Republic v. Sereno
Republic v. Sereno
Republic v. Sereno
237428
EN BANC
SERENO, C.J.,*
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
- versus - LEONEN,
JARDELEZA,
CAGUIOA,
MARTIRES,
TIJAM,
REYES, JR., and
GESMUNDO, JJ.
Promulgated:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Respondent. ____________________
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Whoever walks in integrity and with moral character walks securely,
but he who takes a crooked way will be discovered and punished.
No Part.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 237428
No one is above the law and the Constitution, not even a Chief Justice
who took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land. The Court in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,3 says
it tritely – “the Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court.”4 All public officers whether in the Executive,
Legislative or Judicial departments are bound to follow the law. If a public
officer violates the law, he or she shall suffer punishment, sanctions and
adverse consequences. The obligatory force of the law is necessary because
once we allow exceptions, concessions, waiver, suspension or non-
application to those who do not want to follow the law, nobody else will
obey the law.
The Case
The Antecedents
8
Annex “D” of the Petition.
9
Id. at 173.
10
Id. at 850-851.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 237428
attached a copy of her SALN for 198923 which she supposedly sourced from
the “filing cabinets”24 or “drawers of U.P.”25 Similarly, despite having been
employed as legal counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to
2009, there is likewise no showing that she filed her SALNs for these years,
except for the SALN ending December 31, 2009 which was unsubscribed
and filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court only on June 22, 2012.
23
Id. at 1727-1728.
24
TSN, Oral Arguments on April 10, 2018, p. 105.
25
TSN, Oral Arguments on April 10, 2018, p. 120.
26
Id. at 67-70.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 174.
29
Id. at 1729-1730.
30
TSN, Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives.
31
TSN, Oral Arguments dated April 10, 2018.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 237428
employment vis-á-vis the SALNs filed by her and available on record are as
follows:
When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012,
the JBC announced32 the opening for application and recommendation of the
32
Id. at 83.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 237428
position of Chief Justice. During the 2012 deliberations for the position of
the Chief Justice, the members of the JBC En Banc were Associate Justice
Diosdado M. Peralta (Justice Peralta) as Acting ex officio Chairman;
Undersecretary Michael Frederick L. Musngi as ex officio member vice Leila
M. De Lima; Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Representative Niel
Tupas as ex officio members representing the Congress; Justice Regino C.
Hermosisima Jr. as regular member representing the retired Supreme Court
Justices; Justice Aurora Santiago Lagman as regular member representing
the Private Sector; Atty. Maria Milagros N. Fernan-Cayosa as regular
member representing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and Atty. Jose V.
Mejia as regular member representing the academe. The JBC Executive
Committee (Execom) was composed of the JBC Regular Members and
assisted by the Office of the Executive Officer (OEO) headed by Atty.
Annaliza S. Ty-Capacite (Atty. Capacite).
On June 25, 2012, the JBC En Banc resolved not to require the
incumbent Supreme Court Justices who are candidates for the Chief Justice
position to submit other documentary requirements, particularly the
required clearances. Instead, the JBC En Banc required the incumbent
Justices to submit only the SALNs, bank waiver, medical certificate,
laboratory results and the PDS.
xxxx
The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly the
candidates coming from the government, and identified who among them
would be considered to have substantially complied:
38
JBC Announcement dated June 19, 2012; id. at 2190.
39
Id. at 71-72.
40
Id. at 73-74.
41
Id. at 75-77.
42
Id. at 269.
43
Id. at 174-175.
44
Minutes of JBC Meeting dated July 6, 2012.
45
Annex “17” of the Comment.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 237428
Thus, on July 20, 2012, the ORSN, through its then Chief Atty.
Richard Pascual (Atty. Pascual), inquired as to respondent’s SALNs for the
years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999.48 During the Congressional hearings on
impeachment, Atty. Pascual would later on testify that he asked respondent
to submit her SALNs from 1996 to 2006, or spanning a period of 10 years. 49
During the Oral Arguments, respondent would maintain that Atty. Pascual
only required her to submit her SALNs from 1995-1999 and did not ask for
her more recent SALNs. Either way, the years requested from respondent are
within the period (1986 to 2006) covered by her employment with the U.P.
College of Law.
xxxx
me.
x x x x51
The letter dated July 23, 2012 was received by the Office of the
Administrative and Financial Services (OAFS) and copies thereof were
received by the offices of the JBC regular members, the ORSN and the
OEO.52 The letter, however, was neither examined by the JBC regular
members nor was it deliberated upon either by the JBC En Banc or the
Execom.53 Although the determination of whether a candidate has
substantially complied with the documentary requirements was delegated to
the Execom, the latter could not produce any minutes of the meeting or
record that the members thereof deliberated on the July 23, 2012 letter of
51
Id. at 78-79.
52
See Comment of Executive Officer Atty. Capacite in A.M. No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-
11-17-SC, p. 5.
53
See Joint Comment of Atty. Mejia and Atty. Cayosa in A.M. No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-
11-17-SC, p. 6.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 237428
respondent.54
1. Carpio, Antonio T.
2. Abad, Roberto A.
3. Brion, Arturo D.
4. Jardeleza, Francis H.
5. Sereno, Maria Lourdes P.A.
6. Zamora, Ronaldo B.
7. Leonardo-De Castro, Teresita J.
8. Villanueva, Cesar L.
54
Letter dated April 6, 2018 of Atty. Capacite to the Office of Justice Tijam, certifying that there
was no such minutes of meeting. The letter states:
xxxx
This pertains to your request (through a telephone call) this afternoon for a copy of the
minutes of a meeting wherein the Executive Committee of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) supposedly
made a determination after the 20 July 2012 JBC En Banc meeting of who among the candidates for the
Chief Justice position had or had not substantially complied with the documentary requirements for the said
post.
As I have earlier informed you, no such minutes is extant in our records.
x x x x.
55
See Annex “C” of the Joint Comment of Atty. Mejia and Atty. Cayosa in A.M. No. 17-11-12-SC
and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC,
56
Id. at 278-279.
Decision 15 G.R. No. 237428
The foregoing sworn declarations made during the hearings before the
House Committee on Justice spawned two relevant incidents: one, the
proposal of the House Committee for this Court to investigate on the
proceedings of the JBC relative to the nomination of respondent as Chief
Justice which is now presently docketed as A.M. No. 17-11-12 and A.M. No.
17-11-17-SC; and two, the Letter62 dated February 21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio
Mallari to the OSG requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against respondent.
57
Id. at 176-177.
58
TSN dated February 7, 2018, VI-3, Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives.
59
TSN dated Febraury 12, 2018, LCLV, XIII-2, Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives.
60
TSN dated February 12, 2018, HLEF, XXII-3, Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives.
61
TSN dated February 12, 2018, LCLV, XXVIII-4, Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives.
62
Id. at 93-94.
Decision 16 G.R. No. 237428
The Republic, through the OSG, claims that an action for quo
warranto is the proper remedy to question the validity of respondent's
appointment. It alleges that the instant petition is seasonably filed within the
one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66, 63 of the Rules of
Court since respondent's transgressions only came to light during the
proceedings of the House Committee on Justice on the allegations of the
impeachment complaint filed against her. Alternatively, the Republic claims
that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the
maxim nullum tempus occurit regi.
requirement.68
strength of Section 2,70 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and the cases of
Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,71 Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan,72 In Re: First
Indorsement from Hon. Gonzales,73 and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment Against Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio,74 the Chief
Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment. Respondent
contends that the use of the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section
2, Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that Members of the
Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
According to respondent, the clear intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can
be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.
Respondent avers that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file
her SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her
70
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
71
213 Phil. 288 (1984).
72
241 Phil. 162 (1988).
73
243 Phil. 167 (1988).
74
En Banc Resolution dated August 10, 2012 in A.M. No. 12-8-4-SC.
Decision 19 G.R. No. 237428
The Republic maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office”
in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the
Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment and
disagrees with respondent’s interpretation that the word “may” qualifies only
the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office.
The Republic claims that respondent’s interpretation would lead to an absurd
situation in the event that the Senate imposes a lesser penalty, like
suspension of the President, which would result in a vacancy in the position
not intended by the Constitution. This is because vacancy in the Office of the
President occurs only in case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation, in which event the Vice-President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term.
Further, the Republic claims that even if it be assumed that the one-
year period applies against the State, it cannot be deemed to have been
75
406 Phil. 1 (2001).
76
En Banc Resolution dated May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748.
77
647 Phil. 122 (2010).
78
599 Phil. 258 (2009).
Decision 21 G.R. No. 237428
In any case, the Republic claims that the unique circumstances of the
instant case behoove this Court to be liberal in interpreting the one-year
reglementary period.
position. In this case, the filing of SALN is neither an official duty nor a
function attached to a position of a U.P. College of Law Professor. In any
case, the Republic claims that it has successfully disputed such presumption
through the Certifications it presented from U.P. and the Ombudsman.
The Republic also argues that respondent's claim of good faith is not a
defense. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 301980 and R.A. No. 671381 are special
laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein
malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial. Thus, her act of blaming
the Review and Compliance Committee of U.P. for its failure to inform her
that she had no SALNs on file does not exonerate her. The Republic further
notes that respondent resorted to the fallacy of tu quoque – a diversionary
tactic by using the fault of others to justify one's own fault.
Respondent insists that she can be removed from office only through
impeachment. In addition to the arguments raised in her Comment Ad
Cautelam, respondent asserts that impeachment was chosen as the method of
removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from
harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their functions
which are vital to the continued operations of government. Such purpose,
according to respondent, would be defeated if Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution would not be construed as providing an exclusive means for the
removal of impeachable officers. Respondent argues that it would be absurd
for the framers of the Constitution to provide a very cumbersome process for
removing said officers only to allow a less difficult means to achieve the
same purpose.
Respondent contends that the Republic, in citing the 2010 PET Rules
and the cases of Estrada v. Desierto83 and Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines and/or Oliver Lozano v. President Corazon Aquino et al.,84
erroneously lumps together the Chief Justice, the President and the Vice-
President, simply because they are all impeachable officers. Respondent
argues that there are substantial distinctions between the President and Vice-
President on the one hand, and Members of the Supreme Court on the other:
first, unlike Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the
Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the President and the Vice-President, there is no similar
provision with respect to the other impeachable officials, i.e., the Members
of this Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commission or the
Ombudsman; and second, the President and Vice-President are elected
officials while the other impeachable officers are appointive officials.
