CARMELITA T.

BORLONGAN v BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI

BANK),
G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017, SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION (Velasco, Jr, J.)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Due process

Due process means that any person with interest to the thing in litigation must
be notified and given an opportunity to defend that interest. Thus, as the essence
of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense, the defendant must
be properly served the summons of the court.

FACTS:

Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property.
They went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the TCT in
preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise, the
title contained an annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject
of an execution sale.

Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an

affidavit of adverse claim and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety
Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents.
He alleged in his Complaint that the subject property is a family home that
belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains he established with his wife. He
further averred that the alleged surety agreements upon which the attachment
of the property was anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and did
not redound to benefit their family. Thus, he prayed that the surety agreements
and all other documents and processes, including the ensuing attachment, levy
and execution sale, based thereon be nullified.

Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment (With Urgent Prayer

for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) with the CA but it was denied.
ISSUE:

Does Petitioner Carmelita has a right to be protected in order for the court to
grant the TRO?
RULING:

Yes. Carmelita has a right to be protected.

A writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing that
there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to
be directed violate an established right. Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on
the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI, it must only inquire into the
existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected;
and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
 Petitioner has a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected. This
right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject property but
her constitutionally protected right to due process before she can be deprived of
her property.

In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest
to the thing in litigation must be notified and given an opportunity to defend that
interest. Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of
her defense, she must be properly served the summons of the court.
Unfortunately, as will be discussed, it would seem that the Constitutional right
of the petitioner to be properly served the summons and be notified has been
disregarded by the officers of the trial court.

At this very juncture, the existence of the second ground for the issuance
of a TRO and/or WPI is self-evident. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
respondent bank from continuing in the possession and consolidating the
ownership of the subject property, petitioner's right to be afforded due process
will unceasingly be violated.

It need not be stressed that a continuous violation of constitutional rights

is by itself a grave and irreparable injury that this or any court cannot plausibly
tolerate.
 ROBERTO P. FUENTES v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186421, April 17, 2017, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe,J.)

DOCTRINE: RA 3019; Mayor’s Power to Issue Business Permits

The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public
officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

FACTS:

An information was filed against petitioner Roberto P. Fuentes, stating

that, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte, in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to office, with evident bad faith caused undue injury to
private complainant Fe N. Valenzuela by refusing for unreasonable length of time,
to renew the latter's Business Permit to engage in Ship Chandling Services in the
Port of Isabel without any legal basis or reason despite the fact that Fe N.
Valenzuela has complied with all the requirements and has been operating the
Ship Chandling Services in the Port of Isabel since 1993. This act of Fuentes
caused damage to the perishable ship provisions of Fe N. Valenzuela for MN Ace
Dragon and a denial of her right to engage in a legitimate business thereby
causing damage and prejudice to Valenzuela.

In his defense, Fuentes averred that as early as 1999, 2000, and 2001, he
has been hearing rumors that Valenzuela was engaged in illegal activities such
as smuggling and drug trading, but he did not act on the same. However, in 2002,
he received written reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and Progress and
Isabel Chief of Police Tamse allegedly confirming the said rumors, which
prompted him to hold the approval of Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A,
and to issue the unnumbered Memorandum addressed to port officials and the
BOC. Fuentes maintained that if he went on with the approval of such permit
and the rumors turned out to be true, many will suffer and will be victimized; on
the other hand, if the rumors were false, then only one stands to suffer.

The Sandiganbayan found Fuentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged. The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution had established
all the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
ISSUE:

Did petitioner Fuentes violate Section 3 (e) of RA 3019?

RULING:

Yes. Fuentes was correctly convicted of the crime charged.

 The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that
the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public
officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

Anent the first element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public

officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time he committed the
acts complained of.

As to the second element, it is worthy to stress that the law provides

three modes of commission of the crime, namely, through "manifest partiality",
"evident bad faith", and/or "gross negligence." There is "manifest partiality" when
there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or
person rather than another. On the other hand, "evident bad faith" connotes not
only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive
or ill will. "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by
the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to
take on their own property."

