <»
261
may wonder how and why what is so naively called a falsification was
possible (one can't falsify just anything), how and why the 'same-
words and the 'same' statements — if they are indeed the same—might
several times be made to serve certain meanings and certain contexts
that are said to be different, even incompatible. One may wonder why
the only teaching institutions or the only beginning of a teaching in-
stitution that ever succeeded in taking as its model the teaching of
Nietzsche on teaching will have been a Nazi one" (pp. 23-24/81-82).
Derrida even asserts: "There is nothing absolutely contingent about
the fact that the only political regimen to have effectively brandished his
name as a major and official banner was Nazi" (p. 31/98). All this may
seem to be close to an argument of Nietzsche's Corpsje, but it is not.
In his political rereadings of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's relation-
ships to national socialism, Derrida does what many lesser philoso-
phers and literary critics do, mentioning or using the work of no social
historian of the period, even though his analyses depend on many
historical presuppositions (Channel 1), some of which are not only
problematic but downright false. Pace Derrida, it was not the Nazis
but Italian fascists who most openly and unproblematically embraced
Nietzsche as their own. In fact, a quite large range of opinions about
Nietzsche was not only allowed but actively encouraged throughout
the Third Reich. Indeed, "Nietzsche" was one of a very small number
of topics about which one could "agree to disagree" publicly, in lectures
and in print. In this sense, "Nietzsche" was precisely how Nazi hege-
mony worked, but not because his name was "brandished" only in a
positive, affirmative manner. Rival Nazi Party members from Alfred
Baeumler to Alfred Rosenberg to Martin Heidegger openly and vig-
orously contested the right to represent Nietzsche. And other Nazis
debated not merely how but whether his thought was proto- or indeed
fully Nazi. Indeed, many thought it was &»ri-Nazi, and said so freely.169
By inflating Nietzsche's alleged use and/or abuse by German national
"S? socialism, and by suggesting that it is not wholly wrong to conflate the
* two, Derrida renders it impossible to grasp the complexity of Nietz-
^ sche's actual influence on Nazism and fascism and the complexity of
£ liberal democratic complicity with fascism of all types — which is what Der-
£ rida also thinks that he is interrogating in Otobiographies. His view
g of Heidegger's relationship to national socialism is —or rather has be-
E come —comparatively complex. Here Derrida recognizes very clearly
262
that national socialism was an exceedingly heterogeneous phenome-
non and that we can never assume that we are free from what he rightly
calls "Nazisms" (in the plural), that we can yet presume to "think"
them, even with Heidegger's more or less unwitting aid.170 Derrida's
view of the problem of Nietzsche and Nazisms is not correspondingly
complex and lucid. At times appearing to take seriously the question
of Nietzsche's intentions and responsibility—or rather what Derrida
rightly calls, though only in scare quotes, Nietzsche's "'programming
machine'" (machineprogramtnatrice) —he ends up by dismissing the
problems of intentionality and responsibility as basically irrevelant to
the task he insists is "not only decipherment but also transformation —
that is, a practical rewriting according to a theory-practice relationship
which, if possible, would no longer be part of the program" (p. 30/
pp. 95-96). Derrida's project of political rewriting may be all well and
good for some purposes, but carrying it off in the case of Nietzsche
requires paying much closer attention to what Nietzsche's "program-
ming machine" is esoterically, not just exoterically.
Derrida and his readers have not worked through Nietzsche herme-
neutically or antihermeneutically and so continually act him out as
corps/e. And this holds just as true for the otherwise very different and
rival poststructuralism of Foucault, to whom Nietzschean new history
and cultural studies appeal. Foucault was at least as hostile to mere
"interpretation" as is Derrida—though less interested in advancing a
new kind of philosophical close reading—and also passed too quickly
from concern about what Nietzsche meant in order to try to make use of
him, as if these two channels were totally incommensurate. In Fou-
cault's own words in 1975:
Foucault, too, was very happy with Channel 2, very happy to be Nietz-
schoid corps/e.
For Derrida, the philosophers proper relationship to others is in-
scribed by incorporation, death, and mourning—a problematic that,
he says, "has only a limited affinity with that of Heidegger."172 None-
theless, this problematic is properly Nietzschean albeit, in Derrida's
case, appears to be so in unwitting ways. Derrida defines "mourning as
the attempt, always doomed to fail (thus a constitutive failure, pre-
cisely), to incorporate, interiorize, introject, subjectivize the other in
me. Even before the death of the other, the inscription in me of her or
his mortality constitutes me. I mourn therefore I am, I am — dead with
the death of the other, my relation to myself is first of all plunged into
mourning, a mourning that is moreover impossible. This is also what I
call ex-appropriation, appropriation caught in a double bind: I must
and I must not take the other into myself; mourning is an unfaithful
fidelity if it succeeds in interiorizing the other ideally in me, that is, in
not respecting his or her infinite exteriority" (p. 321). The problem is
that Derrida's suitably complex ethic of ex-appropriative consumption
was radically betrayed in advance by Nietzsche, who proleptically pro-
grammed his corpus to handicap, manipulate, and incorporate a duped
corps, disrespecting any truly independent integrity it might otherwise
possess.
"Political rewriting" or "utilization" of Nietzsche has meant re/ en-
acting part of his own program. Paying "tribute" is always risky busi-
ness. The "aporia" reached with poststructuralism recalls Bataille's
^ Channel 3 and the likelihood that no program between Channels 1 and
£ 3 is ever going to be radical enough to get after or beyond Nietzsche—
^ or even to see or hear him except in programmed ways. This is a question
g of responsibility—not so much Derrida's or Foucaulfs responsibility—
» that's their affair and that of their often unwished-for oto-acolytes—
£ but rather Nietzsche's responsibility and that of the rest of us. To get after
2 Nietzsche means being after poststructuralism, at least as it has been
264
incorporated as the corps/e. In other terms, poststructuralism has
hardly arrived at a vantage point where it might say: "Nietzsche may be
the master key and its affirmation, but we're not turning him either"173
After Klossowski
Nietzsche Again
w
o
In On the Genealogy of'Morals:APolemic (i$87) —afterBeyondGood and H
Evil the second of his two major "retrospective prefaces" to Thus Spoke 2
Zarathustra —Nietzsche spoke explicitly of "signs" to anticipate not g
only Klossowski's "pulsatile semiotic" but the "ghost semiotic" in- £
o
forming the consensual hallucination of postcontemporary cyberspace. H
Nietzsche generated his semiotic argument not out of a purely theoreti- »
275
cal fascination, but out of his pragmatic "genealogical" analysis—in the
exact center of his book: part 2, aphorism 12—of what he called "the
cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility."204 On the Geneal-
ogy of Morals has been dubbed "the Bible of the neostructuralist theory
of power,"205 and whether or not they allude to this aphorism explicidy,
its argument undergirds the thought of Nietzscheans of nearly all ideo-
logical persuasions. Aphorism 2:12 is worth citing at length especially
because it can be used to produce a properly Nietzschean account of the
lethal embodiment of Nietzsche's corps/e—not least in contemporary
technoculture. Large chunks of this oft-cited text will be given first, but
with its seldom-cited last sentence withheld for a moment.
Nietzsche begins:
The cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employ-
ment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart. Whatever exists,
having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new
ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it;
all events . . . are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and
becoming master involves afreshinterpretation, an adaptation by which any
previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured, even obliter-
ated. No matter how well one has understood the utility of any physiological
organ (or legal institution, social custom, political usage, form in art or
religious cult [or, one might interpolate, in a philosophy]), this means
nothing regarding its origins. . . Yet purposes and utilities are themselves
only signs [Anzeichen] that a Will to Power has become master of some-
thing less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function; and the
entire history of a "thing" and organ as custom can in this way be a contin-
uous sign-chain [Zeicben-Kette] of ever new interpretations and adaptations
the causes of which do not even have to be related to one another but, on the
contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with one another in purely
chance fashion. The "evolution" of a thing, custom, organ is therefore by no
»" means itsprogressus toward a goal, even less a [o&calprqfjressw by the shortest
^ route and with the smallest expenditure offeree—but rather a succession of
^ more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of
S subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transforma-
05 tion for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of successful
£q counteractions. The form is fluid, but the "meaning" even more so. (KGW
fc 6/2:329-331)
276
In our current postmodernist climate, all this sounds familiar, even
natural. In addition to Benjaminian, Foucauldian, Deleuzian, Bau-
drillardian, new historical, and cultural studies types of argument, it
sounds like a pretext for one or more of the following: cohabitation
wixh"differance" (Derrida),"thedifferend" (Lyotard), and "unlimited
semiosis" (Eco); or, alternatively, open season on "master narratives"
(Lyotard), "performative felicity" (Austin), and "restricted fusion
of horizons" (Gadamer). But what stands out in Nietzsche's influen-
tial argument is not only its apparent extremism but its equally ex-
treme reluctance to specify exactly what is meant by terms such as "su-
perior power"—which always lurk about, more or less visibly, in the
background.
In Nietzsche's expressed exoteric view, the origin and the use—think
also of him and his reception — are said to be "worlds apart"; use means
"nothing" vis-a-vis origins; "purpose and utilities are themselves only
signs"; the apparent development of "all" conceivable phenomena
through their Kentire history"—from biological organs equally up
through individual subjectivities all the way to social institutions — is
"by no means" to be understood teleologically, and certainly not as
"progress"; new interpretations are never necessarily related to their
originary objects, authors, or historical moments — randomly and ro-
bustly alternating as they do among themselves "in a purely chance
fashion " governed only by an abstract (not to say metaphysically hypo-
statized) "Will to Power." Now, all this too sounds familiar to "us" —
not merely as specifically "Nietzschean" but as the more or less ho-
mogenized fare peddled as common sense at intellectual and pop-cult
marketplaces, where Nietzsche appears as a founding father in a world
supposedly absent of fathers. What is too typically ignored in the post-
modernist mind-set, however, is any specific interest and profit Nietz-
sche might have chosen to draw from his argument. And this interest
and profit have only exoterically to do with the much ballyhooed "per-
spectivism" "relativism" "pluralism" "aestheticism" or "Dionysiac g
play," all of which—lo and behold! — are always already "inscribed" or H
"figured" in Nietzsche's texts. For Nietzsche's part, however, as Za- 2
rathustra is forever fond of putting it, the fundamental question is g
"Wozu? [So what? To what end? 1" 5
o
The postmetaphysical—more or less Heideggerian—response to H
such passages focuses on its perspectivism, which is held to be a good e»
277
thing, t h o u g h unfortunately contaminated occasionally in Nietzsche
by residues of metaphysical g r o u n d i n g as in Will to Power, which is
held t o be bad. Lyotard's position in The Inhuman (1988) is symptom-
atic of this dominant reading and could easily be about aphorism 2:12.
T h e political stakes for Lyotard are high, for he begins The Inhuman
by saying that Nietzsche was "taken hostage by fascist mythology"
(p. 1) — a formulation that begs several embarrassing questions. W i t h
all t h e respect otherwise due Lyotard, this particular framework is p o -
litically naive and philosophical nonsense—at least it is in terms of
w h a t Nietzsche intended and if intention still matters. If Channel 1 is
wholly irrelevant, then we are of course "free" in Channel 2 t o appro-
priate Nietzsche as a perhaps misguided but basically well-meaning an-
"5" archist or libertarian or perspectivist or whatever else we may " c h o o s e "
* T h e question t o ask is whether we might ask why it might have been
° that Nietzsche would have "succumbed" t o such an elemental "mis-
JJ take" or "fault" And is n o t Nietzsche's "perspectivism" simply an epis-
« temological name or sign for Will t o Power? W h o is really "taken
£ hostage"? Could n o t Nietzsche's "mistakes" or "faults" be willed strat-
Z egies or tactics that are often—wittingly o r unwittingly—obfuscated
278 by Nietzsche/anism?
Althusser's terse characterization in 'The Transformation of Philoso-
phy" (1976) of contemporary Nietzscheanism's account of the history
of philosophy "in terms of the will to power . . somewhat in Nietz-
sche's manner" remains apt. 207 "At a given moment," Althusser para-
phrases Nietzsche, "there existed men motivated by ressentiment who,
wounded by the world, set about dominating it through thought—in
short, making themselves masters of the world, conceiving it exclu-
sively through their own thought. The philosophers were precisely
these specialists in the violence of the concept, oiBegrijf, of appropria-
tion, who asserted their power by subjecting to the law of Truth all the
social practices of men, who became sadder and sadder and lived on in
the night" (pp. 250-251). Althusser is precisely critical, if only by
implication, of Nietzsche/anism. He continues: "We know that such a
perspective is not foreign to some of our contemporaries who, natu-
rally enough, discover in philosophy the archetype of power, the model
of all power. They themselves write the equation knowledge = power
and, in the style of modern and cultivated anarchists, affirm: violence,
tyranny, state despotism are Plato's fault—just as they used to say a
while back that the Revolution was Rousseau's fault. The best way to
respond to them is to go further than they do and introduce the scan-
dalous fracture of practice into the very heart of philosophy. This is
where Marx's influence is perhaps most profoundly felt" (p. 251). The
more restricted task here is to combat Nietzsche/anism's doctrine or
sign of Will to Power by introducing into its heart the "scandalous
fracture" between the practice of Nietzscheanism and Nietzsche's own
iUocutionary practice.
Here, in any case, is the commonly withheld continuation, the
punch line, of aphorism 2:12 of On the Genealogy of Morals, the final
ellipsis being Nietzsche's:
Postscript.
His career has been an extraordinary one. He is a man of good birth and
excellent education. , . He won a . . . Chair at one of our smaller univer-
sities and had, to all appearance, a most brilliant career before him. B u t . . . a
criminal strain ran in his blood, which, instead of being modified, was in-
creased and rendered infinitely more dangerous by his extraordinary powers.
Dark rumours gathered around him in the University town, and eventually
he was compelled to resigu his Chair and to . . . set up as an Army coach. So
much is known to the world, but what I am telling you now is what I have
myself discovered. . . . For years past I have continually been conscious of
some power behind the malefactor, some deep organizing power which
forever stands in the way of the law, and which throws its shield over the
wrong doer. . . . He is the Napoleon of Crime. . He is the organizer of
half that is evil and of nearly all that is undetected in this great city. He is a
genius, a philosopher. . . He has a brain of thefirstorder. He sits motion-
less, like a spider in the centre of its web, but that web has a thousand
radiations, and he knows well every quiver of each one of them. He does
little himself. He only plans. But his agents are numerous and splendidly
organized. . . . The agent may be caught. . . . But the central power which
uses the agent is never caught—never so much as suspected. . . . , the Pro-
fessor was fenced round with safeguards so cunningly devised t h a t . . . it
seemed impossible to get evidence which would convict. . . . I had at last
met an antagonist who was my intellectual equal.22*
And equals in Nietzsche's corps/e are his actually and virtually indis-
«• tinguishable victims.
%
o
o
This last voice drifts over from the Interzone where "Nothing is true,
everything is permitted"—the epigraph of David Cronenberg*s film
about William S. Burroughs. This slogan is a basic ethical or ethno-
logical problematic of Cronenberg's oeuvre and that of Burroughs,
especially the latter^ trilogy Cities of the Red Night (1981), The Place
ofDeadRoads (1983), and The Western Lands (1987). "Nothing is true,
everything is permitted" has been "the first line in the canon of the
secret tradition, a nihilist catchphrase, an entry into negation, a uto-
pianism, a shibboleth."230 It sounds quintessentially "Nietzschean,"
though Burroughs happens to turn not to Nietzsche but to premodern
Near Eastern thought—as did Nietzsche. The slogan is attributed to
Hassan i Sabbah II, Old Man of the Mountain, the twelfth-century
leader of the cult of Ismailians in what is now Iran—also the home
of Zoroaster-Zarathustra. Hassan i Sabbah's assassins are said by Bur-
roughs to have killed "at a distance" by means of what he calls "or-
ganic communication" because, unlike telepathy, "the whole organism
is involved."231 This is related to what Cronenberg means by "scan-
ning." In Scanners (1981), telepathy is not mind reading. Rather, it is
the direct Unking of two nerve systems separated by space; what it links
are not only brains to hearts but brains and hearts to computer ma-
trixes, with potentially murderous intent. This is no Cartesian, meta-
physical, or binary interpersonal world but deformed neo-Spinozist «
monism, in which a representative dialogue between two biologically H
related but mortal enemies is: "Tin one of you.' 'You're one of me?' M
<Yes.'"232 g
"Organic communication" and "scanning" are precise ways of de- §
scribing what Nietzsche had in mind with his illocutionary warfare — H
which, following Spinoza, he thought of as actio in distans. Guy De- «
bord refers in his 1978 film In girum—his history of the Situationist 289
International—to the slogan "Nothing is true, everything is permit-
ted" as coming from Hassan i Sabbah IFs gnostic disciple, Rashid
al-Din Sinan, another Old Man of the Mountain and leader of the As-
sassins, the millenarian terrorists of the Levant.233 According to De-
bord, Rashid al-Din Sinan "surrendered only in his final hour, it is
said, and then only to the most faithful of his fanatical followers" —
clearly afigurefor Debord himself. Burroughs's basicpolitical problem-
atic, also derived from Hassan i Sabbah, is that "paradise actually exists
and that it can be reached. "234 Whereas for Burroughs—alongside Cro-
nenberg and Debord—this notion can entail a project of radical de-
mocracy, for Nietzsche it entails an equally radical elitism. For his part,
Nietzsche preferred to frame the slogan "Nothing is true, everything
is permitted" in scare quotes: "*Nichts ist wahr: Alles ist erlaubt"';
for him this was just one of the many "prejudices of the age."235 In
other words, it was a hypothesis — something to make use of, whether
it was true or not, for his own mode of communication, scanning,
assassination.
In Stuart Gordon's film Re-Animator (1985), a scientist develops a
serum that can revitalize animal and human victims after he has killed
them. Their personalities are altered in the process, rendering his re-
vived corps of corpses violent. By contrast, Nietzsche's process of re-
animation was hardly so crude; his corps is not necessarily violent in
appearance, only in effect.
The esoterrorist process of weeding out for Nietzsche is embedded
in a characteristically complex matrix of ideas and illocutionary experi-
ments to implement them. This matrix includes calculations and preju-
dices involving the necessity for a social formation ultimately based on
male domination, on various types of "breeding," and on a political
economy of slavery and its modern equivalents. Thus, the people who
had to be "weeded out" included potential mothers and all forces in
opposition to slavery. Nietzsche's affirmation of euthanasia, paradox-
ical for a "life philosopher," was not illogical in his terms. Rather,
Pi
^ it emerged out of hard-headed historical and scientific calculations:
" including about the social as well as cultural drift of the late nine-
£ teenth century, its political economy and differences between men and
w women, his self-described "Jesuitical" ideas and writing at this par-
g ticular historical conjuncture, and his teaching of Eternal Recurrence
B of the Same with regard to its transformative social function. Here
290
special philological techniques are required to grasp Nietzsche's pro-
cess of weeding out.
There are some who think that the female contributes semen during coition
because women sometimes derive pleasurefromit comparable to that of the
male and also produce a fluid secretion. This fluid, however, is not semi-
nal; . . . the female, in fact, is female on account of an inability of a sort, viz.,
it lacks the power to concoct semen out of thefinalstate of the nourishment
(this is either blood, or its counterpart in bloodless animals) because of the
coldness of its nature. . . No, what happens is what one would expect to
happen. The male provides the "form" and the "principle of the movement,"
"5" the female provides the body, in other words the material. . . Thus, if the
^ male is the active partner, the one which originates the movement, and the
w female qua female is the passive one, surely what the female contributes to
2 the semen of the male will not be semen but material. And this is in fact what
oo happens; for the natural substance of the menstrual fluid is to be classed as
^ "prime matter." Taking, then, the widest formulation of each of these two
£ opposites, viz., regarding the male qua active and causing movement, and
302
the female qua passive and being set in movement, we see that the one thing
which is formed is formedfromthem only in the sense in which a bedstead is
formed from the carpenter and the wood, or a ball from the wax and the
form.279
Millennia later, Nietzsche had not progressed one wit beyond this self-
legitimating male fantasy. This was not exactly what Heidegger had in
mind when he used to tell his students that they really ought to have
studied Aristode for years before even beginning to read Nietzsche, let
alone grasping Will to Power. Nonetheless, Nietzsche's "Aristotelian"
misogyny, as complex and self-deconstructive as it may be in some re-
spects, remains at the root of his thinking.
For Nietzsche, misogyny made perfect sense in one crucial respect at
least. His writing—not his actual penis lampooned by Wagner—was
his phallus, his sexuality, his dissemination, his proleptic-prophetic
procreation, his perlocutionary desire and capacity to incorporate every-
thing, including everyday life. Understood in this context, Derrida's
articulation of the stylus of Nietzsche's writing with the phallus, with
style, and with the spur/spoor/spore of the trace turns out to be on the
mark. Above all else, however, writing was Nietzsche's way of making
war—"father of all things." Marie Hecht, the earliest known feminist
critic of attempts to incorporate Nietzsche into feminism, was also near
the mark when she wrote already in 1888-1889: "In truth, Nietzsche-
anism in the world of women means giving up the demands of'radical
egalitarians.' For it reinforces yet again the biological role and, in trans-
figured form, reasserts male domination."280 But it is the illocutionary
complexity of this transfiguration that must be attacked more than the
mere theme. Recall also that Nietzsche's view of the Self and his own
"center" gives no support to celebrations of "the decentered subject"
and its relatives. Rather, it was in his interest to keep the possibilities of
the self-mastering and mastering male subject radically open, thus to
make use of it as needed. »
o
Nietzsche's acknowledgment in "The Greek State" about the neces- H
sity of esotericism for social cohesion and male genius remained his «
most enduring line of march, as well as his most explicit attempt to g
come to terms with the "inevitability" of slavery, to put it to work in 5
combat against "socialism." The nexus of phallocentric thoughts here H
are as close as it may be possible to get to Nietzsche's rigid designator v>
303
in the Kripkean sense—so rigid, in fact, that it is difficult to imagine
how any moral scruple, including about matters of life and death, could
get in its way. So enduring is this conceptual nexus that it is misleading
to speak of anything like an "epistemological break" in Nietzsche's
work, or of its clear periodization. To the extent that scientific thought
requires the possibility of breaks, paradigm shifts, and self-reversals,
Nietzsche cannot be lumped together with Freud or Marx. According
to a time-honored tradition, however, Nietzsche's ceuvre is divided up
into three more or less distinct, more or less related periods, each
having its "transition" texts: (i) an "early" period, including The Birth
of Tragedy and the Untimely Meditations, when the budding classicist
comes under the influence of Wagner and Schopenhauer and is active
in German cultural politics; (2) a "middle" period of withdrawal,
when he leaves academia for good, reacts against his prior intellectual
formation, and enters into a more "positivistic" "critical" and even
quasi-"democratic" phase, particularly in Human, All-Too-Human; and
(3) a "late" "mature," "axial," or "creative" period, beginning with the
last section of The Gay Science and continuing in Thus Spoke Zarathustra
to the end in Turin. To be sure, this periodization is Nietzsche's own,
. and therefore suspect. For example, Zarathustra speaks of three basic
phases or "transformations" of spiritual activity—"the camel" (beast of
burden), "the lion" (beast of prey and revolt), and "the child" (playful
creator) —and this quasi-Hegelian sequence is taken literally to apply
to Nietzsche's "transformations" as well.
The external historical and ad hominem or psychological explana-
tions for the supposedly distinct periods of Nietzsche's thought—in
addition to its internal logic and pragmatic impetus — can be located in
his relationship to his contemporaries, the specter of the Paris Com-
mune after the defeat of France, the collapse of Nietzsche's career as a
university professor, the re/unification and rapid industrialization and
"socialization" of Germany under Prussian hegemony, and so forth.
«• Ultimately, a full historical and sociological contextualization of Nietz-
g sche's drift into esotericism would have to include his complex re-
^ sponse to all the world events of which he was aware from his vantage
g point on the Swiss and Italian periphery of Germany, including events
$ that affected him indirecdy as his "geopolitical aesthetic." Nor are his
£ sexuality and fluctuating, but increasingly miserable, health wholly ir-
Z relevant. But such external and internal "contextualization" in the end
304
provides little more than yet another description of the overdetermined
causes of Nietzsche's esotericism, and does not get after its philosophi-
cal and illocutionary taproot—which is what continues to feed his
posthumous corps/e.
Particularly crucial in this regard remains Nietzsche's "break" with
Wagner—germs of which were present, however, even in The Birth of
Tragedy and the UnUmely Meditation on "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth"
(1876). This "break" eventually became irreversible: either by May
1877 in Sorrent, after what was to be his last personal encounter with
Wagner, or by the end of that year, when he could have learned that
Wagner was describing him behind his back as, among other things, an
"onanist" and a "pederast." True or not, this assertion drove Nietzsche
deeper into seclusion of all kinds, rhetorical as well as existential. By
then it had also become dear to him that he could never return to
teaching at a university due to the severity of his various—physio-
logical primarily but also psychosomatic and psychological—ailments,
which forced him to resign his post at Basel in May 1879. Henceforth,
having lost any institutional base for his own cultural-political interven-
tions, he was forced to come up with ever newer iUomtionary models to
incorporate readers no longer in the present but in the future—models
post-Wagnerian in inspiration and elitist in ideological formation. Fi-
nally, the largely—though not entirely—indifferent response by his
contemporaries to his writings, particularly to Thus Spoke Zamthustm,
further led Nietzsche to experiment with ways of relating esoteric in-
tent or cause to exoteric articulation and proleptic effect.
The persistence in Nietzsche of the ideas expressed in "The Greek
State" of 1872 indicates that his political ideology and reflections about
how to implement it remained remarkably unchanged over the course
of his life. His later teaching of Eternal Recurrence of the Same rein-
forces the impression that his thinking could never be subject to sub-
stantial change or radical break, though his illocutionary strategies had
been adjusted to respond to historical conjunctures, including Nietz- «
o
sche's obsessive "predictions" about the future. Part of what this rela- g
tive rigidity means is that—unlike Freud or Marx—Nietzsche was 2
both theoretically and empirically impervious to the crises that come «
with such epistemological breaks as may distinguish, say, "the moment §
of 'ideology5 and 'criticism'" from "the moment of 'science*" Stricdy 3
speaking, ideologically speaking, there is no "mature" or "axial" Nietz- «
305
sche for the same reason that there is also no "young" or "transitional"
Nietzsche. Althusser once suggested that the "youth of a science is its
prime of life; before this age it is old, its age the age of the preconcep-
tions by which it lives, as a child does the preconceptions and hence the
age of its parents"281 In the case of more or less scientific thinkers like
Freud and Marx, it may be necessary for readers to return to a certain
"age" of their work, to find its "prime" break with its "preconceptions "
On the one hand this principle might seem applicable to Nietzsche,
given the staying power of "The Greek State" written when he was
twenty-eight years old, since it was, in his own context, his first "scien-
tific" work—at least for the themes it broached, though not yet for its
illocution, which was perfected, in Nietzsche's view, only a decade later
in Thus Spoke Zarathustm. On the other hand the very persistence in his
work of the basic triad depicted in "The Greek State" — slavery plus
esoteric writing plus social project—requires the opposite of any "epis-
temological break," and instead only a "Machiavellian" calculation of
how to nurture and manipulate his corps/e under changing and often
hostile circumstances. In the matter of fundamental politico-rhetorical
convictions, there is no real difference between any one Nietzsche and a
prior or subsequent incarnation. Modern or postmodern, precontem-
porary, postcontemporary, or just plain contemporary. Nonnegotiable
and unchanging in Nietzsche remained interlocked demands: the so-
cial necessity for slavery and the secret tactics, strategies, and tech-
nologies required to realize it by whatever means necessary.
Ini88i —afull decade after "The Greek State"—Nietzsche wrote:
"Slavery is to be seen everywhere, although this is not admitted: —we
have to struggle to be everywhere, too, to know all conditions of slav-
ery, in order to be able to represent all its views in the best possible way.
This is the only way we can be master over slavery and make use of it.
Our true essence [Unser Wesen] must remain concealed, just like the
Jesuits who exercised dictatorship in the guise of tools and Junctions.
"5r What is our function, our mantle of slavery? Pedagogy? — Slavery
* should not be eradicated, it is necessary. Our task is to see to it that
^ there will always be peopleforwhom work is done, so that this gigan-
g tic mass of politico-commercial potential [diese grofie Masse von
« politisch- commerciellen Kraften ] is not squandered. Even so that there
£ will be viewers and. people who no longer ploy along in the game!"282 In
Z short, anything except a Hands-On Imperative for viewers and players
306
and, Nietzsche hoped, for most of us. Better couch potatoes at night
and workers by day—thinking that they're at play, we're at play. In this
sense reading Nietzsche or not reading him amounts to the same thing.
In the "Jesuitical" sense, Nietzsche's task was to maintain socialism,
keeping it from becoming communism. In so doing he was "diplo-
matic." Gramsci noted not only that 'The Society of Jesus is the last of
the great religious orders," because its origins were "reactionary and
authoritarian, its character repressive and 'diplomatic,' "283 but also that
it is immaterial whether a writer is "technically" Jesuit or not. Any
writer is "Jesuit," in the extended Gramscian meaning, who declines, in
principle or in practice, "to elaborate a modern 'humanism' able to
reach right to the simplest and most uneducated classes" and who
engages in conspiratorial, esoteric writing in this prophylactic proj-
ect against the masses.284 But Nietzsche's Jesuitism is exceptionally
complex.
Even the most hostile things he said in public about "democracy" and
the like were exoteric posturing. While working out the illocutionary stra-
tegy of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he noted: "Zarathustra [is] happy about
the fact that class war is over, and now there is finally time for a rank
ordering of Individuals. Hatred against the democratic system of level-
ing is onlyforeground: in fact he [ Zarathustra] is very happy that this has
come thus far. Now he can finish his task. — "285 But while Nietzsche
thought of socialism as "inevitable,"286 communism was not. Nietzsche
was not as "mandarin" as he is commonly represented to be: that is,
wholly ignorant about political economy.287 For this reason, the ortho-
dox Marxist objection—beginning at the end of the nineteenth century
with Franz Mehring in Germany and Georgi Plekhanov in Russia — to
all forms of "Nietzschean pseudoradicalism" that move only across the
superstructure without ever descending into the economic structure is a
paradigm far more applicable to J^-Nietzscheanism than to Right-
Nietzscheanism or to Nietzsche himself.
In the early 1870s, not long after Nietzsche had been admitted into «
Wagner's inner family circle in Tribschen, Switzerland, he was en- g
trusted by The Master with proofreading the essays from the latter*s ~
"Dresden" or "communist" period. So it was that Nietzsche encoun- g
tered such texts as T h e Revolution" (1849) and "Artistry of the Fu- S
ture: On the Principle of Communism" (1849) — both of which are 3
riddled with positive albeit muddled allusions to Marx and Engels, »
307
including The Communist Manifesto (1848).288 These unconscious car-
icatures of communism by Wagner were as close as Nietzsche came to
communist literature, though he knew a bit more about socialism from
reading secondary sources, journalism, Eugen Duhring, and Ferdinand
Lassalle. The impression perhaps given by Adorno aside, Wagner en-
joyed a quite good reception among large segments of the working
class and socialist leaders during Nietzsche's lifetime and into the twen-
tieth century, in part because of Wagner's revolutionary background
as a self-described "communist'* in 1848, in part because of the percep-
tion that his music dramas continued to retain elements of subversive,
progressive ideology. This was the opinion not only in Germany and
France but messqgiorno Italy. For example, the first mainland socialist
minister of note to visit Gramsci's Sardinia, Guido Podrecca in 1910,
chose as hisfirstlecture to socialist activists and proletarians in Cagliari
the topic 'The Revolutionary Thought of Richard Wagner."289
Now, in 1879 Nietzsche read with interest a German translation of
the main work of the American political economist Henry Charles
Carey (1793-1879), it being one of the main arguments in nineteenth-
century political economy.290 Nietzsche returned to read Carey, along
with the infamous Duhring, in 1881, leading up to the composition of
Thus Spoke ZarathusPm (1883-1885).291 Nietzsche remained interested
in Carey because he recognized that Carey had influenced Duhring's
work, which Nietzsche held in considerable contempt—as did Marx—
on philosophical and stylistic grounds, but also — as Marx did not—for
what Nietzsche regarded as its botched but otherwise admirable elitist
aspect. In May 1887 Nietzsche wrote Gast that Duhring had "appro-
priated all essential oeconomica"fromCarey.292 But, as a notebook used
in 1879 indicates, what Nietzsche himself really appropriated positively
from Carey was the economic notion that competition, as Nietzsche
paraphrased it, is at once "useful" and "fundamentally evil'*—viewing
this dual principle and its concealment—beyond good and evil, of
course — as crucial to the maintenance of social order, "harmony," and
PH
g "equilibrium.'*293 In his aphorism 'The Principle of Equilibrium" in
" the expanded version of Human, All-Too-Human, entitled The Wan-
g derer and His Shadow (1880), Nietzsche concealed Carey's direct influ-
« ence on his own argument that "robbers" and "authorities" "robbers"
£ and "traders," are really two sides of the same coin, insofar as both
S5 serve in "dialectical" tandem to produce and legitimate socioeconomic
308 "harmony."294
Unbeknownst to Nietzsche, but applicable to him, was Marx's ear-
lier analysis of precisely this moment in nineteenth-century political
economy The twin ideologically motivated illusions, first, that bour-
geois capitalist relations of production are inherently "harmonious,"
and, second, that any "antagonisms" within its system of "free" compe-
tition are merely contingent and superficial, rather than structural, had
been exposed to light by Marx in volume i of Capital (1867), as well as
a decade earlier in the unfinished drafts of his Grundrisse (1857-1858).
In both works, Marx had made explicit reference to the work of Carey,
who exemplified for him not only the most recent American version
of this main current of capitalist self-legitimation—represented at the
time in France by Frederic Bastiat's Harmonies tconomiques (1851),
which Nietzsche did not know—but also what happens to political-
economic thinking—indeed all thinking—when it fails to perceive the
fundamental contradiction between regional and global economies.295
Nietzsche's "thought" — Eternal Recurrence of the Same — is a philo-
sophical version of the political-economic principle of "harmonization"
developed by Bastiat and Carey to legitimate bourgeois class rule. Eter-
nal Recurrence of the Same turns out to produce its harmonization-
effect by means up to and including encouraging people to kill them-
selves or to murder. It must be noted first, however, that in Nietzsche's
thinking economic class is at most a contingent result of elitism,
though he has no more principled objection to class rule than he does to
any other manifestation of the Will to Power. Nietzsche was primarily
interested in intellectual and cultural castes, not economic classes in
the Marxist sense. And precisely this makes him attractive for post-
Marxists, and his patent elitism quite tasty, if invisible. The full com-
plexity of Nietzsche's distinctive take on the political-economic cannot
be easily exposed to light, since his other primary concern was to con-
ceal by "secret writing" the full mechanisms of social and philosophical
power. It is at this point that questions of "style" and "literature" be-
come relevant for him. Had Nietzsche known Marx, he would have 5
' o
directed much greater efforts against him than he had against Carey. £
Marx, alas, would likely have ignored Nietzsche. £
As for Nietzsche's way of reading literature, it was informed by re- g
markably specific considerations of political economy. This is visible in 5
over seventy pages of notes he took while reading Charles Baudelaire's H
opuspostumous in 18 88, during his own last stage of creativity.296 Nietz- «
sche shared with Baudelaire, whom he had also read earlier, a complex 309
metaphoric of money, but not only that. 2 9 7 Christine Buci-Glucksmann
has shown that many of the most infamous Baudelairean "figures" (or
rather "signifying practices") —such as "the sterile woman," "the an-
drogyne," "the lesbian," and especially "the prostitute"—were not only
contradictory among themselves, for Baudelaire, but also intended by
him to expose the multiple contradictions of capitalism as he knew
them. 2 9 8 Nietzsche's reading notes indicate that he was as fascinated by
this aspect of Baudelaire as were Walter Benjamin and Althusser years
later. 299 In bourgeois and patriarchal ideology, the lesbian, androgyne,
and prostitute are not re/productive: they re/produce neither children
nor, insofar as they are social "parasites," surplus value, or corps/es. So
it is, for instance, that "the prostitute" comes to embody or figure
commodity production and fetishism, likewise the transformation of
love by capital into an exchange value. As such, the prostitute both is
informed by and elicits the fundamental nether experiences of alienation
that shadow rationalizing and commercializing modernity: for ex-
ample, boredom, melancholy, emptiness, spleen, vertigo, and more
boredom. Other figures, however, such as "the lesbian" and "the an-
drogyne," stand as points of ostensible resistance against precisely this
objective commodification and its concomitant alienation effect. Along
these lines, t o employ James Jay Slawney's felicitous turn of phrase,
Baudelaire had worked out an amazingly detailed and precise "material-
ist physiognomies of the somnambulistic society" of early capitalism. 300
Leaving his views of woman aside, Nietzsche himself had been groping
toward a rudimentary analysis of capitalism all his mature life. H e had
been introduced to the theme of aesthetic resistance to "American-
ism" —belief in progress; worship of money as a god; the commodifica-
tion of art; the soon-to-be-Taylorized division of intellectual and man-
ual labor that locked out the return of "Renaissance man"—when he
had read intently Thebphile Gautier's preface to Les fleurs du mat in
188s. 301
«" Because he always circles back to the need for the esoteric dissemina-
^ tion of his philosophical and social agenda, Nietzsche is particularly
^ pleased t o find in Baudelaire's opus postumous echoes of his own theo-
£j ries: that is, "all true politics is essentially or inevitably Jesuit and revo-
$ lutionary [ Si tu etais jesuite et revolutionnaire, comme tout vrai politi-
g que doit Fetre ou l'est fatalement]. "302 Nietzsche's last notebook
S3 excerpts from the (Euvres posthumes terminate as a dual-language reflec-
310
tion—part citation, part interpolation—on what he approvingly calls
Baudelaire's "monstrous" or "hair-raising" (Haantrdubend) vision of
what in Thus Spoke Zamthustm he had called "the last men." This speech
by Zarathustra is considered today by neoconservatives and neoliberals
alike to be Nietzsche's decisive attack not only against modernity but
against all socialist and democratic attempts to forge something pro-
gressive out of modernity.303 According to the final Baudelairean-
Nietzschean pastiche, European politics has become so "American-
ized" (americaniziert) that any effective "great politics" is in danger of
being eliminated, if it has not been already. For Nietzsche, the "Party of
Peace," of socialism, is in danger of triumphing over the "War Party"
also called the "Spiritual" or "Intellectual Party." In his pastiche:
311
decadence, Nietzsche's tone abrupdy changes. H e abandons Baude-
laire and his "dandy" with the familiar d e m a n d — i n his o w n or Zara-
thustrian voice—for "A little pure air!" A n d propelled by thin m o u n -
tain air from "the pathos of distance" comes Nietzsche's spin back away
from the Baudelairean problematic toward his o w n "Tractatus politi-
cks, " his o w n plans for the "War Party" t o be projected into any possible
future, returning eternally.
It is important that Nietzsche usually restrained himself (torn pub-
lishing his thoughts of an explicidy economic nature, particularly since
many of his philosophical and cultural analyses presuppose arguments
about the political economy. Whatever the full reason for this reticence
may have been, its effect o n his reception has been profound especially
a m o n g Left-Nietzschoids generally, and n o t only of the "literary" per-
suasion. Ignorance of Nietzsche's economic thinking—or rather the
economic dimension of his o n e thought—leads to the a priori supposi-
tion that Nietzsche's—exoteric—critique of power s o m e h o w would
have included the capitalist m o d e of production, if only Nietzsche had
not—supposedly—shared the c o m m o n intellectualist, mandarin dis-
dain for getting his hands dirty in the infrastructure. In point of fact,
Nietzsche's hands were dirty.
A quite c o m m o n and fundamental blunder in reading Nietzsche is t o
reduce his n o t infrequent use of the term "economics" t o an imagined
Freudian or Bataillean "psychodialectic" that is n o t merely of an exclu-
sively heterosexual nature b u t one w i t h o u t any significant reference t o
political economy stricdy conceived. 3 0 5 This position is g r o u n d e d on
the false assumption that Nietzsche was basically an exoteric thinker
and writer, and s o it makes perfect sense t o suspend whatever judgment
one might have about Nietzsche's also n o t infrequent affirmations of
h u m a n slavery, reducing this affirmation t o a silly choice that m u s t
obviously be rejected: either make light of Nietzsche's "self-glorifying
sentimentality" or remark that this "oversensitivity is n o justification
«• for the adoption of a reactive stance." 306 This antinomy legitimates bail-
£ ing o u t of reading Nietzsche seriously with the unintentionally positiv-
^ istic claim that "our concern here is n o t t o blame or to praise Nietzsche
jg but rather t o map the forces of his economy" (p. 85) — an "economy"
o that is always already bled dry of any real meaning or import.
During the writing of Thus Spoke Zamthustm—the text into which the
principle of Eternal Recurrence of the Same was most effectively and
w
covertly embodied not merely thematically but rhetorically— Nietzsche ^
wrote to himself: 'The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence as hammer in H
the hand of the most powerful people" And this "hammer"—musical »
319
and deformed socialist but also a bludgeon —had a very specific histor-
ical and social task. 'The new Enlightenment—the old was on behalf of
the democratic herd. The equalization of all. The new Enlightenment
intends to show ruling natures the way—insofar as everything is permit-
ted them that is not open to herd-beings."334 In this regard, Nietzsche
was not "^atf-Enlightenment" or "postmodern"—time or periodization
hardly matters. In theological terms, the doctrine of Eternal Recur-
rence of the Same seems paradoxical because in one aspect it rejects any
possible transcendence out of temporality and hence would seem to be
quintessentially antitheological; in its other aspect, however, the doc-
trine itself seems predicated on transcendent experience and belief. The
doctrine appears to be Nietzsche's version of Tertullian's Credo, quia
absurdum: "I believe [in the Resurrection of Jesus] because it is absurd."
In Nietzsche's case, however, the paradox can be resolved by assuming
that he is ultimately interested in any belief not just for its theological
and philosophical meanings but for what it can otherwise do, for its
transformative social potential. "A belief like a guillotine, as heavy, as
light" (Kafka, in 1920) , 335
In precisely this context it is important to grasp Nietzsche's lifelong
interest in the Jesuits. At least by the mid-sixteenth century, the latter
had begun to distinguish clearly between the secrets of nature and
natural science (arcana naturae), divine secrets and theology (arcana
Dei), and secrets of power and political theory (arcana imperii) — three
"realms" that had previously worked in tandem, often in the same
minds. As the struggle to maintain control over the secrets of nature
was increasingly lost to natural science, to technology, and to the divi-
sion of labor in allfields,and as Protestantism and Calvinism proved
themselves to be powerful, often more powerful, adversaries on many
fronts, the Jesuits conceded that in the modern epoch the realm of
science was going to be essentially egalitarian and, in the words of
historian Carlo Ginzburg, "open to all in principle, even artisans and
"w peasants"336 Protestantism and Catholicism went their different ways,
£ in theory, on the issue of control over divine secrets, arcana Dei. But,
" for the Jesuits, at least the realm of politics was still "forbidden to
g 'private citizens' attempting to penettate the secrets of power" (p. 69).
£ Think of Nietzsche's main cosmological principle — Eternal Recur-
£ rence of the Same—and especially of the political use he wanted to
E extract from it, when reading about esotericism and exotericism on the
320
threshold of modernism and modernity. "Catholic censure of the helio-
centric system has been judged," Ginzburg argues,
Other historians have imaged the "culture of the baroque" as the first
systematically hegemonic or "guided" society, indeed as the prototype
of a mass culture more or less consciously using "rhetoric" to maintain
political and economic control. 337
For Nietzsche, arcana naturae—that is, Eternal Recurrence of the
Same and aspects of Will to Power — and arcana Dei — that is, God Is
Dead, or Never Existed—were comparatively exoteric doctrines, the
latter more exoteric than the former, and both equally dangerous for
their potentially leveling, democratizing implications. So what Nietz-
sche kept in "standing reserve" so to speak, were the deepest levels
of his arcana imperii. When Nietzsche talked about Eternal Recurrence
of the Same as a secret Jesuitical hammer "in the hands of the most
power" he meant it: Greco-Renaissance elitism was to be kept alive and
well forever, and his opponents will never quite grasp the fact, thinking
him always on their and our side. «
A key chapter in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is "The Convalescent" for it H
is here for the first time that Zarathustra makes public to his animals 2
and other listeners a relatively coherent, though ultimately inarticulate, g
depiction of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence of the Same.338 In an §
unpublished notebook, however, Nietzsche reminded himself that be- H
hind this pivotal scene an entirely different—invisible and inaudible — »
321
transformation was to take place both in Zarathustra and in some read-
ers. H e wrote: "With the Convalescence of Zarathustra, CAESAR stands
there, unyielding, inexorable [unerbittlich], gracious [giitig]—the
gap is destroyed between being a creator, goodness, and wisdom. Clarity,
quiet, no exaggerated yearning, [but rather] happiness in the instant that
is appropriately applied and eternal!"339 But happiness for w h o m , in this
new, explicidy imperial, world order? Intrigued in the late 1930s—
another new age of empire—by Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence of the
Same, particularly in its relation to the modernist problem of boredom,
Benjamin quipped: ' T h e thought of Eternal Return emerged when
the bourgeoisie n o longer dared to look in the eye the impending
development of the order of production it itself had set t o work. T h e
thought of Zarathustra and of Eternal Recurrence and the embroi-
dered m o t t o on the sofa pillow—'Just a 15 Minute Quickie' —all be-
long together." 340 And today we think of Andy Warhol's "15 minutes"
in which w e "last men" are famous — kings and queens for a day. But
when Benjamin—who was profoundly ambivalent about Eternal Re-
currence because he, t o o , sought a nonteleological view of time and
history, though in his case in opposition especially to bourgeois myths of
progress —came to the remark in Nietzsche's notebooks about Zara-
thustra as Caesar he was startled. 341 If Eternal Recurrence of the Same
is true, or believed t o be true, then all is indeed permitted, even permis-
sible. All current political actions, social hierarchies, patriarchies, and
other power trips become legitimated, and the possibility of legitima-
tion crisis in the halls and back rooms of power is eliminated. Any
"critique of cynical reason" or of "knowledge-power" becomes not so
much impossible as irrelevant. Benjamin suddenly glimpsed the con-
nection in Nietzsche between the ancient idea of Eternal Recurrence
and modernist boredom cum middle-class sensibility—and also na-
tional socialist aggression. But Benjamin mistakenly thought that this
note showed that Nietzsche himself "suspected the complicity of his teach-
er ing with imperialism." 342 Symptomatically for Western Marxism, Ben-
^ jamin did not see that, like all Nietzsche's major publications, Thus
^ Spoke Zarathustra had been intentionally programmed by Caesarism
£j from its inception.
» Supreme importance is ascribed t o the thought of Eternal Recur-
£ rence of the Same by Nietzsche, w h o thus refers to it simply as "my
fc t h o u g h t " This status is reconferred in Heidegger's seminal thesis in
322
I93<5-I937 th a t "Thinking Being, Will to Power, as Eternal Recur-
rence, means thinking Being as Time." Heidegger immediately went on
to distinguish himself from Nietzsche on the grounds that the latter
ostensibly "thought this thought but did not think it as the question of
Being and Time. Plato and Aristode, too, thought this thought when
they grasped Being as ousia [presence], but just as little as Nietzsche
did they think it as a question."343 In short, according to Heidegger,
while Nietzsche definitively grasped the being of entities as Will to
Power and hence technology, only Heidegger himself has grasped fully
Being Itself as Time . . . and therefore as authentic history in its ongo-
ing polemic with technocentrism. But metaphysics and rhetoric aside,
Heidegger was in basic concord with Nietzsche in ideological and
social matters.
In the German phrase for Eternal Recurrence of the Same, Ewige
Wiederkunft des Gleichen, Nietzsche preferred the noun die Kunft to its
synonym in the construction die Wiederkehr.34* This is likely because
Kunft derives from the common verb kommen, "to come" whereasKehr
derivesfromhehren, "to turn"—which implies mere mechanical, circu-
lar reiteration without adaptation to changing historical or political
circumstances. Also Wiederkebr is weighted more to the past than the
future, whereas what properly recurs for Nietzsche is also what is antic-
ipated rhetorically, is prophecy. Dionysus is the demigod who comes,
whose being is in his coming. Nietzsche's Wiederkunfr indicates dy-
namic—retroactive, current, and proleptic — praxis. As Kafka noted,
"Beyond a certain point there is no return. This point has to be
reached."345 Or, as phrased by Lou Reed, "this is the time" precisely
because "there is no time" and vice versa.346
Klossowski once suggested that Nietzsche seems to have reckoned
with the curious fact that, sooner or later, his readers forget about the
doctrine and its full implications.347 Something about it does seem oc-
culted from view. But why? And what is this it? For Nietzsche, some-
thing comes not only from the past but also out of the future into the g
present, and then flows multidirectionally backward and outward yet g
again. To draw the political and economic consequence immediately, 2
"slavery" and "nobility" must always stay the same in immobile es- «
sence, yet must also always come again and again and once again— %
differendy only as the situation demands.348 But Eternal Recurrence of H
the Same is impossible to "define" stricto sensu, if the very act of defini- <»
323
tion requires some sort of spatiotemporal distance from the object in
question. In terms of the doctrine's philosophical definition at least,
what recurs definitionally always tends to be something different with
each attempt to pin it down, as Deleuze has noted in detail.349 And in
this case, by Nietzsche's scotomizing design, no such distance exists.
Related to scotomization but better able to capture its lethal aspect,
and hence to bridge the space between Nietzsche's esoteric semiotics
and esoterrorist process of weeding out, is thefigureof Medusa.
In an important paper entitled "Nietzsche meduse" (medused
Nietzsche) delivered in 1972 at the conference "Nietzsche Today?",
Bernard Pautrat shed light, but not quite enough, on the darker rules
of Nietzsche's game.350 Pautrat began under the sign of Bataille and
Klossowski by pointing out that Nietzsche's problem was less in talk-
ing about a doctrine called Eternal Recurrence of the Same than in
talking, always already within it and by means of it. "Because time is not
linear, it admits of neither before nor after: if everything returns eter-
nally, then the future is already a past, necessarily, and the present is
then at the same time a past and a future" (p. 16). The consequences of
this problematic for anysemiotic are severe. In this view, signs too could
exist only within a field of extreme spatiotemporal compression and
conflation. Pautrat argued that Nietzsche's doctrine cannot be fully
represented in any Nietzschean text nor even as the text—not even
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Rather, to use Althusserian terms, the doctrine
is the text's symptomatic silence, its determinant absence. For his part,
Pautrat was pushing Klossowski's notion of Nietzsche's pulsatile semi-
ology harder in terms of the relationship of sign and representation to
effect. Speaking of the sign "Eternal Recurrence of the Same," Pautrat
concluded: "So it is that the sign itself has vanished: a blind spot, one
no longer sees it. This does not necessarily mean that one does not see
its trace, its vestige on the sand of the text [le sable du texte], but in the
end it is no longer there, literally [ en propre]" (pp. 12-13). But what,
w" if any, is the scotomizing sign junction—the de-signs—of such more or
* less scotomized or medused signs? Pautrat seemed to recognize for a
® split second that Nietzsche's point was to build into his text not only
g the themej say, of the Medusa but also something—mirabile diau et
u visu—that literally "cannot be looked at, under the penalty of being im-
£ mediately medused, petrified, congealed, hardened unto death" (p. 13).
fc Pautrat also recognized that the ultimate effect of this medusing sign or
324
nonsign would be "to harden the world into mortal combat: this is
therefore also the effea of the thought of eternal return'' (p. 13). But
what Pautrat did not specify is the precise nature or purpose of Nietz-
sche's "mortal combat."
Nietzsche explicidy referred to the thought of Eternal Recurrence of
the Same as "a Medusa's head." He recorded this image in the winter of
1884-1885, while working on the last part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra
and planning up to six more parts. He wrote to himself: "In Zara-
thustra 4: the great thought 2&Medusays head: all features of the cosmos
become immobile, a frozen death struggle [Todeskampf ] ."3S1 When
Benjamin read and copied out a slightly different version of this note-
book entry, he—symptomatically for the "leftist" reception of Nietz-
sche—overlooked the fact that Nietzsche was giving himself instruc-
tions not merely about how to describe "Medusa" but about how to
write Medusa.352 Pautrat, to his credit, goes beyond Benjamin in this
regard, though he seems unaware that Benjamin had worked with the
same passages. For Nietzsche himself, "Medusa" was an illocutionary
principle, the desired perlocutionary effect of which was to exert lethal
petrifaction on some readers, who would be medused, immobilized,
rendered impotent. In general his task was to separate the men from
the boys, both from women, and generally divide readers into two
basic groups: those few empowered ones who are "in the know," and
those many disempowered ones who are "out of the know." "It really
must be stressed that it is precisely the first elements, the most elemen-
tary things, which are the first to be forgotten. . . The first element is
that there really do exist rulers and ruled, leaders and led. The entire
science and art of politics are based on this primordial, and (given cer-
tain general conditions) irreducible fact In the formation of lead-
ers, one premise is fundamental: is it the intention that there should
always be rulers and ruled, or is the objective to create the conditions in
which this division is no longer necessary?"353 Here is where Nietzsche
and communism part company, for he wanted there always to be leaders £
and led, and wrote accordingly. "The Nightwanderer's Song " the pen- g
ultimate chapter of the last completed part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, £
was designed—by means of its intentionally hypnotic, multiply re- g
peated lines and glosses ("O Man, beware . . .," etc.) — as "Medusa's £
o
head."354 Whether it actually has this effect on empirical readers is one H
thing, but verbal and musical repetitiveness—the basic subliminal ad- «
325
vertising technique—was explicitly intended by Nietzsche as a verbal
equivalent of the thought of Eternal Recurrence of the Same, as the
freezing, castrating, killing head of the Medusa.355
With this singular esoterrorist locutionary, illocutionary, and per-
locutionary act, Nietzsche also linked up his magnum opus with the
experience he had described in his earliest major writings, including
The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit ofMusic, as "Dionysian": namely,
the absolute "synthesis" and actual fusion of the "poet, the actor, and
the viewer" and also, as he put it now in the 1880s, "the creator, the
lover, the destroyer"356 Certain technological developments would
have to occur before cyberpunk could fear and/or desire exacdy the
same effect—with similar possibilities of success.
