20 - Roberts Jr. Vs CA
20 - Roberts Jr. Vs CA
1. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis
of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants
of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been
resolved.
2. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance
of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
RATIO
I.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a
petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It
merely advised the DOJ to, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. Crespo could not
have intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court which recognizes the authority of the Secretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.
Pursuant to the said provision, the Secretary of Justice had promulgated the rules on appeals from resolutions in
preliminary investigation. At the time the petitioners filed their petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of the
investigating prosecutor, the governing rule was Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990. Section 2 thereof
provided that only resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice.
Its Section 4,]however, provided an exception, thus allowing, upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion, appeals from resolutions finding probable cause, provided that the accused has not been arraigned.
But whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a matter of guesswork.
Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to
defer arraignment. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it,
not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in
cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the
accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the
prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being
sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutions word for its
supposed insufficiency.
II
The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses, but he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn statements of
Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer as well as the counter- affidavits of the
petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties evidence made in the DOJ Panel
Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners.
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability,
not the certainty of the guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by
merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the
Probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the evidence
attached to the records of the case.
Unfortunately, nothing accompanied the information and as revealed by the certification of Branch Clerk of Court
Gibson Araula, Jr., no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of Criminal
Case No. Q-93-43198 as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order
of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information,
amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence
supporting the prosecutors finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of
probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest after June 21, 1993. It may, however, be
argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional
requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing
logic.
RULING
There can be no doubt that, in light of the several thousand private complainants in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
43198 and several thousands more in different parts of the country who are similarly situated as the former for being
holders of 349 Pepsi crowns, any affirmative holding of probable cause in the said case may cause or provoke, as
justly feared by the petitioners, the filing of several thousand cases in various courts throughout the country.
Inevitably, the petitioners would be exposed to the harassments of warrants of arrest issued by such courts and to
huge expenditures for premiums on bailbonds and for travels from one court to another throughout the length and
breadth of the archipelago for their arraignments and trials in such cases. Worse, the filing of these staggering
number of cases would necessarily affect the trial calendar of our overburdened judges and take much of their
attention, time, and energy, which they could devote to other equally, if not more, important cases. Such a frightful
scenario would seriously affect the orderly administration of justice, or cause oppression or multiplicity of actions - a
situation already long conceded by this Court to be an exception to the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not
be restrained or stayed by injunction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted and the following are hereby SET ASIDE:
(a) Decision of 28 September 1993 and Resolution of 9 February 1994 of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 31226;
(b) The Resolution of the 349 Committee of the Department of Justice of 23 July 1993 dismissing the
petitioners petition for review and of 3 February 1994 denying the motion to reconsider the dismissal;
and
(c) The Order of respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of 17 May 1993 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
43198.
The Department of Justice is DIRECTED to resolve on the merits, within sixty (60) days from notice of this
decision, the petitioners petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor Ramon Gerona and
thereafter to file the appropriate motion or pleading in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198, which respondent Judge
Asuncion shall then resolve.
In the meantime, respondent Judge Asuncion is DIRECTED to cease and desist from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
Notes
The Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul stated as follows: “In order therefor to avoid such a situation
whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be
left entirely for the determination of the Court.”
2-S 2016-17 (VARGAS)
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