In the instant case, Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest
partiality, but also with bad faith. As can be gleaned from the records, Fuentes
himself testified that according to the rumors he heard, all five (5) ship chandlers
operating in the Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug
trading. Yet, it was only Valenzuela's chandling operations through Triple A that
was refused issuance of a Business Permit. As regards the issue of bad faith,
while it is within the municipal mayor's prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse
to issue Business Permits, the mayor must observe due process in that it must
afford the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.

Anent the third and last element, suffice it to say that Fuentes's acts of
refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his
issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from
engaging in its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused
some sort of undue injury on the part of Valenzuela.

In view of the foregoing, Fuentes committed a violation of Section 3 (e) of

RA 3019, and hence, must be held criminally liable therefor.
RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF ROWIE A. QUIMNO, Utility Worker I,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of lpil - Tungawan - Roseller T. Lim, lpil,
Zamboanga Sibugay
A.M. No. 17-03-33-MCTC, April 17, 2017, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-
Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE: Law on Public Officers; Public Accountability

Prolonged unauthorized absence causes inefficiency in the public

service. A court employee's continued absence without leave disrupts the normal
functions of the court. It contravenes the duty of a public servant to serve with
the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The Court
stresses that a court personnel's conduct is laden with the heavy burden of
responsibility to uphold public accountability and maintain people's faith in the
judiciary.

FACTS:

This administrative case involves Mr. Rowie A. Quimno, Utility Worker I in

the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ipil Tungawan- Roseller T. Lim in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

The records show that Quimno has not submitted his Daily Time Record
(DTR) since February 2016 up to the present. He neither submitted any
application for leave. Thus, he has been on absence without official leave (AWOL)
since February 1, 2016. It was later found out that Quimno was arrested at his
residence on September 20, 2016; and was subsequently formally charged for
violating several provisions of Republic Act No. 9165. His salaries and benefits
were withheld.

The OCA recommended that Quimno's name be dropped from the rolls
effective February 1, 2016 for having been absent without official leave for more
than thirty (30) working days.

ISSUE:

Should a public officer with continued absence without approved leave

be separated from service?

RULING:

Yes. Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by
Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of2007, states:

Section 63. Effect of absences without approved Leave. - An official

or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave
for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on
absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from
the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x x x.
 Based on this provision, Quimno should be separated from service or
dropped from the rolls in view of his continued absence since February 2016.

Prolonged unauthorized absence causes inefficiency in the public

service. A court employee's continued absence without leave disrupts the normal
functions of the court. It contravenes the duty of a public servant to serve with
the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The Court
stresses that a court personnel's conduct is laden with the heavy burden of
responsibility to uphold public accountability and maintain people's faith in the
judiciary.

In this case, Quimno failed to report for work long before he was arrested.
He also exhibited disinterest in diligently fulfilling his assigned tasks. Evidently,
his conduct constitutes gross disregard and neglect of his duties. Undeniably, he
failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all
those in the government service.
 CITY OF DAVAO, et al. v ROBERT E. OLANOLAN
GR No. 181149, April 17, 2017, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE:
Writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an
adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance
of the act to be compelled.
FACTS:
Robert Olanolan was elected and proclaimed Punong Barangay. An
election protest was file by his opponent, Celso A. Tizon and was eventually
granted by the COMELEC. Hence, Tizon was declared as the duly-elected Punong
Barangay.
Olanolan filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC but to no
avail. Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, with
prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, before the Supreme Court.
The Court en banc gave due course to the petition and issued a Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO) which was immediately implemented by the Department of Interior
and Local Government. Thus, respondent was reinstated to the disputed office.
Upon his reinstatement, Olanolan presided over as Punong Barangay and
in the regular course of business, passed Ordinance known as the "General Fund
Annual Budget of Barangay Bucana for Calendar Year 2005" totaling up to
P2,2l6,180.20. Likewise included in the local government's annual budget is the
Personnel Schedule amounting to P6, 348,232.00, which formed part of the
budget of the General Administration, appropriated as salaries and honoraria for
the 151 employees and workers of Brgy. 76-A.
On March 31, 2005, the Court en banc rendered a Decision dismissing
Olanolan's petition. Consequently, it also recalled its SQAO issued. Olanolan filed
a Petition for Mandamus etc. before the RTC, seeking to compel the City of Davao
to allow the release of funds in payment of all obligations incurred under his
administration.
ISSUE:
May the mandamus filed by Olanolan be granted?
RULING:
No.
"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
 Moreover, Section 332 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code of 1991," provides that:
Section 332. Effectivity of Barangay Budgets. - The ordinance
enacting the annual budget shall take effect at the beginning of the
ensuing calendar year. An ordinance enacting a supplemental budget,
however, shall take effect upon its approval or on the date fixed therein.
The responsibility for the execution of the annual and supplemental
budgets and the accountability therefor shall be vested primarily in the
Punong Barangay concerned.
In this case, Olanolan has no clear legal right to the performance of the
legal act to be compelled. His petition before the Supreme Court was denied,
therefore, he was stripped of the technical niceties, and the Court finds that
respondent had no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be
compelled of, which altogether justifies the dismissal of his mandamus petition.
Thus, considering that respondent had no right to the office of Punong Barangay
at the time he filed his mandamus petition on July 26, 2005, during which the
SQAO had already been recalled, he had no valid legal interest to the reliefs
prayed for.
 LO LOY UNDURAN, et al. v RAMON ABERASTURI, et al.
G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017, EN BANC (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE: Law on Environment and Natural Resources; Jurisdiction of