Respondent avers that she complied with the SALN laws as Professor
of the U.P. College of Law and that the law presumes regularity in the filing
of SALNs. According to respondent, that at least 11 of her SALNs have
been found tends to prove a pattern of filing, rather than non-filing.
her U.P. SALNs and she has direct proof that she executed at least 12
SALNs as a U.P. Professor. She stresses that the U.P. HRDO has thrice
“cleared” her of all administrative responsibilities and administrative
charges.
Respondent also claims that she was not even required to file a SALN
from 1986 to 1991 because her status and appointment then was merely
temporary. According to her, the fact that she served as counsel for the
Republic for the PIATCO cases in 2004, 2005 and 2006 does not negate her
defense that under the law, she was not required to file her SALNs for the
years when she was on leave and was not receiving compensation arising
from public office (i.e., 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2006).
In explaining her statement before the JBC that her SALNs were
irretrievable, respondent avers that she honestly could not retrieve copies
from U.P. over the course of a weekend given to her to complete her missing
documentary requirements. She declares that she did not keep copies of her
SALNs and she was not required to do so by law.
Respondent asserts that her 2009 SALN was not belatedly filed. She
explains that her 2009 SALN is an entry SALN which she originally filed on
September 16, 2010 within thirty (30) days after her assumption of office as
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. According to her, the revised
2009 SALN which has the annotation “revised as of 22 June 2012,” is a
revised version executed in June 2012 to more accurately reflect the
acquisition cost of certain assets declared in 2010.
considers her 2006 SALN as one of the missing SALNs she is still trying to
locate.
Respondent claims that she could not recall all the circumstances why
her 1998 SALN was executed only in 2003 which, according to her, was
reasonable since it happened 15 years ago. She claims that there is no law
prohibiting her from submitting the same, and the fact that the SALN was
filed serves the purpose of the law and negates any intention to hide
unexplained wealth.
With regard to the jewelry she acquired from 1986 to 1991 which
were supposedly declared in her 1991 SALN but were undeclared in her
1990 SALN, respondent avers that these assets were actually declared in her
1985 and 1989 SALNs, and they were consistently declared in all her
subsequent SALNs beginning 1991. According to respondent, she should
not be faulted for her inadvertent omission to declare such assets in her 1990
SALN as her declaration of the same thereafter is consistent with good faith
and cured whatever error there may have been in her 1990 SALN. She
argues that said assets were not manifestly disproportionate to her lawful
income and even as a U.P. Professor, she could have afforded to purchase
jewelry worth Php15,000.00 over a span of six (6) years.
A few hours after the filing of the Capistrano et. al.,'s Comment-in-
Intervention, another set of intervenors composed of: (1) BAYAN MUNA
Representative (Rep.) Carlos Isagani Zarate; (2) ACT Teachers Partylist
Rep. Antonio Tinio & Francisca Castro; (3) GABRIELA Women's Party
Rep. Emerenciana De Jesus & Arlene Brosas; (3) ANAKPAWIS Partylist
Rep. Ariel Casilao; (5) KABATAAN Partylist Rep. Sarah Jane Elago; (6)
Convenors and members of Movement Against Tyranny (MAT), namely:
Francisco A. Alcuaz, Bonifacio P. Ilagan, & Col. George A. Rabusa (Ret.);
Decision 29 G.R. No. 237428
(7) Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag; (8) Bishop Broderick S. Pabillo,
D.D.; (9) Secretary Gen. of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN)
Renato M. Reyes, Jr.; (10) Member of MDD Youth (an Affiliate of Aksyon
Demokratiko) Kaye Ann Legaspi; and (11) Secretary General of National
Union of People's Lawyers Atty. Ephraim B. Cortez (Zarate, et al.,) filed a
Motion for Leave to File Motion to Intervene and Opposition-in-
Intervention, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. They claim that as
citizens and taxpayers, they have a legal interest in the matter of
respondent's ouster or removal.
Zarate et al. raise the similar argument that the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court may only be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust and that it is
only the Congress who has the power to remove the Chief Justice through
the exclusive mode of impeachment.
As well, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed its Motion
for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Opposition-in-Intervention as an
organization of all Philippine lawyers, having the fundamental duty to
uphold the Constitution and an interest in ensuring the validity of the
appointments to the Judiciary. The IBP's arguments reflect the arguments of
the respondent and the other movant-intervenors that the quo warranto
petition is time-barred and is unavailable against an impeachable officer. The
IBP further argues that the determination of whether respondent is of
“proven integrity” belongs to the JBC and which question the Court cannot
inquire into without violating the separation of powers. It is likewise the
contention of the IBP that the petition is fatally flawed since the JBC never
required the submission of respondent's SALNs from 2001 to 2006.
Decision 30 G.R. No. 237428
In the said Motion, Senators De Lima and Trillanes assert that they
possess a clear legal interest, both personal and official, in the subject matter
of the Republic's petition to oust the Chief justice on the ground that she
does not possess the constitutional requirement of integrity. According to
Senators De Lima and Trillanes, they have the right and duty to uphold the
Constitution and to oppose government actions that are clearly and patently
unconstitutional. It is also Senators De Lima and Trillanes' theory that the
instant quo warranto case is aimed to deprive the Senate of its jurisdiction as
the impeachment tribunal. They argue that their mandated duty as judges in
the possible impeachment trial of the Chief Justice will be pre-empted and
negated if the quo warranto petition will be granted. Their claimed legal
interest in their intervention in and opposition to the petition for quo
warranto is mainly anchored upon their duty and prerogatives as Senators-
judges in an impeachment trial and to protect the institution of impeachment
as a mode of enforcing accountability.
Senators De Lima and Trillanes also advance the argument that the
Constitution identifies and enumerates only three qualifications for
appointment to the Supreme Court: (1) natural born citizenship; (2) age,
i.e., at least forty years; and (3) an experience of at least 15 years either as
judge of a lower court or in the practice of law in the Philippines. They
assert that the filing of a SALN, taking of psychological or physical
examination, and similar requirements, are merely discretionary
administrative requirements for consideration of the JBC, not Constitutional
requirements, hence, can be waived, removed entirely, or adjusted by the
JBC in the exercise of its discretion. According to the said movant-
intervenors, Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that,“[a] Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
Decision 31 G.R. No. 237428
The Issues
From the arguments raised by the parties and the issues as delineated
in the Advisory governing the special Oral Arguments by way of
accommodation to respondent, the paramount issues to be resolved by the
Court are:
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course
to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent who is an
impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has
already been filed with the House of Representatives;
89
Id.
Decision 33 G.R. No. 237428
Preliminary Issues
their “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the
Philippine Constitution”. The movant-intervenors further assert a “public
right” to intervene in the instant case by virtue of its “transcendental
importance for the Filipino people as a whole”. Apart from such naked
allegations, movant-intervenors failed to establish to the Court’s satisfaction
the required legal interest. Our jurisprudence is well-settled on the matter:
Indeed, if every person, not parties to the action but assert their desire
to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, were allowed to intervene,
proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive, and
91
Ongco v. Dalisay, 691 Phil. 462, 469-470 (2012) citing Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. v.
Northeast Freight Forwarders, Inc., 600 Phil. 789, 799 (2009).
92
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Estanislao Miñoza, 656 Phil. 537, 547
(2011).
Decision 35 G.R. No. 237428
interminable.93
The remedy of quo warranto is vested in the people, and not in any
private individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are
viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a
private quarrel among rival claimants.94
institute proceedings against any other violator of the law. That general
public interest is not sufficient to authorize a private citizen to institute
such proceedings, for, if it was, then every citizen and every taxpayer
would have the same interest and the same right to institute such
proceedings, and a public officer might, from the beginning to the end of
his term, be harassed with proceedings to try his title.
The only time that an individual, in his own name, may bring an
action for quo warranto is when such individual has a claim over the
position in question. Section 5 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
For these reasons, the Court, in its Resolution 96 dated April 3, 2018,
resolved to deny the motions for intervention respectively filed by
Capistrano et al., and Zarate et al., and to note the IBP's intervention. For
similar reasons, the Court resolves to deny the motion for intervention of
Senators De Lima and Trillanes.
recuse.
On the other hand, respondent was more emphatic when she sought
affirmative relief, in the form of the inhibition of six (6) Justices, of the
Court, whose jurisdiction she questions and assails. Specifically, respondent
prays for the inhibition of Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Diosdado
M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Noel Gimenez Tijam, Teresita J. Leonardo-
De Castro and Samuel R. Martires fundamentally on the ground of actual
bias for having commonly testified before the House Committee on Justice
on the impeachment case.
a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity.”97
of the article which suited her objective of imputing bias against Justice
Tijam.
[T]he second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1,101 does not give judges
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The
inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, We have
noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground
for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has
to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Moreover,
extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. The only exception to the rule is when the error is
so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or
malice.102 (Citations omitted)
In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory
inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of the
Associate Justices participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice
determining probable cause for the impeachment of respondent does not
make them disqualified to hear the instant petition. Their appearance thereat
was in deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional duty
to investigate the impeachment complaint filed against respondent could not
be doubted. Their appearance was with the prior consent of the Supreme
Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the Court set
for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing, should be carefully viewed
within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an adverse
attack against respondent.
100
606 Phil. 615 (2009).
101
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
102
Supra at 638-639.
Decision 40 G.R. No. 237428
103
Dated December 6, 2017.
104
See TSN of the House Committee on Justice dated December 11, 2017, p. XI-2;XVII-1.
