Policarpio Vs Active Bank
Policarpio Vs Active Bank
FACTS:
The spouses Septem and Grelita Ricaza are the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa City, covered by TCT. In 1996, they mortgaged the property to respondent Active Bank (formerly Maunlad Savings
and Loan Bank). For failure to settle their obligation, respondent foreclosed the mortgage. The spouses Ricaza also failed to redeem
the property during the redemption period. Hence, respondent consolidated its ownership over the property.
Respondent subsequently filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession with the RTC of Muntinlupa City. Petitioner
Iluminada Lumen R. Policarpio opposed it and submitted a Deed of Sale[6] of the property executed by Septem in her favor on
April 22, 1998. The trial court set the Opposition for hearing but neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared. The trial court ordered
the issuance of a Writ of Possession. It observed that the Deed of Sale appears to be void since only Septem signed it and it was
not shown that he was authorized by Grelita to sell the conjugal property. Thereafter, petitioner was served with the Resolution,
the Writ of Possession and the Notice to Vacate.
In 2002, the court sheriff together with respondents employees entered the property and removed petitioners personal
belongings. However, respondent was able to occupy only a portion of the property due to the timely intervention of the Muntinlupa
Police and the Ayala Alabang Village Security personnel.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. She sought the nullification of the trial
courts Resolution, the Writ of Possession and the Notice to Vacate. She argued that the trial court could not issue the Writ of
Possession in favor of respondent since she was a third party in possession of the property contemplated under Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.
Respondent countered that the Deed of Sale in petitioners favor was void since it was executed without Grelitas consent. It
added that the sale, unlike the mortgage, had not been registered. It also contended that petitioners possession came only after the mortgage
was constituted and registered.
On August 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. It ruled that the validity of the sale in petitioners favor
was questionable since only Septem signed the deed. It also noted that unlike the mortgage, the Deed of Sale was not
registered. Finally, while petitioner opposed the petition for issuance of Writ of Possession, she never pursued nor prosecuted her
claim. Laches may be said to have worked against her, given the urgency and grave consequences that the writ entailed.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the appellate court denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is a third party in possession of the property contemplated under Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court such as to preclude the trial court from issuing a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent.
RULING: NO. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which relates to the right of possession of a purchaser of
property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale provides:
SEC. 33. Under the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of
the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the
same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.
Ordinarily, a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property. Thus,
whenever the purchaser prays for a writ of possession, the trial court has to issue it as a matter of course.[9] However, the obligation
of the trial court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the
property claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.[10] Where such third party exists, the trial court should conduct a
hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession.[11]
In this case, the trial court conducted the required hearing but neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared. We cannot
therefore fault the trial court for evaluating the only documentary evidence submitted by petitioner, the Deed of Sale and the
certified true copy of TCT which Septem gave her. Even if both Ricaza spouses had signed the Deed of Sale, the result would still
be the same, given the circumstances in this case. In any event, we note that the deed was not even registered, a truly fatal defect in
this case.
Petitioners reliance on the certified true copy of TCT is misplaced. It is settled that a person dealing with registered
property is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims which are annotated on the title.[12] Yet, petitioner simply believed
Septems assurance that the title was clean and accepted a copy consisting only of the first page sans the dorsal page where
respondents mortgage was annotated. What is more, we find it hard to believe that petitioner did not compel the spouses Ricaza to
register the sale in her favor and to have the proper title issued in her name. As a lawyer, petitioner should have been more
circumspect in protecting her interests.
The mortgage in favor of respondent preceded the sale in favor of petitioner. There was no allegation either that
respondent was at any point of time aware that petitioner occupied the property. Respondent has no legal obligation to honor
petitioners possession of the property. Rather conversely, it is petitioner who has the legal obligation to honor respondents prior
ownership and existing right to possess the property.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 21, 2002 and the
Resolution dated February 6, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68939 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.