Professional Documents
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Leonen
Leonen
Promulgated:
7
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------ x
May 11, 201
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN,J.:
I dissent.
This Petition should have been dismissed outright and not given due
course. It does not deserve space in judicial deliberation within our
constitutional democratic space. Even if the Chief Justice has failed our
expectations, quo warranto, as a process to oust an impeachable officer and a
sitting member of the Supreme Court, is a legal abomination. It creates a
precedent that gravely diminishes judicial independence and threatens the
ability of this Court to assert the fundamental rights of our people. We render
this Court subservient to an aggressive Solicitor General. We render those
who present dissenting op'inions unnecessarily vulnerable to powerful
interests.
She also has the alternative to have the grace and humility to resign
from her office to protect the institution from a leadership which may not have
succeeded to address the divisiveness and the weaknesses within.
I
the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for
two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a
record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(S) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges oflower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy . Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
Section I 0. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Cou rt, and
of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in oftice, their salary shall not
be decreased.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties
of their office . The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency perfonning quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Cou1t in any case submitted to it for decision en bane
or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no
part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same
requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Dissenting Opinion 4 G.R. No. 237428
RULE 66
Quo Warranto
own name. 9
I disagree.
II
It is true that Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution uses the phrase
"may be removed," thus:
9
RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, secs. 2, 3, and 5.
IO CONST.,
ait . VIII, sec. 5( I).
Dissenting Opinion 6 G.R. No. 237428
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment. 11 (Emphasis supplied)
Since it is the Constitution that we are reading, the context of the words
and phrases (1) within the entire document, (2) in the light of the textual
history as seen in past Constitutions ratified by our people, (3) within the
meaning of precedents of this Court, and (4) in the light of contemporary
circumstances, which may not have been in the contemplation of those who
ratified the Constitution, as well as those who participated in the deliberation
and decision of those who voted precedents in the light of their written
opinions, must likewise be considered.
11
12
CONST., art. XI, sec. 2.
I
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016, 803 SCRA435 [Per.I. Leonen, En Banc].
13
Id. at 478---479.
14
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016, 803 SCRA435 [PerJ. Leonen, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 7 G.R. No. 237428
Definitely, the framers of the Constitution did not use the words
"SHALL be removed." Clearly, this would not have been possible because it
would have communicated the inference that removal through impeachment
and conviction was mandatory. Thus, the word "may" should mean that it
was an option to remove, in the sense that it was not mandatory to remove an
impeachable officer. After all, most should be expected to serve out their term
with "utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency," acting "with
patriotism and justice" and leading "modest live s."15
Neither did the framers use the phrase "may ALSO be removed from
office ... " This would have clearly stated the intent that there were processes
other than impeachment and conviction that would remove a sitting Chief
Justice.
Admittedly, the framers also did not use the phrase "may ONLY be
removed from office ... " However, the absence of the word "only" should
not immediately lead to the conclusion that another process-like Quo
Warranto-was possible. The context of the provision should be taken into
consideration.
This list is exclusive. For all other public officers, the Constitution
allows a process that may be provided by law-not by impeachment.
I
15
CONST., art. XI, sec. I
16
CONST., art. XI, sec. 2.
Dissenting Opinion 8 G.R. No. 237428
In the same manner, the President enjoys immunity from suit so that he
may be able to exercise his duties and functions without any hindrance or
distraction, thereby giving his office and the country the undivided attention
that they deserve. 17
Section 16....
(3) Each House may determine the rnles of its proceedings, punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all its members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.18
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
17
Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394 ( 1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
18
CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (3).
Dissenting Opinion 9 G.R. No. 237428
at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(7) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide aJl cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall vote. No person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.
(8) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
The votes needed are also specified. One-third of all the members of the
House of Representatives is required to impeach, and thus, to file the Articles
of Impeachment. Two-thirds of all the members of the Senate are required to
convict.
The purpose of the one (1)-year time bar for impeachment is intended
not only to avoid harassment suits against the impeachable officer, but also to
prevent the disruption of public service. If numerous impeachment
complaints are filed one after the other, impeachable officers would be unable
to do their official functions and duties. Important legislative work would be
delayed in order to be able to process the complaints. Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives20 explains:
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining
only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites
Justice Adolfo Azcuna's separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco
f
19
CONST., art. XI, secs. 3( I) to (8).
20
658 Phil. 322(2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc ].
Dissenting Opinion 10 G.R. No. 237428
[v. House ofRepresentatives] ruling. Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose
of the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment;
and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [ofJ legislation, with
main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:
Third, the grounds for impeachment are weighty and serious, thus:
21
Id. at 400-401 citing J. Azcuna, Separate Opinion in Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil.
830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
22
See also the Separate Opinion of Justice Azcuna in Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830
(2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 11 G.R. No. 237428
(3) Bribery;
(4) Graft and Corruption; and
(5) Betrayal of the Public Trust.23
Again, the list is exclusive. The process does not allow removal for any
other crime or misdemeanor. It is not left wholly to the discretion of the
members of Congress. The evidence must infer facts which amount to the
offenses mentioned.
III
Even assuming that this Court can take cognizance of the petition, an
action for quo warranto is limited in time regardless of who institutes the
action. It can only be instituted within one (1) year after the cause of action
arises.24
Rule 66, Section 11 of the Rules of Court is clear and leaves no room
f
23
CONST., art. XI, sec. 2.
24
Villegas v. De La Cruz, 122 Phil. 1102 (1965) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc]; Cristobal v. Melchor,
168 Phil. 328 (1977) [Per J. Munoz Palma, First Di vision].
Dissenting Opinion 12 G.R. No. 237428
for interpretation:
In the same manner, public officers cannot rest easy with the threat of
being unseated at any time looming over their heads. The right of civil
servants to occupy their seats must not be subjected to constant uncertainty.
A public officer cannot afford to be distracted from his or her duties. When
public officers cannot do their work effectively, it is not just the office that
deteriorates. The nature of the office is such that it is the public that is
inconvenienced and ultimately suffers.
