Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183822 January 18, 2012
RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact
Wenifreda C. Agullana, Petitioner,
vs.
Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and JUSTA
AGUSTIN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the Decision dated 08 January 2008
1

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645,

which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution dated 15 July 2008
2

denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the Decision of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had
dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by herein
petitioner.
The Factual Antecedents
The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment
against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the
allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of
land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT
No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City
Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions as
follows:
1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey
of Laoag), with improvements thereon, situated in the
barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag.
Bounded x x x containing an area of five thousand
seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters
more or less x x x.
2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral
Survey of Laoag), with the improvements thereon,
situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of
Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing an area of twenty
thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square
meters, more or less x x x.
Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias
Duldulao in whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O-
1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August
27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C.
Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to
occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.
Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the
premises.
Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess
subject property having acquired the same from his father,
Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on
March 15, 1971.
Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense
that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father,
disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of
Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven
Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,150.00).
The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and
dismissed the complaint.
In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which
shows that they entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and
the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or
owners, disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that
defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to
occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and
considering further the length of time that the defendants
have been in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the
9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been
continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon,
this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is
concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled to the
possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot
No. 11711.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City
affirmed said dismissal, the dispositive portion of said
decision states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED. 3

Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the

earlier dismissal of the case by the MTC, by instituting an
appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the appellate
court through its Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal. It
4

noted that his father engaged in a double sale when he

conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and
respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in
favor of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed
of Sale with respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both
documents were notarized shortly after their execution. The
5

Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October
1976, resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
6

(TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of

Sale executed with respondents was, however, not
annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained
unregistered.7

Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner

had knowledge of the sale of the disputed real property
executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and
respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to
respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the
nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful
detainer case instituted by petitioner against respondents,
the appellate court concluded that respondents’ possession
of the property was not by mere tolerance of its former
owner – petitioner's father – but was in the exercise of
ownership. 8

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father’s

sale of the properties to respondents as early as 1973.
However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to
initiate any action to annul it and oust respondents from the
subject properties. The appellate court rejected his
9

contention that, as registered owner of the disputed

properties, he had a better right to possession thereof,
compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by
respondents in their defense of the same properties. The
CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge of
the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of
respondents’ unregistered deed. In dismissing his appeal,
10

the CAconcluded that respondents’ possession was "not ...

anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer"; hence "the complaint for
ejectment must fail." The dispositive portion of the assailed
11

Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of Branch XVI,
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-
16 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 12
 The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for
Review on Certiorari:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT of appeals seriously
erred in failing to consider the legal ownership of
petitioner on the disputed property to claim better right
to possession.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF
THE ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS
TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE BETTER RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421
SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT
CASE.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION
FOR REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT. 13

Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue

of his Petition: who between the parties has the right to
possession of the disputed properties -- petitioner, who is
the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or
respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed
of Absolute Sale over the same properties?
The Court's Ruling
We DENY the Petition.
Although this case does not present a novel question of law,
there is a need to discuss the nature of an ejectment case
for the recovery of physical possession in relation to the
Torrens system. A resolution of the issue would be relevant
to the determination of who has the better right to
possession in this unlawful detainer case.
One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of
possession of real property is "accion interdictal, or an
ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible
entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which
is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession
where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one
year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court." In
14

ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic

question of who is entitled to physical possession of the
premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and
not possession de jure. 15

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of

ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to
determine who between the parties has the better right to
possess the property. However, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession,
adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding,
but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is
only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property.
16
In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they
are occupying the disputed properties as owners, having
acquired these from petitioner's father through a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that
they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties,
since they are the owners and are in actual possession
thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this claim
of ownership, contending that he has registered the
disputed properties in his name and has been issued a land
title under the Torrens system. He asserts that, having
registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized
owner and consequently has the better right to possession.
Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to
all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily
includes possession. Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens
17

title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful

owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the
lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that
possession of the disputed properties by respondents was
in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the
elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open
and notorious possession of the property for more than 30
years up to this day.
Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al., which has
18

facts and legal issues identical to those of the instant case.