NCIP

The jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to claims and
disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties belong to the same
ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties
who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have
jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Petitioners Unduran, et al. argue that (1) the NCIP and not the regular
courts has jurisdiction over the case under the principle that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case is determined by the allegations in the complaint,
and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing exemptions thereto; (2) the jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as conferred by the IPRA;
(3) the IPRA is a social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much from
themselves or fellow IPs but more from non-IPs; (4) the· IPRA created the NCIP as
the agency of government mandated to realize the rights of IPs; (5) in the exercise
of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial body with jurisdiction to
resolve claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs; (6) the jurisdiction of the
NCIP in resolving claims· and disputes involving the rights of IPs is not limited to
IPs of the same tribe; (7) harmonizing the related provisions of the IPRA supports
the argument that the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights
whether or not the parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs; (8) the NCIP as quasi-judicial
agency provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the fulfillment of the
State's obligations to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights; (9) the NCIP
has the competence and skill that would greatly advance the administration of
justice with respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights;
and (10) recognition and enforcement of customary laws and indigenous justice
systems fulfill the State's obligations as duty bearers in the enforcement of
human rights.

ISSUE:

Is the NCIP's jurisdiction limited to cases where both parties are ICCs/IPs,
or primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or original and exclusive to
the exclusion of said courts, on all matters involving the rights of ICCs/IPs?
RULING:

The Court maintains that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of
the IPRA is limited to claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both
parties belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise
between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the
proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.
 The NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP group because of the qualifying provision under Section 66 of the IPRA
that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws." The Court stated
that said qualifying provision requires the presence of two conditions before such
claims and disputes may be brought before the NCIP, i.e., exhaustion of all
remedies provided under customary laws, and the Certification issued by the·
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute
that the same has not been resolved. The Court thus noted that the two
conditions cannot be complied with if the parties to a case either (1) belong to
different ICCs/IP groups which are recognized to have their own separate and
distinct customary laws, or (2) if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member
who is neither bound by customary laws or a Council of Elders/Leaders, for it
would be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for parties who
do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own distinct
customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. In which case, the Court ruled
that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction, and that the NCIP's quasi-judicial
jurisdiction is, in effect, limited to cases where the opposing parties belong to the
same ICC/IP group.

Thus, the Court restates that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall
have limited jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs
only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP
group; but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do
not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have
jurisdiction. However, under Sections 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of
the IPRA, as well as Section 54, the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over
adverse claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral
domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently-issued CADTs, regardless of
whether the parties are non-ICCs/ IPs, or members of different ICCs/IPs groups,
as well as violations of ICCs/IPs rights under Section 72 of the IPRA where both
parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Double Jeopardy

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus,

final and unappealable.

FACTS:

Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo points out that the State miserably

failed to prove the corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the
identification of the main plunderer as well as personal benefit on the part of the
raider of the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution of the crime of
plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion
in the charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of
plunder, would violate her right to be informed of the accusation against her
because the information did not necessarily include the crime of malversation;
and that even if the information did so, the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case for that purpose.