Decision 41 G.R. No. 237428
JUSTICE MARTIRES :
Solicitor Calida, would you agree with me na lahat ng taong may
dibdib ay may kaba sa dibdib? At lahat ng taong may ulo ay may katok sa
ulo.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Now would you consider it a mental illness (sic) when a person
always invokes God as the source of his strength? The source of his
inspiration? The source of happiness? The source of everything in life? Is
that a mental illness.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
So, I'm just making a follow-up to the question that Justice Velasco
Decision 43 G.R. No. 237428
earlier asked. So, would you agree with me that the psychiatrist made a
wrong evaluation with respect to the psychiatric report of the Chief
Justice?106
In the same vein, insinuations that the Justices of the Supreme Court
are towing the line of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte in entertaining the quo
warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds
of mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members
of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people
who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to
misrepresent that the Solicitor General who has supposedly met consistent
litigation success before the Supreme Court shall likewise automatically and
positively be received in the present quo warranto action. That the Court
spares the Solicitor General the rod is easily dispelled by the Court's firm
orders in G.R. Nos. 234359 and 234484 concerning alleged extra legal
killings – a case directly concerning the actuations of the executive
department – to provide the Court with documents relative to the Oplan
Tokhang operations and by a uninamous vote, rebuked the Soliciotor
General's plea for reconsideration. Suffice to say that the Court decides
based on the merits of a case and not on the actors or the supposed
benefactors involved.
contrary.
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a
natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in
unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill
behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or
prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to
complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as
yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not
thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his
would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to
assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will
do in a case before him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal
case that a charge made before trial that a party "will not be given a
fair, impartial and just hearing" is "premature." Prejudice is not to
be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation
under his oath to administer justice "without respect to person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich." To disqualify or not to disqualify
himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of
conscience.111 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
108
469 Phil. 373 (2004).
109
Id. at 384-385.
110
128 Phil. 176 (1967).
111
Id. at 182-183.
112
People v. Moreno, 83 Phil. 286, 294 (1949); Perfecto v. Contreras, 28 Phil. 538 (1914); Joaquin
v. Barretto, 25 Phil. 281, 287 (1913).
Decision 45 G.R. No. 237428
In the En Banc case of Jurado & Co. v. Hongkong Bank,114 the Court
elucidated that a challenge to the competency of a judge may admit two
constructions: first, the magistrate decides for himself the question of his
competency and when he does so, his decision therein is conclusive and the
other Members of the Court have no voice in it; and second, the challenged
magistrate sits with the Court and decides the challenge as a collegial body.
It was in Jurado that the Court adopted the second view as the proper
approach when a challenge is poised on the competency of a sitting
magistrate, that is, the Court, together with the challenged magistrate,
decides. Jurado further expressly excluded a possible third construction
wherein the Court decides the challenge but without the participation of the
challenged member on the ground that such construction would place power
on a party to halt the proceedings by the simple expedient of challenging a
majority of the Justices. The Court sees no reason to deviate from its
standing practice of resolving competency challenges as a collegial body
without excluding the challenged Member from participating therein.
113
Dr. Raul M. Sunico v. Judge Pedro Dl. Gutierrez, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457, February 21, 2017.
114
1 Phil. 395 (1902).
Decision 46 G.R. No. 237428
Substantive Issues
I.
The Court has Jurisdiction over the instant
Petition for Quo Warranto
specifically set out in the petition.115 In the instant case, direct resort to the
Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the
qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office
is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special
interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a
public position.116
115
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Assn., Inc. (CREBA) v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 635 Phil.
283, 300 (2010).
116
Republic of the Philippines v. Pablico Corpin, 104 Phil. 49, 53 (1958).
Decision 48 G.R. No. 237428
While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of
the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic,
impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo
warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.
Impeachment
Practically all who have written on the subject agree that impeachment
involves a protection of a public interest, incorporating a public law
element, much like a criminal proceeding....[I]mpeachment is a process
instigated by the government, or some branch thereof, against a person who
has somehow harmed the government or the community. The process,
moreover, is adversarial in nature and resembles, to that extent, a judicial
trial.125
Quo warranto
The oft-cited origin of quo warranto was the reign of King Edward I
of England who questioned the local barons and lords who held lands or title
under questionable authority. After his return from his crusade in Palestine,
he discovered that England had fallen because of ineffective central
administration by his predecessor, King Henry III.126 The inevitable result
was that the barons, whose relations with the King were governed on paper
by Magna Carta, assumed to themselves whatever power the King's officers
had neglected. Thus, King Edward I deemed it wise to inquire as to what
right the barons exercised any power that deviated in the slightest from a
normal type of feudalism that the King had in mind. The theory is that
certain rights are regalia and can be exercised only upon showing of actual
grants from the King or his predecessor. Verily, King Edward’s purpose was
to catalogue the rights, properties and possessions of the kingdom in his
efforts to restore the same.
124
Records of Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 272.
125
<As cited in Matthew R. Romney, The Origins and Scope of Presidential Impeachment,
HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS> (visited on March 15, 2018).
126
Nathan Isaacs, The Statutes of Edward I. Their Relation to Finance and Administration,
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 8 (Jun., 1921), pp. 804-818.
127
See Agcaoili v. Suguitan, supra note 87.
Decision 51 G.R. No. 237428
Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and
impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies
are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining
to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
The term “quo warranto” is Latin for “by what authority.” 128
Therefore, as the name suggests, quo warranto is a writ of inquiry. 129 It
determines whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public office
he or she occupies.130
The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only
directly, by quo warranto proceedings. In the past, the Court held that title
to public office cannot be assailed even through mandamus or a motion to
annul or set aside order.131 That quo warranto is the proper legal vehicle to
directly attack title to public office likewise precludes the filing of a petition
for prohibition for purposes of inquiring into the validity of the appointment
of a public officer. Thus, in Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,132 the Court held:
may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto
where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case certified to
him, the Solicitor General may start the prosecution of the case by filing the
appropriate action in court or he may choose not to file the case at all. The
Solicitor General is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in
actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the
government policy on the matter at hand.136
(a) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the office;
(b) the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, shall recover his costs; and
(c) such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the
public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires.140
Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit"
and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action
pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the
situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Litis
143
Grace Park International Corporation v. Eastwest Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 210606,
July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 644, 651.
144
First Philippine International Bank v. CA, 322 Phil. 280, 303 (1996).
145
City of Taguig v. City of Makati, G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016, 793 SCRA 527, 550.
146
Yap v. Chua, et al., 687 Phil. 392, 400 (2012).
Decision 55 G.R. No. 237428
Ultimately, what is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and
the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or
related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the
process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.149
147
Benavidez v. Salvador, 723 Phil. 332, 342 (2013).
148
City of Taguig v. City of Makati, supra at 551.
149
Yap v. Chua, et al., supra at 399-400.
Decision 56 G.R. No. 237428
In fine, forum shopping and litis pendentia are not present and a final
decision in one will not strictly constitute as res judicata to the other. A
judgment in a quo warranto case determines the respondent’s constitutional
or legal authority to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office
to which he lays claim;154 meanwhile a judgment in an impeachment
proceeding pertain to a respondent’s “fitness for public office.”155
Considering the legal basis and nature of an action for quo waranto,
this Court cannot shirk from resolving the instant controversy in view of the
fact that respondent is an impeachable officer and/or in view of the
possibility of an impeachment trial against respondent.
Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office
only by impeachment on the Court’s ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,156
Cuenco v. Fernan,157 In Re Gonzales,158 Jarque v. Desierto159 and Marcoleta
v. Borra.160 It should be stressed, however, that none of these cases
concerned the validity of an impeachable officer’s appointment. Lecaroz
involved a criminal charge against a mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while
the rest were disbarment cases filed against impeachable officers principally
for acts done during their tenure in public office. Whether the impeachable
152
776 Phil. 623 (2016).
153
SPO2 Jamaca v. People, 764 Phil 683 (2015).
154
Mendoza v. Allas, 362 Phil. 238, 246-247 (1999).
155
Separate Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Francisco v. HRET, supra note 3.
156
213 Phil. 288 (1984).
157
241 Phil. 816 (1988).
158
243 Phil. 167 (1988).
159
En Banc Resolution dated December 5, 1995 in A.C. No. 4509.
160
601 Phil. 470 (2009).
Decision 58 G.R. No. 237428
officer unlawfully held his office or whether his appointment was void was
not an issue raised before the Court. The principle laid down in said cases is
to the effect that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be
criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of
removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to
qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The
proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or
right to the office he or she occupies. The ruling therefore cannot serve as
authority to hold that a quo warranto action can never be filed against an
impeachable officer. In issuing such pronouncement, the Court is presumed
to have been aware of its power to issue writs of quo warranto under Rule
66 of the Rules of Court.
Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of
the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable
officers. Following respondent’s theory that an impeachable officer can be
removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice-
President against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for
the dismissal of the protest on the ground that it can potentially cause his/her
removal from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain
respondent’s position is to render election protests under the PET Rules
nugatory. The Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since
fraud and irregularities in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of
the people as reflected in their votes must be determined and respected. The
Court could not, therefore, have unwittingly curtailed its own judicial power
by prohibiting quo warranto proceedings against impeachable officers.
Further, the PET Rules provide that a petition for quo warranto,
contesting the election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of
ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be filed by
any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten (10)
days after the proclamation of the winner.161 Despite disloyalty to the
161
A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC or The 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, pertinently
provide:
ELECTION CONTESTS
RULE 13. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
RULE 14. How initiated. – An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest
shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
RULE 15. Election protest. – The registered candidate for President or Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified election protest with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner.
RULE 16. Quo warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of the President or Vice- President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within
ten days after the proclamation of the winner.
RULE 17. Contents of the protest or petition. – (A) An election protest or petition for quo
Decision 59 G.R. No. 237428
Republic being a crime against public order162 defined and penalized under
the penal code, and thus may likewise be treated as “other high crimes,” 163
constituting an impeachable offense, quo warranto as a remedy to remove
the erring President or Vice-President is nevertheless made expressly
available.
In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance
of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the
consolidated cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. Macapagal-
Arroyo,164 the Court took cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the quo
warranto petition filed against respondent therein who, at the time of the
filing of the petition, had taken an oath and assumed the Office of the
President. Petitioner therein prayed for judgment confirming him to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity.
In fact, in the said cases, there was not even a claim that respondent therein
was disqualified from holding office and accordingly challenged
warranto shall commonly state the following facts:
(a) the position involved;
(b) the date of proclamation; and
(c) the number of votes credited to the parties per the proclamation.
(B) A quo warranto petition shall also state:
(a) the facts giving the petitioner standing to file the petition;
(b) the legal requirements for the office and the disqualifications prescribed by law;
(c) the protestee’s ground for ineligibility or the specific acts of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines.
(C) An election protest shall also state:
(a) that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
had been voted for the same office.