The petitioner therein filed an unlawful detainer case against
the respondents over a disputed property. He had a Torrens
title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of
the property claimed ownership thereof based on their
unregistered Deeds of Sale. The principal issue was who
between the two parties had the better right to possess the
subject property.
This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder
as the one who had the better right to possession of the
disputed property based on the following justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for
resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.
Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not
susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of
asserting ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the
Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted
competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership
for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein
found in a case between the same parties upon a different
cause of action involving possession.
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between
the parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the
property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered
deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan
Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in
the name of petitioner.
In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the
Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once
the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible
and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has
been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under
existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass
upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first
instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a
direct proceeding for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the
possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of
his ownership. Respondents' argument that petitioner is not
an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith
in having the subject land registered in his name is a
collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not
allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral
attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law. 19

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in

Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel and in Spouses
20

Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al., wherein we

21

consistently held the age-old rule "that the person who has
a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof."22
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present
petitioner has instituted an unlawful detainer case against
respondents. It is an established fact that for more than
three decades, the latter have been in continuous
possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the
concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of
petitioner’s father. Under these circumstances, petitioner
cannot simply oust respondents from possession through
the summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding.
Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera, which
23

reads thus:
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is
entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply
wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual
occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses
what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment
case against respondents. Ejectment cases—forcible entry
and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings designed
to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession
or the right to possession of the property involved. The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is:
who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises,
that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession
de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the
property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case
will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has
presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment
case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently
proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents’
possession of the building was by mere tolerance of
petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer involves the person’s withholding from
another of the possession of the real property to which the
latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the
former’s right to hold possession under the contract, either
expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer
case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such
possession must have turned unlawful only upon the
expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the
possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such
lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case,
the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the
plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents’
continued possession of the subject properties was by mere
tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof.
In fact, petitioner has not established when respondents’
possession of the properties became unlawful – a requisite
for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.
In Canlas v. Tubil, we enumerated the elements that
24

constitute the sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful

detainer, as follows:
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of
the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over
the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment
cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts
as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings
are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough
on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol evidence.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real
property from one who illegally withholds possession after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. The possession of
the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.
An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature,
jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within
one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said
case is the right to physical possession.
... ... ...
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if
it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
 (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant
to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not
complied with the requirements sufficient to warrant the
success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against
respondents. The lower courts and the CA have consistently
upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued
possession of the subject properties, since their possession
has been established as one in the concept of ownership.
Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer
case of petitioner.
We concur in the appellate court’s findings that petitioner’s
father engaged in a double sale of the disputed properties.
The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or
less five years from 1971 when he acquired the property
from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the
conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title
registered in his name under the Torrens system.
Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession
of the properties, but without bothering to register them or to
initiate any action to fortify their ownership.
We cannot, however, sustain the appellate court’s
conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate any action to
annul the sale to respondents and oust them from the
disputed properties had the effect of registration of
respondents’ unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held
thus in Ruiz, Sr. v. Court of Appeals :
25

(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing

interest which is unregistered at that time he acquired a right
to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered
interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge
of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held
in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],
Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529),
provides that the registration of the deed is the operative act
to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned. But where the party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that
prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. The Torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442).
[Emphasis supplied.]
In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in
favor of petitioner was executed ahead of the Deed of Sale
of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by
petitioner’s father to respondents cannot be considered as a
prior interest at the time that petitioner came to know of the
transaction.
We also note that, based on the records, respondents do
not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-12980 registered in
the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land
title issued to him was an "act of fraud" on his part. We find
26

this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against

the Torrens title of petitioner – an attack we cannot allow in
the instant unlawful detainer case. 1âwphi1

It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title

cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Such attack must
27

be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. It is a well-

28

established doctrine that the title represented by the

certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged,
or diminished in a collateral proceeding. Considering that
29

this is an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to

be decided is possession de facto rather than
possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein
respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.
Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of
who has the better right to possession in relation to the
issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties.
Questions as to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can
be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its
validity, an issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this
unlawful detainer case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant
Petition for lack of merit. The Decisions of the Court of
1âwphi1

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08,

2008), of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil
Case No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal Trial
Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing
the unlawful detainer case of petitioner – are AFFIRMED.
We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack
of evidence.
SO ORDERED.