Returning to Pautrat, it is as if even he "forgets" the fundamen-
tal element of Nietzsche's medusing doctrine. Scotomized, he looks
quickly away from the supposedly "most" literal and pragmatic aspect
of Nietzsche's semiotic, looks away from the supposedly "most" lethal
combat, looks away from what Pautrat ends up —in the manner of
Klossowski or Derrida—calling Nietzsche's "game." As is so often the
case in Nietzscheanism, it is for Pautrat, too, a "senseless game" (jeu
insense), with a nod toward psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic Me-
dusa, but no longer toward Nietzsche's esoteric semiotics or process of
weeding out. In this instant of looking away, Pautrat is corps/ed.
He is not alone. For Deleuze and Foucault as well, Eternal Recur-
rence of the Same is also ultimately only "an empty sign, a passageway to
be crossed, the formless voice of the abyss whose approach is indis-
sociably both happiness and disgust, disgust."357 The etymological rec-
ollection that ciphers are simultaneously nullities as well as signs is funda-
mental to Lacan's early essay on the mirror stage, which concludes: "In
the recourse of subject to subject that we preserve, psychoanalysis may
accompany the patient to the ecstatic limit of the 'Thou art that,' in
which is revealed to him the cipher of his mortal destiny, but it is not in
"« our mere power as practitioners to bring him to the moment where the
^ real journey begins."358 From Nietzsche's point of view, however, such
^ trips are in principle never to be made available to just anyone. Death
g trips, for the "all-too-many."
v> Pautrat's psychoanalytic terms are problematic for getting at Nietz-
g sche's own ideas in several respects. Helene Cixous in her 1976 es-
1-1
Klossowski once remarked that there are two basic types of assassins or
murderers. The first, the more petty human type, is one who might
"yield to the temptation to commit homicide—and to whom one
could say: 'you've already murdered, you've done it once before, try not
to do it again'—such a man would understand nothing of Eternal
Return. But a murderer who would murder in such a way that he
would also want Eternal Return—that would perhaps be another kind
of murderer."367 But the Nietzschean Klossowski waffled on whether
Nietzsche was this second kind or higher murderer—precisely the kind
Nietzsche thought himself to be.
And if "we" do not literally commit suicide when reading Nietzsche's
corpus, and he'obviously could not count on people to blow out their
brains, even if some have done so after reading him, then the "suicide"
will have to take more metaphoric, nuanced, intricate, and subterra-
nean forms—esoterrorist forms more socially productive for "those in S
the know." In dealing with his opponents, euthanasia and war are H
Nietzsche's second choice, he said. The.firstis suicide. "I do not speak to 2
you as to a people [Volk]," Nietzsche-Zarathustra says; "For it, the »
ultimate is to despise and destroy itself; the second highest is to despise ^
Q
and destroy one another."368 If overt coercion and domination are im- H
possible, inappropriate, or ineffective—as indeed they are in many e»
329
situations—then noncoercive coercion and hegemony will have to
work in tandem with them. At least this, apparendy, was Nietzsche's
intention. Whether he was successful or not is an even more serious
problem — especially since in Nietzsche's world, by esoteric definition
and design, virtually no one could ever know for sure whether s/he had
fully incorporated a properly Nietzschean thought or not. Nonethe-
less, surety aside, what is at stake is a more or less surreptitious—both
unconscious and musical—process of weeding out. That this process
was absolutely crucial to Nietzsche ought to be clear enough, legible
enough. In private he screamed it out:
And:
2 The revolution will probably be televised. But I don't have a TV and I'm not
330 gonna watch. With talk of rating records and increased censorship it may
be getting difficult for some to speak their minds. Black Flag already has
enough problems with censorship coming from the business sector. Some
record companies have refused to stock and/or display certain Black Flag
records because of objectionable cover art and/or lyrical content. Now, with
additional government involvement, the "crunch" is on. Hope does not lie
in the fact that fortunately these straight pigs show little ability in decoding
intuitive data. For example, even though this record may communicate cer-
tain feelings, emotions, and ideas to some, I have faith that cop-types with
their strictly linear minds and stick-to-the-rules mentality don't have the
ability to decipher the intuitive contents of this record. Of course, there may
be a problem in that much of the public, most of whom comply with the
whole idea of hiring the pigs in thefirstplace, seem equally unable to intu-
itively feel and listen to music. Still here it is, "The Process of Weeding
Out."373
338
4 Trasformismo
from Gvamsci to Dick, or, The Spectacular
Technoculture of Everyday Life
Preliminaries
None of this is to suggest that Nietzsche himself would have liked all
the influence that he has come to exert proleptically on the everyday life
of technoculture, and it retroactively on him. Reaganomics would give
him as little satisfaction as Newt Gingrich's Virtual America and Con-
tract with America; and G. Gordon Liddy and Rush Limbaugh would
surely disgust him. For in many personal respects Nietzsche was an
exceptionally kind-hearted man. Yet another "word for donkeys"! Oth-
erwise the Left might not read him at all. On the contrary, Nietzsche
would almost certainly judge that this reciprocal influence is often
miserably botched in terms of his positive, creative intentions. But just as
certainly he would judge that this influence has been remarkably suc-
cessful negatively, ptvphylacticaUy. For his corps/e has a powerful way of s 3
anticipating and preventing genuinely communist—or other—options J£
both to Nietzsche/anism and to the predatory "blond beast" that is g
neocapitalism. In 1994, the hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of Nietz- 5
sche's birth, the jury was still out even on the existence, never mind the §
success, of what he called his "War Party" and "spiritual" or "intellec- J3
tual party" that he had pitted to the death against the "Party of Peace" £
30
and "socialism." If Nietzsche were to take pleasure in the existence of £
Left-Nietzscheanism, and of the fate of actually existing socialism, it 5
would be only if both have made it impossible for a more proper Left to Q
think and do other things than it does, think alternative thoughts to ©
what it thinks, build communism. Beyond this essentially prophylactic, H
privative, and negative efFectivity, Nietzsche would have a much harder *
349
time seeing fitlly positive incorporations of his teaching around the
world. But, then, in certain circumstances, under the sign of Eternal
Recurrence of the Same, 'There ain't no success like failure . . . " to
cite part of a phrase by Bob Dylan. And, to rephrase a remark by a
historian of "posthistory" under postindustrial conditions the masters
do not necessarily remain masters, but the slaves still remain slaves.31
"All over the world, the left isfightingrear-guard actions, staging hold-
ing operations, trying to gain time to rally people around a new vision.
That seems a defensive and not very exalted task. Yet, if we fail, we
reallyfindourselves in k temps des assassins. "32 Le temps de Nietzsche.
w
"w It took the Dutchman and his team three months to put Turner together
^ again. They cloned a square meter of skin for him, grew it on slabs of
collagen and shark-cartilage polysaccharides. They bought eyes and genitals
2 on the open market. The eyes were green. He spent most of those three
» months in a ROM-generated simstim construct of an idealized New En-
£ gland boyhood of the previous century. The Dutchman's visits were gray
fc dawn dreams, nightmares that faded as the sky lightened beyond his second-
358
: Sfloorbedroom window. You could smell the lilacs, late at night. He read
', Gonan Doyle [read: Nietzsche] by the light of a sixty-watt bulb behind a
parchment shade printed with clipper ships. He masturbated in the smell of
~ clean cotton sheets and thought about cheerleaders. The Dutchman opened
a door in his back brain and came strolling in to ask questions, but in the
morning his mother called him down to Wheaties, eggs and bacon, coffee
with milk and sugar.60
Whereupon, in this tale of love, keyboard cowboy Turner sets out into
the matrix to get his revenge. Where in this world is Nietzsche? In
techno-Nietzsche/anism he is arguably everywhere.
So is Nietzsche's principle that "In order to act, you have to believe
errors; and you will still act according to these errors after you have
seen through them as errors." Nietzsche would have to adjust very little
of his esoteric semiotics to insinuate himself into not only cyberspace
but the rest of everyday life. As £izek suggests, it is normal for the sub-
jects of ideological systems to be perfecdy aware that exoteric, public
claims about what is, say, "freedom" "justice" "equality" "prosper-
ity" "democracy," and so on, are politically manipulated terms that —
whether under "Liberal Capitalism" or "Actually Existing Socialism" —
amount to real freedom, justice, and prosperity only for an elite few.
And yet the deeper point is that these same people carry on as if
this very ideology applied equally to them. 62 Nietzsche would savor
such mechanisms of "conscious illusion"—after all, he helped invent
them. 63
Of course, it is not reasonable to expect people to dwell on things ^
they feel they cannot radically change; just as it is not reasonable to £
expect them to cut their own throats, ideological or fleshy. As political g
scientists and critics of postmodern tedmoculture have noted, much of £
the public in the "First World"—and not only here —has abandoned §
the perception of the world and of everyday life in terms of an exclusive p
"Left-Center-Right" "continuum" or "choice " Instead, this modernist g
"political" perception has been significandy supplanted by a dual per- £
spective or "frame" that is part economic, part pragmatic. On the one s
hand basic social difference is still grasped as being between "the 'haves' 2
and the 'have-nots'"; on the other hand social issues are now grasped 0
only as being between "'those where I can exert some influence' and H
'those where I cannot.' " M This "dual perspective" (the term was Gram- H
359
sci's and before him Machiavelli's) could yet be salutary for rejuvenated
communism—it ought to be capable of working just suchfissuresand
differences between ideology and economics. But nothing can help a
leftism always already infliltrated by a Nietzschean denial of difference
between the Left, the Center, and the Right: that is, a denial of political
difference that is exoteric, and that ends up tilting social and economic
difference always toward the Right, as part of its basic process of sur-
reptitious transformation.
Baudrillard has remarked that in the current society of the spectacle
among the traditional distinctions obliterated are between "watching
TV" and "being watched by TV? and with them vanishes the possibility
of living and thinking "as if TV wasn't there. "6S With Nietzsche/anism,
the entire Enlightenment project would indeed seem to explode or
implode into the thin air of the "aesthetics" currently called cyberspace.
And, to the extent that communism has always involved not only the
building of "a new social formation" but also "a new form of organiza-
tion of matter,"66 and hence of techno-human interface, it is particularly
exigent that it—as the only position outside of Nietzscheanism—come
to terms with all the current transformations of mechanic technocul-
ture in a way that shuns the false antinomy between merely personal,
privatizing prostheses in its one aspect, and the total obliteration of the
individual in collective machines in its other. So it is necessary to cut the
ground out from under Nietzsche's seminal exoteric claim, beginning
in The Birth of Tragedy, that life is "justified" only as an "aesthetic" or
"artistic phenomenon"67 The meaning of this remark is misunder-
stood, trivialized, and depoliticized when grasped as a philosophical
argument promoting "life as literature" or "thinking on stage."68 Nietz-
sche, at least, was refreshingly candid—mostly in his unpublished
notebooks, it is true —about just whose "life" and "stage" he had in
mind andforwhose benefit his "aesthetic philosophy" existed. For him,
his corpus must be instrumentalized, harnessedfor war. He reminded him
self: "Philosophy [is] not for the people, and therefore not the basis of a
PH
g culture, therefore only the tool of a culture [also nur Werkzeug einer
^ Kttltur] " 69 For this reason, socialist polemicist and critic Franz Meh-
g ring (1846-1919), Nietzsche's contemporary and a friend of Engels,
« was quite right to warn throughout the 1890s that the Left should
£ never "aestheticize away the fact that Nietzsche combated proletarian
£ class struggle from the same elevated circles of thought as did the next
360
? best stockbroker or the next best reptile " 70 Nietzsche's personal view of
stockbrokers and reptiles aside, this is not the exaggeration it likely
sounds to refined academic ears today.
''A-. Key for Nietzschean aesthetics as it bears on postmodernity is a
simple maxim he underlined in 1881: "Reduction of morality to aesthet-
%cs!!!"n An awful lot of socioeconomic baggage comes along with his
peculiar "aesthetic" reductionism, including the following tripartite
• Hitbpian" scheme: (1) the institutionalization of suicide as public fes-
tival; (2) the rigorous, institutionalized separation of sexual pleasure
from marriage, since "a population of workers needs good whore-
houses"; and (3) the "absolute necessity'' that "the wise acquire for
themselves the monopoly of the money-market [das Monopol des Geld-
marktes]^ so as to direct it "amorally" and "aesthetically" with their
more or less concealed "life-style and aims."72 Exclusively for the elite,
the potential geniuses, was reserved the neo-Grecian pleasures of "free
individuals": namely, in Nietzsche's own words, those males who are
to relearn "the art of coitus" with young boys {Knabenliebe) as a cure
for "effeirunization" and who will support abortion—but less as a right
of individuals than as a social duty for the sake of breeding that men,
not women, will determine. And this entire agenda is naturally based
for him socially and economically on "slavery," including the right to
loll dissenters.73
In Minima Moralia (1951), Adorno suggested that both the main
proponent of "the bourgeois doctrine of violence" (Nietzsche) and the
tatter's "main adversary" (Marx) shared a common "lie": namely, that
art or culture "creates the illusion of a society worthy of man which !•*
B
does not exist; that it conceals the material conditions upon which Sg
all human works rise, and that, comforting and lulling, it serves to g>
keep alive the bad economic determination of existence." But, Adorno 5
quickly added, "precisely this notion, like all expostulation about lies, §
has a suspicious tendency to become itself ideology."74 Yet this de- j*
pends, one might think, on the kind of art and on what one can make of g
it. Adorno tended to turn "Art" into a hypostatized, personified cate- £
gory, and to this extent followed Nietzsche's — exoteric — lead much £
CO
the mass media and other less polite techniques of persuasion. Also at £
issue is the influence exerted on the traditional working class and on the o
new social worker by the entire Society of the Spectacle—defined by 2
the late Debord, in part, as "the autocratic reign of the mass market *
363
economy" "the activities of the world's owners." Has a spectacular
Nietzscheanism, which is isomorphic with the Society of the Spectacle,
"integrated itself into reality to the same extent as it was describing it,
and . was reconstructing it as it was describing it"?81 If Nietzsche
was really a prophet, if he was really a political aesthetician or aesthetic
politician of the first rank and relevance, then he must at least, at bare
minimum, have proleptically tele-vised or fore-seen "letzte Menschen":
that is, "last" or ""ultimate" or "posthumari" men and women like us.
Trasformismo
Technoculture/Everyday Life
Readers who turn to Nietzsche's corpse qua corpus to grasp the prob-
lem of the articulation of aesthetics, politics, and prophecy must partic-
ularly resist the tendency to ignore their (our) own "national-popular"
culture and its Nietzscheanism. High philosophy today morphs into
mass or junk culture, indeed strives to exist only in this form. On the
other hand, cultural studies as the current "discipline" purporting to
deal with this situation will remain counterproductive to the extent
that it remains definable as "junk culture minus philosophy" or, to be
more precise, when the philosophy it thinks it has to legitimate itself
«f remains Nietzschean, remains part of the corps/e.
g The Situationist International used to insist that not only was God
^ dead but also—along with Him, Her, or It—aesthetics and the arts,
g the political and politics as we have traditionally known them: both
S "high" and "low," both far above quotidian life and deeply, invisibly
^ informing it. It was in this context that the term "corpse" came to
fc situationist life. One of the leaflets passed out at the University of
372
Strasbourg in the spring of 1966 —the first of the great student upris-
ings of the period—was entitled "De la miseretiudicmt[on the poverty
of student life]." Written by situationist Mustapha Khayati, one of its
slogans read: "In any era when art is dead the student is the most avid
consumer of its corpse." Two years later, the following clarification
appeared on the walls around the Sorbonne, reappearing three years
later in Rene* Vienet's detourned kung-fu film Can Dialectics Break
Bricks?: "People who talk about revolution and class struggle without
referring explicitly to everyday life, without understanding what is sub-
versive about love and positive about the refusal of constraints, have
corpses in their mouths."99 And as late as 1988 there came another
update: "Since art is dead, it has . . increasingly become easy to dis-
guise police as artists"100 Including, one might wish, Nietzsche, par-
ticularly in the multiple forms his corpse takes today. How—in this
looking-glass situation where little is as it seems —might one begin to
look for national-popular manifestations of Nietzsche's corps/e hie et
nunc: that is, in the postmodern, postcontemporary condition, in the
spectacular technoculture of everyday life>
After the "defeat" of communism Nietzsche/anism itself is undergo-
ing trasfbrmismo:froma mode of overt insurrection and struggle into a
system of security and foresight in a technocultural situation in which
"the doctrine of security is founded on . . . the saturation of time and
space by speed, making daily life the last theater of operations, the
ultimate scene of strategic foresight"101 In that event the search for
Nietzsche's corps/e must continue to take place not in terms of "Nietz-
schean" themes—either explicit or implicit — but rather of more or less 2
occluded signs embedded in an everyday life that is ever more mediated S£
and saturated by spectacular technoculture and by traces of the prop- g
erly Nietzschean intent to exert proleptic, esoteric, subliminal effect, £
traces of his actio in distans. The terrain on which this search must be §
conducted is not familiar to scholars trained only to read, let alone to £
read only Nietzsche. g
One of the deteirnining features of the f ascoid-liberal axis, according £
to Gramsci, is the failure of "traditional" intellectuals like Croce to %
CO
the masters" (p. 25). Masters, one must add, who live on nowhere £
more complexly than as Nietzsche's corps/e. o
Cyberpunks may be quick to point out, in post-Spinozist fashion, 2
that today the cyberspatial matrix is "the Other," is "metaphysics," is X
377
"God"; but also that this apparently totalitarian system does not (yet)
exclude the possibility of inworming it, virusing it, opening it up to
democratic uses. But what must be made as clear as possible in this
actual or virtual world is that the description of "She [or better: S/he],
the Inappropriate/d Other" as a humanoid moving about "with always
at least two/four gestures: that of affirming 1 am like you' while point-
ing insistently to the difference; and that of reminding 'I am different'
while unsettling every definition of otherness arrived at"113 — that this
description, also commonly understood today as "Nietzschean," is any-
thing but positive or progressive in Nietzsche's awn protocyborg terms:
Overman, Superman, or Hyperman by name.
The technologically foreseeable "end" of ancient differences —in-
cluding, in the last instance, divisions of labor — need not necessarily be
only "parodic," as Debord seemed to think in his updated thesis on the
Society of the Spectacle. As he rightly warned, however, to date this
project has relendessly tended to be parodic in the increasingly inte-
grated and global Society of the Spectacle, whose "highest ambition"
"is still to turn secret agents into revolutionaries, and revolution-
aries into secret agents."114 Which defines, fairly exactly, one aspect
of techno-Nietzsche/anfr«j/frm«w<?.Nonetheless, "cybernetic capital-
ism" is not (or not yet) as total as is imagined (and likely secretly
desired) by many (more or less Nietzschean) versions of "leftist" econ-
omism and technological determinism (a la Virilio) —a self-fulfilling
determinism with which Marx would have had no patience.115
Nietzsche would have relished the current "leftist" presentation of the
basic technosocial options available to "us" as being only two in num-
ber: "Athens without Slaves . . or Slaves without Athens?"116 As has
been pointed out, navigating between the technophilia of "silicon posi-
tivists" and the technophobia of "technological determinists" the for-
mulation "'slaves without Athens' is actually the inverse of .
Athens without slaves.'"117 For Nietzsche, Athens and slavery were
simply indivisible, the one a code term for the other, so that either
&4
Were Nietzsche to hear Virilio calling "daily life the last theater of
operations" in global military strategy today, he would want a piece of
"5" the action. Political scientist and media analyst Arthur Kroker is not
* entirely off the mark when he suggests that "Writing one hundred years
® after Nietzsche, at the end of the twentieth and not the nineteenth cen-
g tury, Virilio is the truth of Nietzsche's prophecy. Indeed, it might even
» be suggested that The Will to Power and Pure War are t h e beginning-
g and-end-points of the twentieth century." 123 M o r e specifically: "the
fc exterminatory nihilism of Nietzsche's 'will t o power* is replaced by
380
t i r o ' s 'dromacracy3; Nietzsche's 'ascetic priests who work to alter the
Unction of ressentimenf anticipate Virilio's Svarrior priests'; Nietz-
lsche*s 'maggot man' is substituted by Virilio's description of the para-
d e d body as a 'metabolic vehicle'; Nietzsche's 'nowhere' of the 'noon-
Hay sun,' populated by those living in a postcatastrophe time after the
\fvviping clean of the horizon,' grounds Virilio's image of the endlessly
; (Circulating body of the social mass drifting in perfect polar inertia be-
ttween past and future; and, finally, Nietzsche's power as an empty
rfperspectival simulacra' is the metaphysical basis, the 'grammatical er-
ror,' for Virilio's theorization of virtual power as a 'sight machine'"
(pp. 28-29). But there are two significant and related differences be-
tween Virilio and Nietzsche. The first is a matter of historical and
ethico-political analysis, in that Virilio argues that Nietzschean Will to
Power in "First World" nations is actually a thing of the past in "drom-
ospheric terms": that is, in terms of the problem of "pure war" which
has replaced already old-fashioned "total war" in that it obliterates
distinctions between offense and defense. Virilio elaborates: 'The will-
to-power of industrial nations who, at the turn of the century, practiced
the techniques of total war, has now been replaced by the theoretical
operation of a totally involuntary war, on the part of post-industrial na-
tions investing increasingly in informatics, automation, and cybernet-
ics. In these societies, the use of human labor-force and the direct re-
sponsibility of people has been displaced by the powers of'anticipated'
and 'deferred' substitution, the power of the system of auto-directed
armaments, self-programmed detection networks, and automotic re-
spondents who lead humanity to the confinement of a hopeless wait- H
2
ing."124 Visible between the lines of Virilio's patented nihilistic escha- £
tology—which is either therapeutic or a lethal self-fulfilling prophecy, g
depending on your point of view—is that Virilio sometimes appears £
horrified by what he calls "thefetalconstruction of the automation ofthe §
declaration ofwarnns and the concomitant geopolitical disappearance p
of human responsibility. Nietzsche, by contrast, exoterically decon- g
struaed the notions of responsibility and accountability, apparency £
dissolving them with Eternal Recurrence of the Same and Will to g
V)
This is all about personal empowerment. . . Because of the way that com-
puters are networked, I'm as powerful as a government agency. Fd say I have
about as much power as a group in the Defense Department here. . . . In a
couple of years I'll be much more powerful than they are because they're still
stuck in local mode. One of the things about computer viruses is that I can
go beyond boundaries. Things about networks I can go beyond. One of the
things I learned a long time ago is the old rule of thumb: distance means
nothing to a computer hacker, 'phonefreak,whatever. For anyone using a
computer, 'phone line, fax (who knows?): distance doesn't mean anything
anymore. I can be anywhere I want. And one of the other things I found out
about computer viruses is that it's a beautiful lever: "Give me a lever and I
PH
^ shall move the earth." A computer virus is a way of building a little AI
w [Artificial Intelligence] of me that can go out and copy itself millions of
^ times, and do whatever it has to. One of the things I was asked recently was:
« "Sure, you can take down the banking system. But would you really?" I've
^ told people before and I'll tell people again: If I think it's necessary, I will.
£ One of the reasons I said that is that someone asked me: "What happens if
382
Itt^ye get a fascist government here in the States—would you be willing to take
IHit down?" The more they get computerized, the more powerful I get, the
ifemore willing I will be to do that.128
At the end ofNietzsche's corps/e, two analytic conditions must be met. If,
first, it is possible to locate the Nietzschean corps/e—or at least some of
its members—here and now in technocultural everyday life, and, sec-
ond, if it is possible to detect Nietzsche's in/direct influence on this
life — or it on him — then it is also possible, finally, to attain the vantage
point—an Archimedean point —from which to see, grasp, and begin
PW
^ to settle accounts with Nietzsche's original corpse, corpus, and corps in
£ their full historical intent, extent, and power. And all this in a situation
g in which we must continually ask the Spinozist question: "Is global
w Difference the same today as global Identity?"134 Indeed, these two
g conditions, constitutive of the postcontemporary and contemporary
z alike, must be met, if we are no longer to "suffer from the dead as well as
384
the living," and if this "dead man" is t o cease "seizing the living" 1 3 5
Remarkably, these conditions can be met.
% In fact they are met, mirabile dictu, in the published and unpublished
;work of Philip K. Dick. Dick was America's most prolific, and arguably
greatest, "science fiction" writer: the inspiration for the n o w classic
New Bad Future films Blade Runner and Total Recall and w h o knows
what else besides. 136 Of the several properly Nietzschean themes, struc-
tures, and loops in Dick, among the most serious involve the con-
struction of systems of technophobic-technophiliac "paranoia" that d o
hot quite occlude or obviate the real world of political economy, in-
cluding subliminal and liminal levels of power and social "order of
tank" 1 3 7 O n what the Nietzschean "order of rank" might look like in
the new bad future—not t o say in some parts of the world right now—
see Clans of the Alphane Moon (1964), in which different social func-
tions are divided u p by psychopathological type—exoterkally without
any grounding term, and so deconstructable, but with the esoteric
grounding term being concealed thematicaUy and formally. 138 A n d so it
is in Nietzsche's corps/e, too, that "The text imposes its o w n under-
standing and shapes the reader's evasions." 139
But n o w think back over the entire, long, virtually interminable extent
of Nietzsche's corps/e, us Nietzsche's Corps/e begins to conclude with a
pastiche of t w o passages from Dick's posthumously published note-
books or "auto-exegesis" entitled In Pursuit of Valis. First, however, it is
important to note that Dick (1926-1982) was an avid, astute, un-
tutored reader of both Heidegger and Nietzsche, though the question £j
of direct influence is not the main point. I n a letter to Claudia Bush £
(July 16, 1974), Dick wrote, " I had planned to call m y next book, g
T H U S S P O K E ZOROASTER, b u t I guess I had better not." Also n o t £
unreasonably, he was convinced that the categories of Dasein in Being §
and Time were "based" o n Gnosticism and German mysticism, such as £j
that of Jakob Boehme. O n e of Dick's last main protagonists, Bishop g
Tim Archer, "gets into Heidegger & Dasein."140 Leaving Nietzsche S
aside for the m o m e n t , the hypertextual link, so t o speak, between Dick £
and Heidegger was "predicted"—or at least made plausible implic- £
itly—by Marshall McLuhan already in The Gutenberg Galaxy: TheMak- o
ing of Typographic Man (1962), in that remarkably prescient section 2
entitled "Heidegger Surf-Boards Along o n the Electronic Wave as Tri- w
385
umphandy as Descartes R o d e the Mechanical Wave" McLuhan, cir-
cling d o s e to one of his central early theses, argued: "The alphabet
and kindred gimmicks have long served man as a subliminal source of
philosophical and religious assumptions. Certainly Martin Heidegger
would seem to be o n better ground [than the metaphysical tradition]
in using the totality of language itself as philosophical datum. For
there, at least in non-literate periods, will be the ratio among all the
senses. . . ." 1 4 1 But McLuhan —unlike most McLuhanites or cyberspa-
tial Heideggerians and Nietzscheans—still possessed the g o o d sense to
add a caveat: "An enthusiasm for Heidegger's excellent linguistics could'
easily stem from naive immersion in the metaphysical organicism of
our electronic milieu. . There is nothing g o o d or bad about print but
the unconsciousness of the effect of any force is a disaster, especially a force
that w e have made ourselves" (p. 66; emphasis added). This untutored
reading of Heidegger is n o t entirely off the mark. Near the end of an
interview filmed for television, conducted months before his death in
1976, Heidegger reaches across his desk and opens u p a notebook from
which he reads the following remark that he attributes to Heinrich von
Kleist: " 1 stand back before one w h o is n o t yet here [da ist], and bow
before his spirit a century in advance.'" 142 Presumably, reading the
Nietzschean Heidegger, we are t o follow suit, incorporating the prolep-
tic Fuhrerprinzip, transforming ourselves accordingly. Finally, in the
same television interview, Heidegger uses a surprising analogy to illus-
trate the claim that authentic thinking is a matter of only a few people
"direcdy," of the many only "indirecdy." 143 Only a tiny handful of peo-
ple in the entire world, h e says, know h o w television actually works —
these being the media-tors—even as everyone else merely uses tele-
vision and is used by it—literally: the media-ted. Presumably, this the-
sis would be true a fortiori of all post-Nietzschean thinking. For his
part, Dick—who sometimes had g o o d reason to believe he was an
android—resisted better than almost anyone becoming fully Heideg-
«* gerized. Nietzschized is always a slighdy different matter. And so it was
g in the agonized case of Dick.
^ The first passage to be cited from Dick's auto-exegesis —and the
g terrible "ironies" provided by mental illness, drug addiction, and their
% pain aside—provides one of the most succinct and brilliant descrip-
£ tions extant of the properly Nietzschean articulation of aesthetics, poli-
fc tics, prophecy: that is, the desire t o write proleptically so as t o have the
386
maximum possible and subcutaneous effect in the future, after the
death of one's material body, under the sign of the slogan, as Nietzsche
himself put it in 1882, "sub specie trecmtorum annorum [under the aspect
of three hundred years]."144 "To be ignited in 300 years—that is my
desire for fame" 145 Elsewhere, Nietzsche spoke in Social Darwinian
terms of millennia and had his own version of a millennial Reich: "The
age of experiments [Experimente]! The claims of Darwin are to be
tested—through experimentations [Versuche]! As is the evolution
of higher organisms out of the lowest. Experimentations [Versuche]
must be conducted for millennia! Raise apes into men!"146 Whatever
one may think of Dick's ideological position in these matters, his in-
sights into the nature of Nieizsche/anism and Nietzsche's corps/e rival the
greatest insights anyone has ever had. When reading Dick's following
remarks put on Peter Tosh singing: "400 years, 400 years, 400 years, O,
O / I And it's the same, the same philosophy, / I said it's 400 years,
400 years, 400 years, / Look how long, O, O— / The people, my
people, they still can't see. / Come on, come on, let's make a
move.. ," 1 4 7
Dick wrote in 1975 for his eyes only:
My very recent book dream, the masterpiece novel gummed into the ency-
clopedia—it refers to such as the above novel [Flow My Tears, the Policeman
Said] cum covert message, as well as [my novel] UBIK, etc. I'm beginning
to think this most recent dream did not carry the message: Write such a
book. But rather: You did write such books (with the gospel reassembled
from trashy bits, as [Stanislaw] Lem put it) .148 (So as to get past the Soviet ^
Marxist materialist censors.) There ate other sheep whom I must bring in," !£
as Christ said. This dream told me not what to do but explained to me what I g
have been doing. I, so fashionable to Marxists both in the West & East—I £
unknown even to myself, carrying the gospel to them in a form acceptable Q
to them. I wonder, now that (3-74) [Dick's quasi-schizophrenic, quasi- p
o
mystical revelation in March 1974] it was explained to me, if I could do it, £
now being self-conscious and deliberate and doing it myself per se; maybe £
my work is done, successfully. I was finally told what I had done: the sheep in g
Co
Thus spake, in our own Night of the Living Dead, the eternally re-
turning, eternally returning as "different" corpse of Friedrich Wilhelm
Nietzsche—in 1975, dictating into the notebooks of Philip Kendred
Dick.
We might indeed conclude that the esoteric project at issue for Dick
was itself intended as some sort of Christian or Gnostic Gospel. At least
one passage in the New Testament —and probably every significant
religious book—complicates this thesis: namely, Mark 4:11-12. As
depicted by Frank Kermode in The Genesis ofSecrecy (1979), when asked
by his disciples what the Parable of the Sower meant, Jesus replied,
"that they, his elect, know the mystery of the kingdom and do not need
to be addressed in parables, but those outside are addressed only thus,
'so that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing they may hear
but not understand, lest at any time they should turn, and their sins
be forgiven them.5"150 This biblical passage and principle—both de-
scribed by Albert Schweitzer as "repellent"—are fully in accord with
</5
g Dick's and Nietzsche's esoteric semiotic or Channel 4. Alternatively
3 put: The Bible, too, is Nietzsche/an.
^ Leaving biblical esotericism aside, however, consider the following
£ note, produced around 1978. Dick wrote:
CO
N
£ Lem & the party experts saw correctly that in my writing I was handing over
£ weapons (secrets) of power to the disenfranchised of the capitalist west;
388
H their appraisal of me is correct. Over & over in my books (i) power is
If studied; (2) who has it; & (3) how those denied it manage to get it. Al-
ls though not appearing left wing my training is really Fascistic—not "Fascis-
I tic" as Marxist rhetoric defines it but as Mussolini defined it: in terms of the
1 deed & the will, with reality de-ontologized, reduced to mere stuff on which
§: the will acts in terms of deed. Since few living people correctly understand
t (genuine) Fascism, my ideology has never been pejoratively stigmatized by
the left, but those to whom I appeal are in essence the core-bulk of latent
masses, the fascist mob. I speak of & for the irrational & the anti-rational, a
kind of dynamic nihilism in which values are generated as mere tactics. Thus
my real idol is Hitler, who starting out totally disenfranchised rose to total
power while scorning wealth (aristocracy) plutocracy to the end. My real
enemy is plutocracy; I've done my (Fascistic homework. [ . . . ] My fascistic
premise is: 'There is not truth. We make truth; what we (first) believe
becomes objectively true. Objective truth depends on what we believe, not the
other way around." This is the essence of the Fascist epistemology, the per-
ception of truth as ideology imposed on reality—mind over matter.151
Inside the restroom, Jonny splashed rusty water onto his face. The room
stank of human waste, and the paper-towel dispenser was empty. On the
floor he found half a copy of Twilight of the Gods. The toilet was full of
Nietzsche. Jonny dried his hands with the few remaining pages. The water
made him feel a little better. However, the comedown from the speed had
left him jumpy and nervous.2
Nietzsche in Dormancy
A Nietzsche lies dormant in every writer, and this is doubdess why a writer
lay dormant in Nietzsche.3
What Marx and Engels said of Hegel's Absolute Spirit and Its fate must
today be said of the dead heads and industrialists of Nietzsche/anism.
the public must often be distinguished from those who pose as its
representatives and spokesmen. In many respects the attitude of the public is
quite different from, even contrary to, that of its spokesmen. Whereas the
public is inclined good-naturedly to blame itself when a philosophical work
does not appeal to it, these others, certain of their own competence, put all
the blame on the author. The effect of such a work on the public is more
noiseless than the action of these dead men when they bury their dead. The
general level of insight now is altogether more educated, its curiosity more
awake, and its judgment more swiftly reached, so that the feet of those who
will carry you out are already at the door. But from this we must often
distinguish the more gradual effect which corrects, too, contemptuous cen-
sure, and gives some writers an audience only after a time, while others after
a time have no audience left.6
How lightly one takes the burden of an ex[cuse] upon oneself, so long as
one has to be responsible for nothing.
BUT I AM ACCOUNTABLE.7
i. Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, vols. 2: The
History of Eroticism [1950-1951] and 3: Sovereignty [1950-1954], trans. Robert
Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 373 (Sovereignty), translation modified.
La part maudite, CEuvres completes, ed. Denis Hollier et al. (Paris: Gallimard,
1970-1988), 8:405. "La position de Nietzsche est la seule en dehors du commu-
nisme." Actually, Bataille supplies a footnote that retreats a step from this stark
assertion.
2. Richard Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Post-Nietzschean Philosophy*
in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2: Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1 -6.
3. Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World
System (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press and London: BFI,
1992), pp. 4-5.
4. Ibid., p. 31.
5. Ibid., p. 82.
6. Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 218.
7. See Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and
Politics [ 1981 ], trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1991). For an important communist counterbalance to Negri's read-
ing of Spinoza, see Fltienne Balibar, "Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell: The Fear of the
Masses" [1985], in Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and
After Marx, trans. James Swenson (New York and London: Roudedge, 1994),
PP- 3-37. Although they share a communist approach, Balibar is more cautious than
Negri in assigning immediately liberatory value to Spinoza's notion of multitudo,
preferring to stress instead the "experimental" nature and "aporetic" structure of
Spinoza's analysis of "the fear of the masses" in the double sense of the genetic
metaphor: namely, the masses' fear of power, and power's fear of them, about which
Spinoza himself remained radically and productively ambivalent. Part of the differ-
ence between Negri and Balibar can be explained by the supposition that Spinoza
employed an exo/esoteric mode of writing, and by the constitutive reluctance of
communist analysis to engage this problematic.
8. See, for example, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, vol. 2: A Thousand Plateaus [1980], trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 123-125,256-261, and 507, and What Is
Philosophy? [ 1991 ], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1994), p. 49; and Deleuze's two books on Spinoza. For a
more conventional view of Spinoza and Nietzsche, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza
and Other Heretics, vol. r: The Marram of Reason, and vol. 2: The Adventures of
Immanence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989),esp. 2:104-135.The jury
on the depth of Nietzsche's relationship to Spinoza is still out; for contrasting points
of view see two monographs: Robert Snel, Het hermetisch universum: Nietzsches
verhouding tot Spinoza en de moderne ontologie [1987] (Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon,
1989); and R. Henrad, Nietzsche en Spinoza: Vreeme verwanten [ 1987] (Delft: Uit-
geverij Eburon, 1989). The most extensive scholarly account remains William S.
Wurzer, "Nietzsche und Spinoza" (Diss., University of Freiburg, 1974; Meisenheim
amGlan: HeimVerlag, 1975).
9- Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-
Form (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 17.
10. Louis Althusser, "Philosophic et marxisme: Entretiens avec Fernanda Na-
varro (1984-1987)," in Sur la philosophie, ed. Olivier Corpet (Paris: Gallimard,
1994), pp. 13-79; here p. 5% ellipsis in original. After around 1980, roughly speak-
ing, Althusser seems to have changed his mind about Nietzsche (and Heidegger),
who is mentioned in his earliest philosophical and political writings only in a per-
functory, commonplace way, and only in his last writings as a legitimate, materialist
contributor to what he begins calling "aleatory materialism." Contrast his obligatory
asides about Nietzsche in "L'intemationale des bons sentiments" (1946), "Du con-
tenu dans la pensee de G. W. F. Hegel" (1947), and even as late as "Marx dans ses
limites" (1978) with his more complex and positive remarks in "Le courant souter-
rain du materialisme de la rencontre" (1982) and especially "Portait de philosophie
matenaliste" (1986), all in his Hcrits philosophiques et politiques, vol. 1, ed. Francois
Matheron (Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1994; Edition posthume d'auvres de Louis Althusser,
vol. 4/1),pp. 35-57 (herep. 35)>59-238 (herepp. 76,199,239, and241), 357-524
(here p. 467), 539-579 (here pp. 561 and 569), and 581-582 (here p. 582), respec-
^ tively. (On Althusser's shift to a more positive valorization of Heidegger in much
N the same regard, see "Le courant souterrain," pp. 539-543, 547,550-551, and 562-
M 564.)
< r i. The Left certainly has no monopoly over the notion that the "end" of commu-
O nism is coterminous with the demise of bourgeois "democracy"—following the
03 cynical logic that the latter without opposition ceases to have any reason to exist. Indeed,
w
H this thesis is far more prevalent and influential on the Right, being shared by
53 "Straussians" as different as Allan Bloom and Francis Fukuyama. See Peter Levine,
398
jjjietzsche and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1995), PP- 260-261 n. 5. Compare also the claim once made by Benito
ftlussolini: "Here the problem arises: but how do you manage to do without an
opposition? . . .Opposition is not necessary to the functioning of a healthy political
regime. Opposition is stupid, superfluous in a totalitarian regime like the Fascist
regime. Opposition is useful in easy times, academic times, as was the case before the
war, when there were discussions in the Assembly about if, how and when socialism
would be achieved, and indeed a whole debate about this—though this was clearly
not serious, despite the men who took pan in it. But we have the opposition within
ourselves, dear sirs, we are not old nags who need a touch of the spur. We keep a
strict check on ourselves . . ." (Benito Mussolini, speech of May 26,1927; as cited in
Selectionsfromthe Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith [New York: International Publishers, 1971], p. 254
n.56).
12. The Mekons, "Funeral," The Curse oftheMekons, © 1991 Blast First/Mute
Records, Ltd., BFFP 80 C. "Your dead are buried ours are reborn / you clean up the
ashes we light the fire / they're queuing up to dance on socialism's grave / this
funeral is for the wrong corpse / This is my testimony a dinosaur's confession / how
can something really be dead when it hasn't even happened / democracy is an alibi
the peaceful country an ordered cemetery / what you call a sane man is now an
impotent man / this funeral is for the wrong corpse / This is my testimony a
dinosaur's confession / how can something really be dead when it hasn't even
happened / smart bombs replace the dumb bombs we can aim right into someone's
kitchen / hard rice sprays from the cooking pot into the eye's delicate jelly / when
the natural order gets unruly the cost of living starts going up / Coo what a
scorcher! are you ashamed of your bum? / this funeral is for the wrong corpse." The
Mekons, originally out of Leeds, trace their genealogy in uneven development to
punk rock's heyday in 1976-1977 around the Sex Pistols. Depending on how one
hears it, "Funeral" either confirms or puts the lie to the perception that "The
present-day Mekons are like any casualties of a defeated revolution—nervous, on
good terms with oblivion,filledwith rage and guilt" (Greil Marcus, "The Return of
King Arthur" [ 1986 ], in Rantors & Crowd Pleasers: Punk in Pop Music 1977-92 [New
York: Doubleday, 1993], pp. 331-337; here p. 331). And Marcus, too, likes the
Mekons.
13. Contemporaneous and independent philosophical support for The Mekons' ^
questioning "the death of socialism" is provided by a former student of Althusser, °
communist philosopher Alain Badiou. See his D'un desastre obscur (Droit, ttat, Politi- «
que) (Paris: Editions de l'aube/Monde en cours, 1991). Jacques Derrida, too, has o
resisted rejoicing at the funeral. See his Spectres de Marx: Utiat de la dette, le travail £
du deuil et la nouvelle internatimak (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1993). This study in S
"hauntology" is dedicated to the assassinated South African communist Chris Hani. UJ
The tripartite subtitle of Derrick's hauntology refers to the desolate state (and ^
399
State) of the "postsocialist" world, to the resulting work of mourning (in thefl
psychoanalytic sense), and to the nouvelle Internationale that is in the process oftl
formation in response to both. Resisting the common perception that he himself i
was ever non- or anti-Marxist, Derrida now asks: "Who can say either 'I am Marxist^ |
or 'I am not Marxist'?"—adding, however, that his thought, like deconstruction I
generally, is simply inconceivable except as a critical appreciation of Marxism: thatJg
is, its "specter" or "spirit'' in the sense of esprit and f&ntome. For an important!
critique, however, see Aijaz Ahmad, "Reconciling Derrida: Spectres of Marx and |
Deconstmctive Politics" New Left Review 208 (1994), 88-106. In 1993-1994, De-1
leuze began writing a book on "the greatness of Marx/5 Visual artists, even in the; Si
First World, are also protesting the alleged death. See, for example, the passionate ;:S
and precise statement by artist and photographer Claude Caroly, which accom-'%
panies his exhibit "Tournee 1991 Paris-Berlin-Prague": "Oui bien sur, je montre |
Berlin, Dresde, Prague, sans indulgence, avec sevente1 et vous pourriez en ddduire f
que je deeds 1'eroulement du Communisme, une m^taphore en somme. Erreur. Je 'I
crois au communisme. Mais de quoi parle-t-on alors? II s'agit simplement de mon
angoisse face a une victoire et une d^faite, face a la projection simpliste du monde,
face a ce mal universe! dont on veut nous faire croire que e'est celui des autres. Ne me
demandez pas si ce travail tdmoigne de mes certitudes, il ne tlmoigne que de mon
desarroi. . . ." Note finally that even nearly a half century ago one of Beckett's
personae, when confronted by an orator speaking elliptically and telegraphically of
"Union . . brothers Marx . . . capital. . . bread and butter . . love," re-
marked that "It was all Greek to me" but also that the orator called him a Hiving
corpse" for not listening to what was being said (Samuel Beckett, "The End" trans.
Richard Seaver and the author, in Stories <& Texts for Nothing [Nouvelles et textespour
rien
> i9S&] [New York: Grove Press, 1967], pp. 47-72; here p. 66\ emphasis
added). Communists and communism have always been "dead," it seems — and for
that no less alive.
14. See Mike Davis, City ofQuartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles, photo-
graphs by Robert Morrow (London and New York: Verso, 1990).
15. Linton Kwesi Johnson, "Di Good Life," Tings an* Times, © 1991 Shanachie
Records Corp., 43084. This future-oriented project contrasts with today's rather
lugubrious "Gothic Marxism," which seems able to keep living on only by feeding
off the past. Cf. Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the
^ Paris of the Surrealist Revolution (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of
Jn California Press, 1993), pp. 11-12.
w 16. Gregory Elliott, "Analysis Terminated, Analysis Interminable: The Case of
«< Louis Althusser," in Althusser: A Critical Reader, ed. Gregory Elliott (Oxford and
Q Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 177-202; here p. 196.
05 17. Atif Khan, "On the Philosophy of Louis Althusser," unpublished manuscript,
w
H Cornell University, 1995.
2 18. See The Last Bolshevik (Chris. Marker, France, 1993)-
400
ip. Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London and
^Jfew York: Verso, 1990), p. 183; emphasis added. This book often reads like a
remarkably old, left-liberal reflection on revolution's imagined impossibility. Sim-
) ilarly benign views of Nietzsche are ubiquitous in post-Marxism, particularly when
they are of Foucauldian—which is also to say Nietzschean—persuasion. See, for
example, Michelle Barrett, The Politics of Truth: From Mm; to Foucault (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1991).
30. Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, p. 112; emphasis added.
Not only "Nietzsche" is explicitly enlisted in this project but also "Heidegger,"
"Wittgenstein," and—small surprise—"pragmatism."
21. See Jameson, The Seeds of Time [1991] (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994)-
22. See V I. Lenin, The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State and the
Tasks ofthe Proletariat in the Revolution [1917-1918], Collected Works, various transla-
tors (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 25:385-497; here esp. 475-479.
23. Generally speaking, when the term "ideology" occurs in this book it means
not a problem of false consciousness (Marx), which notoriously entails impossible
access to true consciousness, but rather a set of material interests in conflict with
others (Lenin). Thus defined, ideology is more even than "a 'representation' of the
Imaginary relationship of individuals to their Real conditions of existence"—a rela-
tionship that no social transformation can eradicate but only modify because in this
sense "ideology has no history" (Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Appara-
tuses [Notes towards an Investigation]" [1969-1970], in Lenin and Philosophy and
Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster [New York and London: Monthly Review Press,
1971], pp. 127-186; here pp. 159 and 162). For ideology is also a relay between
people and the element in which all possible human relationships transpire in strug-
gle and in peace: "In class society ideology is the relay whereby, and the element in
which, the relation between people and their conditions of existence is settled to the
profit of the ruling class. In a classless society ideology is the relay whereby, and the
element in which, the relationship between people and their conditions of existence
is lived to the profit of all people" (Althusser, "Marxism and Humanism" [ 1965 ], in
For Marx [1965], trans. Ben Brewster [New York: Vintage, 1969], pp. 219-247;
here pp. 235-236).
24. Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], in The Marx-Engels Reader,
2d ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1978), 55
PP- 525-541; here p. 531. §
w
25. Regarding what William Haver calls the "impossibility of psychoanalytic Svork- «•
ing through'" and the "refusal to mourn"—which is not the refusal to grieve—see o
Takenishi Hiroko, <cThe Rite," in The Crazy Iris and Other Stories of the Atomic £
Aftermath, ed. Kenzaburo Oe (New York: Grove Press, 1985), pp. 169-200; Ota »
Yoko, City of Corpses [ 1945 ], in Hiroshima: Three Witnesses, ed. and trans. Richard H. ^
Minear (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 143-273; David Woj- ^
401
narowicz, CTare to the Knives: AMemoirofDisintegration (New York: Vintage, 1991);^
and the analysis of this problematic in William Haver, "A World of Corpses: Front •
Hiroshima and Nagasaki to A I D S " forthcoming article. Finally, on the refusal to
work as a political and economic tactic, think less of contemporary slacker culture
than of the essays collected mAutonomia: Post-Political Politics, ed. Sylvere Lotringer
and ChristianMarazzi, special issue of Semiotext(e) 3:3 (1980).
26. William S. Burroughs, Cities of the RedNight (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, i98i),p. 157.
27. Avital Ronell, "Our Narcotic Modernity," in Rethinking Technologies, ed. Ver-
ena Andermatt Conley (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press,
i993)i PP- 59_73> here p. 62. O n drugs in a related but nonmetaphoric sense, see
Burroughs, appendix [1956] t o his Naked Lunch [1959] (New York: Grove Wei-
denfeld, i99i),pp. 215-232.
28. Ronell, "Namely, Eckermann" in Looking After Nietzsche, ed. Laurence A.
Rickels (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 233-257; here
p. 233. Reprinted \nRonc\[,Finitude>s Score: Essaysfarthe Millennium (Lincoln and
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994),pp. 159-181.
29. See Kurt Breysig, "Gedenkrede an Friedrich Nietzsches Bahre" Die Zukunft
32 (September 8, 1900), 413-414. Actually, Breysig did find Nietzsche compara-
ble—most favorably at that—only to Jesus, Buddha, and Zoroaster among all other
figures in history. Breysig was an associate of the Stefan George Circle.
30. Zizek paraphrasing Jameson in "Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology," in
Mapping Ideology, ed. Slavoj Zizek (London and New York: Verso, 1994), PP-1-33;
here p. 1.
31. Althusser, ' T h e Object of Capital," in Louis Althusser and ^tienne Balibar,
Reading Capital [Lire le Capital, 1965, 2d ed. 1968], trans. Ben Brewster (London:
NLB, 1970), pp. 71-198; here p. 184.
32. Crime & the City Solution (Bronwyn Adams, Simon Bonney, Chrislo Haas,
Alexander Hacke, Mick Harvey, Thomas Stern), "The Adversary," as recorded on
Music from the Motion Picture Soundtrack of Until the End of the World, A Film by Wim
Wenders, © 1991 Warner Bros. Records Inc., 9 26707-4.
33. Nick Cave & The Bad Seeds, "City of Refuge," Tender Prey, © 1988/92. Mute
Records, Ltd., 9 61059-4.
34. See Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Dur-
ham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 67-129, and The Geopolitical Aesthetic,
l> pp. 22-35.
w 35. Albert Kalthoff, Zamthustrapredigten: Reden iiber die sittliche Lebensauffassung
<j Friedrich Nietzsches (Leipzig: Eugen Diederichs, 1904), p. 4. The author of these
O "Zarathustra Sermons," Pastor Kalthoff, was a leader-member of a remarkably ex-
05 tensive German Protestant movement that had begun by the 1890s to "synthesize"
w "
H Christianity and Nietzsche and, in Kalthoff's case, Marx as well. Thinking that he
£ had proved definitively by his philological research that the historical Jesus did not
402
! exist, Kalthoff held to the belief that the Early Church had nonetheless produced
f«the widest communist manifesto that was ever framed" Adding gleaned notions of
fj^arx and Nietzsche into this pot, Kalthoff brewed what has been called the first
^Theology of Hope," even "Liberation Theology" See James Bendey, Between Mane
Wmd Christ: The Dialogue in German-Speaking Europe 1870-1970 (London: NLB,
I1982), esp. pp. 37-41 and 57-59-
§£• 36. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke, ed. Fritz Koegel (Leipzig: C. G. Naumann,
I1899), 12:5-130, which assembles his remarks from the summer of 1881 on T h e
Ithcorporation of the Basic Errors f T h e Incorporation of the Passions," "The Incor-
Iporation of Knowledge (The Passion of C o g n i t i o n ) " T h e Individual as Experi-
f ihenC and T h e New Weight of Gravity?'
I 37. Franco Bolelli as cited in Maurizio Viano, A Certain Realism: Making Use of
iPasolinft Film Theory and Practice (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of
^California Press, 1993),p. 18.
% 38. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter, Foreword to Incorporations, ed. Jona-
than Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone Books, 1992), pp. 12-15; here
p. 12.
39. See Maggie Kilgour, "Metaphors and Incorporation" in From Communion to
Cannibalism: An Anatomy of Metaphors of Incorporation, ed. Maggie Kilgour (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 3-19.
40. Chris Rodley, ed., Cronenberg on Cronenberg [ 1992], 2d, expanded ed. (Lon-
don and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. 29.
41. The "economic-corporate" is a keyterm in Antonio Gramsci's attempt in T h e
Modern Prince" (1931-1934) t o describe and change social "relations offeree."
Extrapolated from the Leninist concept of "trade-union consciousness" it consti-
tutes the narrow (i.e., necessary but insufficient) mode of particular economic
consciousness that communists must make more universal politically, culturally, and
hegemonically. It is an index of the critical moment when "the development and
expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the
motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the 'national' energies.
In other words, the dominant group is co-ordinated concretely with the general
interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the state is conceived of as a
continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria (on the
juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the
subordinate groups—equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group pre- ^
vail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly economic- °
corporate interest" {Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gmmsci, p. 182). In *
Gramscfs analysis, fascism and liberalism are particularly skillful in exploiting the O
economic-corporative moment; indeed, this is a major source of their power, indi- >
vidually and en bloc. See his "Some Aspects of the Southern Question" [1926], in w
Selections from Political Writings (1921-1926), ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare (New 00
York: International Publishers, 1978), pp. 441 -462. It is not commonly recognized °°
403
in t h e English-speaking world h o w concerned Gramsci was with questions o f l
e c o n o m y — a concern that becomes evident as m o r e of his prison writings beconiel
accessible. See his Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. D e r e k l
Boothman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp-161-277. -|
42. Antonin Artaud, The Theater and Its Double [1938], trans. Mary Caroline!
Richards ( N e w York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 8.
43. See Elaine Scarry, The Body inPain: TheMaking of the World. (Oxford and N e w !
York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
44. See G e o r g Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen uberdie Geschichte derPhiloso^i
phie [various versions from 1805 to 1830;firstpublished by K. L. Michelet in 1833-;!
1836], Werke in zwanzig Bdnden, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel!
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 18:441-516; here 514. For a transla-|
tion, see Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ed. and trans. E. S. Haldane, 3!
vols. (London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul, 1955;rpt.ofthei892-i896ed.), 11384-^
448.
45. Hegel, Vorlesungen titer die Philosophic der Geschichte [various versions from
1822 t o 1831; first edited and published b y E. Gans in 1837], Werke in zwanzig
Bdnden, 12:329-330. F o r a translation, see Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History,
trans. J. Sibree ( N e w York: T h e Colonial Press, 1899), pp. 2 6 9 - 2 7 0 .
46. Bryan S. Turner, The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 251. To be sure, Turner is not wrong to accuse both
Marxism and structuralism of having neglected the human body; and his concept of
individuality is more complex thansimply "bourgeois: 'The body is at once the most
solid, the most elusive, illusory, concrete, metaphysical, ever present and ever distant
thing—a site, an instrument, an environment" (p. 8).