It is, thus, imperative that a quo warranto petition be filed within the
one (1 )-year prescriptive period so as to establish immediately and with
finality any nagging questions regarding title to public office.
In Villegas v. De la Cruz,26 this Court stated that "it is not proper that
the title to a public office be subjected to continued uncertainty for the
people's interest requires that such right be determined as speedily as
possible."27
The public policy behind the prescriptive period for quo warranto
proceedings was emphasized in Unabia v. City Mayor28 :
[I]n actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be
instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the island
since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in section 216 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an
expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to
an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take
steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of
25
RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, sec. 11.
26
122 PhiI. 1102 ( 1965) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
27
Id.at1105.
28
99 Phil. 253 ( I 956) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 13 G.R. No. 237428
one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience
that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to
positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that
public business may be unduly retarded,· delays in the statement of the right
to positions in the service must be discouraged.29 (Emphasis supplied)
In Pinullar:
In De la Cerna:
Following the doctrine laid down in the case of Unabia vs. City
Mayor, supra, and other cases, where we held that "any person claiming
right to a position in the civil service should also be required to file his
petition for reinstatement within the period of one year, otherwise he is
thereby considered as having abandoned his office" , we find no error in the
two appealed orders, and, consequently, hereby affirm the same.34 (Citation
omitted)
An action for quo warranto should be promptly filed and persons who
claim a right to the office occupied by a supposed usurper should do so within
the provided period, lest they be deemed to have abandoned35 their right.
The majority refers to Article 1108(4) of the Civil Code to support their
stand that the prescriptive period for filing the quo warranto petition has not
yet prescribed and will never prescribe because prescription does not lie
against the State.
I cannot agree.
(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or
other legal representatives;
(2) Absentees who have administrators, either appointed by them before
their disappearance, or appointed by the courts;
(3) Persons living abroad, who have managers or administrators;
(4) .Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.
3
105 Phil. 774, 776 ( 1959) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc).
/
35
Castro v. Del Rosari o, 125 Phil. 611 (1967) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
36
CIVIL CODE, art. 11 08.
Dissenting Opinion 15 G.R. No. 237428
37
Civil Service Commission v. Javi er, 570 Phil. 89 (2008) [Per J. Austr ia-Martin ez, En Banc] citing
Montesclaros v. Commission on Election s, 433 Phil. 620 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
38
Republic of the Philippines v. Animas, 155 Phil. 470 (1974) [Per J. Esguerra, First Division]; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 253 Phil 698 (1989) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division]; Reyes v. Court o/
Appeals , 356 Phil 606 ( 1998) [Per J. Ma1i inez, Second Division]; Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 327 Phil 852 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division]; Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 349
Phil. 898 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division]; East Asia Traders Inc . v. Republic of the Philippines.
477 Phil 848 (2004) (Per .I. Sand oval- G ut ie rrez, Second Divisi on) ; Pe/be/ Manufacturing Corporation
v. Court of Appeals , 529 Phil 192 (2006) [Per J. Puno, Second Division); Heirs of Parasac v. Republic
of the Philippines, 523 Phil 164 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division]; Samahan ng Masang
Pilipino sa Makati. Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development Authority, 542 Phil 86 (2007) [Per J. Velasco,
Jr., Second Divi sion) ; land Bank of the Philippines v. Republic of the Philippine s, 567 Phil 427 (2008)
[Per J. Reyes, R.T., Third Division]; Yu Chang v. Republic. 659 Phil 176 (201 I) [Per J. Villarama, Jr.,
Third Division].
w 253 Phil. 698 (1989) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Divisi on].
Dissenting Opinion 16 G.R. No. 237428
IV
42
ld.at713.
See J. Vitug, Separate Opinion in Francisco v. House of'Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J.
Carpio Morales, En Banc].
I
Id. citing Michael Nelson, ed., THE PRESIDENCY A To Z, WASHINGTON D.C. CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY ( 1998).
43 Id.
44
Id. citing Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional limits to Impeachment and its Alternatives, 68 TEX.
L. REY. I (November 1989).
45
Id. citing Michael Nelson, ed., THE PRESIDENCY A TO Z, WASHINGTON 0.C. CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY ( 1998).
46
Id. citing Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional limits to Impeachment and its Alternatives, 68 TEX.
L. REY. I (November 1989).
Dissenting Opinion 17 G.R. No. 237428
ARTICLE IX.-IMPEACHMENT
ARTICLE XI.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
Dissenting Opinion 18 G.R. No. 237428
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
47
See J. Vitug, Separate Opinion in Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J.
Carpio Morales, En Banc].
48
Id. citing Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 2 (Winter 1999).
49
J. Vitug, Separate Opinion in Francisco v. House c!f Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 957 (2003) [Per J.
Carpio Morales, En Banc].
50
Id. citing UP Law Center Constitutional Revision Project, Manila (1970).
51
Id. citing Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 2 (Winter 1999).
52
Lecture by United States Court of Appeals Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial
Independence, Benjamin N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures, delivered on November I, 1978, New York,
1002.
51
See Gonzales 111 v. Office of the President of'the Philippines, 75 Phil. 380(2014) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 19 G.R. No. 237428
impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt."54
Proceedings stall legislative work, are costly to prosecute, and result in the
divisiveness of the nation. 55 Thus, impeachment is limited "only to the officials
occupying the highest echelons of responsibility m our government."56
ARTICLE IX.-IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. The President, the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption.
(Emphasis supplied)
Rule 16. Quo warranto. - A verified petition for quo warranto contesting
the election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of ineligibility
or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may be filed by any
registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten days
after the proclamation of the winner.
To the majority, the existence of this rule does not preclude the
availability of a petition for quo warranto to remove impeachable officers. 58
This ignores that among the impeachable officers, the President and the Vice
President are the only ones elected by the public. The rest are appointed
officials.