(b) the total number of precincts of the region, province, or city concerned;
(c) the protested precincts and votes of the parties to the protest in such precincts per the
Statement of Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified, an explanation why the votes
are not specified; and
(d) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral
frauds, anomalies, or irregularities in the protested precincts.
162
Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. — The penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be imposed upon public officers or employees who have failed to resist a
rebellion by all the means in their power, or shall continue to discharge the duties of their offices under the
control of the rebels or shall accept appointment to office under them.
163
Michael J. Gerhardt in "Putting the Law of Impeachment in
Perspective"(1999).FacultyPublications.Paper975.http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/975 made the
following observations:
In the English experience prior to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution,
impeachment was primarily a political proceeding, and impeachable offenses were regarded as "political
crimes." For instance, Raoul Berger observed in his influential study of the impeachment process that the
English practice treated "[h]igh crimes and misdemeanors [as] a category of political crimes against the
state." Berger supported this observation with quotations from relevant periods in which the speakers use
terms equivalent to "political" and "against the state" to identify the distinguishing characteristics of an
impeachable event. In England, the critical element of injury in an impeachable offense had been injury to
the state. The eminent legal historian, Blackstone, traced this peculiarity to the ancient law of treason,
which distinguished "high" treason, which was disloyalty against some superior, from "petit" treason,
which was disloyalty to an equal or an inferior. The late Professor Arthur Bestor explained further
that "[t]his element of injury to the commonwealth-that is, to the state and to its constitution-was
historically the criterion for distinguishing a 'high' crime or misdemeanor from an ordinary one."
(Emphasis ours)
164
406 Phil. 1 (2001).
Decision 60 G.R. No. 237428
165
People v. Amigo, 322 Phil. 40 (1996).
166
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 656 Phil. 246 (2011).
167
Muñoz v. Commission on Elections, 527 Phil. 733 (2006).
168
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 7 (May, 1930), pp. 870-909, published by The Michigan
Law Review Association; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1279763>(visited on April 20, 2018).
Decision 61 G.R. No. 237428
Neither can the Court accept respondent’s argument that the term
“may” in Section 2, Article XI qualifies only the penalty imposable at the
conclusion of the impeachment trial, such that conviction may result in
lesser penalties like censure or reprimand. Section 3(7), Article XI of the
Constitution specifies the penalty of “removal from office” and
“disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines” in
Decision 62 G.R. No. 237428
We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust. 171
Thus, the people have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed
to public office. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as
proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to
169
Section 3(7), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states: “ Judgment in cases of impeachment
shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.”
170
Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549, 552.
171
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 1.
Decision 63 G.R. No. 237428
The essence of quo warranto is to protect the body politic from the
usurpation of public office and to ensure that government authority is
entrusted only to qualified individuals. Reason therefore dictates that quo
warranto should be an available remedy to question the legality of
appointments especially of impeachable officers considering that they
occupy some of the highest-ranking offices in the land and are capable of
wielding vast power and influence on matters of law and policy.
At this juncture, it would be apt to dissuade and allay the fear that a
ruling on the availability of quo warranto would allow the Solicitor General
to “wield a sword over our collective heads, over all our individual heads,
and on that basis, impair the integrity of the Court as a court."174
172
Re: Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients from Paying
Filing, Docket and Other Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009.
173
Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno in Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, 658 Phil. 322 (2011).
174
TSN, Oral Arguments dated April 10, 2018, p. 200.
175
See Section 1 of Executive Order No. 300, July 26, 1987 entitled, Constituting The Office Of
The Solicitor General As An Independent And Autonomous Office Attached To The Department Of Justice
And For Other Purposes
176
Supra note 131.
Decision 64 G.R. No. 237428
Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy
177
See Ramon A. Gonzales vs. Hon. Francisco I. Chavez, 282 Phil. 858, 881 (1992).
Decision 65 G.R. No. 237428
Given the nature and effect of an action for quo warranto, such
remedy is unavailing to determine whether or not an official has committed
misconduct in office nor is it the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's
performance in the office. Apropos, an action for quo warranto does not try
a person's culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo
warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability.
And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly
complements the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in
our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the
legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations
under law. The question of whether a franchisee is in breach of the
franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited
to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one
to which no such function has been delegated by Congress. In the same
way that availability of judicial review over laws does not preclude
178
Sec. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 302 (1998).
179
In Mendoza v. Allas, 362 Phil. 238, 244-245 (1999), the possible outcome of a Petition for Quo
Warranto can be any of the following:
If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is
entitled to the office. If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as
follows:
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right,
privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and
altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover
his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and
to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires."
If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully
holding the same, the court may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right,
privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
180
602 Phil. 625, 669 (2009).
Decision 66 G.R. No. 237428
In the same vein, the fact that the violation of the SALN requirement
formed part of the impeachment complaint does not justify shifting
responsibility to the Congress, no matter how noble the respondent and the
intervenors portray such act to be. The fact remains that the Republic raised
an issue as to respondent's eligibility to occupy the position of Chief Justice,
an obviously legal question, which can be resolved through review of
jurisprudence and pertinent laws. Logic, common sense, reason, practicality
and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an
unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately
if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To
abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of perceived
availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to
sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and
arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment
proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset,
may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law. Evidently, this
scenario would involve waste of time, not to mention unnecessary
disbursement of public funds.
checks and balances as it would dilute the judicial power of courts, upon
which jurisdiction is exclusively vested to rule on actions for quo warranto.
Nevertheless, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to
obliviate confusion in the future as to when quo warranto as a remedy to
oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in keeping with the
Court’s function of harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution,
the Court herein demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at
the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to
hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the
subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the
commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if
it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding,
but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.
For one, at the time of the filing of, and even during the pendency of
the resolution of the instant petition, no impeachment trial has been
commenced by the Senate. In fact, it will be purely skeptical, nay
lackadaisical, on the part of the Court to assume, at the time the petition was
filed, that the House of Representatives will affirm a favorable resolution
with the Articles of Impeachment and that trial will eventually carry on.
exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review. (David v. Macapagal Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
186
Supra note 3, at 919.
187
J/Sr. Supt. Engaño v. Court of Appeals, 526 Phil. 291, 299 (2006).
Decision 70 G.R. No. 237428
In the same breath, the Supreme Court cannot renege on its avowed
constitutional duty and abdicate its judicial power. To do so would similarly
amount to culpable violation of the Constitution. Instead, this Court asserts
its judicial independence and equanimity to decide cases without fear or
favor; without regard as to a party's power or weakness; without regard to
personalities; all to the ultimate end that Our sacrosanct oaths as magistrates
of this Court, which We voluntarily imposed upon ourselves without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion, to support and defend the
Constitution and to obey the laws of the land, are strongly and faithfully
realized.
In repudiating the Court's jurisdiction over her person and over the
subject matter, respondent harps on the fact that as Chief Justice, she is an
impeachable officer who may be removed only by impeachment by the
Senate constituted as an impeachment court. As extensively discussed, the
Court maintains jurisdiction over the present quo warranto proceedings
despite respondent's occupation of an impeachable office, as it is the legality
or illegality of such occupation that is the subject matter of the instant
petition. Further, respondent cannot now be heard to deny the Court's
jurisdiction over her person even as she claims to be an impeachable official
because respondent in fact invoked and sought affirmative relief from the
Court by praying for the inhibition of several Members of this Court and by
moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments, albeit ad cautelam.
II.
The Petition is Not Dismissible
on the Ground of Prescription
The rules on quo warranto, specifically Section 11, Rule 66, provides:
Since the 1960's the Court had explained in ample jurisprudence the
(Emphasis ours.)
191
See Palma v. Hon. Galvez, et al., 629 Phil. 86 (2010); Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh
Division) v. Judge Quilala, 759 Phil. 700 (2008); Herrera-Felix v. Court of Appeals, 479 Phil. 727, 735
(2004).
192
606 Phil. 351 (2011).
193
677 Phil. 351 (2011).
Decision 73 G.R. No. 237428
application of the one-year prescriptive period for filing an action for quo
warranto.
That the present Rule 66 on quo warranto takes root from Act No.
160, which is a legislative act, does not give the one-year rule on
prescription absolute application. Agcaoili v. Suguitan,200 squarely addressed
this non-absolute character of the one-year prescriptive period as follows:
xxxx
made. He had a right to await the answer to his protest, in the confident
belief that it would be resolved in his favor and that action would be
unnecessary.201 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
to say he is too late. Indeed this court has itself decided that, after the
information has once been filed, its discretion ceases, and it has then
nothing to do but administer the law the same as in any other case. 203
(Citations omitted)
In People v. Bailey:204
Appellant claims that the action is barred by the provisions of the statute of
limitations, xxxx We are of the opinion that the established rule of law, as
to the statute of limitations and its bearing upon cases of this character, is
correctly stated in the quotations above made and "that the attorney
general may file the information on behalf of the people at any time,
and that lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding." The law,
in thus permitting the attorney-general, either upon his own information or
upon the information of a private party, to file an information at any time
against one who has unlawfully intruded into and is holding a public
office, does not place the courts or private parties in much danger of
having to deal with stale claims. The action can only be brought with the
consent and permission of the attorney-general of the state, and, it is
to be assumed, he will not permit the institution of such a suit, if by
reason of a great lapse of time the claim has become stale, or for any
other reason the state has ceased to have a present interest in it.
(Citations omitted)
203
State of Rhode Island v. Pawtuxet Turnpike Company (Supreme Court of Rhode Island), Jan 1,
18678 R.I. 521 (R.I. 1867).
204
(District Court of Appeal of California), 30 Cal.App. 581, 584, 585.
205
160 Ill., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 806.
Decision 77 G.R. No. 237428
Governmental functions are those performed for the general public with
respect to the common welfare for which no compensation or particular
benefit is received. xxx Quo warranto proceedings seeking ouster of a
public official are a governmental function. (Citations and annotations
omitted) No statute of limitations is, therefore, applicable. The district
court did not err in denying Meneley's motion to dismiss based on the
statute of limitations. xxxx
The doctrine of laches, furthermore, does not apply when a cause of action
is brought by the State seeking to protect the public. (Citations and
annotations omitted) xxx Having already noted that the quo warranto
action is a governmental function and not a propriety function, we hold the
district court did not err in denying Meneley's motion to dismiss on the
basis of laches.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from
206
(Supreme Court of Kansas) 271 Kan. 355, 372, 22 P.3d 124 (2001).