4.7. Hegel, Vorlesungen uberdie Geschichte der Phihsophie, in Werke, 1:515.
48. For a related—but also very different—version of Nietzsche's relationship t o
Socrates, see W e m e r Dannhauser, Nietzsche's View of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1974).
49. According to Plato's narrative, Socrates only seemed to assert that he had never
taught an esoteric doctrine, adding, "if anyone asserts that he has ever learned or
heard from me privately anything which was not open to everyone else, you may be
quite sure that he is not telling the truth" {Apology, 33b). And Socrates claimed
never to have participated in any "secret societies," or other such activities in Athens
O (3fib).On the other hand, after the jury had decided the death penalty, he predicted
ov rather ominously that his accusers w o u l d discover after his death that they "will have
N m o r e critics, w h o m u p till n o w I have restrained without your knowing it; and being
•< younger they will be harsher on you and will cause you more annoyance" than he
Q himself has done (39c-d; emphasis added). It seems, therefore, that Socrates had
[_!
,3 withheld at least one thing from public scrutiny after all. This contradiction m a y be
pq
H resolved only by assuming that the ultimate Socratic irony consists in the fact that
fc Socratism had already inculcated itself into the jury, such that it was condemning
404
^itself by condemning him, indeed that it was condemning the Athenian state to its
demise. Thus, by claiming that no one had "ever learned or heard"fromhun "pri-
vately anything which was not open to everyone else," Socrates did not strictly
' exclude the transmission of knowledge by other than rational or audible means,
which is after ail part of his teaching in the first place. For a translation, see Plato,
Socrates'Defense (Apology), trans. Hugh Tredennick, in The Collected Dialogues of
Plato, Including the Letters, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 2d, cor-
/recteded. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 3-26. Manycontem-
^porary philosophers, political theorists, and rhetoricians deny that Plato's dialectic,
as imputed to Socrates, was as logical or dialogic as it might appear. To them the
Socratic method sooner resembles an interested interrogation than a genuine di-
alogue, and Plato may well have had ulterior, antidemocratic motives behind his
, unfair representations of opponents, including the Sophists. It remains to be seen
what Nietzsche's position was in this regard.
50. Martin Heidegger, Nietzscbes metaphysische Grundstettung im abendldndischen
Denken: Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleicben [Freiburg summer semester 1937], ed.
Marion Heinz, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986),
2/47:79-80; emphasis added. This seminar was republished—ostensibly verba-
tim— in Nietzsche, 2 vols. (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1961), 1:255-472; here 331-
332. It was originally given at the University of Freiburg in 1937, years after Hei-
degger supposedly had given up his commitment to Nazism. In most cases it is
important—as is almost never done—to compare and contrast the 1961 version of
Heidegger's ostensible "confrontation" with national socialism in his Nietzsche
lectures with the original seminars of the late 1930s and early 1940s. But in the case of
this passage Heidegger made only minor stylistic changes.
51. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life [Arts defaire, 1974], trans.
Steven Rendall (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press,
1988), p. 149-
52. Think of Andres Serrano's exquisitely composed photographs of human
corpses that are alive with overdetermined—part precise, part obscure—icono-
graphic and psychological power: for example, in the series Morgue (1992) and
Object ofDesire (1992).
53- Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics [completed 1675, published 1678], in On the
Improvement ofthe Understanding, The Ethics, Correspondence, trans, with an introduc-
tion by R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955; rpt- of the 1883 o
ed.), pp. 43 -27 r; here p. 216 [ part 4, prop. 39, note]. w
54. Nietzsche, "Nachgelassene Fragmente, Juli-August 1882," in Kritische Gesam- *4
tausgabe, Werke, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin and New York: ^
Walter de Gruyter, i967fF), 7/1:7. This edition will be cited as KGW, with ap- o
propriate section, volume, and page numbers. Nietzsche's notebooks, which he *>
did not intend for publication, are referred to in the KGW as his "Nachgelassene 7
Fragmente" (posthumous fragments); they will be abbreviated as "NF," followed *•»
405
by the date of composition assigned by the editors. The KGW is the most authorita-
tive edition of Nietzsche's work but does not include his early writings. The earliest
of these—though still not including his later philological work and lectures at the
University of Basel—have been reprinted from an unfinished edition undertaken in
1933-1940 as Friihe Schriften, 5 vols., ed. Hans Joachim Metre (Munich: C. H.
Beck, 1994), with the editorial and critical apparatus remaining inadequate.
55. Nietzsche, "NF, Sommer-Herbst 1882"; KGW7/1:57] emphasis added.
56. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1883"; KGW 7/1=533,627.
57. Also see Stanley Corngold, The Fate of the Self: German Writers and French
Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 95-128. The Nietzschean
self is strikingly similar or parallel to the "poetic self" described by Corngold: that is,
a self that "cannot be known in advance of its articulation; it can come to life only for
a reader. But it is not produced ab ovo by that reader. It is present to him as the being
which intended by an act of writing to be present to the future of that act" (p. ix).
58. Spinoza, Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being [c. 1662], in The
Collected Works of Spinoza, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, 2d, corrected ed. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), 1:53-156; here 75 [first dialogue, para. 8 ] .
59- Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy [1970], trans. Robert Hurley
(San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), p. 13.
60. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation [ 1819 and 1844],
trans. E. F. J. Payne (Indian Hills, Colo.: The Falcon's Wing Press, 1958), 1:5;
Samtliche Werke, ed. Julius Frauenstadt and Arthur Hiibscher (Wiesbaden: F. A.
Brockhaus, 1965), 2:6 [first bk., ch. 2 ] .
61. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], dual-language
ed., with an inttoduction by Bertrand Russell (London and New York: Routledge,
1992), p. 150/151 [prop. 5-632].
62. Balibar, "Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell," in Masses, Classes, Ideas, p. 12.
63. Negri, The Savage Anomaly, p. xix.
64. As the liberal political philosopher Norbeto Bobbio has pointed out, follow-
ing the lead of Joseph Schumpeter, elitism in the abstract is not necessarily a prob-
lem. Not only do elites remain "even" in representative democracies, but there are
many kinds of elites, not all of which necessarily block democratic participation.
Rather the problem is the specific ways that some elites attempt to impose their will
on society and to what ultimate ends they do so. See Norbeto Bobbio, The Future of
•p Democracy: A Defense of the Rules of the Game, ed. Richard Bellamy, trans. Roger
2 Griffin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 31-33. And some
« elites, notably the Gramscian and Leninist Communist Party, are designed to elimi-
<j nate elitism eventually.
Q 65. Nietzsche, Werke, 12:215. "Alle Wesen nur Voriibungen in der Vereinigung
H (Einverleibung) von Gegensatzen.'
W
H 66. Nietzsche, "NF, Juli-August 1882"; KGW 7/1:34-35; here 35. This collection
Z was intended as a gift for his then close friend Lou Andreas-Salome' (1861 -19 3 7) —
406 hence the "our" in the aphorism.
*'J~67- "I" bourgeois society, living labor is but a means to increase accumulated
labor. In Communist society, accumulated labor is but a means to widen, to enrich,
to promote the existence of the laborer. In bourgeois society, therefore, the past
dominates the present; in Communist society, the present dominates the past. In
4
bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living per-
son is dependent and has no individuality. And the abolition of this state of things is
-called by the bourgeois abolition of individuality and freedom! And righdy so. The
fabolitfon of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois free-
dom is undoubtedly aimed at" (Marx and Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the
'Communist Party" [1848], in Collected Works, various translators [New York: Inter-
national Publishers, i97<SrT], 6:477-519; here 499).
68. Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy [ 1857-1858,
first published 1939], trans, with a foreword by Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vin-
tage Books, 1973), p- 361.
69. Burroughs, Cities of the Red Night, p. 13.
70. HDTV allows not only particularly sharp images but the possibility of tech-
nohuman, digital interface of the kind required today for the newest and most
powerful technologies. "American industry, many economists say, will stand or fall
with high-definition television. Economists and business consultants have reg-
istered their belief in the importance of HDTV for American economic inter-
ests. Economic well-being depends on how soon American industry can produce
[and/or afford, one ought to add] these flat-screen displays for home video, for
other countries are competing for the video market. The importance of the state-of-
the-art interface goes beyond economic competition and includes national defense.
The U.S. military depends on the latest video displays. . . . A nanosecond delay or a
slight distortion in visual information can spell disaster" (Michael Heim, The Meta-
physics of Virtual Reality [New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993 j ,
p. 76). On HDTV and its implications, see further Jean-Luc Renaud, Toward
Higher Definition Television," in Future Visions: New Technologies of the Screen, ed.
Philip Hayward and Tana Wbllen (London: BFI, 1993), PP- 46-71.
71. See Victor Tausk, 'The Influence Machine" [1919], trans. Dorian Feigen-
baum, in Incorporations, pp. 542-569; andTheodor W. Adorno, "Television and the
Patterns of Mass Culture" [first published 1954 in English as "How to Look at
Television"], in Mass Communications, ed. Wilbur Schramm (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, i960), pp. 594-612; here p. 602. Adorno is paraphrasing a central Q
thesis of Lowenthal. w
72. Davis, City of Quartz, p. 12. On the contribution of a "Southern-Californized" H
Nietzsche to the right-wing inception of Los Angeles in the minds and actions of ^
such men as General Harrison Gray Otis and Willard Huntington Wright, and on c
the more recent "Nietzschean porno-mythology of motorcycle gangs and hotrod- «
ders," see pp. 28 and 66. See further Davis, Beyond Blade Runner: Urban Control and ^
the Ecology of Fear (Westfield, N.J.: Open Magazine Pamphlet Series, 1992)- Finally, o
for an analysis of what can be called "Nietzschean architecture " see Kazys Varnelis, 407
' T h e Spectacle of the Innocent Eye: Vision, Cynical Reason, and the Discipline of
Architecture in Postwar America" (Diss., Cornell University, 1994) •
73. Davis, City of Quartz, p. 21.
74. Ibid., p. 25.
75. Jonathan Crary, "Critical Reflections,Mrt/ww& (February 1994), 59 and 103;
here 59.
76. Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the "Grundrisse" [ 197S-1979], ed. Jim
Fleming, trans. Harry Cleaver, Michael Ryan, and Maurizio Viano, 2d ed. (Lon-
don: Pluto Press; New York: Autonomedia, 1991), pp. roo-101.
77. Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic, p. 25.
78. Alex Callinicos, "What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of
Althusser" [ 1988 ] , in TheAlthusserian Legacy, ed. E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprin-
ker (London and New York: Verso, 1993), pp. 39-49; here p. 48. Whereas Cal-
linicos folds Althusserian Marxism into this problematic, this book attempts to
liberate it.
79- The neo-Heideggerian popularizer Michael Heim—dubbed by his publisher
"the philosopher of cyberspace"—writes on virtual reality "in the hope that my
beloved philosophia will awaken from her slumber and once again radiate brighdy
and move beautifully as she has in past centuries and in my dreams'* (Heim, The
Metaphysics of Virtual Reality, p. xviii). As if high philosophy (sexism and self-
promotion aside) could be extracted—as a homogeneous whole, as it ostensibly orig-
inally was—like "the rational kernel within the mystical shell"!
80. Nietzsche's most extensive diatribe against the nascent culture industry is in
his seldom-read first "untimely meditation'' on David Friedrich Strauss. See Nietz-
sche, Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen, Erstes Stuck: David Strauss der Bekenner und der
SchnftsteUer [1873]; KGW 3/1:153-238 [Untimely Meditations: David Strauss,
the Confessor and the Writer].
81. See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social
Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
82. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism [1972], rev. ed. (London: NLB, 1975),
p. 387. Aspokesman for the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (USec),
the late MandePs claim to represent the legacy of Trotsky is disputed by other
factions of the Fourth International, such as the Spartacist League (SL) and the
International Communist League (ICI).
83. Davis, "Urban Renaissance and the Spirit of Postmodernism" [1985], in
l
Postmodernism and Its Discontents: Theories, Practices, ed. E. Ann Kaplan (London
B and New York: Verso, 1988), pp. 79-87; here pp. 81 and 82-83. Obviously the
<! attempt to locate the incept date of postmodernism and t o attempt to map it onto
O the general development of capitalism is at stake as well: the '60s? the mid-^os? Here
w Davis disagrees with Jameson, for example, or rather with the tatter's appeal to
B
H Mandel. But as soon as "postmodernism" is grasped not as a problem of history but
55 as a way of producing and receiving artifacts "hermeneutically," the issue of its
408
precise social "birth" and "death" becomes relatively moot. And this is exactly what
has happened in the case of Nietzsche, who is all too easy to read as if he were a
postmodern writer.
84. Davis, Prisoners ofthe American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History ofthe
U.S. Working Class (London: Verso, 1986), p. 233.
85. Althusser, "Contradiction and Overdetermination: Notes for an Investiga-
tion" [1962; 1965], For Marx, pp. 87-128; here p. 113.
86. Deleuze and Guatcari, What Is Philosophy? p. 21.
87. Actually, a more useful definition of "essentialism" than that commonly em-
ployed in cultural and literary studies comes from the history of science: namely, the
conflation of words and things. Entailed then is the "rejection of the attitude of
attributing importance to words and their meaning (or their 'true' meaning)," or at
least undue attention (Karl Popper, Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography
[Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co./Fontana, 1976], p. 17)- As Spinoza had
noted, "we may never, while we are concerned with inquiries into actual things,
draw any conclusions from abstractions; we shall be extremely careful not to con-
found that which is only in the understanding with that which is the thing itself"
(Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding [1661, unfinished], in On the
Improvement of the Understanding, The Ethics, Correspondence, pp. 1-41; here 34).
88. Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space [1974], trans. Donald Nicholson-
Smith (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 285; emphasis
added.
89. To repeat, Nietzsche's Corps/e also can qualify as a commodity, for it is what
identifies-produces Ntetzsche/anism.
90. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? p. 5. This "Nietzschean" definition
has accompanied Deleuze throughout his career; compare the following remark
made in the late 1960s: "A philosophy's power is measured by the concepts it creates,
or whose meaning it alters, concepts that impose a new set of divisions on things
and actions. It sometimes happens that those concepts are called forth at a certain
time, charged with a collective meaning corresponding to the requirements of a
given period, and discovered, created or recreated by several authors at once" (De-
leuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza [Spinoza et la probleme de ^expression,
1968], trans. Martin Joughin [New York: Zone Books, 1990], p. 321).
91 • Nietzsche, "NF, April-Juni 1885"; KGW 7/ 3 ^07. 3
92. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? p. 17. ^
93- Balibar, "Althussers Object," Social Text 39 (Summer 1994), 157-188; here e»
157- Communists must not back down from confronting Lenin's assertion in 1917 O
that "the theory of the class struggle was created not by Marx, but by the bourgeoisie ^
before Marx, and, generally speaking, it is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. Those who w
recognize only the class struggle are not yet Marxist; they may be found to be still ^
within the bounds of bourgeois tliinking and bourgeois politics. To confine Marx- 1
ism to the theory of the class struggle means curtailing Marxism, distorting it, +•
409
reducing it to something acceptable to the bourgeoisie. Only he is a Marxist who
extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship of
the proletariat. This is what constitutes the most profound distinction between the
Marxist and the ordinary petty (as well as big) bourgeois. This is the touchstone on
which the real understanding and recognition of Marxism should be tested" (Lenin,
The State and Revolution, in Collected Works, 25:416-417). J o h n E h r e n b e r g takes this
passage as his point of departure to argue that, properly understood, the dictator-
ship of the proletariat is at the core of communism and that in theory (though not as
it has been generally practiced) it "still describes the democratic and revolutionary
politics" of what remains the "only alternative" to capitalism, for the latter "has not
undergone some sort of miraculous transformation over the last decade or so; its
contradictions and driving forces are the same as they were when Marx, Engels, and
Lenin were still alive" (John Ehrenberg, The Diaatonhip ofthe Proletariat: Marxism's
Theory of Socialist Democracy [New York and London: Routledge, 1992], pp. 4 and
188). But, while these contradictions and driving forces may be the same in essence,
the forms they take are certainly different, and Lenin would be among the last
communists to refuse to adjust to and test them. Nonetheless, the dictatorship of the
proletariat remains "the ideal of the masses learning to govern themselves by the
actual practice of governing themselves " this being the only notion "that keeps alive
the possibility that humanity might raise itself above the level of bestiality" (Robert
Paul Resch, Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory [Berkeley, Los An-
geles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992] > p. 32). See further, Balibar, On
the Diaatonhip of the Proletariat [ 1976], trans. Grahame Lock, afterword by Louis
Althusser (London: New Left Books, 1977); and Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power,
Socialism [1977], trans. Patrick Camiller (London: New Left Books, 1978). As
Resch notes, these books represent the two "nuanced positions within the Althus-
serian camp" on the elimination by the USSR in 1976 of the official slogan "dictator-
ship of the proletariat"—Balibar's being more Leninist, Poulantzas's more Grams-
cian(p. $66).
94. See Henri Bergson, Lapensee et le mouvant (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1934); and GUles Deleuze, "La conception de la difference chez Bergson,"
Lesetudesbergsoniennes4 (i95<5), 77-112, Bergsonism [i9<56], trans. H u g h T o m l i n -
son and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), The Fold: Leibniz and
the Baroque [1988], foreword and translation by Tom Conley (Minneapolis: Uni-
^ versity of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 104-106, and Expressionism in Philosophy,
H pp. 88-89. See further the clear (if uncritical) exposition of Deleuze's critique of
w Bergson in Michael H a r d t , Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy ( M i n -
es
«5 neapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), ch. 1: "Bergsonian
O Ontology: The Positive Movement of Being," esp. pp. 16-18.
w 95- Deleuze, Bergsonism, p. 96: see further H a r d t , Gilles Deleuze, p. 17.
w
g 9<5. See Althusser, " T h e Object oiCapital," in Reading Capital, p. 198.
!zi 97. Readers curious about that strange subject known as the "author"—including
410
her/his motivation in writing about something s/he not merely does not like, but
hates—may be interested in a central proposition of Spinozist ethics that "If a man
has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will,
pauses being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his
hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love," and the proposition
that "Joy arising from the fact that anything we hate is destroyed, or suffers other
injury, is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us* Another matter entirely,
however, is Spinoza's concomitant proposition that "Hatred which is completely
vanquished by love passes into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred
had not preceded it." Of such a love, the author has no knowledge in the case of
Nietzsche/anism—less because of any personal inadequacy, possibly, than because
of the constitutive duplicity of the phenomenon here in radical dispute. See Spi-
noza, The Ethics, pp. 155,160, and 159 [part 3, props. 38,47, and 44]. Readers even
more curious are advised that, yes, the author remains in 1995-1996 and since "the
'6os"—in spite of often severe reservations (with several Maoist and Trotskyist
"deviations") —a communist, indeed a member of the CPUSA. While he criticizes
aspects of his own book severely as yet another way in which, alas, "reading has
become the appropriate form of politics," he agrees also with Aijaz Ahmad about the
significance of the Gramscian phrase "community of praxis": namely, "if you do not
explicitly partake of the life of identifiable communities of individuals as they actu-
ally straggle in their lives, your criticism may have keenness of intelligence and ob-
servation but it is also likely to have that Orwellian lovelessness that comes, inev-
itably, from having 'floated upwards' and from 'rooting yourself in yourself."*
Academic discourse being one form of community, no matter how limited. See
"Blindness in Literary and Cultural Studies" [interview with Aijaz Ahmad by
Shuchi Kapila], The Bookpress 3:3 (April 1993), 12-13; here 13; and Ahmad, In
Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London and New York: Verso, 1992), esp.
pp. 169-175. Finally, a word about the trope of "speaking as a . . . ": for example,
"speaking as a c o m m u n i s t . . . " or "as a Nietzschean. . . . " On the one hand it is
sometimes important to label one's position as clearly as possible, so as not to give
the impression of having attained a position of objectivity and neutrality that one
does not in fact possess, but also as an act of solidarity with some people against
others. On the other hand one therebyrisksbuying into mass-mediatized images of
what this label means, and, as Barbara Johnson puts it, of "treating as known the very
predicate I was trying to discover" (Barbara Johnson, "Lesbian Spectacles: Reading a
O
Sula, Passing, Thelma and Louise, and The Accused," in Media Spectacles, ed. Marjorie «
Garber, Jann Matlock, and Rebecca L. Walkowitz [New York and London: Rout- ^
ledge, 1993], PP- 160-166; here p. 160). See further Nancy K. Miller, Getting Per- g
sonal (New York and London: Routledge, 1991). 2
98. This is not to defend all types of "materialist monism"; see Althusser, "On the *
MaterialistDialectic:OntiieUnevermessofOrigiris'>[i963],mi7^iMaK«,pp. 161- "f
218; here pp. 201-202. Nor is this to suggest that Nietzsche/anism cannot be ^.
411
described by classical metaphysics—virtually anything can. In the Platonic tradition:
generally, it is deemed logically necessary t o "elucidate the essential nature and-
characteristics" of something "before describing its effects" (Plato, Symposium,.
2 o i d - 2 0 2 ) . Aristode might call Nietzsche/anism a "substance" in the technical
sense of something that at once underlies ("Nietzsche") and undergoes ("Nietzsche-;
anism") change, both retains its identity and yet (a move denied later by Descartes),
is capable of admitting or emitting contrary qualities. See Aristode, Cat. 4a 19-21 and
2b 29. As Deleuze suggests, Spinoza's notion of causality was anti-Cartesian, not
anti-Aristotelian (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, p. 157). Speaking Hegelese
metaphysics, one might say that it is as Nietzscheanism that Nietzsche "survives his
own supersession" and that their relationship, qua Nietzche/anism, would be one
of "dialectical negation" ozAuJhebung. But such metaphysical "definitions" remain;
paradoxical and— as metaphysical systems tend to do—provide little more than yet
another description of phenomena that thus remain ungrasped. For his pan, Spinoza
would likely not have considered Nietzsche t o be an "uncreated substance" (e.g.,
God and Nature) — although Nietzsche has been treated this way, at least implicidy,
by many Nietzscheans. But Spinoza makes it conceptually possible to think of
substance as having more than one attribute, indeed an infinite number. This is in
contrast to Descartes, who did hold that substances can have only one attribute, and
which would reduce Nietzsche/anism only to the question of what Nietzsche
"really meant." Whether Nietzsche's Corps/e can ultimately evade such metaphysical
snares is obviously open to doubt.
99. A recent book in English o n the phenomenon of "Nietzscheanism" is symp-
tomatic of this general problem, informed as it is by several methodological, ideo-
logical, and theoretical prejudices and confusions. "Nietzscheans" are defined as
"simply those who regarded themselves as significandy influenced by Nietzsche and
sought to give this influence some concrete or institutional expression"; and it is
further assumed that it is "clear that Nietzsche was not identical with any of the
political appropriations made in his name." The author of these assertions—which
in fact are anything but simple and clear—then feels himself under surprisingly little
obligation to read Nietzsche himself—and almost never his notebooks, with the
occasional exception of the so-called Witt to Power—nor to ask how Nietzsche might
have attempted rhetorically t o control his subsequent "legacy" This refusal is par-
ticularly strange because Nietzsche remains for this author the "central inspiration"
<* for Nietzscheanism, in spite of the self-evident fact that "there were always other
J? forces and influences at work" in its formation (Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche
w Legacy in Germany 1890-1090 [Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of Califor-
<j nia Press, 1992], pp. 13, 14, and 15; emphases added). In addition to his o w n
O extensive archival research into the reception of Nietzsche, Aschheim gets appro-
<a priate mileage out of such standard research tools for analyzing this reception as
W
H Richard Frank Krummel's Nietzsche und der deutsche Geist, 2 vols. (Berlin and New
O
E York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974 and 198 3). Krummers massive—though hardly com-
412
orehensive and not always accurate—book is part of an extensive literature, mostly
in German, documenting and analyzing various aspects of the reception of Nietz-
sche, and Aschheim has made conscientious use of much of it. Though, to repeat,
his own knowledge of Nietzsche does not extend much beyond standard references
and cliches. So his book is predictably rich in interesting and useful detail, especially
for readers with no access to German accounts. Aschheim claims to be sociologically
neutral and abstentionist. For example, he refuses to ask—let alone answer—"what
Nietzsche 'really* meant," even though he admits, at the end of his book, that "to
argue for the centrality of interested, mediated appropriations does not, of course,
render irrelevant the role of the Nietzschean text in this process" (p. 316). But this
claim of neutrality is belied, among other things, by Aschheim's own distinctly
ideological positions: for example, unreflected historicism. Aschheim cites a remark
made by Eric Vdgelin in 1944 to the effect that, while one ought not deny "the
horror passages" in Nietzsche's writing, "their existence should not be an incentive
either to whitewash or to condemn Nietzsche, but rather to explore the structure of
his thought which produced them." But, just as one obviously ought never "white-
wash" any complex phenomenon, so too one ought never give up in advance the
possibility that—after its structure has been grasped asfirmlyas possible—the same
phenomenon may well be worthy of being "condemned" (Eric Vogelin, "Nietz-
sche, the Crisis and the War,"Journal ofPolitics 6:1 (February 1944), 201; as cited in
Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, p. 318).
100. Deleuze and Guattari,^ Thousand Plateaus, p. 403.
101. Warren Montag, "Spinoza and Althusser Against Hermeneutics: Interpreta-
tion or Intervention" [1988], in The Althusserian Legacy, pp. 51-58; here p. 53.
(Montag is paraphrasing Spinoza's Theobgico-Political Treatise, esp. ch. 7.) For
a general study of the Marxist tradition's view of Spinoza, see Rainer Bieling,
"Spinoza im Urteil von Marx und Engels: Die Bedeutung der Spinoza-Rezeption
Hegels und Feuerbachs fur die Marx-Engelssche Interpretation" (Diss., Freie Uni-
versitat Berlin, 1979) • And, for an approach to Althusser's Spinozism that is more
skeptical than Montagus, placing it in the context of French intellectual history, see
Peter Dews, "Althusser, Structuralism, and the French Epistemological Tradition "
vci Althusser: A Critical Reader, pp. 104-141.
102. Montag, "Spinoza and Althusser Against Hermeneutics" in The Althusserian
Legacy, p. 52.
103. Spinoza,-4 Theologico-PoliticalTHatise [ 1670], inA Theobgico-PoliticalTreatise O
and a Political Thatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, 1951; £
rpt. 1883 ed.), pp. 1-278; here, p. 5 [preface]. See further £izek, Tarrying with the g
Negative, p. 23 5 — where £izek, following Etienne De La Boetie's notion of servitude g
voluntaire, makes much the same point, notwithstanding his own imagined anti- g
Spinozism. *
104. Pierre houidizuyL'mtotogiepolitique de Martin Heidegger (Paris: Les e\iitions ^
de minuit, 198S), p. 102. Compare too Bourdieu's brilliant, untranslatable turn of >J
413
phrase describing Heidegger's apologia for his Nazi past: " D e fait, rien n'est renie^l
tour est re-denie^ (p. 115). I n other words: Heidegger could deny any element of!
his exoteric political ontology, without at the same time denying his esoteric o n e — |
the latter being fascoid at root.
105. S p i n o z a , ^ Theohgico-Folitical Treatise, p. 112 [ch. 7 ] .
106. i i z e k , The Sublime Object of Ideology (London and N e w York: Verso, 1989),!
P- 43-
107. Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind [1985], illustrations by Juliana Lee (New i
York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone, 1988), p. 78. For an imaginative account of
the "first" such engine, see William Gibson and Bruce Sterling, The Difference Engine
(New York: Bantam Books, 1991).
108. Minsky, The Society of Mind, p. 78; emphasis added.
109. Nietzsche, "NF, Juli-August 1882"; KGW 7/1:13.
n o . See, for example, William Gibson, Neuromancer ( N e w York: Ace Books,
1984), pp. 5 and 51, and CountZero ( N e w York: Ace Books, 1987), pp. 38-39.
i n . Aithusse^L'avenirdunlongtemps [1985], mL'avenirdurelongtemps [suivide]
lisfaits, ed. Olivier Corpet and Yann Moulier Boutang (Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1992;
Edition posthume d'wuvres de Louis Althusser, vol. 1: Textes autobiographiques), pp. 7 -
279; here p. 74. "Je tiens en effect tout au long de ces associations de souvenirs a
m'en tenir strictement aux faits: mais les hallucinations sont aussi des faits."
112. Burroughs, Blade Runner, a Movie [1979] (Berkeley: Blue Wind Press,
1990), [p. 6 ] .
113. This saying is commonly attributed t o Pythagoras. See, for example, Ap-
uleius, De Magia, XLIII, 50 (ed. H e l m ) . I t is important to add, however, that
Pythagoras is traditionally thought to have been one of the earliest practitioners of
esoteric writing, a n d hence it was in his best interest to make it appear that any
conscious response to a text was possible, precisely so as to promote the sub-
conscious incorporation of distasteful messages. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, " O b -
servations by Jean-Jacques Rousseau o n the Answer to His Discourse [Discourse on
the Sciences and Arts ofmo ]," in The First and Second Discourses and Essay on the Origin
of Languages, trans. Victor Gourevitch ( N e w York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1986), pp. 41-42. O n Pythagorean esotericism also see, earlier than Rousseau, the
extraordinary work of John Toland, Tetradymus (London: J. Brotherton and W.
Meadows, 1720), pp. 61-100, esp. pp. 65-66 and 72-73.
<p 114. Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic ofLate Capitalism, p. xxi.
% 115. T h e notion of "proleptic handicapping'' (German Vorgabe) includes the
pq sense meant in various sports, games, horse racing, and so on. It was one of several
•< productive interventions in the 1970s by significant East German literary critics and
Q theorists (Naumann, Trager, Schlenstedt, Weimann) in their attempt t o grasp the
^ ways that texts maintain at least weak control over their subsequent appropriation,
w
H and to oppose the aestheticizing and subjectifying tendencies of West German "re-
55 ceptiori" theory (Wolfgang Iser, Hans Robert Jaufi). See, most notably, Manfred
414
ttfaurnann, "Literatur und Leser," Weimarer Beitrage 16:5 (1970), 92-116, "Literary
£ production and Reception" New Literary History 8:1 (1976), 107-126, and "Das
Dilemma der 'Rezeptionsasthetik,'"poetka 8:3/4 (1976), 451-466; Claus Trager,
«Zur Kritik der burgerlichen Literaturwissenschaft: Methodologischer Kreislauf
mndie unbewaltigte Geschichte (Teil I)," Weimarer Beitrage 18:2 (1972), 10-42,
and "Zur Kritik der burgerlichen Literaturwissenschaft (Teil II)," Weimarer Beitrage
; 18:3 (1972), 10-36; Gesellschaji—Literatur—Lesen: Literaturrezeptionintheoretischer
Sicht, ed. Manfred Naumann et al. (Weimar and Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1973);
Robert Weimann, "'Rezeptionsgeschichte' und die Krisis der Literaturgeschichte:
Zur Kritik einer neuen Strdmung in der burgerlichen Literaturwissenschaft,'' Wei-
ntarer Beitrage 19:8 (i973)>5-33 [trans. Charles Spencer as "'Reception Aesthetics'
and the Crisis of Literary Theory," CLIO 5:1 (1975), 3-33]; and Dieter Schlenstedt,
Wirkungsdstbaische Anaiysen: Poetologie und Frosa in der neuren DDR-Literatur
(Berlin, GDR: Akademie-Verlag, 1975).
116. Leo Strauss, "Persecution and the Art of Writing" [ 1941 ] in Persecution and
the Art of Writing [1952] (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1988), pp. 22-37; here p. 24. Strauss and his disciples have never quite applied this
principle to Nietzsche—in spite or, more likely, because of the supreme importance
he has in the Straussian system.
117. Strauss, Thoughts onMachiavelli [1958] (Chicago and London: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 13. This book remains the best introduction to how
to read Nietzsche.
118. Robert Darnton, "Censorship, a Comparative View: France, 1789—East
Germany, 1989"Representations 49 (Winter 1995), 40-60; here 58.
119. An offshoot of liberal pluralism—weaving its uncertain, rearguard way be-
tween Leo Strauss and Jacques Derrida—represents only a partial exception, al-
though it does recognize the problem of esotericism in Nietzsche as theme. Cf.
Levine, Nietzsche and the Modern Crisis ofthe Humanities, esp. pp. 125-135.
120. Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes,
andNietzsche (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), PP- 276-277.
See further pp. 306-310, where Lampert applies esoteric criteria to Nietzsche most
explicidy (read: exoterically). But see also Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching: An Inter-
pretation of <eThus Spoke Zarathustm" (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1986), where for unstated reasons the esoteric problematic is not applied to
Nietzsche's purported masterpiece, and Leo Strauss and Nietzsche (Chicago: Univer- O
sity of Chicago Press, 1996), where it is.. ^
121. See, for example, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject of Philosophy [La g
suja de la philosophie (Typographies I), 1979], ed. Thomas Trezise, trans. Thomas ^
Trezise et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 15. As is most g
of his work, this is a very exact and exacting study of Nietzsche (among others) in "
terms of the mutual imbrication of "literature" and "philosophy" which Lacoue- °
Labarthe sees as foundational for all serious thought and writing. As such, The ^
415
Subject of Philosophy's extensive and intensive take on Nietzsche, quite brilliant in its
own terms, certainly ought not to be reduced to the criticism that it fails to see the
esoteric problematic explicitly enough. Nonetheless, this book remains symptomatic
of a more general blindness among Left-Nietzscheans—in spite and because of the
fact that Lacoue-Labarthe is one of the brightest and most self/critical members of
the corps/e.
122. Jean Genet, Uncaptifammreux (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), pp. 10-11.
123. Althusser, "Reply to John Lewis" [1972-1973], in Essays in Self-Criticism,
trans. Grahame Lock (London: NLB, 1976), pp. 33-99; here p. 78.
124. James Baldwin, "If Black English Isn't a Language, Then Tell M e What Is?"
[ 1979], in The Price of the Ticket: Collected Nonfiction 194&-198S (New York: St. Mar-
tin's/Marek, 1985), pp. 649-652; here p. 651; also cited and discussed in N o r a M .
Alter, "Chester Himes: Black Guns and Words," in Alteratives, ed. Warren Motte and
Gerald Prince (Lexington, Kentucky: French Forum, Publishers, 1993), pp. 11-24.
The latter essay is an analysis of how a politically committed author's turn to fictional
genres can be a dual-index: first, not of a "break* with an explicitly political agenda
but rather a "channel" for other related kinds; and, second, the substantial—
personal, literary, and social—risks when various forms of mediation between "fact"
and "fiction" break down, as they almost always d o eventually. This dual problematic
bears fundamentally on the phenomena of Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism.
125. Balibar, "Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell," in Masses, Classes, Ideas, p. 33.
126. Friedrich Schlegel, "Uber die Unverstandlichkeit" [1800], in Kritische
Schriften, ed. Wolfdietrich Rasch (Munich: CarlHanser Verlag, 1964), pp. 530-542;
here p. 538. Ostensibly written as a response to the complaint that thcAthenaum—
the most significant journal of early romanticism—was incomprehensible, Schlegel
was in fact speaking of the problem of incomprehensibility at much higher levels of
theoretical and practical interest. If Nietzsche is to be regarded as either "romantic"
or "postromantic" it ought to be primarily in the terms of this quotation from
Schlegel; all other terms more commonly used are mere literary history.
127. Today Althusserianism, or rather what is left of it, is under siege on several
fronts for various reasons, including by Marxists or former Marxists; see, for exam-
ple, Althusser: A Critical Reader (1994). In addition to the recent vigorous direct
defense of Althusserianism by Resch in Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social
Theory, less directly by various works of £iiek, and more critically by the essays
™ collected in The Althusserian Legacy (199 3), see also the less consequential essays in
JS the special issue of Studies in Twentieth Century Literature 18:1 (Winter 1994), "The
w Legacy of Althusser," ed. Philip Goldstein.
«i 128. See further David Macey, "Thinking with Borrowed Concepts: Althusser
O and Lacan," in Althusser: A Critical Reader, pp. 142-158; here p. 146.
w 129. This juxtaposition of Althusser and Heidegger is in no way intended to be
w
H comprehensive with regard to the philosophical question of causality, nor does it
J3 adequately represent the variety of positions available today in philosophy or in the
416
^natural and social sciences. For a major depiction and original theory of causation
;|nere, but not in continental philosophy or the human sciences, see Richard W.
filler, factand Method: Ri^lanation, Confirmation and Reality in the Natural and the
•Social Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), esp. chs. 2 and 4. Also
from within the Anglo-Saxon problematic see Causation, ed. Ernest Sosa and Mi-
chael Tooley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Nevertheless, the Althus-
serian and Heideggerian positions—though they are not always clear, sometimes
are self-contradictory, and may even be simply untrue or debilitating in serious
ways—do represent two of the most directly relevant and opposing theories in the
human sciences or humanities generally, most notably in continental philosophy
and literary theory, and specifically for grasping Nietzsche/anism.
At the same time, it is important to note that, in France, Althusser has been
understood to have been profoundly, albeit indirectly influenced by Heidegger. This
assumption requires clarification. As his Vavenir dure Umgtemp makes quite clear,
Althusser certainly respected Heidegger as a philosopher. Derrida, interviewed
about his relationship to Althusser, has claimed that his friend "was always fasci-
nated" with.Heidegger "without having ever given any public sign of this fascina-
tion." Although Derrida remarks "I don't believe Althusser ever read Heidegger
well," nonetheless Althusser was supposedly one of many French intellectuals "im-
pregnated" by Heidegger—which leads Derrida to make the following blanket
claim and demand: "For Althusser, if I may be allowed to say it in such a brutal way,
Heidegger is thegreat unavoidable thinker ofthis century. Both the great adversary and
also a sort of essential ally or virtual recourse (Althusser's entire work should be read
following this indication)." This hyperbolic assertion needs to be taken with a large
grain of salt, however, and begins to sound rather dubious—not to say wildly self-
serving and self-descriptive—the moment Derrida intimates that he himself was Al-
thusser's main—even sole—direct source of information about Heidegger ("Poli-
tics and Friendship: An Interview with Jacques Derrida" [1989, with Michael
Sprinker], trans. Robert Harvey, in The Althusserian Legacy, pp. 183-231; here
pp. 189-191). On the other hand Derrida suggests, in his genuinely moving eulogy
to Althusser, that he has in turn incorporated Althusser into himself— as the tatter's
corps/e, so to speak. See Derrida, "Text Read at Louis Althusser's Funeral" [ 1990],
in The Althusserian Legacy, pp. 241-245. For his part, Althusser valued less Heideg-
ger than he did Derrida; indeed, the latter is for him "a gianr" among all contempo-
rary philosophers. See Althusser, Vavenir dure Umgtemp, in Vavenir dure Umgtemp O
[sum de] Lesfaits, pp. 170 and 174. ^
Nonetheless it must be said that what Derrida and his interviewer both ignore in g
the interview "Politics and Friendship" is that Althusser did mention Heidegger in g
public. Indeed, a significant partem of references spans Althusser's publishing ca- g
reer, and it is quite critical. As early as his 1964 essay, "Freud and Lacan" Althusser ^
had remarked on the purely strategic reasons for Jacques Lacan's appropriation of |
Heidegger, who remained, however, a thinker "completely foreign to his scientific o
417
undertaking." A year later, in the first section of Reading Capital, Althusser implied
that Heidegger remained trapped in the classical epistemological problematic of
idealism in a way less "conscious and honest" than his great predecessor Edmund
Husserl. In "Lenin and Philosophy" written in 1968—still before the question of
Heidegger's relationship to Nazism was widely or adequately raised—Althusser
pitted Lenin's notion of "partisanship in philosophy" against the trajectory of West-
ern philosophy from Plato to Heidegger, noting of the latter that "in some of his
writings, the history of philosophy" has been "dominated" by a "contradiction":
namely, as he emphasized, "the theoretical denegation of its own practice, and enormous
theoretical efforts to register this denegation in consistent discourses" And, eight years
down the road, in his relatively late essay, "The Transformation of Philosophy"
Althusser reformulated this critique by asserting, "All philosophies with which we
are familiar, from Plato to Husserl, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, have been pro-
duced as 'philosophies' and have themselves furnished the proofs of their philosoph-
ical existence by means of rational theoretical systems that generate discourses,
treatises, and other systematic writings which can be isolated and identified as
'philosophy' in the history of culture," and thus "convey the knowledge of an object
of their own"—the precise problematic that Althusser attempted to analyze and
contest by means of his reflection on the oxymoronic notion of "Marxist philoso-
phy" as being more properly grasped as a "transformation <?f philosophy" in both
senses implied by this genitive construction. See Althusser, "Freud and Lacan"
[1964, corrected 1969] and "Lenin and Philosophy" [1968-1969], both in Lenin
and Philosophy and Other Essays, pp. 195-219 and 23-70; here pp. 203 and 64,
respectively; "From Capital to Marx's Philosophy" [1965], in Reading Capital,
pp. 11-69; here p. S3; and "The Transformation of Philosophy" [1976], in the
collection Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy ofthe Scientists & Other Essays, ed.
with an introduction by Gregory Elliott, trans. Ben Brewster, James H. Kavanagh,
Thomas E. Lewis, Grahame Lock, and Warren Montag (London and New York:
Verso, 1990), pp. 241-265; here p. 242.
In any case, Derrick's oddly ill-informed depiction of the relationship of Althusser
to Heidegger elides its differentia specifica. For a more balanced view, see Callinicos,
"What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser," in The Al-
thusserian Legacy. Callinicos argues that parts of Althusser's work (especially the first
section of Reading Capital) do indeed evidence infection by what Callinicos, bor-
•p rowing a phrase from the neoliberal political philosophers Luc Ferry and Alain
£> Renaut, refers to as the ubiquitous "Nietzscheo-Heideggerian register" that domi-
w nated French intellectual life in the early 1970s. While admitting that fundamental
<j aporias of Althusser's work can indeed be traced to this register, Callinicos goes on
Q to distill what he calls Althusser's "enduring strengths"—including nothing less
w than "the critique of Hegelian Marxism, the conceptual clarification of historical
H materialism, and the elaboration of a realist philosophy of science"—all of which are
£ dead set against Nietzsche and Heidegger, not to mention, with regard to the last
418
nvo examples at least, Derrida. Cf. Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, Lapensie 68 (Paris:
Gallimard, i985),pp. H3-II4.
, 130. See Schopenhauer, Uber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden
Grunde [ 1813 ], ed. Michael Landmann and Elfriede Tielsch (Hamburg: Verlag von
Felix Meiner, 1970).
131. See, for example, Anstot[c,Metaphysics, loi^a-iow, Physics, II, I94b-i95a;
^d PosteriorAnalytics, II, 94a. See further Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Under-
standing, in On the Improvement of the Understanding, The Ethics, Correspondence,
pp. 35-36.
132. See Aristotle, Physics, II, 197a-198a; also see Plato, Laws, X, 889c, where
chance is identified with mere physical necessity.
133. See, for example, Aristode, Eth. Nich., 1112a.
ii^.H6lhneCixo\^>lMvilJeparfureouLerepeUdeserinyes (n.p.:ThdatreduSoIeil,
1994), P-12,6.
135. See Heidegger, "Die FragenachderTechnik" [1953], VortrdgeundAufsdtze
(Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1954), 1:5-36. For a translation see The Question
Concerning Technology: Heidegger's Critique of the Modern Age, trans. William Lovitt
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977). The vexed question of the philologi-
cal, philosophical, or historical "accuracy" of Heidegger's representation of pre-
Socratic thinking—or anything else—appears to be less resolvable than all the dif-
ferent camps involved in this debate would like and is of no concern here.
136. Felix Guattari, "Machinic Heterogenesis," in Rethinking Technologies, pp. 13-
27; here p. 13; see further his Chaosmose (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1992).
137. In spite of his abhorrence for voluntarism, Althusser held, for example, that
in practice "It is often sufficient that a simple individual take an initiative for the
atmosphere to be changed" (Althusser, Lesfails [1976], inI/avenir dure longtemps
[suivi de\ Lesfaits, pp. 281-356; here p. 310). Indeed, this might be said to be one
half of Althusser's formative experience in a German prisoner of war camp from
1940-1945; the other half, however, was his encounter in the same camp with
communism as a lived experience, before it came to him as a theory (see p. 313).
Finally, note that in Uavenirdure longtemps, Althusser avers that his "belated" read-
ing of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism (1947) "influenced my arguments concern-
ing theoretical antihumanism in Marx" (p. 176).
138. So it is that in many quarters today Althusser's alleged producrivism is deeply
Z
suspect, whereas Heidegger's apparent commitment to "deep ecology" is uncrit- O
ically lauded. But this dual response overlooks the fact that Althusser took one of his £
main points of epistemological departure from Spinoza's notion of "immanent £j
causation " which entails a principled refusal—superficially very much like Heideg- ^
get^s—to accept any vulgar distinction between a Creator God and "His" Creation; g
natura naturans and natura naturata; artificer and artifact; and, by extension, any w
c*
producer and produced, not merely Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism. For a clear 1
introduction to Spinoza's position on causation, see Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza o
419
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1951), pp. 40-55. For the broader philosophi-
cal context of Spinoza's position, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of
Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Process of His Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1934), 1 =296-330; and R. S. Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leib-
niz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics (London and New
York: Routledge, 1993), esp. ch. 7: "Causation, Occasionalism and Force." One
thing that distinguishes Spinoza and Althusser together from Heidegger on the
matter of causation has been suggested by Nicolas Tertulian in a different context. It
is that the "purely theoretical aspects of scientific process and search for truth be-
yond any immediate finality (tangible 'results') are completely obscured by Heideg-
ger's reasoning. He treats the principle of causality itself as a simple projection of the
utilitarian apprehension of the world and deprives it thus of any real ontological
import. Here, he adapts the neopositivist prejudices on the subject without noticing
that he's doing so" (Tertulian, "The History of Being and Political Revolution:
Reflections on a Posthumous Work of Heidegger," in The Heidegger Case: On Philos-
ophy and Politics, ed. Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis [Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1992], pp. 208-227; here p. 212). Another significant reason why
Althusser ought not to be conflated with Heidegger (or Nietzsche) is that Spinoza
"seems to have attached no importance to aesthetic experience in his scheme of
human development and happiness; and this is only one symptom of his general
detachment from Greek . . . influences" (Hampshire, Spinoza, p. 29). Finally, Hei-
degger's—and Nietzsche's—notion of Being was infected by a profound commit-
ment to social and natural hierarchy against which the ontology of Spinoza—and,
following him, Althusser—was radically opposed. "The conception of being in
Spinoza is . . . an overdetermined conception, outside of every possible analogy or
metaphor. It is the conception of a powerful being, which knows no hierarchies,
which knows only its own constitutive force" (Negri, The Savage Anomaly, p. 5). A
recent example of the thorough muddling of Spinozist, Nietzschean, Heideggerian,
and even Althusserian positions is provided both between the lines and explicitly
throughout the book of a leading apologist for deconstruction, Christopher Norris,
Spinoza & the Origins of Modern Critical Theory (London and Cambridge, Mass.:
Basil Blackwell, 1991).
„j to 'change the world'"; but then Althusser added his crucial rider: "which he cannot
H do alone without a genuinely free and democratic communist organization, having
Z close ties with its grass roots and beyond them with other popular mass move-
426
merits" (Althusser, Uavenir dure longtemps, i n Uavenir dure longtemps [suivi de] Les
jaits,p. 165) •
198. Ibid., p. 234.
!$<?. W i t t g e n s t e i n , Philosophische Untermehv^ngert/Philosophical Investigations [writ-
ten 1945 an<^ *947-1949, published 1953], dual-language ed., trans. G. E. M. An-
scombe (Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1968), p. 47/47C
200. Ibid., p. 48/48c Note that in this system it would, however, be a mistake to
equate "picture" with the words "image" or "idea." "An image [Vorstellung] is
not a picture, but a picture can correspond to it [kann ihr entsprechen]" (p. 101/
loie).
201. See, for example, Gerhard Hilbert, Modeme WUUnsziele (Leipzig: A. Dei-
chert, 191 i),P-19.
202. Parmenides, Fr. 2; Empedocles, Fr. 17; Heraclitus, Fr. 53.
203. H e r a c l i t u s , Fr. 125. S e e further K a t h l e e n F r e e m a n , The Pre-Socratic Philoso-
phers: A Companion to Diels, "Frqgmente der Vorsokratikerf 2d ed. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 105 and 129; and W. K. C. Guthrie,.*!
History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1: The EarlierPresocmtics and the Pythagoreans (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 449.
204. Heidegger wrote; "Thepdlemos named here [i.e., in Heraclitus's Fr. 53] is a
conflict [Streit] raging prior to everything divine and human, it is no war [Krieg] in
the human manner. As thought by Heraclitus, battle [Kampf ] in the first instance
allowed the realm of being to pull away [auseinandertxeten] intoopposites, allowed
position and order and rank to relate in being. In such pulling-away [Auseinan-
dertreten], cleavages, intervals, distances, and points of articulation are opened up.
In setting-apart [Aus-einander-setzung] cosmos comes to be. (Setting-apart nei-
ther separates nor much less does it destroy unity. It constitutes unity, is collection
[Mgos~\ . Pdlemos a n d logos are t h e s a m e t h i n g ) " ( H e i d e g g e r , Einfiihrung in die Meta-
physial [Freiburg summer semester 1935, published 1953], ed. Petra Jaeger, in
Gesamtausgabe [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983], 2/40:66). For
another translation, see An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (Gar-
den City, New York: Anchor Books, I96l),p-5I.
205. Heidegger, Einfiihrung in dieMetaphysik, p. 66. Also see 'The Origin of the
Work of Art" [1935], trans, with an introduction by Albert Hofstadter (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), pp. 17-87; here pp. 61-62, where one "way in ^
which truth occurs is in the act that founds a State." See further his "Die Selbstbe- ^
hauptung der deutschen Universitaf [1933] and "Das Rektorat 1933/34" [i945], «°
b o t h i n Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Unipersitdt (Rede, gehalten bei derfeier- o
lichen Ubernahme des Rektorats der Unipersitdt Freiburg i. Br. am 27.$. 1933) [und] >>
Das Rektorat 1033/34, ed. Hermann Heidegger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klos- w
termann, 1983), esp. pp. 18-19 and 28-29. For translations of the last two texts, see <>
the (important but ultimately very obscurantist) anthology Martin Heidegger and \
National Socialism: Questions and Answers [1988], ed. Gunther Neske and Emil Ket- *»
427
tering, trans. Lisa Harries and Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Paragon House
1990).
206. Heidegger, Parmenides [Freiburg winter semester 1942-1943], ed. Man-
fred S. Frings, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982)
2/54:134 and 74. See further his Heraklit [Freiburg summer semester 1943 and
summer semester 1944], ed. Manfred S. Frings, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), 2/55:186-204, and again "Die Frage nach der
Technik," translated in The Question Concerning Technology.
207. Lacan, for example, reduced aMtheia to an erotic, rather than esoteric, prob-
lematic, noting "that when we are attentive to the manner in which Martin Heideg-
ger discovers for us the play of truth in the word aUthem, we only find again a secret
in which truth has always initiated its lovers, and from which they believe that it is in
what truth hides that it offers itself to them most truly" (Lacan, "Le se'minaire sur 'La
lettre volee'" [1956], in Merits I [Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966], pp. 19-75; here
p. 31). For a translation, see "Seminar on the Purloined Letter" trans. Jeffrey Mehl-
man, Tale French Studies 48 (1972), 39-72; special issue on French Freud: Structural
Studies in Psychoanalysis.
208. Heidegger, Heraklit, Gesamtausgabe, 2/55:139.
209. Stanley Rosen, The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. xiv.
210. On the transformation of "aesthetics"—under conditions specific to tech-
nological, socioeconomic, and political modernity—from a theory of the senses into
the ideology of beauty, see Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford and
Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990), and Susan Buck-Morss, "Aesthetics and An-
aesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay Reconsidered" October 62 (Fall 1992),
3-41. Though momentous, this transformation is not irreversible, as seems to be
indicated nowadays by developments of the technologies of cyberspace and virtual
reality; but nor was it irreversible already for Nietzsche in theory if not also in fact.
211. See, for example, Heidegger, Beitrdge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) [ 1936-
1938], ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), 3/65:31 and 395-401. Whether this explicitly esoteric
work, and not the earlier and more exoteric Being and Time (1927), constitutes Hei-
degger's magnum opus has become a hot topic of debate among Heideggerians. See
further his relatively esoteric seminar Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewdhlte (Trob-
Y leme"der <(Logik" [ Freiburg winter semester 1937-1938],ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von
*c Hermann, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984), 2 / 45.
rt 212. See, for example, Nietzsche, "Die dionysische Weltanschauung" [ the Diony-
(3
<J sian worldview, 1870], <cUeber das Pathos der Wahrheit" [on the pathos of truth,
p<
O 1872], "Homer's WettkampP [Homer's contest, 1872], "Die Philosophie im Gra-
ta gischen Zeitalter der Griechen" [philosophy in the tragic age of the Greeks, 1873 ] i
w
H and "NF, Sommer 1875"; KGW 3/2:43-69, 249-257, 277-286, and 293-366; and
Z 4/1:173-203, respectively. These texts from the NF have been translated as 'The
428
%lruggle between Science and Wisdom" in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from
W^che'sNotebooks of'the Early1870s [1979], ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Atlan-
li^Highlands, N.J., and London: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1991).
||£§r3. Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustm; KGW 6/1:45 [parti: "On Reading and
Cwhting"] • "Muthig, unbekiimmert, spottisch, gewaltthatig—so will uns die Weis-
ijieit: sie ist ein Weib und liebt immer nur einen Kriegsmann."
jpfei-H. See Nietzsche, Zur Geneaiogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift [1887]; KGW
fly 2:257-430. Book 3 —"What Is the Meaning of Our Ascetic Ideals?"—also begins
'with the motto just cited from Thus Spoke Zarathustm.
'/ 215. On Brecht's notion of "crude thinking" as a crucial component of properly
/dialectical thought, see Walter Benjamin, "Brechts Dreigroschenroman" [ 1935], hi
•^Gesammelte Scbriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhauser (Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 9:440-449; hereesp. 445-447. Foratrans-
riation, see Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, ed.