The Constitution does not provide any other qualifications. Thus, any
person who fulfills these minimum requirements will be considered a
candidate. Otherwise, former President Joseph E. Estrada, who was not a
college graduate, and former President Corazon C. Aquino, who had no
58
Maiority opinion, pp. 48-50.
59
1986 Constitutional Deliberations, Journal No. 40, Vol. I, July 26, 1986.
°
0
CONST., art. VII, secs. 2 and 3.
Dissenting Opinion 21 G.R. No. 237428
political experience,61 would not have even been allowed on the ballot.
The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
61
Veronica Palumbarit, Past PHL presidents: Many were lawyers, one a housewife, another a mechanic, /_
GMA NEWS ONLINE , December 1 7, 2015
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/spec ialr eports/548 l 56/past-phl-presidents-many-were
lawyers-one-a-housewife-another-a-mechanic/story/> (last accessed May 7, 2018).
62
See C ONST., art. VIII, sec. 9 and art. XI, sec. 9.
63
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule I, sec. I.
64
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule I, sec. 8.
65
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 3, rule 4, and rule 5.
66
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule I, sec. I .
67
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 4, sec. 2.
68
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 5, sec. 2.
69
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 6.
70
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 7, sec. I.
71
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 2, sec. 2.
72
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 8, sec. I .
73
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016), rule 8, sec. 2.
Dissenting Opinion 22 G.R. No. 237428
b) Copies of Income Tax Returns for the four (4) immediately preceding
fiscal years;
c) Verified statements of assets and liabilities for the four (4) immediately
preceding fiscal years, including those of his spouse, if the nominee or
appointee is in the government service; or verified statements of net worth
for the four (4) immediately preceding fiscal years, if the nominee or
appointee comes from the private sector;
and interest for the four (4) immediately preceding fiscal years, including
those of his spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age
living in his household;
g) Statement, under oath, whether the nominee or appointee has any pending
criminal or administrative case against him.78
The Judicial and Bar Council has the sole constitutional mandate of
preparing a short list of nominees for the President. The Commission on
Appointments meanwhile has the sole constitutional mandate of acting upon
nominations and appointments submitted to it. The Commission on Elections,
however, exercises several functions, 81 its primary purpose being to ensure
"free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections."82 It is only expected
to assess whether a person running for office fulfills the minimum
requirements under the law.
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the
Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from
office only by impeachment. To grant a complaint for disbarment of a
Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be
to circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the constitutional mandate that
Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment
for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the
Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the
Ombudsman and his deputies, a majority of the members of the
Commission on Elections, and the members of the Commission on Audit
who are not certified public accountants, all of whom are constitutionally
required to be members of the Philippine Bar.88 (Citations omitted)
This Court again reiterated this principle in In re: Gonzalez,89 a case filed
by then Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales, requesting Justice Fernan to comment
on the letter of Mr. Cuenco questioning the dismissal of his disbarment
complaint against Justice Fernan. This Court stated:
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this
matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court said:
85
CONST., art. IX (C), sec. 1 (I).
86
CONST., art. IX (0), sec. I.
87
241 Phil. 816 (1988) [PerCuriam, En Banc].
88
Id. at 828.
89
243 Phil. 167 (1988) [PerCuriam, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 25 G.R. No. 237428
Sec. 3 ...
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its
Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are
entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehaviour.
What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined
and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from
office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3
of Article XI of the I 987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme
Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to
answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings)
for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in
appropriate proceedings.
90
Id. at 169- 1 73, citing lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 213 Phil. 288 ( 1984) [Per J. Relova, En Banc].
91
A.C. No. 4509, December 5, 1995, as cited in O ffice of the Ombudrnwn v. Court o/Appea/s, 493 Phil.
63 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
92
493 Phil. 63 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
9
' Id. at 82.
Dissenting Opinion 27 G.R. No. 237428
This is not to say that this Court has never passed upon the issue on the
discipline of impeachable officers. In Espejo-Ty v. San Diego,98 a disbarment
case was filed against Lourdes P. San Diego, an Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals in 1970 for misconduct as a bar examiner and for falsifying a
public document when she was still a trial court judge. At the time, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 provided that a Justice of the Court of Appeals may only
be removed from office through impeachmen t.99 This Court, in giving due
course to the complaint, stated that it exercises the power to remove any
unworthy member of the Bar, it is Congress alone that can remove from office
the impeachable officer:
94
95
Id.
A.C. No . 99 12 , September 21 , 2016
<http://sc .jud iciar y.gov.ph/pdf /we b/viewer. htm l? fi le =/jur is prudence /20 l6 /september 2016 /99 12. pdt>
I
[Per J. Peralta, Third Division]
96
DuqueJ,: v. Brillantes, Jr. , A.C. No. 9912, September 21, 2016 [Perl Peralta, Third Division].
97
Majority opinion , p. 116. The majority opinion's argument appears to be that while impeachable officer s
can only be removed by impeachment , an officer who is unqualified to be an impeachable officer may
be removed through other means.
98
150-A Phil. 757 (1972) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc] .
99
Republic Act No . 296 (1948), ch. Ill, sec. 24 provides:
Section 24. The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals shall not be removed
from office except on impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in Article IX of
the Cons titutio n.
Dissenting Opinion 28 G.R. No. 237428
And so, in the case now before this Court, the fact that the
respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals is no reason for this Court
not to exercise its disciplinary power over her as a member of the bar. The
provision of the second paragraph of Section 24 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
(R.A. No. 296), as amended, that the justices of the Court of Appeals shall
not be removed from office except on im peachment , is no reason for this
Court to abdicate its duty, and give up its inherent power, to oversee and
discipline all members of the bar, regardless of whether they are in the
private practice of the profession, or they hold office in any of the three
departments of our gove rnment , or they pursue any other calling. The
power of this Court to disbar an unworthy member of the legal profession
is distinct and apart from the power of any other authority to remove such
member of the legal profession from his judicial position or from any other
position that he holds in the government. Constitutional or statutory
proceedings for removal from office are wholly distinct and separate from
disciplinary proceedings involving members of a profession.