207
539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
208
Republic of the Phils v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 689, 713 (1989).
209
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:
xxxx
(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.
Decision 78 G.R. No. 237428
the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. People v. City Whittier,210
explains that the remedy of quo warranto is intended to prevent a continuing
exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted. Indeed, on point is People v.
Bailey,211 when it ruled that because quo warranto serves to end a
continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action.
Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person
to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary.
210
People v. City of Whittier (1933) 133 Cal.App. 316, 324; 25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 223 (1955).
211
People v. Bailey (1916) 30 Cal.App. 581, 584, 585.
212
Rollo, pp. 2147-2148.
213
Id. at 2144.
214
Id. at 228.
Decision 79 G.R. No. 237428
feasible for her to retrieve said SALNs from U.P. as her records therein are
more than 15 years old. Notably, these are mere reiterations of her
representations before the JBC.
215
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED
BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION
SHALL BEGIN TO RUN. Approved on December 4, 1926.
216
Rollo, p. 1198.
217
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense
punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after
twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
218
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
x x x x.
Decision 80 G.R. No. 237428
Finally, it bears to stress that this Court finds it more important to rule
on the merits of the novel issues imbued with public interest presented
before Us than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality. The Court
cannot compromise on the importance of settling the controversy
surrounding the highest position in the Judiciary only to yield to the
unacceptable plea of technicality. It is but more prudent to afford the
Republic, as well as the respondent, ample opportunities to present their
cases for a proper and just disposition of the case instead of dismissing the
petition outright on the ground of prescription. Inasmuch as the ultimate
consideration in providing for a one-year prescriptive period was public
interest, so is it the same consideration which prompts this Court not to act
nonchalantly and idly watch title to the public office in question be
continuously subjected to uncertainty. Indeed, dismissal of cases on
technicality is frowned upon especially where public interest is at the other
end of the spectrum.
III.
Respondent is Ineligible as a Candidate and
Nominee for the Position of Chief Justice
A.
The Court Exercises Supervisory Authority
Over the JBC
supervision in general:
Thus, in interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the
JBC, it is consistently held that the Court's supervisory power consists of
seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. As
when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, the Court, through its
supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter
and ensure that the JBC is compliant with its own rules.223
The Constitution also vests upon the JBC the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary and such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.225 On this, Justice Arturo
220
Id. at 50.
221
Hon. Drilon v. Mayor Lim, 305 Phil. 146 (1994).
222
741 Phil. 460 (2014).
223
Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, 757 Phil. 534 (2015).
224
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 8:
xxxx
4.The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations
for the Council.
225
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 8:
xxxx
Decision 82 G.R. No. 237428
Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of
its assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to
determine who to recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how
and when to do its duty, but it can, under its power of supervision,
direct the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being
performed because of JBC’s fault or inaction, or because of
extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard that,
constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC other functions
and duties – a power that suggests authority beyond what is purely
supervisory. 227 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, along this line, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC's actions in the same
category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
Questions of policy or wisdom refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government."230
230
Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
231
369 U.S. 186.
Decision 84 G.R. No. 237428
xxxx
x x x x232
Requirement of these traits stems from the need to ensure the strength
and sustainability of the third branch of the government. Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc.,233 sufficiently explains the state interest involved in
safeguarding judicial integrity:
the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of JBC-009.
True enough, guidelines have been set in the determination of
competence," "probity and independence," "soundness of physical and
mental condition, and "integrity."
The case of Jardeleza, however, is not the first time this Court
interpreted the requirement of integrity. In Samson v. Judge Caballero,235 this
Court dismissed a judge for “obvious lack of integrity” in making a false
statement in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). Meanwhile, in Re: Judge
Jaime V. Quitain,236 this Court declared Judge Quitain to be dishonest and
lacking in integrity when he failed to disclose in his PDS that he was
imposed a penalty of dismissal from service in an administrative case filed
against him.
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office
but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s
faith in the integrity of the Judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.
234
Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno, et al., supra note 222, at 492-494.
235
612 Phil. 737 (2009).
236
JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007
237
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC Adopting the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
(April 27, 2004).
Decision 87 G.R. No. 237428
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of
the defenseless or the oppressed.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he
shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to
the extent necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily
prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
xxxx
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the
bar of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character,
education, or other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
It is also important to note that the Court has always viewed integrity
with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. In
Edaño v. Judge Asdala,238 this Court stated that:
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates
that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
238
555 Phil. 195 (2007).
Decision 88 G.R. No. 237428
Thus, in compliance with their mandate, the JBC provided for Rule 4
on Integrity in JBC-009 Rules,240 as follows:
RULE 4
INTEGRITY
239
Id. at 201.
240
September 23, 2002.
Decision 89 G.R. No. 237428
B.
Compliance with the Constitutional and
statutory requirement of filing of SALN
intimately relates to a person's integrity.
We elaborate:
In 1961, R.A. No. 3019 was amended by R.A. No. 3047 242 by
specifying the period within which a public official should make the
disclosure and enumerating certain public officials who are exempt from the
requirement.
Even during the martial law years, under then President Marcos, the
obligation imposed upon public officers and employees to declare their
assets and liabilities was maintained under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
379243 but with the curious addition that the filing and submission of SALN
are now to be required from all citizens, subject to few exceptions. P.D. No.
379 was later on amended by P.D. No. 417 244 which amended the contents of
the statement and the manner of providing the acquisition cost of the
properties. Yet still, P.D. No. 379 was further amended by P.D. No. 555,245
which prescribed stiffer penalties for violation thereof.
241
Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno in G.R. No. 200238, November
20, 2012.
242
AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION SEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY
HUNDRED AND NINETEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “THE ANTIGRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT” SO AS TO EXEMPT CLASSROOM TEACHERS, LABORERS, CASUAL AND
TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES, AND BARRIO OFFICIAL FROM THE REQUIREMENTS THEREOF.
Approved June 17, 1961.
243
REQUIRING THE SUBMISSION OF STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET
WORTH, January 21, 1974.
244
AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 379 BY
ENLARGING THE COVERAGE OF THE SAME, March 19, 1974.
245
AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 379 ENTITLED "REQUIRING THE
SUBMISSION OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH", September 16, 1974.
Decision 92 G.R. No. 237428
Two years after the birth of the 1987 Constitution, R.A. No. 6713 or
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees246 was enacted and thereby expanded the obligation to disclose
by enumerating the information required to be disclosed as regards the
assets, liabilities, business interests and financial connections; requiring the
identification and disclosure of relatives in government; making the
statements and disclosures available and accessible to the public; and
prohibiting certain acts.
246
February 20, 1989.
Decision 93 G.R. No. 237428
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may
file the required statements jointly or separately.
xxxx
Decision 94 G.R. No. 237428
xxxx
Both Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 and Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019
require the accomplishment and submission of a true, detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities.247 Further, under Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713, non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold
public office. As the Court explained in Hon. Casimiro, et al. v. Rigor:248
247
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission v. The Office of the President, 661 Phil. 643 (2011).
248
749 Phil. 917 (2014).
Decision 95 G.R. No. 237428
employee must make a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net
worth in order to avoid any issue regarding questionable accumulation of
wealth. The importance of requiring the submission of a complete,
truthful, and sworn SALN as a measure to defeat corruption in the
bureaucracy cannot be gainsaid. Full disclosure of wealth in the SALN is
necessary to particularly minimize, if not altogether eradicate, the
opportunities for official corruption, and maintain a standard of honesty in
the public service. Through the SALN, the public can monitor movement
in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a valid check and balance
mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth. The failure to file
a truthful SALN reasonably puts in doubts the integrity of the officer and
normally amounts to dishonesty.249
In the present case, because of the fact that the Chief Justice is a public
officer, he is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a positive
duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. This already operates as the
consent required by law.
The Offices of the Chief Justice and of the 14 Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court are an express creation of the Constitution, which vests
them with explicit powers necessary for the proper functioning of a
democratic government.
Those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and
are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its
benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and
legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the
duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance
of those duties.
xxxx
249
Id. at 929-930.
250
Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, supra note 241.
Decision 96 G.R. No. 237428
general or flag ranks to publicly disclose their assets and liabilities. 251
(Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
x x x x
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
x x x x
Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense
is penal in character and is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for
public officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency
as a deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official
who has failed to comply with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be
said to be of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her
disqualified from holding public office. In De Castro v. Field Investigation
255
<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/integrity > (visited on March 19, 2018).
256
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_unodc_commentary-e.pdf> (visited
on May 8, 2018)
Decision 98 G.R. No. 237428
257
G.R. No. 192723, June 5, 2017.
258
656 Phil. 148 (2011).
259
G.R. No. 221153, April 17, 2017.
260
G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016, 801 SCRA 46.
261
Rollo, pp. 235-237.
Decision 99 G.R. No. 237428
It is apparent from the foregoing that the above mentioned cases are
factually different from the instant petition. The aforesaid jurisprudence,
aside from determining the administrative liability of therein public
employees, dealt with misdeclaration of assets or properties. Meanwhile, the
instant petition questions respondent's qualifications and as an incident
thereto, the validity of the process leading to her appointment. Further, the
fundamental issue in the case at bar is not merely inaccurate entries, but the
glaring absence of respondent's SALN for various years prior to her
resignation from the U.P. College of Law.
The SALN laws contemplate both the (1) physical act of filing her and
262
Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, supra.
263
Daplas v. Department of Finance and the Office of the Ombudsman, supra.
264
Navarro v. Office Of The Ombudsman And Department Of Finance-Revenue Integrity
Protection Services, supra.
265
Rollo, pp. 2111-2112.
Decision 100 G.R. No. 237428
her family’s statement of assets, liabilities and net worth and (2) filing of a
true, genuine and accurate SALN. RA 6713 and RA 3019, being special laws
that punish offenses, are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is
the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. An act which is declared malum prohibitum renders malice or
criminal intent completely immaterial.266 Thus, whether or not respondent
accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue at this point in time, but
whether she, in the first place, complied with the mandatory requirement of
filing of SALNs. Worse, to subscribe to respondent's view means that the
Court would altogether be deprived of the opportunity to ascertain whether
or not she accumulated unexplained wealth as the tools for doing so, that is,
the filed SALNs and the representations contained therein, are lacking.