'with an introduction by Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York and
London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978). See further Ernst Bloch, Georg
Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor Adorno, Aesthetics and Pol-
itics, afterword by Fredric Jameson, translation editor Ronald Taylor (London:
NLB, 1977), pp. 60-109. Jameson notes that MarxistplumpesDenken stands not on
its own but rather in supplemental relationship to "the intellectual positions that it
corrects—the overcomplicated Hegeliamsm or philosophic Marxism for which it
substitutes some hard truths and plain language" (Jameson, "Criticism in History"
[1976], in The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-19S6, vol. 1: Situations of Theory,
foreword by Neil Larsen [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988],
Pp. 119-136; here p. 119). Finally, for a defense of the necessity for a certain "strate-
gic crudeness" to show that the circular "subde description" or ludic porno of much
current cultural theory can be complicit with the global logic of wage labor and
capital, see Mas'ud Zavarzadeh, Seeing Films Politically (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1991); also Michael Parenti, Make-Believe Media: The Politics of
Entertainment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
216. Gramsci, "In principe era il sesso" [1917], in Opere diAntonio Gratnsci, ed.
FelicePlatone (Turin: Einaudi, 1947-1972), 6:337.
217. Nietzsche, "NF, Winter iSS^KGWy/v.&o.
218. Ibid., 7/2:81. 2
219. Montag, "Spinoza and Althusser Against Hermeneutics," in TheAlthusserian O
L&aty, p. S^; emphasis added. S
220. See Herman Melville, T h e River" appendix A of The Confidence-Man: His Q
Masquerade [1857], ed. with an introduction and notes by Stephen Matterson £
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 341-343. w
221. For a reflection on the problem of having and narrating alternative lives, see ^
Stanley Comgold and Irene Giersing, Borrowed Lives (Albany: State University of 1
New York Press, 199 r). <*
429
222. Franz Kafka, "The Truth about Sancho Panza" [1917], in Dearest Father"
Stories and Other Writings, trans. Emst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins (New York*
Schocken Books, 1954), pp. 69-70. >^
223. Paul A. Cantor, "Leo Strauss and Contemporary Hermeneutics" in Leoi
Stmuss's Thought: Toward a Critical Engagement, ed. Alan Udoff (Boulder and Lon3
I
don: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), pp. 267-314; here p. 277. ~|
224. See Plato, Phaedrus, 2756.9-275^ and 264D7-C5, and Leo Strauss, The QriJ
and Man [1962, first published 1964] (Chicago and London: The University off
Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 52-62. -
225. For a comparison in this context of Plato to Nietzsche as esoteric writers, see
Stanley Rosen, "Suspicion, Deception, Concealment," inArion [3dser.] 1:2 (1991),
112-127.
226. Arnold Schoenberg as cited in Kyle Gann's obituary for John Cage in The"
Village Voice (October 13,1992).
227. Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic, p. 3. See further his "Cognitive Mapping,"
mMarxism and the Interpretation of Culture, pp. 347-357.
228. Donna J. Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and
Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century* [198 3-1985], in Simians, Cy-
borgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Roudedge, 1991),
pp. 149-181; here p. 149.
229. Jean Baudrillard, Forget BaudriUard [interview with Sylvere Lotringer], in'
Forget Foucault & Forget BaudriUard, trans. Nicole Dufresne, Phil Beitchman, Lee
Hildreth, and Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext[e] Foreign Agents Series,
1987), pp. 65-137; here p. 68. BaudriUard himself submits, however, to a certain
premature cynicism—the old-fashioned, time-honored celebration of Nietzsche/
anism as "thrilling" even while recognizing that it is "a world where the name of the
game remains secret" (p. 71). And if, as Baudrillard also proposes, the Society of the
Spectacle circa 1968 has today passed without trace at the end of the twentieth
century into the Cynical Society, the Society of Ceremony, then the triumph of
Nietzsche/anism—botched ceremony or not—would indeed be total. Cf. his The;
Ecstasy of Communication [IIAutre par lui-meme, 1987], trans. Bernard and Caroline:
Schutze, ed. Sylvere Lotringer (New York: Semiotextfe] Foreign Agents Series,
1988), pp. 103-104.
^ 230. Bardies, S/Z [1970], trans. Richard Miller, preface by Richard Howard
f (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), p. 53-
\o 231. £izek, Looking Awry: An Introduction toJacques Lacan through Popular Culture
w (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 23.
< 232. Aithusser, "The 'Piccolo Teatro5: Bertolazzi and Brecht (NotesonaMaterial-
O istTheatre)" [1962],in For Marx, pp. i29-i5i;herep. 143.
t^
w 233. Aithusser to Fernanda Navarro, October 11,1984; in the "Correspondance"
w
H mSurla philosophic, pp. 81-137; here pp. 114-115.
!zi 234. Kirk Rising Ireland, "Anglers, Satyr-Gods, and 'Divine Lizards': Comedy in
430 Excess" (Diss., Cornell University, 1994), 46-47.
i l i W < . V N. Voio$inov,Matxism andthePhilosophy of Language [1929-1930], trans.
i^jjslavMatejka and I. R. Titunik (New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973),
p | § | , if, as is possible, the author of this book was the Nietzschean Mikhail Bakhtin,
jpSjjeh it is arguable that he himself did not take this remark at face value but used it
tSotonly to placate Stalinist censors but also in his effort, as a closet neo- or even
fljj^conservative, to attack both vulgar Marxism and Marxism. As can be learned
§gqm Leo Strauss, it is standard practice under censorship systems to place orthodox
Sfernarks at the beginning and end of books, placing the heterodox in the middle.
ifuti in this case at least, this practice does not mean that the orthodox remark is
Iflecessarily untrue, the heterodox true.
III236. Michel Serres, La naissance de la physique dans le texte de Lucrece: Fleuwes et
^iwbidenccs (Paris: Les Editions de minuit, 1977), p. 29; also Deleuze a n d G u a t t a r i , ^
'^JmsandPlateaus, p. 367.
§|:237. "What actually distinguishes the concept of the problematic [problematique]
Ifrbm subjectivist concepts of an idealist interpretation of the development of ide-
|ologies is that it brings out within the thought the objective internal reference system of
%jk particular themes, the system of questions commanding the answers given by the
Ideology. If the meaning of an ideology's answers is to be understood at this internal
fjevel it must first be asked the question of its questions. But this problematic is itself an
fanswer, n o longer to its own internal questions—problems—but to the objective
Iproblemsposed for ideology by its time" (Althusser, " ' O n the Young Marx,'" in For
-Marx, p. 67 n. 30).
I I 2 3 8 . Negri, The Savage Anomaly, p. 11.
| S 239. Should the reader again prefer a sharper statement of ideological—as op-
|posed to merely methodological—purpose, here it is. This book tries to be an
|argurnent for and a performance of the untimely/timely relevance today of real
|communism. With this end in mind, it is written in the spirit of Toni Negri and
pother "communists like u s " Like him and them, it attempts to combine "old-
fashioned" philological and scholarly work—known at least as well to Marx, Engels,
Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, Mao, and Gramsci as to Nietzsche or any of us—
with a certain, equally "passe" and "intransigent" insistence on keeping alive some
basic political and economic themes of "orthodox communism"—though not of
much "actually existing socialism" or even "Marxism" This book is not Marxist so
much as communist. From the Althusserian perspective, "Marxism had [ and has ] an ^
original meaning (a 'problematic' of its own) only if it was [and is] a theory of and §
for the communist tendency. The criterion for accepting or rejecting any 'Marxist' o>
thesis was [and is] always the same, be it presented as an 'epistemological' or a Q
philosophical' criterion: namely whether it made [and makes] a communist politics £
intelligible, implementable, or not" (Balibar, "The Non-Contemporaneity of Al- §
thusser" [ 1988], in The Althusserian Legacy, pp. 1-16; here p. 4 ) . ©>
2+0. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology: Critique of Modern German Philosophy \
According to Its Representatives, Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, and of German Social- o
ismAccordingto ItsVariousProphets [1845-1846, published 1932], in Collected Works, 431
5 ^ 9 - 5 3 9 ; here 49. Compare also the remark of Alex Trocchi about definition:'*
"Revolt is understandably unpopular. As soon as it is defined it has provoked the 1
measures for its containment. The prudent man will avoid the definition which is in ,1
effect his death sentence" (Trocchi, "Invisible Insurrection of a Million Minds?! \
[ 1966]; as cited in Jon Savage, England's Dreaming: Anarchy, Sex Pistols, Punk Rock\i
and Beyond [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992], p. 371) • ^
241. Fdix Guattari and Toni Negri, Communists Like Us: New Spaces of'Liberty,Ned^.
Lines of Alliance [1985], with a "Postscript, 1990" by Toni Negri, trans. Michaek
Ryanetal. (New York: Semibtext[e] Foreign Agents Series, 1990), p. 10. Itshould
be unnecessary to add: "The project: to rescue 'communism* from its own disrepute.
Once invoked as the liberation of work through mankind's collective creation, com- "
munism has instead stifled humanity. We who see in communism both collective ,
and individual possibilities must reverse that regimentation of thought and desire
which terminates the individual" (p. 7) - s
242. Ibid., p. 10. <:
243. See William Butler Yeats, ' T h e Second Coming" [1920], in Selected Poems \
and Three Plays of William Butler Teats, e d . M . L. Rosenthal, 3d rev. ed. (New York:
Collier Books, 1986), pp. 89-90; here p. 89.
244. Guattari and Negri, Communists Like Us, pp. 16-17.
245. Compare, too, Trotsky's important answer to a very common question:
"does not an excess of solidarity, as the Nietzscheans fear, threaten to degenerate
man into a sentimental, passive, herd animal? N o t at all. The powerful force of
competition which, in bourgeois society, has the character of market competition,
will not disappear in a socialist society, but, to use the language of psychoanalysis,
will be sublimated, that is, will assume a higher and more fertile form. There will be
the struggle for one's opinion, for one's project, for one's taste. In the measure in
which political struggles will be eliminated—and in a society where there will be no
classes, there will be n o such struggles—the liberated passions will be channelized
into technique, into construction which also includes art. Art then will become
more general, will mature, will become tempered, and will become the most perfect
method of the progressive building of life in every field. It will not be merely 'pretty'
without relation to anything else" (Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution [1922-
1923], excerpted in his On Literature and Art, ed. Paul N . Siegel [New York:
Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1970], pp. 29-62; here pp. 60-61).
^ 246. Nonetheless worth reading is the accompanying cover story written by Der
t-v Spiegel's editor in chief and entitled "A Nietzsche for Green and Alternative Poli-
w tics?" See Rudolf Augstein, "Ein Nietzsche fiir Grune und Alternative?" Der Spiegel
o
•< 35:2.4 (June 8,1981), 156-184. The original illustration of Denker Nietzsche, Tdter
Q Hitler (1981) was the work of Michael Mathias Prechtl ( b o m 1926) and is repro-
w duced in the catalogue Fiir R N: Nietzsche in der bildenden Kttnst der letzten dreiftg
f-r Jahre (Weimar: Stiftung Weimarer Klassik, 1994), p. 103.
E 247. Reproduced in Fiir F. N: Nietzsche in der bildenden Kunst der letzten dreifiig
432
Wahnfi&5*see n i r t n e r ' •" *^€ s a m e catalogue, Hansdieter Erbsmehl, "'Schatten
flfer Europa': Nietzsche in Werken von Max Ernst und Joseph Beuys," pp. 19-25;
j | x pp. 22-24.
H248. See Nietzsche, Ecce homo: Wie man wird, was man ist [ 1888]; KGW 6/ 3: 3 35
Kljflius Spoke Zarathustra," 1 ]. For a historical—nonphilosophical—discussion of
Nietzsche's political views, see Peter Bergmann, Nietzsche, "the last antipolitical Ger-
^m" (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987); for a philo-
Ipphical—ahistorical—discussion of Nietzsche's critique of liberalism, see Mark
tVarren, Nietzsche's Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The MIT
stress, 1988), esp. pp. 152-158. But both books downplay or explain away the
discoid aspect of Nietzsche's thought, and neither takes into account its esoteric
.aspect.
v;: 249. The phrases in quotation marks are from Mao Tse-Tung, Talks at the Tenan
Eorum on Literature and Art [May 2, 1942], trans, anon. (Peking: Foreign Lan-
guages Press, 1967), p. 9- Compare Spinoza's central early thesis: "we may never,
while we are concerned with inquiries into actual things, draw any conclusion from
abstractions; we shall be extremely careful not to confound that which is only in the
understanding with that which is in things [in res]. The best basis for drawing a
conclusion will be either some particular affirmative essence, or a true and legitimate
definition'' (Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding, in On the Improve-
ment of the Understanding, The Ethics, Correspondence, p. 34 [section 13], translation
modified).
250. Jeffrey Mehlman, Walter Benjamin for Children: An Essay on His Radio Tears
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 42. Mehlman
relates the story of the seventeenth-century Sabbati Zevi, who headed a messianic
Jewish revival only to be forced by the Turkish sultanate to convert to Islam, "thus
leaving the masses who had rallied to his call with the excruciating dilemma of how
to absorb the paradox of an apostate messiah." The "solution" was "voluntary Mar-
ranoism," or rather the Sabbatian doctrine that "it was the task of the Messiah to
descend into evil in order to defeat it from within" (p. 42). Mehlman suggests that
this premodern version of virusing the matrix was built upon a paradox: on the one
hand (citing Scholem), "the legacy of Sabbatian antinomianism" was centered
around a "commandment to be fulfilled by means of a transgression [mitzpah ha-
ba'ah ba-averah]"'; on the other (paraphrasing Bataille), "Transgression is not the
negation of a prohibition [interdit], but its completion'" (p. 66). See further Ger- as
O
shorn Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken, 1941), «l
p. 99; Sabbatai Zevi: The Mystical Messiah, trans. R. J. Z. Werblowsky (Princeton: g
Princeton University Press, 1973) ;andBzt^e,L,Avtisme,Mitimillustre'e(Vatis:'Les £
Editions du minuit, 1957), p. 70. Actually, Bataille says something rather different: g
"Au dela de l'interdit nous devons maintenant envisager la transgression." ^
251. Judith Buder, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York 1
and London: Roudedge, 199 3), p. 241. *
433
251. See Samuel Rosenberg, Naked Is the Best Disguise: The Death & Resurrection of (
Sherlock Holmes (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1974), ;•
253. In the German Democratic Republic, for example, 'In the 1950s and
1960s . . . it was dangerous to own works by authors like Freud and Nietzsche. But 1
such books circulated through networks of trusted friends. A friend would appear j
with a volume and give you a time limit, often two days, to read it. You would shut ^
yourself up in a safe place and pore over the text, day and night. The effect was
overwhelming: 'It cut into you like a knife' . . " (Darnton, "Censorship, a Com-
parative View," 56). Nietzsche would have savored this effect, corresponding as it
would to something like an ideal reading situation for his work, in which the critical
capacity is at a minimum vis-a-vis the text and vis-a-vis the surrounding social
environment is at a maximum.
254. Althusser, "Contradiction and Overdetermination," in For Marx, p. 116.
255. For the now classic analysis (the argument dating to 1983-1984) of the
articulation in postmodernism of pastiche and the schizoid, see Jameson, Postmod-
ernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, pp. 16-31. Compare further a
remark of Deleuze on what might be called the ethics, as well as the aesthetics, of
creating philosophical concepts: "some concepts must be indicated by an extraordi-
nary and sometimes even barbarous or shocking word, whereas others make do
with an ordinary, everyday word that isfilledwith harmonics so distant that it risks
being imperceptible to a nonphilosophical ear. Some concepts call for archaisms,
and others for neologisms, shot through with almost crazy etymological exercises"
(Deleuze and Claire Pamet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Hab-
berjam [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987], P-17).
256. Himself admitting exceptions, Adorno is right to argue for the use of dashes
(Gedankenstriche: thought-strokes) against parentheses (Klammer: clamps). "The
test of a writer's sensitivity in punctuating is the way he handles parenthetical mate-
rial. The cautious writer will tend to place that material between dashes and not in
round brackets, for brackets take the parenthesis completely out of the sentence,
creating enclaves, as it were, whereas nothing in good prose should be unnecessary
to the overall structure. By admitting such superfluousness, brackets implicitly re-
nounce the claim to the integrity of the linguistic form and capitulate to pedantic
philistinism. Dashes, in contrast, which block off the parenthetical material from the
flow of the sentence without shutting it up in a prison, capture both connection and
0\
I
detachment" (Adorno, "Punctuation Marks" [1956], in Notes to Literature, 1:91--
^ 97; here 95).
w 257. Heim, The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality, pp. 30-35. "Like fractal structures, a
<< text can turn back on itself linguistically, and hypertext shows the turns, the links,
Q the recurring motifs, and the playful self-references" (p. 9) •
a, 258. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks; as cited in Joseph A. Buttigieg, introduction to
w
H Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed. with introduction by Joseph A. Buttigieg, trans.
53 Joseph A. Buttigieg and Antonio Callari (New York: Columbia University Press,
434 1992), 1:1-64; here 59-60 [notebooks 7 § 6 and 11 § 27]. See further Buttigieg,
"philology and Politics: Returning to the Text of Antonio Gramsci's Prison Note-
books," boundary 2 21 :z (Summer 1994), 98-138.
v 2S9. See, for example, Nietzsche, "NF, Fruhjahr 1888"; KGW 8/1:250: "Lack of
philology: one constandy confuses the explanation [Erklarung] with the text—and
•ivhat an 'explanation!"' As will be seen later, Nietzsche moves to replace "explana-
tion" in this thesis with the, for him, more positive term "interpretation " which is
pitted against "facts." Nonetheless, he will remain dedicated to the proposition not
only that the "text" exists but also that it has a very specific, albeit esoteric political
task. For Nietzsche has self-interested reasons for diverting "explanation" away
from his own texts and this project.
260. Gramsci, "Culture and Class Struggle'> [1918], in Selections from Cultured
Writings, e<*- David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, trans. William Boelhower
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 31-37; here p. 32.
261. See Negri, The Savage Anomaly, pp. 98-108 ("Philology and Tactics").
262. Montag, "Spinoza and Althusser Against Hermeneutics," in TheAlthusserian
Legacy, p. 55-
263. Cf. Nietzsche, "Versuch einer Selbstkritik" [1886], inZ>« Geburt der Tra-
godie. Oder: Griechenthum und Pessimismus [expanded ed. 1886]; KGW 3/1:5-16
("Attempt at a Self-Criticism"]; and Ecce homo; KGW 6/1:307-313 ["The Birth of
Tragedy"].
264. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst I881"; KGW 5/2:513.
265. See Rosalyn Diprose, "Nietzsche and the Pathos of Distance" in Nietzsche,
Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Paul Patton (London and New York: Roudedge,
1993), pp. 1-26.
266. Althusser, "From Capital to Marx's Philosophy," in Reading Capital, p. 16.
267. Montag, "Spinoza and Althusser Against Hermeneutics,'' in TheAlthusserian
Legacy, p. 55.
268. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power ofa Common-
wealth EccUsiasticall and Civil [1651], ed. with an introduction by Michael Oake-
shott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), pp. 246-255.
269. Montag, "Spinoza and Althusser Against Hermeneutics," in TheAlthusserian
Legacy, p. 56.
270. Ibid. As Montag goes on to show, Althusser's development of Spinoza's
materialist way of reading was part of a multifront intervention directed not only
against the idealist tendencies of hermeneutics and structuralism but also against the O
ostensible "materialism" of deconstmction. ^
271. Bataille, Theory ofReligion [ 1948,firstpublished 1974], trans. Robert Hurley g
(New York: Zone Books, 1992), p. 9. Theoriede la religion; CEuvres completes, 7:281- g
36i; here 285. g
272. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit [1807], trans. A. V. Miller, with an analysis *
and foreword by J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), PP- 2 ~3 ^
r 0°
[preface § 3]; emphasis added. ***
43
273. Ibid., p. 39 [preface § 64] • 5
274- Fjnile Zola, preface [1877] to HAssommoir [1872], trans. Leonard Tancocfcl
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970) > pp. 21 -22; here p. 21. J§l
275. Peter Szondi, Theory of the Modern Drama [1956], trans. Michael Haysl
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) > P- 96.
276. Deleuze and Guattari,^4 Thousand Plateaus, p. 356. Actually, the authors are!
speaking about Kleist, but in this regard "Kleist" and "Nietzsche" are for thenil
virtually convertible terms.
277. Ibid., p. 377.
278. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley and Los Angeles:!
University of California Press, 1990), p. 165.
279. Derrida, "Force et signification" [ 1963], in Venture et difference (Paris: Fxli-t
tions du Seuil, 1967), pp. 9-49; here p. n . For a translation, see Writing andi
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978). Irii
this early essay, Derrida identifies the capacity to "comprehend force from withini
itself" with "creativity" in order to suggest, first, that literary criticism remains I
structuralist "in every age, in its essence and destiny" and, second, that philosophyl
and criticism be teoriented to provide an immanent critique of force.
280. Contrast Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbacb and the End of Classical Germant
Philosophy [1886] (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), pp. 4 0 - 4 1 , with At-fj
thusser's definitive critique in "Contradiction and Overdetermination " in ForMarx%
esp. pp. 93-94-
281. Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason [1983], trans. Michael EldrecLj|
foreword by Andreas Huyssen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,:
I987),p-xxix.
282. For an analysis of the modernist obsession with the human body as prosthe^
tic armoring, as ambivalent response to the inwardness enforced by modernity, and
as symptomatic of the death drive, see Hal Foster, Compulsive Beauty (Cambridge,;
Mass., and London: The M E Press, 1993) and ongoing work.
28 3. See Max Horkheimer, "Materialism and Morality" [ 193 3 ] , in Between Philos-
ophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings, ed. G. Frederick Hunter, trans.
G. Frederick Hunter et al. (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The MLT Press, i993)>
pp. 15-47.
284. Nietzsche, Diefrohliche Wissenschaft {"lagayascienza") [ 1st ed. 1882]; KGW
5/2:80 [aphorism 38]; emphasis added.
00 285. Bataille, "Propositions" [1937], Visions ofExcess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939,
£ ed. with an introduction by Allan Stoekl, trans. Allan Stoekl, with Carl R. Lovitt and
^ Donald M . Leslie Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 198 5 ) , pp. 197-
<j 201; here p. 197. (Euvres completes, 1:467-473; here 467.
Q 286. See J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words [1962], 2d ed., ed. J. O.
OT Urmson and Marina Sbisa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975),
H pp. 94-120 and 145-146; see further "Performative Utterances" Philosophical Papers
B [1961], 2d ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Wamock (Oxford: Oxford University
436
press, 1970), pp- 233-252- According to Austin in How to Do Things with Words, it is
necessary to distinguish between different types of perlocutionary act or effect—
which are not conventional, as opposed to illocutionary ones, which are—in terms
of whether and how the speaker's or writer's "design, intention, or purpose" is
fulfilled or unfulfilled. For instance, the speaker or writer may perform an act "in the
"nomenclature of which reference is made either . . . only obliquely, or even . . .not
\ at all, to the performance of the locutionary or illocutionary act" (p. 101). And the
i»fact that the object person does not mention a term or doctrine does not necessarily
mean that s/he is not using it or being used by it. In other words, the listener or
c
reader may well not be conscious of the full design, intention, or purpose behind a
locution, illocution, and perlocution. Interestingly, major critics of Austin as dif-
ferent from one another as John Searle and Derrida have failed to take up fully the
rather more sinister implications of Austin's work. Turning to the problem of ana-
lyzing this problematic, Austin also noted that with the descriptive or "constative"
utterance "we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects
of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary: moreover, we use an over-
simplified notion of correspondence with the facts—over-simplified because essen-
tially it brings in the illocutionary aspect"; whereas, "with the performative utter-
ance, we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and
abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts" (pp. 145-146). But this
means that the very capacity to distinguish the constative from the performative is
relative, contingent, and overdetermined by other factors. And it is particularly
difficult if not impossible to distinguish them, when the distinction is always already
blurred by design—as it is in exemplary fashion in Nietzsche's discursive practice.
In Brechtian terminology, performatives would count as "social gests": that is,
not mere "gesticulations"—though they involve this—but rather condensed ways
of "conveying particular attitudes" so that "conclusions can be drawn about the
social circumstances," See Brecht, "On Gestic Music" [c. 1934], inBrechton Theatre:
The Development of an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. John Willett (New York: Hill and
Wang; London: Methuen, 1964), pp. 104-106.
287. Bill Nichols, Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary (Bloom-
ington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 234.
288. Valery Podoroga,"Evnukhdushi (Pozitsii chteniiaimir Platonova)," Voprosy
filosofii 3 (1989), 21-26; translated and expanded as "The Eunuch of the Soul: ^
Positions of Reading and the World of Platonov," South Atlantic Quarteriy 90:2 O
(Spring 1991), 357-408; here 391-392. e»
289. Althusser, "From Capital to Marx's Philosophy," in Reading Capital, p. 46. o
290. Colin MacCabe, preface to Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic, pp. ix-xvi; £
here pp. xii-xiii. §
Co
291. See Georg Forster, MachtwiUe und Machinewelt: Dcutung unser Zeit (Pots- M
dam: Alfred Protte, 1930), p. 67. For Forster, the Nietzschean Superman could be 1
realized under conditions of modernity not in terms of any—effeminate—"self- °
437
referential" thought but only in the—masculinist—"iron world of technology1?:
(p. 78). This techno-Nietzschean problematic had been anticipated internationally^
however, by Nietzscheans such as Emst Junger, Filippo Marinetti, and Wyndhanv
Lewis, among many others.
292- Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886"; KGW 8 /1:98.
293. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Bose: Vonpiel einer Philosophic der Zukunft
[1886]; KGW 6/2:92 [part 4, aphorism 108]; ellipsis in original. An apogee in
literary criticism of this supposedly "Nietzschean" principle (affirmatively grasped1
now as a matrer of "textual pluralism") was reached in 1970 by Bardies in S/Z; see,
for example, p. 5, where he appeals explicidy to Nietzsche for his methodology. This
was a seminal moment in contemporary literary criticism, for it demonstrated that a
text commonly understood as "modernist" could be transformed into what was in
effect "postmodern." North American literary-theoretical "deconstruction" also de-
veloped, notably in the work of Paul de Man, out of Nietzsche's alleged views of
interpretation. While de Manian deconstruction does often appear poised to ac-
knowledge (though it actually does so far too coyly) the darker aspects of Nietz-
sche's political ideology, sometimes termed the "Dionysian," nonetheless its general
drift is to "deconstruct" (i.e., to expose the linguistic mechanisms of the supposedly
irreducible, "allegorical" tension in both rigorous philosophical and rigorous liter-
ary language between referentiality and figurality, constatation and performance,
rhetoric and eloquence, literature and philosophy) this "Dionysian" with the aid of
a "rigorously" critical or "Apollinian" moment that either textuaUy already "under-
mines" the former moment or can be made to "undermine" it by an act of "reading"
as opposed to the more contingent and subsequent act of interpretation. In this'
system, "allegory" means "repetitive of a potential confusion between figural and
referential statement"; it opposes the category "historical," which here means only
"revelatory of a teleological meaning." But precisely this deconstructive move—
which was to a large extent anticipated by a more or less intentional "misreading" of
Nietzsche—ends up leaving the full complexity and efficacy of Nietzsche's politico-
rhetorical project of exploitation remarkably intact, in the guise of what de Man
hyperbolically and obscurantistically dubs an "allegory of errors [that] is the very
model of philosophical rigor" (Paul de Man, "Rhetoric of Tropes [Nietzsche]"
[ 1974], in Allegories ofReading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and
Proust [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979], PP- 103-118; here
<> pp. 116-118). The most consistently interesting development of de Manian "alle-
£ gory" has been that of Jameson—who, however, follows Walter Benjamin's path-
M breaking discussion of allegory rather more closely than he does de Man's, though
«i the latter, too, was influenced by Benjamin in this regard.
O 294. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886"; KGW 8 / r: 152.
w 295. For an example of a savvy reader doing just this, see Samuel Weber, Institu-
te c
H tions and Interpretation, afterword by Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: Universiry or
E Minnesota Press, i987),pp.4-6.
438
. 296. For a major Althusserian-Marxist defense of postdialectical thought in this
J sense, and of its premodern, Spinozist antecedents, see Pierre Macherey, Hegel ou
'Spinoza (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), zm&Avec Spinoza: fituaessur
'!la doctrine et Phistoire du spinozisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992);
for an alternative Althusserian approach that nonetheless stresses certain dialectical
tendencies in Spinoza's political philosophy, see the work of Balibar, including
;-Spinoza et la politique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985); see further
^ Andr^Tosel, Spinoza etlecrepuscuk de la servitude: Essaisurle Truite'theologico-politique
(Paris: Auber, 1984). Central to orthodox Marxism, including especially the prop-
erly Leninist tradition, is the principle, as expressed by philosophical materialist and
textual critic Sebastiano Timpanaro, that "contradictions are described in terms of
conflicts between forces, not in terms of the identity of opposites; and the Hegelian
'trichotomies' are regarded as idealist rubbish, Vhich it would be absurd to confuse
with materialist dialectics'* (Sebastiano Timpanaro, "Karl Korsch and Lenin's Phi-
losophy," in On Materialism [1973], trans. Lawrence Garner [London: NLB,
1975], pp. 221-254; here p. 252). Timpanaro cites here from Lenin, "Karl Marx"
[1914-1915], in Collected Works, 21:43-97. For yet another relevant perspective on
the dialectic as real opposition, not synthesis or mere contradiction, see Lucio Col-
lerti, "Marxism and the Dialectic" [1974], trans. John Matthews, New Left Review 93
(September-October 1975), 3-29. Alternatively, for a spirited rejection of the no-
tion that Hegelian thought, or German Idealism generally, promotes synthesis in
any facile sense, see Ziiek, Tarrying with the Negative. But the dialectic is certainly to
be rejected whenever, as Negri notes, it is "the form in which bourgeois ideology is
always presented to us in all its variants—even in those of the purely negative
dialectics of crisis and war" (Negri, The Savage Anomaly, p. 20).
297. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philos-
ophy, p. 174. A number of critics have—rightly—pointed out that in general the
mechanism of interpellation, first proposed in 1970, is more contradictory and less
necessarily debilitating or supportive of a functionalist status quo than Althusser
implies; see perhaps most notably Michel Pecheux, Language, Semantics and Ideology
[Les verites de La Police, 197s] (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); Goran Ther-
born, The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (London: Verso, 1980); and
Zizek, The Metastases ofEnjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (London and
New York: Verso, 1994), pp. 57-62. This important theoretical debate notwith-
standing, however, Nietzschean interpellation has remained a remarkably homoge- KO
neous historical phenomenon. ^
298. See Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, pp. 92-93; Althusser and Balibar, £
Reading Capital, pp. 16-17, 102-107, and 187-189; Althusser, "Elements of Self- 5
Criticism" [ 1974], in Essays in Self-Criticism, pp. 101 -161; here pp. 132-141; and "Is g
It Simple to Be a Marxist in Philosophy?" in Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy *
°f the Scientists, here esp. pp. 216 and 224-228; and Negri, The Savage Anomaly, *[>
passim. See further Resch, Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory, pp. 42- o*
439
49 and 57-60, and Montag, "Spinoza and Althusser Against Hermeneutics" in Th$
Alihusserian Legacy. However, in the interests of critiquing excessively Eurocentric^
modes of thought, it is important to add that Spinozism has no monopoly on the;
complex view of nature as at once natured and naturing. For example, the important;
eighteenth-century Japanese philosopher, physician, and social critic, Ando Shoeklf
(1703-1762), responded to the ways that Taoism and Buddhism were being approj§
priated to legitimate the feudal state by elaborating a rigorous and intricate idea 'bit
nature with ideographs such as shizen (roughly: "self-nature") ondgosei (roughly||
"the nature of mutual determination'' or "the naturing of interactive processes") onl
behalf of an explicitly liberatory project. While Ando was well aware of certain^
trends in Dutch thought, and thus may have been indirectly influenced by Spinoi?
zism, it is quite unlikely that he knew Spinoza's work directly. For an edited transla^
tion of some of Ando's works with a useful introduction, see Toshinobu Yasunagaf
AndoShoeki: Social and Ecological Philosopher in Eighteenth-CenturyJapan (NewYorkl
and Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1992). It is unfortunate, however, that today in muchl
Japanese philosophy Ando's work is commonly assimilated not to Spinoza ancf
Althusser but to Heidegger and Nietzsche. J|
299. Negri, The Savage Anomaly, p. 129. 1
300. Balibar, "The Non-Contemporaneity of Althusser," in The Althusserian Le0
acy, pp. 12-13. ';•!
301. Pier Paolo Pasolini, "Un intervento rimandato" [1948], in Diafogo con Pas$
olini: Scritti 1957-1984 (Rome: Rinascita, 1985), p. 109. f.
302. The view of Gramsci presented here is in solidarity with Ahmad's observa-f
tion that most of his readers today simply refuse "to acknowledge the full import of.
the fact that Gramsci was a communist militant" (Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, NaZ
tions, Literatures, p. 218).
303. See again Guartari and Negri, Communists Like Us, and—another important-
document of twenty-first-century thought—Autonomia: Post-Political Politics. Con-
trast the gist of Heidegger's argument in "Die Zeit des Weltbildes" [1938]) "*
Holzwege, pp. 73-110, translated as 'The Age of the World Picture," in The Question.
Concerning Technology: Heidegger's Critique ofthe Modern Age.
304. Selectionsfromthe Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, p. 405.
305. This remark is meant quasi-ironically. A recent article by two classicists
intimates that at least their philology and knowledge of Greek is superior to Nietz-:
<* sche's and to that of the rest of us. See Anton Bierl and William M. Calder III,
c£ "Friedrich Nietzsche: Abriss der Geschichte der Beredsamkeif; A New Edition"
« Nietzsche-Studien 21 (1992), 363-389. These authors conclude with "the welcome
<5 truth that by November 1872 traditional historical philological scholarship bored
Q Friedrich Nietzsche. Indpit tragoedia " (389). Indeed!
w 306. Cornelius Castoriadis, "Social Transformation and Cultural Creation"
H [ 1978], in Political and Social Writings, vol. 3: Recommencing the Revolution: From
O
2 Socialism to the Autonomous Society, trans, and ed. David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis
440
land London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 300-313; here p. 305. The
%rmcr communist Castoriadis is very fond of this turn of phrase, without following
liis own advice. It also occurs automatically, for example, in 'The 'End of Philoso-
|^y»» [1986—1990] and'The Crisis of Culture and the State" [1986-1987], both in
this Vkilosophy, Politics, Autonomy, ed. David Ames Curtis (New York and Oxford:
^Oxford University Press, i99i),pp. 13-32 and 219-242, respectively.
£§§307. Althusser, "From Capital to Marx's Philosophy," in Reading Capital, pp. 15-
Hs;; translation modified.
H308. Althusser, "Freud and Lacan," in Lenin and Philosophy, p. 196.
I&309. See Derrida, 'Text Read at Louis Althusser's Funeral" in The Althusserian
ftyacy, p. 244.
! i 310. See Althusser, Vavenir dure longtemps (1985) and also Lesfaits (1976), in
f&avenirdure longtemps [suivi de] Lesfaits. These texts—quite different in tone and
Hbth unfinished—were written before and after Althusser fatally strangled his wife
iieUne Rytman in 1980. He died in October, 1990.
3v'311. See his Journal de captivite": Stalag XA1940-194.$, Garnets—Correspondances—
fcextes, ed. Olivier Corpet and Yann Moulier Boutang (Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1992.;
Edition posthume d'ceuvres de Louis Althusser, vol 2: Journal et textes de captivite*).
I 312. Yann Moulier Boutang, Louis Althusser: Une biographic, vol. 1: La formation
$umythe (1918-1956) (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1992), p. 213.
I 313. See Althusser to Lacan, December 10,1963; "Correspondance avec Jacques
Lacan 1963-1969" in his Merits sur lapsychanalyze: Freud et Lacan, ed. Oliver Corpet
j'and Francois Matheron (Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1993; Edition posthume d'eeuvres de
Louis Althusser, vol. 3: Merits surla psychanalyze), pp. 267-305; here pp. 286-298.
J- 314. See Althusser's letters to Navarro in 1984-1985, in Sur la philosophic, esp.
pp. 108,116, and 120.
; 315. The extensive—more or less post-Lacanian—literature on the Dora case
includes Steven Marcus, "Freud and Dora: Story, History, Case History," in Repre-
sentations: Essays on Literature and History (New York: Random House, 1975),
pp. 247-310; Suzanne Gearhart, T h e Scene of Psychoanalysis: The Unanswered
Questions of Doa.^ Diacritics (March 1979), 114-126; Toril Moi, "Representation
of Patriarchy: Sexuality and Epistemology in Freud's Dora," Feminist Review 9 (Au-
tumn 1981), 60-74; A Fine Romance: Freud and Dora, ed. Neil Hertz, special issue
of Diacritics (Spring 1983); In Dora's Case: Freud-Hysteria-Feminism, ed. Charles Q
Bernheimer and Clair Kahane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and w
Jerry Aline FHeger, "Entertaining the Menage a Trois: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, H
and Literature," in Feminism and Psychoanalysis, ed. Richard Feldstein and Judith ^
Roof (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp-185-208. A
316. Frank J. Sulloway, Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic «
Legend (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 482-483. See further Ernest Jones, The g
Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, 3 vols. (New York: Basic Books and London: I
Hogarth Press, 1953-1957), vol. 2: Tears of Maturity, 1901-1919, pp. 152-153; vol. 3: ^
441
The Last Phase, 1919-1939, p. 135; and Free Associations: Memories of a Psycho-Analys
(New York: Basic Books and London: Hogarth Press, 1959), pp. 227-228.
317. Spinoza, Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, Gramsci, Althusser, and cyberpunk
hackers all work esoterically to some extent, but this is necessitated mainly by practical
constraints and cautions.
318. 'To rive in a glass house is a revolutionary virtue par excellence. It is also an
intoxication, a moral exhibitionism that we badly need. Discretion concerning one's
own existence, once an aristocratic virtue, has become more and more an affair of
petit-bourgeois parvenus" (Benjamin, "Surrealism" [1929], in Selections, pp. 177-
192; here p. 180). Benjamin was inspired by an experience in Moscow: at a hotel,
Tibetan lamas, who had come to discuss the relation of religion and the revolution,
habitually left their doors open. This vision of a completely transparent, and self-
transparent, society was explicitly anticipated by Rousseau.
319. Miller, "Social and Political Theory: Class, State, Revolution," in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Marx, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991 )> pp. S4-105; here p. 75.
320. See, for example, Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings, p. 126, especially
the section of the prison notebooks with the heading "Father Bresciani's Progeny*
(pp. 301-341) where Gramsci is particularly keen to reject the novelist Antonio
Bresciani's presentation of the Revolution of 1848 as having been, in the words of
Gramsci's editors, "entirely the work of fanatical conspirators and secret societies,
while at the same time expropriating revolutionary language to the cause of reac-
tion" (p. 298).
321. Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic, pp. 9 and 22.
322. On attempts—beginning already at the end of the nineteenth century and
lasting until now—of the political "Left" in Germany to synthesize Marx and Nietz-
sche, indeed to replace the former with the latter, see Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy
in Germany, ch. 6: "Nietzschean Socialism: Left and Right," esp. pp. 164-192.
323. The influence of Nietzsche on Freud has long been a topic of discussion and
conjecture. See, for example, Ronald Lehrer, Nietzsche's Presence in Freud's Life and
Thought: On the Origins of a Psychology of Dynamic Unconscious Mental Functioning
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 199s). The best general framework
may have been provided by Timpanaro, however, although even he concedes too
o much to Nietzsche. He argues that psychoanalysis is irrevocably informed by an
i internal, core contradiction: namely, as "a doctrine that never entirely abandoned
2 certain materialist principles, and a metaphysical and even mythological construc-
w tion." In this respect, Timpanaro continues:
o
<
Q It is no accident that he [Freud] was to acknowledge Nietzsche and later Schopen-
,0 hauer as the thinkers who were most akin to him, his "precursors" — even if he always
w
H scrupulously insisted that he had arrived at conclusions similar to theirs before he had
£ read their works, and by purely scientific means. For its part, the literature'Of European
442
decadence could scarcely have found so much inspiration in psychoanalysis, if this had
really been a doctrine of materialist enlightenment. Students of Freud, especially those
who—with the best intentions—have argued for the materialist and enlightened na-
ture of his work, do not seem to have paid sufficient attention to this paradox. It is
certainly true that if we liberate the genuine Nietzsche from ultra-irrationalist and even
pre-fascist interpretations of his work, we find a potent critic—even if an "internal"
critic—of the hypocrisy and false moralism of the bourgeois Christian ethic; and in his
vitalism there are undoubtedly materialist and hedonistic elements. But the aphoristic
and contradictory character of Nietzsche's thought is such that it can instill materialism
only in someone who has already become a materialist by another route (and not
merely by pragmatic adaptation in a particular discipline). Certain of Nietzsche's
professions are also genuinely enlightened . . [Timpanaro is thinking of aphorism
197 i" Day Break]. But this is an enlightenment that is nearly entirely consumed in a
polemic against a certain type of romanticism, and therewith remains within the limits
of an exasperated aristocratism. In the case of Schopenhauer—whose influence is in
any case essentially restricted to Freud's late work—there is no need even for the
niceties of distinction that Nietzsche allows us to make. (Timpanaro, The Freudian
Slip: Psychoanalysis and Textual Criticism [ 1974], trans. Kate Soper [London: NLB,
1976], pp-184-186)
Nietzsche himself was neither "ultra-irrationalist" nor "prefascist," as these terms are
commonly understood, but tendencies at least as sinister are absolutely fundamental
both to his thought and to his influence—neither of which, in any event, is as
"distinct" from the other as Timpanaro implies.
324. Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, ed. Herman Nunberg and Ernst
Federn, trans. M. Nunberg (New York: International Universities Press, Inc.,
1962), 1 (i906-i908):358 [April 1,1908].
325. Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London and New York: Verso, 1991 )>
p. 126.
326. UcceUacd e uccellini (Pier Paolo Pasolini, Italy, 1966). This film is one of the
major statements (by a rare non- or anti-Nietzschean) about "the death of ideol-
ogy," "the death of communism" and other deaths as well. The Crow's last words
before his death: "Once upon a time, there was the beautiful color red. . . . Oh,
middle class, you've identified the whole world with yourself. This identification Q
means the end of the world; but the end of the world will also be your end." See also w
Pasolini's filmbook UcceUacd e uccellini (Mikn: Garzanti, 1966)> p- 59- Here, he H
wrote of Tot6 and Ninetto: 'They perform an act of cannibalism, called communion ^
by Catholics: namely, they swallow the body of Togliatti (or of Marxists) and Q
incorporate it; after they incorporate it, they carry it on down the road, so that even co
though you don't know where the road is going, it's obvious that they have incorpo- o
rated Marxism." The Crow is an allegorical figure not only for "Left-wing intellec- 1
tuals in the era before Togiiatti's death" for Palmiro Togliatti (the then recently
443
deceased leader of the Italian Communist Party and comrade of Gramsci) and fetf
Marxism tout court but also, according to Pasolini, an allegory for himself and btheil
First-World left-bourgeois intellectuals like him, at the time, as thefilmputs it, wheii|
"it is the sunset of gteat hopes, the age of Brecht and [Roberto] Rossellini is over!
while the workers advance in the sunset." Nonetheless, Pasolini also described the!
film as having been made "by a Marxist, from the inside, totally unwilling to believed
that Marxism is ended" Finally, the Crow says: "Don't weep for the end of what •%
believe in, because surely someone else will come to take up the red banner, carryings
it forwards; I weep only for myself." See further Marc Gervais, Pier Paolo Pasolinii
(Paris: Seghers, 1975), pp. 142-143; Barth David Schwartz,, Pasolini Requiem (Newt
York: Pantheon Books, 1992), pp. 483-491; and Viano,A CertainRealism, pp. i4<j4
160.
327. Pasolini as cited in Viano, A Certain Realism, p. 17.
328. Pasolini, "Perche quella di Edipo e una storia" introduction to the filmbook
o£hisEdipore (Milan: Garzanti, 1967),p. 14.
329. Viano's A Certain Realism is a good book about Pasolini but is wholly;
mistaken both in its depiction of Nietzsche and hence in its attempt to bring a;
Nietzschean perspective to bear on the filmmaker and poet.
330. In addition to the writings of Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch (both of
whom remained rather more ambivalent about Nietzsche than others associated
with critical theory), see most notably Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlight-
enment [written 1944, published 1947], and Herbert Marcuse's many works, begin-
ning with Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud [delivered as
lectures 1950-1951, published 1955], 2d ed. (New York: Vintage Books, i9<Si)i
Particularly Left-Nietzschoid is Marcuse's^4» Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1969). This ideological drift is particularly unfortunate because in this text
Marcuse, more perhaps than any other member or associate of the Frankfurt School,
began to grasp power as an eso/exoteric problematic. He follows Freud to argue
that the "power of society in shaping the whole experience, the whole metabolism
between the organism and its environment," ought not to be reduced to ideology—
the reason being that the proper site of ideology is beneath the threshold of con-
sciousness and in "patterns of behavior" (p, 11). In other words, social power can be
esoteric, though Marcuse failed to read his philosophical mentor Nietzsche accord-
^g ingly. Already of Nietzschean inspiration, however, was the underlying concept
T behind the seminal Dialectic ofEnlightenment, as Horkheimer's drafts and contribu-
2 tions make particularly clear. For two different takes on the extensive, basically
w affirmative and uncritical Frankfurt School appropriation of Nietzsche, see Rein-
«< hart Mauer, "Nietzsche und die kritische Theorie" Nietzsche-Studien 10/11 (1981-
Q 1982), 34-58 (followed by a discussion, 59-79); and Jose* Guilherme Merquior,
o. Western Marxism (London: Paladin, 1986). Whereas Merquior critiques Western
£-1 Marxism and the Frankfurt School specifically after having reduced it to Nietzsche-
fc anism (which he dislikes), Mauer argnes that the Frankfurt School did not under-
444
lland Nietzsche (whom he likes) at his ostensibly most radically demystifying root
fiecause its own lingering traces of positive, affirmative dialectic would have thereby
%een exposed and called on the carpet.
|W 331. See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation [The Terry
llectures, Yale University, 1961], trans. Denis Savage (New Haven and London:
||ale University Press, 1970), pp. 20-36 (ch. 2: "The Conflict of Interpretations").
:• Later Ricoeur proposed, in the same basic vein but more interestingly, that "Hei-
'deggerian deconstruction must now take on Nietzschean genealogy, Freudian psy-
choanalysis, the Marxist critique of ideology, that is, the weapons of the herme-
fneutics of suspicion. Armed in this way, the critique is capable of unmasking the
%nthought conjunction of bidden metaphysics and worn-out metaphor" (Ricoeur,
:/The Ride of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Lan-
guage [ 197s ], trans. Robert Czerny, with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello,
S.J. [Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977], p. 285). The typical
problem with all such Ricoeurian formulations, however, is that they ignore the
possibility that thinkers—such as Nietzsche and Heidegger—consciously concealed
their full intentions in their "metaphors" so as to have maximum subconscious
effect. Be this as it may, Peter Dews has righdy noted in a different context that "the
force of the thought of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche can scarcely be sidestepped by
the elementary move of pointing out the self-undermining character of the deter-
minism supposedly implied by the ^hermeneutics of suspicion' by countering gene-
alogy with simple asseverations of the autonomy of textual meaning . . . " (Dews,
Logics of Disintegration: Post-structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory
[London and New York: Verso, 1987], p. xiv). Actually, Dews is complaining less
about Ricoeur directly than about a derivative thesis of Renaut and Ferry in La
pensee 68.
332. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth
Century" [1962], in Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans, and ed. by David E. Linge
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 107-
129; here p. 116.
333- Far more fruitful—potentially—is Gadamer's claim that interpretation after
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud involves what he calls hintergehen, which (as the transla-
tor points out) does not merely denote "to go behind" something (including so as
to get at a deeper level "behind the surface of what is meant" "behind the subjec- Q
tivity of the act of meaning," as Gadamer puts it) but also connotes "to deceive" and w
"to double cross." See Gadamer, "The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth H
Century" in Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 117. However, the fundamental problem ^
in the case of Nietzsche—to an extent untrue of Freud and Marx—is that the o
w
principle of hintergehen was consciously and successfully employed as a technique *»
of— esoteric—textual production, and not merely of— exoteric—textual interpreta- °
tion as is assumed by consumption-oriented philosophical hermeneutics and by its M
various rivals in the current intellectual marketplace. "^
445
334- See Deleuze, Nietzsche et la pbiiosophie (Paris: Presses Universitaires d&
France, 1962), esp. pp. 169-189. For the too tardy translation of this seminal book,
set Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. HughTomlinson (New York: Columbia Univer- i
sity Press, 1983). x
335. There are severe problems with Deleuze's basic thesis, and withNietzsche etla :
philosophie generally, for grasping Nietzsche/anism. A recent commentator on De^;
leuze's early work has unwittingly implied that it lacks any notion of the exo/')_
esoteric distinction. In direct opposition to Heidegger, for example, Deleuze "limits
us to a strictly immanent and materialist ontological discourse that refuses any deep '
or bidden foundation of being. There is nothing veiled or negative about Deleuze's
being; it is fully expressed in the world. Being, in this sense, is superficial, positive, .
and full" (Hardt, Gilies Deleuze, p. xiii). While this (neo-Spinozist) approach to -
ontology may well make for good philosophy and politics of its own kind, it can lead
only to a superficial grasp of Heidegger and of Nietzsche; and {pace Hardt and
Deleuze himself) it is "Nietzschean" in name only, only exoterically.
336. See Dews, Logics of Disintegration, p. 2. As he acknowledges, Dews is here
following an argument advanced already in 1969 by Paolo Caruso, Conversazioni con
Claude Levi-Strauss,MichelFoucault,JacquesLacan (Milan: U. Mursia, 1969)> p. 117.
337. Dews's book is one of the first major attempts from a leftist perspective to
articulate German critical theory and French poststructuralism. It can also be read as
a tacit but sustained confrontation with Nietzscheanism. See Dews, Logics of Dis-
integration, esp. pp. 157-177 and 197-219. Unfortunately, however, Dews him-
self breaks no new ground on the latter front, in part because he appears not to
know Nietzsche's own work independently of the Nietzschean thinkers he wishes to
critique. Thus the "dilemma" Dews finds "at the heart of Nietzsche's thought'?
(p. 179), and which resurfaces as "the fundamental inconsistency" of "Nietzschean
pluralism" (p. 218), represents a superficial, exoteric epistemological problem that
is removable (and removable only) by settling accounts with the more esoteric,
rhetorical, and political dimension of Nietzsche's intent.
338. See Jean Hyppolite, 'The Structure of Philosophic Language According to
the 'Preface' to Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind" [1966], in The Structuralist Contro-
versy: The Languages of Criticism and the Science of Man, ed. Richard Macksey and
Eugenio Donato (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
o\
0 1972), pp. 157-169; here p. 157.
1 339. De Man, Temporality in HolderHn's 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . ' " [Gauss
2 Lecture, Princeton University, 1967; announced as "The Problem of Aesthetic To-
« tality in Holderlin"], in Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism: The Gauss Semi-
^ nars and Other Papers, ed. E. S. Burt, Kevin Newmark, and Andrzej Warminski (Bal-
&i
Q timore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 50-73; here
w p. 51. This essay is representative of what is most valuable in de Manian deconstruc-
ts
H tion.
O
£ 340. Michel Foucault, "Structuralism and Post-Structuralism" [interview with
446
l l e r a r d Raulet, 1983], trans. Jferemy Harding, Telos ss (Spring 1983), 195-211; here
Woo. Foucault was first deeply impressed by Nietzsche in 1953, having discovered
Ithe Untimely Meditations while on vacation in Italy, though "like any good normalien
the had in fact read Nietzsche years before" (James Miller, The Passion of Michel
^(fucautt (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), pp. 66-67). This was a turning
f point in Foucault's life.
p^; 341. See Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx," in Nietzsche [Colloque Philosophi-
fque International de Royaumont, July 4 - 8 , 1964] (Paris: Les editions de minuit,
I1967), pp. 183-192 (followed by a discussion, pp. 193-200). See further The Order
Wf'Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences [Les mots et les choses, 1966], trans,
ianon. (New York: Random House, 1970), where Foucault writes: ' T h e first book
piDas Kapital is an exegesis of Value'; all Nietzsche is an exegesis of a few Greek
5-words; Freud, the exegesis of all those unspoken phrases that support and at the
same time undermine our apparent discourse, our fantasies, our dreams, our bodies.
'Philology, as the analysis of what is said in the depths of discourse, has become the
modern form of criticism" (p. 298); and The Archaeology ofKnowledge [ 1969], in his
The Archaeology of Knowledge & The"Discourseon Language, trans. A. M . Sheridan
Smith (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1976), where Foucault speaks of the
work of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche as the three major modern "decenterings" of
the subject (pp. 13-14). For a t o o uncritical account of Foucault's Nietzscheanism,
see Michael Mahon, Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject:
1961-1975 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). And for an impor-
tant —unfortunately not very influential—attempt by one of Althusser's students t o
rescue the early Foucault, himself a student of Althusser, from his Nietzschean
tendencies, see Dominique Lecourt, Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Can-
guilhem and Foucault [1969-1972], trans. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1975),
pp. 187-213.
342. Foucault, "Politics and Ethics: An Interview" [with Paul Rabinow, Charles
Taylor, Martin Jay, Richard Rorty, and Leo Lowenthal, 1983], trans. Catherine
Porter, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books,
1984), pp. 373-38o; here p. 374.
343- Jiitgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests [ 1968], trans. Jeremy J.
Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 299; see further esp. chs. 2 (Marx), 10
(Freud), and 12 (Nietzsche). Habermas's overall project may be viewed as the *
tripartite attempt to establish the authority of self-critical Reason as philosophically £j
and socially prior to the epistemological skepticism, and consequent ideological ^
irrationalism (1) of Nietzsche himself, as exemplary post-Enlightenment thinker; ^
(2) of French postmodern Nietzscheanism; and (3) of powerful Nietzschean ten- £
dencies of the Frankfurt School. See Habermas, "The Entwinement of Myth and &>
Enlightenment: Re-Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment," New German Critique 26 O
(Spring-Summer 1982), 13-30, and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve ^
Lectures [1985], trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, O
447
1987). Like all of critical theory, however, Habermas has never grasped Nietzsche.
except thematically and exoterically, never in terms of illocutionary "cause" and *
perlocutionary "effect." *
344. This is the philosophical, methodological, historiographical, and ideological'
core of Sloterdijk's Critique ofCynical Season; see pp. 195-213-
345. Habermas, "Zu Nietzsches Erkenntnistheorie (ein Nachwort)" [1968],
in Kultur und Kritik: Verstreute Aufsdtze (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag,
1973), pp- 239-263.
346. Habermas, "Conservative Politics, Work, Socialism and Utopia Today" [in-
terview with Hans-Ulrich Reck, 1983], trans. Peter Dews, in Autonomy and Soli-
darity: Interviews, ed. with an introduction by Peter Dews (London: Verso, 1986),
pp. I3i-i47;herep. 132.