It is, therefore, Our considered view that the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to entertain and decide complaints for disbarment against a
justice of the Court of Appeals. But while this Court may order the
disbarment of a justice of the Court of Appeals, it is Congress, and Congress
alone, in the exercise of its power of im peachment , that can remove from
office a justice of the Court of Appeals. 100
VI
100
Esp e jo-Ty v. San Diego, 150-A Phil. 757, 779 (1972) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
101
24 I Phil. 8 I 6 ( I 988) [Per Cur iam, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 29 G.R. No. 237428
Lower court judges who have failed to meet the ethical standards
imposed on the judiciary may face administrative10 3 and disciplinary sanction
from this Court. They may be admonished, reprimanded, suspended, or even
removed from service depending on the gravity of their offense. This Court
is specifically empowered under Article VIII, Section 11 of the Constitution,
to dismiss lower court judges "by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon."
The same is not true with regard to the members of this Court. Article
XI, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Members of the Supreme
Court, among others, may be removed from office through impeachment
proceed in gs.10 4 Liability of Members of the Supreme Court for the
commission of a crime or a violation of judicial ethics can only be imposed
after this process. 10 5 This rule is based on the principles of judicial
independence and the doctrine of separation of powers.
102
Sandra Day O'Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not Threaten, Judicial Independence:
An Introduction, 86 D EN Y. U. L. REY. (2008).
103
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6 provides:
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.
104
CONST., art. XI, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crim es, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
105
In re: Gonzales, 243 Phil. 167, 172 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc] .
106
243 Phil. 167 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc).
Dissenting Opinion 30 G.R. No. 237428
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will
afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since
nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the
judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a
duty.
107
108
minor party in the community. 111
Id. at 170-172.
f
Lecture by United States Court of Appeals Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial
Independence, Benjamin N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures, delivered, on November I, 1978, New York.
109 Id.
1
I() The Federalist Papers No. 78, <http://avalon.iaw.yale.edu/l 8th_century/fed78.asp> (last visited May 9,
2018).
Ill Id.
Dissenting Opinion 31 G.R. No. 237428
VII
Courts are the sanctuaries of rights, and not the preserve of political
majorities. They are not representative organs. They do not exist to mirror
the outcomes of deliberations in forums where the representatives of the
majority of our people supposedly prevail. Rather, courts clarify the content
of governmental powers most especially in the context of our fundamental
rights. They are the sanctuaries for law. Courts are the soul of the
government.
The Judiciary is the final arbiter of conflicts between and among the
branches and different instrumentalities of the government. It has the duty to
determine the proper allocation of governmental power and to guarantee "that
no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which
is the source of all authority."113 Moreover, the Judiciary acts as the guardian
of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Bill of Rights.11 4
112 Id.
113
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 182 (1936) (Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
114
See Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 233 Phil. 3 13 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 32 G.R. No. 237428
[T]he Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several depai1ments, however , sometimes
makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In
times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or ma rred, if not entirely obli terated.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
I
115
63Phil.139(1936)fPerJ.Laurel.EnBanc].
11
(' Id. at 1 57- 1 58.
117
CONST., art. Vlll, sec. I .
Dissenting Opinion 33 G.R. No. 237428
118
Sandra Day O'Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not Threaten, Judicial In dependence :
An Introduction, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. (2008).
f
119
41 Phil. 322 (1921) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
120
Id. at 329-330.
121
Re: COA Opinion on Computation of Appraised Value of Properties Purchased by SC Justices, 692 Phil.
147, 156 (2012) [Per Curiam, En Banc] .
122
Id . at 157.
123
Sandra Day O'Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not Threaten, Judicial Independence:
An Introduction, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. (2008).
Dissenting Opinion 34 G.R. No. 237428
124
125
Id.
I
Francia v. Ahe/on, 739 PhiI. 299, 3 13 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].
126
Re: COA Opinion on Computation a/Appraised Value of Properties Purchased by SC Justices , 692 Phil.
147,156(2012) [Per Cur iam, En Banc] citing In re: Ma casaet, 583 Phil. 391 (2008) [Per J. Reyes , R.T.,
En Banc].
127
Lecture by United States Court of Appeals Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial
In dep endence, Benjamin N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures, delivered on November I , 19 78, New York.
128
1973 CONST., art. X, sec. 5(5) provides :
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers :
5. Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all cou11s, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the bar, wh ich, how ever, may be repealed, altered or supplemented
by the Batasang Pambansa. Such ru les shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not d imini sh,
incre ase, or modify substantive rights.
The grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judici ary130 and the prohibition on
Congress from diminishing the scope of the Supreme Court's constitutionally
defined jurisdiction and from passing a law that would, in effect, undermine
the security of tenure of its Members131 are among the other constitutional
guarantees of judicial independence.
°
13
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 3 provides: I
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall
be automatically and regularly released.
131
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define , prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section
5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenu re of its
Members .
132
293 Phil. 503 (1993) [Per J. Nocon, En Banc].
133
Id. at 506.
134
Sandra Day O'Connor , Judicial Accountability Musi Safeguard, Not Threaten, Judicial Independence:
An Introduction, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. (2008).
135
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 8(5) provides:
Section 8. (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
136
G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/v ie wer.html?tile=/jur is prudence/20 l 5/april2015/211 833.pd t> [Per
J. Reyes, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 36 G.R. No. 237428
TITLEX
OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Article 80. The President of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Solicitor
General shall be appointed by the National Assembly with the concurrence
of the President of the Republic and the Secretaries of Government, and
137
shall have absolute independence from the legislative and executive
Id. at 7- 8.
f
m J. Leanen, Dissenting Opinion in Umali v. Judicial and Bar C ouncil , G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 20 I 7
<http://s c.jud iciar y.gov.ph/pd f/web/viewer.h tm l?file =/juris prudence/20 1 7/july20 I 7/228628.pdf> [Per J.
Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 37 G.R. No. 237428
branches.
ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
Section 5. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
ARTICLEX
The Judiciary
Section 4. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts
shall be appointed by the President.
The Judicial and Bar Council's creation under the 1987 Constitution
was revolutionary as it was seen as a way to "insulate the process of judicial
appointments from partisan politics"140 and "de-politicize" the entire
Judiciary.141
[T]he intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the
Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming
presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The
experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even
candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential
with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for
139
CONST., ati. VIII, sec. 9 provides:
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
J
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission
of the list.
140
J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july20 l 7/228628.pdf> 2 [Per
J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
141
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629,697 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
142
629 Phil. 629(2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 38 G.R. No. 237428
the consideration of the President, because they first had to undergo the
vetting of the .TBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC
was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the
intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process
was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment. 143 (Citations omitted,
emphasis in the original)
Aside from the goal of insulating the Judiciary from partisan politics,
the Judicial and Bar Council was envisioned to guarantee that only those who
are deserving and qualified may be considered for purposes of appointment.
Applicants undergo a rigorous process of screening and selection based on the
minimum standards required by the office or position to which they are
applying and the criteria set by the Judicial and Bar Council.
Aspiring members of the Judiciary must not only have the basic
qualifications under Article VIII, Sections 7( l) and (2) of the Constitution,
they must also be persons of "proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence."144 The members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
believed that neither the President nor the Commission on Appointments
would have the time to undertake this vetting process. Thus, the Judicial and
Bar Council was tasked to take on the meticulous process of studying the
qualifications of every candidate, "especially with respect to their probity and
sense of mo rali ty."I 45
Villanueva is instructive:
144
143
145
Id.
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7(3). 1
J.. Leanen, Dissenting Opinion in Jarde/eza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
I
<http ://sc.judi ciary.gov.ph/pdf/w eb/viewer.ht rn l?tile=/jurisprudence/20 I4/august2 14/213181.pdt>
[Per J. Mend oza, En Banc] citing I RECORDS, CONSTITUTIONA COMMISSION,
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, JOURNAL No. 29 (Monday, July 14, 1986).
I4
c, G.R. No. 21 I 833, April 7, 2015
<http://sc.judi ciary.gov.ph/pdf/w eb/v iewer.htm l?tile=/j urisprudence/20 I 5/april2015/21 I 833.pdt> 8-9
[Per J. Reyes. En Banc] citing Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460 (2014) [Per J . Mendoza, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 39 G.R. No. 237428
The assailed policy required by the Judicial and Bar Council was declared
constitutional. It was a reasonable requirement that would demonstrate an
applicant's competence:
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor
that determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed
by the President. Persons with this qualification are neither automatically
selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The applicants are
chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their
individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned policy was
arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis. 147
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judici ary148
indirectly secures the institutional independence of the entire Judiciary by
ensuring that individual judges remain independent in the exercise of their
functions. Upon appointment and during their tenure , judges are expected to
comply with and adhere to high ethical standards. Members of the Judiciary
are "visible representation[s] of the law." 149
CANON 1
Independence
It has been consistently held that "the conduct of a judge must be free
of a whiff of im pro priety." 152 Acts that appear to be legal and not wrong per
se may not necessarily be ethical.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary guards
the Judiciary not only against possible influence and interference from
litigants, parties, and personal affiliations, but also from influence that may
possibly be exerted by judicial colleagues. Thus, Canon 1, Section 1 requires
judges "to be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions
which the judge is obliged to make independently."
For the law to progress it must occasionally adopt views that were
previously in dis favor, and the intellectual foundations are often laid by the
opinions of dissenting judges. A dissent, said Hughes, "is an appeal to the
brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day."155
that the Constitution has protected. rt may even stifle free speech.
154 Id.
1ss I d.
I
1 5 b Id.
Dissenting Opinion 43 G.R. No. 237428
Kaufman observes:
A judge who feels threatened by the perception that other judges are
looking over his shoulder, not to decide whether to reverse him but to
consider the possibility of discipline, will perform his work with a timidity
and awkwardness damaging to the decision process. Judicial
independence, like free expression, is most crucial and most vulnerable in
periods of intolerance, when the only hope of protection lies in clear rules
setting for the bright lines that cannot be traversed. The press and the
judiciary are two very different institutions, but they share one significant
characteristic: both contribute to our democracy not because they are
responsible to any branch of government, but precisely because, except in
the most extreme cases, they are not accountable at all and so are able to
check the irresponsibility of those in power. Even in the most robust of
health, the judiciary lives vulnerably. It must have "breathing space." We
must shelter it against the dangers of a fatal chill. 157 (Emphasis supplied)
VIII
Statements of Assets and Liabilities to the Judicial and Bar Council ultimately
meant that she failed "to pass the test of integrity." 15 8
I cannot agree to this blanket finding, which is based simply on the non
existence of the Statements of Assets and Liabilities.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges oflower courts,
but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
The Judicial and Bar Council was created under the 1987 Constitution,
and it was intended to be a fully independent constitutional body functioning
as a check on the President's power of appointment. Article VIII, Section 8
of the Constitution provides:
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President
for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the
Integrated Bar shal I serve for four years, the professor of law for three years,
the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector
for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
158
Pet it ion. p. 2.
Dissenting Opinion 45 G.R. No. 237428
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as
may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall
provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Counci/ 1 59 explains that the Judicial and Bar
Council was created to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of
political pressure and partisan activities.160 The Judicial and Bar Council is a
separate constitutional organ with the same autonomy as the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Angara
v. The Electoral Commission161 emphasizes that the Electoral Commission is
"a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it
by the Constitution." 162 The grant of power to the Electoral Commission is
intended to be "complete and unimpaired." 163
The Judicial and Bar Council is tasked to screen applicants for judiciary
positions, recommend appointees to the Judiciary, "and only those nominated
by the Judicial and Bar Council in a list officially transmitted to the President
may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary."164 In
carrying out its main function, the Judicial and Bar Council is given the
authority to set standards or criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the Judiciary, 165 as well as the discretion to determine how to best
perform its constitutional mandate. 166
159
160
691 Phil 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
I
Id. at 188.