Initially, the OCA reported that Doblada's records disclose that he had
not been submitting his SALNs for the years 1975, 1977 to 1988, 1990,
1992, 1999 and 2000. When asked to explain, Doblada maintains having
filed all his SALNs and admits that he does not have copies of said SALNs
as he might have accidentally disposed of the same during the various times
that he transferred office. As proof, Doblada submitted a copy of a letter
dated May 7, 2001 sent by the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, stating therein
that attached to said letter are the sworn SAL[N] of the staff of RTC, Pasig
City, Branch 155, including that of respondent's, for the year 2000. Said
letter was established to have been sent to and duly received by the OCA,
and yet Doblada's SALN for 2000 was one of those missing in the OCA's
files.
Nevertheless, for the SALNs which the U.P. HRDO itself cannot
produce, i.e., 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005
and 2006, and not proven to be in the records of, nor proven to have been
sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman, are altogether a different
matter. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were
neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by
mere inference.
The Court in Doblada also gave the latter the benefit of the doubt
considering the lack of the categorical statement from the OCA, as the
repository agency, that Doblada failed to file his SALN for the relevant
years. The Court observed that the report of the OCA simply stated that “it
does not have on its file the subject SAL[N] of [Doblada].” Hence, the
Court therein concluded that there was no substantial evidence to show that
Doblada failed to file his SALNs for the relevant years.
It is for this reason that We hold that the Republic was able to
discharge its burden of proof, and thus it becomes incumbent upon
respondent to discharge her burden of evidence. Sps. De Leon, et al., v. Bank
of the Philippine Islands269 offers a distinction between burden of proof and
burden of evidence:
269
721 Phil. 839 (2013).
270
Id. at 848.
271
1890.
272
Id. at 493-494.
273
1892.
Decision 105 G.R. No. 237428
the continued holding of the office, if any such qualifications exist. But
where the respondent has shown a good prima facie title, the burden of proof
is shifted to the prosecutor.274
Aside from maintaining that she filed all her SALNs, respondent
layers her defenses by saying that her non-filing of SALN is nevertheless
excused because she was on leave from the U.P. College of Law during June
1, 1998 to October 16, 1998, June 1, 2000 to May 31, 2001, June 1, 2001 to
May 31, 2002, November 1, 2003 to May 31, 2004, June 1, 2004 to October
31, 2004, February 11, 2005 to October 31, 2005 and November 15, 2005 to
May 31, 2006. However, per the Certification278 issued by the U.P. HRDO
dated December 8, 2017, it appears that respondent filed her SALN for the
year ending December 31, 2002, a year she was purportedly on leave. To this
Court, respondent's own act of filing a SALN in 2002 negates her argument
that being on leave excuses her from filing her SALN. As likewise pointed
out during the Oral Arguments,279 respondent, as a regular faculty member,
receives monthly compensation and from at least January 2000 to May 2000
(when she was not on leave), she earned income and thus should have filed
her SALN covering said period.
274
Id. at 744-745.
275
Volume IV-B , 1972.
276
Id. at 332.
277
See Department of Education v. Tuliao, 735 Phil. 703 (2014).
278
Rollo, p. 64.
279
TSN, Oral Arguments on April 10, 2018, p. 102.
Decision 106 G.R. No. 237428
On the contrary, relevant laws provide that all public officials and
employees are required to file a SALN.
There is no argument that the filed SALNs need not be retained by the
receiving officer or the custodian after more than ten years from the filing or
receipt thereof as such documents may be destroyed unless needed in an
ongoing investigation. In this context, the filer is likewise under no
obligation to keep records of such SALNs after the ten-year period.
The fact, however, remains that even respondent's more recent SALNs
falling within the ten-year period for her application to the Chief Justice
position are not on record. Logically, a public officer under question should
obtain a certification from the repository agency to attest to the fact of filing.
In the event that the SALNs were actually filed but missing, such
certification should likewise attest to the fact that the SALNs filed could no
longer be located due to a valid reason (such as destruction by a natural
Decision 108 G.R. No. 237428
For the years that respondent rendered government service in U.P., the
relevant rules would be that provided under the Rules Implementing the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
dated April 21, 1989. Rule VIII thereof provides:
Rule VIII
Review and Compliance Procedure
The above official shall likewise have the authority to render any opinion
interpreting the provisions on the review and compliance procedures in the
filing of statements of assets, liabilities, net worth and disclosure of
information.
The Rules implementing R.A. No. 6713 thus authorize only certain
officials of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Departments, and the
Constitutional Commissions and Constitutional offices to establish
compliance procedures for the review of statements in the SALN to
determine whether said statements have been been properly accomplished.
The said officials are also authorized to render opinions interpreting the
provisions on the review and compliance procedures and to determine
whether or not a SALN is properly filed. If the SALN was not properly filed,
the authorized officials are required to inform the reporting individual and
direct him/her to take the necessary corrective action. The records do not
show that at the time respondent assumed her post as a professor in U.P., or
at any time thereafter until her resignation, that concerned authorized
official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman had established
compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and
employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P.
xxxx
xxxx
Further, the failure to file a truthful SALN not only puts in doubt the
281
Id. at 71-73.
282
See Sps. Modesto v. Urbina, et al., 647 Phil. 706 (2010).
Decision 111 G.R. No. 237428
integrity of the officer, but such failure to file a truthful, complete and
accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended
by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.283
(c) Her SALNs for the years 1997, 1998, 1999 and
2002 were notarized only on August 21, 2003;284
(d) She failed to file her SALNs for 2004, 2005, and
2006 which were the years when she received the bulk of her
fees from the PIATCO cases. As respondent divulged, she
received from the Republic, through the OSG, the following
fees287 in relation to the PIATCO cases:
Year Income
2004 P7,055,513.56
2005 P11,532,226.00
2006 P2,636,006.64
2007 P4,673,866.36
2008 P4,070,810.93
2009 P301,552.00
TOTAL P30,269,975.49
283
Gupilan-Aguilar v. Office of the Ombudsman, 728 Phil. 210, 234 (2014).
284
Rollo, p. 1965.
285
Id. at 1961.
286
Id. at 1963.
287
Id. at 2003.
Decision 112 G.R. No. 237428
The SALNs that she submitted in support of her application for Chief
Justice likewise bear badges of irregularities:
(g) Her SALNs for 2006 and 2009 did not reflect the
fees she received as counsel for the Republic in the PIATCO
cases.
The dockets of the Sandiganbayan itself show that several charges for
violations of R.A. No. 6713 for failure to file and for untruthful declarations
in the SALNs resulted to a plea of guilt from the accused, lest the latter run
the risk of being imprisoned.290 Interestingly, the Sandiganbayan concluded a
288
Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, supra note 258.
289
338 Phil. 919 (1997).
290
See People of the Philippines v. P/C/ Supt. Eugene G. Martine, SB-12-CRM-0228 to SB-12-
Decision 114 G.R. No. 237428
It is thus plainly obvious that the courts do not take violations of the
SALN laws slightly even as against lowly public officials.
With more reason should such test of dishonesty and lack of integrity
be applied in the instant case when respondent failed to file her SALNs for
several years and for those years that she filed, the SALNs so filed prove to
be untruthful.
C.
Respondent failed to submit the required
SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant
to the JBC rules
CRM-0234, January 12, 2018; People of the Philippines v. Sadikul Adalla Sahali, SB-16-CRM-0501 to
0506, August 18, 2017; People of the Philippines v. Maria Gracia Cielo Magno Padaca, SB-15-CRM-0248
to 025, September 27, 2017; People of the Philippines v. Ruby Sahali Tan, SB-16-CRM-1291 to 1296,
September 18, 2017.
291
People v. Pureza, Sandiganbayan Criminal Case Nos. 27995-98, June 30, 2006.
Decision 115 G.R. No. 237428
With this, the JBC proceeded to go over, one by one, the compliance
of the candidates with the lacking documentary requirements. For instance,
Justice Abad was considered as having substantially complied because he
submitted 4 SALNs in his 6 year-stint with the OSG and because the filing
of the SALN at the time Justice Abad joined the government was not yet
required. Dean Raul C. Pangalangan lacked 5 SALNs but that he was trying
to get them from the Civil Service Commission and so, regular member
Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman moved that the SALNs he submitted be
considered as substantial compliance. Congressman Rufus B. Rodriguez did
not submit even one SALN which prompted Justice Peralta to remark that
Congressman Rodriguez may no longer be interested. Commissioner Rene
V. Sarmiento also submitted incomplete SALNs, but there was no mention
whether the SALNs he submitted were considered as substantial compliance.
Similarly, for respondent, the JBC determined that she did not submit her
SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as remarked by Senator Escudero, the
filing thereof during those years was already required. There was no
indication that the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010
and 2011) submitted by respondent for her 20 years as a professor in the U.P.
College of Law and two years as Associate Justice, as substantial
compliance.
292
JBC Minutes, July 20, 2012.
293
JBC Minutes, July 20, 2012.
Decision 116 G.R. No. 237428
xxxx
Justice Peralta suggested that the Council examine the matrix per
candidate as follows:
The Executive Officer reported that Justice Abad lacks the Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the years 1982-1983.
Senator Escudero said that SALNs were not yet required at that
time.
The Executive Officer said that Justice Abad had been with the OSG
from 1982 to 1986; but he submitted only his SALNs for the period
1981, 1984, 1985 and 1986. He was already asked to submit the
lacking SALNs.
Justice Peralta asked whether there is a need for them to explain the
reason for failing to comply with the requirements considering the time
constraint.
Senator Escudero said that it would be more proper for the JBC to ask
the candidate for the reason; however, in the case of Justice Abad, he
opined that he substantially complied with the requirements of the
JBC.
There being no objection, the Council agreed that Justice Abad had
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED with the requirements of the JBC
xxxx
The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly
the candidates coming from the government, and identified who
among them, would be considered to have substantially complied:
xxx
xxxx
xxxx
16. Atty. Ronaldo B. Zamora- has lacking SALNs and MCLE cert.
xxxx
The minutes of the JBC En Banc meeting also show that Senator
Escudero moved that the determination of whether a candidate has
substantially complied with the requirements be delegated to the Executive
Committee.294 In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require
only the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-2011, for
applicants to the Chief Justice position.295 This, as much, was confirmed by
Atty. Pascual during the Congressional hearings.296
From the foregoing, it is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away
with the requirement of submission of SALNs, only that substantial
compliance therewith, i.e., the submission of the SALNs for the immediately
preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs, was deemed sufficient.