347. See Andre" Glucksmann, The Master Thinkers [1977], trans. Brian Pearce
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980), esp. pp. 207-236 (Marx), 237-263
(Nietzsche), and the brief nods to Freud on 167 and 259.
348. See Bernard-Henri Levy, Barbarism with a Human Face [1977], trans.
George Holoch (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979).
349- See Hans Kiing, Does God Exist?: An AnswerforTbday [ 1978 ], trans. Edward
Quinn (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980), pp. 217-261 (Marx),
262-339 (Freud), and 341-424 (Nietzsche). Kiing uses the nexus to define the
agenda of Catholic metaphysics, ontology, and theology in the following manner:
"If today 'metaphysics' is understood as a human 'projection' (Feuerbach), an ideo-
logical 'superstructure' (Marx), an ideal 'afterworld' (Nietzsche), an unreal 'wishful
world' (Freud), or even if'metaphysics' is understood simply as 'true reality' in the
sense of Plato's world of ideas, set apart from present reality, all of which must be at
the expense of this reality of ours, then we are not pursuing metaphysics. If, how-
ever, 'metaphysics' means that the purely empirical cannot be sustained from its own
resources and must be surpassed in an approach to a meta-empirical that does not lie
behind, beyond, above, outside this reality, but—so to speak—constitutes the inner
aspect of present reality, then we are pursuing 'metaphysics' or—a word that may be
preferred in order to avoid misunderstanding—ontology ('theory of being'). What is
important is to understand the thing properly; we need not trouble about the word"
(pp. 550-551).
350. Cf. J. P. Stem, Friedrich Nietzsche [1978] (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1
1979), pp. 17-32 (ch. 1: "Nietzsche in Company").
o
351. Callinicos, "What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Al-
pq thusser," in The Althusserian Legacy, p . 4 1 .
<i 352. Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
o 1993),p-269.
09 353- See Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures, esp. ch. 5: "Orientalism
H and After: Ambivalence and Metropolitan Location in the Work of Edward Said."
53 354. For the most recent book on the nexus along these lines see Jeremy Barris,
448
God and Plastic Surgery: Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and the Obvious, a Book (New York:
Autonomedia, 1990).
255. For this argument see Balibar, "On the Basic Concepts of Historical Mate-
rialism," in Reading Capital, esp. pp. 201-208.
356. Also reproduced in Mark Tansey: Visions and Revisions, with an introductory
essay by Arthur C. Danto, notes and comments by Mark Tansey, ed. Christopher
Sweet (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1992), p. 98.
357. Arthur C. Danto, "Mark Tansey: The Picture Within the Picture," in Mark
Tansey: Visions and Revisions, pp. 7-29; here p. 15.
358. Mark Tansey, "Notes and Comments" [interview with Christopher Sweet,
1991], inMark Tansey: Visions and Revisions, pp. 127-135; here p. 127.
359. Baudrillard, Cool Memories 1980-1985 (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1987)5 P- 278.
360. Actually, Baudrillard's own point is rather different. In one of several more
nihilist moods in Cool Memories, he is intent to distinguish "the Nietzschean, Marxo-
Freudian Age" as a past historical period: namely, as part of an age of "hard ide-
ologies and radical philosophies," as opposed to our current "soft" and "spoilt" age,
which is characterized by "altruism, conviviality, international charity, and the indi-
vidual bleeding heart" by "emotional outpourings, solidarity, cosmopolitan emo-
tiveness, and multi-media pathos"—all of which, Baudrillard claims, was "harshly
condemned by the Nietzschean, Marxo-Freudian age." The point here is that Nietz-
sche, at least, was prepared to go either way: toward the "hard" or the "soft" as
history demands. And thus it is also that we still have Nietzscheans who are "soft"
and ones who are "hard," as Baudrillard believes himself to be, and no longer
Freudian or Marxist. Not fortuitously in this regard, Tansey has grouped Baudril-
lard with Barthes and Derrida in his extraordinary revision of Paul Cezanne's Mont
Sainte-Victoire (1987); Derrida and Barthes then reappear grouped with Lacan and
Jean-Francois Lyotard in another update of Cezanne's The Bathers (1989)- Sec Mark
Tansey: Visions and Revisions, pp. 86-87 and 91, respectively.
361. See Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Investiga-
tions (New York: The Guilford Press, 1991), pp. 126-128. Exemplary of this axial
"turn" in Baudrillard's thought is his essay "On Nihilism" [1980], On the Beach 6
(Spring 1984), 38-39.
362. Ian Forbes, "Marx and Nietzsche: The Individual in History," in Nietzsche
and Modern German Thought, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (London and New York: g
Routledge, 1991), pp. 143-164; here p. 16 3. H
w
363. For his great early period, see Wilhelm Reich, SEX-POL: Essays, 1929-1934, ed.
Lee Baxandall, introduction by Bertell Oilman, trans. Anna Bostock et al. (New O
York: Random House, 1966). >
364. Ronald Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari (London and New York: Routledge, w
1989),p. 83. See further Deleuze and Guattari, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, vol. 1: «
Anti-Oedipus [ 1972], trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New \^
York: The Viking Press, 1977) • "»
449
365. Derrick, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences?!!
[1966], in Writing and Difference, pp. 278-293; here p. 292. pg
366. See Derrida, "White Metaphor: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" [ 1971 f f %
and "Qual Quelle: Vatery's Sources" [1971], both in Margins of Philosophy [197a] r J
trans, with additional notes by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago t"
Press, 1982), pp. 207-271 and 273-306, respectively. O n e of his more "Nietz- £
schean" accounts of Freud is "Speculations—On Freud," trans. Ian McLeod, Oxford /-;
:
Literary Review 3:2 (1978), 78-97. Derrida's t w o monographs o n Nietzsche focus
on "the question of style" and o n "otobiography" and date from 1972 and 1982,'
respectively.
367. For Derrida's extended reflection o n Marx as "specter" (playing on the
double translation of German Geist into French: esprit zndfAntome)i by way of a
forceful comparison with the ghost in Shakespeare's Hamlet, see again Spectres de
Marx.
368. £izek, Looking Awry, pp. 141-142. I t is important t o add, however, that
£izek's remark occurs in the context of a quite valid criticism of Habermas's attempt /
to distinguish modernity from postmodernity.
369. For a typical example of h o w deeply Nietzschean political philosophy—
alongside its great progeny, Heideggerian political ontology—has penetrated into
contemporary cultural studies, "even" of a supposedly "leftist" stamp, see Iain .
Chambers, Mjgranty, Culture, Identity (London and New York: Routledge, 1994),
or Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). This is not to say that the specific analyses
in these books are necessarily invalid, only that all uncritical, direct and indirect,
appeals to Nietzsche and to Heidegger must be ruthlessly scrutinized. For instance,
many of the worst theoretical and analytic excesses in the recent work of H o m i K.
Bhabha appear to be underwritten by Nietzsche. If the question of intention re-
mains relevant, particularly illicit is the use of Heidegger and Nietzsche t o serve as
the philosophical base of radically liberatory projects. The latter may not need a
philosophical base, but jf they d o appeal to one, it ought not to be Nietzsche or
Heidegger, unless their exo/esoteric problematic were acknowledged. To date, cul-
tural studies must be defined as "junk culture without philosophy."
370. Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, pp. 32-33. Laclau
£> provides this important illustration: "The word 'man' differentiates the latter from
1 Svoman' but is also shared with 'human being* which is the condition shared by
E both men and women. What is peculiar to the second term is thus reduced to the
p§ function of accident, as opposed to the essentiality of the first."
<; 371. Burroughs, Cities of the Red Night, p. 114.
Q 372. Karl von Clausewitz as cited in Guy Debord's autobiography Panegyric,
^ vol. 1 [1989], trans. James Brook (London and New York: Verso, i99i),p. 3.
H 373- Sun Tzu, The Art of War [c. 400 B . C . B . ] , trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston and
jz; London: Shambhala Publications, 1988), p. 172.
450
& 3 7 4 - ^ r ^ » ^ ^ t e ' ^ ^ w * ^ ^ ^ * ^ " ^ i * ' : * , w [1908], in Collected Works, 14:343;
'Emphasis altered. This book can be read as an indirect attack on "Nietzschean" ideas,
!# will be seen later.
>. 375. For an introduction to the philosophical and political similarities and differ-
;|nces between the perspectives of Leninism, Gramscianism, Althusserianism, oper-
faisnto, and movimento autowmo, all of which are properly critical of Western Marx-
^ism and the Frankfurt School, see Yann Moulier, introduction, trans. Philippa
iHurd, to Negri, The Politics of Subversion: A Manifestoforthe Twenty-First Century,
ftrans. James Newell (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press/Basil Blackwell,
1989), pp. 1-44.
376. We can only build communism out of the material created by capitalism, out of
that refined apparatus which has been molded under bourgeois conditions which—as
for as concerns the human material in the apparatus —is therefore inevitably imbued
with the bourgeois mentality. That is what makes the building of communist society
difficult, but it is also a guarantee that it can and will be built. In fact, what distin-
guishes Marxism from the old, Utopian socialism is that the latter wanted to build the
new society not from the human material produced by bloodstained, sordid, rapa-
cious, shopkeeping capitalism, but from very virtuous men and women reared in
special hothouses and cucumber frames. Everyone now sees that this absurd idea really
is absurd and everyone has discarded it, but not everyone is willing or able to give
thought to the opposite doctrine of Marxism and to think out how communism can
(and should) be built from the mass of human material which has been corrupted by
hundreds and thousands of years of slavery, serfdom, capitalism, by small individual
enterprise, and by the war of every man against his neighbor to obtain a place in the
market, or a higher price for his product of his labor (Lenin, "A Little Picture in
Illustration of Big Problems" [1918-1919, published 1926 in Pmpda], in Collected
Works, 28:386-389; here 388)
On respect for traditions of thought rivaling Marxism and the need to study them
carefully, see especially one of Lenin's last philosophical testaments, "On the Signifi-
cance of Militant Materialism" [ 1922], in Collected Works, 33:227-236.
377- Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, p. 192.
378. "Capitalism will never be completely and exhaustively studied in all the man-
ifestations of its predatory nature, and in all the most minute ramifications of its £
historical development and national features. Scholars (and especially the pedants) H
will never stop arguing over details. It would be ridiculous to give up the socialist
struggle against capitalism and to desist from opposing, on such grounds, those °
who have betrayed that struggle" (Lenin, 'The Collapse of the Second Interna- >
tionaP [1915], in Collected Works, 21:205-259; here 212). w
379- Althusser, Lesfaits, inI/avenir dure longtemp [suivide] Lesfaits, p. 313. CN
380. Althusser to Fernanda Navarro, July 30,1984, hi Sur la philosophic, pp. 107- \_
109; here p. 109. "^
451
381. Front 242 (Daniel B and P. Codenys), c The Rhythm of Time," Tyranny fi$|
Ton, © 1991 Epic/Sony Music Entertainment Inc., ET 46998. -2|f
382. Will Friedwald [jacket n o t e ] , Cab Callaway: Best of the Big Bands, © 1990^
CBS Records, Inc., C T 45336. f|
383. Adomo,Aesthetische Theorie [ 1969], ed. Gretel A d o m o and Rolf Tiedernanri>|
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), p. 273. ||
384. Rene" Vienet, Enrages etsituationnistes dans le mouvement des occupations (Paris: 1
Gallimard, 1968), p. 17; emphasis altered. |
385. Karl Ferdinand Gutzkow; as cited in Worterbuch der deutschen Sprache, ed;el
Daniel Sanders, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, i860), 1:729; and as discussed by *
Sigmund Freud, ' T h e 'Uncanny 5 " [1919], Art and Literature, ed. Albert Dickson |
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985; The Pelican Freud Library, vol. 14), |
PP- 335-376. Also Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern :$
Unhomely (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The M I T Press, 1992), pp. 17-44.
386. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling; as cited in Worterbuch der deutschen %
Sprache, 1:729; emphasis added. O n the centrality for Freud of Schelling's phrase,
though still not on its most canny political implications in terms of the exo/esoteric v.
distinction, see further Cixous, "Fiction and Its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud's \
Das Unheimliche," New Literary History 7 (Spring 1976), 525-548; and Vidler, The ]
Architectural Uncanny, p. 26.
387. Early on, the Situationist International described its project as the "embodi-
ment" of "the supersession of both the Bolshevik Central Committee (supersession
of the mass party) and of the Nietzschean project (supersession of the intelligen-
tsia)" (RaoulVaneigem, "Basic Banalities [ I I ] " [1962], in Situationist International
Anthology, ed. and trans. Ken Knabb [Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1981],
pp. 118-133; here p. 132).
388. Nietzsche, Ecce homo; KGW 6/3:363 ["Why I Am a Destiny," 1 ] .
389. Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977), p. n o .
390. Partly as backlash against the active repression and passive repression of
Nietzscheanism in the former German Democratic Republic, since 1989 Nietzsche
and the Nietzsche Archive have quickly returned as key players in cultural politics in
Eastern and united Germany— as they had been before 1945. The so-called Stiftung
o Weimarer Klassik (the Weimar Classicism Foundation) runs the Nietzsche Mu-
V seum and publishes books related to Nietzsche (e.g., Eur E N.: Nietzsche in der
3 bildenden Kunstder letzten dnifiig Jahre). The foundation also offered an elaborate
w three-year program on Nietzsche, predictably entitled "Entdecken & Verraten"
<j (discovery and betrayal). In addition to periodic celebrations (e.g., Nietzsche's
Q 150th birthday on October 15, 1994) and various "workshops," this program in-
oj eluded an interwoven series of fifteen major events: "Students in Conversation
w
H about Friedrich Nietzsche" (held on seven occasions from February 1994 to Octo-
525 ber 1995); "From Rocken to Basel: How One Does Not Become What One Is Not"
452
(October 15-17,1993); "Untimely Bayreuth: Beyond Schopenhauer and Wagner"
i, (February 18-20, 1994); "Late Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Free Spiritualism"
(May 20-22, 1994); "Zarathustra's Utopian Missive" (September 23-25, 1994);
«j>jietzsche in the Cosmopolis: The French Nietzsche" (December 9-11, 1994);
"The Eternal Recurrence" (March 17-19,1995); 'The Will to Power" (June 16-18,
1995); and "Nietzsche's Arrival in Weimar" (October 20-22,1995). More to come.
The sessions and collateral events go from morning to night. Speakers are almost
invariably from Germany or Austria and Switzerland. The standard conference fee is
50 DM, which does not include excursions, musical events, meals, housing; this fee
is halved to 25 DM for "students, unemployed, and those in the military and civil
service."
391. For a criticism of this book, before the fact, for its Eurocentric bias, see
Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. However, Ahmad is simply wrong to
depict as "Nietzschean" the "idea that no true representation is possible because all
human communications always distort the facts" (p. 193). This is true at most of
Nietzsche's exoteric epistemological stance and not true at all of his deeper political
and rhetorical position. Nietzsche's way of communicating leaves esoteric facts to
do their work unmolested.
392. Davis, City of Quartz, p. 310. For the already classic analysis of terms such as
"flexible accumulation" to articulate political economy and cultural production, and
as a way of criticizing the understanding of postmodernism as representing a radical
break with Fordist modernism, see David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity:
An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
393. U2 (Bono, The Edge, Adam Clayton, Larry Mullen Jr.), "Hawkmoon"
Battle and Hum, © 1988 Island Records, Ltd., 422-842-299-4.
394' Both have occurred quite literally in Nietzsche's case. For a relatively recent
"psychological" attempt to equate Nietzscheanism with Satanism, see Samuel J.
Wamer, The Urge to Mass Destruction (New York and London: Grune and Stratton,
1957) • This is an old current in the reception of his work, however, which became
especially prominent during World War I, when Nietzsche was canonized in Ger-
many, demonized by the Allies, and again thereafter. See Aschheim, The Nietzsche
Legacy in Germany, pp. 134-136 and 299-300. The immediate postwar moment in
Nietzsche's reception as demonization was represented not only by Thomas Mann's
well-known Doktor Faustus (1947) but by various today unknown self-described
"Christian" commentators as well as by Friedrich Meinecke in The German Catastro-
phe: Reflections and Recollections [ 1946], trans. Sidney B. Fay (Boston: Beacon Press,
x
963), where the alleged covenant between Nietzsche and Nazism was explicitly
called "demonic" (p. 24).
395. Robert G. L. Wake, Tfo Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler [1977] (New York:
Da Capo Press, 1993), p. xvii.
396. "Information wants to be free" is "the Hacker's Ethic." See Steven Levy,
Hackers (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1984), pp. 39-49-
397- See Foucault, "Final Interview" [with Gilles Barbedctte and Andre" Scaiall
1984], trans. Thomas Levin and Isabelle Lorenz, Raritan 5:1 (Summer 198s) • *-$fj
13; here 9. ;;|||
398. Ernesto Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare [ i960], authorized trans. J. P. Mori*
ray, with an introduction and case studies by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. DavielH
Jr. (Lincoln and London: The University of Nebraska Press, 1985), p. 69. Jl§
399. Deleuze, "Letter to a Harsh Critic" [1973], Negotiations, 1972-1990, transll
Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995),pp. 3-12; here pp. gM
and 184 n. 4. -\$^
• •<;*§
IH70. Pablo Neruda, "Para lavar a un nino" [ to wash a child, 1962 ], xs\A New Decade
^pems: 19&-1967) [dual-language ed.], ed. with an introduction by Ben Belitt,
flans. Ben Belitt and Alastair Reid (New York: Grove Press, 1969), pp. i44-i45-
*|Oh vigilancia clara / Oh duke alevosfa! / Oh tiema guerra!"
%i 71. Giacomo Leopardi, "La ginestra o il fibre del deserto" [the broom or the
.Cdesertflower,1836], in A Leopardi Reader [dual-language ed.], ed. and trans. Otta-
^vio M. Casale (Urbana, Chicago, and London: University of Illinois Press, 1981),
£pp. 205-213 and 262-269; here pp. 207 and 263. "Qui mira e qui ti specchia, / Secol
^superbo e sciocco, / Che il calie insino allora / Dal risorto pensier segnato innanti /
•: Abbandonasti, e volti addietro i passi, / Del ritornar ti vanri, / E procedere il
,chiami."
72. Strauss, Thoughts on Macbiavelli, p. 12.
73. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in Collected Works, 5:28-29. This thesis
is a main source of Althusser's notion of "problematic": "It could not be better said
that it is not answers which make philosophy but the questions posed by the philoso-
phy, and that it is in the question itself, that is, in the way it reflects that object (and not
in the object itself) that ideological mystification (or on the contrary an authen-
tic relationship with the object) should be sought" (Althusser, "'On the Young
Marx'" in For Marx, p. 66 n. 29).
74. R.E.M. (Bill Berry, Peter Buck, Mike Mills, Michael Stipe), "King of Birds,"
as recorded on Number s Document, © 1993 IRS Records/EMI Records, Ltd., o -
7777-13200-2-6.
75. See Ferdinand Tonnies, Der Nietzsche-Kultus: Eine Kritik (Leipzig: O. R.
Reisland, 1897).
76. For an alternative account of "Right-" and 'Xeft-"Nietzscheans produced in
this book, see Levine, Nietzsche and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities (1995), esp.
ch. 8: "Nietzsche Today." Levine takes his point of departure from Strauss's thesis
that Nietzsche brings modern thought to its unavoidable, decisive crossroads: "To
avert the danger to life, Nietzsche could choose one of two ways: he could insist on £
the strictly esoteric character of the theoretical analysis of life—that is, restore the H
Platonic notion of the noble delusion—or else he could deny the possibility of ^
theory proper and so conceive of thought as essentially subservient to, or dependent
on, life or fate. If not Nietzsche himself, at any rate his successors adapted the second ^
alternative" (Strauss, Natural Bight and History [ 1950], 7th printing [Chicago and %
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971], p. 26; also partially cited by ^
Levine, p. 162). In Levine's analysis, however, Strauss's last remark is not to be taken ^
at face value. "Nietzsche's postmodern followers have 'adapted the second alterna- «
461
tive,' and have become unabashed prophets of the end of morality and metaphysial
But Nietzsche and Strauss follow the former path, keeping the full 'truth' of nihilis|f§
a secret" (p. 162), In other words, Strauss and followers such as Allan Bbbralf
exactly like Nietzsche, are "esoteric nihilists," whereas Derrick—representative fo§§
Levine of "Left-,'Nietzscheanism—develops only Nietzsche's exotericaily intendet-1
message. Levine's own position, then, is to develop a more properly "postmen!?!!
ern"—that is, nonnietaphysical, pragmatic, and explicidy "humanist historicism"stU
which would avoid the allegedly still metaphysical pitfalls of Nietzschean, Strausfft
sian, and Derridian "Weltanschauung historicism." Which is to say a more or less?!
unwitting commitment, appearances to the contrary, to "the theory that each personH
belongs to a single delimited culture" (p. 187). Superficially similar to certain argiilt!
ments in this book, Levine's account is troubled by his reluctance to move past(•&$
philosophical and cultural problematic into more political terrains. Symptomat-, }
ically, ideology is terra incognita to him. Levine's failure is overdetermined, and '
hardly his alone. Although he is very good at bringing out aspects of the esoteric 'f
thematic of Nietzsche and Strauss—he is less knowledgeable about Derrida—Le« ,
vine does not wonder how esotericism might be implemented as an illocutionary
strategy. Moreover, he tacks onto his analysis of Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism his t
own rather feeble "postmodern" plea for liberal pluralism in the humanities. At the ,
very end of his book, this plea uncritically and without comment incorporates a
similar-sounding one from Nietzsche that, according to Levine's own prior argu- !
ment, would have been designed by Nietzsche as exotericaily manipulative. Symp-
tomatic, too, is Levine's choice of "Right-" and "Left-"Nietzscheans for analysis. ,
By picking for his "Right-"Nietzschean Leo Strauss—rather than, say, Stanley -
Rosen—Levine already carves out a less than radical space for depicting or opposing
Straussianism. Rosen, as will be shown presendy, is even more complex and elusive .
than is Strauss himself in terms of damage control against insight into Nietzsche's
own illocutionary strategies and their unwitting perlocutionary effect on the Left.
By the same token, picking Derrida as his <<Left-"Nietzschean allows Levine not to
consider, say, Richard Rorty's take on Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism. For to have
confronted Rorty—or Ernesto Laclau—would have required Levine to admit that
both his supposedly specific "democratic" and "pragmatic" critique of Nietzsche and
his concomitant overall program for postmodern humanism are already firmly in
5. place in Rorty's work. By contrast, none of Levine's own cultural heroes (e.g., Isaiah
1 Berlin, Clifford Geertz, John Rawls) has developed an explicit analysis of Nietzsche;
^ Habermas represents only a partial exception here, since Levinc does not mention
rt Habermas's critique of Nietzsche, and since Habermas's basic project is not radically
•< different from Levine's. Because he has come to terms with Nietzsche/an esoten-
Q cism primarily as a—philosophical and cultural—theme, rather than also as a—
,0 political—strategy of subcutaneous influence, Levine can insist that Nietzsche's
H antidemocratic Weltanschauung was at once <tnron0y>—and hence correctable by
E Levine's rational argument—and—unlike Levine—"unable to get an adequate con-
462
illptual grip o n w n a t i l meant to be a humanist" in this, the age of the "Last Man"
|Ji. . Z I J ) —two claims that suddenly and very conveniently ignore the fact that
tfevine has already admitted that Nietzsche's project is esoteric. Finally, Levine
tannounces the raison d'etre of his book to be this: "to use my alternative paradigm
| ^ provide a new theoretical understanding of the modern humanities—and also to
Ifihdicate the life of the modern humanist, Nietzsche's Last Man" (p. xxi). This
Idesire may be all well and good, but Levine is far from having pulled it off, not only
ifor the aforementioned reasons but because he believes that "Nietzsche's worst
liiightrnare i$ a herd which has seen all its morals dethroned but is unable to say a new
p e s ' " (p- 159) — in other words, Nietzsche's worst nightmare would be Levine's
$$Uetzsche and the Modem Crisis of the Humanities. Nice work if you can get it, but
frather too reassuring, not to say megalomaniac and therefote . . . "Nietzschean."
¥r 77. On Tdnnies, his simultaneous critique of and adherence to Nietzscheanism,
fahd on the Nietzschean and "irrationalist" orientation of German sociology gener-
jally, see Arthur Mitzman, Sociology and Estrangement: Three Sociologists of Imperial
Germany (New York: Knopf/Random House, 1973); Jiirgen Zander, "Ferdinand
^Tonnies und Friedrich Nietzsche" in Ankunft bei Tdnnies: Soziologische Beitrdge zum
12$. Geburtstag von Ferdinand Tdnnies, ed. Lars Clausen and Franz Urban Pappi
(Kiel: W. Muhlau, 1981), pp. 185-227; Wolf Lepenies, Between Literature and Sci-
ence: TheBJse of Sociology [Die drei Kulturen, 1985], trans. R J. Hollingdale (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Harry Liebersohn, Fate and Utopia in
German Sociology, 1870-192$ (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 1988);
and Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, pp. 39-41. Zander and Liebersohn
in particular show that Tonnie's very influential binary opposition between Gesell-
schaft and Gemeinschaft was profoundly indebted to what he regarded as the "com-
munitarian" or Gemeinschaft impulse of the Dionysian as depicted by Nietzsche in
The Birth of Tragedy.
78. See Wilhelm Carl Becker, DerNietzschekultus: Ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte der
Verirrungen des menschlichen Geistes (Leipzig: Richard Lipinski, 1908). While it is
unlikely that Nietzsche would have personally approved of German genocide against
entire tribes in southeast Africa—carried out under the leadership of Hermann
Goring's father and documented by Eugen Fischer, later head of the Nazi Institute
of Racial Hygiene and Heidegger's friend—his notion of Will to Power makes it
impossible to find logical reasons to oppose such policies, let alone expansionist ^
power grabs generally. £j
79. Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures, p. 222. ^
80. Althusser,Lesfaits, inVavenir dure longtemps [suivide] Lesfaits, pp. 351-352. ^
81. On early "Left"-Nietzscheans, see: William J. McGrath, Dionysian Art and £
Populist Politics in Austria (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Intellectuals «
and the Future in the Hapsburg Monarchy 1890-1914, ed. Laszlo Peter and Robert B. £
Pynsent (London and New Yotk: Macmillan, 1988); R. Hinton Thomas, Nietzsche ^
in German Politics and Society 1890-1918 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, ^
463
1983); Joelle Phillipi, "Das Nietzsche-Bild in der deutschen Zeitschriftenpresse defH
Jahrhundertwende" (Diss., University of the Saarland, 1970); Ernst Behler, " Z t ^ |
friihen sozialistischen Rezeption Nietzsches in Deutschland," and Vivetta Vivareltfll
"Das Nietzsche-Bild in der Presse der deutschen Sozialdemokratie um die Jahrhun^i
dertwende," both in Nietzsche-Studien 13 (1984), 503-520 and 521-569, respecfi
tively; Krause, "Martyrer'5und <cProphet": Studien zwm Nietzsche-Kult in der bildendenfk
Kunst der Jabrhundertwende; Bergmann, Nietzsche, "the Last Antipolitieal German^
Seth Taylor, Left-Wing Nietzscheans: The Politics of German Expressionism, ioio~ip2^
(New York and Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990); Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy *#|
Germany, ch. 2: "Germany and the Battle over Nietzsche, 1890-1914" ch. 3: "Ihefl
Not-So-Discrete Nietzscheanism of the Avant-Garde" and ch. 6: "Nietzschean So-H
cialism: Left and Right"; and Sautet, Nietzsche et la Commune. One of the best||
introductions to Nietzsche in historical context remains Richard Hamann and Jostl
Hermand, Epochen deutscher Kukur von 1870 bis zur Gegenwart, vol. 2: Grimderzeiit
(Berlin, GDR: Akademie-Verlag, 1965), esp. pp. 24-202. In some respects, Her-g
mand's sociological placement of Nietzsche in historical context has not been super-?;
seded; thus, it opens up the possibility for more speculative approaches to Nietzsche?:;
and Nietzscheanism. f
82. See J[ean] Bourdeau, "Nietzsche socialiste malgre' lui" [feuilleton],7<0»r»0/'•••'{
desD&ats politique* etlitteraires, September 2,1902.
83. See Nietzsche's correspondence about and to Bourdeau for mid- to late De-
cember, 1888 in KGB 3/5:529-531, 537, 539, 546, 548, 557, 559-561, 564, 566, and 7
568-569.
84. For recent takes on "Nietzsche and feminism" see the very uneven anthologies
Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory, and Nietzsche and the Feminine, ed. Peter J.
Burgard (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1994)- A sub-
stantial problem with both collections of essays is that the authors do not address at
all the problematic of Nietzsche's eso/exotericism, so that they all take his sup-
posedly "contradictory" statements, in this case about "women" at face value, in
spite of varying degrees of theoretical sophistication and appearances sometimes to
the contrary. Another problem is that the authors do not adequately address Nietz-
sche's view of men, including a distinctly homoerotic, homosocial, and homosexual
problematic. And the occasional references in Nietzsche and the Feminine are insuffi-
cient and undertheorized. Today, the work on Nietzsche by Irigaray is arguably the
F most significant in terms of both philosophy and feminism. Developing critically a
N
J famous argument of Derrida in Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles (1978), Irigaray has gone
« farthest to argue that women—not "Woman"—should affirm the dissembling veil
< that Nietzsche attributed to them: that is, the veil that both conceals and reveals
$ patriarchal Truth, indeed virtually all forms of essentialism. Whatever validity this
^ current tendency of feminism may have in other respects, and it may be consider-
H able, it is philologically and philosophically mistaken to appeal to Nietzsche for any
% help in such projects. See especially Irigaray's 1980 Marine Lover ofFriedrich Nietz-
464
Il§& ft m u s t a ^ so ^ e saic* t n a t Jrigaray's o w n brand of Nietzscheanism, symptomat-
li&lly for t^tst times, is virtually/>«t-Marxist. For a Marxist-feminist critique of her
fHojk see Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (London and
lliew York: Methuen, 1985), esp. pp. 127-149; though other more or less "Nietz-
llthean" feminists are implicated as well.
1/1:85. See the annotated bibliography by Peter Putz, Friedrich Nietzsche [ 1967], zd,
Irey. and expanded ed. (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1975;
iSealien zur Literatur, 62), pp. 67-89.
S | 86. See Heide Schliipmann, "Zur Frage der Nietzsche-Rezeption in der Frauen-
Ibewegung gestem und heute" [ 1986], in Nietzsche heute: Die J&zeptim seines Werkes
twitch 1968, ed. Sigrid Bauschinger, Susan L. Cocalis, and Sara Lennox (Bern and
ptuttgart: Francke Verlag, 1988), pp. 177-193.
1|> 87. See, for example, Helene Stocker, "Friedrich Nietzsche und die Frauen," Das
VMagazm fur Literatur 67 (1898), 128-132 and 153-158, and Die Liebe und die
fFrauen (Minden in Westfallen: J. C. C. Bruns, 1906).
I 8&. Stocker, "Nietzsche" [c. 1935?], unpublished manuscript, Swarthmore Col-
lege Peace Collection, 21; cited in Schliipmann, "Zur Frage der Nietzsche-Rezeption
in der Frauenbewegung gestern und heute" in Nietzsche heute, p. 177. Schlupmann
also discusses at length the many positive references to Nietzsche in one of Stacker's
main works, Die Liebe und die Frauen (1905-1906). On Stocker, see further Asch-
heim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, pp. 88-92, 125, and 166. For the standard
English treatment of early German feminism see Richard J. Evans, The Feminist
Movement in Germany 1894-1933 (London and Beverly Hills, Sage, 1976), though
Nietzscheanism is insufficiently addressed.
89. Schlupmann, "Zur Frage der Nietzsche-Rezeption" in Nietzsche heute, p. 179.
90. Alfred Rosenberg, DerMythos des 20. Jahrhunderts: Fine Wertunfj der seelische-
gcisfyen Gestakenkrafte unserer Zeit [1930] (Munich: Hoheneichen-Verlag, 1936),
p. 523; emphasis added. Actually, this best-seller was seldom read and never taken
seriously by Hitler's innermost circle, where it was ridiculed as "Rosenberg's meta-
physical belch." For the first important critique of Rosenberg's Nietzsche, see
Bataille, "Nietzsche and the Fascists" [1937], in Visions of Excess, pp. 182-196; here
p. 188. (Euvres completes, 11447-465. See further Manfred Frank, "DerMythos des 20.
Jahrhunderts (Alfred Rosenberg, Alfred Baeumler)," in Gott im Exit: Voriesungen
uber die neve Mythokgie, II Teil (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), o
pp. 105-130. w
91. "In his name, the contamination of the race by blacks and Syrians progressed, H
whereas he himself strictly submitted to the characteristic discipline of our race. ^
Nietzsche fell into the dreams of colored gigolos, which is worse than falling into o
the hands of a gang of thieves" (Rosenberg, DerMythos des 20. Jahrhunderts, p. 523) • *
92. For two representative recent attempts to articulate Marx and Nietzsche £
positively see Nancy S. Love,ikfow, Nietzsche, andModernity (New York: Columbia «
University Press, 1986); and David B. Myeis,Marx and Nietzsche: The Reminiscences +•
465
and Transcripts of a Nineteenth-Century Journalist (Lanham: University Press-oBif
America, 1986). The former is a sober, critical work of political history and theory*!!
the latter an imaginary "encounter" between Marx and Nietzsche; the former is alsoiJ
much more hard-headed with regard to the unsettling elements of Nietzsche's social^!
philosophy, but the cumulative effect of both books is to overlook its most problem!!!
atic aspects. •[$%
93. See Ernst Nolte, "Marx und Nietzsche im Sozialismus des jungen Mussolini"If
Historische Zeitschrift 191:2 (October i960), 249-335, and Three Faces of Fascism^
Action Franfoise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism [1963], trans. Leila Vennewittll
(New "York: A Mentor Book, 1969), esp. pp. 218-219 and 246. More recently^!
as pan of his now explicitly "revisionist" agenda, Nolte reduces virtually all of |
twentieth-century German—indeed European—history to a murderous "civil war*? J|
between "Marxist annihilation" and "Nietzschean annihilation." See Nolte, Nietz- '•'$
scheundderNietzscheanismus (Frankfurt am Main: Propylaen Verlag, 1990), pp. 10, :rf
193, and 265. This is not to say that all German conservatives are united in this ^
negative view of Nietzsche. Their very positive political appropriation is represented f
today by the quite influential Karl Heinz Bohrer. See, for example, "Why We Are 1A
Not a Nation—And Why We Should Become One,"New German Critique 52 (Win- ^
ter 1991), 72-83; here esp. 82-83; Nach derNatur: UberPoliUk undAsthetik (Mu- \
nich: Hanser Verlag, 1988); Die Kritik der Romantik: Der Verdacht der Philosophie.
gegm die literarische Modern* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989); and ;i
"Die Asthetik am Ausgang ihrer Unmundigkeit," Merkur 500 (October /November
1990), 851-865. On Nietzsche and German national socialism, see Arno Miinzer, :
Nietzsche et le Nazisme (Paris: Editions Kimd, 1995)- Finally, on certain protofas-
cist tendencies in Nietzsche's own work and its early fascist reception, see Bern-
hard H. F. Taureck, Nietzsche und der Faschismus: Fine Studie iiberNietzschespolitiscke •
Philosophie und ihre Folgen (Hamburg: Junius, 1989), esp. pp. 25-26 and 97-101.
Taureck rightly articulates Nietzsche's political philosophy with the ideology not of :
German national socialism but of Italian fascism, without simply conflating—as
Nolte has come to do—Marxism, Nietzscheanism, and fascism.
94- See Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook cfRevolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed
Phase of the African Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1969), p. 13.
95. Strauss, "Liberal Education and Responsibility" [1962], Liberalism Ancient
and Modern [1968], with a new foreword by Allan Bloom (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 9-25; here p. 24.
*
^ 96. See Lukacs, The Destruction of Reason, esp. pp. 202-203 and 309-399- This
S book was hugely influential on the reception of Nietzsche both in the Soviet Union
< and in Eastern Europe, even when Lukacs the man was officially persona nongrata for
Q political reasons. See, for example, S. F. Oducv, Auf den Spuren Zarathustms: Der
^ EinflufiNietzsches aufdie buigerliche deutsche Philosophie [ 1971 ], trans. Giinter Rieske
H (Berlin, GDR: Akademie-Verlag, 1977); and the many works on Nietzsche of Heinz
Z Malorny, including "Friedrich Nietzsche gegen den klassischen burgerlichen Hu-
466
Ijianisnttis," in Philosophic undHumanismus: Beitrage zumMenschenbild der deutschen
§j@assik (Weimar: Bohlau Verlag, 1978), pp. 220-234. While Nietzsche's Corps/e hap-
Ipens to be in considerable philosophical agreement with these authors about Nietz-
ftthe, their philological approach to his texts was never substantially different from
•fthat of "bourgeois" scholarship, and theirpolitico-normative approach to the scholar-
s'
fshiP of others tended to be Stalinist. It may also be noteworthy—after all, there are
Inb coincidences if the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence of the Same holds true—that
fthe las1 publication of the philosophy division of the East German Academy of
fSciences, a book entided Modernity-Nietzsche-Postmodernity, was a desperate last-
f Hitch effort to provide Marxian resistance to what had long been too hot a topic. See
tyfyderne-Nietzsche-Postmoderne, ed. Manfred Buhr (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1990).
£ 97. Adomo, Minima Moralia, p. 188. The other such philosophy for Adomo is
fthat of Henri Bergson.
;. 98. Rosen, "Nietzsche's Revolution" [1987], in The Ancients and the Modems:
Rethinking Modernity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989),
: pp. 189-208; here p. 189. Also see his important TheMask of Enlightenment: Nietz-
sche's "Zarathustra" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 137-
138 and 235-250.
99. See Maxim Gorky, My Universities [1923], trans. Ronald WUks (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1979), pp. 40-41. This book was a particular favorite of Lenin's.
100. See Hans-Joachim Becker, DiefruheNietzsche-RezeptioninJapan (1893-1903):
Ein Beitrag zur Indmdualismusproblematik im Modernisierungsprozefi (Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1983), pp. 107-109.
101. There have been at least two major waves of "Nietzsche fever" in mainland
China: the first from 1915 to 1920, during the so-called May Fourth New Cultural
Movement (e.g., in the work of intellectuals such as Chen Duziu, Hu Shi, Liang
Qichao, and Lu Xun, and in the fiction of Mao Dun, Mu Shiying, and Xie Bingxin),
and the second in the 1980s, as part of the general "culture fever" (e.g., the philoso-
phers Chen Guying and Zhou Guopind and the novelist LiuXiaobo).
102. On Nietzsche's impact in Japan, see Nietzsche andAsian Thought, ed. Graham
Parkes (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); and the
much superior, earlier book by Becker, Diefiiihe Nietzsche-RezeptUm inJapan (1893-
1903). By far the most extensive and insightful treatment in English of "Nietzsche in
China" is Carlos Rojas, "Nietzsche and the Body Politic: Culture and Subjectivity in §
Twentieth Century China" (senior honors thesis, Cornell University, 1995) • On »
Nietzsche in Russia, see the very uneven anthology Nietzsche in Russia, ed. Bemice >_]
Glatzer Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). For two different >_,
accounts of Nietzsche and southern Europe see Udo Ruckser, Nietzsche in der His- o
pania: Ein Beitrag zur Hispanischer Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte (Bern and Munich: o
Francke Verlag, 1962); and Nietzsche in Italy, ed. Thomas Harrison (Saratoga, £
Calif.: Anima Libri, 1988). The former represents traditional scholarship to the M
point of inducing sleep, the latter is adventurous to the point of losing all contact <*
467
with Nietzsche and what a cyberpunk might call "primary reality," the world lurkin!!!
outside the matrix. For a straightforward account of Nietzsche's influence in c o n ^
temporary Italy see Giangiorgio Pasqualotto, Nietzsche e la cultura contemporanetfZ
(Venice: Arsenate cooperativa editrice, 1982). On France, see Louis Pinto, Les n&?f
veux de Zarathoustm: La reception de Nietzsche en France (Paris: Editions du Seuil-^
1995), and Alan D. Schrift, Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy ofPoststructuralismf
(New York and London: Routledge, 1995). O n Australia, see Noel Macainsh^f
Nietzsche in Australia: A Literary Inquiry into a Nationalist Ideology (Munich: Verlagj?
fur Dokumentation und Werbung, 1975). On Eastern Europe, see Ernst Behler,^
"Nietzsche in dermarxistischen Kritik Osteuropas"Nietzsche-Studien 10/ n (1981-*
1982), 80-96. O n the East German reception, see Denis M . Sweet, "Friedrich^
Nietzsche in the G D R : A Problematic Reception," Studies in GDR Culture and <:
Society 4 (1984), 227-241, and "Nietzsche Criticized: T h e G D R Takes a Second
Look," Studies in GDR Culture and Society 7 (1987), 141-153. One of the most
significant debates about Nietzsche in any country occurred at the 10th Writers' *
Congress of the German Democratic Republic in November 1987, and in articles
written by Heinz Pepperle, Wolfgang Harich, Stephan Hermlin, among others,
which were published in the G D R journal Sinn und Form from 1986 to 1988. On the
specific problem of Heideggerian Nietzscheanism in the former USSR and today,
see Geoff Waite, "Politicheskaya ontologiya" [political ontology], trans. E. V
Oznobkinoi and E. V. Petrovskoya, in Philosophiya Martina Heideggera i sovremen-
noste (Martin Heidegger's philosophy and the present), ed. N. V. Motroshilova et
al. (Moscow: "Nauka," 1991), pp. 188-214. This is the first collection of essays
published on Heidegger in the USSR; the other contributors are W. Anz, Y V.
Bibikhin, H. Brunkhorst, F.-W von Hermann, V Hosle, V. I. Molchanov, N. V
Motroshilova, J.-L. Nancy, V. A. Podoroga, O. Poggeler, and R. Rorty. On Nietz-
sche in North America, see Nietzsche in American Thought and Literature, ed. Man-
fred Piitz (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, Inc., 1995).
103. The first album of Will to Power (Bob Rosenberg, Suzi Carr, Dr. J ) , Witt to
Power, © 1988 CBS Records, Inc., ET 40940, has as its jacket-cover slogan: '"A
strong life masters its e n v i r o n m e n t . . . whatever does not destroy me makes me
stronger, life remains . . . WILL T O POWER!'—Nietzsche"; and has among its
cuts "Zarathustra," "Freebird Medley (Free Baby)," and "Anti-Social." Other cur-
t^
£ rent "Nietzschean" bands are far less naive, well-meaning, and benign. I n one recent
^ song, the German skinhead band out of Stuttgart with the "Nietzschean" name
$ Neue Werte (new values) instructs Germans how t o deal with the nearly two-
S million-strong T u r k i s h " population: "Kill their children, rape their women. . . . "
<i Alfred Rosenberg salutes from his grave.
Q 104. Rosen, "Nietzsche's Revolution," pp. 189-190.
w 105. Rorty, "De Man and the American Cultural Left" [1989], in Philosophical
w
H Papers, vol. 2: Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University
E Press, 1991), pp. 129-139; here p. 137.
468
wkio6. Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Post-Nietzschean Philosophy" in
IAssays on Heidegger and Others, p. i.
fH 107. Rorty, "Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics" [1986-1989],
finEssays on Heidegger and Others, pp. 9-26; here esp. p. 19.
| | 108. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity [based on lectures delivered 1986-
|i9g7] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
fl 109. Ibid., pp. 119-120.
| | n o . Jean-Francois Lyotard, Discours, Figure (Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1971),
I?- 2 8 3 '
I i n . Rosalind Krauss, 'The Im/pulse to See" in Vision and Visuality, ed. Hal
iFoster (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988), pp. 51-75; here p. 66.
I 112. Francois Laruelle, Nietzsche contre Heidegger: Theses pour une politique nietz-
i$chSene (Paris: Payot, 1977), P- 9- This remains the most extensive attempt in politi-
cal philosophy to distinguish Nietzsche from Heidegger at the expense of the latter,
on behalf of the former.
113. LAIBACH: A FilmfromSlovenia (Daniel Landin, A TV Slovenia/Mute Film
Production, 1993) • This film is part documentary, part critical analysis provided by
2iiek, part music video, part advertisement. On Laibach, see further 2izek, The
Metastases ofEnjoyment, pp. 71-72 and 208.
114. But, in addition to £izek's take on the film in the film, Laibach confirms
Balibar's neo-Spinozist analysis that today "borders, boundaries or limits are no
longer mainly (or apparently) on xhcfringes of every political 'community,' they are
located everywhere (just as the 'peripheries' of the world economy are more and more
in its 'center5). It is, therefore, a world in which the projective mechanisms of identi-
fication or (imaginary) recognition of the 'human* and the 'infra-human' (perhaps
even the 'superhuman,' since there is no stable 'measure' of humanness in this re-
spect, or better said, the 'mismeasure' is the actual rule), which classical psycho-
analysis described mainly at the individual level (although they are in reality pro-
foundly transindmdual) become direct stakes and objects of politics" (Balibar,
preface to Masses, Classes, Ideas, pp. xix-xx; on the Spinozist origins of this argu-
ment, see pp. 27-28 and 34-35).
115. For a rare glimpse at Heidegger's view of the relationship between esoteri-
cism and political ontology see his Beitrage zur Philosophic (Vom Ereignis); Gesam-
tausgabe, 3/65:3 and 61-62; and Grundfragen der Philosophies Gesamtausgabe, 2
2/45:191-223. H
116. Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy (Berkeley, Los An- *
geles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992), p. 16. °
117. See, for example, Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism, Technology, Culture, >
and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University «
Press, 1984). £
118. Josef Goebbels, speech of February 17, 1939; as cited in Herf, Reactionary \
Modernism, p. 196. ^
469
H9. Compare and contrast, for example, Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger on Betyg?k
and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy [Le principle d'anarchie: Heidegger et la ques-M
tion de Vagir, 1982], trans. Christine-Marie Gros, in collaboration with the author-
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), with Gianni Vattimo, The End oM
Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture [ 1985], trans, with aril;
introduction by Jon R. Snyder (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press-H
1991). See further their contributions to the anthology The Problem of Technology &$
the Western Tradition, ed. Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard^
Zinmann (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), ch. 8: Schurmann;:!
'Technicity, Topology, Tragedy: Heidegger on That Which Saves' in the Global!
Reach," and ch. 9: Vattimo, 'Tostmodernity, Technology, Ontology."
120. See especially Vattimo's major attempt in the early 1970s to produce a Nietz-£|
sche for the Left: II sqggetto e la maschem: Nietzsche e il problema delta liberazioneS
(Milan: Bompiani, 1974), which is being translated into English by Bruno Bosteels.;?
121. For example, the full political-ontological dimension of Heidegger's famous =
1936 talk in Rome on "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry" remains obscure •
because we do not have access to Heidegger's companion lecture on "Europe and
German Philosophy" which he delivered six days later in Rome at the Kaiser Wil- ,-.•;
helm Institut. Karl Lowith, who was present at the Holderlin talk and who sensed •
what was politically at stake, cannot help us here. As a Jew he was not invited or \
allowed to attend the Nietzsche event at the national socialist think tank. Heidegger
himself conceived the two lectures as necessary pendants to one another. See Hugo ;;
Ott,Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographic (Frankfurt am Main and New ;
York: Campus Verlag, 1988), pp. 132-137 and 251-253. On the larger context of
Heidegger's invitation to Rome and on Heidegger's subsequent misrepresentation ;
of it, see Victor Farias, Heidegger und der NationalsozuUismus, trans. Klaus Laer-
mann, with an introduction by Jiirgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer,
1989), pp. 311-317.
122. On Heidegger and national socialism, see especially Alexander Schwari,
Politische Philosophic im Denken Heideggers [1965], 2d, expanded ed. (Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989); Ott, Martin Heidegger, along with his numerous arti-
cles on the subject; the anthology Heidegger und die praktische Philosophic; and,
especially important, Dieter Thoma, Die Zeit des Sel&st und die Zeit danach: ZMT
Kritik der TextgeschichteMartin Heideggers 1910-1976 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
~\ Verlag, 1990). For useful but ultimately not very incisive recent attempts to relate
<s Heidegger's relationship with technology and national socialism to the influence of
M Nietzsche among others, see (in addition to the contextual depiction in Herf's
< Reactionary Modernism) Silvio Vietta, Heideggers Kritik am Nationalsozialismus und
Q an die Technik (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1989); Michael E. Zimmerman, Heideg-
^ ger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art (Bloomington and Indi-
ra
H anapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990); Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being:
E The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press,
470
i?9°)'•>Rockmore, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy, pp. 204-243; and some of
the essays in The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics. Vietta's book is, know-
ingly or not, an apologia for Heidegger's Nazism, whereas Zimmerman, Wolin, and
Rockmore think they are more critical. But all share an inadequate appreciation of
Heidegger's and Nietzsche's esotericism and rhetoric, and so remain locked in a merely
thematic problematic. Of all these, Rockmore goes farthest in tackling the problem
of concealment and unconcealment but not as an illocutionary practice of subliminal
communication. On Heidegger's strategic attempt to backdate his critique of tech-
, nology, as part of his attempt to cover up his quite early personal commitment to the
Nazi Party, see Hans Ebeling, "Das Ereignis des Fuhrers: Heideggers Antwort," in
Martin Heidegger: Innen- und Aufenansichten, ed. Forum fur Philosophic Bad
Homburg (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989), pp. 33-57. Heidegger's
backdating and its political motivations are egregiously whitewashed both by his
readers who use him simply to oppose technoculrure and by those who wish to use
him simply to cooperate with it. For an example of the latter see Heim, The Meta-
physics of'Virtual Reality, esp. p. 54. For an example of the former, see the works of
Hubert L. Dreyfus, which are as hopelessly confused as is Heim with regard to
Heidegger's political agenda and illocutionary technique. See Dreyfus, What Com-
puters Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason [ 1979], rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.:
The MIT Press, 1992), Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and
Expertise in the Era of the Computer, with Stuart E. Dreyfus and Tom Athanasion
(New York: The Free Press, 1985), and Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Hei-
digger's "Being and Time," Division I (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990).
123. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 20; emphasis added.
124. Ibid., pp. 53-54-
125. Ansell-Pearson, >4» Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker, p. 170. Sim-
ilarly deficient is the author's objection to a book by William Connolly—in which
Nietzsche is discussed in terms of "radical liberalism"—on the grounds that "there is
something risible about the attempt to enlist Nietzsche's thinking to the cause of a
postmodern liberalism" (p. 178). For Connolly is exactly like Ansell-Pearson in that
both begin and end with the assumption that Nietzsche did not have a unified
political stand, stance, or theory but rather what is hallucinated as "a diverse set of
ethical and political possibilities." Cf. William E. Connolly, Political Theory andMo-
aernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 140, to^4» Introduction to Nietzsche as 2
Political Thinker, pp. 1 and 199. ^
126. Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker, p. 171. H
127. Kirk Rising Ireland, "Fish Hooks, Nostrils, and Nietzsche" unpublished ®
manuscript, p. 5. See further his "Anglers, Satyr-Gods, and Divine Lizards': Com- j£
edy in Excess." S
128. Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays [1957] (Princeton:
+•
Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 40-41. I
129. Ireland, "Fish Hooks, Nostrils, and Nietzsche," pp. 5-6. °*
471
i30. Kerry's notion of "irony" barely skims Nietzsche's surface. Appealing to
Nietzsche, Hayden White argued that, "as the basis of a world view, irony tends to'-
dissolve all belief in the possibility of positive social actions" (Hayden White, Meta-/
history: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe [Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973], p. 38). But if that were true, Nietzsche andT
his corps/e would have nothing to do with irony—except exoterically. Nor does its'
help matters to gloss White's argument by adding that "this kind of irony, the wit of
the self-conscious mind, was itself put into question by the total ironism of Nietz-,
sche—a Svorld-historical irony' as he called it, that even destroyed the pretensions
to positivity of irony itself" (Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny, p. 192). This claim,1
still reading only the most exoteric level of Nietzsche's rhetoric, continues to ob-
scure not merely the core content of his political philosophy but also his way of
implementing it: that is, by forming his corps.
131. See, for example, Glenngary Glen Ross (James Foley, USA, 1992), based on
the Broadway play by David Mamet. The pitch of real estate salesman Roma (Al
Pacino) illustrates particularly well Ireland's theory of the eiron-alazon as a mode of
properly Nietzschean confidence.
132. Althusser, "The 'Piccolo Teatro,'" in Tor Marx, p. 139 n. f; emphasis added.
133. £i£ek, The Metastases ofEnjoyment, p. 72.
134. Podoroga's position can be described as "postcontemporary" to the extent
that it is comparable with Baudrillard's postpsychoanalytic thesis that "we have two
existences, each one perfecdy original and independent of the other (this is not
psychological splitting). Any interpretation of the one by the other is impossible—
this is why psychoanalysis is futile" (Baudrillard, Cool Memories 1980-1985, p. 146).
But Podoroga, unlike Baudrillard, has lived and thought in, and through, a social
formation claiming t o be "communist," and unlike Baudrillard is thus careful to;
draw very exact, and exacting, distinctions between "we" and "you," "us" and;
"them." See Podoroga, "The Eunuch of the Soul.? esp. 387-388.
135. For the classic account of the way visibility and invisibility are not only
mutually imbricated in a single intellectual problematic but also as a matter of
"embodiment* and "the flesh" see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and thebmsi
ible [posthumously published 1964], ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). Merleau-Ponty argues, for ex-
ample, that "it is not / who stes, not he who sees, because an anonymous visibility
F inhabits both of us, a vision in general, in virtue of that primordial property that
o
belongs to the flesh, being here and now" (p. 142). O n the way that the hegemony
w of images of vision in philosophy can g o hand in hand with antiocularism, see
<j Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French
O Thought (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993)-
K 136. For relevant but less demanding views of Platonov than Podoroga's see the
w
H entry in Handbook of Russian Literature, ed. Victor Terras (New Haven andLondon:
Z Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 341-342; and Thomas Seifrid, Andrei Platonov:
472
^Uncertainties of Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). O n t h e
?ereat importance of Platonov for reflecting o n the nexus utopia-modernism-death
ffrom m e perspective of non-socialist realist, b u t c o m m u n i s t , Second World culture,
X
isce Jameson's a r g u m e n t that Chevengur is "a text first read by the last surviving
{ modernists i n w o r l d culture, over whose shoulders w e postmoderns are still in a
^position t o p e e r " a text itself surviving "in t h e virtually universal debacle of t h e
^modernist repertoire elsewhere . . . " (Jameson, The Seeds of Time, p p . 80 a n d 8 1 ) .