161
63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
162 Id. at 175,
16, Id.
164
Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, 757 Phil. 548 (2015) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
165
Id. at 549.
166
Id. at 556.
167
CONST. a1t. VIII, sec. 7(3).
Dissenting Opinion 46 G.R. No. 237428
IPI case, The Court Administrator shall attach to his report copies of the
complaint and the comment of the respondent.
It is true that in some cases, courts can put themselves in the shoes of
representative branches to see how policy questions were weighed. But, this
is only to provide them with context-not to supplant decisions. Furthermore,
this is only valid to understand the milieu under which a power granted as a
fundamental right guaranteed is present and must be understood. It is to
sharpen the issues and the context of the ratio decidendi that will emerge.
168
CONST., art. I I, sec . 17 provides:
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may
I
be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets , liabilities, and net worth. In the case
of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Ca bine t, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional oftices, and ofticers of the armed forces with
general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
Dissenting Opinion 48 G.R. No. 237428
It was only in the year 2009 that the Judicial and Bar Council first
required candidates to the Judiciary to submit Statements of Assets and
Liabilities as part of the documentary requirements. Even then, only
candidates from the private sector, who were applying for a position in the
appellate courts, were required to submit their Statements of Assets and
Liabil ities.171
In the January 20, 2010 announc ement172 for the opening of the position
of Chief Justice following the retirement on May 17, 2010 of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, the Judicial and Bar Council required applicants or
recommendees to submit six (6) copies of each of the following documents:
16
'! Navarro v. O.ffrce of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 210128. August 17, 2016 [Per J. Mendoza, Second
Division) summarized the contents of Section 8, Republic Act No. 6713 as:
I
"[T]hat it is the duty of public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath
of their assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests, including those of their spouses
and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. The sworn
statement is embodied in a proforma document with specific blanks to be filled out with the necessary
data or information. Insofar as the details for real properties are concerned, the information required to
be disclosed are limited to the following: I) kind, 2) location, 3) year acquired, 4) mode of acquisition,
5) assessed valu e, 6) current fair market value, and 7) acquisition cost."
170
Republic Act No. 3019, sec.7 provides:
Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval
of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as
well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall
prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of
Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members
of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the
corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement
of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers
assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in
the following months of January.
171
Ad Cautelam Manifestation/ Submission, Annex 21, p. 15.
172
Published in Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. A14.
Dissenting Opinion 49 G.R. No. 237428
Personal Data Sheet (JBC Form 1 downloadable from the JBC Website ... )
Proof of Filipino Citizenship
ID Picture (2x2)
Cert. of Good Standing or latest Official Receipt from the IBP National
Treasurer
ITR for the past two (2) years
2010 Clearances from NBI, Ombudsman, IBP, Office of the Bar Confidant
and employer
Transcript of School Records
2010 Police Clearance from place of residence
Certificate of Admission to the Bar (with Bar Rating)
The January 20, 2010 and June 24, 2010 announcements for vacancies
in the Supreme Court, the first of which pertained to the position of Chief
Justice, did not require the applicants and recommendees to submit their
Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Despite the constitutional requirement
that a member of the Judiciary should be of "proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence," the Judicial and Bar Council, until recently, has
not consistently required the submission of Statements of Assets and
Liabilities for applicants to the Judiciary.
Liabilities for the past two (2) years, while applicants in private practice were
required to submit their Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the preceding
year. Likewise, it was only during the vacancy left by Chief Justice Corona's
impeachment that the Judicial and Bar Council required the submission of all
previous Statements of Assets and Liabilities for applicants in government
service.17 4
Clearly, the Judicial and Bar Council recognized that the Statement of
Assets and Liabilities is merely a tool in determining if an applicant possesses
integrity and is not the actual measure of integrity.
The Judicial and Bar Council's own internal rules recognize that
integrity is a collection of attributes that tend to show "the quality of a person's
character,"175 and as such, the Judicial and Bar Council in its discretion has
prescribed the submission of select documents and formulated other processes
which may allow it to best determine if a candidate possesses the required
integrity for the position.
This Court in Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho 178 stressed that the
failure to disclose assets or the misdeclaration of assets in a Statement of
Assets and Liabilities does not automatically translate to dishonesty. Rather,
what the Statement of Assets and Liabilities law aims to guard against are
accumulated wealth of public servants that are grossly disproportionate to
their income or other sources of income, and which cannot be properly
In this case, the discrepancies in the statement of Racho's assets are not the
results of mere carelessness. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence
pointing to a conclusion that Racho is guilty of dishonesty because of his
unmistak ble intent to cover up the true source of his questioned bank
deposits,.
It is within the discretion of the Judicial and Bar Council to decide that
the mere failure to file a Statement of Assets and Liabilities or misdeclaration
or omission of assets in a Statement of Assets and Liabilities, without any
evidence of disproportionate or unexplained wealth, cannot be said to be
reflective of one's lack of integrity. I find no transgression of the Constitution
when the Judicial and Bar Council does so.
IX
The Judicial and Bar Council, in the proper exercise of its constitutional
mandate, considered respondent's application and after finding that she
substantially complied with the requirements and possessed all of the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the position of Chief
Justice, included her in the shortlist for the consideration of the President.
That process is not being assailed in this quo warranto proceeding.
Under the guise of this Court's power of supervision over the Judicial
and Bar Council, the majority wants to supplant their own finding of
respondent's lack of integrity over that of the Judicial and Bar Council's
determination of respondent as a person of proven integrity.
The Judicial and Bar Council is under the supervision of the Supreme
180
Court and may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it.181 This Court's supervision over the Judicial and Bar
I
179
Id. at 164.
°
18
CONST. art. VIII, sec. 8(1 ).
181
CONST. art VIII, sec. 8(5).
Dissenting Opinion 52 G.R. No. 237428
The Court goes beyond its constitutional role when its actions amount
to control and not merely supervision. The varied composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council is testament to its uniqueness with members that come not
only from the Judiciary, but from the Executive and Legislative branches , the
academe, and the private sector. While the Court possesses the power of
control and supervision over members of the Judiciary and the legal
profession, it does not have the same authority over the Secretary of Justice,
a representative of Congress or a member of the private sector.187
This Court's power of supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council
cannot be read as authority to interfere with the Judicial and Bar Council's
discretion in performing its constitutional mandate . At most, this Court's
supervision is administrative in nature. 18 8
182
183
18
C ONS T. art VII I, sec. 8( I) .
A.M. No. 03-11- l 6-SC , Sec. 4( a). A Resolution Strengthening the Role and Capacity of the Judi cial and
Ba,· Council and Establishing the O ff ic es Therein.
C ONST. art VIII, sec. 8(3 ).
I
1 85
CONS T. art VIII, sec. 8(4).
186
Drilon v. Lim, 305 Phil. 146 (199 4) [ Pe r J. Cruz, En Banc].
187
J. Leonen, Co ncurrin g Opinion in Aguinaldo v. Aq uino Ill, G.R . No. 224302 (Novembe r 29, 2016) [Per
J. Leonardo- De Castro, En Banc] .
188
J. Leon en, Diss ent ing Opinion in Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460 (201 4) [Per .I. Mendoza, En Banc].
1 89
629 Phil. 629 (20 I 0) fPer J. Bersamin, En Banc] .
Dissenting Opinion 53 G.R. No. 237428
Court, so also cannot the Court intervene in the JBC 's authority to
discharge its principaljimction. In this sense, the JBC is fully independent
as shown by A.M. No. 03-11-16-SC or Resolution Strengthening the Role
and Capacity of the Judicial and Bar Council and Establishing the Offices
Therein. In both cases, however and unless otherwise defined by the Court
(as in A.M. No. 03-11-16-SC), the Court can supervise by ensuring the
legality and correctness of these entities' exercise of their powers as to
means and manner, and interpreting/or them the constitutional provisions,
laws and regulations qffecting the means and manner of the exercise oft heir
powers as the Supreme Court is the final authority on the interpretation of
these instruments....190 (Emphasis supplied)
The dissent in Jardeleza v. Sereno191 then stressed that this Court should
observe restraint in reviewing the Judicial and Bar Council's vetting process
so as not to unnecessarily interfere with the nomination and appointment of
its own Members:
190
Justice Brion, Separate Opinion in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 736 (20 I 0) [Per
J. Bersamin, En Banc]. ·
I
191
741 Phil. 460 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
192
J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]
193
757 Phil. 534 (2015) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
194
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20I6/november2016/224302.pdt>
[Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc] .
Dissenting Opinion 54 G.R. No. 237428
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
196
J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Aguina ldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 [Per J.
Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc] citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J.
Laurel, En Banc] and CONST., art. VIII , sec. I.
197
See Ganaden, et al. v. Court of Appeal s, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 and 170510- 11 , June I, 2011 , 650
SCRA 117 [Per J. Yillarama, Jr., Third Division] and Ysidoro v. Hon. De Castro, G.R. Nos. 171513 and
190963, February 6, 20 I 2, 665 SCRA I [Per J. Brion, Second Divis ion].
Dissenting Opinion 56 G.R. No. 237428
the duty not only of the Court but likewise by the legal profession which
includes the Solicitor General.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court is not political in that way. By
providing for a term until the age of 70, the Constitution ensures that the vision
of each member of the Court is for the longer term, and therefore, that
decisions are made, not merely to address pragmatic needs, but long term
principles as well. The Court is expected to be the last resort even in
determining whether a political majority has transgressed its constitutional
power or a fundamental right of the minority.
Thus, even the majority of this Court must be shielded against the
majority's power to remove. Their removal should also be done only through
impeachment and conviction.
It cannot be denied that there are dire consequences in granting this Quo
Warranto Petition.
Fourth, there will be no security of tenure for justices of this Court who
will consistently dissent against the majority.
Fifth, this precedent opens the way to reviewing actions of the Judicial
Bar Council and the President. It is an illicit motion for reconsideration
against an appointment, even long after the exercise of judicial power.
XI
This dissent, however, should not be read as a shield for the respondent
to be accountable for her actions.
Unfortunately, in her efforts to save her tenure of public office she held
as a priviiege, this nuance relating to this Court's role in the constitutional
democracy may have been lost on the respondent. She may have created too
much of a political narrative which elided her own accountability and
backgrounded her responsibilities as a member of this Court.
that the facts before her may not be the entire reality. The conclusion that the
initial effort to hold her to account for her acts was an attack on the entire
judiciary itself should have been a judgment that should have been carefully
weighed.
It was unfortunate that this seemed to have created the impression that
she rallied those in political movements with their own agenda, tolerating
attacks on her colleagues in social and traditional media. She may have
broken the expectations we have had on parties to cases by speaking sub
Judice on the merits of the Quo Warranto Petition and her predictions on its
outcome. She may not have met the reasonable expectation of a magistrate
and a Chief Justice that, whatever the reasons and even at the cost of her own
personal d isco mfo rt, she-as the leader of this Court-should not be the first
to cause public shame and humiliation of her colleagues and the institution
she represents.
The claim that the present actions against her was because of her
constant position against the administration is belied by her voting record in
this Court.
198
G.R. No. 231658, Jul y 4, 2017
<http:// sc.j udic iary.gov .ph/ pdf /web/vie wer.htm l?fi le =/jur is prudence /20 1 7/ju ly20 I 7/231 6 58.pdt> [Per J .
De l Castillo, En Banc].
99
! G. R. No. 23 16 71 , Ju ly 25, 201 7
<http://sc ,jud ici ary.go v.ph/pdf/ web /vie wer.html? fi le =/juris prudence /20 I7/j u ly20 1 7/231671 . pd t> [ Pe r J .