(a) Justice De Castro submitted a letter 297 dated July 17, 2012 with the
attached SALNs for 16 years covering the period 1997 to 2011, from the
294
JBC Minutes
295
House Committee on Justice Report, p. 22.
296
House Committee Hearing on February 27, 2018.
297
JBC files of Justice De Castro.
Decision 118 G.R. No. 237428
(b) Jose Manuel Diokno submitted a sworn and verified statement298 dated
July 17, 2012, stating therein that while he served as General Counsel of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and as Special Counsel to the Board of
Directors of the Development [Bank] of the Philippines, his engagement was
only as a consultant on a contractual basis and as such, was not required to
file a SALN.
(c) Justice Carpio submitted a letter299 dated July 23, 2012 stating that he
resigned as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel effective January 31, 1996 and
as such, he did not submit a SALN for the year 1995 because the submission
for that year was on April 30, 1996 when he was no longer employed with
the government. Nevertheless, the clearance issued by the Office of the
President certifies that Justice Carpio has submitted his SALN and that he
has no pending criminal or administrative case.
(d) Justice Abad submitted an attestation300 dated July 23, 2012 that he
does not have a copy of his SALNs for the years 1968 to 1974, 1976 to 1980
and 1982 to 1983.
(e) Dean Amado Valdez wrote a letter301 dated July 23, 2012 saying that
he could no longer find the SALNs covering the years 1985 to 1987, 2002 to
2003 and 2004 representing the years of his intermittent government service.
He said that in, any case, the assets reflected in the SALN which he already
filed were acquired after he left government service as shown by his income
tax returns for the periods from 2005 to 2011.
Notably, Jose Manuel Diokno and Dean Amado Valdez were not
included in the short list.
That such was the standing requirement of the JBC from at least the
incumbent Associate Justices applying for the position of Chief Justice is
298
JBC files of Jose Diokno.
299
JBC files of Justice Carpio.
300
JBC files of Justice Abad.
301
JBC files of Dean Amado Valdez.
Decision 119 G.R. No. 237428
evident from the fact that five (5) out of six (6) applicants who were
incumbent Associate Justices, namely: (1) Justice Carpio; (2) Justice Brion;
(3) Justice Velasco; and (4) Justice De Castro were determined to have
completely complied with the SALN requirement; and (5) Justice Abad was
determined to have substantially complied. These Justices submitted the
following numbers of SALNs:302
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that
respondent submitted only 3 SALNs in her 20-year service in U.P., and that
there was nary an attempt on respondent's part to comply.
as respondent alleged) from U.P., are old and thus “infeasible to retrieve.”
But the Republic, through the OSG, was able to present before the Court
copies of respondent's SALNs for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, and 2002 from the U.P. HRDO. These files, therefore, are not
“infeasible to retrieve.” Also, in comparison with the other nominees, the
SALNs which the latter could no longer produce are much older in age than
the SALNs which respondent regarded as “infeasible to retrieve”. For
instance, Justice Abad had no copy of his SALN from 1968-1974, 1976-
1980 and 1981-1983 while Justice Leonardo-De Castro had no copy of her
SALNs from 1973-1978.
He concealed from the appointing authority, at the time he applied for the
judicial post until his appointment, information regarding the criminal
charges for homicide and attempted homicide filed against him. Such fact
would have totally eluded the Court had it not been complained of by one
Mrs. Ruth L. Vda. de Sison who, incidentally, is the mother of one of the
victims. x x x
xxxx
x x x Respondent did not honestly divulge all that the appointing authority
ought to know to correctly discern whether he is indeed fit for the judicial
post. He continuously suppressed vital information on his personal
circumstances under the false belief that he can mislead the Court and get
away with it for good. What respondent did, or omitted to do, was a
calculated deception committed not only against the Court but against the
public as well, clearly indicative of his lack of moral rectitude to sit as
303
317 Phil. 600 (1995).
Decision 121 G.R. No. 237428
Respondent argues that failure to submit the SALNs to the JBC is not
cause for disqualification because the SALN was not among the documents
which the JBC considered as evidence of integrity.
his motion was the fact that the reason why Chief Justice Corona was
removed from office was due to inaccuracies in his SALN. The
Members of the House of Representatives, in the exercise of their
wisdom, determined that non-inclusion of assets in one's SALN is an
impeachable offense. Likewise, majority of the Senate voted to convict
because of the inaccuracies in the bank accounts and statements in his
SALN. He said that the JBC would not want to recommend a person
who is susceptible to such kind of attack. He said that the JBC should
impose higher standards to aspirants for the position of Chief Justice.
x x x x. (Emphasis ours)
The requirement to submit the SALNs along hand with the waiver of
bank deposits, is therefore not an empty requirement that may easily be
dispensed with, but was placed by the JBC itself for a reason – in order to
allow the JBC to carry on its mandate of recommending only applicants of
high standards and who would be unsusceptible to impeachment attacks due
to inaccuracies in SALNs.
Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC
and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant's
fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In respondent's
case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would
be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since
the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries indicated in the
SALN. This is precisely the reason why the JBC required the submission of
the SALNs together with the waiver of bank deposits, thus:
Senator Escudero said that if the argument that the JBC would not
use the waiver unless there is a complaint, bank information could not be
secured. The complaint could have no basis. He commented that by the
time the JBC receives the information, the public interview is finished. In
this case, the least that the JBC could do is to give the candidate an
opportunity to explain his side. He explained that the theory and logic
behind the requirement of a waiver was precisely due to the fact that
the former Chief Justice was impeached because of inaccuracies in his
SALN. Thus, the JBC should ensure that all the nominees who would
be nominated would not be accused of the same. The JBC would just
want to avoid a situation where the next Chief Justice, nominated by
Decision 124 G.R. No. 237428
xxxx
This waiver is executed on the condition that the JBC or its duly
authorized representatives shall make use of it, as well as any and all
information or data obtained by virtue thereof, for the exclusive and sole
purpose of evaluating my qualifications for the position of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis ours)
D.
Respondent's disposition to commit deliberate
acts and omissions demonstrating dishonesty
and lack of forthrightness is discordant with
any claim of integrity
310
Minutes JBC En Banc Meeting dated July 16,2012, pp. 11-12.
Decision 125 G.R. No. 237428
The Court cannot play blind against the manifest inconsistencies, lack
of forthrightness and dishonesty committed by respondent as a government
official prior to and at the time of her application as Chief Justice. In
addition to the suspicious and highly questionable circumstances
surrounding the execution of her SALNs, the following untruthful
statements and dishonest acts (as herein elsewhere discussed) ultimately
negate respondent's claim that she is a person of proven integrity:
(7) She claims that the other candidates for the Chief
Justice position did not comply with the SALN requirement for
the application, when it was only she who did not comply. Out
of the six incumbent Justices who were candidates for the Chief
Justice positions, it was only respondent who did not comply
with SALN submission. There are competent proofs on record
to show these other candidates' compliance, contrary to
respondent's allegations.
311
Rollo, p. 1973.
Decision 127 G.R. No. 237428
Q2 - -
Q3 4,379,198.29 2,183,529.33 -2,195,668.96
Q4 633,670.58 - -633,670.58
2008
Q1 - 2,650,440.00 2,650,440.00
Q2 - -
Q3 - 508,032.00 508,032.00
Q4 5,184,435.85 1,045,262.67 -4,139,173.19
2009
Q1 344,243.65 301,552.00 -42,691.65
Total Undeclared Income Subject to VAT -16,656,980.39
There is no truth to the allegation that respondent was not afforded the
opportunity to address this matter or that this matter is "totally alien" to this
proceedings. This matter was actually brought up during the Oral
Argument. In its Memorandum, the Republic explained that during the Oral
Argument, some Members of the Court raised questions regarding
respondent's income as counsel in the PIATCO cases and the payment of the
corresponding taxes thereto, hence, the inclusion of the same in its
Memorandum.312 In the same way, respondent could have addressed the
same in her Memorandum Ad Cautelam, instead she opted to do so in a
belatedly filed Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam.
It bears stressing that respondent is not being prosecuted for tax fraud
in this case. The Court did not discuss the merits of the said tax fraud nor
did the Court made any conviction against the respondent as regards the said
offense. Neither is this Court's finding of respondent's lack of proven
integrity during her application anchored upon this act. This matter is cited
312
Id. at 1884.
313
Reply/Supplement, p. 2-8.
Decision 128 G.R. No. 237428
SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. -- Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do
the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to
prove a specific inent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like. (Emphasis ours)
E.
Respondent's ineligibility for lack of proven
integrity cannot be cured by her nomination
and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice
The Court is all too aware that the instant petition neither partakes of
an administrative or criminal proceeding meant to determine culpability for
failure to file SALNs. Respondent maintains that she filed all her SALNs,
only that she refuses to present proof of such SALNs before the Court. The
Court's pronouncement, however, should not be made dependent upon the
pieces of evidence which a party may possibly present in a different forum.
Rather, the Court is mandated to render judgment based on the evidence
presented before it, in compliance with the dictates of due process. And the
evidence, as it stands before Us, shows that respondent failed to file nine
SALNs in her 20-year service in U.P. College of Law and submitted to the
JBC only three out of the required ten SALNs at the time of her application
as Chief Justice.
Such failure to file and to submit the SALNs to the JBC, is a clear
violation not only of the JBC rules, but also of the law and the Constitution.
The discordance between respondent's non-filing and non-submission of the
SALNs and her claimed integrity as a person is too patent to ignore. For lack
of proven integrity, respondent ought to have been disqualified by the JBC
and ought to have been excluded from the list of nominees transmitted to the
President. As the qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest
standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as a Member of the
Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not
qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of
respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot
override the minimum Constitutional qualifications.
xxxx
315
Maquiling v. COMELEC, 709 Phil. 408 (2013).
316
Id.
317
SEC. 9. Judgment where usurpation found. – When the respondent is found guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be
rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefro, and that the petitioner or relator,
as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective
rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
Decision 132 G.R. No. 237428
318
227 Phil. 303, 307 (1986).
Decision 133 G.R. No. 237428
F.