137. Podoroga, "The Eunuch of the Soul," 362.
138. William Styron, Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness [ 1990 ] ( N e w York:
Vintage, 1992), p . 64.
139. Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration [ 1975 ] ,
2d, expanded ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California
Press, 1988), p. 217, following the long train of Kaufmann's 1950Nietzsche: Philoso-
pher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Strong's occasionally interesting, more often erratic and
unfocused work commences with the statement that it will "take at face value those
claims in Nietzsche which appear the most histrionic and exasperating," yet tends
not to do this. Never making clear enough what "transfiguration" has to do with
political philosophy in general or Nietzsche's in particular, Strong remains too
dependent on the apologetics of Kaufmann among others. Nor are these problems
remedied by his more recent, particularly uneventful essay, "Nietzsche's Political
Aesthetics," in Nietzsche's New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Politics,
ed. Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong (Chicago and London: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 153-174.
Bruce Detwiler is right that there is in Strong's account "no sufficient explanation
for Nietzsche's advocacy of war, slavery, or a long order of rank between classes and
castes" (Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism [Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990], p. 221 n. 23). But this remark is
applicable to most of the Nietzsche Industry: Left, Right, and Center. Detwiler's
book is the first systematic study in English to take Nietzsche's virulent antidemo-
cratic animus more or less at its word. Unfortunately, Detwiler's account is innocent
of a sufficiently coherent political, philosophical, or philological theory of its own,
though it often does a good job of calling to task the readings of Nietzsche's politics
produced by American commentators such as Kaufmann, Strong, and Mark War-
ren. The following comment sums up some of Detwiler's problems: "It is not my fe!
objective t o denigrate the significance of Nietzsche's achievement, a n d I have no H
desire topromote Nietzschean politics, which, as I interpret them, are intriguing but "
odious. Nevertheless, there is something problematic about propounding Nietz- °
schean ideas without exploring their ostensible political dimension. To the extent >
that Nietzsche's political views are integral with the rest of his thought—to the jg
extent that they are made possible by it and in some ways even required by it (and I £
believe they are) —we stand guilty of both sanitizing and trivializing his contribu- ^
tion when we deliberately sweep under the rug its unsavory political implications" °°
473
(p. 5; emphasis added). This passage, too, is symptomatic of the Nietzsche Industrpl
spearheaded by many people and institutions, including the international publica-S|
tion Nietzsche-Studien. Its underlying sense seems to be this: If Nietzsche's politically
views are integral with the rest of his thought—and they are, in Detwiler's view~il!
and if these views are taken to be odious—and he thinks they are—then (pace0
Detwiler) not to have the wish to denigrate Nietzsche's achievement is «te/f nothing%
but a sanitization and trivialization of Nietzsche's "contribution" to whatever it is asf
contribution to. Detwiler attempts to explain what Nietzsche's "contribution" is•%
exactly, by saying that "if one believes with [J. S.] Mill, as this writer does, in t h e !
value of even offensive challenges to one's beliefs,.. . then the proper response to %
Nietzsche's immoralism in the political sphere is to think it through" (p. 8). What; J
then, does Detwiler himself believe in, on what point does he stand to make his |
critique of Nietzsche's political thinking? Well, Detwiler believes in offensive chal: p
lenges to his own beliefs. What beliefs exactly? Well, offensive challenges to them, I
and so on. This circular, if not also masochistic gesture, is hardly reassuring as a way 4
of getting after or out of Nietzscheanism. N o t a few of Detwiler's methodological4
and conceptual confusions—which time and again reveal Detwiler showing beyond ;J
much doubt that Nietzsche was a deeply protofascist thinker, and yet also denying
the radical implications of this very demonstration—can be traced to the fact that,";
with the notable exceptions of Nietzsche's early essay "The Greek State" (1872) and
the materials published by Nietzsche's sister as The Will to Power', Detwiler ignores ;
virtually all of Nietzsche's unpublished notebooks and letters. Detwiler's attempt on '•.
pp. 14-16 to explain his principle of selecting published over unpublished work is
particularly convoluted and n o advance over Kaufmann's similar philological bias
nearly a half-century ago. This is one reason—and he wrote his book under the
partial guidance of a Straussian—that Detwiler does not entertain the possibility
that Nietzsche was an esoteric thinker, and that perhaps he did not publish exactly
what he could have said. O n the one hand, then, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristo-
cratic Radicalism renders a valuable service to Anglo-American Nietzsche scholar-
ship, though Detwiler seems ignorant of the most relevant German and French
studies on his topic. H e has convincingly uncovered some dominant patterns of
Nietzsche's antidemocratic and protofascist political agenda. O n the other hand,
Detwiler can say only what Nietzsche's agenda looked like at the thematic level; his
methodological and hermeneutic incoherency disallows the vitally important ques-
r tion of how Nietzsche intended to implement or disseminate this political project
o.
with, and as, writing. This failure becomes an issue especially at pp. 4^-44, 65-66,
w 67,130,166,169, and 188.
<j 140. Rosen, "Remarks on Nietzsche's T l a t o n i s m ' " in The Quarrel Between Philos-
O ophy and Poetry: Studies in Ancient Thought (New York and London: Routledge,
t^
w 1988), pp. 183-203; here p. 189. The context of Rosen's claim is crucial to it. "An
H accurate account of the history of philosophy would . . . look something like this.
Z There are three fundamental 'positions' or teachings: (1) the position of Plato and
474
?jjeidegger, or genuine Platonism, namely, the attempt to preserve the quarrel be-
:tween poetry and philosophy in a third language that is the origin of both; (2)
i'Platonism' or the self-deluded attempt to replace poetry by a fundamentally mathe-
: rnatical philosophy which is actually itself poetry; (3) the teaching of Nietzsche, or
the self-conscious recognition that poetry is triumphant over philosophy. What is
today called 'postmodernism' is a version of the teaching of Nietzsche" (pp. 188-
189). For Rosen's most extensive development of this argument see The Question of
Being, esp. pp. 137-175. Whatever one may think of it for other—ideological—
reasons, Rosen's account of the "quarrel" in question is far more precise and valu-
able—both to grasp Nietzsche and generally—than is the account of a stridendy
"postmodern" book that passes over Rosen in silence, even as it struggles to define
Nietzsche in similar terms. See Bemd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre
Mileur, Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature (New York and London: Rout-
ledge, 1993 [actually 1992]). It is never made clear here what might really have been
at stake for Nietzsche politically—or even philosophically and poetically—in the
tendentious distinction between "philosophy" and "literature.'' Nor does this dis-
tinction matter very much to the authors, since these terms are imagined to refer
pretty much to the same thing anyway. Their more specific claim is that "the body of
Nietzsche's thought [is] thoroughly permeable andsuturable, available to thoughtful
intervention, whether the means be marked 'literary' or 'philosophical'"; none-
theless, by a paradoxical and remarkably unconscious sleight of hand, the authors
claim in the same breath to have produced for and with Nietzsche not only "a kind
of suturing, even a kind of healing" but also "above all a kind of thinking that
has a rigor of its own—a rigor which, one hopes, has left mortis behind" (p. 255;
emphases added). A particularly pious hope in the case of this book, one might
add.
141. Rosen, "Remarks on Nietzsche's 'Platonism,'" in The Quarrel Between Philos-
ophy and Poetry, p. 202.
14a. See Shadia B. Drury, The Political Ideas ofLeo Strauss (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1988), esp. ch. 9: "Post-Modernity: Plato or Nietzsche?" andch. 10: "Esoteri-
cism Betrayed." On Straussian Nietzscheanism, see further Levine, Nietzsche and the
Modern Crisis of the Humanities, pp. 152-167.
143. Remi Brague, "Leo Strauss and Maimonides" in Leo Strauss'* Thought: To-
ward a Critical Engagement, pp. 9 3-114; here pp. 104 and 105. Q
144. See, for example, for a useful introduction to this Straussian problematic in «
relation to contemporary literary theory and criticism, Cantor, "Leo Strauss and ^
Contemporary Hermeneutics," in Leo Strauss's Thought: Toward a Critical Engage- ^
ment; esp. p. 269. Because Cantor is silent about the likelihood that Strauss him- Q
self was an esoteric writer, and hence also a Nietzschean to one degree or another, «>
Strauss—bizarrely—is figured here as a wholly unproblematic, benevolent cham- £
pion of liberal democracy and pluralism. ^
14s. See Strauss, "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil" [ 1973 ], °
475
in Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, with an introduction by Thomas L. Panglel
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 174-191.
146. Strauss, The City and Man, p . 52.
147. Rosen, "Leo Strauss and the Quarrel Between the Ancients and the Mod-!
ems'' [i9S6],\n.LeoStmuss}s Thought: Toward a Critical Engagement, pp. iss-i68p
here p. 161.
148. H a m p s h i r e , Spinoza, p . 167.
149. Spinoza, The Ethics, p . 235 [ p a r t 4, p r o p . 72 ] .
150. R o s e n , " R e m a r k s o n Nietzsche's ' P l a t o n i s m ' " p . 203.
151. Bataille, Theory of Religion, p . 59. Giuvres completes, 7:316-317.
152. Spinoza, TheEthics, p. 234 [part4, prop. 70].
153. R o s e n , preface t o The QuarrelBetween Philosophy andPoetry, p p . vii-xiii; here
p. vii.
154. R o s e n , Hermeneutics as Politics ( N e w York a n d Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987), p . 193.
155. Nor can Rosen's arguments be found informing, for better or worse, the
pages of Revolutionary Worker, the organ of the Maoist-inspired Revolutionary Com-
munist Party, USA (RCPUSA). Its "Three Main Points": "(1) The whole system
we now live under is based on exploitation—here and all over the world. It is
completely worthless and no basic change for the better can come about until this
system is overthrown. (2) Many different groups will protest and rebel against
things this system does, and these protests and rebellions should be supported and
strengthened. Yet it is only those with nothing to lose but their chains who can be
the backbone of a struggle actually to overthrow this system and create a new system
that will put an end to exploitation and help pave the way to a whole new world. (3)
Such a revolutionary struggle is possible. There is a political Party that can lead in
such a struggle, a political Party that speaks and acts for those with nothing to lose
but their chains . . . " {Revolutionary Worker 787 [vol. 16:34], December 25,1994).
156. DeLUlo,AfrwI£ p . 141-
157. Warren, Nietzsche's Political Thought, p . 213.
158. See L u l d c s , "Nietzsche als Vorlaufer der faschistischen Asthetik" [written
J934, published 1 9 3 5 ] , in Werke, vol. 10: ProblcmederAsthetik (Neuwied a m Rhein
a n d Berlin: Luchterhand, x969), p p . 3 0 7 - 3 3 9 ; esp. p p . 3 3 3 - 3 3 4 .
>o 159. Freud, Group Psychology and ihe Analysis of the Ego [ 1 9 2 1 ] , ed. a n d trans.
T James Strachey ( N e w York: W. W. N o r t o n & C o . , 1952), p . s s ; emphasis added.
o 160. Warren, Nietzsche's Political Thought, p . 209.
w 161. Ibid., p . xiv. H e n n i n g O t t m a n n , w h o s e evaluation of Nietzsche's ideological
<- position is in s o m e ways similar t o W a r r e n ' s — t h o u g h n o t as positively, o r even at
Q all, attuned t o t h e problematic of p o s t m o d e r n i s m — p r o v i d e s a m o r e solid recon-
OT stniction of the context and development of Nietzsche's political ideas in their own
H terms, something Warren does not necessarily set out to do. But Ottmann, too, has
2 no clear sense of the distinction between Nietzsche's eso- and exoteric levels of
476
work, substituting instead a loose distinction between "truthfulness" and "mask-
ing" —and even then only in order to make the all-too-familiar claim that Nietzsche
wrote for "those who can think for themselves," and so on. Cf. Ottmann, Philosophic
ttndPolitik bei Nietzsche (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987)- Nor do
either Ottmann or Warren—who wrote independently of one another—delve with
sufficient depth into Nietzsche's workbooks, and as a consequence they share the
dual—more or less "postmodern"—defect of taking Nietzsche's philosophy too
seriously as a positive—albeit more or less limited—contribution to contemporary
political thought, and not seriously enough in its original revolutionary intent. This
is not to say that the construction of that intent ought to be the only thing that
matters; it is to say, however, that both Warren and Ottmann are symptomatic of
most Nietzsche scholarship in that they base their own political notions to a signifi-
cant degree on an intent that is never really scrutinized, and yet one that uncannily
anticipates, prefigures, and informs their work, even at its most "critical" moments.
For a somewhat more critical account of Nietzsche's political philosophy, but one
that also passes over its esoteric dimension in silence, see Urs Marti, "Dergrosse Pobel
und Sklavenaufstand": Nietzsches Anseinandersetzung mit Revolution und Demokratie
(Stuttgart und Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 1993). Marti makes his point of departure the
problem of how to appropriate under current postmodern conditions a body of
thought, notably Nietzsche's, that emerged under modernism. But his "historical"
formulation of Nietzscheanism ignores the possibility of esotericism, conceals the
fact that Nietzsche was shrewder than to reduce his thought to historical and eco-
nomic contingencies, and makes impossible an explanation of the massive influence
of this thought precisely on postmoderns. Compare also Ansell-Pearson's<4» Intro-
duction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker, where the esoteric is also wholly unknown
territory, and where therefore Nietzsche must remain "ambiguous and paradoxical"
(p. 1), "fundamentally ambiguous and double-natured" (p. 199). Ansell-Pearson's
analysis on pp. 71-78 of Nietzsche's essay "The Greek State" is particularly deficient
and certainly a retreat past Detwiler.
162. In 1984 Ofelia Schutte, in an unjustly overlooked book, made the argument,
sensible enough on the surface, that "While Nietzsche has outlined various incen-
tives for overturning the democratic influences of modern times and for instituting a
'purer5 system of patriarchal domination under the banner of overcoming the 'evils'
of'effeminacy' and 'decadence' it is up to us, not him, to make the choice as to what 2
we want our political future and our moral values to be" (Schutte, Beyond Nihilism: H
Nietzsche without Masks [Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, H
1984], p. 188). Sounds reasonable. But then why do "we" still need Nietzsche in the °
first place? For apparendy, according to Schutte, "we" do need him, buying as some >
of "us" do into the notion of "a future . . promised in Nietzsche's image of the ^
child's 'sacred Yes' to life and in the symbol of the Ubermensch" (p. 193). Henry £
Staten's imagined critique of Schutte's argument is no less free from her false as- ^
sumption that Nietzsche in principle meant what he said about everything, was a <•*
477
basically exoteric thinker and writer. See Henry Staten, Nietzsche's Voice (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 77-83.
163. See Nietzsche to Georg Brandes, December 2, 1887; KGB 3/5:205-207.
Also see Brandes, "An Essay on Aristocratic Radicalism" [delivered as a lecture
1887], in Friedrich Nietzsche [En Afhandlung om aristokratisk radikalisme, 1889],
trans. A. G. Chater (New York: TheMacmillan Company, n.d.), pp. 3-56.
164. See, for example, Nietzsche, Diefrohliche Wissenschafi [1st ed. 1882]; KGW
5/2:75 [aphorism 29], and Gotzen-Dammeruruj oder Wie man mit dem Hammer
phUosophiert [written 1888, published 1889]; KGW 6/3:138 ["Skirmishes of an
Untimely Man," aphorism 43 ].
165. Nietzsche, "NF, Friihjahr 1884"; KGWjIi'M.
166. Georgi Plekhanov,^4rf and Social Life [1912], in Selected'Philosophical Works,
2d, rev. ed., trans. K. M. Cook and A. Fineberg (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1981), 5:630-687; here 664-665. In this and several other impressive works,
Plekhanov provided the earliest and still most valid sociological approach to both
Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism.
167. Rosen, "Nietzsche's Revolution," in The Ancients and the Moderns, pp. 190-
193; emphasis added.
168. Pasolini, "Le ceneri di Gramsci" [the ashes of Gramsci, 1954], in Poems
[dual-language ed.], ed. and trans. Norman MacAfee, with Luciano Martinengo,
foreword by Enzo Siciliano (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), pp. 2-23; here
pp. 12-13. w Ma come io possiedo la storia, / essa mi possieda; ne solo il-
luminato: / ma a che serve la luce? / Non dico Pindividuo. . . . "
169. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Exscription" [1977], trans. Katherine Lydon, in On Bo-
tailU, ed. Allan Stoekl, special issue of Yak French Studies 78 (1990), pp. 47-65; here
pp. 47-48.
170. See Freud, The Interpretation ofDreams [1899-1900], trans. James Strachey
(New York: Avon, 1965), p. 545. On the implications of this thesis for interpreta-
tion generally, see Mehlman, "Trimethylamin: Notes on Freud's Specimen Dream,"
Diacritics 6:1 (1976), 42-45, and Walter Benjamin for Children) p. 6.
171. Virilio, The Lost Dimension, p. 103.
172. Greimas's "semantic rectangle" or "elementary structure of signification"—
even as developed by Jameson for Marxism as a way of problematizing all binary
* and merely "dialectical" paradigms—remains locked in Channel 3 as this book
I figures it. Jameson's "political unconscious" and the "conspiracy theory," both of
£ which depend on the semantic rectangle, also pull up short of confronting the
rt possibility and fact of consciously programmed subliminal reception. In this respect,
«j what is to be said about the structural paradigms of Barthes and Althusser could also
O be said mutatis mutandis about those of Greimas and Jameson. Greimas's system
g_i
og suggests two basic ways the semantic rectangle is un/finished: either as "constitu-
w
H tion": that is, so as to constitute an independent textual or semantic system with the
% supplement of a fourth term to the triangle of positive term, oppositional term, and
478
negative term; or as "transformation": that is, when the fourth term is not given, or
given in an unexpected way, which then forces the uncompleted rectangle of signifi-
cation to be propelled into yet another one, any resolution deferred indefinitely. In
addition to Greimas, Semantique structural, see Greimas with Francois Rastier,
"The Interaction of Semantic Constraints," Tale French Studies 41 (1968), 86-105,
Finally, as Jameson puts it, "in actual practice, however, it frequendy turns out that
we are able to articulate a given concept in ouly three of the four available positions;
thefinalone remains a cipher, or enigma for the mind" (Jameson, The Prison-House
of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism [Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1972 ], p. 166). Whatever spin one gives it, the semantic
rectangle remains just that—a matter of a meaning accessible in principle to conscious
perception. Wherever else its analytic powers may lie, and they are among the
greatest in all linguistic and literary criticism, the rectangle has insufficient power to
crack the code of Nietzsche's Channel 4.
173. Barthes, 'The Third Meaning: Research Notes on Some Eisenstein Stills"
[ 1970], in A Barthes Reader, ed. with an introduction by Susan Sontag (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 317-333. A veritable "school" of cultural studies finds its
theoretical and methodological warrant in this one essay.
174. Althusser, "On the Marxist Dialectic," in For Marx, p. 183.
175. Ibid., pp. 184-185.
176. 'The theory of proper names should not be conceived of in terms of repre-
sentation; it refers instead to the class of'effects': effects that are not a mere depen-
dence on causes, but the occupation of a domain, and the operation of a system of
signs." This theory of name-effects was explicitly developed by Deleuze and Guattari
out of a reading of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus,
p. 86; see also pp. 20-21,63,185-186, 343-345, and 367-368). See also, from a very
different perspective, the account of naming given by Kripke. A distinction between
proper names as "rigid designators" and "nonrigid or accidental designators" is
considered in terms of the "tendency to demand purely qualitative descriptions of
counterfactual situations," and of the concomitant "confusion of the epistemological
and the metaphysical, between a prioricity and necessity" (Saul A. Kripke, Naming
andNecessity [1972], 2d ed. [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980],
Pp. 48-49).
177. For the first and most enduring of Harold Bloom's analyses of literary epigo- g
nism see The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (London, Oxford, New York: «
Oxford University Press, 1973). A member of Nietzsche's corps/e, Bloom waffles ^
uncontrollably on the question of whether his own great, admitted precursor, ^
Nietzsche, was or was not beset by the anxiety or influence. From the perspective of Q
W
structural causality, however, this question is moot. «
178. See Umberto Eco, Lector infabula (Milan: Bompiani, 1971), PP- 59~6o. CK
179. Hyppolite, "The Structure of Philosophic Language According to the Tref- X
ace^ to Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind," in The Structuralist Controversy, p. 167- **
479
i8o. Myron E. Krueger, foreword to Heim, The Metaphysics of'Virtual Recdj$M>
pp. vi-xi; here p. ix. Krueger is commonly called the primary "inventor" of V ®
technology. ;;i|
181. Takayuki Tatsumi, "The Japanese Reflection of Mirrorshades" in Stormi^M
the Reality Studio: A Casebook of Cyberpunk and Postmodern Science Fiction, ed. LarrlS
McCaffery (Durham and London: Duke University Press, i99i),pp- 366-373; hereH
p. 372; emphasis added. But for William Gibson's most complex take to date oafl
"Japan," see Virtual Light (New York: A Bantam Spectra Book, 1993) • |H
182. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 1:178; Samtliche WerktM
2:210 [3dbk.,ch. 34]. ^)
183. Althusser, "Is It Simple to Be a Marxist in Philosophy?" in Philosophy and the%
Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists, p. 227. In some respects Spinoza seems to part |
company with Althusser on this point. 4
184. Spinoza, The Ethics, p. 148 [part 3, prop. 27; proof]; emphasis added. Think ?
again of the Nietzschean mind-body Videodromes and Interzones, dead zones, in- ;>
terfaces, psycho-somatic interchanges, telepathic metamorphoses, mutations, om- ,
nisexuality, bio-psycho-hardwiring, viral communications, psychoplasmic meta- (
physics, and implicit monism in Cronenberg's ceuvre. Cronenberg himself avers
that he is a "Cartesian " though hisfilmsstruggle continually to overcome all forms
of dualism. See, for example, Cronenberg on Cronenberg., p. 58.
185. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, "Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre" [1801], in
Samtliche Werke, ed. J. H. Fichte (Berlin: Verlag Veit und Comp., 1845-1846),
2:19-20. See further Manfred Frank, What Is Neostructuratism? [1984], trans. Sa-
bine Wilke and Richard Gray, foreword by Martin Schwab (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 89-91.
186. Paul Auster, The New York Trilogy, vol. 1: City of Glass [1985] (New York:
Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 15-16.
187. Debord, Lasocietidu spectacle, thesis 34.
188. Spinoza, The Ethics, p. 163 [part 3, prop. 51].
189. On Bataille's response to Heidegger, though she overlooks Heidegger's re-
sponse to Bataille, see Rebecca Comay, "Gifts without Presents: Economies of
'Experience' in Bataille and Heidegger," in On Bataille, pp. 66-89.
190. Derrida, "De l'e'conomie restreinte a l'e'conomie generale: Un hegelianisme
J^ sans reserve" [1967], in Udcriture et la difference (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967)1
I pp. 369-407; here p. 369. For a translation see Writing and Difference.
£• 191. See Bataille, <cNietzche in the Light of Marxism" [1951],in Nietzsche's Re-
« turn, ed. James Leigh and Roger McKeon, special issue of Semiotext(e) 3:1 (1978),
< 114-119; here 116. Also see his The Accursed Share, vols. 2 and 3:367 (Sovereignty).
fit
Q (Euvres completes, 8:401. For an account of Nietzsche and Bataille that differs from
w that of this book see Nick Land, Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent
H Nihilism; an Essay in Atheistic Religion (London and New York: Roudedge, 1992).
53 192. Bataille, Sur Nietzsche: Volentide chance [ 1944-1945 ]; (Euvres completes, 6:17-
480
Ilor a translation see, On Nietzsche, trans. Bruce Boone, introduction by Sylvere
llfltringer (New York: Paragon House, 1992). Its title and main theme notwith-
standing, this book is more a record of a stage of Bataille's spiritual odyssey during
fthe German occupation and eve of liberation in terms of an imagined identification
Iwith Nietzsche, and less the conceptual confrontation with Nietzsche that occurs in
tihany of his other works. On the relationship between Bataille's interpretation of
iNietzsche and his cultural politics in the 1930s, see Jean-Michel Besnier, "Georges
iBataille in the 1930s: A Politics of the Impossible" trans. Amy Reid, in On Bataille,
I'pp. 169-180.
%.; 193- Lou Andreas-Salome's Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken (Friedrich Nietz-
; $che in his works) was first published in 1894 (Vienna: C. Konegen). In it, "Salome1
writes from within an implicit presumption of convergence. She inhabits Nietz-
sche's own words by quoting him in such a way and to such a degree that it is often
difficult to discern where his ideas leave off and hers begin. . . . Nevertheless, writ-
ing is an act of separation and difference . . . " (Biddy Martin, Woman andModer-
nity: The (Life)Styles of Lou Andreas-Salome' [Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, I99i],p. 94)-
194. Bataille, "Nietzsche and the Fascists," in Visions ofExcess, p. 194.
195. See further Jean-Joseph Goux, "General Economics and Postmodern Cap-
italism," trans. Kathryn Ascheim and Rhonda Garelick, in On Bataille, pp. 206-224.
196. In Kant's Third Critique, "The sublime is that in comparison with which
everything eke is small. . . The sublime is that, the mere ability to think which shows a
faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of sense" (Immanuei Kant, Kritik der
Urteilskraft [1790], ed. Wilhelm Weischedel [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Ver-
lag, 1974], p. 172; Critique of Judgement, trans. J. H. Bernard [New York: Hafner
Press, 1974], p- 89). But, for Kant, every standard of sense is not every standard of
mind, of Ideas. On the drift of post-Kantian, romantic, and postromantic thinking
away from the assumption that the Sublime or Ideas were unsayable and into a
problematic of re/presentation (Darstellung), and on the attendant philosophical
and literary aporias of this assumption, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc
Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism
[1978], trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1988); and Neil Hertz, The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and
theSublime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). For a politically sharper, g
and less "Nietzschean" discussion of the problem of even talking about the Kantian ^
Sublime, see 2izek's analysis of a decisive "paradox" here: namely, "the conversion H
of the impossibility of presentation into the presentation of impossibility" (£iiek,
For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor [London and New j£
York: Verso, 1991], p. 144). Jean-Francois Lyotard has summarized the enormous S
ambition behind Kant's location of a feeling—or rather "enthusiasm"—that would vj
both respond to something vital in human nature and yet would not require verifica- ^
tion by comparison with any known or unknown empirical fact. Lyotard is par- o
481
ticularly interested in the philosophical implications of what he calls the diffennd'i^M
labile linguistic and conceptual moment in which an assertion that for one reasbrffp
must be phrased for some other reason cannot be, or c a n n o t ^ be. And this notionWk
itself of a certain ''Nietzschean" inspiration, comes close to how Nietzsche oftenf!
used language. See Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute [ 1983], trans. GeorgeH
Van Den Abbelle (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 12-1 p i
On the related Heideggerian notion of the "proximate," see Emil Kettering, Ndh^^lM
Das Denken Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1987); in this regardpl
Lyotard's differend reinvents a Heideggerian wheel. In Kant's Critical Philosophy^
Deleuze argues that a point of the Kantian confrontation with the Sublime was t o p
force the imagination, in Kant's own phrase, to "recoil upon itself" and thereby tall
learn that, in Deleuze's words, "it is reason which pushes [imagination] to the Iirnit||
of its power, forcing it to admit that all its power is nothing in comparison to an Idea^M
(pp. 51-52; emphasis added). But it is also thus that the principle of comparability |I
is recuperated by and for Idealism; in Deleuze's precise turn of phrase: "the Ideas of; 1
reason are speculatively indeterminate, practically determined" (p. 52). It should be if
unnecessary to add that, ideologically speaking, the Sublime is an open site, not |
necessarily owned by the Right, the Center, or the Left. On the possibility of mobi-1
lizing the theory of the sublime for Marxism, see Terry Eagleton, The Ideology ofihe%
Aesthetic, ch. 8: "The Marxist Sublime" But the properly Nietzschean question |
remains as how to use the Sublime as something subliminal.
197- A binary obverse of the Sublime is, roughly, what the non-Catholic theologi- 0
cal tradition calls "Hell:* It, too, strictly speaking—unlike the Catholic version—can V;
be neither visualized nor described. Calvin grasped each and every word for Hell in %
the New Testament as "that which our senses are unable to comprehend"—much :;
like the Kantian Sublime. Needless to say, the presumed actuality of Hell—or of the 4
Sublime—hardly ceased to exist for merely linguistic reasons. See John Calvin,
Commentary on a Harmony ofthe Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, and Luke [1555], trans.
William Pringle (Edinburgh: The Calvin Translation Society, 1846), 3:182. What
postmodernist commentators on Kant, on the Sublime generally, and on Nietzsche
fail to note is its specifically Protestant—indeed Calvinist— inflection. Nietzsche
had remarkably little to say about Calvin, though his fascination with determinism
and fate—Eternal Recurrence of the Same, amorjati—bears remarkable similarities
t* with predestination, especially since the latter so clearly has to do, as Max Weber
1 showed, with mechanisms of social control. Nietzsche's reticence to talk about
w Calvin may even be a symptomatic silence.
w 198. See, for example, Wolfgang Kersting, "Politics, Freedom, and Order: Kant's
<! Political Philosophy," a n d Eva Schaper, "Taste, Sublimity, and G e n i u s : T h e Aes-
O thetics of N a t u r e a n d Art," b o t h in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, e d . Paul
05 Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 342-366 and 367-393?
H respectively.
55 199. Much nonsense has been written and assumed about the philosophical "in-
482
;fluences"on Nietzsche, as if he were a professional philosopher or informed critic of
the institution. In fact he was not particularly well versed in the canon and was
informed largely by secondary accounts, as anyone who has worked in his personal
library in Weimar can testify. In spite of the fact that in 1868 he considered writing a
doctoral dissertation "On the Ideology or Concept of the Organic in Kant," he did
not know Kant beyond basic texts, any more than he knew Hegel, as was shown by
Erich E Podach in the 1930s. The most thoroughly read and annotated collected
works in Nietzsche's private library were written not by academic philosophers but
by Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Wagner. The neo-Kantian historian Friedrich Albert
Lange (1828-1875) is an important exception, since Nietzsche learned much of
what he knew about the history of philosophy from Lange's History of Materialism
and Critique of Its Present Significance, which Nietzsche began devouring when it was
published in 1866.
200. See Paul Ricoeur, Le confiit des interpttations (Paris: Editions du Seuii, 1969),
p. 55-
201. See Jameson, The Prison-Howe ofLanguage, pp. 214-216.
202. The requirements for being a real "savage anomaly" are very severe: <cSpi-
nozian philosophy is an anomaly in its century and is savage to the eyes of the
dominant culture. This is a tragedy of every philosophy, of every savage testimony of
truth that is posed against time—against the present time and against the present
reality. But the tragedy can open itself powerfully into the future" (Negri, The
Savage Anomaly, p. 122). The view of Spinoza as a radical democratic, even pro-
tocommunist, is by no means uncontested, of course, and his own esotericism
makes it difficult to decide. On the latter problem, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and
Other Heretics, vol. 1: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989); and, though mysteriously, Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion [written
1925-1928, first published 1930] (New York: Schocken Books, 1982). The overall
relevance of Spinoza's own ideas for contemporary political thought is equally am-
biguous. On the one hand he took the position of many people in his authoritarian
and intolerant age that no radically new political possibilities or alternatives could
exist beyond those already assayed by history: that is, monarchy, aristocracy, and
more or less liberal democracy. He wrote, for example, almost as a Hegelian before
the fact, that "experience has revealed all conceivable sorts of commonwealth, which
are consistent with men's living in unity, and likewise the means by which the §
multitude may be guided or kept within fixed bounds. So that I do not believe that «
we can by meditation discover in this matter anything not yet tried and ascertained, &^
which shall be consistent with experience or practice" (Spinoza, A Political Treatise ^
[ 1676], in A Theologico-Politual Treatise and a Political Treatise, pp. 279-387; here Q
p. 288 [ch. 1, § 3 ]; emphasis added). Spinoza's model of a—relatively—ideal social 00
formation was certainly provided by mercantile Amsterdam; and generally absent ^
from Spinoza's thinking was an adequate concept of history—though this is dis- _,
puted by Macherey InAvec Spinoza, esp. pp. 11 r -140 ("Spinoza, lafinde fhistoire et O
483
la ruse de la raison," 1986). O n the other hand Spinoza was n o conservative or ultra-
conservative in the modern sense, either. Antiauthoritarianism in many guises—
indeed as a certain "motor of history"—informs his Political Treatise: for example, in
the fact that insurrection against authority, u p t o and including violent revolution,
was considered not only legitimate but absolutely necessary—if and when such
insurtection could ever be deemed "the lesser evil." Spinoza's political argument
depends, in part, on the liberal assumption that people can be better swayed to your
position by telling them that you offer them n o t the best or ideal solution to any
problem but rather the least bad solution, for example, Winston Churchill's dictum
that "Democracy is the worst form of government except for any other"; but the
implications of this argument need n o t support liberal pluralism, which, as Spinoza
also precisely anticipated, typically ends u p as a cover for other, more covert forms of
superstition and tyranny. O n Spinoza and the Left, see further Friedrich Balke, "Die
grofite Lehre in Haresie: Uber die Gegenwartigkeit der Philosophic Spinozasf
afterword to Pierre-Francois Moreau, Spinoza: Versttch iiber die Anstofiigkeit seines
Denkens [Spinoza, 1975], trans. Rolf Loper (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag,
1994), pp. 135-179.
203. Spinoza, The Ethics, pp. 43-271; here p. 174 [part 3, def. 4 ] ; also compare
part 3, prop. 52 and part 4, prop. 29. According to prop. 52: "An object which we
have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and which we do not conceive to
have any property that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so
long, as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself." But
on the one hand Spinoza regarded what he called Substance—or Dew sive Natura,
God or Nature—as "that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other
words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other con-
ception" and hence so absolutely unique as to be beyond comparability. On the other
hand—since for him Substance is not something that can ever be fully grasped, and
only conceptually approximated—comparison is not only possible but required. See
Spinoza, TheEthics, pp. 45 and 263 [parti,def. 1 and part 5, prop. 31 and note].On
Kant's own response to Spinozism, see George Di Giovanni, 'The First Twenty
Years of Critique: The Spinoza Connection," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant,
pp. 417-448.
204. Negri, The SavageAnomaly, pp. 22 and 33.
Spinoza's reply [to neoscholasticism and Descartes] is clear: the very concept of pos-
sibility is negated, because every analogical conception of being is negated. Being is
v>
W univocality. This univocal being cannot be translated into analogical being on the
<! terrain of knowledge; but, still on the terrain of knowledge, neither is it possible to be
Q univocal. In other words, the real analysis shows us a univocally determined being,
H
which is tenable as such only on the ontological terrain and, therefore, in the adhesion
W
H to its totality. On the terrain of knowledge it is presented as equivocal being: It allows
!3 no possibility of homology. The tension that is released here, in part II [ofMetaphysical
484
Refections, 1633], can therefore be resolved only on the terrain of practice: of power
(potentia), within the ontological determination as such. With one single move Spi-
noza destroys both the Scholastic representation of analogical being and the idealistic
representation of univocality, both the NeoScholastic reformism of the image of
Power (potestas) and the Cartesian and idealistic flight from the responsibility of
transformation, (p. 43)
our ancestors did. I mean, the hardware is in the future, the scenery's in the future, ^
but the situations are really from the past* (Dick in a 1974 interview, cited as the Q
motto to The Collected Stories of Philip K. Dick, vol. 2: We Can Remember It for Tou en
Wholesale). From the tempting psychoanalytic perspective, Dick is simply project- <o
ing back into history, in this case the most archaic past, the scene of a constitutive ^
moment of virtually all ego formation. For Lacan, for example, "paranoiac aliena- <*
491
tion" always subtends the radical "fragmentation" of subjectivity in the imaginary,
thus antedating the subsequent "assuaging" and "armoring" effects of subjectivity's
symbolic construction as the subject of law and of language. See Lacan, "Le stade du
miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je, telle qu'elle est revelee dans I'expen-
ence psychanalytique" [1949], in Baits I, pp. 89-97. For a translation see Eaits:A
Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1977).
But Lacanian analysis does not quite explain the force of Dick's vision. Finally, in
this context, listen to the music of paranoid corps/es, as produced by the great heavy
metal band Black Sabbath, Paranoid, © 1971 Warner Bros., Records Inc., M5 3104;
esp. "War Pigs," "Iron Man," "Electric Funeral," and the tide cut "Paranoid"—this is
nothing if not the contemporary birth of tragedy out of the spirit of music.
248. The College of Sociology (1937-39), ed. Denis Hollier, trans. Betsy Wing (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988),p. 14s. Le College de Sociologie (1937-
1939), ed. Denis Hollier (Paris: Gallimard, 1979).
249. Roger Caillois [with Bataille], "Brotherhoods, Orders, Secret Societies,;
Churches" [1938], in The College of Sociology, pp. 145-156; here p. 155.
250. Editor's note, The College ofSociology, p. 415 n. 3.
251. Caillois [with Bataille], "Brotherhoods, Orders, Secret Societies, Churches,"
in The College ofSociology, p. 151.
252. Editor's note, The College of Sociology, p. 415 n. 4. Also Bataille, CEuwes com-:
pikes, 11645. Andler's biography is a landmark in the history of research on Nietz-
sche. Andler's balanced perspective was honed by his work on pan-Germanism and
oh what he called "German Socialist imperialism and expansionism." On these two
aspects of Andler's lifework and their interrelationship, see Ernest Tonnelat, Charles
Andler: Sa vie et son osurre (Paris: Societe" d'Fldition/Les Belles Lettres, 1937))
pp. 167-282.
253. Charles Andler, Nietzsche, sa vie etsapensee, 6 vols. (Paris: Editions Bossard,
1920), 4:309.
1. Nietzsche, Also spmch Zarathustra; KGW 6/1:149 [part 2, "On the Land of
£ Education" ]. "Vollgeschrieben mit den Zeichen der Vergangenheit, und audi diese
1 Zeichen uberpinselt mit neuen Zeichen: also habt ihr euch gut versteckt vor alien
2* Zeichendeutern!"
w 2. Baudrillard, Simulations [Simulacns et simulation, 1981],trans. PaulFoss, Paul
o
<; Patton, and Philip Beitchman (New York: SemiotextfeJ Foreign Agents Series,
O *983)> p. 88. On the influence of Nietzsche on Baudrillard's "political economy of
„, the sign" see Lutz Niethammer, in collaboration with Dirk van Laak, Posthistoire:
w
h Has History Come to an End? [1989], trans. Patrick Camiller (London and New
fc York: Verso, 1992), p. 141.
492
3. Strauss, "Persecution and the Art of Writing" [ 1941 ], in Persecution and the Art
of Writing [1952.] (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988),
pp. 22-37; here p. 25.
4. Jane Siberry (with k. d. lang), "Calling All Angels" When I Was a Boy, © 1993
Reprise Records/Time Warner Company, 9-26824-4.
5. Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language [1984] (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1986), p. 14.
6. See Raoul Richter, "Friedrich Nietzsche und die Kultur unserer Zeit" [1906],
in Essays, ed. Lina Richter (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 19x3), p. 112. Richter
was also author of "Nietzsches Stellung zu Entwicklungslehre und Rassentheorie"
(1906], in Essays, pp. 137-177; this essay first appeared in the influential Politisch-
anthropologischMonatsschrift (political-anthropological monthly), then a major or-
gan of racial anthropology. See further his Friedrich Nietzsche, sein Leben und sein
Werk (Leipzig: Durr, 1903) and Nietzsche-Aufia'tze (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1917).
Nowhere, however, did Richter make clear either the significance or the techniques
of Nietzsche's esotericism. Richter was a racialist but not an anti-Semite. Basing
himself on certain passages in Nietzsche, he held that the Superman of the future
had to be bred to include not only German and Slavic but also Jewish features. See
"Nietzsches Stellung zu Entwicklungslehre und Rassentheorie," pp. 172-174-
7. Already by 1900, the year of Nietzsche's death, members of the volkisch move-
ment claimed—without much justification—that Nietzsche's attacks on the Ger-
man Volk were only to be understood exoterically and strategically, not as what he
really meant. See, for example, Wilhelm Schaner, "Friedrich Nietzsche," Der Volk-
serzieher 4:35 (September 2,1900), 273; as cited in AschhtimyTheNietzsche Legacy in
Germany, p. 120. The obviously self-serving nature of this claim concealed its deeper,
unintentional insight into the structure of Nietzsche's exoteric-esoteric problematic.
On the eve of the First World War, leaders of the right-wing German Youth Move-
ment had established a three-stage dialectical process with which to approach Nietz-
sche: (1) he ought not to be read by recruits, since his message was too contradic-
tory on its surface; (2) he was to be studied in depth for his esoteric message by older
members, as the only important thinker really to combat the depraved state of
European culture and political life; only then (3) could Nietzsche's life and work be
dialectially sublated, since the Youth Movement itself would take up the sword
where Nietzsche had let it fall, and since the entire age then would have incorpo- ~
rated his spirit. See, for example, Walter Hammer, Nietzsche als Erzieher (Leipzig: $
Verlag Hugo Vollrath, 1914); this book appeared before the war broke out and was H
enthusiastically greeted in the right-wing press. Hammer had also been an impor- ^
tant theorist of vegetarianism and of the so-called Life-Reform Movement, and had Q
written positively about Nietzsche in both contexts, beginning around 1909. *>
8. Nietzsche, "NF, Mai-Juli 1885"; KGW 7/ 31263. §
9. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Phiiosophische Briefe fiber Dogmatismus und I
Kriticismw [ 1795 ], Samtliche Werke, ed. Karl Friedrich August Schelling (Stuttgart "-*
493
and Augsburg: J. G. Corta'scher Verlag, 1856), 1/1:281-341; here 341. «ES ist
ein Verbrechen an der Menschheit, Grundsatze zu verbergen, die allgemein mitt-
heilbar sind. Aber die Natur selbst hat dieser Mittheilbarkeit Grenzen gesetzt; sie
hat—fur die Wurdigen eine Philosophic aufbewahrt, die durch sich selbst zur eso-
terischen wird, weil sie tachtgelcrnt, nicht nachgebetet, nicht nachgeheuchelt, nicht
auch von geheimen Feinden und Ausspahem nachgesprochen werden kann—eini
Symbol fur den Bund freier Geister, an dem sie sich alle erkennen, das sie nicht zu
verbergen brauchen, und da doch, nur ihnen verstandlich, fur die andem ein ewiges
Rathsel seyn wird." Contrast and compare to this proto-Nietzschean position Rous-
seau's earlier remark (c. 1749-1755), made before the French Revolution just as
Schelling wrote after it: "any tongue with which one cannot make oneself under-
stood to the people assembled is a slavish tongue. It is impossible for a people to
remain free and speak that tongue" (Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of Languages
which Treats of Melody and Musical Imitation [ 1749-1755],in Jean-Jacques Rousseau
and Johann Gottfried Herder, On the Origin ofLanguage, trans, with afterwords by
John H. Morgan and Alexander Gode [Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1986], p. 73).
10. Bobbio, The Future ofDemocracy) p. 83.
11. See Heidegger, Schelling, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) [Freiburg
summer semester, 1936], ed. Hildegard Feick, Gesamtausgabe, 2/42 (Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988). For a translation see Schellirufs Treatise on the
Essence ofFreedom, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985).
12. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy ofHistory, pp. 237-238.
13. Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 106; emphasis added.
14. Spinoza, A Political Treatise, in A Theologico-Political Treatise and a Political
Treatise,^. 295-296 [ch. 2, § 11]; emphasis added.
15. This, for example, is how "Nietzscheans" like Stefan George and his circle had
used the term "esoteric" in their poetry and other writing, and how they under-
stood Nietzsche's project. Along with Le College de Sociologie, with which it had
some ties, the George Circle is among the "institutions" that have been most self-
consciously "Nietzschean" in inspiration.
16. See Stanley Ca.vc\L, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and
Tragedy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), esp. the preface
0 [i978j,pp.xi-xxii.
1 17. See Arnold I. Davidson, "Questions Concerning Heidegger: Opening the
21 Debate" Critical Inquiry 15:2 (Winter 1989), 407-426; here 409.
w 18. Rosen, "Nietzsche's Revolution," in The Ancients and the Moderns, p. x89.
o
<! 19. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. xvii.
O 20. Ibid., p. xvi. This passage is also cited by Arnold Davidson in "Questions
,0 Concerning Heidegger" but Davidson then scurries past the problem of actually
H applying this argument to Heidegger, an attempt Cavell himself apparently has
Z sanctioned but also not undertaken. (See Davidson's acknowledgment to Cavell at
494
the beginning of his essay.) Since 1978, Cavell has come to appreciate Heidegger, to
say the least; whether the term "conversion" is too strong is not clear. For his
attempt to deal with the question of Heidegger and Nazism see Philosophical Pas-
sages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Black-
well, 1995), pp-12-41.
21. See Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, p. 420.
22. Frank Kermode, The Genesis ofSecrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative (Cam-
bridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1979; The Charles Eliot
Norton Lectures, i977-i978),p. 58.
23. Ibid., p. 3.
24. Gramsci's most succinct formula for philosophical and political "democratic
centralism," which includes what he meant by "dialectic," was "the critical pursuit of
what is identical in seeming diversity of form and on the other hand of what is
distinct and even opposed in apparent uniformity " {Selections from the Prison
Notebooks ofAntonio Gramsci, p. 189). This was also Gramsci's way of relating to
comrades. As described by a fellow communist militant: "If one was discussing a
definite body of fact, Gramsci examined its various aspects, its various phases, its
various relations with other facts, and its developments, until he saw it, and made
others see it, in broad daylight. . . . If a discussion had no set theme, he willingly let
himself be carried along by our questions . . . and in the course of the argument he
himself raised new problems . . . " (Nicola Potenza, as cited in Paolo Spriano,
Antonio Gramsci and the Party: The Prison Tears [1977], trans. John Fraser [London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1979] > pp. 100-101).
25. Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, p. 326.
26. Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism [1976]* augmented ed.
(London: Verso, 1979), p. 67.
27. Gramsci to Tania Schucht, September 30,1931, in Lettersfrom Prison, 2:77.
28. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, p. 423; translation
slightly modified, in accord with the useful discussion of common sense in Thomas
Nemeth, Gramsci's Philosophy: A Critical Study (Sussex: The Harvester Press and
Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: The Humanities Press, 1980), pp. 75-83; here esp. p. 77.
29. Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, p. 324.
30. Strauss, 'The Literary Character of the Guidefarthe Perplexed," in Persecution
and the Art of Writing, p. 66. O
31. More precisely, this is Rosen's paraphrase of Alexandre Kojeve's position. See w
Rosen, Hermeneutics as Politics, p. 110. £
32. Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook ofRevolutionary Warfare (London: Panaf Books, g
Ltd., 1968), p. 115. g
33. See Astradur Eysteinsson, The Concept of Modernism (Ithaca and London: *
Cornell University Press, 1990). 2
34- Anderson, "Modernity and Revolution" [1983], in Marxism and the Inter- g
pretation of Culture, pp. 317- 3 3 3; here esp. pp. 324- 325- *
495
35- Strauss, Thoughts onMachiavetti, p. 30. AS|
36. Rosen, Hermeneutics as Politics, p. 123. glf
37. For example, Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist (Canal!
bridge,Mass.,andLondon: Harvard University Press, 1995)— which e n d s u p r e p r o l l
ducing, as positive solutions to imagined "contradictions" in Nietzsche's writing, vir-li
tually every exoteric cliche" that Nietzsche wanted liberals to incorporate and believe;:!
38. Nietzsche, XterAntichrist:FltuhaufdasChristenthum [i888];-KGW6/3:i8&l
[ aphorism 23]; emphasis added.
39. See Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the SenseM
(New York and London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 85-86.
40. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 2:570-571; Sdmtliche%
Werke, 3:654-655 [supplements to the 4th bk., ch. 4 5 ] . Schopenhauer h a s h e r e i n !
mind "the a a of procreation" as "affirmation of the will-to-live" but the principle bfl;
the public secret has much broader implications both in his work and in Nietzsche&i
Quite unlike his first philosophical mentor, however, Nietzsche did not denegrateS
the use of "codes" in aesthetics or in philosophical writing generally Contrast, fbr£
example, Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 1:237-242; SdmtHcheg
Werke, 2:279-286 [ 3d bk., ch. 50].
41. Nietzsche,Morgenrbthe;KGWs/i 1279-280 [aphorism457].
42. See, for example, Heidegger, "Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis" [ 1939 ] 5 in
Nietzsche 1:473-658.
43. See Sarah Kofman, Explosion I: Del'KEcce Homo" de Nietzsche (Paris: Editions;:
Galilee, 1992), and Explosion II: Les enfants de Nietzsche (Paris: Editions Galile'ej
1993)-
44. Koftnan, Explosion I, p. 41. See further Denrida, "Interpreting Signatures
(Nietzsche/Heidegger): Two Questions" [1981], trans. Diane Michelfelder and
Richard E. Palmer, in Looking After Nietzsche, pp. 1-17; and Lacoue-Labarthe, "Ob-
literation," trans. Thomas Trezise, The Subject of Philosophy, ed. Thomas Trezise
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), PP- 57-98. For yet another
analysis of Nietzsche's "names" in the same, basically uncritical Denridian vein, see
Rodolphe Gasch£, aEcce Homo or the Written Body" [ 1976], trans. Judith Still, in
Looking After Nietzsche, pp. 113-136.
45. Koftnan, Explosion, p. 42.
O 46. Derrida, "Interpreting Signatures," in Looking After Nietzsche, pp. 1-2.
J^ 47. Koftnan, Explosion II, p. 349-350.
rt 48. Nietzsche to Heinrich Kdselitz [Peter Gast], December 30; KGB 3/5:565-
M 567; here 566.
<j 49. Nietzsche to Jean Bourdeau, around December 17, 1888 [draft]; KGB 3 /
O 5:532-536; here 535-
[_!
50 50. Koftnan, Explosion I, pp. 18 and 31.
w
H 51. Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug, end of March 1884; KGB 3/1:489-
Z 490.
496
52. To date the most extensive treatment of Nietzsche in terms of a gay male
problematic is Kohler, Zarathustras Geheimnis. But Kohler's is not really a theoret-
ically or politically informed exercise in "queering the canon" in the positive sense;
indeed there are several oddly homophobic moments in his work. The supposition
that Nietzsche "was homosexual"—and that he was infected with syphilis not by a
woman but by a man—has a long—if rather subterranean—history; it was ex-
plicidy discussed by Freud's circle in Vienna as early as 1908. Freud himself shied
away from this hypothesis, for reasons that have never become clear; perhaps be-
cause of his own "unruly" nature. The most meticulous "medical biography" of
Nietzsche—in terms both of his possible physical and mental illnesses and also,
as important, of his limited awareness of them—does not address the question
of Nietzsche's sexuality in any depth, though it does tend to side with Kohler's the-
sis that Nietzsche indeed "was gay," and that this may have had something to do
with his concern with esoteric communication. See Pia Daniela Volz, Nietzsche im
Labyrinth seiner Krankheit: Eine medizinisch-biqgraphische Untersuchung (Wurzburg:
Ronigshausen & Neumann, 1990), esp. pp. 2,20,49-50,59-60, and 193-i94i with
relevant endnotes. Nor is Kohler's hypothesis denied by the most extensive biogra-
phy of Nietzsche attempted so far: Hermann Josef Schmidt's unfinished Nietzsche
absconditus oder Spuren lesen bei Nietzsche (Berlin-Aschaffenburg: IBDK Verlag,
i99iff), of which four volumes have been published to date, following Nietzsche
up to 1864; on Kohler, see Teil I/II: Kindheit, 40-41. This is a very quirky, self-
published book. It oscillates more or less out of control between minute historical
reconstruction, including some genuine discoveries, and the most rambling and
impressionistic of interpretations.
From its inception, members of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society held the
position—not contradicted by Freud—that Nietzsche "had homosexual tenden-
cies" or "was homosexual." According to some members of the society, this thesis
was based on "reliable sources" who had known Nietzsche personally: likely the
philosopher Paul Ree. Discussion of Nietzsche's homosexuality was to some extent
also public, as is evident, for example, from a feuilleton that appeared in Vienna's
prestigious Neue Freie Press around 1907. See again Minutes of the Vienna Psycho-
analytic Society, vol. 1 {1906-1908): 357-359 [April 1, 1908] and vol. 2 (1908-
i9io):29-32 [October 28, 1908]. For a rather different, and wholly unscientific,
SS
take on Nietzsche's sexuality see Barris, God and Plastic Surgery: Marx, Nietzsche, O
Freud and the Obvious. Barris pits a theory—and apparendy a practice—of what he £
calls "the limp penis" with, and against, 'The erect manhood of Marx's proletariat, g
proud to overcome; the rigid urgency of a Nietzsche; the competent penetration of £
a Freud, delaying the gratification of conclusion until the subject matter is ready to g
come to voice: all these have their place, their importance, and their distinguishable ^
degrees and kinds of instructive and admirable achievement, of political, aesthetic ^
and spiritual significance" (p. 204). w
Actually, both the size and sexual preference of Nietzsche's penis have long been a o
497
matter of private and public controversy in the Nietzsche Industry—beginning^
already with its founder, Nietzsche himself. See Curt Paul Janz, "Die 'tddtliche
Beleidigung': Ein Beitrag zur Wagner-Entfremdung Nietzsches," Nietzsche-Studien 4 '••.
(1975), 262-278. O n e of Nietzsche's personal physicians, Otto Eiser (1834-1897).^
confided the results of an examination of Nietzsche in late 1877 to Richard Wagnecr
(Eiser was a Wagnerian. A founder of the Frankfurt am Main Wagner Society, also \
in 1877 he published in Bayreuther Blatter a hagiographic "exegesis" of Wagner's
Ring of the Nibelungen.) Based on this information, Wagner informed his inner-
circle, as Nietzsche discovered to his horror at a moment of overdetermined per?/
sonal and philosophical crisis in his life, that Nietzsche's various somatic and psy-;:;
etiological ailments were due to the "small size" of his penis, to "excessive onanism,5*
and/or to "pederasty." Just when he learned of Eiser's incredible indiscretion is.;
unclear, perhaps as early as 1877 and no later than 1882; in any event, Nietzsche was,
understandably hurt to the quick. This incident had considerable bearing not only
on the nature of Nietzsche's break with Wagner but also on his subsequent analysis
of the phenomenon of modernist "decadence," and most especially on his eso-
tericism, since the incident occurred at the time of his "Zarathustra year." Janz's take
on the issue has been contested, however. For further debate about Wagner's "mor-
tal insult" and Nietzsche's reaction to it see Dieter Borchmeyer, "Wodurch hat
Wagner Nietzsche todlich beleidigt? Ein Replik auf Eugen Bisers Aufsatz 'Glaube
und Mythos,'" PhiiosophischesJahrbuch 92 (1985), 149-156; and Eugen Biser, "Der
'beleidigte' Nietzsche und der 'bekehrte' Wagner: Versuch einer Entzauberung,"
PhiiosophischesJahrbuch 93 (1986), 175-180.
The question of whether or not Nietzsche "was gay" would be relevant only to the
extent that this might have been one contributing factor, among others, in deter-
mining his profound commitment to esotericism.
53. Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug; KGB 3/11490.
54. Nietzsche to Elisabeth Forster-Nierzsche, mid-November, 1888 [draft]; KGB
3/5:473-474; here 474.
55. There is something crazy—literally—about the Sublime. Shoshana Felman
once distinguished between speaking madness and speaking ^ m a d n e s s as roughly
equivalent to the difference between rhetoric and grammar. See Felman, Writing
and Madness [Lafblie et la chose littemire, 1978], trans. Martha Noel Evans and the
author (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 12-13.
1 56. Richard Klein, Cigarettes An Sublime (Durham and London: Duke Univer-
° sity Press, 1993), p-xi
w 57. Derrick, Speech and Phenomenon and Other Essays on HusserVs Phenomenology
<< [1967], trans. David B.Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, I973)>
O P-54
58. In addition to the work of Baudrillard, see, for example, the now classic
w
H philosophical discussion of simulacra as types of performative utterance in Derrida,
J5 "Signature Event Context" [197'i]> Margins of Philosophy, pp. 307-330. O n the
498
limulacrum as re/presentational structure of a subrational "economy" see Lyotard,
fgconomie libidinale (Paris: Les Editions de minuit, 1974), esp. pp. 57-115. On the
simulacrum as "the power of the false and the false as power," see Deleuze, "Plato
and the Simulacrum" trans. Rosalind Krauss, October 27 (Winter 1983), 4S-S6.
%. 59. Fundamentally mistaken in this regard, for example, is Louis A. Siss^Madness
and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and Thought (New
^ybrk: Basic Books, 1992), esp. pp. 150-154: "Verbal Concepts and Nietzschean
IDualism." Sass, who ignores monist systems of thought—including Spinoza's—
takes this "dualist" Nietzsche as "a kind of blueprint" for his entire book (p. 149);
but the "profoundly ambivalent, perhaps even contradictory philosophical posi-
tion" that Sass thus ascribes to Nietzsche (p. 150) is a function of Nietzsche's quite
conscious commitment to esoteric rhetoric, and has nothing to do, unless of course
ironically, with "schizophrenia" even in the extended sense that Sass has in mind,
namely, as a primary mode of modernist hyperconsciousness alongside alienation
from body and affect.
60. The late Tim Mason, a Marxist historian at Oxford, exposed the intricate
dialectic between coercion and hegemony, political economy and ideology in the
Nazi Fiihrerstaat; and the very fact that Mason tended to downplay the specifically
anti-Semitic and racist component of German national socialism makes his analysis
all the more relevant for the study of fascism and Nietzscheanism, neither of which
was essentialistically racist, though certainly racialist. See Mason, Sozialpolitik im
Dritten Reich: Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,
1977), and "Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpre-
tation of National Socialism," in DCT- "Fiihrerstaat": Mythos undRealitdt; Studienzur
Struktur und Politik des Dritten Retches, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Ket-
tenacker, introduction by Wolfgang J. Mommsen (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981),
pp. 21-42. To the extent that Nazism can be reduced to the Pubrerprinzip—and
perhaps only to that extent . . Nietzsche can be viewed as a Nazi.
61. Benito Mussolini and Alfredo de Marsico, cited in Amerigo Montemaggiore,
Dizumario deltadottrinafascista (Turin: G. B. Paravia & Co., 1934), pp. 369 and 371;
from the entry on "Gerarchia"—the Italian word used to translate German Ran-
gordnunfl, "order of rank."
62. Mussolini, "Relativismo e Fascismo" [// Popolo dTtalia 279 (November
1921), 8], in Opera omnia, ed. Edoardo and Duilio Susmel (Florence: La Fireze, £
19S1-1963), 17:267-269; here 269. g
63. It goes without saying that not all forms of relativism are fascist, even re- ^
motely. For a sophisticated historical treatment, and an original defense, of philo- °
sophical relativism that is not, see Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism >
(Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1991)- For a cogent argument £
against relativism that also does not link it to fascism see James F. Harris, Against £
Relativism: A Philosophical Defense of Method (La Salle, III.: Open Court, 1992)- J,
64. Nietzsche to Paul Deussen, January 3, 1888; KGB 3/5:221-223; here 222; £
499
emphasis added. Deussen (1845-1919) had been a friend of Nietzsche at university
and had gone on to become a historian of Western and Eastern philosophy and
scholar of the Indie Vedinta.
65. Nietzsche, "NF, Sommer 1886-Herbst 1887"; KGW 8/1:191.
66. This metaphor is owed to Balibar, "Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell," in Masses
Classes, Ideas, p. 33.
67. Nietzsche, "NF, Sommer 1886-Herbst 1887"; KGW 8/1:191.
68. See, for example, de Man's conceptually muddled, self-effacing claim:
Sometimes it is the text, sometimes the author that is said to "know" what it is
doing—constraining the reader, including the reader of de Man, in Umbo. A great
precedent for de Man's maneuvres may be Kierkegaard, who also claimed to dif-
ferentiate between "accidental" and "personal" authorship from "essential" and
"productive" text. See Soren Kierkegaard, "A First and Last Explanation" [1846],
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments" in Kierkegaard's Wrih
ings, 12/1, ed. and trans, with introduction and notes by Howard V Hong and
Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 625-630. But
r»
1' then Kierkegaard was a major esoteric writer, and so it is unclear by intention when
N he is to be taken literally, when figuratively. For more straightforward current philo-
w sophical struggles with the related problem of the connections, and lack thereof,:
< between authorial and textual responsibility, see The Political Responsibility oflntettee-
O tuals, ed. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore, and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge
w University Press, 1990).
H 69. For his Allegories of Reading, de Man chose a splendid motto from Pascal:
S3 "Quand on lit trop vite ou trop doucement on n'entend rien. [When one reads
500
too fast or too leisurely, one hears (or understands) nothing.]" Nietzsche's was a
rhetoric—a technology—of violent speed, as well as of leisure. Certainly "one hears
nothing" of it if one "reads" him too slowly or too fast. But neither in the three essays
on Nietzsche in Allegories ofReading nor elsewhere in his works does de Man read let
alone deconstruct either Nietzsche's esoteric intent—which de Man does not and, in his
own terms, cannot set out to do—or even—appearances to the contrary—Nietz-
sche's illocutionary rhetoric. Rather, he constructs a philologically arbitrary, depoliti-
cized caricature of Nietzsche's—and perhaps de Man's own—exoteric philosophical
and political desires. For a glimpse of at least the young de Man's political affiliation
and phantasmagoria see his Wartime Journalism 1939-1943, ed. Werner Hamacher,
Neil Hertz, Thomas Keenan (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press,
1988). Debate still circles about whether the apparently pro-Nazi stance of the
young de Man was later abandoned by him or whether it went deep underground in
his writing, and some of his students deny that his early "journalism" was ever pro-
Nazi in thefirstplace. Unfortunately, the position taken on this vexed and still open
question by the editors of this anthology is ultimately uncritical and obscurantist.
For an ideologically conservative criticism of de Man and Nietzsche—though many
aspects of it are objectionable—see Brian Vkkers, In Defense of Rhetoric, 2d, cor-
rected ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 453~47i- Finally,
note that de Man knew well the Straussian theory of exo/esoteric writing, as is
revealed in passing in his analysis of dialogism in Mikhail Bakhtin—an analysis that
seems to have a strong autobiographical undercurrent as well. It might follow
logically that de Man would have coded exo/esotericism into his own writing. But
the main point here is that he did not—perhaps for that very reason—use Straussian
theory to read Nietzsche's writing. Cf. de Man, "Dialogne and Dialogism" [1981;
i983],in7foResistance to Theory, pp. 106-114; here pp. 107-108.
70. Gadamer, WahrheitundMethode: GrundzugeeinerphilosophischmHernieneutik
[i960], 3d, expanded ed. (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr [PaulSiebeck], 1972), p. 510;
and Ludwig Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins [ 1962]
(Munich and Basel: Emst Reinhardt Verlag, 1964), pp. 218-219.
71. See Nietzsche, "NF, Sommer 1875";KGW4/i:i95-
72. Kripke, Naming andNecessity, pp. 3-4 and 48. The rigid designator is compa-
rable to Ferdinand de Saussure's notion of the "key-word," "anagram," "paragram "
or "hypogram" as analyzed by Jean Starobinski and translated by de Man as "sub- g
text or, better, infra-text." Saussure was fascinated by the possibility that "Latin $
poetry was structured by the coded dispersal (or dissemination) of an underlying ^
word or proper name throughout the lines of verse" (de Man, "Hypogram and ^
Inscription" [1981], in The Resistance to Theory, pp. 27-53; here pp. 36-37). Hypo- a
grams hover radically on the cusp between perceptibility and imperceptibility, as do v>
rigid designators. But the Saussurean hypogram, at least as read by Starobinski and «
de Man, differs from the properly Nietzschean rigid designator in several respects. ^
Although both are exo/esoteric by design, "The function of the textual elaboration ^
501
[of the hypogram]," according to de Man, "is n o t . . . to state" its "meaning (whicrftl
would be devoid of all interest since there is nothing remarkable about the semantical
kernel) but rather to hide it, as Saussure's key-word is hidden in the lines of verse a0k
rather, to disguise it into a system of variations or paragrams which have b e e r i ^
overdetermined by codification in such a manner as to tantalize the reader into a self- ^
rewarding process of discovery. . . . For although the hypogram behaves coyly *'',
enough, it will eventually be unveiled since this is, in fact, its raison d'etre: the form is *'
encoded in such a way as to reveal its own principle of determination" (p. 38). By *
instructive contrast: Nietzsche's esoteric semiotics is not coy in this sense; is not self- \
rewarding; is not semantically empty, transcendentally self-referential, or unremark- »
able; and perhaps cannot, in theory or in practice, be fully unveiled. By the same
token, the purpose of textual elaboration in the case of Nietzsche's rigid designator '
precisely should be t o expose its content and mode of incorporation to the maximum
amount of light possible. Cf. further Jean Starobinski, Words upon Words: The Ana-
grams of Ferdinand de Saussure [1971], trans. Olivia Emmet (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1979).
73. Spinoza, The Ethics, p. 68 [part 1, prop. 29].
74. Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 92.
75. Nietzsche to Heinrich Koselitz [Peter Gast], September 2, 1884; KGB 3 /
1:524-526; here 525.
76. Giorgio Colli, "Nachwort," in Nietzsche, Sdmtliche Werke, Kritische Studien-
ausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin and New York: Walter de
Gruyter and Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980), 13:651-668; here
651-652. Hereafter cited as KSA, with appropriate volume and page numbers.
Levine, in Nietzsche and the Crisis of the Humanities (1995), also points out the
importance of this passage (pp. 129-130). More acutely than Colli, Levine notes its
implications for Nietzsche's philosophy but also for its reception by the "Right"
(Leo Strauss) and the "Left" (Derrida), since not only Will to Power but also
Eternal Bxcurrence of the Same and the Superman (see also p. 126) are hereby
exposed as mere "exoteric" teachings of a strategically withheld "esoteric doctrine."
Nonetheless, Levine interprets the upshot for Nietzsche more culturally and philo-
sophically than politically: for example, "to say 'yes' despite his knowledge of the
abyss" (p. 130). In the end, Levine believes that "Nietzsche's exoteric program for
£j cultural reform was explicitly antipluralist and antidemocratic, while his esoteric
l message was radically unpolitical" (p. 206) —a wholly incoherent distinction in
5 Nietzsche's terms.
« 77. Nietzsche, Gbtzen-Ddmmeruna; KGW 6/3:39 ["Dicta and Arrows," § 36 ].
<< 78. Boethius, Philosophiae consolations, II, 74-77-
O 79. Nietzsche, Vorwort [ 1886] to Menschliches, Attzumenschliches I: Ein Buchfur
^ freieGeister [1878; 1886];J<TGW4/2:7-i6;here 16 [preface, § 8 ] .
H 80. For the medieval uses of these biblical maxims see, for example, Alan of the
53 Isles (c. 1128-c. 1203), A Compendium on the Art of Preaching, and Humbert of
502
Jjtomans (H98-I2i6),7ratfi«r on Preaching, both in Readings in Medieval Rhetoric,
fed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson (Bloomingron
and London: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 228-239 (here pp. 235-236);
and pp. 245-250 (here pp. 247-248), respectively.
81. Carlo Ginzburg, "Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm" [1979], in Clues,
>Jtfyths, and the Historical Method [1986], trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi (Bal-
timore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 96-125; here
p. 123.
82. Nietzsche,/#w«'fr von GutundB6se;KGW6/2:44-45 [part 2, aphorism 30].
83. "AH oppressing classes stand in need of two social functions to safeguard their
rule: the function of the hangman and the function of the priest. The hangman is
required to quell the protests and the indignation of the oppressed; the priest is
required to console the oppressed, to depict to them the prospects of their sufferings
and sacrifices being mitigated (this is particularly easy to do without guaranteeing
that these prospects will be 'achieved'), while preserving class rule, and thereby to
reconcile them to class rule, win them away from revolutionary action, undermine
their revolutionary spirit and destroy their revolutionary determination" (Lenin,
T h e Collapse of the Second International" in Collected Works, 211231-232). For the
modern concept of "hegemony" as part of the dialectic between overt coercion and
tacit or noncoercive coercion, though often its Leninist taproot is repressed or
suppressed, see, for example, Stuart Hall, Bob Lumley, and Gregor McLennan,
"Politics and Ideology: Gramsci" in On Ideology (London: Hutchinson, 1978; Cen-
tre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham), pp. 45-76;
Joseph V Femia, Gramsci'sPoUticalThought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolu-
tionary Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); and Robert Bocock, Hegemony
(London and New York: Tavistock Publications, 1986). The Leninist taproot is not
suppressed in John Hoffman, The Gramscian Challenge: Coercion and Consent in
Marxist Political Theory (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984).
84. For two non-Nietzschean explications of Hegel's position that are relevant
here see Alexandre Kojeve [Kojevenikov], Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lec-
tures on the Phenomenology ofSpirit [ 1933-1939], assembled by Raymond Queneau,
ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols Jr. (New York and London: Basic Books,
1969), esp. chs. 2 and 3; and Genevieve Lloyd, "Masters, Slaves and Others," in
Radical Philosophy Reader, ed. Roy Edgley and Richard Osborne (London: Verso, 0
1985), pp. 291-309, esp. pp. 292-299: "Hegel on Masters, Slaves and Women." w
85. Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, p. 235. H
S6. Ibid., pp. 134-135. This section of the notebooks, T h e Modern Prince" was ^
drafted in 1931-1932 and revised in this version in 1933-1934. In this matter, a
Gramsci desperately held on to a certain Enlightenment belief in rational progress. «
Even though "Machiavellianism has helped to improve the traditional political tech- £*
nique of the conservative ruling groups " and even though, by exposing its own w
techniques to view, "the philosophy of praxis" may do the same, nonetheless this
503
"should not disguise" the "essentially revolutionary character" of either Machia^ 1
vellianism or the philosophy of praxis. For Gramsci, this also "explains all anti-'"£
Machiavellianism, from that of the Jesuits to the pietistic anti-Machiavellianism of
Pasquale Viilari" (p. 136). Villari (1826-1917) had written a book on Machiavelli
Niccold Machiavelli e i suoi tempi (1877-1882) and was a friend of Nietzsche's friend
Malwida von Meysenbug. Nietzsche knew of Viiiari's work in German translation! ''•
Like Gramsci, he held his highly moralistic account of Machiavelli in contempt
though for exactly the opposite ideological reasons. \r
87. Ibid., p. 135.
88. See, for example, the claim by Rush Limbaugh—hyped by his publisher as '
"the most influential conservative spokesperson of our day," "America's #1 talk-show
host" indeed "the most powerful man in America"—that not only "Liberalism" but
Gramsci has "long ago captured the arts, the press, the entertainment industry, the
universities, the schools, the libraries, the foundations, etc." (Rush Limbaugh, See, I
Told You So [New York: Pocket Star Books, I993],pp-97~98).
89. See Mark Seltzer, Bodies and Machines (New York" and London: Routledge,
1992), esp. pp. 95-96.
90. O n Nietzsche's knowledge of the sciences in general and of physiology, in-'4
cluding Fechner's work, and on his own pretension as a "natural philosopher," see:/
Alwin Mittasch's widely neglected workFriedrichNietzsche alsNaturphilosoph (Stutt- C
gart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 1952), and the equally neglected study by Karl Schlechta• •/:
and Anni Anders, Friedrich Nietzsche: Von den verborgenen Anfdrtgen seines Phildso- :
phierens (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Gunther Holz-
b o o g j , 1962). For more recent attempts to breathe life into the theme of Nietzsche's
articulation of "art* and "science," see, primarily, Helmut Pfotenhauer, Die Kunstals
Physiolqgie: Nietzsches dsthetische Theorie und litemrische Produktion (Stuttgart: J. B. .
Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1985); and, secondarily, Kunst und Wissenschaft
bei Nietzsche, ed. Mihailo Djuric and Josef Simon (Wiirzburg: Konigshausen & .
Neumann, 1986); and Babette E. Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting
Science on the Ground ofArt and Life (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1994)- O n the significance of early physiology for modernism and modernity, see
Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision andModernity in the Nineteenth
Century (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The MIT Press, 1990). Nietzsche's proj-
^ ect was more "phantasmagoric" than "stereoscopic," in the nineteenth-century sense
1 outlined by Crary, though his own view of Nietzsche happens t o be conventionally
$ benevolent: because Nietzsche preferred t o conceal rather than foreground the
« deepest levels of his rhetorical "machine" from public purview, keeping them in
<j camera—in both meanings of the term.
O 9i- Seltzer, Bodies and Machines, p. 9S •
05 92. Ibid., pp. 95-96. O n the link between sexuality and the machine in the context
pq
H of German modernism, see Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism,
Z Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). For a
504
fflecessarily speculative but, ideologically speaking, unnecessarily naive reflection on
Ijsfietzsche's attitude toward technologies of writing, see Friedrich A. Kittler, Dis-
burse Networks 1800/1900 [1985], trans. Michael Metteer, with Chris Cullens, fore-
|yord by David E. Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 177-
§205- "Nietzsche: Incipit Tragoedia." In his otherwise important book, Kittler locates
f Nietzsche as the pivot point between two distinct discursive systems: idealism-
j romanticism and modernism. Yet he has no understanding of Nietzsche's complex
^position with regard to esoteric communication. Taking Zarathustra only at his
exoteric word, Kittler writes: "Over the beginning of the literature of 1900 stands a
curse. 'Whoever knows the reader will henceforth do nothing for the reader. An-
other century of readers—and the spirit itself will stink. That everyone may learn to
read, in the long run corrupts not only writing but also thinking.' Zarathustra's curse
strikes at the technological-material basis of the discourse network of 1800: univer-
sal alphabetization. Not content or message but the medium itself made the Spirit,
the corpus composed of German poetry and German Idealism, into a stinking
cadaver. The murderer of the letter met its own death" (p. 178). Kittler says noth-
ing, however, about the cadavers Nietzsche himself planned to produce as corps/e.
See further Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra; KGW 6/1:44 [part r, "On Reading
and Writing"].
93. Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth" in Structural Anthropol-
ogy [1958], trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (Garden City,
N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 202-238; here p. 212.
94. TSlieTzscheyEcce homo; KGW 6/3:262 [wWhy I Am So Wise," r ] .
95. Buck-Morss, "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics," p. 10. See further Nietzsche, "NF,
Fruhjahr 1888"; KGW 8/ 3:149; and Heidegger, Nietzsche: Der Wille zurMacht als
Kunst [Freiburg winter semester 1936-1937], ed. Bemd Heimbuchel, Gesam-
tausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), 2/43:91-92. It must
also be noted that "Male fantasies of androgyny are . . . strategies of totalization and
ethical compensation" for underlying misogyny (Julie Ellison, Delicate Subjects:
Romanticism, Gender, and the Ethics of Understanding [Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1990], p. 19). Ellison is here paraphrasing the work of Carolyn G.
Heilbrun, among others.
96. On the powerful masculinist bias of Machiavelli himself and to a lesser extent
on Machiavellianism, though unfortunately not on Nietzsche, see Hanna Fenichel Q
Pitkin, Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought ofNiccolb Machiavelli w
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984)- H
97. Selectionsfromthe Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, pp. 126-127. On Gram- >«
sci and Machiavelli, see Benedetto Fontana, Hegemony and Power: On the Relation o
between Gramsci and Machiavelli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, <"
1993)- -S
98. Required might be a reading of Nietzsche's ceuvre as painstaking as the one ^
provided, say, by Stanley Fish on Milton. Fish argues that Paradise last is a text
505
about how readers come to be who they—ostensibly—are. See Stanley E. Fish
Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost [1967] (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London*
University of California Press, 1971) • In Nietzsche's case, however, such a reading
would have to include the exposure and analysis of subconscious collective as well as
merely individual embodiments.
99- Niccolb Machiavelli to Francesco Guicciardini, May 17,1521, in The Prince: A
New Translation, Backgrounds, Interpretations, Peripherica, trans, and ed. Robert M.
Adams (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977), pp. 133-135; here p. 135.
100. Sophocles, Antigone, trans. Elizabeth Wyckoff, in Greek Tragedies, ed. David
Grene and Bichmond Lattimore (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, i960), 1:177-227; here 187 [11.175-177].
101. Baltasar Grecian, The Art of Worldly Wisdom: A Pocket Oracle [El Ordculo
manual, 1647], trans. ChristopherMauer (New York: Doubleday Currency, 1992),
pp. 3, 54, and 73.
102. Francis Bacon, The Essays [ 1597 and 1625], ed. with an introduction by John
Pitcher (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 76.
103. Ibid., p. 128. See further appendix 4: "Idols of the Mind" [from the Novum
organum, 1620], pp. 277-285. In fact, Bacon was one of the great practitioners of
esoteric writing, though arguably on behalf of a very different constituency than
Nietzsche's. Cf. Cantor, "Leo Strauss and Contemporary Hermeneutics," in Leo
Strauss'* Thought: Toward a Critical Engagement, pp. 289-297; and Lampert, Nietz-:
sche and Modern Times, pp. 15-141, 393, and 410.
104. See Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena: Kleine phtiosophische Schriften
[1851], ed. Julius Frauenstadt, 7thed. (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1891), 2:258-260
["Zur Rechtslehre und Politik," § 125].
105. Kict2schcyMenschliches,AllzumenschlichesI; KGW 4/2\%%-%9 ["On the His-
tory of Moral Sensations," aphorism 93].
106. See Spinoza, The Ethics, in On the Improvement of the Understanding, The
Ethics, Correspondence, pp. 212-215 [part 4, prop. 37], and^4 Political Treatise, mA
Theologico-Political Treatise and a Political Treatise, pp. 292 and 294-295 [ch. 2, §§ 4
and 8].
107. See Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena, 2:260.
108. Saul Bd\ov/,Herzog [1961] (New York: A Fawcert Crest Book, 1965),p. 389.
£ 109. Strauss, "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil," in Studies in
^ Platonic Political Philosophy, p . 177.
<s n o . A recent collection of essays on Nietzsche's relationship to postmodernism
w has the cumulative effect of egregiously misunderstanding him politically; see Nietz-
< sche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra, ed. Clayton Koelb (Albany: State Uni-
O versity of New York Press, 1990). The same must be said for the essays in Exceedingly
w Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Interpretation, ed. David Farrell Krell and
w
H David Wood (London and New York: Routledge, 1988). As for Strauss himself, he
Z is not unconnected to at least one basic project of postmodernism: "virtual reality,"
506
at least in one of its preliminary manifestations, namely computer "outlining."
The notion of post-Aristotelian oudining—a key to the hierarchical organization
of thought—in elitist political philosophies, societies, and cyberspatial matrixes
alike—was developed in close proximity to Strauss. "KAMAS (Knowledge and
Mind Amplification System) was the first outliner on personal computers. A group
of former philosophy professors wrote the program, seeing outlining as a vehicle for
fostering a certain way of thinking. Compusophic Sysrems wanted to promote the
educational philosophy of the Chicago school of the late 1940s and 1950s, which
advocated the neoclassicism of Leo Strauss, Richard McKeon and Mortimer Adler.
The group described KAMAS as the 'classic vehicle' for thinking, as it helps writers
structure their thoughts in hierarchical levels" (Heim, The Metaphysics of Virtual
Reality, pp. 47-48) • And not thoughts only.
i n . Strauss, "What Is Political Philosophy" [1954-1955], in What Is Political
Philosophy? and Other Studies [1959] (Chicago and London: The Universiry of Chi-
cago Press, 1988), pp. 9S5\ here p. 46. See further "The Three Waves of Moder-
nity," in Political Philosophy: Six Essays, ed. with an introduction by Hilail Gildin
(Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), pp. 81 -98. For one of Strauss's
most significant reflections on secret writing, though the example is Lessing, not
Nietzsche, see his "Exoteric Teaching" [1939], Interpretation 14 (1986), 5i-S9>
since reprinted in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the
Thought of Leo Strauss, selected and introduced by Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 63-71. Unfortunately,
Strauss's early work on one of the most important neo-Spinozists, Friedrich Hein-
rich Jacobi (1743-1819) —work that is assumed to contain not merely the future
program of esoteric Straussian political philosophy but also its most unabashedly
Nietzschean mode—has yet to see the light of day. Jacobi was the author of On the
Teaching ofSpinoza in Letters to Mr. Moses Mendelssohn (1785), a text of immense, and
still not fully fathomed, significance for German and European intellectual history.
112. Strauss, "What Is Political Philosophy," in What Is Political Philosophy?, p. 46.
113. Strauss, Thoughts onMachiavelli, p. 13.
114. Spinoza, The Ethics, p. 151 [part 3, prop. 31 ].
115. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1885-Fruhjahr 1886"; KGW 8/1:37. There are a
number of such reflections in Nietzsche's unpublished writings, including a passage
he chose to strike from the second Untimely Meditation: The Use andMisuse of History 0
for Life (1874), which made his intent behind speaking crudely on occasion all too w
clear. See the editors' philological apparatus in Nietzsche, KSA 14:68. H
116. See once more Deleuze's depiction of Nietzsche as non- or antidialectical ^
thinker in Nietzsche et la philosophic, pp. 169-189. Though here, too, Deleuze was g
anticipated by Bataille. See, for example, Bataille, The Accursed Share, vols, a and «
3:368-371 {Sovereignty). (Euvres completes, 8:402-404. Robert Paul Resch's analysis £
of the political impact on and of Deleuze's Nietzscheanism and related theory of ^
what he calls "chaosmos" is worth noting in this regard.
507
Deleuze, following Nietzsche, sees a chaotic will to power as the ahistorical, ontologi-
cal motor of history. To be sure, this chaosmos is always historically structured, but the
principle of that structuration lies outside of history. For Deleuze, as for Nietzsche '
history is merely one more (false) structure of meaning imposed on meaningless
differences taking on a historical form. . . Deleuze's problematic was a powerful
influence on the French Left in the seventies, the decade Nietzsche replaced Marx as
the central reference for French intellectuals. It seemed to provide a framework within
which the ideals of May 1968 could survive the pessimism that attended their defeat.
Indeed, that defeat could be rationalized by stressing the deficiencies of Marxism,
which was ultimately held responsible for the failure of the revolution (Althusserian
theory as a repressive and narrow rationalism; the reactionary nature of the French
Communist Party, which lost the revolution by pursuing limited, traditional, self-
interested tactics; and so on). Leaving aside (for the moment) the theoretical signifi-
cance of the neo-Nietzschean dissidence, it is clear that its negative thrust cut two
ways. It did attempt to provide a critical perspective against which domination could
be measured, but it also exploited the extreme disappointment within the ranks of the
Left after 1968 and contributed significandy to the general anti-Marxist fervor that
swept Paris after 1975. Positively, it joined with poststructuralism to form the theoret-
ical core of what became known in the United States as postmodernism. (Resch,
Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory, pp. 232-23 3)
This analysis of Deleuze may be basically correct, though Resch's polemic against
much of the remainder of Deleuze's work—which is not reducible to Nietzsche-
anism—is misdirected and certainly counterproductive in intellectual coalition
building. But what is especially curious is that Resch fully incorporates the De-
leuzean interpretation of Nietzsche into his own criticism of Deleuze and of the
anticomrnunist—at the very least anti-Althusserian—Left generally. Whatever else
this move may accomplish, it effectively eliminates the possibility of ever theorizing
''the theoretical significance of the neo-Nietzschean dissidence" in its full complexity
and influence. Finally, it must be said that even a theorist as sharply—and to some
extent justifiably—critical of Deleuze and Guattari as is Manfredo Tafuri—who
aruges, for example, that their theory of the rhizome abdicates the painful but
necessary requirement of "historical criticism" to "balance on the razor's edge that
£ separates detachment and participation"—has incorporated into his work the very
1 standard view of Nietzsche as critically progressive—which is the view of Deleuze
JT and Guattari as well. See Tafuri, The Sphere and the Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and
w ArchitecturefromPimnesi to the 1970s [ 1980], trans. Pellegrino d'Aciemo and Robert
«< Connolly (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), pp. 4-11 and 291.
O H7- Mick Jagger and Keith Richards, "Street Fighting Man" [© 1968], The
w Rolling Stones: Hot Rocks 1964-1971, © London/Abkco Records, AC2T-042.01.
H 118. On Carmen and Nietzsche, see Klein, Cigarettes Are Sublime, ch. 4: 'The
Z Devil in Carmen"
508
H9. For instance, by Michael Allen Gillespie, "Nietzsche's Musical Politics," in
"Nietzsche's New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics, tmd Politics, pp. 117-149.
Quite early on in his reception, however, Nietzsche was commonly depicted as
"musical." See, for example, Bernard Scharlitt, "Das musikalische Element in Fried-
rich Nietzsche" DieMusik 4 (1904), 108-112. Nietzsche has influenced many "clas-
sical" composers — not only the neoromantic Richard Strauss, as is well known, but
also avant-garde Alban Berg. For a preliminary attempt to analyze Nietzsche's "me-
dia philosophy," see Rudolf Fietz, MedienphUosophie: Musik, Spmche und Schrifi bei
Friedrich Nietzsche (Wurzburg: Konigshausen 8c Neumann, 1992); on Nietzsche's
"musical semiotics" see esp. pp. 82-91 and 130-144. More detailed on Nietzsche's
own relation to music—though still missing the connection between his views and
esoteric written communication—is Georges Lie'bert, Nietzsche et la musique (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1995).
120. Nietzsche, "NF, Mai-Juli 1885"; KGW 7/3:234-235- The passage then
concludes: "Preparation for becoming Masters of the Earth: The Legislators of the
Future. At least out of our children. Basic attention to marriages."
121. Oswald Spengler, "Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert" [1924], Reden und
Aufeatze, ed. Hildegard Kornhardt (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhand-
lung, 1938), pp. 110-124; here p. 112.
122. Schopenhauer, The World as Will und Representation, 1:257-259; Samtliche
Werke, 2:304.
123. Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music [1977], trans. Brian
Massumi, foreword by Fredric Jameson, afterword by Susan McClary (Minneap-
olis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 11.
124. Lou Reed, "Last Great American Whale," New York, © 1989 Sire/Warner
Bros. Records, Inc., 9-25829-4. Actually, Reed is referring to Americans—not Left-
Nietzschoids—when he sings: 'They say things are done for the majority / Don't be-
lieve half of what you see / and none ofwhat you hear / It's a lot like what my painter
friend Donald said to me: 'Stick a fork in their ass and turn them over, they're done.'"
125. U2 (Bono, The Edge, Adam Clayton, Larry Mullen Jr.), "Acrobat? Achtung
Baby, © 1991 Island Records, Ltd., 314-510-347-4.
126. Rousseau, Essay on the Origin ofLanguages, p. 15.
127. See again Althusser, "The Object of Capital," in Reading Capital, pp. 188-
189. q
128. See again Negri, The Savage Anomaly, p. 129. j*
129. There exist several versions of this text. See, for example, Derrick, "La ques- g
tion du style " in Nietzsche aujourd'hui? [ Colloque du Centre Culturel International g
de Cerisy-la-Salle, 1972], vol. 1: IntensiUs (Paris: Union Generate d'Editions 10/18, g
I
973), pp- 235-287; and a dual-language edition of the expanded text, Spurs: Nietz- *
sche's Styles/tperons: Les styles de Nietzsche [1978], introduction by Stefano Agosti, £
trans. Barbara Harlow, drawings by Francois Loubrieu (Chicago and London: The w
N
University of Chicago Press, 1979).
509
130. Derrida, Otobiqgraphies: I'enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nompropre
[1976; 1982] (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1984). In this text, Derrida puns briefly on
the relationship between corpus and corps (p. 41) • For a translation see The Ear ofihe
Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation (Texts and Discussions with Jacques Der-
rida), ed. Christie V. McDonald, trans. Avital Ronell and Peggy Kamuf (New York:
Schocken Books, 1985), pp. 5-6. Another French philosophical position explicitly
attacks the celebrations of the "death" of communism by articulating the notions of
"corpse" and "corps"; see especially the concluding pages of Badiou, D'un desastre
obscur.
131. See, for example, Mary Ann Doane, "Veiling over Desire: Close-ups of the
Woman" [1989], in Femtnes Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis (New
York and London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 44-75. For a critique specifically of Spurs,
though in several respects less incisive than Doane's in Femtnes Fatales, that struggles
rather helplessly to remind Derridians of the "historical context" in which Nietzsche
developed his ideas about women, and in particular of Nietzsche's "campaign
against the values of egalitarianism" see Adrian Del Caro, "The Pseudoman in
Nietzsche, or The Threat of the Neuter" New German Critique so (Spring/Summer
1990), 135-156; here 156. Del Caro, too, seems unaware of the homosexual compo-
nent of Nietzsche's thought and is certainly unaware of the problematic of esoteri-
cism. With regard to Derrida's "woman," Julia Kristeva has justly argued that "If the
feminine if," then "it exists only through its relation to sense and signification, as
their other, exceeder or transgressor—says itself, thinks (itself) and writes (itself) for
the two $excsn (Kristeva, "II n'y a pas de maitre a langage" Nouvette revue de psych-
analyze 20 [Fall 1979], 119-140; here 134; also see "Lafemme, ce n'est jamais ca," Tel
quel s9 [Fall 1974], 19-24)- For Kristeva, following in the wake of Lacan, "Woman
as such does not exist. . . .The problems of women have n o interest except inasmuch
as they bring to an impasse the most serious problems of our society: how to live not
only without God, but without man?" (Kristeva, About Chinese Women [1974L
trans. Anita Barrows [New York: Urizen Books and London: Boyars, 1977], p. 16).
Judith Butler in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York
and London: Routledge, 1990) directly problematizes the question of whether gay
as well as hetero-sexuality is primarily biological or sociocultural, though But-
ler does not know Nietzsche well. Donna Haraway suggests—also not with re-
*4- gard to Nietzsche— that the "refusal to become or to remain a 'gendered' man or
^ woman . . . is an eminently political insistence on emerging from the nightmare of
H the all-too-real, imaginary narrative of sex and race" (Haraway, "'Gender' for a
w Marxist Dictionary: The Sexual Politics of a Word" [1987], Simians, Cyborgs, and
<j Women, pp. 127-148; here p. 148).
O 132. See Adorno, "Aus Sils Maria," in Ohne Leitbild: Parva aesthetica (Frankfurt
^ am Main: SuhrkampVerlag, 1967), pp. 48-51. Adomo died three years later. For an
H account of Sils Maria as both historical travel goal for foreigners and as a complex
% allegory for Switzerland's own peculiar anxieties about modernity, see Iso Camartin,
510
Von Sils-Maria aus betrachtet: Ausblicke vom Dcub Europas (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1991).
133. Barthes, S/Z, pp. 44-45.
134. See the facsimile of Nietzsche's postcard to his sister, Elisabeth Forster-
Nietzsche, May 30,1891, in Volz, Nietzsche im Labyrinth seiner Krankheit, p. 458.
135. Herta D. Wong, "Plains Indian Names and 'the Autobiographical Act"'
[1992], inAutohiography & Postmodernism, ed. Kathleen Ashley, Leigh Gilmore, and
Gerald Peters (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), pp. 212-
239; here p. 237.
136. Derrida, "Interpreting Signatures," in Looking After Nietzsche, p. 16.
137. For an analysis of the question of "Derrida and politics" that is rather more
favorably disposed to Derrida and Nietzsche, see Dominick LaCapra, <cUp against
the Ear of the Other: Marx after Derrida" in Soundings in Critical Theory (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1989), pp iS5-i8r. LaCapra provides a critical elabora-
tion of Derrida's dictum that "il n*y a pas de hors-texte." Of course, there is nothing
particularly scandalous or even remarkable about Derrida's claim about "texts" if
one understands it to mean that they and their "readings" are always mediated
by some son of "context" and "pretext." The problem is that, as member of the
corps/e, "even" Derrida has misunderstood the project of Nietzschean political
thinking at its esoteric root.
138. See, for example, Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being
and Time" [1968], in Margins of Philosophy, pp. 29-67. Derrida here links the exo-
teric to Aristotle's discussion of "ordinary" or "vulgar" time, and follows Heidegger
to show that in effect there is no vulgar concept of time, in the—presumably more
esoteric—sense that T h e now is given simultaneously as that which is no longer and
as that which is not yet. It is what is not, and is not what it is" (pp. 63 and 39). But
this ontological problematic about time in relation to being does not require from
Derrida an inquiry into esotericism as a question of political rhetoric. Nor, more
surprisingly, does he deal with this question when he discusses the relation, in
Nietzsche, between philosophy and metaphor. Cf. Derrida, "White Metaphor: Met-
aphor in the Text of Philosophy," inMargins ofPhilosophy, esp. pp. 216-219.
139. Derrida,La verite1enpeinturt (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), p. 309."—Jem'in-
t&esserais plut6t a une correspondance secrete, evidement: eVidement secrete,
S5
cryptee dans lather de l'evidence et de la ve>ite\ trop evident parce que le chiffre en ce O
cas reste secret de n'etre pas cele\" This remark complicates the today standard j£
notion—especially prevalent, it seems, among Germanise and would-be German £
leftists, none of whom has produced anything remotely as interesting on Nietzsche £
as has Derrida—that Derridian deconstruction is totally uninterested in "ideology- ^
en
criticism" or in "exposing error" and as such is locked in its own self-perpetuating ^
problematic. But it complicates also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's more or less 4^
approving assertion that "Derrida is interested in how truth is constructed rather £
than in exposing error.. . . Deconstruction can only speak in the language of the <><
511
thing it criticizes. So as Derrida says, itfellsprey to its own critique, in a certain waWi
That makes it very different from ideology-critique . . . " (Spivak, The Post-QAoniqj$
Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, ed. Sarah Harasym [New "fork and London:!
Roudedge, 1990], p. 135). The real problem, as Spivak recognizes, hinges on who!
exactly is "constructing truth" or "crypting," and with what ideological motivations!
and consequences.
140. Donald Davidson, "Intending" [ 1974], in Essays on Actions and Events, corP
rected ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 83-102; here p. 102. For a relevant'
reflection on the connection between intention in literary semantics and criminal!
law see Annabel Patterson, "Intention," in Critical Termsfor Literary Study, ed. Frank!
Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 135-146.
141. Documents Relating to the Proceedings against William Prynne, ed. S. R. Gap
diner (New "fork: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1965: rep. of the original ed. of 1877); as^;
cited in Patterson, "Intention," p. 13s.
142. See Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduc-
tion (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), esp. pp. 15-29, 55-90, and 127-
177.
143. See Derrida, Otobiographies, pp. 101-102; Ear of the Other, p. 32. Deni-
da's methodological position is elaborated further in his uneventful "debate" with
Hans-Georg Gadamer about reading and understanding as modalities of "Will to
Power"—but the implications for reading Nietzsche remain basically unchanged,
the lack of insight into Nietzschean esotericism as operative in Derrida as it is in
Gadamer. See Derrida, "Guter Wille zur Macht (I): Drei Fragen an Hans-Georg
Gadamer" and "Guter Wille zur Macht (II): Die Unterschriften interpretieren
(Nietzsche/Heidegger)" both in Text und Interpretation: Deutsch-franzosische De-
batte mitBeitragen von J. Derrida, Ph. Forget, M. Frank, H.-G. Gadamer,]. Greisch and
F. Laruelle, ed. Philippe Forget (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1984), pp- 56-58
and 62-77, respectively. The latter text has been translated in Looking After Nietzsche.
144. See Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx" in Nietzsche [Colloque de Royau-
mont, 1964], esp. p. 192.
145. See Heidegger, Sein und Zeit [1927] (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1972),
PP- 34-39 [ch. 2, § 7 C]. For the later Heidegger, too, untruth is not at all privative,
o\
^ negative, or antithetical to truth; rather, concealment and untruth are of its very
^ essence. See, for example, "On the Essence of Truth" [1930, published 1943] and
N T h e End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" [1964], both in his Basic Writ-
pq ings: From <(Being and Time" (1927) to "The Task of Thinking" (1964), ed., with general
< introduction and introductions to each selection by David Farrell Krell, various
O translators (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), pp. 113-141 (here esp.
OT p. 132) and 373-392 (here esp. p. 391), respectively. For an account of the influ-
H ence of Heidegger and Nietzsche on Foucault as well as Derrida see Allan Megiil,
£ Prophets ofExtremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley, Los Angeles,
512 London: University of California Press, 1987).
146. Derrida, Mai dArchive: Une impression freudienne (Paris: Editions Galilee,
1995). In addition to the recalcitrant "archives" of the psyche encountered by psy-
choanalysis, Derrida has in mind the use and abuse of "facts'1 to prove or disprove
the existence of the Holocaust and, though not explicitly, the construction of "dos-
siers" to "prove" the alleged complicity of Heidegger and de Man with Nazism
(p. 1). His main primary texts include Yosef Hayim Yemshalmi, Freud's Moses,
Judaism Terminable and Interminable (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1991), and several works by Freud himself.
147. For a compendium documenting Nietzsche's precise and peculiar relation-
ship to "philology," see Eric Blondel, Nietzsche: The Body and Culture, Philosophy as
a Philological Genealogy [1986], trans. Sean Hand (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1991), even though Blondel symptomatically ignores the esoteric and ex-
plicitly political dimensions of Nietzsche's thinking and writing. See further Richard
Roos, "Regies pour une lecture philologique de Nietzsche" in Nietzsche aujoutd'bui?
vol. 2: Passion, pp. 283-318.
148. See, for example, Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, esp. pp. 108-112. Of
course, Derrida and Marcuse share a common pre-Nietzschean source for play in
Kant—as mediated for Marcuse by Friedrich Schiller and for Derrida by Nietzsche
himself, who had found his own sources in the pre-Socratics.
149. See Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustm; KGW 6/1:173-178 [part 2, "On
Deliverance"].
150. Friedrich Holderlin, Hyperion [1779], in Samtliche Werke, ed. Friedrich
Beifiner (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, i943fF), 3:152. Nietzsche had read this
passage in Hyperion no later than 1861. Holderlin's sources for this image include
Rousseau, Discourssur les sciences etles arts [1750], (Euvres completes, ed. B. Gagnebin
andM. Raymond (Paris: Biblioteque de la Pl&ade, 1964), 3:26.
151. Marx to Arnold Ruge, May 1843; letters from the Deutsch-Franzosischejahr-
bUcher, in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, 3:134.
152. Marx to Ruge, March 1843; lettersfromthcDeutsch-FranzosischeJahrbiicher,
in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, 3:133-134.
153. See, for example, Heidegger, Was heifit Denken? esp. pp. 30-47-
154. Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustm; KGW 6/1:174-175 [part 2, "On Deliv-
erance"!.
155. See Nietzsche, Ecce homo; KGW6/ 3:346 ["Thus Spoke Zarathustra," 8]. o
156. See Roman Jakobson, T w o Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic w
Disturbances," in Fundamentals oflanguage, ed. Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle H
(The Hague: Mouton, 1956), pp. 69-96. £|
157. Nietzsche, "Ueber Wahrheit und Luge im aussermoralischen Sinne" [ 1873 ]; g
KGW 3/2:375. £
158. Nietzsche, Vorrede [1886] to Menschliches, AUzumenschliches: Ein Buchfur £
jreie Geister. Zweiter Band; KGW 4/3:3-11; here 4 [vol. 2, preface 1 ]. ^
i59.Nietzsche,./4iw sprach Zarathustm; KGW 6/1:257-259 [part 3, "On the Old o
and New Tablets" 20]. 513
160. Ibid., 6/1:254 [part 3, "On the Old and New Tablets," 16].
161. Derrida, Otobiographies, p. 43; Ear of the Other, p. 6. This influential view of
Nietzsche's "names" is not all that original—nor need it be—as a look at Klossow-
ski's Nietzsche will show presently.
162. Derrida, "La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences hu-
maines" [ 1966], in Ilicnture et la difference, pp. 409-428; here p. 427. For a critical
survey of the significance of "play," see Mihai Spariosu, Dionysus Reborn: Play and the
Aesthetic Dimension in Modem Philosophical and Scientific Discourse (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989). In his thinking about Nietzsche, Spariosu acknowledges
the importance of the unpublished notebooks, but he tacks in the opposite direc-
tion. He uses "play" to deconstruct Nietzsche's published writings, whereas they
are the comparatively exoteric expression of the former; and he thinks Nietzsche's
"Dionysian play" is prerational yet postmodern and liberatory, whereas it is dis-
tinctly postrational and fascoid-liberal. But Spariosu is refreshingly candid about
the seriousness of play—at least for some children: "unashamed pleasure in power
and manipulation (e.g., in torturing, maiming, and killing insects and small ani-
mals; in getting their way with adults), immediacy of feeling, insouciance about
'moral' standards or the Other, lack of self-image or self-consciousness and therefore
also of guilt. . . " (p. 97). Whether all this can be applied mutatis mutandis to
Nietzsche's political philosophy and Ulocutionary strategies is an interesting ques-
tion, though as Spariosu reminds us constantly this problem with play is a lot older
and younger than just Nietzsche. Nonetheless, Spariosu himself cites Nietzsche as
saying, "One would make a fit little boy stare if one asked him: Would you like to
become virtuous?'—but he will open his eyes wide if asked: *Would you like to
become stronger than your friends?" (p. 97 n. 53).
163. Nietzsche, "NF, Juni-Juli 1883"; KGW7/V.&6.
164. See again Nietzsche,Ecce homo; KGW6/ 3:262 ["Why I Am so Wise" 1 ].
165. Derrida, Otobiographies, pp. 40-41; Ear ofthe Other, p. y.
166. Ibid., p. 63; Ear of the Other, p. 16. For a better sense of what the "real"
biographical pressures of his father, mother, and sister were on Nietzsche's Eece
Homo, see Mazzino Montinari's detailed account of the passages Elisabeth Forster-
Nietzsche censored, in "Ein neuer Abschnitt in Nietzsches Ecce homo" [1972],
Nietzsche Usen (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), pp. 120-168.
^ 167. Otobiogmphies, p. 69. Ear ofthe Other, p. 19. Henceforth this text will be cited
I in parentheses: first the English, then the French edition.
*©
168. For an early introduction to Derrida that makes effective use of the metaphor
pq of "parasitic inworming" philosophical texts both to paraphrase Derrida's project
«»j and to criticize it politically and ideologically, see D. C. Wood, "An Introduction to
0 Derrida [ 1979 ], in Radical Philosophy Reader, pp. 18-42.
w 169. On the variety of responses to Nietzsche that existed all during the Third
H Reich, see the uneven but important thesis of Hans Langreder, "Die Auseinander-
fc setzung mit Nietzsche im Dritten Reich" (Diss., University of Kiel, 1970). But see
514
also the earlier, published work of Konrad Algermissen, Nietzsche und das Dritte
Rekh (Celle: Verlag Joseph Giesel, 1947), even though Algermissen's own position
was badly compromised by opportunism. At the inception of the Third Reich in
1933, Algermissen had written an extreme anticommunist book that was very much
in the Nazified mood of the times. For a more recent and scholarly approach to
the general conditions of philosophical discourse in the Third Reich see Thomas
Laugstien, PhUosophieverhaltnisse im deutschen Faschismus (Hamburg: Argument-
Sonderband, 1990). On Italian fascism and Nietzsche more specifically, see Taureck,
Nietzsche undderFaschismus. See further Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany,
esp. ch. 8: "Nietzsche in the Third Reich" and ch. 9: "National Socialism and the
Nietzsche Debate." But the latter's own main thesis in this regard is fundamentally
mistaken. When Aschheim finally comes to say what the relative degree of debate
about Nietzsche among Nazis might mean, he stresses that "these scholarly presen-
tations, the head-on criticisms, oppositional polemics, Aesopian deployments, in-
deed, the very employment of Nietzsche as a foil for coming to terms with national
socialism demonstrate the normative nature and the centrality ofthat thinker as definitive
of the Nazi order." This is idealist nonsense on at least two levels: not only because no
body of mere "thinking" could ever be "normative" "central," or "definitive" most
especially not for an activist movement such as Nazism, but also because what the
"debate" about Nietzsche in the Third Reich illustrates has far less to do with
Nietzsche ultimately than with the operational complexity of hegemony. "Even"
national socialism required—and requires—levels of consent posing as dissent. This
is certainly not to deny the obvious, as put hesitantly by Aschheim: "in some mean-
ingful way nazism was, in part, aframeof mind and . . . ideas (in their most general
sense) were both central to its disposition as a historical project and to its subse-
quent comprehension" (p. 320; emphasis added), though how something that is
"most general" can also be "central" demands clarification.
170. See, e.g., Derrida, "Heidegger, the Philosophers' Hell" [interview with Di-
dier Eribon, 1987], Points . Interviews, 1974-1994, ed. Elisabeth Weber, trans.
Peggy Kamufetal. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 181-190; here
p. 186. Derrida is quite right that his many encounters with Heidegger over the
years have always served to deconstruct from within certain gestures of closure in
Heidegger's texts. Nonetheless, it is only comparatively recently, under the external
pressure of disclosures by historians about the full extent and depth of Heidegger's o
commitment to national socialism, that the specifically political implications both of w
Heidegger's closure and of Demda's deconstruction have become clear. H
171. Foucault, "Prison Talk" ["Lesjeux dupouvoir" interview with J.-J. Brochier, ^
1975 ], Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin ©
Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 37-55; "
here pp. 53-54. ^
17Z. Derrida, "Istrice 2: Ick biinn all hier" [interview with Maurizio Ferraris, £
1990], in Points . -,pp. 300-326; here 321. "^
515
173- Ronell, The Telephone Book: Technology-Schizophrenia-Electric Speech (Lincoln
and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989)> p. 135.
174. "Art Damage: The Manifesto" [editorial], Mondo 2000 6 (1992), 8-9.
175. See Pierre Klossowski, "Nietzsche, le polythewme et la parodie" [1957], Un
sifuneste desir (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), pp. 185-228.
176. Kierkegaard, "A First and Last Explanation" Concluding Unscientific Post-
script, p. 627.
177. Adomo, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic [1933], trans., ed., and
with a foreword by Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1989), pp. 11-12.
178. See, for example, Nietzsche, Der Fall Wagner: Ein Musikanten-Problem
[ 1888]; KGW 6/ 3:3-4 [foreword], and Ecce homo; KGW 6/ 3:316-321 ["Why I
Write Such Good Books: The Untimely Meditations"].
179. Whether Klossowski thought of himself as a man of the Left, the Right, or
something else is an ultimately related question but not particularly relevant—just
as it was also not with regard to Bataille. Both are part of the corps/e.
180. For this reason the comparison of Strauss and Derrida as "Nietzscheans" by
Levine is problematic in Nietzsche and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities.
181. De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, p. 188.
182. Baudrillard, Simulations, pp. 88-89.
183. Nietzsche, Gbtzen-Ddmmerung; KGW 6/3:59 ["Maxims and Arrows," aph-
orism 38].
184. See Foucault, "What Is an Author?" [1969], Language, Counter-Memory,
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. and with an introduction by Donald F.
Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1977), pp. 113-138.
185. For a recent attempt—too innocent of issues relating to political ideology—
to describe the "ludic" quality of poststructuralist and posthermeneutic responses to
Nietzsche, and to mediate between them, see Alan D. Schrift, Nietzsche and the
Problem ofInterpretation: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction (New York and
London: Roudedge, 1990).
186. Klossowski, "Nietzsche, le polyrhe'isme et la parodie," in Un sifuneste desir,
p. 193. See further, Nietzsche, Gbtzen-Ddmmerung; KGW 6/3:74-75 ["How the
R True World' Finally Became a Fable"].
l 187. See Nietzsche, Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen, Zweites Stuck: Vom Nutzen und
^ Nachtheil der Historiejur das Leben [1874]; KGW 3/1:239-330. Too, this essay
w ought to be read alongside the other three essays in this collection. "On the Use and
<j Disadvantage of History for Life" deals with the historical and historiographical
O aspects of a tightly integratedfourfoldproblematic, the other sides of which are the
^ mechanisms whereby high philosophy can be incorporated (Nietzsche's own rela-
te
H tion to his master in "Schopenhauer as Educator"); the criticism of contemporary
53 mass and popular culture ("David Friedrich Strauss as Confessor and Writer"); and
516
the possibilities and risks of an opposing cultural politics ("Richard Wagner in
Bayreuth").
188. Nietzsche's nearly total lack of fun in any common sense of the term was
recalled by Cosima Wagner—who was at least as deficient on this score—in a letter
to Richard Strauss written after Nietzsche's death. See Cosima Wagner to Richard
Strauss, letter of November 3,1901, in Cosima Wagner-Richard Strauss: Ein Brief -
wechsel, ed. Franz Tenner, with Gabrieile Straus (Tutzing: H . Schneider, 1978),
p. 245.
189. Which is to recall Ireland's important work o n "comedy." In terms of per-
sonal lifestyle—excepting perhaps his occasional sexual exploits—Nietzsche was
never himself a "Nietzschean" in common parlance: namely, an "immoralist" or a
"confidence man" in the antibourgeois, antiworking-class, and quasi-aristocratic
lifestyles of, say, Andre1 Gides' MicheL, Thomas Mann's Felix Krull, or a Paul de Man.
The fact that G o d is dead, and therefore all is permitted, did not mean for Nietzsche
that all should be done. H e was meticulous in maintaining his bourgeois cover, and
did not leave, say, a trail of unpaid bills and distraught family and friends behind
him. For the kind of master revolutionary Nietzsche was, the transformation of
humankind is far too serious a matter to be compromised by any one man's foibles
or "humors," including his own.
190. This is true, for example, of the account of both Klossowski and Nietzsche-
anism offered in the otherwise informative book by Vincent Descombes, Modern
French Philosophy [Le mime et I'autre, 1979], trans. L. Scott-Fox and j . M . Harding
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). O n Klossowski and Nietzsche,
and for similarly blinded remarks about their relationship, see further Deleuze, The
Logic of Sense [1969], trans. Mark Lester, with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V.
Boundas ( N e w York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 280-301.
191. The distinction between "tough," "medium," and "gende" Nietzscheans—all
three of which did in fact represent significant strains of his own thought—goes
back to Crane Brinton, Nietzsche [1941] (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965),
esp. pp. 184-199, 221, and 231. Still readable after all these years, this book—writ-
ten as part of the fight against Nazism—would have to be theoretically grounded
and empirically updated, however, to account for many subsequent and more com-
plex incarnations of Nietzsche's corps/e.
192. Klossowski, "Le Marquis de Sade et la Revolution" [1939], i n i > Cohtye de %
Sociologie, pp. 369-393; here pp. 393 and 380. D e Sade's seminal thesis had already &
provided the basis for Bataille's earlier essay "The Sacred Conspiracy" [1936], in H
O
Visions ofExcess, pp. 178-81. CEuwes completes 1 -.44.2-446. ^
193. Horkheimer and A d o m o , "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality," Dialec- £
w
tic ofEnlightenment, pp. 8 r -119; here p. 119. »
194. Klossowski, "Circulus vitiosus" in Nietzsche aujount'hui? vol. 1: Intensity, ^j
pp. 91-103; here p. 94. s>
195. A basic problem for the communist tradition with regard to both anar- <*>
517
chism—of the Left—and libertarianism—of the Right—is that both movements
which have many important criticisms of liberal democracy, attempt to "smash the
State" immediately or prematurely, without the prerequisite social, political, cul-
tural, and economic transformation, and so it is that they can be relatively easily
contained by capitalism and/or totalitarian oppression.
196. Klossowski, Nietzsche et k certk vicieux [1969], rev. and corrected ed. (Paris:
Mercure de France, 1975), p- 47-
197. Klossowski, "Sur quelques themes fondamentaux de la 'Gaya Scienza* de
Nietzsche" [1956], in XJnsifunestedisir, pp. 7-36; here p. 35.
198. See Klossowski, Nietzsche et k certk vicieux, pp. 37-88.
199- Ibid., p. 81.
200. See, for example, Klossowski, Nietzsche etk cerck vicieux, esp. pp. 363-364—
his conclusion.
201. Ibid., pp. 177-249.
202. Ibid., pp. 179-193.
203. Ibid., p. 58.
204. See Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral; KGW6/2:329-331 [part 2, apho-
rism 12]. The significance of placing key arguments in the exact centers of books—as
opposed to the more obvious beginning or ending—was a major interpretive obses-
sion and rhetorical practice of Leo Strauss. See John Finnis, "Aristotle, Aquinas, and
Moral Absolutes* Catholua 1 2 ( 1 9 9 0 ) , 7 - 1 5 . O n this and on the significance of the
central position of aphorism 12 in On the Genealogy of Morals, see Levine, Nietzsche
and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities, pp. 162-163,261 n. 8, and 263 n. 61.
205. Frank, WhatlsNeostructuralismfp. 181.
206. Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time [1988], trans. Geoffrey Ben-
nington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 2 8 -
29; emphases added.
207. See Althusser, "The Transformation of Philosophy? inPhilosophyandthe Spon-
taneous Philosophy ofthe Scientists, pp. 250-251. Althusser has in mind his own former
student Foucault but especially the tatter's students, the so-called "New Philoso-
phers."
208. Cantor, "Leo Strauss and Contemporary Hermeneutics" in Leo Strauses
Thought: Toward a Critical Engagement, pp. 272-273. But Cantor distincdy fails to
00 apply this principle t o his own reading of Nietzsche; indeed, he whitewashes pre-
' cisely aphorism 12 in On the Genealogy of Morals. See Cantor, "Friedrich Nietzsche:
N" The Use and Abuse of Metaphor," mMetaphor: Problems and Perspectives (Brighton,
w Sussex: The Harvester Press; Adantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982),
•< pp. 71-889; here esp. pp. 76-78.
Q 209. William Congreve, The Doubk Dealer [ 169 3 ] , act V, scene 1.
w 210. Emily Dickinson, 'Tell all the Truth . . . " [c. 1868, first published 1945], in
w
H Final Harvest: Emily Dickinson's Poems, ed. Thomas H . Johnson (Boston and To-
55 ronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), pp. 248-249; here p. 248.
518
211. See £izek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 197; although £izek's gloss on the
joke here is surprisingly ad hominem: "telling the truth represented a breach of the
implicit code of deception which ruled their [the two interlocutors'] relationship:
when one of them was going to Cracow, he was supposed to tell the lie that his
destination was Lemberg, and vice versa."
212. See, notably, Alexander Tille, Von Darwin bis Nietzsche: Ein Buch Entwick-
lungsethik (Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1895), p. 235.
213. See, for example, Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, ch. 9: 'True Illusions:
Friedrich Nietzsche."
214. Eagleton, Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism (London:
Verso, 1981), p. 66; see also pp. 108 and 101. As he acknowledges, Eagleton's
argument here is heavily influenced by Helmut Pfotenhauer, "Benjamin und Nietz-
sche," in Walter Benjamin im Kontext, ed. Burkhardt Lindner (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), pp. roo-126.
215. Andrew Benjamin, Art, Mimesis and the Avant-Garde: Aspects ofa Philosophy of
Difference (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 29.
216. See Nietzsche, Zur Geneakgie derMoral; KGW6/2:420-423 [part 3, apho-
rism 25].
217. Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, p. 178.
218. Hart Crane, "The Case Against Nietzsche" The Pagan 2/3 (April/May
1918), 34-35; here 35.
219. Rosen, "Nietzsche's Revolution," in The Ancients and theModerns, p. 199-
220. Rolf Busch, Imperialistische und faschistische Kleist-Rezeption i8po-i?4s: Eine
Untersuchung (Frankfurt am Main: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 1974), p- 10; em-
phasis added.
221. De Man, 'The Literature of Nihilism" [ 1966], in Critical Writings, 1QS3-1078,
ed. Lindsay Waters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 161-
170; here p. 163; emphasis added.
222. See Michael Sprinker, Imaginary Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the The-
ory of Historical Materialism (London and New York: Verso, 1987), esp. pp. 237-
266; and Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, esp.
pp. 219-259. See further T>emdz,Me'moires: ForPauldeMan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986). Christopher Norris has noted similarities in the structure of
Derrida's apologias for de Man inMemoires and for Heidegger in De Pesprit: Heideg- g
ger et la question (Paris: Galilee, 1987) —though Norris's own agenda is far more »
uncritically apologetic. Cf. Norris, Paul deMan: Deconstruction and the Critique of _j
Aesthetic Ideology (New York and London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 193-198. ^
223. Reproduced mMarkTansey: Visions and Revisions, p. 120. O
224. See Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, T h e Adventure of the Final Problem" [ r 89 3 ], »
in The Illustrated Sherlock Holmes, illustrated by Sidney Paget, with additional illus- »
nations by George Hutchinson and Frank H. Townsend (New York: Clarkson N. ^
Potter, Inc., 1984), pp. 314-317; here p. 314. ^
519
225. O n Nietzsche's influence on Conan Doyle, see again the impressionistic and
speculative but interesting account in Rosenberg, Naked Is the Best Disguise: The
Death & Resurrection of Sherlock Holmes, esp. pp. 38,42,60, and 64-65.
226. Conan Doyle, "The Adventure of the Final Problem" pp. 316-317.
227. Nietzsche, " N F Sommer-Herbst 1884"; KGW 7/2:265. "Carcass, you're
trembling? You'd tremble a lot more if you knew where I'm taking you" is a phrase
attributed to the dominant field commander of the seventeenth century, Henri de la
Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne (1611-1675), later buried in the Invalides by
Napoleonic decree. Turenne's bon mot was a favorite of Nietzsche's. H e used it as
the epigraph of the new fifth book, "We Fearless Ones," of The Gay Science (1882)
when the latter was reissued in 1887, after having also considered it as the epigraph
for Beyond Good and Evil (1886). See Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886";
KGW 8/i-M-
228. Edgar Allan Poe, "The Man of the Crowd" [1840; 1845], in The Complete
Works ofEdgar Allan Poe, ed. James A. Harrison, with textual notes by R. A. Stewart
(New York: Crowell, 1902), 4:134-145; here 134.
229. Naked Lunch (David Cronenberg, Canada, 1991).
230. Greil Marcus: Lipstick Traces: A Secret History of the Twentieth Century (Lon-
don: Seeker & Warburg, 1989), p. 442. The slogan was first exploited in film culture
by Performance (Donald Cammell and Nicholas Roeg, UK, 1970), forming its the-
matic and formal core. Two types of "performer"—rock musical and underworld
(the term is British slang for "enforcer" or "hit man") — exchange identities and one
is murdered by the other. James Fox as Chas Devlin is paired with The Rolling
Stones' Mick Jagger as Turner, who reads the slogan aloud from a book about the
original assassins.
231. See Burroughs, Cities of the Red Night, pp. xviii and 158-159, and The Place of
Dead Roads (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1983), pp. 169-173.
232. Scanners (Cronenberg, Canada, 1981).
233. See Debord, Ingirwm imus nocte et consumimur igni [1978], in his (Euvres
cinematographiques completes: 1952-1978 (Paris: Champ Libre, 1978), pp. 224-225.
O n the historical assassins, see Bernard Lewis's standard account, The Assassins: A
Radical Sect in Islam [1967], 2 d e d . (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) —
the likely source for both Burroughs and Debord.
ov 234. See Burroughs, Cities of the Red Night, pp. xi-xv, and The Place ofDead Roads,
^ pp. 171 and 173. For Burroughs's reflection on himself"as Hassan i Sabbah see the
N final volume of the trilogy, The Western Lands (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987))
w pp. 191-210.
«j 235. See Nietzsche, "NF, Sommer-Herbst 1884"; KGW7/2:153. Nietzsche also
O puts the alternative phrase in scare quotes: "'Everything is false! Everything is
„, permitted"' ("NF, Fruhjahr 1884"; KGW 7/2:142). It is common to ignore the
w
H quotation marks, however; compare, for example, Rosen, "Nietzsche's Revolution,"
% in The Ancients and the Moderns, p. 198.
520
236. Lacan, "Aggressively in Psychoanalysis" [ 1948], in Edits: A Selection, trans.
Alan Sheridan (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977), pp. 8-
29; here p. 22.
237.Nietzsche,"NF,Friihjahri888";JK:GPr8/3:250.
238. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1885-Herbst 18S6"; KGWS/1:98.
239- Lucretius, De rerttm not., IV:476; emphasis added.
240. "The truth of history cannot be read in its manifest discourse, because the
text of history is not a text in which a voice (the Logos) speaks, but the inaudible
and illegible notation of the effects of a structure of structures" (Althusser, "From
Capital to Marx's Philosophy," in Reading Capital, p. 17). To repeat, it is certainly
not the bookNietzsche's Corps/e that wishes to displace "history" by "Nietzsche" but
rather Nietzsche/anism itself, Nietzsche's corps/e itself.
241. Nietzsche, Diejrohliche Wissenchaft [2d ed. 1887]; KGW $ /z:$ 15 [aphorism
381].
242. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst-Friihjahr 1886"; KGW 8/1:15.
243. See Lacan, The FourFundamental Concepts ofPsycho-Analysis, w> 79-90, and
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1059-1960, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: W. W. Nor-
ton, 1992), p. 152.
244. £izek, The Metastases ofEnjoyment, p. 92.
245. The following model of "textuality" and "legibility" is derived from the visual
theory developed by Jean-Louis Schefer, Scenogmphie d'ttn tableau (Paris: Editions
duSeuil, 1969).
246. Althusser, "From Capital to Marx's Philosophy," in Reading Capital, p. 21.
247. Nietzsche, "NF, November 1887-Marz 1888"; JCCPF 8/2:433.
248. Nietzsche, "NF, Fruhjahr 1884"; KGW 7/2:71; emphasis added.
249. Ibid., 7/2:70.
250. Nietzsche, "NF, November 1882-Febniar 1883"; KGW 7/1:169.
251.Ibid., 7/1:187.
252. For a discussion of Nietzsche's relationship to Wagner and Schopenhauer,
see Libert, Nietzsche etlamusique, pp. 185-211, ch. 9: utCaveMusicam!>n In Kof-
man's terminology, Schopenhauer and Wagner were two crucial "metaphors" for
Nietzsche, in the complex sense of allowing him to "transport" himself backward
and forward in time so as to become, in effect, himself always as if for the first time.
See Kofman, Explosion II, pp. 131 and 158-174. O
253. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1883"; KGW 7/1:523. "
254. For how euthanasia was to be incorporated, see, for example, his aphorism H
"Heilige Grausamkeir" (holy brutality) in The Gay Science, in which the killing of g
deformed infants is implied. See Die frbhliche Wissenschaft [ist ed. 1882]; KGW O
5 / 2:106 [ aphorism 73 ]. More controversially, this recommendation is expanded in *
On the Genealogy of Morals to include "decadents." See Zur Geneahgie der Moral; £
KGW6/2:383-385 [part 3, aphorism 13]. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is peppered with fc>
more or less implicit allusions to involuntary euthanasia and voluntary death. <*
521
255. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1883"; KGW 7/^5^5-
256. Nietzsche, "NF, November 1882-Februar 1883"; KGW 7/1 =214. This prin-
ciple was also incorporated into Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
257. See, for example, Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality [1841], trans.
E. F. J. Payne (Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1965), p. 96.
258. Nietzsche, "NF, Friihjahr 1884"; KGW 7/2:133-
259. Ibid., 7/2:85.
260. See Albert Camus, The Fail [1956], trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vin-
tage Books, 1963).
261. Arthur Kroker, The Possessed Individual: Technology and the Trench Postmodern
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 8. Actually, this notion is itself a bit
"romantic." A little Facel-Vega coupe split completely in two against a plane tree
near Villeblevin on January 4, i960 around 2:15 P.M. The driver, Michel Gallimard,
along with two unnamed women had been blown out of the car on impact. Wedged
between the back seats of the wreckage was Camus's corpse. But accounts of the
remaining contents of the car vary, including about the books.
262. Toni Morrison, Song of Solomon (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), p-155.
263. In Camus's major philosophical analysis of Nietzsche—the "Nietzsche and
Nihilism" section oiUhomme revoke1 (the rebel, 1951)—he does recognize that
Nietzsche was a "strategic" thinker—positive as diagnostician, dangerous for his
prescriptions—yet fails to ask how this strategy might have been worked out at the
level of Nietzsche's language. This failure helps explain the basic contradictions in
Camus's analysis of Nietzsche here: for example, on the one hand Camus says
Nietzsche wrote only for the future, "never . . . except in terms of an apocalypse to
come"; on the other "the fundamental difference" between Nietzsche and Marx is
"that Nietzsche, in awaiting the superman, proposed to assent to what exists and
Marx to what is to come." Camus then concludes his analysis by situating his "rebel"
between and beyond anarchism, Nietzscheanism, and Marxist-Leninism. "Placed in
the crucible of Nietzschean philosophy, rebellion, in the intoxication of freedom,
ends in biological or historical Caesarism. The absolute negative had driven [Max]
Stimer to deify crime simultaneously with the individual. But the absolute affir-
mation leads to universalizing murder and mankind simultaneously. Marxism-
t^
<* Leninism has really accepted the burden of Nietzsche's freewill by means of ignoring
^ several Nietzschean virtues. The great rebel thus creates with his own hands, and for
N his own imprisonment, the implacable reign of necessity. Once he has escaped from
pq God's prison, hisfirstcare was to construct the prison of history and of reason, thus
< putting the finishing touch to the camouflage and consecration of the nihilism
O whose conquest he claimed" (Camus, The Rebel: An Essay onMan in Revolt [1951],
OT with a foreword by Sir Herbert Read, trans. Anthony Bower [New York: Vintage
w
H Books, 1956 ], pp. 65-80; here pp. 65-66 and 79-80). Thus, in contemporary terms,
55 Camus's position reveals itself, ironically, as dose to current German neoconserva-
522
tive and neoliberal interpretations of Nietzsche and nihilism: for example, Nolte,
Bohrer et al.
264. Camus, The Fall, p. 28.
265. Rosen, "Nietzsche's Revolution," in The Ancients and the Moderns, pp. 190-
192.
266. See Nietzsche, "Der griechische Staat" [1872]; KGW 3/2:258-271; here
261,270, and 271.
267. See Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity; and John Rawls, Political Liber-
alism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
268. Wilhelm von Humboldt, Gesammelu Schrifien, ed. Royal Prussian Academy
of Sciences (Berlin: B. Behr, 1903-1936), 1:271.
269- See M. I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modem Ideology [1979] (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1983), p. 57. Further compare and contrast the positions taken on
Greek slavery and high culture by the Gottingen historian Arnold Heeren and by
Frederick Engels, as cited by Finley on p. 12. For analysis of classist, racist, and
politically conservative aspects of Humboldtian "Hellenomania," see Martin Bernal,
Black Athena: The AJroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, vol. 1: The Fabrication of
Ancient Greece 178S-19SS (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987), csp-
pp. 281-316.
270. Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the
Power ofthe People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. ^7-
271. See Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 73-85,187-199, and 297-
299.
272. Ibid., p. 293.
273. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, p. 83.
274. Nietzsche, "DarsteJIung der antiken Rhetorik'7"E>escription 0 f Ancient
Rhetoric" [1872-1873], in Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language [dual-
language ed. on facing pages], ed. and trans, with a critical introduction by San-
der L. Gilman, Carole Blair, David J. Parent (New York and Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1989), pp. 2-206; here pp. 2 and 3.
275. See Nietzsche, "NF, Anfang ifyi"; KGW 3/3:347-363; here esp. 363. If a
recent anthology on the topic "Nietzsche and women" reaches any consensus, and
whatever other interest the collected essays may have, it is that one need not be
concerned with Nietzsche's unpublished work and that the entire topic can remain Q
of thematic interest only; see Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory. w
276. Nietzsche, "NF, Sommer-Herbst 1882"; KGW 7/1:105; emphasis added. H
277. See Nietzsche Archive Manuscript M I I 1 3 [ 18], and "NF, Herbst 1880"; >^
KGW 5/T-.517. g
278. Nietzsche, "NF, Juli-August 1882"; KGW 7/1:28.
n
279. Aristode, Generation of Animals, trans. A. L. Peck (Cambridge: Harvard ^
University Press/Loeb Classical Library, 1943), 1:103, 109, and 113. See further
Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex [1949], trans. H. M. Parshley (New York:
523
Bantam Books, 1961), esp. p p . 1-33: ' T h e Data o f Biology"; a n d Not in God's
Image: Women in History from the Greeks to the Victorians, ed. Julia O T a o l a i n and
Lauro Martines (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973), esp. pp. 117-126:
"Biological and Medical Views."
280. Marie H e c h t , "Friedrich Nietzsches Einflufi auf die Frauen," Die Ftnu 6:8
( 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 8 9 ) , 4 8 6 - 4 9 1 ; here 491; emphasis added.
281. Althusser, "Freud and Lacan" in Lenin and Philosophy, p. 200. Althusser's
controversial application of the notion of epistemological break to Marx and Marx-
ism was first developed in "'On the Young Marx'" (i960), in For Marx; it was
subsequently criticized and modified by Althusser himself in his "Reply to John
Lewis" (1972-1973) and "Elements of Self-Criticism" (1974), both in Essays in Self-
Criticism.
282. Nietzsche, "NF, Fruhjahr-Herbst iS$xn;KGWs/2:42s; see further 381 and
388-390; and "NF, Herbst 1883*; KGW7/1:553 and 635-636.
283. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, p. 332.
284. Gramsci, Selectionsfrom Cultural Writings, p. 211; see further the section here
entitled "Father Bresciani's P r o g e n y " pp. 301-341, including the editors' remarks,
p p . 2 9 8 - 3 0 1 . "Brescianism"—from the Jesuit priest and novelist A n t o n i o Bresci-
ani—was o n e of Gramsci's c o d e terms for "Jesuitism."
285. Nietzsche, Werke (ed. Koegel), 12:325. "Zarathustra glucklichdaruber, dass
der K a m p f der Stande voriiber ist, u n d jetzt endlich Zeit ist fur seine R a n g o r d n u n g
der Individuen. Hass auf das demokratische Nivellirungs-System ist n u r im Vor-
dergrund: eigentUch ist er sehr froh, dass dies so weit ist. N u n kann er seine Aufgabe
losen.—"
286. On the inevitability of "socialism" for Nietzsche and related matters, see
"NF, Ende 1880"; KGW 5/1:689; "NF, Friihjahr 1880 bis Friihjahr 1881"; KGW
5/K753 and 764; "NF, Fruhjahr-Herbst 1881"; KGW 5/2:343; "NF, Herbst
i88iM;JCGTF5/2:489.
287. For the classic account of the alleged ignorance of the economy on the part of
German intellectuals—a thesis that ought not be applied to Nietzsche—see Fritz
Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community,
1800-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
288. See Richard Wagner, "Die Revolution" [the revolution, 1849] and "Kunst-
00
o lertum der Zukuhft: Zum Prinzip des Kommunismus" [artistry of the future: on the
J^ principle of communism, 1849], both in Ausgewahlte Schrifien, ed. Dietrich Mack,
2> with an introduction by Ernst Bloch (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1974),
« pp. 114-122 and 123-137, respectively.
< 289. See Fiori,^4«/»n«> Gramsci, p. 63.
O 290. See H e n r y Charles Carey, Lehrbuch der Volkswirthschaft und Soziahnssenschaft
eg [Principles of Political Economy, 1837], authorized German ed., trans. Karl Adler, 2d,
w
H rev. ed. (Vienna: BraumuUer, 1870); and Nietzsche's letter to his editor Ernst
Z Schmeitzner, June 8,1879; KGB 2/5:417-418.
524
29i. See Nietzsche to Heinrich Koselitz [Peter Gast], July 8,i%&i;KGB 3/1:99-
100.
292. See Nietzsche to Koselitz, May 20,1887; KGB 3/ 5:78-80.
293. See Nietzsche, "NF, Juli 1879"; 2 ^ ^ 4 / 3 : 4 4 5 .
294. Compare the published remarks in Menschliches, AUzumenschliches II: Der
Wanderer und sein Schatten [Human, All-Too-Human, part 2: The Wanderer and
His Shadow, 1880]; 2CGIT4/3:i93-i95 [aphorism 22] to the draft cited in the
editors' notes, KSA 14:186, where the indebtedness to Carey is divulged.
295. See Marx, Capital, 1:533,730, and 749, and esp. Grundrisse: Foundations ofthe
Critique of Political Economy [1857-1858, 6rst published 1939], trans, with a fore-
word by Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 886. On the impor-
tance of Marx's critique of the "harmonizers" Bastiat and Carey for the development
of his own thought, see the incisive discussion by Negri, Atone BeyondMarx, pp. 53-
SS>
296. See Charles Baudelaire, (Euvres posthumes et correspondances inddites, pre'cedees
d'uneetude biographique, ed. Eugene Crepit (Paris: Maison Quantin, 1887); and, for
Nietzsche's extensive, complex gloss on this text when he discovered it in early 1888,
see"NF, November 1887-Marz 1888"; esp. manuscript pages 11 [160]-11 [234];
KGW 8/2:317-334. For a preliminary description of Nietzsche's reading of Bau-
delaire's (Euvres posthumes see Karl Pestalozzi, <cNietzsches Baudelaire-Rezeption,"
Nietzscbe-Studien 7 (1978), 158-178; esp. 166-171.
297. Unfortunately, the most systematic work to date on the nexus in intellectual
history and literature between money, language, and thought deals with Nietzsche
only in passing, and with Baudelaire not at all. See Mark ShelL, Money, Language,
and Thought: Literary and Philosophic Economiesfromthe Medieval to the Modern Era
[1982] (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993)? esp*
pp. 175-176.
298. See Christine Buci-Glucksmann, La raison baroque, de Baudelaire a Benjamin
(Paris: Editions Galilee, 1984), esp. part 2: "L'utopie du feminin."
299. See Walter Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, 1:301-489 [section J: "Baude-
laire"] and 612-642 [section O: "Prostitution, Spiel"]; and Althusser to Fernanda
Navarro, October 27,1984; in Sur la philosophic, p. 117.
300. See James Jay Slawney, 'The Phantom of Reason: Oneirocriticism from
Baudelaire to Benjamin" (Diss., Cornell University, i99i),esp. 24-38. O
301. See Gautier's introduction to Charles Baudelaire, Lesjkun du mal, pricidees w
d'une notice par Theophile Gautier, nouvelle edition (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1882), H
pp. 1-75; esp. pp. 48-50. Gautier (1811-1872) was himself an important poetic ^
craftsman and precursor of the Parnassian school, and Baudelaire dedicated the first Q
edition oiLesfieurs du mal to him. His presentation of Baudelaire's life and works *=
was positive albeit apologetic and generally would have reinforced Nietzsche's ini- o
tial impression of both writers, alongside Poe—mentioned by Gautier—as major ^»
modern decadents. This was the copy of Baudelaire's magnum opus read by Nietz- °
525
sche in Nizza, and is still in his library in Weimar. Nietzsche's command of French
was insufficient to follow the complexities of Baudelaire's poetry beyond a certain
thematic point—marked with red crayon in a few places, especially concluding
stanzas—but he read Gautier with care.
302. Nietzsche, "NF, November 1887-Marz 1888"; KGW 8/2:325; ellipsis in
original.
303. Compare, for example, the paradigmatic disagreements about Nietzsche and
Marxism between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojeve, as expressed in their private
correspondence and in Strauss's analysis of Xenophone's Hiero. See Strauss, On Tyr-
anny, rev. and expanded ed., including the Strauss-Kojeve correspondence, ed. Vic-
tor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 207-
212 and 238-239.
304. Nietzsche, "NF, November 1887-Marz i888";-KGW8/2:333-334.
305. Most notably by Staten, Nietzsche's Voice, pp. 8-39 and 77-85- On "slave
morality" as the irreducible base of Nietzsche's "social philosophy" see Karl Brose,
Sklavenmoral: Nietzsches Soziatphilosophie (BonnrBouvierVerlag, 1990).
306. Staten, Nietzche's Voice, p. 85.
307. Nietzsche, "NF, Fruhjahr 1884"; KGW7/2:76-
308. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst i887";iCGJF8/2:i4.
309. Spinoza, The Ethics, p. 172 [part 3, prop. 59, note], translation modified, and
A Theolqgico-Political Treatise, p. 203 [ch. 16]. According to Spinoza, people who
"are governed by reason—that is, who seek what is useful to them in accordance
with reason—desire for themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the
rest of mankind, and consequently, are just, faithful, and honorable in their con-
duct" {TheEthics, p. 202 [part4,prop. 18,note]).
310. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program [early May, 1875], inTheMarx-Engels
Reader, 2d ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
1978), pp. 525-541; here pp. 529-531-
311. See Nietzsche's letters for May, 1875; KGB 2/5:44-60.
312. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1883"; KGW 7/1:533.
313. Lampert,Nietzsche and Modern Times, p. 293. The author bases this assertion,
repeated several times, on a particularly limited selection and interpretation of
Nietzsche's remarks about Jesuitism in his published and, to a lesser extent, tin-
's published writings.
T 314. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1883"; KGW 71 \\s\i.
m 315. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886"; KGW 8/1:116-117; emphasis
w added. "Das Kunstwerk, wo es ohne Kiinstler erscheint z.B. als Leib, als Organiza-
< tion (preufiisches Offiziercorps, Jesuitenorden). Inwiefem der Kiinsder eine Vor-
O stufe ist. Was bedeutet das 'subject' ?"
at 316. Nietzsche, "NF, Fruhjahr 1884"; KGW7/*:Si-
w
H 317. Nietzsche, "NF, Sommer-Herbst"; KGW 7/2:295. As always, the long
E dashes in the KGW and KGB indicate that the text is illegible to the editors.
526
3i8. Nietzsche, "NF, Sommer-Herbst"; KGW 7 / 2:23 9.
319. See Stocker, "Zur Reform der sexuellen Ethik," editorial statement of the
inzu^ir^ issnc ofMuttenchutz:Zeitschnfizur Reform dersexuellenEtbik 1:1 (1905).
See further Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, p. 92.
320. On Tille, see Alfred Kelly, The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Dar-
winism in Germany, 1S60-1914 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
i98i),pp. 10-12; HmtonThomte,Nietzsche in German Politics and Society, pp. 113-
114; and Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, pp. 89 n. 15 and 123-125.
Among the other hats worn by Tille at one time or another were those of folklorist
(the Faust legend), scholar of Icelandic sagas, historian of the German fascination
with Christmas, and editor of the English edition of Nietzsche's works (1896). Tille
also taught and lectured in Scodand and Italy, toting his Nietzschean baggage with
him.
321. SeeAmo J. Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War
(New York: Pantheon, 1981).
322. The volume Von Darwin bis Nietzsche is peppered with Nietzsche's ideas, but
see especially the last chapter, "Das neue Ideal," pp. 206-241. Tille's publisher, C. G.
Naumann, had been one of Nietzsche's own presses. Naumann also brought out the
work of Eugen Duhring—the nemesis not only of Nietzsche but of Marx and
Engels.
323. See Tille, Von Darwin bis Nietzsche, esp. pp. 237-240. Aschheim is imprecise,
however, to characterize Tille's racism as "rabid" (The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany,
p. r23). In the racist climate of his time, Tille's enthusiasm for nationalism was
comparatively temperate; his book ends with the claim that true nationalisms are in
the service of humanity at large—a point he thinks was missed by Nietzsche himself.
Aschheim is right, however, to suggest that Tille complicates the thesis that Nietz-
sche became a figure of "a new and radical right different from the traditionally
conservative right" (p. 118) only after World War I, ostensibly having been largely
hostile to Nietzsche originally.
324. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 1:283-284; Sdmtliche
Werke, 2:334.
325. Alphonso Lingis, T h e Will to Power," in The New Nietzsche: Contemporary
Styles of Interpretation, ed. and introduced by David B. Allison (New York: Delta,
1977), pp- 37-63; here p. 60. g
326. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, ^
Psychoanalysis, and History (New York and London: Roudedge, 1992), p. 69. See H
further LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1991). %
327. Spinoza, The Ethics, p. 264 [part 5, prop. 33, note]. m
328. Felman and Laub, Testimony, p. 114. ^
329. Freud, Moses and Monotheism [1937-1939], trans. Katherine Jones (New J,
York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 84; see further pp. 90-101. ^
527
330. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920], trans. James Strachey, intro-
duction and notes by Gregory Zilboorg (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1961),
p. 23.
331. On various forms and causes of trauma, including modern warfare, see
Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pp. 6-8 and 23-29; on birth trauma and Mac-
duff specifically, see his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis [ 1917], trans, and ed.
James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1966), pp. 396-397 and 407. See
further Shakespeare, Macbeth, act V, scene viii.
332. See HoUiet, Against Architecture, pp. 138-170: 'The Caesarean."
333. See again Burroughs, Cities of the Red Night, p. 157.
334. Nietzsche, WNF, Sommer-Herbst 1884"; JTGW 7/2:295.
335. Franz Kafka, "Reflections on Sin, Suffering, Hope, and the True Way" [tide
given by Max Brod, 1920], in Dearest Father, p. 44 [nr. 87] • Das erzdhlerische Werk,
vol. 1: Erzdhlungen, Aphorismen, Brief an den Voter, ed. Klaus Hermsdorf (Berlin,
G D B J Riitten & Loening, 1983), p. 382. "Ein Glaube wie ein Fallbeil, so schwer, so
leicht."
336. Ginzburg, T h e High and the Low: The Theme of Forbidden Knowledge in
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" [ 1976], in Clues, Myths, and the Historical
Method, pp. 60-76; here p. 69.
337. See again Maravall, Culture of the Baroque: Analysis of a Historical Structure,
and Barner, Barokrhetorik: Untersuchungen zu ihrenjjeschichtlichen Grundlagen.
338. See Nietzsche, Also sfrrach Zarathustra; KGW 6/1:266-273 [part 3, "The
Convalescent" 1 and 2].
339- Nietzsche, "NF,Herbst 1 8 8 3 " ; ^ * ^ 7/1:552.
340. Benjamin, Das Passqgen-Werk, 1:175 [section D: "Die Langeweile, ewige
Wiederkehr"]. Benjamin's quip about the pillow is related to Adomo's analysis in
1933 of the imbrication in Kierkegaard of existential pathos and bourgeois world-
view; and Benjamin followed Karl Lowith's 1935 reading of Eternal Recurrence of
the Same as a paradoxical "anti-Christian repetition of antiquity at the apex of
modernity." But the link he saw between Zarathustra's idea of Eternal Recurrence
of the Same and Caesarist imperialism was closer to Lukacs's view of Nietzsche, also
in the mid-i93os. Anticipations or parallels aside, Benjamin's attempt in his un-
finished magnum opus to articulate Eternal Recurrence of the Same with such
£ psychological and social phenomena as boredom and dreams, city and nature, ra-
1 tionalism and primitivism, enlightenment and myth, history and historicity, dandy
& and worker, leisure and labor, and so on is a major intellectual achievement, even in
pq this very fragmentary and compressed form. In 1929-1930, Heidegger had also
<j analyzed modernist boredom as a precondition for fascism and Nazism—which he,
Q however, was then already warmly embracing. See the transcript of his course Die
w Grundbegriffe derMetaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit [ Freiburg winter semester
t-> 1929-1930], ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am
O
2 Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 198 3), 2 / 29- 30:111 -116. A more depoliticized ver-
528
sion of the basic argument had appeared already in his Being and Time (1927). Thus
does 1929-1930 mark the moment of Heidegger's irrevocable philosophical turn to
national socialism—inspired, one might say, by the politics of boredom. Hispolitical
turn had come even earlier.
341. Benjamin did not read the notebook itself but found the passage cited in Karl
LowithyNietzschesPhilosophic derEwigen Wiederkehr desGUichen (Berlin: Die Runde,
193s), p- 73; in the 2ded. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1956), P- 77-
342. Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, 1:175 [section D: "Die Langeweile, ewige
Wiederkehr"]; emphasis added.
343. Heidegger, Nietzsche, 1128. Also see the original, slighdy different version in
Nietzsche: DerWillezurMachtalsKunst; Gesamtausgabe, 2/43:22-23.
344- It is quite common in German to refer to Nietzsche's thought as "Emge
Wiederkehr," but this was not his own preferred term.
345. Kafka, "Reflections on Sin, Suffering, Hope, and the True Way," in Dearest
Father, p. 35 [nr. 5]- Das erzdhlerische Werk, 1:374. "Von einem gewissen Punkt an
gibt es keine Ruckkehr mehr. Dieser Punkt ist zu erreichen."
346. "This is no time for phony rhetoric / This is no time for political speech /
This is a time for action / because the future's within reach / This is the time, This is
the time, This is the time because There is no time / There is no time, There is no
time, There is no time, There is no time" (Lou Reed, 'There Is No Time," New Tork,
© 1989 Sire/Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 9-25829-4).
347. Klossowski, "Oubli et anamnese dans l'expertence vecue de l'e'ternel retour
da meme? in Nietzsche [ColloquedeRoyaumont, 1964],pp. 227-235 (followed by
a discussion, pp. 236-244). For a translation see Nietzsche's Return.
348. For reasons that are less clear—and the likely, additional reason of euphony
aside—Nietzsche normally referred to what was to recur not as "the same" (das
Selbe) but rather as "the equal" or "identical" (das Gleiche). Attempts, notably that
of Lowith, to sort out this particular distinction are inconclusive. Lowith argued
that the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence of the Same—to which he imprecisely re-
fers as Wiederkehr rather than Wiederkunft—had a personal-existential as well as
cosmological-historical aspect. He suggested that the term das Selbe refers to the
former, das Gleiche to the latter; but since the doctrine requires both aspects, the two
terms could be collapsed. See Lowith, Nietzsches Philosophic der Ewigen Wiederkehr
des Gleichen, 2d ed., p. 161. ?
349. See Deleuze, Difference et ripfation (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, ^
1969), pp. 52-61 and 376-384. H
350. See Bernard Pautrat, "Nietzsche meduseV in Nietzsche avjourd'hui? vol. 1:
Intensites, pp. 9-30. For a translation, see Looking After Nietzsche. Q
351. Nietzsche, "NF, Winter 1884"; KGW 7/3:74. Also cited and discussed by £
Pautrat in "Nietzsche meduse." Another of Nietzsche's notes for Thus Spoke Zara- b)
thustm refers —in scare quotes to indicate esoteric circumspection—to a'Medusa J,
head.' (c. 40 pages)" (Nietzsche, "NF, Winter 1884-85"; KGW 7/3:76-77)- He £
529
also planned a series of "Medusa-Hymns" which apparently were likewise never
written. See the editors' notes in Nietzsche, KSA 14:711.
352. See Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, 1:173 [section D: "Die Langeweile,
Ewige Wiederkehr"]. Benjamin was citing from the so-called Musarion edition of
Nietzsche's works, published in the 1920$; here the editors misleadingly give "part
two" instead of "part four"; but Benjamin was not paying really close attention
anyway.
353. Selectionsfromthe Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gmmsri, p. 144.
354- See Nietzsche, Abo sprach Zarathustm; KGW 6/1:391-400 [part 4, 'The
Nightwanderer's Song"], and the editors' notes in Nietzsche, KSA 14:343-
355. See Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1884-Anfang 1885"; KGW 7/ 3:54-
356. Nietzsche, "NF, Winter 1884-85"; KGW 7/3:74. See further Die Geburtder
Tragodie aus dent Geiste derMusik [ 1872]; KGW 3/1:26 and 43-44 [sections 2 and
5]; "Die dionysischen Weltanschauung" [the Dionysian worldview, 1870]; KGW
3/2:43-69; here 52 and 60; and "Die Geburt des tragischen Gedankens" [the birth
of the tragic thought, 1870]; KGW 3 / 2:71 -91; here 81 and 88.
357. Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum" [ 1970 review of Deleuze, Difference et
repetition andLogiquedusens], in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, pp. 165-196;
here p. 195.
358. Lacan, "Le stade du miroir," in Merits I, p. 97; last emphasis added. For
Lacan's later position on the cipher, explicidy in connection with the relation of
political discourse and the Real, see his Television (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974),
p. S9' Lacan's conceptual orientation here is very Nietzschean, at least in structure
though not in liberatory intent.
359. Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa" [ 1975-1976], trans. Keith Cohen and
Paula Cohen, in New French Feminisms: An Anthology, ed. with introductions by
Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (New York: Schocken Books, 1981),
pp. 245-264; here p. 259.
360. SeePautrat, Versionsdusoleil:Figuresetsystemede Nietzsche (Paris: fiditions du
Seuil, 1971).
361. SunTzu, The Art of War, p. 112.
362. Kristeva, "Practique signifiante et mode de production" [i973-i974J, in
¥sistcvza.^Latraversie des signes (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975), pp. 11-30; here
i P- «•
P 363. Nietzsche, "NF, November 1882-Februar 1883"; KGW 7/1:223. "Der
pj
Gedanke ist nur ein Zeichen, wie das Wort nur ein Zeichen fur den Gedanken ist."
w 364. Nietzsche, "NF, November 1882-Februar 1883"; KGW 7/1=214.
o
«; 365. See, for example, Nietzsche, "NF, Sommer-Herbst 1884"; KGW 7/2:280-
O 282.
,0 366. Further theological—and potentially heretical—implications of the ancient
H idea of Eternal Return—which is, however, not identical with Nietzschean Eternal
O
fc Recurrence of the Same—have been known for a very long time, as Nietzsche was
530
at least partly aware. He apparently knew, for instance, that the early Helleno-
Christian thinker Origen (185-253) had argued in his Deprincipiis that if, as Aris-
totle had asserted, what lacks a beginning is incomprehensible, then our cosmos
must have had a beginning; but this raises a new problem, if one follows the account
of Genesis in the Jewish-Christian Bible. Origen was compelled to ask what God was
doing before "He" created our cosmos. How did "He" avoid boredom? Origen's
answer was that throughout eternity God is producing a series of other worlds that
are not exaa replicas of this one but very close. In short, "He" is repeating himself
eternally—though always with a slight virtual difference, so as to avoid boredom.
But this seems to indicate that God has little choice but to repeat "Himself" thus. In
short, "He" is not all-powerful but "Himself" a servant to infinite time, much like
the rest of us. See Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories
in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983),
pp. 183-190, and Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradi-
tion (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 118. On Nietzsche's
knowledge of Origen, see Edgar Steiger, "Zarathustra auf der Schulbank und auf
den Lehrstuhl," Das literarische Echo 17 (1915), 1349-1353. Finally, for the classic
account of archaic notions of Eternal Return see Mircea Eliade, The Myth of Eternal
Return, or, Cosmos and History [ 1949], trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1954). Compare the slogan of the situationists and of punk rock:
"What are the politics of boredom?"
367. Klossowski, "Oubli et anamnese" in Nietzsche [Colloque de Royaumont,
1964], p. 237.
368. Nietzsche, "NF, November 1882-Februar 1883"; KGW7/1:126.
369. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1883"; KGW7/1:538. In light of remarks like this, it
might not be wholly irresponsible to compare that of the Argentine General Iberico
Saint-Jean (December 1976): "We'll begin by killing all the subversives, then their
collaborators, their their sympathizers, then the indifFerents, and finally the timid"
(cited in Virilio, Popular Defense & Ecological Struggles, p. 74). Fascists have no
monopoly on such behavior, alas, which has been indulged in at one time or another
by members of all the world religions, by self-described "democrats," "communists,"
and so forth. But fascists, almost by definition, have a very special relationship not
only to killing but to their own deaths. Often members of fascist military and
political organizations not only produce corpses but also themselves are required to Q
be what the Nazi SS termed Kadavergehorsam: "cadaver-obedient." This meant obe- w
dient to the death to the Fuhrer, not merely in every fiber of one's being but also of H
one's corpse; the initiation oath to this effect was absolute, explicitly superseding ^
any commitment, say, to spouse, progeny, friends, even fellow SS men and officers. g
A leading journal of the SS (the "black shirts") was tided Das schwarze Korps (the Co
Summer 1984]), pp. 137-147; here p. 147 n. 8. See further Vietnamese Studies, vol. H
20: American Failure, ed. Nguyen Khac Vien (Hanoi: North Vietnamese Govern- ^
ment Publications, 1968); and Vo Nguyen Giap, Merits (Hanoi: Editions en langues Q
etrangeres, 1977). *
386. Nietzsche, "NF, Fruhjahr 188 4 "; KGW 7/2:81. £
387. Scarry, The Body in Pain, p. 49. <*>
388. Leonard Cohen, 'The Future," The Future, © 1992 Leonard Cohen Stranger »
533
Music, Inc. (BMI) and Sony Music Entertainment Inc./Columbia Records,
CK 53226. This cut is also featured in Oliver Stone's brilliant film of techno-
Nietzscheanism, Natural Bom Killers (1994); Natural Bom Killers: A Soundtrack Jin-
an Oliver Stone Film, © 1994 Warner Bros., Nothing/Interscope 92460-2.
389. Bloch, "Ungleichzeitigkeit und Pflicht zu ihrer Dialektik" [1932], in Erb-
scbaft dieserZeit, pp. 104-126; here p. 115.
390. Bataille, " ' T h e Old Mole' and the Prefix Sur in the Words Surhomme and
Surrealist" [c. 1929-1930, published 1968], in Visions of Excess, pp. 32-44; here p. 38.
CEuvres complkes, 2:93-109.
3 91. See Hans Gunther, Der Herren eigner Geist: Ausgewahlte Schrijten [ first pub-
lished as Der Herren eigner Geist: Die Ideologic des Nationakozialismus (Moscow and
Leningrad, 1935) ] (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau Verlag, 1981); here p. 290; also see
his "Kritische Apologetcn? Internationale Literatur [Moscow] 3 (i93S)> 103-105,
and "Der Fall Nietzsche," Unter dem Banner des Marxismus 11 (1935), 542-556.
Giinther's analysis of Nietzsche is very important—not only historically but theoret-
ically —and is unjustly neglected today.
392. Nietzsche, "NF, Herbst 1883"; KGW 7/1:549.
393. Maledetti ViAmerb (Marco Tullio Giordana, Italy, 1980). For a discussion of
the film, see Maurizio Viano, "The Left According to the Ashes of Gramsci" Social
Text 18 (Winter 1987-1988), 51-60. The "Ashes of Gramsci" in Viano's title refers
t o Pasolini's great 1954 elegy, "Le ceneri di Gramsci" on the dynamics and contra-
dictions of class betrayal. But "le ceneri di Gramsci" is also the phrase Ricardo uses
for cocaine. And since coke, according to Ricardo himself, is right-wing, it serves as
the material allegory, as it were, of the incorporating transformation (trasfbrmismo)
of the Left into the Right.
Multiculturalism does not lead us very far if it remains a question of difference only
between one culture and another. Differences should also be understood within the
same culture, just as multiculturalism as an explicit condition of our times exists within
every self. Intercultural, intersubjective, interdisciplinarity. These are some of the key-
words that keep on circulating in artistic and educational as well as political milieus. To
cut across boundaries and borderlines is to live aloud the malaise of categories and
labels; it is to resist simplistic attempts at classifying, to resist the comfort of belonging
to a classification, and ofproducing classifiable works. Interdisciplinary is, for example,
not just a question of putting severalfieldstogether, so that individuals can share their
specialized knowledge and converse with one another within their expertise. It is to
create in sharing afieldthat belongs to no one, not even to those who create it. What is
at stake, therefore, in this inter-creation is the very notion of specialization and of
expertise, of discipline and professionalism. To identify oneself with a position of spe-
cialized knowledge, to see oneself as an expert or as an authority on matters, even and
especially on artistic matters is to give up all attempts at understanding relations in the
game of power. (TrinhT. Minh-ha, "A Minute Too Long" [1988], in When the Moon
Waxes Red: Representation, Gender and Cultural Polities [New York and London: Rout-
ledge, 1991], PP-107-118; here pp. 107-108)
Second:
What in fact does the slogan of interdisciplinarity mask? 1. Certain real practices,
perfectly founded and legitimate: practices that remain to be defined, in cases that
remain to be defined. To define them is to distinguish rhem from others. Thefirstline
of demarcation. 2. In the interior of these practices and these real problems, there are
new distinctions to be made (application, constitution) and therefore new lines of
demarcation to be drawn. 3. Outside these real practices, we encounter the pretensions
of certain disciplines that declare themselves to be sciences (the human sciences).
What are we to make of their pretension? By means of a new line of demarcation we
-4. distinguish between the real function of most of the human sciences and the ideologi-
es.
*p cal character of their pretensions. 4. If we go back to the slogan of interdisciplinarity,
^ we are now in a position to state (on the basis of certain resistant symptoms) that it is
55 massively ideological in character. (Althusser, "Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philos-
O ophy of the Scientists" [1967], in Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Sden-
** tists, pp. 69-165; here p. 98)
O
w 105. See Derrida, Ifautre cap [suivi de] La demoemtie ajournee (Paris: Les Editions
w
H de minuit, 1991). The first tide would translate literally as The Other Cape or The
Z Other Heading; in the second tide, the adjective ajournee means "adjourned" and
544
"postponed" as well as "summoned"; but it also means "held back," as in the expres-
sion "after failing the exam, the candidate was held back." Derrida weaves a charac-
teristically intricate philosophical text about the possibilities and dangers attending
the "New Europe," asking that we interrogate what the notion "new" ever really
means. He exploits the semantic resources of a specific etymological and connota-
tive word field. French and Latin cap- is coaxed to deconstruct the following nexus
of presuppositions and prejudices: (i) the "naturalness" entailed in privileging one
geopolitical region ("cape") over others, and one which (2) qua shape has hidden
phallocentric and patriarchal connotations, but which is also therefore informed (3)
by castration-anxiety ("decapitation"); (4) the knee-jerk need for a politics headed
by strong leaders {caput: "head" of state); (5) common assumptions about where
symbolic and real centers of power are to be located (their "capitals"); (6) the
direction Europe as a whole is taking and/or ought to take, its "prow" "bearings," or
"heading" (as in the French expression mettre k cap sur); (7) the authenticity of the
dialogue between rival visions of Europe (cap a cap means "head to head" "tete-
a-tete") ; and (8) the kind of political economy that will rule the postsocialist New
Order (some form of "capitalism" undoubtedly, but one with a more or less human
face, with a stronger or weaker welfare state safety net?). While marvelous in its own
terms, ideologically and politically speaking Derrida's text reinvents the wheel.
Readers are left with little more than a well-meaning but empty plea for liberal
pluralist restraint. For example, Europeans are enjoined to recognize and thus con-
front irreducible "Otherness " but at the same time, somehow, they are to integrate
"the Other" into "their" Europe—in a manner uncannily reminiscent of Nietzsche's
"good European"—a concept that was figured to be anything but egalitarian. I/ou-
tre cap is interesting enough read as one might read a text by Stephane Mallarm^;
read as political philosophy—though Mallarme' can certainly be read this way,
too—it is little more than defunct liberalism. And so we would need to ask what
ideology this particular cape, qua cloak, conceals. Contrast Negri's more charged
reflections about 'The End of the Century" in his The Politics of Subversion, pp. 6 1 -
74, as well as Badiou's D'ttn desastre obscur.
106. Think, for example, of "Old World" Jonathan Richman and the Modem
Lovers (David Robinson, Jerry Harrison, Ernie Brooks, and Jonathan Richman),
The Modern Lovers, © 1976 Beserkley Records/Rhino Records, RNC 70091.
107. Milarepa, "The Enlightenment of Rechungpa," in The Hundred Thousand §
Songs ofMilarepa, trans, and annotated by Garma C. C. Chang (New Hyde Park, «
CO
ed. Martin Harry Greenberg and Joseph D. Olander (New York: Taplinger Publish-
•/
ing Company, 1983), pp. 13-25 and 149-159, respectively. Q
149- Dick, In Pursuit ofValis, pp. 131 -132. w
150. Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy, p. 29. H
151. Dick, In Pursuit of Valis, p. 140. Dick's work would be much less complex and ^
significant were it reducible to the terms of the preceding discussion. On the one Q
hand his writing seems "normally" informed by the dialectical possibility that all the v>
conspiracies and visions he sees and constructs might be paranoid or drug-induced °°
projections. In that case In Pursuit of Valis would be an "abnormal" work. On the ^
other hand, however, it is certainly possible to take In Pursuit of Valis as an esoteric *>
551
work exposing an intent which his exoteric, published work would then "normally"
disseminate. And in that case poor Dick would beproperly Heideggereo-Nietzschean
and "fascistic" after all.
152. Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx [1993], trans. Chris Turner (London and
N e w York: Verso, 1995), p. 4.
153. Nietzsche, Menschlkhes, AUzununscbliches II: Der Wanderer und sein Schatten;
KGW 4/3:313 [aphorism 278]. Nietzsche's aphorism is amplified by five linked
theses. First, Leonard Cohen: " N o w you can say that I've grown bitter, but of this
you may be sure: the rich have got their channels in the bedrooms of the poor"
("Tower of Song," Vm Tour Man, © 1988 CBS Records Inc., CK 44191). Second,
Karl Marx: "Modern industry never views and treats the existing form of a produc-
tion process as definitive. Its technical basis is thus revolutionary whereas that of all
earlier modes of production were essentially conservative . . [ O ] n the other hand
in its capitalist form it reproduces the old division of labor with its ossified par-
ticularizations" {Capital, 1:486-87; translation modified). Third, Leo Strauss:
"Only one thing is certain for Nietzsche regarding the future: the end has come for
man as he was hitherto; what will come is either the Over-man or the Last-man. The
last man, the lowest and most decayed man, the herd man without any ideals and
aspirations, but well fed, well clothed, well housed, well medicated by ordinary
physicians and by psychiatrists is Marx's man of the future seen from an anti-Marxist
point of view" ( ' T h e Three Waves of Modernity" in Political Philosophy, p .97; em-
phasis added). Finally, V I . Lenin: "for a revolution to take place it is n o t enough for
the exploited and oppressed masses t o realize the impossibility of living in the old
way, and demand changes; for a revolution t o take place it is essential that the
exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. It is only when the (lower
classes3 do not want t o live in the old way and the hipper classes' cannot carry on in the
old way that the revolution can triumph"; and "the bourgeoisie sees practically only
one aspect of Bolshevism—insurrection, violence, and terror; it therefore strives to
prepare itself for resistance and opposition primarily in this field. It is possible that,
in certain instances, in certain countries, and for certain brief periods, it will succeed
in this. We must reckon with such an eventuality, and we have absolutely nothing t o
fear if it does succeed. Communism is emerging in positively every sphere of public
life; its beginnings are t o be seen literally o n all sides. The 'contagion' (to use the
CK favorite metaphor of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois police, the one most to their
l liking) had penetrated the organism and has completely permeated it. If special
^ efforts are made to block one of the channels, the 'contagion' will find another one,
w sometimes very unexpectedly" ("Left-Wing" Communism—An Infantile Disorder
<j [1920], in Collected Works, 31:17-118; here 84-85 and 101).
Q 154- The following sentences are appropriated almost verbatim from the conclu-
0 sion of Bali bar's essay "Racism as Universalism " substituting "Nietzsche's corps / e "
w
fn and "corps/e" for "racism" (Balibar, "Racism as Universalism" [1989], in Classes,
Z Masses, Ideas, pp. 191-204; here p. 204).
552
Epilogue
Waite, Geoff.
Nietzsche's corps/e : aesthetics, politics, prophecy, or, the spectacular
technoculturc of everyday life / Geoff Waite.
p. cm. — (Post-contemporary interventions)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
I S B N 0-8223-1709-5 (cloth : alk. paper). — I S B N 0-8223-1719-2 ( p b k . :
alk. paper)
1. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. 2. Nietzsche, Friedrich
Wilhelm, 1844-1900 —Influence. 3. Philosophy, Modern— 19th
century. 4. Philosophy, Modern — 20th century. I. Tide. II. Series.
B3317W321996
193 —dc20 95-42018 CIP