Leo nardo- De C astro).
200
G. R. No. 227757, Ju ly 25, 2017
<http: //sc.jud ici ary.gov . ph/ pd f/web/vie wer.htm l?file=/ju ris pr udenc e/ 20 1 7/july 20 l 7/227757.pd t> [Per J .
Pe r las-Berna be, En Banc].
101
G. R. No . 225442, Au gust 8, 2017
<ht tp:// sc.j udici ary.gov .ph/pd f/web /vie wer. htm l?fi le =/juris pr udenc e/ 20 17/august20 I 7/225442.pd t>
[Per J . Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 59 G.R. No. 237428
majority and concurred in the main opm1on, which upheld the curfew
ordinance in Quezon City on the ground that the ordinance, as crafted, did not
violate the constitutional rights of minors.
If true, the claim that the present status quo caused her difficulties due
to her positions is, therefore, puzzling.
XII
On the matter of my leave, please take note that due to the demands
of the Senate trial where I intend to fully set out my defenses to the baseless
charges, I will take an indefinite leave, until I shall have completed my
preparation for the Senate trial, a portion of which will be charged against
my wellness leave under A.M. No. 07-11-02-SC (Re: Wellness Program of
all Justices for 2018), originally from March 12 to 23, 2018, to March 1 to
15, 2018. I will be submitting the requisite forms to the Clerk of Court.
Strangely, the letter was not addressed to her colleagues. Neither were
they given the courtesy of being furnished copies of her letter. /
202
725 Phil. 380 (2014) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
201
G.R. No. .212426, January 12, 2016
<htt p://sc.judi ciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/view er.html? file= /juris prudence/20 l 6/july201 6/21 2426.pdf> [Per
C.J. Sereno , En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 60 G.R. No. 237428
Dear Colleagues:
Thank you.
Her follow-up letter highlighted the inaccuracies over what was agreed
upon during the February 27, 2018 En Banc session. Her camp's propensity to
spin facts into a story that would closely hew to their narrative of respondent
as the righteous and steadfast defender of the Judiciary should have been kept
in check. There is a difference between sober advocacy and reckless media
spm.
The Clerk of Court and the Office of the Court Administrator will be
informed and ordered to inform all courts and offices accordingly.
The Court's statement reveals what really happened during the En Banc
session and confirms that contrary to her team's pronouncements to the media
that it was her choice to go on leave, respondent was in truth asked by her
peers to go on an indefinite leave. There was no reason for the En Banc to
reveal such a delicate and sensitive matter which occurred within its
chambers, but respondent's inaccurate statement meant that the En Banc had
no choice but to correct her in order to preserve the Court's integrity.
The Chief Justice understands the sense of the thirteen (13) justices
that they expected me, in the normal course of events, to cause the
announcement of my indefinite leave. I had agreed to go on an indefinite
leave, but I am also bound by the appropriate administrative rules. The rules
do not contain any provision on "indefinite leave." I had to qualify my leave
according to the provisions of Rule 7, Section 6(c) of the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court which reads "(c) Members who are on wellness leave or
who are on vacation or sick leave, for at least fifteen (15) continuous
calendar days shall be exempt from raffle. xxx" and the Resolution dated
January 23, 2018 (A.M. No. 07-11-02-SC) on the matter of my approved
wellness leave. I requested yesterday in writing the rescheduling of my
wellness leave in view of my restudy of the rules. It is unfortunate that my
plan of making use of any already approved wellness leave in relation to an /J
indefinite leave was inaccurately conveyed for which I apologize. ,,.-'\:;_
Dissenting Opinion 62 G.R. No. 237428
I have not resigned and I will not resign. This indefinite leave is not
a resignation. I will devote my time to the preparation of my Senate defense
and work on the cases in my docket.
The respondent knows fully well that she is a party to her case. For her
to report to control the bureaucracy of the Court-such as the Clerk of Court
and its process servers-when her case is for decision, and for her to put
herself in a position to be engaged in ex parte communication with the sitting
justices who will decide her case, border on the contumacious. At the very
least, this appears to violate Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:
Canon l 3 - A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the Court.
XIII
This Court has its faults, and I have on many occasions written
impassioned dissents against my esteemed colleagues. But, there have always
been just, legal, and right ways to do the right thing. As a Member of this
Court, it should be reason that prevails. We should maintain the highest levels
of ethics and professional courtesy even as we remain authentic to our
convictions as to the right way of reading the law. Despite our most solid
belief that we are right, we should still have the humility to be open to the
possibility that others may not see it our way. As mature magistrates, we
should be aware that many of the reforms we envision will take time.
It is reasonable to expect that the Chief Justice should have the broadest
equanimity, to have an open mind, and to show leadership by being the first
to defend her Court against underserved, speculative, callous, ad hominem,
and irrelevant attacks on their personal reputation. She should be at the
forefront to defend the Court against unfounded speculation and attacks.
Unfortunately, in her campaign for victory in this case, her speeches may have
goaded the public to do so and without remorse.
This is not the end for those who fight for judicial independence. This
is not the end for those who articulate a vision of social justice against the
unjustness of the politically dominant. There are still many among us in the
Judiciary.
J
Disse nting Opinion 64 G.R. No. 237428
Those who choose to make personal sacrifices leave the most important
lesson that can etch into our history that can be emulated by present and future
Justices of this Court: having a soul where the genuine humility of servant
leadership truly resides .
Today, perhaps, a torch may just have been passed so that those who are
left may shine more brightly. Perhaps, an old torch will be finally rekindled:
one which will light the way for a more vigilant citizenry that is sober,
analytical, and organized enough to demand decency and a true passion for
justice from all of government.
It is with all conviction that I vote to dismiss this Quo Warranto Petition.
In my view, it should not even have been given due course. I am convinced
that the majority opinion will weaken the role of the Judiciary to deliver social
justice and assert our fundamental rights.
I dissent.