In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does
not apply because it was denied its day in court, thereby rendering the decision
void; that the Court should re-examine the facts and pieces of evidence in order
to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the
information sufficiently included all that was necessary to fully inform the
petitioners of the accusations against them.

ISSUE:

1. Does the Court has jurisdiction over the case?

2. Is there a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy?

RULING:

1. Yes. The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other
courts of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of capricious,
arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly
incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side.
This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike
down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed.

2. Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, states:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment

for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.

In this case, the consideration and granting of the motion for

reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy. The Court's consequential dismissal of the
Criminal Case as to the petitioners for insufficiency of evidence amounted to
their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them. The Court explained
the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal
and is, thus, final and unappealable.

The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double

jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a new and independent prosecution
but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such,
every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be
recalled for correction or amendment. With the acquittal being immediately final,
granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the
Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because it would effectively
reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite
their acquittal.

It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition

against double jeopardy provides to the accused three related protections,
specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
 BERNADETTE S. BILAG, et al. v. ESTELA AY-AY, et al.
G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE: Law on Natural Resources; Baguio Townsite Reservation;

Public Domain

Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1271 expressly declared that all orders and decisions
issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in connection with
the proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record
211, covering lands within the Baguio Town site Reservation are null and void
and without force and effect. It also provides for a means to validate ownership
over lands forming part of the Baguio Town site Reservation, it requires, among
others that a Certificate of Title be issued on such lands on or before July 31,
1973.

FACTS:

A Complaint for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction

was filed by respondents Estela Ay-Ay, Andres Acop, Jr., Felicitas Ap-Ap, Sergio
ApAp, John Napoleon A. Ramirez, Jr., and Ma. Teresa A. Ramirez against
petitioners Bernadette S. Bilag, Erlinda BilagSantillan, Dixon Bilag, Reynaldo B.
Suello, Heirs of Lourdes S. Bilag, Heirs of Leticia Bilag-Hanaoka, and Heirs of
Nellie Bilag. Respondents alleged that Iloc Bilag, petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest, sold to them separately various portions of a 159,496-square meter
parcel of land situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio City (subject lands), and that they
registered the corresponding Deeds of Sale. According to respondents, Iloc Bilag
not only acknowledged full payment and guaranteed that his heirs, successors-
in-interest, and executors are to be bound by such sales, but he also caused the
subject lands to be removed from the Ancestral Land Claims. Respondents
further alleged that they have been in continuous possession of the said lands
since 1976 when they were delivered to them and that they have already
introduced various improvements thereon.

Petitioners averred that the subject lands are untitled, unregistered, and
form part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation which were long classified as lands
of the public domain.

ISSUE:

Are the subject lands part of the public domain?

RULING:

Yes. The records shows that the subject lands form part of a 159,496-
square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands situated at Sitio
Benin, Baguio City. Notably, such parcel of land forms part of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation, a portion of which, or 146, 428 square meters, was
awarded to Iloc Bilag due to the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO
Record No. 211, as evidenced by a Decision dated April 22, 1968 promulgated by
the then-Court of First Instance of Baguio City.

In a catena of cases, and more importantly, in Presidential Decree No. (PD)

1271, it was expressly declared that all orders and decisions issued by the Court
of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in connection with the proceedings for
the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, covering lands
within the Baguio Town site Reservation are null and void and without force and
effect. While PD 1271 provides for a means to validate ownership over lands
forming part of the Baguio Town site Reservation, it requires, among others, that
a Certificate of Title be issued on such lands on or before July 31, 1973.

In this case, records reveal that the subject lands are unregistered and
untitled, as petitioners' assertion to that effect was not seriously disputed by
respondents. Clearly, the award of lots 2 and 3 of the 159,496-square meter
parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands which includes the subject
lands - to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
GLRO Record 211, is covered by the blanket nullification provided under PD
1271, and consistently affirmed by the prevailing case law. In view of the
foregoing, it is only reasonable to conclude that the subject lands should be
properly classified as lands of the public domain as well.