Respondent is a de facto officer removable
through quo warranto
safe, if it were necessary in every case to examine the legality of the title
of such officer up to its original source, and the title or interest of such
person were held to be invalidated by some accidental defect or flaw in the
appointment, election or qualification of such officer, or in the rights of
those from whom his appointment or election emanated; nor could the
supremacy of the laws be maintained, or their execution enforced, if the
acts of the judge having a colorable, but not a legal title, were to be
deemed invalid. As in the case of judges of courts of record, the acts of a
justice de facto cannot be called in question in any suit to which he is not a
party. The official acts of a de facto justice cannot be attacked collaterally.
An exception to the general rule that the title of a person assuming to act
as judge cannot be questioned in a suit before him in generally recognized
in the case of a special judge, and it is held that a party to an action before
a special judge may question his title to the office of judge on the
proceedings before him, and that the judgment will be reversed on appeal,
where proper exceptions are taken, if the person assuming to act as special
judge is not a judge de jure. The title of a de facto officer cannot be
indirectly questioned in a proceeding to obtain a writ of prohibition to
prevent him from doing an official act nor in a suit to enjoin the collection
of a judgment rendered by him. Having at least colorable right to the
officer his title can be determined only in a quo warranto proceeding or
information in the nature of quo warranto at suit of the sovereign.
(Citation omitted)
IV.
Guidelines for the Bench, the Bar and the JBC
The present is the exigent and opportune time for the Court to
establish well-defined guidelines that would serve as guide posts for the
bench, the bar and the JBC, as well, in the discharge of its Constitutionally-
mandated functions. In sum, this Court holds:
Consistent with the SALN laws, however, SALNs filed need not be
retained after more than ten years by the receiving office or custodian or
repository unless these are the subject of investigation pursuant to the law.
Thus, to be in keeping with the spirit of the law requiring public officers to
file SALNs – to manifest transparency and accountability in public office –
if public officers cannot produce their SALNs from their personal files, they
must obtain a certification from the office where they filed and/or the
custodian or repository thereof to attest to the fact of filing. In the event that
said offices certify that the SALN was indeed filed but could not be located,
said offices must certify the valid and legal reason of their non-availability,
such as by reason of destruction by natural calamity due to fire or
earthquake, or by reason of the allowed destruction after ten years under
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713.
V.
Decision 137 G.R. No. 237428
Perhaps owing to novelty, the instant case has opened a pandora's box
of unsolicited opinions, streaming in abundance from those professed legal
and non-legal experts alike. This flurry of opinions, demonstrations, public
and media appearances made by the parties themselves or at their behest, or
by their lawyers and spokespersons, had demonstrably shifted the plane from
what should otherwise be a purely legal, calm and sober approach to the
present controversy into a detestable feast of pros and cons, and of a
mediocre and haphazard approximation of a perceived good versus evil. This
veritable feast had become too delectable to escape the waiting predators'
keen sense of attack, especially at a time when the prey appears to be at its
most vulnerable. This Court is an institution designed and dedicated to a
specific purpose and thus refuses to fall prey and invite claws to dig into its
walls. Because of the various extraneous redirections from the merits which
the instant case has received, there is a need to emphasize that this case
involves a purely legal and justiciable matter which the Court intends, and
had resolved, through the application of the Constitution, the law and
relevant jurisprudence, unswayed by personalities or sentiments.
As such, the Court had lent extreme tolerance to the parties and non-
parties equally, as the Court shall ultimately speak through its decision. Be
that as it may, the Court, in jealous regard of judicial independence, cannot
simply overlook the open and blatant defiance of the sub judice rule suffered
by the present action.
this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for
contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of
its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference
obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon
as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual
exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an
unprejudiced tribunal.
In Our jurisdiction, this rule finds legal basis on the Court's power of
contempt. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
xxxx
x x x (Emphasis ours)
The sub judice rule finds a more austere application to members of the
Bar and of the Bench as the strict observance thereof is mandated by the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct:
327
P/Supt. Marantan v. Atty. Diokno, et al., supra note 325.
328
384 U.S. 333 (1966).
Decision 139 G.R. No. 237428
CANON 1 – INDEPENDENCE
CANON 2 – INTEGRITY
CANON 3 – IMPARTIALITY
before or could come before them, make any comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair
the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment
in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
CANON 4 – PROPRIETY
329
See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
Decision 141 G.R. No. 237428
330
The websites indicated herein were last accessed on May 8, 2018.
Decision 142 G.R. No. 237428
tatanggalin”
- The granting of a quo warranto
would result into dictatorship and
would destroy the judiciary.
- At ano ho ang mangyayari kung
ang buong sangay, ang lahat ng
kawani ng gobyerno ay kayang
takutin at hindi na pwedeng
maging independent?.. Ano hong
mangyayari kung ang COMELEC
ho ay sinabihan ng Presidente at
Solicitor General na “yung partido
lang namin ang pwedeng manalo,
kung hindi i-quo warranto ka
namin?” Ano po yun? Ano yung
tawag sa ganoong sitwasyon na
may matinding pananakot sa
buong bayan? Ang tawag po dun,
diktaturya.. Kung manalo po ang
quo warranto, yan po ang
magiging resulta”
- “Saang korte kayo pupunta? Sino
ang magtatapang na huwes kung
madali na sila mapatanggal?...
Hindi na ho kayo makakatakbo,
kasi lahat ho ng judges tatakutin
ng Solicitor General...Saan ho
kayo pupunta sa isang arbiter na
impartial?.. wala na po.
Wawasakin nitong quo warranto
petition nito, completely ang
judiciary”
- “Ano na ho ang mangyayari sa
bayan natin kung wala na hong
security of tenure sa government
service? Kasi kung may kaunting
kulang lang sa file... kulang ang
file na nabigay sa JBC.. eh
naglalabasan na ho ang SALN
ko... pero eto tatanggalin at
gagawa sila ng prinsipyo at
ikawawasak ng buong bayan para
lang sa kanilang personal na
interes. Nakakalagim po ang
pangyayaring ito”
Speech on <https://www.youtube.co CJOL Sereno discussed the
Ateneo Law m/watch? contents of the quo warranto
v=oh35V4BMiww>
School for the petition.
forum Tindig: A - On the prescriptive period, CJOL
forum on Sereno said that jobs of the
upholding justices, judges and government
judicial employees are jeopardized because
independence as of the assertion of the OSG that a
Decision 147 G.R. No. 237428
The detrimental effect of this open and blatant disregard of the sub
judice rule or the evil sought to be prevented by the said rule is already
manifest. In fact, in the May 2, 2018 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
certain individuals, including lawyers, already made their own pre-judgment
on the case:
The Quo Warranto action against CJ Sereno, filed beyond the one
year deadline, is itself illegal and unconstitutional. the Supreme Court has
affirmed many times that impeachment is the only mode for removing an
impeachable officer.
The State derives its power from the people. When the key
instruments of the State conspire to subvert the Constitution and
democracy, the people must rise as the last bastion of our rights and
freedoms.
If the Biased 5 will not inhibit, then we call on them to resign. The
people will not acccept any Decision tainted by gross injustice and
Justices who cannot act with justice. (Emphasis ours)
It could readily be seen that such statements do not only "tend to" but
categorically force and influence the deliberative and decision-making
process of this Court. Notably, the threatening tenor could not go unnoticed.
Epilogue
Decision 150 G.R. No. 237428
In the case of Taylor v. Beckham ([1899], 178, U. S., 548), Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller said that: "Decisions are numerous to the effect that public
offices are mere agencies or trust, and not property as such." The basic
idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as in the United States, is
that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere
agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of
men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where
every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and
holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents. 332
(Emphasis ours)
The right to hold public office under our political system is therefore
not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all, only because and by virtue
of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. 333 Needless to
say, before one can hold public office, he or she must be eligible in
accordance with the qualifications fixed by law and the authority conferring
and creating the office. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an
estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. A public officer
who is not truthful, not forthright, in complying with the qualifications to
public office, perforce, has not legally qualified, was not legally appointed,
and consequently, has not legally assumed the said public office. A
disqualification cannot be erased by intentional concealment of certain
defects in complying with the qualifications to public office set by the
Constitution and laws. The passage of time will not cure such invalidity of
holding public office, much less, foreclose the right and duty of the
government, the keeper of the said public office, to oust and remove the
usurper.
331
41 Phil. 188 (1920).
332
Id. at 194.
333
Aparri v. CA., et al., 212 Phil. 215, 221-222 (1984).
Decision 151 G.R. No. 237428
One who claims title to a public office must prove beyond cavil that
he/she is legally qualified to the said office, otherwise, he or she has no
ground to stand upon his or her claim of title to the office and his or her title
may reasonably be challenged. A qualification must be proved positively,
clearly, and affirmatively. It cannot be proved by mere acquiescence nor by
estoppel or prescription. In the same vein, a disqualification cannot be
obliterated by intentional concealment thereof. As a matter of fact, such
concealment is a clear manifestation of lack of integrity, probity, and
honesty. It cannot be over-emphasized that public service requires integrity.
For this reason, public servants must, at all times, exhibit the highest sense
of honesty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must
faithfully adhere to, and hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional
principle that a public office is a public trust.334 The expectation of a strong
adherence to this principle escalates proportionately as one ascends to public
office. John Adams, then President of the United States, said, “society's
demands for moral authority and character increase as the importance of the
position increases.”
In this case, it was found that respondent is ineligible to hold the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court position for lack of integrity on account of her
failure to file a substantial number of SALNs and also, her failure to submit
the required SALNs to the JBC during her application for the position.
Again, one of the Constitutional duties of a public officer is to submit a
declaration under oath of his or her assets, liabilities, and net worth upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law. 335
When the Constitution and the law exact obedience, public officers must
comply and not offer excuses. When a public officer is unable or unwilling
to comply, he or she must not assume office in the first place, or if already
holding one, he or she must vacate that public office because it is the correct
and honorable thing to do. A public officer who ignores, trivializes or
disrespects Constitutional and legal provisions, as well as the canons of
ethical standards, forfeits his or her right to hold and continue in that office.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
(No part)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice
C E RT I FI CAT I O N
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice