Crim 1 Cases
Crim 1 Cases
DECISION Upon arraignment, appellant assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.4 Trial
on the merits ensued.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, Caloocan City, in Criminal Cases Nos. C-53125 and C-53126, At about 10:00 oclock in the evening of November 21, 1997, an informant
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Reynan Santiago y Castillo for violation arrived at the Northern Metro Narcotics District Office in Bagong Barrio East,
of Section 8, Article II and Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as Caloocan City. He reported to Major Jose Valencia, Officer-in-Charge, and
amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1991. P/Insp. Daniel Oamin the rampant trafficking of shabu by appellant at
Sawata, Maypajo, Caloocan City.
The Informations filed against appellant Reynan Santiago are quoted as
follows: Based on such information, the police formed a team led by P/Insp. Oamin,
with PO1 Joseph delos Santos, PO2 Rommel Someros, PO1 Efferson Arceo
1. Criminal Case No. C-53125 and PO1 Emerson Adavilles, as members. PO1 delos Santos was assigned
as the poseur buyer, PO2 Someros and PO1 Arceo as the back-up team,
That on or about the 21st day of November, 1997 in Caloocan City, Metro and PO1 Adavilles and P/Insp. Oamin as perimeter security. P/Insp. Oamin
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named handed PO1 delos Santos a P500.00 bill bearing serial number DH 464448
accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and as poseur money.
feloniously sell and deliver to PO1 JOSEPH DELOS SANTOS, who posed as
buyer of methylamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.07 gram, a regulated It was understood that when the transaction was completed, PO1 delos
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription therefore knowing the Santos would place his left hand on his nape. Then, the back-up team would
same to be such. apprehend appellant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 Then the team and the informant, riding in a red Toyota car and a
motorcycle, proceeded to Sawata, Maypajo, Caloocan City.
2. Criminal Case No. C-53126
Upon seeing the appellant in the area waiting for customers, the informant
That on or about the 21st day of November, 1997 in Caloocan City, Metro briefed PO1 delos Santos then left. PO1 delos Santos approached appellant
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named and asked, Pare, may dala ka? He showed appellant the P500.00 poseur
accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, money. After scrutinizing PO1 delos Santos, appellant took the money and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) transparent handed him a small sachet containing white granules or shabu, saying, Pare,
plastic bag with markings EX-C ETA containing four (4) bricks of dried lisa na lang. He then asked PO1 delos Santos if he wanted marijuana and
pointed to a plastic bag hanging on the left handle of his hopper. Upon
hearing this, PO1 delos Santos made the pre-arranged signal. Immediately, 2. In Crim. Case No. 53126 for Violation of Sec. 8, Art. II of the above-
the back-up team apprehended appellant, at the same time informing him of mentioned Act, this court, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
his constitutional rights. They recovered from him the poseur money and four circumstance, hereby sentences said Accused to suffer the penalty of
bricks of marijuana fruiting tops. Reclusion Perpetua; to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00; and to pay the costs in
both cases.
The team brought him to the Northern Metro Narcotics District Office at
Bagong Barrio East, Caloocan City for investigation. Then the confiscated Subject drugs are hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
drugs were submitted for laboratory examination. They were positive for government to be dealt with in accordance with law. No similar
shabu and marijuana. pronouncement was made re the seized Hopper motorcycle it appearing that
the said property is owned by a third person, i.e., one Mrs. RODELIA
The defense presented as its witnesses appellant, Roberto de Leon, Marissa MALICLIC, not liable for the offenses charged.
Jorda and Jaime Magtalas. Appellant and de Leon testified that at around
10:00 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1997, they were traveling along Incidentally the Urgent Motion to Order the Release of the Illegally Seized
Sawata St., Maypajo, Caloocan City going to the house of appellant's Hopper filed by the Accused, to which the special prosecutor handling this
girlfriend on board a hopper or scooter, when two motorcycle riders chased case was to submit his comment/recommendation thereon will be treated in a
and overtook them. They identified themselves as policemen, then separate order/resolution of this Court.
handcuffed and frisked them. They found chocolates in their possession. The
policemen brought them to the Caloocan City General Hospital and The preventive imprisonment suffered by the Accused shall be credited in full
introduced them as drug addicts. in the service of his sentence in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Both Marissa Jorda and Jaime Magtalas testified that on the night of
November 21, 1997, they saw appellant and his companion being frisked by SO ORDERED.5
two policemen.
In this appeal, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following assignments
After hearing, the trial court issued a Joint Decision finding appellant guilty of of error:
the crimes charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING APPELLANT TO PROVE
WHEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having established HIS INNOCENCE WITH STRONG AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
beyond an iota of doubt the guilt of the Accused of the offenses charged, this INSTEAD OF APPLYING THE RULE THAT CRIMINAL CASES RISE AND
Court hereby renders judgment re above captioned cases as follows: FALL ON THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION AND NOT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE.
1. In Grim. Case No. 53125 for Violation of Sec. 15, Art. Ill of RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659, this Court, in the absence of any modifying II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACTIVELY INTERFERING IN THE
circumstance, hereby sentences Accused REYNAN SANTIAGO y PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASE BY CONDUCTING ITS OWN DIRECT
CASTILLO to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of Arresto EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES INSTEAD
Mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of Prision OF LEAVING THIS MATTER TO THE PROSECUTION.
Correccional, as maximum;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION presumptions operate against plaintiff who has burden of proof, he cannot
EVIDENCE HAS PROVEN THE GUILT OF APPELLANT BEYOND prevail.
REASONABLE DOUBLT."6
Relative to the second assigned error, appellant laments the trial judge's
On the first assigned error, records show that after the prosecution had active participation in the proceedings by conducting cross-examination, in
adduced its evidence, appellant filed a motion to dismiss by way of a violation of his constitutional right to due process as enunciated in Tabuena
demurrer to evidence.7 The trial court denied the demurrer, holding that the vs. Sandiganbayan.10
prosecution has sufficiently established a prima facie case to warrant the
conviction of appellant.8 In its Decision, the trial court mentioned the issue of We carefully perused the stenographic notes of this case and found the
whether the defense by its evidence was able to overcome the prima facie questions propounded by the trial judge to be merely clarificatory, intended to
case established by the prosecution which tends to establish the guilt of satisfy his mind upon material points arising during the witnesses'
appellant. Appellant bewails the fact that the trial court shifted the burden of examination. The judge, being the arbiter, may properly intervene in the
proof from the prosecution to the defense. Our ruling in Bautista vs. presentation of evidence to expedite the trial and prevent unnecessary waste
Sarmiento,9 is squarely in point, thus: of time.11 In Barbers vs. Laguio, Jr.12 citing United States vs. Hudieres,13
we held:
There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is
established beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to acquittal. But when The right of a trial judge to question the witnesses with a view to satisfying
the trial court denies petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a
evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established a prima facie case over which he presides is too well established to need discussion. The
case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and
upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a
prima facie case against them. This is due to the shift in the burden of miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to
evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to a witness which might develop some material facts upon which the judgment
believe. in the case should turn. So in a case where a trial judge sees that the degree
of credit which he is to give the testimony of a given witness may have an
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, important bearing upon the outcome, there can be no question that in the
as in the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It exercise of a sound discretion he may put such questions to the witness as
remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed-the will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the
prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party willingness of the witness to tell the truth, x x x
depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This
burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which As to the third assigned error, appellant insists that the trial court overlooked
balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back. inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He pointed
out that they have different versions on: (1) the initial stages of the formation
A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence of the buy-bust team; (2) how the buy-bust team reached the target area; and
nor by evidence of greater weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the (3) the initial encounter with appellant. Moreover, he assails the version of
weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a the prosecution that there were no preliminary discussions between the
result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at poseur-buyer and the appellant prior to the transaction, contrary to ordinary
the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and human experience.
fails. We have consistently held that courts invariably view with disfavor
Appellant's contentions must fail. The inconsistencies adverted to by the denials and allegations of frame-up for these are easily concocted. They are
appellant are trivial and insignificant and refer only to minor details. Time and the usual and standard defenses in prosecutions involving violation of the
again, we have steadfastly ruled that inconsistencies on minor and trivial dangerous drugs law.18
matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of
witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.14 We therefore uphold the trial court's judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
Furthermore, we cannot expect the testimonies of different witnesses to be reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
completely identical and to coincide with each other since they have different
impressions and recollections of the incident. Pursuant to R.A. 6425, as amended, and in line with People vs. Simon,19 the
penalty for the sale of 0.07 gram of shabu is prision correctional. Applying the
Hence, it is only natural that their testimonies are at variance on some minor Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no qualifying circumstance that
details. attended the commission of the crime, the trial court properly imposed the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
Appellant likewise calls our attention to the discrepancy between the two (2) months of prision correctional, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. C-
testimony and the affidavit of PO1 delos Santos. He testified on cross- 53125. Under the same law (R.A. 6425, as amended), possession of 911.1
examination that when the team arrived at the target area, appellant was grams of marijuana is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There
already there. However, in his affidavit, he stated that he and the informant being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and applying Sec. 63(2) of
waited for several minutes at the place before they saw appellant and his the Revised Penal Code,20 the trial court's imposition of reclusion perpetua
companion. We are not swayed. Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies in Criminal Case No. C-53126 is in order.
between a witness' affidavit and testimony do not necessarily impair his
credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or As to the fine imposed, it is settled that courts may fix any amount within the
inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating limits established by law.21 Under Section 8, Article II of the same law (R.A.
officer.15 Besides, it appears that the affidavit was executed by PO1 delos 6425, as amended), in relation to Section 20, Article IV of R.A. 7659, as
Santos jointly with the other members of the buy-bust team. amended,22 if the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more, the imposable
fine is P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. Thus, in Criminal Case No. C-53126
At this point it is apt to stress that the findings of the trial court, having had where 911.11 grams of marijuana were confiscated from appellant, the fine
the opportunity to personally observe the demeanor of the witnesses, are often million pesos fixed by the trial court may be equitably reduced to five
entitled to great weight and respect, absent any showing that the trial court hundred thousand pesos.
overlooked facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the result
of the case.16 In the present case, the trial court found the evidence for the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Joint Decision of the
prosecution worthy of credence and we see no cogent reason to deviate from Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Cases Nos. C-
such finding. The witnesses for the prosecution are law enforcement officers 53125 and C-53126, finding appellant Reynan Santiago guilty beyond
who, unless shown that they were inspired by an improper motive or were reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 8, Art. II and Sec. 15, Art. Ill of R.A.
not properly performing their duty, have in their favor the legal presumption 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in the sense that
that official duty has been regularly performed.17 in Criminal Case No. C-53126, he is fined P500.000.00.
Thus, pitted against the categorical and positive testimonies of the SO ORDERED
prosecution witnesses, appellant's defense of denial and frame-up miserably
Vitug, (Chairman), Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two
G.R. No. L-11676 October 17, 1916 accused, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty; therefore,
during the trial the chief of police presented the memorandum exhibited by
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, the policeman Andres Pablo, who testified under oath that on the date
vs. mentioned he and Tomas de Leon went to the said barrio to raid a jueteng
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant. game, but that before they arrived there they saw from afar that some
persons started to run toward the hills; that when witness and his companion
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant. arrived at a vacant lot they saw Francisco Dato and a low table there, and
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee. the table caused them to suspect that a jueteng game was being carried on;
that in fact they did find on one side of the lot a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but
that they did not see the accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the said lot, nor did
TORRES, J.: they see them run; and that only afterwards did the witness learn that these
latter were the cabecillas or ringleaders in the jueteng game, from
At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the information given him by an unknown person. In view of this testimony by the
municipality of Balanga, went by order of his chief to the barrio of Tuyo to police officer who made the arrest and of the other evidence adduced at the
raid a jueteng game which, according to the information lodged, was being trial the court acquitted the defendants Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi
conducted in that place; but before the said officer arrived there the players, and sentenced only Francisco Dato, as a gambler.
perhaps advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran away; however, on his
arrival at a vacant lot the defendant there found Francisco Dato and, at a Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the policeman
short distance away, a low table. After a search of the premises he also Andres Pablo had an interview and conference with the accused Malicsi and
found thereon a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls). Notwithstanding ROdrigo in the house of Valentin Sioson. On this occasion he was instructed
that the officer had seen the men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo leave not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in fact received through
the said lot, yet, as at first he had seen no material proof that the game was Gregorio Ganzon the sum of P5.
being played, he refrained from arresting them, and on leaving the place only
arrested Francisco Daro, who had remained there. By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary investigation the
provincial fiscal, on December 1, 1915, filed an information in the Court of
In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman presented a First Instance of Bataan charging Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury,
memorandum containing the following statement: "In the barrio of Tuyo I under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. The following is an extract
raided a jueteng na bilat game, seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw the from the complaint:
cabecillas Maximo MAlicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco
Dato. I saw the two cabecillas escape." That on or about November 6, 1915, in the municipality of Balanga, Bataan,
P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, Andres Pablo,
In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22, 1915, filed a during the hearing in the justice of the peace court of Balanga of the criminal
complaint in the court of justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo, cause No. 787, entitled the United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo
Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in violation of municipal Malicsi, for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of
ordinance No. 5. As a result of this complaint the accused were arrested, but Balanga, did, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affirm and swear in legal
were afterwards admitted to bail. form before the justice of the peace court as follow: `We did not there
overtake the accused Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, nor did we even by the latter, though he said nothing about what amount of money he
see them run,' the said statement being utterly false, as the accused well delivered to the policeman Pablo.
knew that it was, and material to the decision of the said criminal cause No.
787, United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi. An act The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his being asked by
committed with violation of law. the justice of the peace how he could have seen Maximo Malicsi and Antonio
Rodrigo, he replied that he did not see them at the place where the game
The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court rendered was being conducted nor did he see them run away from there, for he only
judgment therein sentencing the defendant to the penalty of two years' found the table, the tambiolo, the bolas, and Francisco Dato; that he did not
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100 and, in case of insolvency, to the surprise the game because the players ran away before he arrived on the lot
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The defendant where, after fifteen minutes' search, he found only the tambiolo and the
was also disqualified from thereafter holding any public office and from bolas; that on arriving at the place where the game was played, they found
testifying in the courts of the Philippine Islands until the said disqualification only Francisco Dato and some women in the Street, and as Dato had already
should be removed. From this judgment he appealed. gone away, witness' companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, got on his
bicycle and went after him; and that he found the tambiolo at a distance of
Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the policemen about 6 meters from a low table standing on the lot.
Andres Pablo and Tomas de Leon arrived at the place where the jueteng
was being played, they found the defendant gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo; From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant Andres
that, prior to the hearing of the case in the justice of the peace court, Malicsi Pablo, who pleaded not guilty, falsely testified under oath in the justice of the
and Rodrigo ordered him to call Andres Pablo, who, together with witness, peace court of Balanga, Bataan, in saying he had not seen the alleged
went to the house of Valentin Sioson, where they held a conference; that gamblers Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo in the place where, according
witness pleaded guilty in the justice of the peace court, in fulfillment of his to the complaint filed, the game of jueteng was being played and where the
part of an agreement made between himself and his two coaccused, Malicsi defendant and his companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, had found a
and Rodrigo, who promised him that they would support his family during the table, tambiolo and bolas, used in the game of jueteng, while it was proved at
time he might be a prisoner in jail; that Andres Pablo did not know that they the trial that he did not them and did overtake them while they were still in the
were gamblers, because he did not find them in the place where the game place where the game was being played. But notwithstanding his having
was in progress, but that when witness was being taken to the municipal seen them there, upon testifying in the cause prosecuted against these men
building by the policemen he told them who the gamblers were who had run and another for gambling, he stated that he had not seen them there,
away and whom Andres Pablo could have seen. knowing that he was not telling the truth and was false to the oath he had
taken, and he did so willfully and deliberately on account of his agreement
Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and further stated that, with the men, Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in consideration of a bribe of P15
on the arrival of the policemen who made the arrest and while they were which he had received in payment for his false testimony he afterwards gave.
looking for the tambiolo, he succeeded in escaping; that Andres Pablo had
known him for a long time and could have arrested him had he wished to do Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the assertion that the
so; that prior to the hearing he and his codefendants, ROdrigo and Dato, did policeman Andres Pablo undertook to exclude the gamblers, Malicsi and
in fact meet in the house of Valentin Sioson, on which occasion they agreed Rodrigo, from the charge and from his testimony in consideration for P15
that they would give the policemen Andres Pablo P20, provided witness and which he received through Gregorio Ganzon.
Rodrigo were excluded from the charge; and that only P15 was delivered to
the said Pablo, through Gregorio Ganzon. This statement was corroborated
Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards
convicted under Act No. 1697, which (according to the principle laid down by Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this
this court in various decisions that are already well-settled rules of law) court in its decisions, was deemed to have repealed the aforementioned
repealed the provisions contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code article of the Penal Code relating to false testimony, comprised within the
relative to false testimony. term of perjury) did not expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code;
and as the said final article of the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act
By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article of the No. 1697, does not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal
Administrative Code, or Act No. 2657, there was repealed, among the other Code are also repealed, the will of the legislation not being expressly and
statutes therein mentioned, the said Act No. 1697 relating to perjury, and the clearly stated with respect to the complete or partial repeal of the said articles
repealing clause of the said Administrative Code does not say under what of the Penal Code, in the manner that it has totally repealed the said Act No.
other penal law in force the crime of false testimony, at least, if not that of 1697 relating its perjury; and, furthermore, as it is imperative that society
perjury, shall be punished. punish those of its members who are guilty of perjury or false testimony, and
it cannot be conceived that these crimes should go unpunished or be freely
Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of false testimony go committed without punishment of any kind, it must be conceded that there
unpunished, and is there no penal sanction whatever in this country for this must be in this country some prior, preexistent law that punishes perjury or
crime? May the truth be freely perverted in testimony given under oath and false testimony.
which, for the very reason that it may save a guilty person from punishment,
may also result in the conviction and punishment of an innocent person? If all There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false testimony, like Law 7
this is not possible and is not right before the law and good morals in a et seq. of Title 2, third Partida.
society of even mediocre culture, it must be acknowledged that it is
imperatively necessary to punish the crime of perjury or of false testimony — However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony
a crime which can produce incalculable and far-reaching harm to society and has been punished under the said articles of the said Code, which as we
cause infinite disturbance of social order. have already said, have not been specifically repealed by the said Act No.
1697, but since its enactment, have not been applied, by the mere
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes interpretation given to them by this court in its decisions; yet, from the
that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by moment that Act was repealed by the Administrative Code, the needs of
the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend society have made it necessary that the said articles 318 to 324 should be
the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in repealing the
liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights. said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the said articles of
the Penal Code have likewise been repealed.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the
necessity for its existence has been recognized even by the most backward This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the
peoples. At times the criticism has been made that certain penalties are crime of false testimony or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11,
cruel, barbarous, and atrocious; at other, that they are light and inadequate Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilacion which says::
to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition of punishment is
admitted to be just by the whole human race, and even barbarians and All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent
savages themselves, who are ignorant of all civilization, are no laws, must be literally obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot
exception.lawphil.net avail; for the Catholic kings and their successors so ordered in numerous
laws, and so also have I ordered on different occasions, and even though HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City),
they were repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by the decree and CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.
which I issued in conformity with them although they were not expressly
designated. The council will be informed thereof and will take account of the Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr., Office
importance of the matter. of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for petitioner.
It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar Puerto.
are properly applicable to crimes of false testimony. Therefore, in
consideration of the fact that in the case at bar the evidence shows it to have
been duly proven that the defendant, Andres Pablo, in testifying in the cause AQUINO, J.:
prosecuted for gambling at jueteng, perverted the truth, for the purpose of
favoring the alleged gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the This case is about the jurisdiction of a city court in estafa cases.
aggravating circumstance of the crime being committed through bribery, for it
was also proved that the defendant Pablo received P15 in order that he On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with
should make no mention of the said two gamblers in his sworn testimony, estafa in the city court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on October
whereby he knowingly perverted the truth, we hold that, in the commission of 16, 1974 two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4, 966. 63 (Criminal
the crime of false testimony, there concurred the aggravating circumstance of Case No. 32140).
price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating
circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the
defendant has incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor accused had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. He
in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its medium degree, and a directed that the case be elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance or
fine. the Circuit Criminal Court.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis
and sentence Andres Pablo to the penalty of two years four months and one Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII, in its order of February 3, 1977
day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in case of returned the case to the city court because in its opinion the case falls within
insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, the city court, as the first
not exceed one-third of the principal penalty. He shall also pay the costs of court which took cognizance of the case, should try it.
both instances. So ordered.
Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in his
Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur. order of April 21, 1977 directed the re-elevation of the case. His view is that
Moreland, J., concurs in the result . the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance because estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision
G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978 mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect on
October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Code.
vs.
That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for certiorari filed in pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 5180, as
this Court on May 27, 1977 by the office of the city fiscal of Cagayan de Oro amended by Presidential Decree No. 77.
City.
WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance, returning the case to
We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has original the city court, is affirmed and the two orders of the respondent city judge,
jurisdiction over it. The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, are set aside. The city court
article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to prision is directed to try the case. No costs.
correccional minimum or four months and one day to two years and four
months. SO ORDERED.
The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
years, imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by
means of issuing bouncing checks which was committed or after October 22, Santos, J., is on leave.
1975.
G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984
That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed by Puerto on
October 16, 1974. To apply it to Puerto would make the decree an ex post ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners,
facto law. Its retroactive application is prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of the vs.
Revised Penal Code and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution. JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City
Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now
The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because the penultimate presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA
paragraph or section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Acts S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
Nos. 2613 and 3828, provides that "judges of city courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners.
offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty
provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not The Solicitor General for respondents.
more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both."
As section 87 itself shows, that jurisdiction is concurrent with the court of AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
First Instance which is empowered to try "all criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official
of more than two hundred pesos" (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law. See People vs. Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated
Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531). October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the
government of carabaos transported from one province to another.
It was not necessary for the city court to have conducted the preliminary
investigation of the case. The filing of the information by the fiscal Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in
presupposes that he had conducted the requisite preliminary investigation an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six
carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia,
Batangas, as the destination. We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the
Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14,
veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2
Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
(2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the
provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars
Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to
list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said
inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay,
from the mayor of Sipocot. 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573;
Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos,
while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de
Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las
aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th
no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no Ed., p. 146.)
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months'
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court
see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144). because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months after
his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of
Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1). That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its
confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute.
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision
replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order
damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be executed by the can be bound thereby.
sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who
heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124
Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and penal regulation.
section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a
1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders
having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It
provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall
be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect." Separate Opinions
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the
Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even
bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the value of each
1015.) carabao which is not returned for any reason. The Pesigans are also entitled
to a reasonable rental for each carabao from the twenty six farmers who
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of used them. The farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the
Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Pesigans.
Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could
not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos.
The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos
should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the Separate Opinions
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive
order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the value of each
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and carabao which is not returned for any reason. The Pesigans are also entitled
dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda to a reasonable rental for each carabao from the twenty six farmers who
and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite used them. The farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the
documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the Pesigans.
same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur.
No costs. G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding 3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the
force and effect. command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to
be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
I shall explain why. futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable.
4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the
even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question
force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence
advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official
all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity
Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree
mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment
any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There
effectivity. must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional
doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not 4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further
require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or
some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view
due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act
no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional
command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect
of law can legally provide for a different rule. Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code
that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain
Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen
previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly
to yield assent to such a pronouncement. published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
Alampay concur in this separate opinion. publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees
specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and
render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of
prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing
for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring
opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms
and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in
punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself.
and its penalties. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of
the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis
nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on
constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree
affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is Gazette.
not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette
required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision:
Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the
it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.
not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition
that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and
said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication thereof.
publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its
sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official
Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public Separate Opinions
nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an
earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur
provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the
which is the Constitution, can assume that role. Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding
force and effect.
be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
I shall explain why. futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable.
4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the
even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question
force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence
advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official
all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity
Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree
mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment
any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There
effectivity. must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional
doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not 4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further
require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or
some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view
due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act
no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect
be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2 of law can legally provide for a different rule.
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of
command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus
previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by
character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
to yield assent to such a pronouncement. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides
otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees
Alampay concur in this separate opinion. specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of
prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing
for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring
opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms
and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned
punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself.
published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
and its penalties. constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.
committed by an employee of the United States military authorities deprive
the court of jurisdiction? We have been cited to no provision in the legislation Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
of Congress, and to none in the local legislation, which has the effect of
limiting, as respects employees of the United States military establishment,
the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First Instance by Act No. Separate Opinions
136 of the United States Philippine Commission above cited, and we are not
COOPER, J., concurring: Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on
I concur in the result of the decision of the court, but am not prepared to the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the
assent to all that is said in the opinion. An offense charged against a military MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal
officer, acting under the order of his superior, unless the illegality of the order cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the
is so clearly shown on its face that a man of ordinary sense and DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
understanding would know when he heard it read or given that the order was certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
illegal, and when the alleged criminal act was done within the scope of his which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
authority as such officer, in good faith and without malice, and where the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
offense is against the military law — that is, such law as relates to the denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review
discipline and efficiency of the Army, or rules and orders promulgated by the arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
Secretary of War to aid military officers in the proper enforcement of the preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in
custody of prisoners — is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil court.
Government. (In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149.) The civil courts, however, may
examine the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the act alleged The petition is not impressed with merit.
to be criminal was done in the performance of duty under the circumstances
above indicated, but should cease to exercise jurisdiction upon such facts First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication
appearing. from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs
determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary
[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000] which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice
and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted
PHILIPPINES, respondent. that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.
The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the
DECISION alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to
be presented at the proper time.[1] At any rate, it has been ruled that the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
dropping of the charges.[2]
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides: Jksm
ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation "Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following
by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail at privileges and immunities:
P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in
protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."
is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ.,
that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to concur.2/22/00 9:47 AM
determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the
prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence,
should it so desire. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity AH SING, defendant-appellant.
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such
as defamation, in the name of official duty.[3] The imputation of theft is ultra Antonio Sanz for appellant.
vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.[4] It appears that MALCOLM, J.:
even the governments chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not
support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of
agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any the costs.
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving state outside his official functions.[5] As already mentioned above, The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China
the commission of a crime is not part of official duty. employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a
foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of
conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.[6] Being had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the
purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on
specifically granted by law.[7] The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed
the MeTC.[8] Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon.
affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did
or otherwise render it defective.[9] not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the
Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine
Islands, was introduced.
SO ORDERED.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been opinion in the Jose case, we find the following which may be obiter dicta, but
proven? which at least is interesting as showing the view of the writer of the opinion:
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it
with the intimation that there exists inconsistently between the doctrines laid anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium discharged or
down in the two cases. However, neither decision is directly a precedent on that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought
the facts before us. into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine
port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the intent to discharge its cargo.
opinion handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found —
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these quoted, we return to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands."
account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the
nationality, the same rule does no apply when the article, whose use is United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without
prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16
landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the importation is not the making entry of
violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the
the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman
court established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.1awphil.net applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully
imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has
in the present instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw case, the come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the
charge case the illegal possession and sale of opium — in the present case Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the
the charge as illegal importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
vessel was in transit — in the present case the foreign vessel was not in Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused was
transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere
Philippine soil — in the present case of United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the
Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which resolution turned, was that accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better
in a prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or other prohibited explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant
drug, the Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly
presumption, that the vessel from which the drug is discharged came into find that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the
Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In the Jose Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said
case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation
opium was imported from a foreign country; in the present case there is no not present.
question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu. However, in the
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, entered into
reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court being within an agreement concerning military bases, and Article XIII thereof is as follows:
the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed with
the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered. JURISDICTION
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur. 1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to
G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948 exercise jurisdiction over the following offenses:
JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner, (a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the
vs. offender and offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED the armed forces of the United States on active duty) or the offense is
STATES ARMY, respondents. against the security of the Philippines;
Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner. (b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed
J. A. Wolfson for respondent. forces of the United States in which the offended party is also a member of
the armed forces of the United States; and
MORAN, C.J.:
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus Miquiabas against forces of the United States against the security of the United States.
the Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus Command, United States
Army, who is alleged to have petitioner under custody and to have appointed 2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other
a General Court-Martial to try petitioner in connection with an offense over offenses committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of
which the said court has no jurisdiction. the United States.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States 3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to
Army in the Philippines, who has been charged with disposing in the Port of exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article,
Manila Area of things belonging to the United States Army, in violation of the the officer holding the offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal
94th Article of War of the United States. He has been arrested for that reason (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province in which the offense has been
and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and found him committed within ten days after his arrest, and in such case the Philippines
guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. This sentence, however, shall exercise jurisdiction.
is not yet final for it is still subject to review.
4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise
It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal
jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province where the offense has been
treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign committed shall so notify the officer holding the offender in custody within ten
nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within days after his arrest, and in such a case the United States shall be free to
certain portions of said territory. On March 11, 1947, the Republic of the exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under paragraph 2 of this article is
committed by any member of the armed forces of the United States.
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction
(a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty, or over the criminal case against petitioner if the offense had been committed
within a base. Under paragraph 1 (b), if the offense had been committed
(b) during a period of national emergency declared by either Government outside a base, still the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction if the
and the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) so finds from the evidence, he shall offense had been committed by a "member of the armed forces of the United
immediately notify the officer holding the offender in custody that the United States" there being no question that the offended party in this case is the
States is free to exercise jurisdiction. In the event the fiscal (prosecuting United States. It is not necessary therefore, to consider whether the offense
attorney) finds that the offense was not committed in the actual performance is against "the security of the United States" under paragraph 1 (c), or
of a specific military duty, the offender's commanding officer shall have the whether petitioner committed it in "the actual performance of a specific
right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary of Justice within ten days military duty" or in time of a declared "national emergency" under paragraph
from the receipt of the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the Secretary 4, or whether we are still in a state of war under paragraph 6, for in all these
of Justice shall be final. instances the military jurisdiction depends also upon whether the offender is
a member of the armed forces of the United States. We shall then determine
5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the custody of in this case (1) whether the offense has been committed within or without a
the accused, pending trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted without base, and, in the second instance, (2) whether the offender is or is not a
delay to the commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge member of the armed forces of the United States.
in writing that such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending
trial in a competent court of the Philippines and that he will be held ready to As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement provides that "bases
appear and will be produced before said court when required by it. The are those area named in Annex A and Annex B and such additional areas as
commanding officer shall be furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) may be acquired for military purposes pursuant to the terms of this
with a copy of the information against the accused upon the filing of the Agreement." Among the areas specified in Annexes A and B, there is none
original in the competent court. that has reference to the Port Area of Manila where the offense has allegedly
been committed. On the contrary, it appears in Annex A that "army
6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is naturally agreed that in time communications system" is included, but with "the deletion of all stations in
of war the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction the Port of Manila Area."
over any offenses which may be committed by members of the armed forces
of the United States in the Philippines. Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The whole article is as
follows:
7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the bases
to any person fleeing from the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
such person be found in any base, he will be surrendered on demand to the
competent authorities of the Philippines. 1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to occupy
temporary quarters and installations now existing outside the bases
8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by the mentioned in Annex A and Annex B, for such reasonable time, not exceeding
United States, the offended party may institute a separate civil action against two years, as may be necessary to develop adequate facilities within the
the offender in the proper court of the Philippines to enforce the civil liability bases for the United States armed forces. If circumstances require an
which under the laws of the Philippines may arise from the offense. extension of time, such a period will be fixed by mutual agreement of the two
Governments; but such extension shall not apply to the existing temporary
quarters and installations within the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no
case exceed a period of three years. Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the
temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Port of City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall
Manila reservation with boundaries as of 1941 will be available for use to the be governed by the provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore,
United States armed forces until such time as other arrangements can be the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within, but without, a
made for the supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two base, since it has been committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is not
Governments. one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and is
merely temporary quarters located within the present limits of the City of
3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to Manila.
temporary quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article
while they are so occupied by the armed forces of the United States; The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be considered as a
provided, that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and member of the armed forces of the United States under Article XIII,
installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be paragraph 1 (b). As above stated, petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian
considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the employee of the United States Army in the Philippines. Under the terms of
provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election not to the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a member of
exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines shall be made by the the armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the
Secretary of Justice. It is agreed that the United States shall have full use Agreement make mention of civilian employees separately from members of
and full control of all these quarters and installations while they are occupied the armed forces of the United States, which is a conclusive indication that
by the armed forces of the United States, including the exercise of such under said Agreement armed forces do not include civilian employees.
measures as may be necessary to police said quarters for the security of the
personnel and property therein. Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the United States,
which enumerates, among the persons subject to military law, persons
The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading, is "Temporary accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States. But this case
Installations." Paragraph 1 refers to temporary quarters and installations should be decided not under the Articles of War, but under the terms of the
existing outside the bases specified in Annex A and Annex B, which may be Base Agreement between the United States and the Philippines. And not
retained by the United States armed forces for such reasonable time as may because a person is subject to military law under the Articles of War does he
be necessary not exceeding two years in duration, extendible fro not more become, for that reason alone, a member of the armed forces under the
than three years, the extension not being applicable to existing temporary Base Agreement. And even under the Articles of War, the mere fact that a
quarters and installations within the limits of the City of Manila. civilian employee is in the service of the United States Army does not make
him a member of the armed forces of the United States. Otherwise, it would
Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation, which have been necessary for said Article to enumerate civilian employees
will be available for use to the United States armed forces, also as a separately from members of the armed forces of the United States.
temporary quarters and installations, its temporariness not being for a
definite period of time, but "until such time as other arrangements can be Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action because the
made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments." Secretary of Justice had not notified the officer holding the petitioner in
There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be construed as placing custody whether or not the Philippines desired to retain jurisdiction under
the Port of Manila Reservation in the category of a permanent base. Article XXI, paragraph 3, of the Military Base Agreement. It is sufficient to
state in this connection that in cases like the present where the offender is a If petitioner is liable for a criminal offense, according to our laws, the
civilian employee and not a member of the Unites States armed forces, no jurisdiction to try him belongs to a justice of the peace or municipal court or to
waiver can be made either by the prosecuting attorney of by the Secretary of a court of first instance.
Justice, under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph
3 of Article XXI, of the Agreement. The jurisdiction can be transferred to other courts by virtue of a law that may
be enacted to said effect. The law, to be effective, must not violate the
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General Court-Martial constitutional Bill of Rights, among them the guarantee of fair trial in favor of
appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense an accused, the equal protection of the law, the due process of law, the
allegedly committed by him and, consequently, the judgment rendered by guarantees against illegal detentions and searches, and others.
said court sentencing the petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the U. S. Army,
rendering services in the Philippines. He attacks the power of the
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without Commanding General, Philippine Ryukus Command, U.S. Army, to have him
prejudice to any criminal action which may be instituted in the proper court of under military custody and tried by a general court-martial of said army.
the Philippines. Respondent invokes, in opposing the petition, the provisions of the
agreement on military Bases entered into by the Republic of the Philippines
Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the Honorable, Secretary and the government of the United States of America on March 14, 1947.
of Justice.
The agreement appears to be a concession to two weaknesses: the
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ, American distrust in Philippine tribunals and Filipino yielding to much distrust;
concur. on one hand, undisguised prejudice, — national, racial, or otherwise, — on
the other, meek submission to the natural consequences of an unreasonable
prejudice; on one side, the haughtiness of a powerful nation, proud in the
Separate Opinions consciousness of its power, on the other, the moral surrender of a new
nation, not yet so sure in the exercise to their fullness of sovereign
PERFECTO, J., concurring: prerogatives. Extra-territoriality is wrong per se.
One of the attributes of national sovereignty is the power to try and punish It is, therefore, assailable on two opposing fronts. On constitutional ground, it
offenses, criminal and otherwise. The exercise of that power is, by virtue of is hardly defensible.
express provision of our Constitution, vested in the Supreme Court and in
inferior courts established by law. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII) The fundamental law The Bill of Rights has been embodied in the Constitution for the protection of
refers to inferior courts created by an enactment of a national legislature, all human beings within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. All
Assembly or Congress, not to foreign courts martial, created by foreign persons covered by the waivers made in the agreement, whether Americans
countries. or Filipinos, whether citizens or aliens, are denied the constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the law. Their fundamental rights are
All this is in accordance with elemental principles of political law. safeguarded by the Constitution, and the agreement places them outside the
Constitution.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the agreement in question, so far as it
stipulates waiver of the jurisdiction of our courts of justice on the class of We concur in the decision, ordering the immediate release of the petitioner.
persons mentioned therein, is null and void, being in open conflict with clear
provisions of our fundamental law. G.R. Nos. L-32921-40 June 10, 1971
Upon this ground, petitioner is entitled to be released by respondent and by ANDRES M. SENERES in his capacity as Collector of Customs for the Port
the court martial which tried him. of Iloilo, GIL B. ARMADA, in his capacity as Acting Deputy Collector of
Customs for the Port of Iloilo, and IRENEO HORTILLOSA, in his capacity as
Even in the erroneous hypothesis that the waiver clauses of the agreement Wharfinger for the Port of Iloilo, petitioners,
are valid, we concur in the reasoning of the Chief Justice in support of the vs.
position that petitioner is not comprehended in said waiver clauses. With HON. VICENTE O. FRIAS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
more reason, respondent has no power nor jurisdiction to hold petitioner in Instance of Iloilo, Branch 11, VICTOR JAVIER and EDUARDO ROQUE,
confinement, nor to have him tried by a U.S. army court-martial. represented by their Attorney-in-Fact ALBERTO BELARDO, ALFREDO
LOCSIN and MARTHA YUMUL, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact
Notice must be served to the whole world that, in rendering the decision in ELPIDIO APUAN, EFREN MANULAT and FORTUNATO QUITSON,
this case, the Supreme Court, in the fullness of judicial maturity, acted not as represented by their Attorney-in-Fact JOSE ARCHANGEL, NORMA LOPEZ
a mere agency of national sovereignty, but in the consciousness that the and ANTONIO HIDALGO represented by their Attorney-in-Fact VICENTE
administration of justice, more than national, is a human function, untethered CARO, DANIEL, DOMINGO and GILDA DULALIA, represented by their
by the narrow provincialism of the points of view of a country, but founded on Attorney-in-Fact ROBERTO SALAPANTAN, EDGAR LAZO and GREGORIO
the universal and permanent interests of mankind, as expressed in principles LANTIN, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact RICARDO CORDERO,
with equal value regardless of the hemisphere of the latitude where a person IRENE WAGAN and OSCAR VITO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact,
may be placed. RENATO NABLE, SIMEON MONTELINO and WILLIAM TAN, represented
by their Attorney-in-Fact RUSTICO AGUSTIN, YOLANDO SINGSON and
There is a suggestion that, because it has not found articulate expression in QUINTIN JAVELLANO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact MANUEL
this case, it should be ignored, when it is boiling in many minds, and it is that PALACIO, JOAQUIN RODRIGUEZ and JUAN REYES, represented by their
respondent, shielded by his military power and the overwhelming national Attorney-in-Fact ROMEO BAUTISTA, GREGORIA SANTIAGO and
power of his country, may ignore our decision, and we will be powerless to FRANCISCA SINGSON, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact EDMUNDU
enforce it. The fact that respondent appeared before us, through counsel, GUMARU, ROBERTO ROMELDAN and LUIS ORTIGA, represented by their
without any reservation, answers the suggestion, and gives full justice to the Attorney-in-Fact VICTOR AVISO, MANUEL INFANTE and PEDRO
sense of moral values of the respondent. BUENVIAJE, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact RUBEN SEQUITIN,
TONY VELILIA and HERNANI GARCIA, represented by their Attorney-in-
Besides, in the present state of international affairs, when America is Fact MANUEL LINSANGAN, JUANA SANTOS and PABLO CASTILLO,
engaged in the noble task of making a reality the ideal of one world, it can represented by their Attorney-in-Fact AUSBERTO ROSALES, LUISA
not compromise its moral leadership by any showing of reckless disregard to PERALOSA and QUINTIN JAVELLANO, represented by their Attorney-in-
the decision of a court of justice. The cry that there must be one world or Fact JOSE JACINTO, ROMEO SOMERA and PAUL FERMIN, represented
none can receive but one satisfactory answer; the reality of world justice. by their Attorney-in-Fact TOMAS CANTOS, BENJAMIN ISIDRO and
Only in justice hinges the salvation of humanity. Only justice can give real CARLOTA VELOSO represented by their Attorney-in-Fact EDUARDO
peace and provide the basis for contentment and happiness. RAMILA, NORBERTO USON and Jose CLEMENTE, represented by their
Attorney-in-Fact CAYETANO DIMACALE, and TEODORO ENRIQUE and without due notice to them and were found to contain parts of slot machines,
ZOSIMO QUIAMRAO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact AGUSTIN which are of prohibited importation under section 102 submitting to
REVILLA, respondents. respondent court for "judicial interpretation" the proposition that the cited
provision "does not prohibit parts only thereof, but only those complete and
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General assembled units so that the same can be utilized for gambling purposes,
Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for petitioners. which the law prohibits."
Romeo F. Zamora for private respondents. Respondents prayed respondent judge for the immediate issuance of a
preliminary mandatory injunction for the release under bond of the shipments
alleging that otherwise "upon notice to respondent [collector] of instant
TEEHANKEE, J.: petition, the respondent [collector] will immediately institute seizure
proceedings over subject shipments thereby divesting and/or abeitting (sic)
Original action of certiorari and prohibition challenging the jurisdiction of this Court from acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter and making the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to take cognizance of petition at bar academic and moot to the irreparable and great damage of
twenty separate petitions for mandamus with preliminary mandatory your petitioners." Respondents, without any appraisal of the collector or his
injunction filed by private respondents and to issue orders for the release examiners, unilaterally computed by themselves the specific amounts
from customs custody of forty crates of imported articles described to be allegedly due by way of "total lawful taxes, duties and other charges due on
used sheet containers and used sample wood panels and other similar the shipments" and prayed respondent judge to issue a writ of mandamus
articles but reported upon customs examination to be parts of slot and "commanding the respondent (collector] to accept (their) payment" therefor.
jackpot machines.
Late in the afternoon of December 11, 1970, without summons having been
The twenty pairs of respondents, totalling forty of them all with given issued by respondent court, respondents' counsel served upon petitioner
addresses at Manila, Quezon City and Rizal, are concededly the consignees deputy collector Armada a notice addressed to petitioner collector Seneres
of the forty crates which arrived at the port of Manila on board the M/S that he would submit his petitions for preliminary mandatory injunction for the
"Tagaytay" and were trans-shipped to the port of Iloilo arriving there on respondent court's resolution at 8:30 a.m., the next day, December 12, 1970.
November 5, 1970 on board the M/B "Don Camilo". Armada refused to receive the notice since it was address to the collector
who was in Manila on official business and since no court summons had
Claiming that petitioners customs authorities of Iloilo had refused to act on been issued in the said cases as to place him under the jurisdiction of
the informal entries filed for the release of the forty crates, without requiring respondent court.3
them either to submit additional documents but refusing to accept payment of
the taxes, duties and other charges allegedly due on the shipments and On December 12, 1970, respondent judge nevertheless issued ex-parte his
without instituting seizure proceedings against the shipments, the forty order of the same date granting the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction
respondents, through their respective designed attorney-in-fact (twenty of prayed for by the forty respondents in the twenty cases below, upon the filing
them representing the twenty pairs of consignees, at one crate per of bonds amounting to double the amounts unilaterally computed by
consignee)filed on December 10, 1970, through common counsel, Atty. respondents as the amounts of taxes, duties and charges payable by them,4
Romeo F. Zamora,1 the twenty separate petitions for mandamus with and directing the release unto petitioners of the questioned articles.
respondent court.2 Respondents allegedly uniformly in their petitions that Respondent judge premised his ex-parte mandatory injunction order inter alia
they had been opened, examined and inventoried by the customs authorities "that said provision (sec. 102 [e] of the Tariff and Customs Code) relied upon
by the respondent does not prohibit importation of parts thereof but only Respondent judge denied dissolution of his mandatory injunction per his
those complete and assembled units, thereby requiring the interpretation of order of December 15, 1970, summarily disregarding the statutes and
the same which is a proper function of this Court; that it is the sense of this jurisprudence cited by petitioner and peremptorily ruling that "(T)here can
Court that the instant importation does not fall as a prohibited importation hardly be any question that since the nature of the cause of action in this
within the purview of the provisions of law aforequoted as they are merely proceedings is mandamus, this Court is vested with jurisdiction to entertain
spare parts and not machines and not jackpot machines and pinball the same more so because the cause involves a justiciable controversy
machines or similar contrivances that the petitioners have established their between the parties in the interpretation of a provision of the Tariff and
clear legal right to claim the subject shipment ...; that respondent's Customs Code of the Philippines (Sec. 102, par. 'e'), which calls for the
unwarranted and unjust refusal to act on the corresponding entry without exercise of the interpretative power of the Court."8
instituting any seizure proceedings against subject shipments and in not
allowing the petitioners to pay the lawful taxes due thereon, thereby On the next day, December 16, 1970, respondent filed an urgent motion to
hindering the ultimate release of said shipment to the petitioners has caused cite petitioner Armada and Hortillosa for contempt and to authorize the sheriff
great and irreparable damage and injury to the herein petitioners ...". to break open the bodega under the custody of wharfinger Hortillosa to effect
release of the forty crates.
The required bonds were filed on the same day, December 12, 1970, and the
order and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction were served in the Respondent judge overruled petitioners' opposition per his order of
afternoon of the same day on petitioner wharfinger Hortillosa. It was also on December 17, 1970, took the wharfinger's manifestation that he could not
the same day, December 12, 1970, only that respondent judge issued his release the articles pursuant to the mandatory writ except after proper
order of the same date finding "the instant petitions for mandamus ... identification of respondent-consignees and completion of the documents
sufficient in form and substance" and requiring petitioner collector Senares necessary and requirements of all importers for release from customs of
as therein respondent to answer the petition within ten days.5 articles imported into the country as "a deliberate move to delay if not render
the writ ineffective" and ordered wharfinger Hortillosa "to open the customs
Petitioner collector filed on December 14, 1970 at urgent motion to dissolve bodega, release and deliver the subject articles to the Provincial Sheriff of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the release of the slot Iloilo or his authorized deputy, and in the event of the failure and/or refusal of
machine parts, on the ground, inter alia of respondent court's lack of the former, the Provincial Sheriff or his Deputy is hereby authorized, as
jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents' lack of cause of action, the prayed for, to break open the padlock of the bodega where subject goods are
grave and irreparable damage that would be caused to the Government and contained for him to effect delivery to the petitioners herein." 9 Respondent
grave abuse of discretion and violation of the Rules in the issuance of the judge further set the contempt hearing for December 23, 1970 at 8:30 a.m.
writ.6 Petitioner movant attached to the petition the very letter of December
4, 1970 of Eduardo Ramila as representative of the forty respondents- Hence, the present action. The Court per its resolution of December 28, 1970
consignees asking for a 10-day extension at least to file entries for the forty required respondents to answer the petition and issued a writ of preliminary
shipments on the ground that the complete shipping documents are not, as injunction enjoining the enforcement of respondent judge's orders and writ of
yet received for complete not presently known to the above consignees"7 mandatory injunction and restraining respondent judge from taking any
and informed respondent judge that as of then, respondents had not yet filed further cognizance of the twenty cases before him.
the necessary documents but had nevertheless filed their premature petitions
with the court for mandamus to order the release of the articles. 1. It is the settled law and jurisprudence in this jurisdiction that the
customs authorities acquire exclusive jurisdiction over goods sought to be
imported into the Philippines, for the purpose of enforcement of Philippine
customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually under their smuggling — by virtue of the enactment of the Tariff and Customs Code
possession and control, even if no warrant for seizure or detention thereof (Rep. Act 1937) as well as the Court of Tax Appeals Law (Rep. Act 1125),
has previously been issued by the port collector of customs. The port "on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude that the
collector is called upon to "cause all such articles to be appraised and legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to
classified, and shall assess and collect the duties, taxes and other charges replevin a property which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings
thereon, and shall hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture
taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be, paid of property violation of Customs laws could easily be undetermined by the
disposing of the same accordingly to law." 10 When the goods are simple device of replevin.
challenged as being of prohibited importation and the collector questions the
legality of the importation, as in the case of the jackpot machine parts at bar, Furthermore, Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code requires the
the law expressly imposes upon the collector the obligation "to exercise such Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the property sought to be
jurisdiction in respect thereto us will prevent importation". 11 forfeited written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity to be
heard in his defense. This provision clearly indicates the intension of the law
The collector's decision may be appealed to the commissioner of customs, to confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of all questions
whose decision, inter alia, in cases involving seizure, detention or release of affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in a seizure and
property affected, may in turn be reviewed only by the Court of Tax Appeals forfeiture case. The judicial recourse of the property owner is not in the Court
under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction conferred on said court under of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting
section 7 of Republic Act 1125. 12 administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs. 17
2. Respondent court manifestly had no jurisdiction to interfere with the 3. In the early 1967 case of Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, 18
Iloilo port customs authorities' custody over the forty crates of alleged slot respondent judge's fallacious concepts that his court may assume and
machine and jackpot machine parts sought to be imported under exercise jurisdiction in mandamus cases involving the exercise of its
respondents' misdeclaration of their being merely used sheet and metal "interpretative power" over disputed provisions of the Tariff and Customs
containers and panels, much less to order their forcible release Code were long laid to rest. The Court, in no uncertain terms, there pointed
notwithstanding their entry not yet having been covered by the required entry out that in cases of illegal importation, as in the case at bar, the
documents nor the collector having directed their appraisal, since he was Commissioner of Customs must first review the collector's ruling and "by a
preparing seizure and forfeiture proceedings against the forty crates for being formal decision" rule on the legality of the importation. It is only after a
of prohibited importation and unmanifested in violation of section 2530 (f) and decision adverse to the importer is rendered that the importer may then
(g) of the Tariff and Customs Code and Central Bank Circular No. 265. In "summon the aid of the corresponding court." But such disposition of the
fact, the collector did issue the corresponding warrant of seizure and customs commissioner, the Court stressed, will not come under the court of
detention under date of December 17, 1970 13 and notices dated January first instance on appeal. Such appeal shall be addressed to the court of tax
27, 1971 were sent in Seizure, identification Case No. 13-70 14 advising appeals. Because, at bottom, the problem is: Was the importation authorized
respondents of the hearings to be held on February 15 to 17, 1971 by the by law?"
collector's hearing officer for the forfeiture of the forty crates. 15
The Court then cited the early 1955 jurisprudence 19 that "... Section 7 of
As held by the Court in the 1966 leading case of Pacis vs. Averia 16 — Republic Act No. 1125 has taken away the power of courts of first instance to
where the Court emphasized the need of the cooperation of all branches of review the actuations of the customs authorities in a case involving seizure,
the Government for the success of the law enforcement agencies in curbing detention or release of property, or other matters arising under the Customs
Law or other law administered by the Bureau of Customs. And this, between the existence of the power and the regularity of the proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that complaints may be styled 'mandamus', taken under it. The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs,
'prohibition' and 'certiorari.' For, in reality these are but expression in varying is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise
forms of a petition to review the actuations of the customs authorities. of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed,
Expressive of the rule is opinion in the Millarez case, viz: the most that can be said is than under certain circumstances the grave
abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not
"Republic Act No. 1125, section 7, effective June 16, 1954 gave the Court of mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with
Tax Appeals decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, involving "seizure, competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not
detention or release of property affected ... or other matters arising under the seen fit to do so. The proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final.
Customs Law other law administered by the Bureau of Customs." In our An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the Court of
provision necessarily has taken away the power of the Manila court of first Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the appropriate petition
instance to "review" decisions of the Customs authorities, "in any case of for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues raised is thus indicated.
seizure" — as in this case — under section 1383 et seq. of the Revised Certainly a court of first instance is not therein included. It is devoid of
Administrative Code." jurisdiction.
It matters not that no seizure proceedings were had. Section 7 of the charter 5. The doctrine was last reaffirmed anew in Luna vs. Pacis, 22 where
of the Court of Tax Appeals does not limit the appellate jurisdiction of said the Court, per Mr. Justice Zaldivar, affirmed the court of first instance's 1964
court of seizure proceedings. The law employs the term "seizure, detention order dismissing and disclaiming jurisdiction over a mandamus action
or release." instituted by therein appellant to seek release of forfeited property from the
Manila customs authorities, in the settled doctrine of the 1955 case of
4. Papa vs. Mago 20 reiterated the doctrine of the lack of jurisdiction of Millarez, maintaining the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
the regular courts of first instance over customs authorities in the Appeals over decisions of the customs commissioner, as subsequently
enforcement of customs laws, thus: "It is the settled rule, therefore, that the reiterated by the Court in a long line of decisions 23 and from which the
Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for Court has found no plausible reason to depart.
the purpose of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods
are actually in its possession or control even if no warrant of seizure or 6. Indeed, prescinding from the patent lack of jurisdiction of respondent
detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in court over the mandamus cases filed in the court below, the Court finds that
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings." respondent judge proceeded in gross disregard of the Rules of Court in
hearing the petitions on December 12, 1970 and peremptorily issuing on the
In the recent case of Ponce Enrile vs. Vinuya, 21 re affirming anew the same date his mandatory order and writ for the release upon bond of the
settled doctrine of Papa and Pacis vs. Averia, supra, the Court, per Mr. forty crates, even before he had found, as required by the Rules 24 the
Justice Fernando, emphasized a new that the regular courts of first instance petitions to be sufficient in form and substance, and caused the issuance of
are "devoid of jurisdiction" to issue replevin or release orders for goods under summons to petitioner collector (as respondent therein). Petitioner deputy
customs custody: "(R)espondents, however, notwithstanding the compelling collector Armada was wholly justified in refusing to receive on the preceding
force of the above doctrines, would assert that respondent Judge could afternoon respondents' counsel's notice the petitioner collector that he would
entertain the replevin suit as the seizure is illegal, allegedly because the submit the next morning to respondent judge his "urgent" petitions for
warrant issued is invalid and the seizing officer likewise was devoid of preliminary mandatory injunction, since no summons had then as yet been
authority. This is to lose sight of the distinction, as earlier made mention of, issued to said petitioner as to place him under the respondent court's
jurisdiction and respondents' counsel had no authority whatsoever under the (e) of the customs code, "as they are merely spare parts and not machines
Rules to serve any binding notice with regard to his petitions, which had not and not jackpot machines and pinball machines or similar contrivances." As
yet been given due course by respondent court, such as to respondent court. in the case of Cloribel, "to proceed with the case below on the merits would
then be a useless ceremony" because respondents would have been already
7. Respondent judge likewise appears to have cast aside the basic what they wanted in their suits below, i.e. release of the forty crates, and the
postulates governing the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction government would have lost its lawful hold on he controverted shipments of
orders, as restated by Mr. Justice Sanchez for the Court in Cloribel, 25 slot machine parts and "literally shall have been left `holding the bag'". The
supra: "(B)y Section 1, Rule 58, 1964 Rules of Court, it is now expressly questioned illegal articles would then have been release from customs,
provided — though — already long generally recognized that a court, at any despite the Tariff and Customs Code's prohibition, by virtue of respondent
stage of an action prior to final judgment, may 'require the performance of a judge's orders peremptorily and hastily issued without jurisdiction, and would
particular act, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory have been quickly disposed of by respondents-consignees, presumably at
injunction.' But, stock must be taken of the truism that, like preventive great profit to service the various illegal jackpot machines in the country or to
injunctions, it is but a provisional remedy to which parties may resort 'for the be assembled as complete units — and no subsequent corrective order of
preservation or protection of their rights or interests, and for no other any court would have availed to recover the articles and bring them back to
purpose, during the pendency of the principal action.' More than this, as a the custody of the customs authorities, for forfeiture and eventual destruction,
mandatory injunction usually tends to do more than to maintain the status if ultimately ruled by proper competent authorities to be of prohibited
quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final importation.
hearing. Per contra it may issue 'in cases of extreme urgency; where the
right is clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in
complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's 8. The government attorneys thus appear to have valid ground for
right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing complaining of respondent judge's orders of December 12, 15 and 17, 1970,
relation where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish having been precipitously granted, to the extent of authorizing the destruction
and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently of the customs warehouse padlock to enable respondents to forcibly realize
and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.' "their scheme to obtain possession of the imported articles" before this Court
Indeed 'the writ should not be denied the complainant when he makes out a could act on the petition filed on December 21, 1970, expecting that the
clear case, free from doubt and dispute.'" Court could not hold sessions until after the long Christmas holidays and thus
render moot and academic the petition with its prayer for a restraining order
In the case at bar, respondent judge's mandatory writ obviously was not against enforcement of the challenged orders, with grave and irreparable
designed to maintain the status quo. Neither had respondents made out "a damage to the public interest. 26
clear case free from doubt and dispute." To paraphrase Cloribel, the most
convincing argument, of course, is that to enforce respondent judge's writ for Respondent judge, notwithstanding his attention having been timely called,
the release of the forty crates of slot and jackpot machine parts, would have by petitioners in their urgent motion to December 14, 1970 for dissolution of
been practically to decide the in favor of respondents. In just one ex-parte the mandatory injunction, to the settled law and jurisprudence on his court's
hearing and without any evidence of his having reflected on his court's lack lack of jurisdiction and this Court's admonition against the precipitous
of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, respondent judge had indeed issuance of injunctive writs, appears to have failed to pay due heed thereto.
prejudged the petitions before him and already expressed his itself in his Mr. Justice Reyes' injunction for the Court in Palanan Lumber & Plywood,
order of December 12, 1970 that the importation of the forty crates were not Inc. vs. Arranz 27 is apropos: "(I)t is not amiss to recall here that time and
of prohibited importation and could not be deemed covered by Section 102 again this Court has had occasion to deplore the read of some judges to
grant and issue injunctions ex parte against acts of public functionaries, designated attorneys-in-fact duly authorized to clear their shipments as well
ignoring the presumption of regularity and validity of official actuations, in as to engage verbally the services of common counsel for the pure the Court
disregard of the deference and courtesy due to a coordinate branch of the therefore directs the Solicitor-General to investigate the matter further with
government, and with no other guide than the far from impartial assertions in the assistance of the appropriate governmental investigative agency and to
pleadings of interested parties, which a summary hearing would have shown ascertain the true facts of the transaction, and the identity and participation of
to be either dubious or unfounded. The result has been that authority too private respondents and their attorneys-in-fact, as well as the full facts of how
often, the public interest has been prejudiced through unnecessary delays. It they came to engage the services of their common counsel, Atty. Zamora,
bears repeating here that preliminary injunctions remain extraordinary and to inform the Court in due course of the results of such investigation and
remedies that should be dispensed with circumspection, and that both sides the appropriate action taken thereon, if any.
should be first heard whenever possible."
ACCORDINGLY, the writs of prohibition and certiorari prayed for are granted,
9. Finally, per its resolution of March 18, 1971, the Court required respondent court being clearly without jurisdiction over the subject of Civil
counsel for respondents, Atty. Zamora, "considering the fact of record that all Cases Nos. 8449 to 8468 filed before it, which cases respondent judge is
the shipments were consigned to the port of Iloilo while all the consignees hereby ordered to dismiss. The order and writ of preliminary mandatory
are residents of Manila, Quezon City and Rizal, to submit with his injunction of December 12, 1970, as well as the other orders of December
memorandum the name(s) of the person or persons who employed him as 15, 1970 and December 17, 1970 (Annexes C, C-1, G and J, petition) issued
well as copies of any written contracts for his legal services executed by him by respondent judge are declared null and void, and the writ of preliminary
with the twenty pairs of respondents and/or with their respective attorneys-in- injunction herefore issued by this Court is made permanent. With costs
fact." In his compliance dated April 12, 1971, Atty. Zamora manifested that against private respondents.
"his legal services (sic) for said cases was verbally engaged first by
respondents' attorneys-in fact Messrs. Alberto Belardo, Ricardo Cordero, The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this decision to the
Renato Nable, Romeo Bautista and Agustin Revilla for the respective Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, particularly with reference to the matters
shipments of consignees-respondents that they represent. Subsequently, the dealt with in paragraphs 6 to 8 thereof. He is likewise directed to furnish copy
other above-named attorneys-in-fact followed in verbally employing my hereof to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, with particular reference to the
professional services, likewise, for respective consignees-respondents that matters dealt with in paragraph 9 thereof.
they represent. Hence, being the attorney of record of the above-named
respondents whose respective shipments are similarly situated, I deemed it So ordered.
wise to file similar or identical petition with the court below (respondent
court)." Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
The Court is intrigued by the fact of record that 40 individuals — private
respondents — all with given addresses in Manila, Quezon City and Rizal Castro, J., is on leave.
would be the consignee each of a crate of 40 shipments apparently
misdeclared as used metal containers and other articles of similar nature but
actually consisting of slot or jackpot machine parts; that the entire forty crates
would he shipped on the same vessel from Singapore for Manila with Footnotes
instructions to trans-ship to the port of Iloilo; and that said forty respondents
"consignees" have apparently not acted on their own account but through
1 With address at 15-C Road 6, Project 6, Quezon City (his former "(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for
address as given to respondent court was Rm. 706, Katigbak Bldg., Manila) customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release
of property affected fines forfeitures or other penalties imposed in thereto; or
2 Docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 8449 to 8468 of respondent court. other matters arising under the customs Law or part of law administered by
the Bureau of Customs.
3 Annex E-3, Petition.
13 Respondents memorandum, p. 9.
4 Annex C. Petition. The bonds fixed by respondent judge ranged from
P900.00 to P3,000.00 per case (each case covering two crates and totalled 14 Entitled "Republic of the Philippines Forty (40) crates jackpot
P35,900.00 for all twenty cases. machine parts which arrived at the port of Iloilo on November 5, 1970."
9 Annex J. Petition. 20 Millarez etc. vs. Amparo, 97 Phil. 282 June 30, 1955), emphasis
furnished.
10 Sec. 1206, Tariff and Customs Code (Rep. Act 1937).
20 22 SCRA 857 (Feb. 28, 1968).
11 Sec. 1207, idem. provides: "Jurisdiction of Collector over articles of
prohibited importation. — Where articles are of prohibited importation or 21 37 SCRA 381 (Jan. 30, 1971), cited in Lopez vs. Comm. of Customs,
subject to importation only upon conditions prescribed by law it shall be the 37 SCRA 327 (Jan. 30, 1971).
duty of the Collector to exercise such jurisdiction in respect thereto as will
prevent importation or otherwise secure compliance with all legal 22 L-24237, Mar. 31, 1971.
requirements.
23 Citing "Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corp. vs. Secretary of
12 Its pertinent provision: Finance, G.R. No. L-24797, October 8, 1968, citing: NAMARCO v.
Macadaeg, 98 Phil. 185, 190; Sampaguita Shoe & Slipper Factory v. Comm.
"Jurisdiction. — The Court of Tax Appeals shall exist appellate jurisdiction to of Customs, 102 Phil. 850; Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Manahan, L-12096,
review by appeal as herein provided — April 30, 1959, 105 Phil. 1299, 1300; Acting Collector of Customs v. De la
Rama Steamship,
xxx xxx xxx L-20676, Feb. 26, 1965, (13 SCRA 298); Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax
Appeals, L-25181, Jan. 11, 1967, (19 SCRA 10); De Joya v. Lantin, L-24037,
April 27, 1967, (19 SCRA 893); Acting Collector of Customs v. Caluag, L-
23925, May 24, 1967, (20 SCRA 204), Romualdez v. Arca, L-20516, Nov. information in Criminal Case No. 6398 for violation of P.D. No. 772
15, 1967, (21 SCRA 856)." (penalizing squatting and similar acts), as well as the Order dated May 31,
1976, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
24 Rule 65, sec. 6; see 3 Moran's Rules 1970 Ed. 203.
Private respondents were charged in the court a quo, then presided over by
25 See also Namareo vs. Cloribel, 22 SCRA 1033 (Mar. 13, 1968). respondent Judge with violation of P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting in
an information which reads:
26 Petitioner's Ex-parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction or for Issuance of Restraining Order, dated Dec. 28, That on or about the 2nd week of October, 1975 and for sometime
1970, Rollo, p. 136. subsequent thereto at Bo. Bagongbayan, Puerto Princess City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
27 22 SCRA 1186 (Mar. 20, 1968). conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another and
taking advantage of the absence and/or tolerance of the landowner, did then
28 Citing "Suarez" vs. Hon. Andres Reyes, et al., L-19828, Feb. 28, and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously occupy and build a house on the
1963; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, et al., L- land owned by Felix Yara for residential and/or commercial purpose and
23838, Dec. 28, 1964; The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary vs. The refuses (sic) to vacate said land despite repeated demands to vacate made
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-22308, L-22343, March 31, by Felix Yara, which act is a violation of Presidential Decree No. 772. (Annex
1964; Hon. Martiniano P. Vivo v. Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, G.R. No. L-23239, 'A' to the Petition for Review, p. 11, Rollo).
Nov. 23, 1966; Vda. de Villanueva vs. Ortiz, No. L-11412, May 28, 1958; and
Coloso vs. Board of Accountancy, L-5750, April 20, 1953 and the cases cited The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6398 of the court a quo.
therein."
Upon a motion to quash filed by private respondents, alleging that the facts
G.R. No. L-44095 April 24, 1989 charged do not constitute an offense, respondent Judge dismissed the case
in an Order dated May 17, 1976. In dismissing the information, respondent
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Judge opined:
vs.
HON. OSCAR P. SIAT AGUSTIN VIGONTE and EDGARDO MAGBANUA, From the purpose clause of Presidential Decree No. 772 it is very evident
respondents. that what is penalized are acts of squatting only in urban communities and
not just any community. In the absence therefore of a recital in the
The Solicitor General for petitioner. information that Barrio Bagongbayan, Puerto Princess City where the
squatting was allegedly committed is an urban community, the court is of the
Teotimo P. Timones for private respondents. opinion and so holds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
(Annex 'F' to Petition for Review, p. 25, Rollo).
BIDIN, J.: The prosecution moved for reconsideration of the said Order, but was denied
in the Order dated May 31, 1976.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Order dated
May 17, 1976 of the then City Court of Puerto Princess City, dismissing the Hence, this petition.
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of
The petition is premised on the sole assignment of error, to wit: Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of
National Defense, Public Works and Communications, Social Welfare and
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRESIDENTIAL the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential
DECREE NO. 772 PENALIZES SQUATTING IN BOTH URBAN AND Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and
RURAL COMMUNITIES. Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, to remove all illegal
constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those
Section 1 P.D. 772 provides, as follows: along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private
property,' squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, country;
or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds
in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully
residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;
imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than
that one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive
court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is against this illegal and nefarious practice. (Emphasis supplied).
omitted).
Considering that PD 772 applies only to urban communities and the
The question as to which community or communities P.D. 772 applies has information filed in the case at bar does not allege that barrio Bagongbayan,
long been resolved by this Court in People vs. Echaves, 95 SCRA 663 Puerto Princesa City where the squatting was allegedly committed is an
(1980) where it was held: urban community, the respondent Judge did not commit any reversible error
in holding that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to ACCORDINGLY, the petition is Dismissed and the orders of the court a quo
squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in dated May 17 and 31, 1976 are Affirmed. No costs.
squatter areas made by well - to - do individuals. The squatting complained
of involves pasture lands in rural areas. SO ORDERED,
The aforesaid ruling was restated in Bernardo vs. People, 123 SCRA 365 Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
(1983) as follows:
[G.R. No. 100210. April 1, 1998]
The intent of the decree (referring to P.D. No. 772) is unmistakable. It is
intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR B.
constructions. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and
ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents.
The unmistakable intent of P.D. No. 772 may be gleaned from its preamble,
thus: DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.: Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati (Branch 148), docketed as Criminal Case No. 1789. The
Is the Court of Appeals, in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, Information reads:
correct in ruling that Subversion is the main offense in a charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under That on or about the 5th day of June, 1990, in the Municipality of Paraaque,
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, and that, therefore, the said charge should be Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
quashed in view of a previous charge of Subversion under R.A. No. 1700, as the above-named accused, being a member of a communist party of the
amended by P.D. No. 885, against the same accused pending in another Philippines, and its front organization, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
court? and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, in furtherance of
or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, a special edition
Stated differently, is the accused charged with the same offense in both ARMSCOR PHILS. caliber .38 special revolver with Serial No. 1026387 and
cases, which would justify the dismissal of the second charge on the ground with six (6) live ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license or
of double jeopardy? permit thereof from competent government authority.[6]
This is the pith issue presented before us in this appeal by certiorari The above Information recommended no bail for Antonio Tujan, which
interposed by the People under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, recommendation was approved by the trial court in an Order dated June 19,
seeking a review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth 1990.[7] The same order also directed the continued detention of Antonio
Division) dated May 27, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, entitled THE Tujan at MIG 15 of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus HON. OSCAR B. Philippines (ISAFP), Bago Bantay, Quezon City, while his case is pending.
PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and
ANTONIO A. TUJAN, Respondents. On June 26, 1990, Antonio Tujan, through counsel, filed a motion[8] invoking
his right to a preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the
The record discloses the following antecedent facts: Revised Rules of Court and praying that his arraignment be held in abeyance
until the preliminary investigation is terminated.
As early as 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with
Subversion under Republic Act No. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law), as However, on June 27, 1990, during the hearing of Antonio Tujans motion for
amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), National preliminary investigation, his counsel withdrew the motion since he would file
Capital Region, docketed as Criminal Case No. 64079.[2] As a consequence a motion to quash the Information, for which reason counsel requested a
thereof, a warrant for his arrest was issued on July 29, 1983,[3] but it period of twenty (20) days to do so. This was granted by the trial court on
remained unserved as he could not be found. that same day.[9]
Almost seven (7) years thereafter, or on June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan was On July 16, 1990, Antonio Tujan did file the motion to quash[10] the
arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest in the subversion case.[4] When Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 on the ground that he has been
arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver and six (6) rounds of live previously in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged in Criminal
ammunition were found in his possession.[5] Case No. 64079 (for subversion) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 45). The said ground is based on Sections 3 (h) and 7, Rule 117 of
Consequently, on June 14, 1990, Antonio Tujan was charged with Illegal the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In support of the motion, Antonio
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under Tujan contends that common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed in subversion,[11]
citing the cases of Misolas vs. Panga, et al. (G. R. No. 83341, January 30, xxxxxxxxx
1990, 181 SCRA 648) and Enrile vs. Salazar, et al. (G. R. No. 92163, June 5,
1990, 186 SCRA 217). Antonio Tujan then avers that the present case is the In other words, the main offense the accused is being charged in this case is
twin prosecution of the earlier subversion case and, therefore, he is entitled also Subversion considering that the alleged Illegal Possession of the
to invoke the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.[12] Firearm and Ammunition is only in furtherance thereof.
The petitioner opposed[13] the motion to quash, arguing that Antonio Tujan Now, subversion being a continuing offense as has been previously held by
does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second time because: (a) he the Supreme Court, the fact that the accused has been previously charged of
has not even been arraigned in the subversion case, and (b) the offense Subversion before another court before the institution of this instant case is
charged against him in Criminal Case No. 64079 is for Subversion, just a continuing offense of his former charge or that his acts constituting
punishable under Republic Act No. 1700; while the present case is for Illegal subversion is a continuation of the acts he committed before.
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion,
punishable under a different law (Presidential Decree No. 1866). Moreover, The court therefore cannot subscribe to the position taken by the prosecution
petitioner contends that Antonio Tujans reliance on the Misolas and Enrile that this case is very different from the other case and that double jeopardy
cases is misplaced.[14] Tujan merely relies on the dissenting opinions in the will attach in this particular case.
Misolas case. Also, the Enrile case which involved a complex crime of
rebellion with murder is inapplicable to the instant case which is not a This court agrees with the position taken by the defense that double jeopardy
complex offense. Thus, the absorption rule as held applicable in the Enrile will attach to the accusation of subversion, punishable now under Republic
ruling has no room for application in the present case because (illegal) Act 1700, as Rule 117 of the Rules of Court particularly Section 1 thereof,
possession of firearm and ammunition is not a necessary means of provides:
committing the offense of subversion, nor is subversion a necessary means
of committing the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.[15] Time to move to quash- At any time before entering his plea, the accused
may move to quash the complaint or information.(1a)
The trial court, in an order dated October 12, 1990, granted the motion to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789, the dispositive portion of In other words, there is no necessity that the accused should be arraigned
the order reading: first before he can move to quash the information. It is before he pleads
which the accused did in this case.
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash the information is hereby GRANTED, but
only in so far as the accused may be placed in jeopardy or in danger of being On the other submissions by the prosecution, that the possession of firearms
convicted or acquitted of the crime of Subversion and as a consequence the and ammunitions is not a necessary means of committing the offense of
Information is hereby quashed and the case dismissed without prejudice to subversion or vice versa, then if the court follows such argument, there could
the filing of Illegal Possession of Firearm. be no offense of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in furtherance
of Subversion, for even the prosecution admits also that in subversion which
SO ORDERED.[16] is an offense involving propaganda, counter propaganda, a battle of the
hearts and mind of the people does not need the possession or use of
It is best to quote the disquisition of the respondent court in quashing the firearms and ammunitions.
information and dismissing the case:
The prosecution even admits and to quote: We agree with the petitioner.
The defense of double jeopardy, while unquestionably available to the The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information for violation
accused, had not been clearly shown to be invokable(sic) at this point in of P.D. No. 1866 filed against private respondent Antonio Tujan. It ruled:
time.
The foregoing information (for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
But the rule says otherwise as previously stated as provided for under in Furtherance of Subversion) filed before the Makati court shows that the
Section 1 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. main case is subversion considering that there is an allegation that the
alleged illegal possession of firearms was made in furtherance of or incident
Thus, if ever the accused is caught in possession of a firearm and to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Also, the information
ammunition which is separate and distinct from the crime of subversion and alleged likewise that the accused is a member of a communist party of the
is not a necessary ingredient thereof and the court believed so, the Philippines and its front organization. Basically, the information refers to the
prosecution will have to file another information as they may wish. The court crime of Subversion qualified by Illegal Possession of Firearms. x x x.[20]
therefore has to grant the motion to quash on the aforestated grounds,
subject to Section 5 of Rule 117, considering that the only offense to which The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
the accused in this case may be placed in jeopardy is Subversion and not
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, under which Antonio Tujan is
charged in Criminal Case No. 1789 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
The prosecution may file any information as warranted within ten (10) days (Branch 148), provides as follows:
from receipt of this order otherwise the court will order the release of the
accused, unless he is in custody for some other offense.[17] (Emphasis ours) Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[18] was also denied in an order dated be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of
December 28, 1990.[19] reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery,
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 24273. However, the appellate court tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
found that the trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion firearm or ammunition.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the questioned
Information. In dismissing the petition, the appellate court, in its decision If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearms,
dated May 27, 1991, basically reiterated the aforequoted ruling of the trial the penalty of death shall be imposed.
court.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the
Court of Appeals is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; penalty of death shall be imposed.
and (2) it was deprived of due process to prosecute and prove its case
against private respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 1789. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS
or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES. (Emphasis ours)
such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or
persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs. On the other hand, the previous subversion charge against Antonio Tujan in
Criminal Case No. 64079, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall 45), is based on a different law, that is, Republic Act No. 1700, as amended.
carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority Section 3 thereof penalizes any person who knowingly, wilfully and by overt
therefor. (Emphasis ours) act affiliates with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive association
or organization x x x. Section 4 of said law further penalizes such member [of
The above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain and simple. Under the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any
the first paragraph of Section 1, the mere possession of an unlicensed subversive association] (who) takes up arms against the Government. Thus,
firearm or ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty of reclusion in the present case, private respondent Antonio Tujan could be charged
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph of either under P.D. No. 1866 or R.A. No. 1700,[23] or both.
the same Section makes the use of said firearm and ammunition in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, This leads us to the issue of whether or not private respondent Antonio Tujan
insurrection or subversion a circumstance to increase the penalty to death. was placed in double jeopardy with the filing of the second Information for
Thus, the allegation in the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 that the Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion.
unlicensed firearm found in the possession of Antonio Tujan, a member of
the communist party of the Philippines and its front organization, was used in We rule in the negative.
furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion
does not charge him with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the Article III of the Constitution provides:
same Information, but simply describes the mode or manner by which the
violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was committed[21] so as to qualify the Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
penalty to death. offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
There is, therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned information, same act. (Emphasis ours)
that is, the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by its
being used in furtherance of subversion.[22] There is nothing in P.D. No. Complementing the above constitutional provision, Rule 117 of the Revised
1866, specifically Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically or by Rules of Court states:
implication that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are the
very acts that are being penalized. This is clear from the title of the law itself SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused
which boldly indicates the specific acts penalized under it: has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700, as
offense charged in the former complaint or information. amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
furtherance of subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can co-exist,
x x x x x x x x x. the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 7636 on September 22, 1992,
totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, as amended, has substantially changed the
The right of an accused against double jeopardy is a matter which he may complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said repealing law being
raise in a motion to quash to defeat a subsequent prosecution for the same favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual
offense. The pertinent provision of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court delinquent, should be given retroactive effect.[26]
provides:
Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on private-respondents case has
SEC. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or never been raised as an issue by the parties obviously because the said law
information on any of the following grounds: came out only several months after the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals was promulgated and while the present petition is pending with this
xxxxxxxxx Court we should nonetheless fulfill our duty as a court of justice by applying
the law to whomsoever is benefited by it regardless of whether or not the
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being accused or any party has sought the application of the beneficent provisions
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. (2a) (Emphasis ours) of the repealing law.[27]
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit That R.A. No. 7636 should apply retroactively to accused-private respondent
of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the first is beyond question. The repeal by said law of R.A. No. 1700, as amended,
criminal action: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) was categorical, definite and absolute. There was no saving clause in the
the defendant had pleaded to the charge;[24] and (d) the defendant was repeal. The legislative intent of totally abrogating the old anti-subversion law
acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise is clear. Thus, it would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the
terminated without his express consent.[25] accused-private respondent for an offense that no longer exists.[28]
Suffice it to say that in the present case, private respondents motion to quash As early as 1935, we ruled in People vs. Tamayo:[29]
filed in the trial court did not actually raise the issue of double jeopardy
simply because it had not arisen yet. It is noteworthy that the private There is no question that at common law and in America a much more
respondent has not even been arraigned in the first criminal action for favorable attitude towards the accused exists relative to statutes that have
subversion. Besides, as earlier discussed, the two criminal charges against been repealed than has been adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity
private respondent are not of the same offense as required by Section 21, with the Spanish doctrine, but even in Spain, where the offense ceases to be
Article III of the Constitution. criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1 Pacheco Commentaries, 296)
(Emphasis ours)
It is clear from the foregoing, that the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is not in accordance with the law and jurisprudence and thus should Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act
be reversed. which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law,
the previous offense is obliterated.[30] It is a recognized rule in this
jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict
and sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the The subversion charge against accused-private respondent Antonio A. Tujan
repeal.[31] in Criminal Case No. 64079 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45,
is hereby DISMISSED.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the
accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should be The other Information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
dismissed. furtherance of subversion against the same accused in Criminal Case No.
1789 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148, is DEEMED
As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, AMENDED to Simple Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. The
qualified by subversion, this charge should be amended to simple illegal accused-appellant is hereby ordered RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from
possession of firearm and ammunition since, as earlier discussed, detention for the reason stated above, unless he is being detained for any
subversion is no longer a crime. other offense.
Moreover, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
is now bailable under Republic Act No. 8294 which was enacted on June 6,
1997. R.A. No. 8294 has amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, as No pronouncement as to costs.
amended, by eliminating the provision in said P.D. that if the unlicensed
firearm is used in furtherance of subversion, the penalty of death shall be SO ORDERED.
imposed.[32] Under the new law (R.A. No. 8294), the penalty prescribed for
simple illegal possession of firearm (.38 caliber) is now reduced to prision Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing. and Purisima, JJ., concur.
thousand pesos (P15,000.00).[33] The reduced penalty of imprisonment -
which is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years - EN BANC
entitles the accused-private respondent to bail. Considering, however, that
the accused-private respondent has been detained since his arrest on June
5, 1990 up to the present (as far as our record has shown), or more than
seven (7) years now, his immediate release is in order. This is so because
even if he were convicted for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TA�ADA III, RONALD LLAMAS,
the length of his detention while his case is pending has already exceeded H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL,
the penalty prescribed by the new law. GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG,
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 27,
1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, including the orders dated October 12, 1990 Petitioners,
and December 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148),
National Capital Region, in Criminal Case No. 1789, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
- versus -
GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE
R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO,
ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-
HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI
GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR
THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
Petitioners,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
- versus -
NI�EZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC.,
Petitioners,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS � KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-
Respondents. KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V.
USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P.
x-------------------------------------------------x DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN,
x-------------------------------------------------x
Petitioners,
- versus -
Petitioner, x-------------------------------------------------x
Petitioner,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AZCUNA,
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP);
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TINGA,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JJ.
Promulgated:
Present:
May 3, 2006
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
*PUNO,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
G.R. No. 171485
G.R. No. 171483
DECISION
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern
problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine the degree of
liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without
which, liberty becomes license?[3]
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state
of national emergency, thus:
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid
formula are necessary.[1] Superior strength � the use of force � cannot NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic
make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty. Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: �The President. . . whenever
it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .,� and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief,
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban�s philosophy of liberty is thus most do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
relevant. He said: �In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.� Laws and actions that obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left
and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down
the democratic Philippine State;
She cited the following facts as bases:
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP,
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left
and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down
the democratic Philippine State;
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all
work within the military and the police establishments in order to forge programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa
alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the
�Ka Roger� Rosal declared: �The Communist Party and revolutionary local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political
movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming rallies, which to the President�s mind were organized for purposes of
year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor
of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer announced that �warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including
to end it.�[9] media, can already be implemented.�[11]
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would
Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: �Anti-Arroyo not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU]
groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-
economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of
personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field.� He converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA
claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti- site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-
Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons,
been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the President�s ouster and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the
is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006. massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters
marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan
Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his
an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit
Street in Makati City.[12] that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is
threatened.[14]
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the
ground for the dispersal of their assemblies. Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin
Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltran�s lawyer explained that the
Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in
any of these petitions.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by
mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon the police.
City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the
newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police
outside the building.[13] went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But
his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the
police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and Retired Major General Ramon Monta�o, former head of the Philippine
its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard
Golf and Country Club in Dasmari�as, Cavite.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is
�meant to show a �strong presence,� to tell media outlets not to connive Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo,
or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro
government.� The PNP warned that it would take over any media Casi�o and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna
organization that would not follow �standards set by the government during Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao
the state of national emergency.� Director General Lomibao stated that �if City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of
they do not follow the standards � and the standards are - if they would Representatives where the �Batasan 5� decided to stay indefinitely.
contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what
is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 � we will recommend a Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of
�takeover.�� National Telecommunications� Commissioner Ronald Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in these
Solis urged television and radio networks to �cooperate� with the petitions.
government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked
for �balanced reporting� from broadcasters when covering the events
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state
of national emergency has ceased to exist. In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged
that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a)
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP Section 4[15] of Article II, (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article III, (c)
1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court against the above-named Section 23[19] of Article VI, and (d) Section 17[20] of Article XII of the
respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as Constitution.
respondent.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 is an �arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial
1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Law powers.� And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of
Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for Martial Law, petitioners argued that �it amounts to an exercise by the
the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees President of emergency powers without congressional approval.� In
of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 �goes beyond the nature and
function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Code.�
Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG�s act of raiding the Daily Tribune
offices as a clear case of �censorship� or �prior restraint.� They also And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that
claimed that the term �emergency� refers only to tsunami, typhoon, PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are �unconstitutional for being violative of the
hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is �absolutely no freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the
emergency� that warrants the issuance of PP 1017. press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all
guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.� In this
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting
G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the House of her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano,
Teodoro Casi�o, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP In respondents� Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute �usurpation of legislative powers�; countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being moot;
�violation of freedom of expression� and �a declaration of martial law.� second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483
They alleged that President Arroyo �gravely abused her discretion in calling (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no
out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President
possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis;
so.� and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the people�s right to free expression and
redress of grievances.
In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members
averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the
arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) parties on the above interlocking issues which may be summarized as
their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of follows:
expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their
grievances. A. PROCEDURAL:
in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This
academic. power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of
judicial review.[22]
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400
(ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda)
have legal standing.
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a
B. SUBSTANTIVE: �self-starting capacity.�[23] Courts may exercise such power only when
the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017. controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality;
third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself.[24]
a. Facial Challenge
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence,
b. Constitutional Basis we shall limit our discussion thereon.
c. As Applied Challenge An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is �definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;� a real
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.[25] The Solicitor
A. PROCEDURAL General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending
that the present petitions were rendered �moot and academic� by
President Arroyo�s issuance of PP 1021.
First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks. Such contention lacks merit.
I- Moot and Academic Principle A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events,[26] so that a declaration thereon
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this would be of no practical use or value.[27] Generally, courts decline
country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. jurisdiction over such case[28] or dismiss it on ground of mootness.[29]
Madison.[21] This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --
The Court holds that President Arroyo�s issuance of PP 1021 did not render
The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP
ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed
national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or
oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues
that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that �an In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it deems it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on legal
affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.�[30] standing or locus standi.
The �moot and academic� principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Locus standi is defined as �a right of appearance in a court of justice
Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the on a given question.�[37] In private suits, standing is governed by the
paramount public interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue �real-parties-in interest� rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that �every action must
bar, and the public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.�
evading review.[34] Accordingly, the �real-party-in interest� is �the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court�s avails of the suit.�[38] Succinctly put, the plaintiff�s standing is based on
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that his own right to the relief sought.
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is
no question that the issues being raised affect the public�s interest,
involving as they do the people�s basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.
petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by Here, the plaintiff who asserts a �public right� in assailing an allegedly
constitutional guarantees.[35] And lastly, respondents� contested actions illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He
review. could be suing as a �stranger,� or in the category of a �citizen,� or
�taxpayer.� In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban�s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
Executive Secretary.[36] However, they failed to take into account the Chief �citizen� or �taxpayer.
Justice�s very statement that an otherwise �moot� case may still be
decided �provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both �citizen� and
continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance.� �taxpayer� standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down
The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed in Beauchamp v. Silk,[39] where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer�s
out by the Chief Justice. suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen�s suit. In the
former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the
II- Legal Standing latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the
New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:[40] �In matter
of mere public right, however�the people are the real parties�It is at least
the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public
offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners
remedied.� With respect to taxpayer�s suits, Terr v. Jordan[41] held that have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the
�the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to principle of �transcendental importance.� Pertinent are the following cases:
restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.�
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[52] where the Court ruled that the
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable
interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which
thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public clothe the petitioner with locus standi;
service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent
�direct injury� test in Ex Parte Levitt,[42] later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman.[43] The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, (2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[53] wherein the Court held
he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, that �given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court
and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the
of the public. lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review� of the Visiting
Forces Agreement;
This Court adopted the �direct injury� test in our jurisdiction. In People v.
Vera,[44] it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have �a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.� The Vera doctrine was (3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,[54] while the Court noted that the petitioners
upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,[45] may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that
Manila Race Horse Trainers� Association v. De la Fuente,[46] Pascual v. �Balikatan 02-01� involves the exercise of Congress� taxing or spending
Secretary of Public Works[47] and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v.
Felix.[48] Zamora,[55] that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be
settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed.
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus
standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was
done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,[49]
where the �transcendental importance� of the cases prompted the Court to By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases
act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
Comelec,[50] this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
�far-reaching implications� of the petition notwithstanding its categorical requirements are met:
statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed,
there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, (1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
and rulings.[51] public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the with the LDP in Lacson.
validity of the election law in question;
Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and
and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No.
171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action �direct injury� resulting from �illegal arrest� and �unlawful search�
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor
General does not question their legal standing.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court�s
attitude toward legal standing. In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was
usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,[56] the Court ruled that the status of not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming
Kilosbayan as a people�s organization does not give it the requisite powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of
personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their
where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations
as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor of their basic rights.
can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it
has suffered. In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in
Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,[61] Association of Small Landowners in the
v. Comelec,[57] the Court reiterated the �direct injury� test with respect to Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[62] Basco v. Philippine
concerned citizens� cases involving constitutional issues. It held that Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[63] and Ta�ada v. Tuvera,[64] that
�there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a
threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act.� citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
In Lacson v. Perez,[58] the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng In G.R. No. 171483, KMU�s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it
demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters. legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of
their members.[65] We take judicial notice of the announcement by the
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[59] the Court ruled that only the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public
petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
claim that the President�s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation
of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the
powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed
to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its
members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[66] the Court Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law incumbency,[67] may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that
importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable
him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the
public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not
as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official,
that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no he remains accountable to the people[68] but he may be removed from office
showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.[69]
pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral
protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance.
She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or
result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance B. SUBSTANTIVE
of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
I. Review of Factual Bases
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but
corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is
the underlying legal tenet of the �liberality doctrine� on legal standing. It
cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not
judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To �necessary� for President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with
bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the
thus call for the application of the �transcendental importance� doctrine, a President�s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its
relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the �PP 1017 distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker[70]
cases.� and Montenegro v. Castaneda[71] to the volatile era of Lansang v.
Garcia,[72] Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[73] and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.[74] The
tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining �political questions,�
particularly those questions �in regard to which full discretionary authority
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.�[75] Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring
that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the
President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang
took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in
the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of
factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the As to how the Court may inquire into the President�s exercise of power,
principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks Lansang adopted the test that �judicial inquiry can go no further than to
and balances, �under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and satisfy the Court not that the President�s decision is correct,� but that
when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and �the President did not act arbitrarily.� Thus, the standard laid down is not
the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in correctness, but arbitrariness.[83] In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this
the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, Court further ruled that �it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
constitutionally supreme.�[76] In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang President�s decision is totally bereft of factual basis� and that if he fails, by
was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.[77] There, the Court was way of proof, to support his assertion, then �this Court cannot undertake an
almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the independent investigation beyond the pleadings.�
imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question.[78] Then came
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there
is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that �in times of war or
national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo�s exercise of the calling-out
very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the
intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God.�[79] Solicitor General�s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora[80] -- a recent case most supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang. the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
While the Court considered the President�s �calling-out� power as a defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that �this does reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners
constituting grave abuse of discretion.� This ruling is mainly a result of the presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
Court�s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of PP 1017 calling for military aid.
the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial
power, the courts are authorized not only �to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,� but also
�to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.� The latter part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not
political departments of the government.[81] It speaks of judicial prerogative expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what
not only in terms of power but also of duty.[82] she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the
exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
on the Power of the President The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to
circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous and make
in Times of Emergency them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State�
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle
to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall
silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In
such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the people�s first intention is that the State shall not perish.[86]
English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In
times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be
inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to
avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative
�power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the
proscription of the law and sometimes even against it.�[84] But Locke Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or �supreme
recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of magistracy� as he termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by
prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the �indiscreet use.� He was unwilling to rely upon an �appeal to heaven.�
prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid
admitted defeat, suggesting that �the people have no other remedy in this, perpetuation of the dictatorship.[87]
as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to
Heaven.�[85]
reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of
liberal institutions,� provided it �serves to protect established institutions
from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of political life.�[92] He
�I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency
of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.�[88] governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing
administrative powers of the executive, while at the same time �imposing
limitation upon that power.�[93] Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme
of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a
Nicollo Machiavelli�s view of emergency powers, as one element in the dictatorship: �The period of dictatorship must be relatively
whole scheme of limited government, furnished an ironic contrast to the short�Dictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in character�Final
Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never
chasm in democratic political theory, thus: rest with the dictator himself��[94] and the objective of such an emergency
dictatorship should be �strict political conservatism.�
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort
to extra �constitutional measures; for although they may for a time be
beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once
established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.[95]
that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she �It is a problem of concentrating power � in a government where power
has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency has consciously been divided � to cope with� situations of unprecedented
and fixed rules for applying it.[89] magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to
equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for
how long, and to what end.�[96] Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging
the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers, to wit: �The
emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means � i.e., he
must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of
Machiavelli � in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill � sought to
an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time
incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby emergency
limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the defense of
powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national
the constitutional order.�[97]
danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a
capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of
emergency, with effective constitutional restraints.[90]
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of
emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar, Germany and the
United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of �constitutional
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of
dictatorship� as solution to the vexing problems presented by
response to emergency by constitutional democracies, have employed the
emergency.[98] Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions
doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.[91] Frederick M. Watkins saw �no
of success of the �constitutional dictatorship,� thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship
should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the 8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under
preservation of the State and its constitutional order� a constitutional dictatorship. . .
2) �the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in 9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to
the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator� institute one should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute
the dictator. . .
It remains a �matter of no little difficulty� to determine when a law may The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
properly be held void on its face and when �such summary action� is exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
from �pure speech� toward conduct and that conduct �even if expressive parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here,
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute �on its face,� not merely petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
�as applied for� so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that
motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern
with the �chilling;� deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of
not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
law�s �very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression.� An overbreadth
ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties. Related to the �overbreadth� doctrine is the �void for vagueness
doctrine� which holds that �a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.�[110] It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth
doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing �on their faces�
statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is
basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v.
Harris,[109] it was held that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect,
is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process
of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
whichever way they might be decided.
�by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII � do �as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and a State of National Emergency.�
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion�
Second provision:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor President�s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power.
There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater
are the limitations.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the
President�s authority to declare a �state of rebellion� (in Sanlakas) and
the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President
Arroyo�s authority to declare a �state of rebellion� emanates from her
powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was
Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, The declaration of Martial Law is a �warn[ing] to citizens that the
which provides: military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the
maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they
must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in
any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of
SEC. 4. � Proclamations. � Acts of the President fixing a date or law.�[113]
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of
an executive order. In his �Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice� on March 13,
2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,[114] an authority in constitutional law,
said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the
power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It
is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be
used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the
President Arroyo�s declaration of a �state of rebellion� was merely keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people
an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual
declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:
words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
XII, a provision on the State�s extraordinary power to take over privately- authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such privilege of the writ.
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not
written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of
declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to
1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify
her calling-out power. acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use
for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act
done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
\
Petitioners� contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative
clause shows that it was lifted[120] from Former President Marcos� PP 1017 states in part: �to enforce obedience to all the laws and
Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads: decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.�
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of
national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce
obedience �to all the laws and to all decrees x x x� but also to act pursuant
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives,
claim that President Arroyo�s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so is an encroachment on the legislature�s emergency powers.
requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
This is an area that needs delineation.
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or
delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare
the existence of a state of war.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of
the �martial law� thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.[122] In (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos� Letter of Instruction authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
Defense to take over �the management, control and operation of the declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine
National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient
Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to
contain, solve and end the present national emergency.� It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision
refers not only to war but also to �other national emergency.� If the
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the
President the authority to declare a �state of national emergency� pursuant
to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the (1) There must be a war or other emergency.
declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have
provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize
the President before he can declare a �state of national emergency.� The
logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. declared by Congress.[124]
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be
construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and
provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be
construed together and considered in the light of each other.[123]
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with
together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the �the State
may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident utility or business affected with public interest,� it refers to Congress, not
in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power
powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et
not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, al. v. Sawyer,[125] held:
the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must
be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that
express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The
contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of
his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term �emergency�
in Article II which say that �The executive Power shall be vested in a under Section 17, Article XII refers to
President . . . .;� that �he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully �tsunami,��typhoon,��hurricane� and �similar occurrences.� This is
executed;� and that he �shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a limited view of �emergency.�
Navy of the United States.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional
provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of
our Constitution, the President�s power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits
his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he
thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is
neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is
to execute. The first section of the first article says that �All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. .
.�[126] �Emergency,� as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth.
It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon,
flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.[131]
This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committee�s definition of �national
emergency� which appears in Section 13, page 5? It reads: In Araneta v. Dinglasan,[134] this Court emphasized that legislative
power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in
Congress even in times of crisis.
When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. �x x x
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate �direct injury.� Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid
although they may be abused and misabused[135] and may afford an
opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.[136] The validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its and the official who receives them.[139] They are based on and are the
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their
case.[137] PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President�s calling-out object.[140] For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is
power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired
which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in
PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest,
search or violate the citizens� constitutional rights. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the
�necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence.�
So far, the word �terrorism� appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police
P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and
the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled �Codifying The Various prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the
Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
Subversive Organizations.� The word �terrorism� is mentioned in the
following provision: �That one who conspires with any other person for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x by force,
violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal x x x.�
policemen who �held his head and tried to push him� inside an unmarked
car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No.
880[145] and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7)
hours; and seventh, he was eventually released for insufficiency of
evidence.
The Constitution provides that �the right of the people to be secured in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
be seized.�[142] The plain import of the language of the Constitution is
that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.[143]
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
In the Brief Account[144] submitted by petitioner David, certain facts
are established: first, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP
operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at
Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and x x x.
booked like a criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by
Section 4 of Article III guarantees:
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner
David�s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting
to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could
invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
with the invective �Oust Gloria Now� and their erroneous assumption the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[146] Consequently, the government for redress of grievances.
Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the
subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge
him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient
evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known
whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[147] �Assembly� means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our
republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of
freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced
in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous
restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of
a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if
the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.
their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably
assemble.
government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that �freedom of assembly is
were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to
warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from prevent.�[149] Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only
circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that
were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral the State may deny the citizens� right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents
argument, failed to justify the arresting officers� conduct. In De Jonge v. failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts
Oregon,[148] it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket
thus: revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected
assemblies was eliminated.
These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all
Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that you have to do is to get those past issues. So why do you have to go there
the search of the Tribune�s offices and the seizure of its materials for at 1 o�clock in the morning and without any search warrant? Did they
publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible become suddenly part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or
�for any purpose,� thus: what?
You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my
policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the purpose of gathering instructions.
evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the clippings.
Is that not in admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were taken
from the Tribune?
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I don�t know if
it is premature to say this, we do not condone this. If the people who have
It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are
nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go and inspect and gather remedies for this.[156]
clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.
Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were,
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: according to the Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned, thus:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO: There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no. SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: I don�t know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal
or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be
condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a
misapplication of the law. These are acts of the police officers, that is their
So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever? responsibility.[157]
violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP
constitutional in every aspect and �should result in no constitutional or 1017�s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
statutory breaches if applied according to their letter.� (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws
even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by
the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also
The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in
ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility
reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the and private business affected with public interest.
military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When
in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the
police committed acts which violate the citizens� rights under the
Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal. In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by
the President � acting as Commander-in-Chief � addressed to subalterns
in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also
provides a valid standard � that the military and the police should take only
In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban�s concurring the �necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part of this ponencia. prevent acts of lawless violence.� But the words �acts of terrorism�
found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by
SUMMATION Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While
�terrorism� has been denounced generally in media, no law has been
enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 � a limits of the AFP�s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
supervening event � would have normally rendered this case moot and
academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were
committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee
that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there
have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be
reimposed �if the May 1 rallies� become �unruly and violent.�
Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also
�evaded;� they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David
aberration. and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on
media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in
G.O. No. 5. PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize
the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without prior legislation.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers
concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in
court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the
Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is �necessary
process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
criminal or administrative liabilities. lawless violence.� Considering that �acts of terrorism� have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP
1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws Chief Justice
not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the
preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now
respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969 administrative case7 for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants
announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner-
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee, appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon,
vs. petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants. Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at
the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12,
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee. 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness,
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for respondent-appellant. authority.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for intervenors-appellants.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the
FERNANDO, J.: witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave
abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause,1 whenever incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in
appropriately invoked, has been accorded due recognition by this Court ever forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his
since the adoption of the Constitution.2 Bermudez v. Castillo,3 decided in assertion that he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually
1937, was quite categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as witness for
that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed
to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of
broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As phrased by prohibition.
Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it was
designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary
the individual intended to be served." 4 injunction issue against the respondent Board commanding it to refrain from
hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in
of Cabal v. Kapunan,5where it was held that a respondent in an the amount of P500.00.
administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be required to
take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it
this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that could call petitioner-appellee to the witness stand and interrogate him, the
he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling
being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the
malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal. matter in the affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-
appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the witness stand, for respondent
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,"
Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a
denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion. criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner
would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some
Gatbonton, the complainants in the administrative case for malpractice an even greater deprivation.
against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be allowed to file an answer as
intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices
duly filed by them on March 23, 1965 sustaining the power of respondent to refer to an American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in
Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, character. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the
to be distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the
incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against self- Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other
incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor
of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it."
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that
claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical
Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the profession.
complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself."
Hence this appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, the 2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by
Gatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for the petitioner-appellee. respondent Board and intervenors-appellants that the constitutional
guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to
1. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being
the principle announced by us in Cabal v. Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the
certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared language of another American decision, 11 is the protection against "any
that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a
against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act,9the complainant requested the criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so
investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted.lawphi1.ñet
which request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such
witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back
respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to
initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt."
well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not 12 Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through
only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a
defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
matter referred to an a administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the genuine will."
Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer
or employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee,
other lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such MANOLITA GONZALES VDA.
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human DE CARUNGCONG, represented
personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference
accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, Present:
given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must as Administratrix,
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 14
Petitioner, CORONA, J., Chairperson,
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the
principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does VELASCO, JR.,
all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial
opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. NACHURA,
Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which - v e r s u s - PERALTA and
government may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with the
observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private MENDOZA, JJ.
enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no
possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the
decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
and WILLIAM SATO,
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed.
Without pronouncement as to costs. Respondents. Promulgated:
THIRD DIVISION
x--------------------------------------------------x
CORONA, J.: For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity
created between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as
between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the
death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such
relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover
the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the 1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,]
another; and Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her
surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22,
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters- 1995 is hereto attached as Annex A to form an integral part hereof.
Wendy Mitsuko Satos supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney 1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more
allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City 2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by
dismissed the complaint.[4] On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No.
reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the 7106;
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for
violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.[5] Thus,
the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87:[6] 3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by
T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No.
7104;
INFORMATION
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
In an order dated April 17, 2006,[8] the trial court granted Satos motion and
ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once
in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3)
Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 The Trial Prosecutors contention is that the death of the wife of the accused
for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR- severed the relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law.
016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of the Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the accused by the
sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and relationship is no longer obtaining.
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in
1994.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code convinces this Court of the correctness of the contention of the
[d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has
Contrary to law.[7] extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that
accused and Zenaidas mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and
mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even
beyond the death of Zenaida.
The prosecutions motion for reconsideration[10] was denied in an order There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the
dated June 2, 2006.[11] provision of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain
language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the
crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being
Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, relatives by affinity in the same line under Article 332(1) of the same Code.
represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991,
Appeals[12] which, however, in a decision[13] dated August 9, 2007, private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to
dismissed it. It ruled: exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article
332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not
extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in
respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts
of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law
Code in favor of private respondent Sato. where none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are
facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or
qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the
lawgivers intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and
apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law
what is not written therein. relationship between Sato and Zenaidas mother, Manolita.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the
are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. exemption from criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the
Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, law and jurisprudence supports petitioners claim that Zenaidas death
the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Codes simple dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the
language is most favorable to Sato.[14] criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members of the
Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided
by Article 332s provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa
or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the
civil aspect only.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the
orders of the trial court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in
his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the
Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the
the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created
offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse
case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
(Satos wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-
owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could
have arisen only after her mothers death. Since Zenaida predeceased her
mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of protection
provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
EFFECT OF DEATH ON RELATIONSHIP
crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there
responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal are conflicting views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity
liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party. is not terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman
vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by
most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no
living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with
held that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and the dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657,
adopted children.[17] By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is
stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his stepson;[18] by the continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living
stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;[19] by the stepfather who issues or children of the marriage in whose veins the blood of the parties are
steals something from his stepson;[20] by the grandson who steals from his commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the
grandfather;[21] by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with medium of the issue of the marriage (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331,
him;[22] and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.[23] 333).[25]
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other
spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
a familial relation resulting from marriage.[24] It is a fictive kinship, a fiction terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce
created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties.[26] Under
relations. this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with
the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily
determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the
ones spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses
spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity? blood relatives.
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues
confronts us in this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue.[27] The
acknowledged the dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries on the rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of
matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on the the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.[28]
subject. As one Filipino author observed:
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the
affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and
spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.[33]
whether the marriage produced children or not.[29] Under this view, the Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall
relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that preserve the solidarity of the family.[34] In this connection, the spirit of Article
produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.[35] The view that
This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the
step-relatives or in-laws, the tie of affinity between these people and their marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of
one of the married parties.[30]
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.[38] The
disqualification and incest.[31] On the other hand, the continuing affinity view rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a
has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step- penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is
relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is
332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree more lenient to the accused.
covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more
appropriate.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through
the lens of the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity in preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of
the same line is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application
no distinction between the spouse of ones living child and the surviving or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that
spouse of ones deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
with respect to his or her parents-in-law)[32] can be drawn from Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that not by the designation of the offense.[40] What controls is not the title of the
the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in
blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the Information.[41] In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission
the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime
justifying circumstance of defense of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the being charged in the Information.[42] It is the exclusive province of the court
Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of to say what the crime is or what it is named.[43] The determination by the
grave offense committed against ones relatives under Article 13[5] of the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an
same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories opinion which is not binding on the court.[44]
under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that
THE REVISED PENAL CODE Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as
follows:
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only
applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the (a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that
said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender time) and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the
State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves (b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with
the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable. her taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing
his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of
Manolitas properties in Tagaytay City;
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies (c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes (d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
through falsification or estafa through falsification.[39]
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds,
to the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real
nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information,
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed
by attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document)
statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolitas acts of signing
the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very
expression of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes.
Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document
intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
she could not have read) because of Satos representation that the document
pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita
showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to
what the document was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the
signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Satos amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of damages
proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes. from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended
Information would now state that, while the total amount of consideration
stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of
Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the Manolitas properties.[45] This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were
purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolitas public documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to
Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and the amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.
thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained
to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it
contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the
SPA. Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that
was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents
(particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a
necessary means to commit the estafa.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
pertinent documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa
Deeds of Absolute Sale and but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents,
Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
(2) once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties,
said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his
own personal use and benefit
falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be
held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under
Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes
EFFECT OF ABSOLUTORY CAUSE UNDER against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected
ARTICLE 332 ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the
FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the
existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332.
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of
DOCUMENTS estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in
that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges
of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the
single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable
for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No. Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to
hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as a private
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply
falsification of public document is required for a proper conviction for the when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is the inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity
ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.[46] It means that the prosecution must and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance,
establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but
as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa. a paramount public interest.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
the Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate scandal.[47] Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply
exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited
to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more
is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.[52] The latter
acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective category is covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article
rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when 48.
the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of
public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family
member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause
under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes
through falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the (concursus delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal
component crimes separately from each other. While there may be two liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:
component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are
animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there
is only one criminal liability.[48] That is the concept of a complex crime. In
other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is
to a single criminal liability. only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or
more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as
component crimes.[53] (emphasis supplied)
The phrase necessary means does not connote indispensable means for if it
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE A NECESSARY did, then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an
MEANS FOR COMMITTING ESTAFA EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A]) indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.[55] In
People v. Salvilla,[56] the phrase necessary means merely signifies that one
crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other.[57] In
this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
necessary means as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out
more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting
Revised Penal Code are as follows: third persons.
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document; When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a
necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation,
the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.[58] her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime
The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of falsification.[64]
of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of
the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document.[59] In WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August
other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to the 9, 2007 and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
consummation of the crime of estafa.[60] Actually utilizing the falsified public, CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa.[61] The remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch
damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
falsification of the document.[62]
SO ORDERED.
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information
show that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato
presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a
statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification RENATO C. CORONA
was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the Associate Justice
estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly
when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the Chairperson
sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of
the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at FIRST DIVISION
the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of
the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document was
used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa.
JULIUS AMANQUITON, G.R. No. 186080
Petitioner,
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement,
had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or Present:
in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused
by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior
thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple
crime of estafa.[63] On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to
her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for CARPIO,
Thereafter, they saw complainant Leoselie John Baaga being chased by a
- v e r s u s - CORONA, certain Gil Gepulane. Upon learning that Baaga was the one who threw the
pillbox[2] that caused the explosion, petitioner and his companions also went
DE CASTRO and after him.
BERSAMIN, JJ.
DECISION During the investigation, petitioner learned Baaga had been previously
mauled by a group made up of a certain Raul, Boyet and Cris but failed to
CORONA, J.: identify two others. The mauling was the result of gang trouble in a certain
residental compound in Taguig City. Baagas mauling was recorded in a
barangay blotter which read:
RECORD purposes
At 10:45 p.m. on October 30, 2001, petitioner heard an explosion. He,
together with two auxiliary tanod, Dominador Amante[1] and a certain
Cabisudo, proceeded to Sambong Street where the explosion took place.
Dumating dito sa Barangay Head Quarters si Dossen[4] Baaga is Alimpuyo That on the 30th day of October, 2001, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro
16 years old student nakatira sa 10 B Kalachuchi St. M.B.T. M.M. Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused in conspiracy with one another, armed with nightstick,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence, a form of physical abuse, upon the person of Leoselie
Upang ireklamo yong sumapak sa akin sina Raul[,] Boyet [at] Cris at yong John A. [Baaga], seventeen (17) years old, a minor, by then and there
dalawang sumapak ay hindi ko kilala. Nang yari ito kaninang 10:p.m. araw ng manhandling him and hitting him with their nightsticks, thus, constituting
[M]artes taong kasalukuyan at yong labi ko pumutok at yong kabilang mata other acts of child abuse, which is inimical or prejudicial to childs
ko ay namaga sa bandang kanan. Ang iyong kaliwang mukha at pati yong development, in violation of the above-mentioned law.
likod ko ay may tama sa sapak.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Patunay dito ang aking lagda.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr.
Paulito Cruz, medico-legal officer of the Taguig-Pateros District Hospital who
attended to Baaga on October 30, 2001, Baaga himself, Alimpuyo and
Thereafter, an Information for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, RA[5] Rachelle Baaga (complainants mother).
7160[6] in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A. 8369 was filed against petitioner,
Amante and Gepulane. The Information read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused JULIUS Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given due course. On August
AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE GUILTY beyond reasonable 28, 2008, the CA rendered a decision[9] which affirmed the conviction but
doubt for violation of Article VI Sec. 10 (a) of Republic Act 7610 in relation to increased the penalty. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision
Section 3 (j) of Republic Act 8369, hereby sentences accused JULIUS read:
AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE a straight penalty of thirty (30)
days of Arresto Menor.
The case against the accused Gil Gepulane is hereby sent to the ARCHIVES
to be revived upon the arrest of the accused. Let [a] warrant of arrest be Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[10]
issued against him.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner principally argues that the facts of the case as
SO ORDERED. established did not constitute a violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA
7160 and definitely did not prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt.
We note Baagas statement that, when he was apprehended by petitioner
and Amante, there were many people around.[15] Yet, the prosecution
The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused presented only Baaga and his aunt, Alimpuyo, as witnesses to the mauling
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.[11] An accused is incident itself. Where were the other people who could have testified, in an
entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable unbiased manner, on the alleged mauling of Baaga by petitioner and
doubt.[12] It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with Amante, as supposedly witnessed by Alimpuyo?[16] The testimonies of the
clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and two other prosecution witnesses, Dr. Paulito Cruz and Rachelle Baaga, did
inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty.[13] not fortify Baagas claim that petitioner mauled him, for the following reasons:
Dr. Cruz merely attended to Baagas injuries, while Rachelle testified that she
saw Baaga only after the injuries have been inflicted on him.
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was discussed in People v.
Berroya:[14]
We note furthermore that, Baaga failed to controvert the validity of the
barangay blotter he signed regarding the mauling incident which happened
[Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the fact that in a criminal prosecution, prior to his apprehension by petitioner. Neither did he ever deny the
the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior allegation that he figured in a prior battery by gang members.
inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command; with
counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public
officers, as therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of
tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a All this raises serious doubt on whether Baagas injuries were really inflicted
perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities by petitioner, et al., to the exclusion of other people. In fact, petitioner
of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction testified clearly that Gepulane, who had been harboring a grudge against
where there is reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof beyond reasonable Baaga, came out of nowhere and punched Baaga while the latter was being
doubt requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces brought to the police station. Gepulane, not petitioner, could very well have
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. caused Baaga's injuries.
Alimpuyo admitted that she did not see who actually caused the bloodied
The RTC and CA hinged their finding of petitioners guilt beyond reasonable condition of Baagas face because she had to first put down the baby she
doubt (of the crime of child abuse) solely on the supposed positive was then carrying when the melee started.[17] More importantly, Alimpuyo
identification by the complainant and his witness (Alimpuyo) of petitioner and stated that she was told by Baaga that, while he was allegedly being held by
his co-accused as the perpetrators of the crime. the neck by petitioner, others were hitting him. Alimpuyo was obviously
testifying not on what she personally saw but on what Baaga told her.
While we ordinarily do not interfere with the findings of the lower courts on However, this noble statute should not be used as a sharp sword, ready to
the trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appear in the records facts and be brandished against an accused even if there is a patent lack of proof to
circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked or convict him of the crime. The right of an accused to liberty is as important as
misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its duty to sift fact from fiction. a minors right not to be subjected to any form of abuse. Both are enshrined
in the Constitution. One need not be sacrificed for the other.
We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case. Where the There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations protecting a child from any
evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the and all forms of abuse. While unfortunately, incidents of maltreatment of
evidence weighs, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.[18] If children abound amidst social ills, care has to be likewise taken that wayward
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, youths should not be cuddled by a misapplication of the law. Society, through
one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent its laws, should correct the deviant conduct of the youth rather than take the
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and cudgels for them. Lest we regress to a culture of juvenile delinquency and
will not justify a conviction.[19] errant behavior, laws for the protection of children against abuse should be
applied only and strictly to actual abusers.
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the
crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 1809 of the Court of First Instance
SO ORDERED. (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for shooting
to death Julius Cagampang. The information alleged:
Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial,
he was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessory penalties thereof under Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised
Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
REYNATO S. PUNO P12,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He
Chief Justice appealed.
Chairperson The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in the evening of
December 30, 1980, while Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were
G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988 conversing in the store adjacent to their house in Barangay Talo-ao,
Buenavista, Province of Agusan del Norte, the accused Vicente Temblor
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, alias Ronald, arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While
vs. Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias "RONALD," defendant-appellant. gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on
the head. His wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot,
shouted her husband's name "Jul" Two persons, one of whom she later evening of December 30, 1980. He heard the gunshots coming from inside
Identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the store through the the store, and saw the people scampering away.
main door and demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm. "Igawas
mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused Dr. Alfredo Salonga who issued the post-mortem examination report certified
fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the that the victim sustained three (3) gunshot wounds.
"maleta" (suitcase) where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the
suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the
husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled. Nasipit Lumber Company's Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and
the NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio Perol (Exh. D), showing that Perol
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the was not at home drinking with the accused and his father, but was at work on
Buenavista police station by the Station Commander Milan, where she saw December 30, 1980 from 10:50 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock in
and Identified the accused as the man who killed her husband. the morning of December 31, 1980. The accused did not bother to overcome
this piece of rebuttal evidence.
The accused's defense was an alibi. He alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of December 30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred:
Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they
spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as "pulutan," until 8:00 1. in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness
o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980. as the killer of the deceased Julius Cagampang; and
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the dreaded NPA 2. in rejecting his defense of allbi.
(New People's Army) were not apprehended earlier because they hid in the
mountains of Malapong with other members- followers of the New People's The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively Identified as the
Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the killer of Cagampang? The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of
mass surrender of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by the the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the
Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on November 26, 1981 appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct
and detained at the Buenavista municipal jail. and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible
evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim's widow, Victorina, did not Dava, 149 SCRA, 582).<äre||anº•1àw>
know him by name. That circumstance allegedly renders the Identification of
the accused, as the perpetrator of her husband's killing, insufficient. The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda.
However, during the trial, the accused was positively identified by the widow de Cagampang did not diminish her credibility, especially because she had
who recognized him because she was less than a meter away from him positively Identified the accused as her husband's assailant, and her
inside the store which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible,
and by an incandescent lamp outside. Her testimony was corroborated by probable and entirely in accord with human experience.
another prosecution witness — a tricycle driver, Claudio Sabanal — who was
a long-time acquaintance of the accused and who knew him as "Ronald." He Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the
saw the accused in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock in the positive Identification made by the prosecution witnesses who had no base
motives to falsely accuse him of the crime. Furthermore, the rule is that in
order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the
appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be SARMIENTO, J.:
demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol's house in barrio This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial Region Branch XIII, dated January 25, 1984,
tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony which "finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty beyond
of the witnesses who had positively Identified him could not be overcome by reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and there being
the defendant's alibi. (People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People vs. neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attending the commission of
Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258.) the crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby imposes upon the said accused the penalty of
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the RECLUSION PERPETUA and all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the
trial court which opined that the defendant's knowledge that Cagampang heirs of the deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount of
possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by P12,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2
members of the New People's Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more
arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel,
Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas" Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a resident of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his
campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has death on July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as manager of the sand
been positively Identified (People vs. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615). and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan was an
illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador. 4
The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after
killing Cagampang and taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest when
Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an implied admission of guilt (People vs. they are applied with more jealousy to the poor, the marginalized, and the
Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422). disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the herein accused-appellant, belongs to
this class. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was poor,
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all respects, marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a flotsam in a sea of violence,
except as to the civil indemnity payable to the heirs of the Julius Cagampang following the odyssey of his widowed mother from one poverty-stricken area
which is increased to P30,000.00. to another in order to escape the ravages of internicine war and rebellion in
Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15 years of Hassan's existence, he and his family
SO ORDERED. had to evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His existence
in this world has not even been officially recorded; his birth has not been
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur. registered in the Registry of Births because the Samal tribe, to which he
belongs, does not see the importance of registering births and deaths.
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, the prosecution and the sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the
vs. police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the Homicide and
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent. Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified for
the prosecution.
xxx xxx xxx
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
and that Usman Hassan must, therefore, be set free. Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital you came to know that
he was already dead, is that correct?
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when
he testified, married, and a resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.
killing, he was employed at the sand and gravel business of the father of the
deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief on February Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?
3, 1982.
A They just asked the description of that person as to his attire and his
He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the appearance.
evening of July 23, 1981; that he was a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon
when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the description of the
Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw a one who stabbed Ramon Pichel, Jr.?
person stab Ramon who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was
parked about two or three meters from the fruit stand where he Samson) was A Yes, Sir.
selecting mangoes; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon "only once" and
that after the stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the Funeraria La
asked at the cross-examination if he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I Merced?
know him by face but I do not know his name." 5
A Yes, sir,
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel,
Jr. was holding the motorcycle with both of his hands, the assailant come Q Can you recall what time was that?
from behind, held his left hand and stabbed him from behind on his chest
while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was able A I do not know what time was that.
to see the assailant because it was very bright there that Ramon was facing
the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these happened in front of the fruit Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police brought to you the
stand a — distance of about 6 to 7 meters from the side of the road. accused?
Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and A...
maong pants, but "he did not see if the aggressor was wearing shoes," that
the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but "he did not exactly see what Q For Identification?
kind of knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said he
brought the wounded Ramon to the Zamboanga City General Hospital in a A Yes, sir.
tricycle.
Q And he was alone when you Identified him?
On cross-examination, Samson testified:
A Yes he was alone.
Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion when he attack
Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand and gravel (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
business, do you have any blood relationship with them?
A-15. He was alone Sir.
A Yes. sir. 6
Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who attacked and stabbed
(Emphasis supplied) your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question?
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at the Office of La
only on July 25, 1981, two days after the stabbing, and sworn to only on July Merced Funeral Homes, wherein you were confronted with one Usman
27, 1981, also two days after it was taken, or four days after the killing, was Hassan, whom this Officer brought along?
never presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information was
practically forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for the A-17. Yes, Sir.
People, during his cross-examination. 8 The sworn statement contained the
following questions and answers: Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and stabbed your companion,
Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?
xxx xxx xxx
A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and stabbed my
Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own words, the companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question.
incident you are referring?
Q-19. Why?
A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw unidentified person
whom I can recognize by face if seen again embraced my companion Ramon A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance were fully noted by
Pitcher Jr. while the latter was aboard his motorcycle parked within the area. me and this I cannot forget for the rest of my life.
That this person without much ado, and armed with a knife suddenly stabbed
him (Ramon). That by coincidence to this incident, our eye met each other Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that had ensued while
and immediately thereafter, he fled the area toward the Philippine National in the process of buying some mangoes in that area?
Bank (PNB). That this unidentified person was sporting a semi-long hair,
dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve), maong pants height to more or A-20. None Sir.
less 5'5, Dark Complexion. That as this unidentified person fled the area I
immediately came to aid my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by said Usman
to Zamboanga General Hospital, on board a Tricycle. That may companion Hassan in stabbing your companion, Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
(Ramon) did not whispered (sic) any words to me for he was in serious
condition and few minutes later, he expired. A-21: None Sir,
Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you have anything more
to say, add or alter in this statement? Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub
and admitted ownership of said knife; claiming among other things that he
A-22. No more Sir. used said knife for slicing mangoes. 11
Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if needed in the xxx xxx xxx
future?
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy
A-23. Yes, Sir. 9 the quantum of proof — beyond reasonable doubt — required by the
Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict an accused
(Emphasis supplied) person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which would allow
us to pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun
xxx xxx xxx guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn
him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him into a flotsam again in a
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is sea of convicted felons in which he would be a very young stranger.
substantially the same as that embodied in the "Case Report," Exhibit it "C",
by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit "2." This exhibit for the In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the
prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an prosecution against the denial and alibi of the accused, value judgment must
unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face, appeared and without not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of
any provocation, the latter embraced the victim and stabbed the same innocence.
allegedly with a knife." The rest of the Case Report: is also significant in that
it confirms the confrontation between the accused and Jose Samson in the When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are
funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and prosecution witness, weighed, the scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of
Corporal Carpio. the constitutional presumtion of innocence the accused enjoys as a counter-
foil to the awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting him.
xxx xxx xxx
The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the
From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter inference of guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That
Trade, wherein the person of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, evidence, as it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the
this City, was arrested in connection with the above stated incident. That this two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore
Officer and companions arrested this person Usman due to his physical suspect. 12
appearance, which was fully described by victim's companion. Jose Samson.
During his arrest, a knife, measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and
blade was confiscated in his possession. The person of Usman Hassan was unconvincing. And so with the evidence sought to be introduced by Police
brought along at the La Merced Funeral Homes for a confrontation with Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the expert testimony of the
victims companion, Jose Samson and in this confrontation, Jose Samson medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin
positively Identified said Usman Hassan as the very person who stabbed the Bernalez, presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the
victim. testimony of the one eyewitness, Jose Samson. While Samson averred on
the witness stand that he saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability as
on his chest" 13 only once, the NBI medico-legal officer Identified two stab eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of
wounds, one at the front portion of the chest at the level and third rib, (sic) Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime
and another stab wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither our
same medical expert also concluded from the nature and location of the respect nor acceptance." 20
chest wound, which was the cause of death, that the same was inflicted on
the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him." 15 Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the
self-proclaimed eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the
The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a
Zamboanga Southern Police Sector, 16 at Zamboanga City, particularly by crime especially at its most crucial stage — the Identification of the accused.
Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For one, we
are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police investigators in the As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At
Identification of the accused as the assailant. We have no doubt that Usman that critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly
Hassan was "presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the police investigator against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure
and prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness
at the office of the La Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. As Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of
correctly termed by the very evidence 18 of the prosecution, the procedure the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within
adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation" between Jose the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this
Samson, Jr. and Usman. Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
testified that Usman was alone when he was brought to Samson for
confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the
made a turnabout by saying that the accused was Identified by Samson in a investigation of the crime and the preparation of the evidence for prosecution
"police line-up;" this tergiversation we dare say, was an afterthought, more were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and superficially. Samson was not
the result of an over or careless cross-examination, augmented by the investigated thoroughly and immediately after the incident. As previously
leading questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a fastidiousness if not mentioned, his statement was taken by the investigator only two days after
sincerity, on the part of the police investigator, to honestly correct erroneous the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been
statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson taken. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to show that the fruit vendor—
and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone from whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes that fateful
when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police line-up as evening and who certainly must have witnessed the fatal stabbing—was
the police investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous statements in his investigated, or why he was not investigated. Nor is any explanation given as
examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused to why the companion 21 of the accused at the time Corporal Carpio arrested
testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to him (accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00
Samson by Carpio. There was no such police investigator claimed on second P.M., according to Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the crime,
thought. was not also investigated when he could have been a material witness of the
killing or of the innocence of the accused. In addition, the knife and its
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify scabbard, 23 Confiscated by Carpio from Usman (tucked on the right side of
the accused alone at the funeral parlor, without being placed in the police his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even subjected to any testing at
line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where there was all to determine the presence of human blood which could be typed and
compared with the blood type of the deceased. A crime laboratory test — to prove his innocence. And he is so marginalized as to claim and deserve
had Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal, or even the trial judge, insisted on it — an honest-to-goodness, thorough, and fair police investigation with all angles
would have revealed whether or not the knife in question (confiscated from and leads pursued to their logical, if not scientific, conclusions. Sadly
the accused by Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of the crime) circumstanced as he is, the authority of the State was too awesome for him
had indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The police investigator to counteract.
instead nonchalantly dismissed this sin of omission by saying that the knife
could have been cleaned or the bloodstain could have been taken away. 24 The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that he
This presumption of the deadly weapon's having been "cleaned" of was arrested at the former barter trade, which is a place just across the place
bloodstains is tantamount to pronouncing the accused of being guilty. of the stabbing at the Fruit Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it "therefore
strange that on the very evening of the stabbing incident he was still at the
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a resolution, barter trade area by 8:00 o'clock in the evening when he usually comes to
25 in a separate case, 26 of Assistant City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning and goes home at past
deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo Murillo, which clearly reveals that 5:00 o'clock and sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's
on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar explanation — that, at around 7:00 o'clock P.M., he was waiting for
stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier incident, transportation to take him home — was found by the trial court as 'flimsy and
with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar Isa, weak since he did not explain why he had to go home late that evening." 32
'a notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long But the whole trouble is nobody asked him. The trial judge did not propound
record of arrests. In that resolution, Fiscal Murillo said the same Benhar Isa any single question to the accused, and only three to his mother on
was tagged as 'also a suspect in the stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death innocuous matters, by way of clarification, if only to put on record what the
and the stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this City." mother and son could articulate with clarity. Taking into account their poverty
The said resolution further states that "with regards to this incident or and illiteracy, the mother and son needed as much, if not more, help, than
witnesses ever testified for fear of possible reprisals." 27 the trial judge extended to the prosecution witnesses during their
examination by asking them clarificatory and mostly leading questions. In
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa himself that sense and to that extent, the accused was disadvantaged.
was killed by a policeman on August 28, 1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently
under the influence of liquor armed with a knife (was) molesting and extorting A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the
money from innocent civilians' and "making trouble." 28 The records of the accused but the importance of which was brushed away by the trial judge
case at bar do not show any attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio, or any was the presence of the accused near the scene (about 100 to 150 meters
other police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in connection with away) soon after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M. although
the killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it fear of the notorious police character that Police Corporal Carpio stated it was 8:00 P.M.) where he was found sitting
made the police officers disregard the possible connection between the on his pushcart with a companion. If he were the assailant, he would have
slaying of Ramon and that of the person (Harun Acan y Arang of the Ministry fled. But the trial court instead indulged in conjecture, foisting the probability
of National Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by Benhar Isa a day after that the accused 'was lulled by a false sense of security in returning to the
the killing of Ramon Jr.? And yet questioning Isa might have provided that place (of the stabbing), when no police officers immediately responded and
vital link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence. But why should the appeared at the scene of the crime," adding 'there are numerous cases in the
police officers investigate Isa when Usman Hassan was already in custody past where criminals return to the scene of their crimes, for reasons only
and could be an available fall guy? Usman Hassan, instead, became a victim psychologist can explain." 33 It must have escaped the trial court's attention
of a grave injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is too poor to wage a legal fight that Usman has no criminal record, and, therefore, he could not be generally
classed with criminals. In the second place, the trial court's rationalization committed this crime and this observation is based on his personal
ignores the biblical truism recognized by human nature and endorsed with appearance, his size and facial features and other personal characteristics,
approval by this Court that "(T)he wicked flee when no man pursueth but the hence he can not be classified as a youthful offender under Article. 189 of
righteous are as bold as a lion." 34 Presendential Decree No. 603, as ammended by Presedential Decree No.
1179. In the case of U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 13 and People vs. Reyes and
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total Panganiban, CA 48 O.G. 1022, cited in the Edition, Page 680, it was ruled by
absence of motive ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete the Supreme Court that "In cases where the age of the culprit is at issue as a
stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in order to basis for claiming an exempting mitigating circumstance, it is incumbent upon
arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind, 35 the accused to establish that circumstance ad any other elements of
procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that a defense. 38
judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack
of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment
This is especially true where there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit 36 or cause the suspension of his sentence under Articles 12 and 80,
as when 'the Identification is extremely tenuous," 37 as in this case. respectively of the Revised Penal Code, if found guilty, more meticulousness
and care should have been demanded of medical or scientific sources, and
We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in which less reliance on the observation of the judge as had happened in this case.
the trial court disregarded the claimed young age of Usman Hassan. The preliminary findings of the dentist that the accused could be anywhere
between fourteen to twenty one years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an
The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such accurate determination due to Hassan's mouth condition, would have placed
claim on the testimony of Lahunay Hassan, the mother of said accused, who the trial judge on notice that there is the probability that the accused might be
declared that her son Usman Hassan, who is one of her four (4) children, exempted from criminal liability due to his young age. All the foregoing
was born in the year 1967. She testified that she was just told by a person indicates that the accused had not been granted the concern and
coming from their place about the year of the birth of her son Usman. compassion with which the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged so
However on cross-examination, Lahunay Hassan cannot even remember the critically deserve. It is when judicial and police processes and procedures are
date or year of birth of her other children. The failure of Lahunay Hassan to thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries of the law and justice
remember the date or year of birth of her children is of course being denied the poor are heard. In any event, all this would not be of any
understandable, considering that she is unschooled and she belongs to a moment now, considering the acquittal of the accused herein ordered.
tribe that does not register births, deaths or marriages, however, it is strange
that she only took pains to find out the year of birth of her son Usman. For WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman
this reason, the Court granted a motion of the defense on September 13, Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His release from
1982, to have the herein accused examined by a competent dentist to confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is held for another legal cause.
determine his age. However, the findings of the dentist of Zamboanga With costs de oficio.
General Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5" shows the following: "age
cannot be determined accurately under present mouth conditions. SO ORDERED.
Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years of age." This simply means
that the herein accused could either be 14 years of age or 21 years of age, or Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
any age in between those aforestated years. From the observation of this
court, the accused Usman Hassan was about 18 years of age at the time he [G.R. No. 135919. May 9, 2003]
knife,[7] making an upward and downward thrust.[8] Flores ran after he was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANNY DELOS SANTOS Y stabbed twice.[9] Appellant pursued him and stabbed him many times.[10] As
FERNANDEZ, appellant. a result, Flores intestines bulged out of his stomach.[11] Appellant ceased
stabbing Flores only after he saw him dead. Thereafter, he turned his ire
DECISION against Jayvee Rainier and chased him. Fearful for his life, witness De Leon
hid himself and later on reported the incident to the police.[12]
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Marvin Tablate corroborated De Leons testimony. On cross-examination,
For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated October 2, 1998 of the Tablate testified that he tried to help Flores by separating him from the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. appellant who ran away.[13] He also testified that the latter joined his group
3551798, finding appellant Danny delos Santos guilty of the crime of murder at about 11:00 a.m. and kept on coming back and forth.
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
Dr. Caballero declared on the witness stand that Flores suffered twenty-one
In the Information[2] dated February 23, 1998, appellant was charged with (21) stab wounds in the frontal, posterior and lateral side of his body, eleven
murder, thus: (11) of which were fatal. Dr. Caballero said it was possible that appellant was
behind Flores considering the stab wounds inflicted at his back.[14]
That on or about the 6th day of November 1997, in the Municipality of San According to the doctor, Flores died because of massive external/internal
Jose, Del Monte, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction hemorrhages due to multiple stab wounds in the thorax and abdomen
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen penetrating both lungs, heart, stomach, liver, spleen and intestines.[15]
knife, with intent to kill one Rod Flores y Juanitas, with evident premeditation,
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there Romeo Flores testified that his son Rod Flores was then working at Vitarich,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said Marilao, Bulacan, earning P600.00 every 15th day of the month;[16] that he
kitchen knife said Rod Flores y Juanitas, hitting him on the different parts of spent P100,000.00 for his sons burial and wake; that he has receipts in the
his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly caused his amount of P19,110.00 spent for the funeral services and the cost of the
death. cemetery lot[17] and a list of other expenses in the amount of
P35,960.00;[18] and that his family has been grieving for the loss of a loved
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.[3] Thereafter, trial on the one.
merits ensued. The prosecution presented Marcelino de Leon, Marvin
Tablate, Dr. Benito Caballero and Romeo Flores as its witnesses. Appellant Appellant had a different version of the events. He denied the accusation and
and Sonny Bautista took the witness stand for the defense. declared that on November 6, 1997 at 8:00 p.m., he was in his aunties house
in Muson, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,[19] forty (40) meters away from the
Marcelino De Leon testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of November 6, 1997, scene of the crime. He was then fetching water.[20] Earlier, at about 5:30
he saw Rod Flores drinking gin with Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and p.m., he and Flores met but they did not greet each other. There was no
Jayvee Rainier at the latters house in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del altercation between them. Hence, he could not understand why De Leon and
Monte, Bulacan.[4] As he was about to fetch water from a nearby faucet, he Tablate testified against him.
approached them and borrowed Flores cart.[5] While waiting for the cart, he
stood across Flores who was then seated and conversing with the group.[6] Sonny Bautista testified that on that particular date and time, he and
Suddenly, appellant emerged from the back of Flores and stabbed him with a appellant were in their aunties house in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.[21]
They watched television up to 8:30 p.m. and then went home. At about 10:00 SO ORDERED.
p.m., appellant was arrested. Bautista did not inform the policemen that they
were watching television in their aunties house at the time the crime took In his Appellants brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following
place. Neither did he accompany appellant to the police station.[22] errors:
The first assigned error involves a determination of the credibility of the Atty. De la Cruz:
prosecution witnesses. Settled is the rule that when it comes to credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts generally do not overturn the findings of trial Q You did not see the accused because it was dark in that place, is it not?
courts. The latter are in a best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity
and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the A No, sir, he suddenly appeared from the back of Rod Flores and started
witnesses manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior in court.[24] stabbing Rod that is why we were surprised.
Appellant maintains that there are inconsistencies in the testimonies of De Q How did the accused thrust the weapon to the victim?
Leon and Tablate. While De Leon testified that appellant did not join Flores
group, however, Tablate declared that he was drinking gin with them at about A (Witness demonstrating by making upward, downward thrust at the back of
11:00 a.m. De Leon testified that no one assisted Flores when he was being the victim)
attacked by appellant. However, Tablate stated that he attempted to separate
Flores from appellant after the former had sustained two stab wounds. Atty. De la Cruz
The first alleged inconsistency is understandable. Unlike Tablate who was Q Where was Rod Flores hit, if you know?
with the group in a drinking spree, De Leon approached Flores only when he
borrowed the cart from the latter at about 8:00 p.m. He stayed with Flores A At the back, sir.
group only for about thirty minutes,[25] or up to 8:30 p.m. Thus, he could not
have observed that appellant joined the group earlier, or at about 11:00 a.m. Q How many times?
The second alleged inconsistency is a minor one that does not enfeeble the A At first, twice, sir.
prosecutions theory that appellant killed Flores. Evident from De Leons
testimony is the fact that he was so shocked in witnessing the gruesome Court:
killing of his companion. With such a state of mind, it would be too much to
demand from him a full recollection of the details surrounding the event. Q That was the time when Rod Flores ran away after having been stabbed
Many times we have ruled that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses twice.
when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their A Yes, Your Honor.
testimony.[26] They only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed xxxxxx
testimony.[27] What we find important in the case at bar is that the two
prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was appellant who stabbed Court:
Flores with a knife. We quote the clear and straightforward account of the
Q How did the accused thrust for the second time the weapon at the back of
the victim. Q What do you mean?
A Both at the back, sir. A Danny delos Santos stabbed Rod Flores at the back, sir.
xxxxxx Q When you said Danny delos Santos stabbed Rod Flores at the back, are
you saying that Danny delos Santos was at the back of Rod Flores at the
Atty. De la Cruz: time?
A Yes, sir. Q How many times did the accused stab Rod Flores?
Q Where were you when Rod Flores was running away? A I saw him stabbed the victim twice, sir. (Witness demonstrated in
downward position as if he was holding something).
A We were left behind, sir. I was not able to move anymore.
Q What was he holding?
Q And was the accused able to reach Flores?
A A knife, sir.
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxx
Q What did the accused do?
Court:
A Again, he started stabbing at the back, sir.
xxxxxx
Q So the stabbing was inflicted at the back of the victim?
Q Are you sure that when Rod Flores fell to the ground, he was not able to
A Not all, sir, because he turned him face up and stabbed him again, sir.[28] rise nor was he able to run away?
Tablates direct testimony reads: A He was able to run but then he was drunk and the accused was able to
catch and stab him again, sir.
Fiscal Vicente:
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
Q Are you positive to the identity of Danny delos Santos that he was the one
Q How did Danny delos Santos stab Rod Flores? who stabbed Rod Flores?
In computing the life expectancy and loss of earning capacity of a person the G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
following formula is used:
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
Life expectancy vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
2/3 x (80-the age of the victim at the time of death)
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
2/3 x (80-25) Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
= 36.66 or 37
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light
to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the
these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a
these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck
either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he
may be taken to be substantially correct: called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to
his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters,
No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date
Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the
quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly protection.
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which
opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to
communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an
covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door
of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house
as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao
the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the
of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about
one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28,
door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room. Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party
separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in
received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was wounded man.
being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.
Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate,
very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron"
leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's
moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which warnings.
had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his
Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant
playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right
forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber. forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to
desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small
the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite
following day. his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any
available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver
guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, the first blow.
and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law. But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a
"ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal
roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there
self-defense. was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his
property or the property under his charge.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
liability: facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime
xxx xxx xxx of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts
at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no
following attendant circumstances: criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact
was not due to negligence or bad faith.
(1) Illegal aggression.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching
would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of
the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that
different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less
sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth.
Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having
vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the
Rogers, 7 Met., 500.) corruption was of one particular form or another.
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an
essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by
as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the law.
definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense
therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily
constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with unless the contrary shall appear.
criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which
liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, he had intended to commit.
which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule
of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word
that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were
crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but
modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the
acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even
these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can
except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without
disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have
may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than
the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal real.
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says: malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of
mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its
the Criminal Law, folio 169.) medium and maximum degrees.
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to
as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
following language:
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph
malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the
cause the injury which may be the object of the crime. degree which they may consider proper.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the
"considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission liability on the actor.
punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American
the following language: statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the
word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly,
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate
or their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent
criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a
judgment and decision of the trial court. statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without
reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes
becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought"
which are as follows: are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often
being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.) vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —
in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully,"
"maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to
generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made
hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from
act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr.
decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine: Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification
of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are
rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the
with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature
proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that — from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a
criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, 286 to 290.)
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent
any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the
mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses
every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals;
which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by — and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have
recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases,
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without
distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that
guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts
actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question
like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes
— 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been
said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need
the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the
respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention;
or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing
necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the
strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a
maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed
Max., 2d ed., 190.) by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the
pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the
such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of
sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his
by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of
vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since
Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by
vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the
the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as law" was committed "voluntarily."
they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect
which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he
acted. If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain
had a felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him,
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide,
nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such
fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418,
homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right
of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as
reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some follows:
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he
is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him,
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in
him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head
the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It
array of cases there cited.) turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish
that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the
hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a
strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger
which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially
it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and
to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not
supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.) exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not
rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing
by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally
somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar. resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that
night, in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of
there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of
him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he
had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was
knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was
head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying:
the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the
as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately
consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice)
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding
father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's
over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not
as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from
paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the
Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the
sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal
employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of
the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the
accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc.
facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence,
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable
mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property
the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed and the property under his charge.
were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March
17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.) The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court
should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his oficio. So ordered.
head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the
delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at
one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot.
Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having Separate Opinions
acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of TORRES, J., dissenting:
Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court,
reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused believes that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by
to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code,
appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed,
accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote and while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however,
spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could
of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on
128.) the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor;
the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable
us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the motive.
information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his
sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the
of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; undersigned the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and
that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided
themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased,
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he from.
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability
on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants. house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping
banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf. place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta. paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee. was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis
and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping
MORAN, J.: with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at
Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him.
corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person
found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a
were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The
months to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to
Defendants appealed separately from this judgment. Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the
provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on
Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received Tecson's body which caused his death.
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the
get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave,
sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta,
Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked
upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further
where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was
newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon
arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand
telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former
was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned
asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas."
one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Galanta then fired at Tecson.
Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the
constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain
see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up."
Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was
Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that
it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held
supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as
something from the floor, he fired at him. appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of
their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held
certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances
contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially
apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while
the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact,
noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is
the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after
contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He
the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the
incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you
testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a
Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then
appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the
themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of
Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad
awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with
the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under
trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head
believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the
and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of
Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused,
that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as
put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the
detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no
ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court. circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could
room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been
him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This,
but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if
the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at
sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the
aggression is offered by him. killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the
is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo
himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por
justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta
or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal
otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate
Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor,
restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a
notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with
peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating
killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance
resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
234, 242). fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two
requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a)
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present —
danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is
case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence
the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered.
action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances,
appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom
whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without
prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the
otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
actuation. prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby murder. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, however, convicted them
declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, only of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to
and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and
of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the 2 months of prision correctional, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of
accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and
jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs. Galanta have appealed.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur. In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they
undoubtedly followed the order issued by the Constabulary authorities in
Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead
Separate Opinions or alive, in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As
the latter became a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and a
PARAS, J., dissenting: record that made him extremely dangerous and a public terror, the
Constabulary authorities were justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead or
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape alive. In view of said order and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying
and flee form Manila to the provinces. Receiving information to the effect that it out, they cannot be said to have acted feloniously in shooting the person
he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the honestly believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that
Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want to
telegram dispatched on December 25, 1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive". take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence. On the
Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the said order, were contrary, they should be commended for their bravery and courage bordering
Antonio Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a on recklessness because, without knowing or ascertaining whether the
Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram received by the Provincial wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without
Inspector and a newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta hesitation and thereby exposed their lives to danger.
and a Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector to
gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered, to The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were
follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the place authorized to use their revolvers only after being overpowered by Balagtas.
where the house of Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that
approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering banana stalks in the effect, was in violation of the express order given by the Constabulary
yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the authorities in Manila and which was shown to the appellants. In the second
room, she was asked by Oanis to tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, place, it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or, for that matter, any
was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was sleeping with Irene. Upon agent of the authority to have waited until they have been overpowered
reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former had before trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In the third place, it is
shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting the man who was immaterial whether or not the instruction given by the Provincial Inspector
found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but was legitimate and proper, because the facts exist that the appellants acted
Balagtas was still alive, for it turned out that the person shot by Oanis and in conformity with the express order of superior Constabulary authorities, the
Galanta was one Serapio Tecson. legality or propriety of which is not herein questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite
psychological or sentimental, in view only of the fact that it was not Balagtas
who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
asleep." Anybody's heart will be profoundly grieved by the trade, but in time
will be consoled by the realization that the life of Serapio Tecson was not According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a
vainly sacrificed, for the incident will always serve as a loud warning to any notorious criminal "must be taken by storm without regard to his life which he
one desiring to follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due time has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers
the duly constituted authorities will, upon proper order, enforce the summary resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent
forfeiture of his life. attack. Precisely, the situation which confronted the accused-appellants
Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of December 24,
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person 1938, was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both officers
killed by them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that they did so in received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or alive" and according to the
the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a superior attitude of not only the said appellants but also of Capt. Monsod,
for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They constabulary provincial inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that
also cannot be held criminally liable even if the person killed by them was not said instructions gave more emphasis to the first part; namely, to take him
Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under an dead. It appears in the record that after the shooting, and having been
honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith. (U.S. vs. Ah informed of the case, Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta might be
Chong, 15 Phil., 488). decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties concerned
honestly believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is criminal who had escaped from his guards and was supposedly armed with a
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met upon
be different from that which he intended; but said article is clearly arriving at the house of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas,
inapplicable since the killing of the person who was believed to be Balagtas informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs. Appellants found there
was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious. asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are
Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his intention to attack
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, the appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt
is not in point, inasmuch as the defendant therein, who intended to injure offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was peacefully
Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake, lying down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human
would not be exempted from criminal liability if he actually injured or killed on the part of the appellants to employ force and to make use of their
Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious design on his part. The other case weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person who, according to
involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that an innocent man
in point, as it appears that the defendants therein killed one Pedro Almasan was actually killed. But taking into consideration the facts of the case, it is,
after he had already surrendered and allowed himself to be bound and that according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid
the said defendants did not have lawful instructions from superior authorities down in the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we
to capture Almasan dead or alive. have, as in the case supra, an innocent mistake of fact committed without
any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who having no time to
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, make a further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with costs de oficio. appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del
this case which favored the accused-appellants, arrives at the conclusion que obra violentado por una fuerza inrresistible o impulsado por miedo
that an incomplete justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore, insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un deber, o en el
according to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty ejercito legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia
should be one which is lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by debida, ni del que incurre en alguna omision hallandose impedido por causa
law. This incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al articulo que comentamos. Y
5 of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in the fulfillment la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad de
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." I believe that the requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola condicion. Hay o no
application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho es o no menor de nueve años;
Code provides as follows: existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que
respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que acontezca lo que el texto que
excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que se imponga al autor del hecho
law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the la penalidad excepcional que establece; esto es, que falten algunos
lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from requisitos de los que la ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que
criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, concurran el mayor numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la
provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall ley no exige multiples condiciones.
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the
number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking. It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower
by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions
Penal Code of the Philippines, and which was also taken from Article 87 of required by the law to justify the same or exempt from criminal liability. The
the Spanish Penal Code of 1870. word "conditions" should not be confused with the word "requisites". In
dealing with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara states: "There are
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by two requisites in order that this circumstance may be taken into account: (a)
Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department of Justice for the drafting of That the offender acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful
the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or offense committed be the
circumstances and circumstances exempting from liability which are the necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise
subject matter of this article are the following: self-defense, defense of of a right or office." It is evident that these two requisites concur in the
relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere present case if we consider the intimate connection between the order given
accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with to the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them of the telegram from
the fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office, Manila to get Balagtas who was with a bailarina named Irene, the conduct of
cannot be placed within its scope. said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the
supposed criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of by Capt. Monsod after the shooting.
Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is the source of Article
69 of our Code says:
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, autopsy appeared to have been caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In
there are more reasons in favor of the acquittal of appellant Galanta. consequence, it can be stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or
According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason why he should be
hit Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon of December 24, declared criminally responsible for said death.
1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and was
corroborated by the unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt. G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014
Valeriano Serafica. According to this witness, since Galanta was made a
corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as part of his equipment, revolver EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,
Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been constantly used by vs.
Galanta, and, according to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
accused when he took it from his trunk in the barracks on the night of
December 24, 1938, upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver DECISION
which was given to the witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty
shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by Sergeant MENDOZA, J.:
Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he
had on the morning of December 24, 1938, when Sergeant Serafica made This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession of the non- December 14, 2012 Decision1 and the May 6, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court
commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary post at Cabanatuan. of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 filed by Eduardo Magsumbol
Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and missed. This testimony is (Magsumbol), questioning his conviction for Theft.
corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets exhibits F
and O, — the first being extracted from the head of the deceased, causing The Facts
wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second found at the place of
the shooting, — had not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from any other Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino). Apolonio
revolver of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the Inanoria (Jnanoria), and Bonifacio Ramirez (Ramirez). vvas charged with the
accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver because when Exhibit L crime of Theft in the Information, dated August 30, 2002, filed before the
was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted that the deceased was Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 (RTC) and docketed as
none other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and Criminal Case No. 2002-1017. The Information indicting Magsumbol and his
therefore there was no reason why Galanta should carry along another gun, co-accused reads:
according to the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside from
wound No. 3 as above stated, no other wound may be said to have been That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay Kinatihan I, in
caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the the Munipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 and confederating together with seven (7) John Does whose true names and
must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter real identities are still unknown and whose physical descriptions were not
of the wound's entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32 and not made known by available witnesses, and who are all still at large, and
.45, because according to the medico-legal expert who testified in this case, mutually helping one another, with intent togain and without the consent of
a bullet of a .45 caliber will produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or the owner, Menandro Avanzado, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
12 mm. diameter. All other wounds found by the surgeon who performed the feloniously cut, take, steal and carry away with them thirty three (33) coconut
trees from the coconut plantation of the said owner, valued at FORTY FOUR All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (₱44,400.00), Philippine currency, Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the land
belonging to said Menandro Avanzado, to his damage and prejudice in the owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on
aforesaid amount.3 that morning of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber
trader and that Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees planted on his lot.
Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto Caringal Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees but
(Caringal), private complainant Engr. Menandro Avanzado (Menandro), and merely supervised the same. He claimed that he did not receive any
SPO1 Florentino Manalo (SPO1 Manalo), it appears that at around 11:00 remuneration for the service he rendered or a share from the proceeds of the
o’clock in the morning of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one- coco lumbers sale. Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down
hectare unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co- of the coconut treesbut confirmed the presence of Magsumbol and Magsino
owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting at the site to supervise the accomplishment of the work being done thereat.
down the coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled Inanoria corroborated the narration of Magsumbol and Ramirez that all the
trees into coco lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men from cutting felled trees were planted inside the lot owned by Atanacio. Inanoria intimated
down the coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, Caringal left that Menandro included him in the complaint for theft due to his refusal to
the site and proceeded toSan Pablo City to inform Menandro about the accede to latter’s request for him to testify against his co-accused in relation
incident. to the present criminal charge.4
On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to the Ruling of the RTC
police. Thereafter, the two, accompanied by SPO1 Manalo, went to the
coconut plantation only to discover that about thirty three (33) coconut trees On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision5 stating that the
(subject trees) had been cut down. The coco lumber were no longer in the prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of all the accused for
area. They took photographs of the stumps left by the men. the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of denial invoked by
the accused in the face of positive identification by Caringal pointing to them
The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado as the perpetrators of the crime. It did not believe the testimony of Atanacio
(Atanacio),accused Ramirez, petitioner Magsumbol, Barangay Captain Pedro and even branded him as biased witness on account of his relationship with
Arguelles (Brgy. Captain Arguelles)and accused Inanoria, to substantiate its accused Magsino and Magsumbol. The trial court adjudged:
claim of innocence for all the accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused Erasmo
Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez
Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his guilty as charged and applying the Indeterminate sentence law, the court
property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio hereby sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1
admitted that he had never set foot on his property for about 20 years day of Prision Correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of Prision
already and that he was not present whenthe cutting incident happened. Mayor as maximum.
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002, The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr.
Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria came to his office seeking Menandro Avanzado and the other heirs of Norberto Avanzado the sum of
permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio. ₱13,200.00 representing the value of the 33 coconut trees they have cut and
sold to accused Ramirez.
SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, the accused appealed from the March 15, 2011 judgment of the The accused moved for reconsideration of the December 14, 2012 Decision
RTC before the CA insisting that the prosecution evidence did not meet the but their motion was denied by the CA on May 6, 2013.
quantum of proof necessary towarrant their conviction of the crime charged.
They posited that the RTC erred in failing to appreciate the lack of criminal Issues:
intent on their part to commit the crime of simple theft. They claimed that not
a scintilla of evidence was presented to prove the element of intent to gain.6 Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbolfiled the present petition before this
Court and imputes to the CA the following
Ruling of the CA
ERRORS:
In its assailed Decision, dated December 14, 2012, the CA sustained the
findings of facts and conclusions of law by the RTC and upheld the judgment THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
of conviction rendered against the accused. The CA was of the view, ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE
however, that the crime committed in this case would not fall under the CRIME OF THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL
general definition of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code CODE, IN THAT:
(RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the same provision which penalizes
theft of damaged property. The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in giving I
full faith and credence to the testimony of Caringal who was not shown to
have been motivated by any ill will to testify falsely against the accused. It NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO
agreed with the RTC that Atanacio’s testimony should not be given any PROVE THAT THE COCONUT TREES THAT WERE CUT WERE BEYOND
evidentiary weight in view of his relationship with Magsino and Magsumbol, THE PROPERTY OWNED BY ATANACIO AVANZADO; and
which provided sufficient reason for him to suppress or pervert the truth.
Anent the element of intent to gain, the CA stated that the mere fact that the II
accused cut the coconut trees on Menandro’s land and made them into coco
lumber, gave rise to the presumption that it was done with intent to gain. The MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF
falloreads: THEFT, ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT HAND.8
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The The Court’s Ruling
Decision dated March 15, 2011, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Lucena City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused- The petition is impressed with merit.
appellants Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and
Bonifacio Ramirez are sentenced to suffer imprisonment of tw0 (2) years, It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to
four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the
months and one (1) day, as maximum; and to pay jointly and severally reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of
private complainant Menandro Avanzado the amount of Thirteen Thousand observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies.
Two Hundred Pesos (₱13,200.00). Though it is true that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the
appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. The exception is land owned by Atanacio. The prosecution claimed that the thirty three (33)
observed if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, cut coconut trees were planted within the land co-owned by Menandro. The
or misapplied some factor circumstance of weight and substance that would defense, on the other hand, averred that only the coconut trees found within
have cast doubt on the guilt of the accused.9 The said exception apparently the land of Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol and his co-accused.
exists in the case at bench. Menandro testified that there were muniments that delimit the boundaries
between the adjacent lots11 while Atanacio claimed that there were none
It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each and that "x" marks were just etched on the trunk of the trees to delineate the
crime under the RPC, while the elements in turn unravel the particular boundary of his land.12 Apart from the bare allegations of these witnesses,
requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent. In the case at no concrete and competent evidence was adduced to substantiate their
bench, petitioner Magsumbol and his co-accused were convicted by the CA respective submissions. In view of such conflicting claims and considering
of the crime of theft of damaged property under paragraph (2) of Article 308 the meager evidence on hand, the Court cannot determine with certainty the
of the RPC which provides: owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact location of
the coconut trees negates the presenceof the criminal intent to gain.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.–: xxxx
At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within
Theft is likewise committed by: Menandro’s land, no malice or criminal intent could be rightfully attributed to
Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC and the CA overlooked one
1. xxxxx; important point in the present case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused
went to Barangay KinatihanI, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut down the coconut
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of trees belonging to Atanacio upon the latter’s instruction.
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage
caused by him; and xxx. Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to financial
reversals, he sold all the coconut trees in his land to Ramirez, a coco lumber
[Emphasis Supplied] trader; that since he could not go to the site due to health reasons, he
authorized Magsumbol and Magsino to cut down his trees and to oversee the
To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of damaged gathering of the felled trees; that he informed Menandro about this and even
property, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable that the accused offered to pay for the damages that he might have sustained as some of his
maliciously damaged the property belonging to another and, thereafter, (Menandro’s) trees could have been mistakenly cut down in the process; that
removed or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, Menandro refused his offer of compensation and replied that a case had
theft of damaged property is an intentional felony for which criminal liability already been filed against the four accused; and that he tried to seek an
attaches only when it is shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent audience again from Menandro, but the latter refused to talk to him
or malice. Criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements anymore.13
of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.10 Was criminal intent
substantiated tojustify the conviction of Magsumbol and his co-accused? Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted
testimony of Atanacio for being unreliable and considered him a biased
It does not so appear in this case. witness simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino.
Family relationship, however, does not by itself render a witness’ testimony
inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight.14 To warrant rejection of the effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason
testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently that the accused would still approach the barangay captain if their real
of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or intention was tosteal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals
that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the would usually execute their criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth
accused falsely.15 or strategy to avoid detection of the commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.
The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not impair his The findings of this Court in this case should not create the mistaken
credibilty.1âwphi1 It bears stressing that while Magsumbol and Magsino are impression that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should always
Atanacio’s brothers-in-law, Menandro ishis cousin. Considering that both the be looked at with askance. The point is that courts should carefully scrutinize
accused and the accuser are Atanacio’s relatives, and purportedly both have the prosecution evidence to make sure that no innocent person is
bearing with regard to his decision, why would then Atanacio support one condemned. An allegation, or even a testimony, that an act was done should
over the other? The logical explanation could only be that Atanacio had never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Evidence adduced
indeed ordered Magsumbol and Magsino to cut the trees on his land. The must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope to ensure
Court is convinced that Atanacio was telling the truth. that conviction only flows from moral certainty that guilt has been established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacio’s instructions, Magsumbol and
his co-accused encroached on the land co-owned by Menandro, because Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.1âwphi1 The prosecution
they missed the undetectable boundary between the two lots, and cut down miserably failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that Magsumbol,
some of Menandro’s trees, such act merely constituted mistake or together with his co-accused, damaged the property or Menandro with malice
judgmental error. The following pronouncement in the case of Lecaroz vs. and deliberate intent and then removed the felled coconut trees from the
Sandiganbayan16 may serve as a guidepost, to wit: premises.
If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est
committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to
exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012
the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to Decision and the May 6, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious CR No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eduardo
responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or Magsumbol is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent, for in this
instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element SO ORDERED.
ofnegligence and imprudence.17
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
[Emphasis supplied] Associate Justice
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and WE CONCUR:
his co-accused even sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to
cut down the coconut trees which was done openly and during broad daylight ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Chairperson
Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Instance of Bulacan, in its Criminal Case No. 5243 (for serious physical
Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES* injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence), overruling a
Associate Justice motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:
CERTIFICATION A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted on December 16,
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision 1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer the Court of First Instance the information in the case now before us, for
of the opinion of the Court's Division. serious physical injuries, and damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway collision.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his
counsel moved to quash the charges on the ground that he had already been
G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968 acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court. The
prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion quash.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Unable to secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.
vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant. Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case placed the
appellant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and is barred by the
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. previous acquittal.
Felipe C. Magat and Amado D. Dyoco for accused-appellant.
We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not
dismissing the information for "serious physical injuries and damage to As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal
property through reckless imprudence," in view of the appellant's previous (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has this to say:1äwphï1.ñët
acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the
same imprudence. Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males diversos,
como el hecho culposo es uno solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or Esta es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal Supremo. De acuerdo con esta
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be doctrinael automovilista imprudente que atropella y causa lesiones a dos
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of personas y ademas daños, no respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y uno
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the de daños por imprudencia, sino de un solo delito culposo.
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into the Supreme Court of Spain (footnotes 2 and 3).
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should 8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y
prosecutions. This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme ademas se ocasionan daños, existe un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo
Court, and is also that of this Court in its most recent decisions on the matter. fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse dos enorden a la responsabilidad
civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a consecuencia de un solo acto imprudente se
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as the produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de daños, como todos son
result of the same vehicular accident one man died, two persons were consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe penarlos por separado, 2
seriously injured while another three suffered only slight physical injuries, we abril 1932.
ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide through reckless The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954, the ruling was that physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
second information of damage to property through reckless imprudence because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of
based on the same negligent act of the accused. In People vs, Belga, 100 grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and
Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for physical injuries through needless rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. Diaz, supra:
imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was declared,
to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless ... The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the
imprudence and another for multiple physical injuries arising from the same prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
collision. The same doctrine was reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L- through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
regard as material that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
were triable in Courts of differing category, or that the complainants were not Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
the individuals. prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of reads as follows:
which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of
province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused
appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense. his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan is directed to quash and dismiss the charge in its That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So ordered. and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior
strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
JJ., concur. causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
Castro, J., took no part.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused
vs. guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the
accused-appellants. dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin
Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants. principals by direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of
Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in
favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12)
MEDIALDEA, J.: years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The
BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First
amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the
damages of P5,000.00. group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him.
They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal
penalty. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused
Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns
Cost against both accused. wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay
not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records). gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human
torch out of him.
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal
and assigned the following errors committed by the court a quo: The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning
body of the deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando
BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the
scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and
SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL Samson as the authors thereof.
TO ITS CASE.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE meantime, the police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer
THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused,
Brief, p. 48, Rollo). after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
The antecedent facts are as follows: After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the
accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay without merit.
were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept
together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-
public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one appellants gave their written statements to the police. The accused Pugay
was a ferris wheel. admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the
deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the
ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on
accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the
fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness
Gabion in the commission of the offense. Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion
alleging that not only was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but
written statements alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an
that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the
commission of the offense. Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who
asked him to testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw
were mentioned and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the
contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the
the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even without other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding
Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.
convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-
serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw
Records). Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is
incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased,
testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's
fact that there were other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that
the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption that However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the reading comics when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda
commission of the crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, and lighted by Samson. How could you possibly see that incident while you
Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico were reading comics?
Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of
pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused- A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were
appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as doing.
prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their
testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and
give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be lighted and burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression of
merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to
Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to prevent him from doing so.
decide.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was
Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what already in the process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
I want to know from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
A. Yes, sir.
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to
to say you come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him? make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline
from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the
A. I do not know that would be that incident. process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion
warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before deceased on fire.
he did that actually?
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir. conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two
accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson.
according to you to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that
pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani? the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the
deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and
A. I was not told, sir. Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is
individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog,
pour gasoline that is why you prevent him? et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the
water but it was gasoline. accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris
wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased,
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this
he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct? flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the
same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
A. Yes, sir. undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through
him not to pour gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline. reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe. follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then that which he intended.
through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as
of danger and injury. amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The
one ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-
to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his 17).<äre||anº•1àw>
conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the
deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate
characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to one ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
not agree.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had spent by Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The
some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the
is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun- deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack
must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party damages as found by the court a quo.
might make.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the Costs against the accused-appellants.
liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable
substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire SO ORDERED.
if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that
as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility.
Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of [G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]
physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If
his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third
he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
DECISION Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
BELLOSILLO, J.: Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore
pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the
State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers
sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which
acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to
obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says - against him.
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any are reproduced hereunder:
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for
non-observance. (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism
wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of (2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or
State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism,
often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their
State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test. subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim.
Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3,
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7,
benefit particular persons or special interests; or par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the
case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558;
who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably,
series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the Law.
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in
Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill- Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of
gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied). denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an
by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied). the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari
are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the
Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for
Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A
within the power of Congress to so classify it. doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train
their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-
constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature
strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts,
forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the
legislature. 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, associates, subordinates or other persons;
the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders
and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge 2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any
judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer;
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as long as subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of
official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR
in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the (a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED
accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose
indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES
which petitioner is alleged to have committed: AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office
of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE (b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and
SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION
Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro,
12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows: JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito (c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right
FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR to due process.
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not
SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein,
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY or because of the employment of terms without defining them;[6] much less
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of
OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the special legal meaning to those words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers -
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject individual characters.
to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime
are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after
and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is another in spatial and temporal succession.
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to
prepare for an intelligent defense. That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be
understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder
definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a Law:
combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say REP. GARCIA: A series.
THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL
ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say
combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else
are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also? why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may
fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series. criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. ISIDRO: Series. REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series. SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination. REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. GARCIA: Yes. REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that - REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination.
Series.
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated
means not twice of one enumeration. REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice. REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts. SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
maybe even two acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, Sec. 2 -
would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or, to read,
therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural. combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1)
to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is
acts mentioned in this. to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy'
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be.... to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall
unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to
more. achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under
the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder there should be, at Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair
least, two or more. warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the
circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but
laws, Mr. President. is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause
and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government or by construction.
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for
treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
law. Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
mounted as against the second whenever directed against such with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some
activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that
assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances
left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
- not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long
as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only
be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context
as in all other statutes. of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled
that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and,
Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
its validity - protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge
to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
application, violates the first essential of due process of law."[13] The applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly conduct of others."[19]
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision
persons or other situations in which its application might be of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other
unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-
First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about.
are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only
Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a
departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient
permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will
abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo
v. Harris[24] challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others,
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to
of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad
questions, whichever way they might be decided. faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable
negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if
resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to
have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-
with which the defendant is charged.[27] Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect
of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by
of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses. plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done
by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a
Part, p. 19). criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always
has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in: reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.[29] The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended). being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual
going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder
provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has
official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life
benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction
without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. constitute the crime with which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges
between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating
in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and -
Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general
acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080,
held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional. 9 October 1990
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law
Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts
the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy - accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less
than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since
there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of
theft? the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information
example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To
not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder
conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution
3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense. at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they
amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the
crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical
series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating,
extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises
totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of
him? the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and
common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an series of
essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond
reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or
the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The
other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious
or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a
will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. series or combination of the predicate acts.
Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable
doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his
supplied). submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of
plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused
refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden cannot be convicted of plunder -
still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact
or element necessary to constitute the crime. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted
under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if
there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts
complained of? SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder
xxxx
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes
enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder. It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the
prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of
proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means
have a conviction under the Plunder Law? to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec.
4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor. is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by
the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and
convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law? vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed
from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more
substantive element of the law x x x x than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the
when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
constituting plunder? remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it
contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being
of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4. declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming
that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by
as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
that far by applying Section 4?
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the Concurring Opinion -
prosecution.[32]
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that
elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the
the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: part of petitioner.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite
mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of
the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that
No. 733: 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer
would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the
evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there
crime of plunder.[33] is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."[35]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding
portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner: Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must
be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death
would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous
cases? crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34] The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by
their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely
commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen
done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and
concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
requisite mens rea must be shown. case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for
Indeed, 2 provides that - more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim
or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by heinous by their very nature.
the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance
and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger
socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more
struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated,
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the
must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left
in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over.
Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation,
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and
offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing
society. saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for
a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently ferment.
immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37] and it does not matter
that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known
plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED
prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an for lack of merit.
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of
the acts. SO ORDERED.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is
now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of J.
having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives Mendoza.
of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring opinion.
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see dissenting
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene opinion.
profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation.
The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.
CARPIO, J.:
Petitioners, Present:
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and
the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court,
Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against
CARPIO, petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez
(petitioners). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, and reconsideration.
TINGA, JJ.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are
the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident
x--------------------------------------------------x Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque.
The Ruling of the MTC
Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 (Joint Order), the MTC[12] initially
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a deferred ruling on petitioners motion for lack of indubitable ground for the
concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of quashing of the [I]nformations x x x. The MTC scheduled petitioners
or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners motion, the MTC
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 (Consolidated Order), granting
partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for
violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in
the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Article
91(B),[4] sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the [T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to mine
Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067),[5] Section 8[6] of Presidential tailings which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac
Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984),[7] Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to
Section 108[8] of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and
(RA 7942),[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.[11] condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the
Informations were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more
than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven
Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence
Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water
constitute legal excuse or justification. Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence necessary to
prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements constituting
violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining
Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other words, the same set
of evidence is required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of not guilty pleas on
parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid
laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining
Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of
Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067) should be Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order
violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners petition was
the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942). raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal
with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing
the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondents
appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondents motion, Branch 38
ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners petition in
Branch 94.
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of
the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for
[v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or
QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of
the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Ruling of Branch 94
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the
common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage
to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not the In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public
negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the
of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of
imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.[13] PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94
affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of
the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x.
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch
94s ruling. The appellate court held:
xxxx
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the
aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds
each crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not although they
stemmed from a single act.[15]
xxxx
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that [D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3,
Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations Rule 117].
for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC
proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac
and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2) the duplicitous
nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.[16] xxxx
Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained of in the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same
acts complained of in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public respondent
latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of
violation of Article 365 of the RPC.[17] their right against multiple prosecutions.
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that
would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing
respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the Informations against the petitioners
be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the context of the for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in
second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article
Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first 365 of the Revised Penal Code.[18]
sentence of the same section. x x x
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for
violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in character.
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that the
laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb
one another as the elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D.
require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, 1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE
although they stemmed from a single act. x x x MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR
INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU
DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
xxxx
The Issues
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single
Information charges more than one offense.[21]
The petition raises these issues:
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and confusing the accused in preparing his defense.[23] Here, however, the
prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of
contravenes People v. Relova. charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the
petition deserves outright denial.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. This contention is also without merit.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the
accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under
the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much charging one Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power
more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City
Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring,
mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not
which are mala in se.[29] because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but
because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and
a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22,
based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. We held:
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
absorbs the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice
it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those The petitioner concludes that:
violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is
criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are
the special laws enacting them. The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is
not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the
second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof
and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is
prosecution contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved
petitioners cite the Courts statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent which reads as follows:
harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5
November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Appeals.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. x x x
SO ORDERED.
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence
of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second ANTONIO T. CARPIO
sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth
the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not Associate Justice
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first
and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The WE CONCUR:
second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of
acts. x x x[30] (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied) Associate Justice
Chairperson
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 24547[1] that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the
Regional Trial Court[2] of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation
G.R. No. 157171 of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.[3]
Present: Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the
1995 senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato
R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, of Section 27(b). The information reads:
CARPIO, That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period
during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of
CARPIO MORALES, and Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal
TINGA, JJ. Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R.
Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel
Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully
PHILIPPINES, decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly
Respondents. disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159)
precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with
Promulgated: Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423
to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of
Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-
March 14, 2006 seven (5,077) votes.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal assigning the following as errors of the appellate court:
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused I
for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE
xxx RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT
5. And finally, on the person of ARSENIA B. GARCIA, the Court PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER
pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE
under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE
Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the II
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next
degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused ARSENIA B. ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT
GARCIA is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT
disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
suffrage.
III
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial
Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE
Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders from the court. ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE
CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. 7, WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT
No pronouncement as to costs. OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[5] IV
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS
modification the RTC Decision, thus, CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.[7]
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals judgment is erroneous,
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, increasing the minimum penalty imposed based on speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial
by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year. evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of
private complainant.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in xxx
the violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.[12] For
otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue
would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are
classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
criminal intent be valid defenses? unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or
decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently
immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646[11] provides: 1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were
tallied, the results thereof were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election of Canvassers for canvassing;
offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense: 2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was
then recorded in the Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as
xxx Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from the precincts and
accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the number
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers in the Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of Votes
who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in were filled up to reflect the votes received by each candidate in the 159
any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered
votes. 3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each
precincts were entered by accused Viray in the Statements of Votes, these
votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the use of likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7),
electrical adding machines. though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not
her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding COC.[18]
machine tapes were handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes
received by each candidate in the precincts listed in each Statement of
Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the proper column in the
Statement of Votes. Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of
Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit 6) and the COC reflected that
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As
accused Palisoc and de Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern was to
Statement of Votes. assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to
exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal
grand total was reflected was handed to appellant who reads the same and responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.[19]
accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the column for grand
total in the Statement of Votes.[14]
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by
Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any
subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b)
008422 was raised as an issue. of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a
candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision.[20]
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.[23] This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against respondent Baltazar
R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross
complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes received of ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of
6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly attributed the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense
to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country.
reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial,
it cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially when the Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an
error results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to another. Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his "commendable record as a
fearless prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila
on December 4, 1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the February 18, 1983; that at in the reorganization of the judiciary after the
Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction but increasing the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was reappointed to his present position;
minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is that his length of service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that
AFFIRMED. would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should be complainant),
whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only known to
him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by
SO ORDERED respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against him was filed
only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN complainant to subject respondent to harassment, humiliation and
vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits a copy (Annex A) as
Chief Justice part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of
rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned
decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for
the dismissal of the petition (should be complaint).
Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988
The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of
ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant, gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision
vs. in question. A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
Court of Pasay City Branch 113, respondent.
The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a A$ 17,425.00
tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard at the Manila
International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign Singapore Dollar
exchange instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a
customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9, 1986, while on board S$ 9,945.00
Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of
his apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency and Deutsche Marck
foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in
various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, DM 18,595.00
Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar,
English Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and Canadian Dollar
Hongkong Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At the time the
accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations CS 13,330.00
which he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in
previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, Hongkong Dollar
1986 for US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency
Declaration No. 06346, dated June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00. HK$ 15,630.00
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for HFL Guilder
violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960, as follows:
HFL 430.00
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the French Franc
above-named accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out of the Philippines through the F/6,860.00
Manila International Airport the following foreign currencies in cash and in
checks: US Dollar
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated: But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin criminal
responsibility on the accused. This is due to its steadfast adherence and
The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused devotion to the rule of law-a factor in restoring the almost lost faith and
wilfully violated Section 6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that the accused had erosion of confidence of the people in the administration of justice. Courts of
in his possession the foreign currencies when he was about to depart from Justice are guided only by the rule of evidence.
the Philippines did not by that act alone make him liable for Violation of
Section 6. The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of
the law in holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank
What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the
currencies out of the country was done the very intention. It is that which criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of
qualifies the act as criminal or not. There must be that clear intention to malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished
violate and benefit from the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the
of which is shown by overt acts of a person. respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free.
The accused at the time of his apprehension at the Manila International
The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him, Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted
tended to show that the accused had no wilfull intention to violate the law. foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without
According to the respondent in his decision: any specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law. At the time of
his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency
... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that the declarations in his possession. These were old declarations made by him on
currencies confiscated and/or seized from the accused belong to him and his the occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.
business associates abovenamed. And from the unwavering and
unequivocal testimonies of Mr. Templo and all of currencies in question came
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the respondent nonetheless chose findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of
to exonerate the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency he the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision
was bringing out of the country at the time he was apprehended by the "in good faith." His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct
customs authorities were brought into the Philippines by him and his alleged prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice.
business associates on several previous occasions when they came to the
Philippines, supposedly to be used for the purpose of investing in some He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the
unspecified or undetermined business ventures; that this money was kept in release to the accused of at least the amount of US$3,000.00, allowed,
the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to take the money according to respondent, under Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite
out as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the of the fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the
"attempted revolution" which occurred on July 6,1986 might spread. Such Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the information, which
fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of according to the respondent should be respected since the Bureau of
the accused under the information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture
"hook, line and sinker." It did not matter to the respondent that the foreign of the property involved in the alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central
currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of the Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the
accused when he was apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again
amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There is
declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not matter to the nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial
respondent that the accused by his own story admitted, in effect, that he was court to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the accused. According
a carrier" of foreign currency for other people. The respondent closed his to the above-cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the
eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of foreign exchange found Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of
in the possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension consisted of foreign exchange brought in by them; for the purpose of establishing such
personal checks of other people, as well as cash in various currency amount, tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more
denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which clearly belied the claim of than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare
the accused that they were part of the funds which he and his supposed their foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. In
associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of other words, CB Circular No. 960 merely provides that for the purpose of
investing in some business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or out of the
most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense at the trial Philippines, a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange
were declarations belonging to other people which could not be utilized by he is bringing in at the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the amount of
the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession. US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. There is nothing in
Although contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior, the said circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least
respondent judge chose to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused US$3,000.00, if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in
that he and his alleged business associates had brought in from time to time excess of said amount without specific authority from the Central Bank.
and accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign exchange (of very
substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge,
denominations) for the purpose of investing in business even before they Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law
knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific business venture in and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and
which they were going to invest. These and other circumstances which make consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper
administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining
the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it "(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver."[1]
is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the
service. All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the
entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms
branch of government service, including government-owned and/or and ammunitions under P.D. 1866[2] thru the following Information:[3]
controlled agencies or corporations.
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles,
This resolution is immediately executory. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
SO ORDERED. in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby
Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-
Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento Cortes, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., 32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-
concur. A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry and possess the same.
Padilla, Narvasa, JJ., took no part.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW."[4]
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,[5] but granted his
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT application for bail.[6] During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of
OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents. not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused,[7] upon advice of
counsel,[8] to make any plea.[9] Petitioner waived in writing his right to be
DECISION present in any and all stages of the case.[10]
FRANCISCO, J.: After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated
April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
found in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.: temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum".[11]
Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994.[12] Pending the appeal
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live in the respondent Court of Appeals,[13] the Solicitor-General, convinced that
ammunitions; the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a
motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining
(1) short magazine with ammunitions; petitioner's conviction,[14] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) "WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed
ammunitions; and decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond
posted by accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance ride on motorcycles (pp. 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While
Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero,
Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle
accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of might get into an accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In
Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant the local vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota
shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7, ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle
appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be immediately executory. The had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp.
herewith. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p. 8,
ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked 'oy ta na'
SO ORDERED."[15] signifying that Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995.[16] On August 9, "Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle
1995 he filed a "motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side
arrest)"[17] but the same was denied by respondent court in its September (pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic
20, 1995 Resolution,[18] copy of which was received by petitioner on group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the
September 27, 1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took
petition for review on certiorari with application for bail[19] followed by two out his radio and called the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine
"supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels,[20] a "second National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time Manarang completed
supplemental petition"[21] and an urgent motion for the separate resolution the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the
of his application for bail. Again, the Solicitor-General[22] sought the denial of general direction to the north (p. 11, ibid).
the application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a Resolution
promulgated on July 31, 1996.[23] The Court also granted the Solicitor- "Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle
General's motion to file a consolidated comment on the petitions and had hit somebody (p. 11, ibid).
thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply.[24] However, after his
vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the "He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant,
respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase
in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33,
a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying TSN, February 15, 1993). He called the Viper through the radio once again
for petitioner's acquittal.[25] (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA
777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the second radio
record and given credence by respondent court, is as follows:[26] call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to
apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City
"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near
and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja
Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle
heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the south approach of
Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, "SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN,
ibid). It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number
office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid). PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled
down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid).
from SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment,
was then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind the
1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to
Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to which appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p.
proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands
PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid). raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed (p.
15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand
the hit and run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja,
MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal papers, it would
but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant, SPO2
1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by
proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19,
passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets
Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles inside (p. 20, ibid).
coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and
informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon "While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO
learning that the two police officers already knew about the incident, Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12,
Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO
Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being
figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's arrested for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant
Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that the license plate the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and
hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his
followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the Abacan bridge. misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one
hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of baril ko' (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture
Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right
twelve (12) meters away from their position, the two police officers boarded pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned
their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated
and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant
the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid). could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine,
SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by
opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby
armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by
had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17- the 1987 Constitution.
21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant
answered angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado After a careful review of the records[27]of this case, the Court is convinced
modified the arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession that petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma,
of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per
Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a single round in its chamber
and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:[28]
Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional
long magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
ibid). After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto.
Rosario Street beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms and (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
TSN, July 13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant admitted possession
of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain, penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification stated transferred from one confinement to another.
that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite
rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed
and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated December 11, 1992 offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person.[29] Both
issued by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle
registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)." figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene."[30] As testified to by
confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the
Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be
order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense.
assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the
responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed
near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.[31] themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the
policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner,[38]
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the
that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit dented hood and railings thereof.[39] These formed part of the arresting
and run.[32] We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's
the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily
in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge
apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have and not on unreliable hearsay information.[40]
taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect
suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters
degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain his plea.[41] Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to
without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.[42]
with private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities
herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list and defects.[43]
of unreported and unsolved crimes.
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for
want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of
aid or take action.[33] The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit,[34] a property is valid,[44] are as follows:
fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime -
all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident.[35] 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section
The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court[45] and by prevailing jurisprudence[46],
had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant
of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.[36] Moreover, when 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47]
caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith &
Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest (a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a
peace officer.[37] (b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged
search and seizure[56], and that his failure to quash the information
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[48] estopped him from assailing any purported defect.[57]
3. search of a moving vehicle.[49] Highly regulated by the government, the Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was
activity.[50] effected, the police may undertake a protective search[58] of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle[59] which are within petitioner's
4. consented warrantless search, and grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense.[60] This satisfied
the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched
5. customs search. (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control[61]
and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.[62] The products of
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule.
authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In
even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible
prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.[51] The seizure of the when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The the proceeds of some criminal offense.[63]
same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which
was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted
the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat.[52] of violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to
Thus it has been held that: possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a
Mission Order[64] and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt.
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga,
offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their
duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be
taking of the corpus delicti."[53] established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain corresponding license or permit to possess.[65] The first element is beyond
view are subject to seizure even without a warrant."[54] dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions[66] were seized from
petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was
magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police.[55] This convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission
formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the Order and Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing
records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere before his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject
afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by
score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus: the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt were left at home, further compound their irregularity. As to be
"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner,
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were issued before the subject would grab the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and
firearms were seized and confiscated from him by the police officers in Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from the long and
Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence adduced indicate that the agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed long fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief
after appellant had been apprehended on October 26, 1992. of Staff, is explicit in providing that:
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his "VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement
authority to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police
investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without resentment to
ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him, present any avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
proper document showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the
Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those "IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential
documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the instruction will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an
preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is
prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject rendered inoperative in respect to such violation."[68]
firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial
presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have produced these which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not. He did not
even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms. The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt,
moreover, were ably controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt.
"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission
contain no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his
authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms. behalf.[69] His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
"Durembes."[70] In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices
"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under
James Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs.[71] PNP Supt.
was not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was not Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum
presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere
found Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source,
January 13, 1994."[67] petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking
in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio
City,"[72] areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby "If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed
needing prior approval "by next higher Headquarters"[73] which is absent in service), they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the
this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular
required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense compensation for the service they are rendering."
which pertinently provides that:
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated
"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without pieces of evidence is accentuated all the more by the testimony and
corresponding certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the firearms and
Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been officially taken Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms
up in that units property book, and that report of such action has been are not licensed or registered in the name of the petitioner.[76] Thus:
reported to higher AFP authority."
"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason find, if any?
why he cannot present the corresponding certification as well.
"A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the one 9 mm pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the
Director for Personnel of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of following firearms being asked whether it is registered or not, I did not find
Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the any records, the M-16 and the caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a
PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by firearm with the same serial number which is the same as that licensed
petitioner's counsel.[74] The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the and/or registered in the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear
and unambiguous, thus: "Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C.
Padilla is a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT
"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same 8214?
to carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular
plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and is "A. Yes, sir.
receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the
agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law "Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the
enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which names of the accused in this case?
specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and
that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its "A. Yes, sir.[77]
equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher
levels of command."[75] xxx xxx xxx
Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise And the certification which provides as follows:
provides as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
Sr. Inspector, PNP
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
Chief, Records Branch" [78]
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a
Camp Crame, Quezon City representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would
"PNPFEO5 28 November 1992 suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm.[79] In People vs. Tobias,[80] we reiterated that such
"C E R T I F I C A T I O N certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From
the foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The
certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence[81] that
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the
licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian,[82] as in the case of
number TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687. petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's
conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was
"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office presented, to depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and
per verification from available records on file this Office as of this date: respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect
and finality.[83]
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D.
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds
that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723 illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under
P.D. 1866 no longer exists.[84] He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and
35723Y, licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San excessive in contravention of the Constitution.[85]
Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the
"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles. respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of
appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed
"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO: only by subsequent ones.[86] Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law as it stands.[87] And until its repeal, respondent
(Sgd.) court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous
statutes adverted to by petitioner.
JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal
illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years
reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months
of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is
discernible from the following explanation by the Court:
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the "In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and alleged or proved, In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws
unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held explained in People v. Simon,[94] although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a
that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code,
oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the
the moral sense of the community' "[88] proper period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of
simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it
is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though "This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with
perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.[89] the rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under
the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the
burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period
appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify to reclusion temporal in its medium period.[95]
nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication,[90] as in this WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals
case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple
Court.[91] Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that
possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1)
. ."[92] Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day,
not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy as maximum.
or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of
Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or SO ORDERED
vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and
apply the laws. Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, concur.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by [G.R. No. 121179. July 2, 1998]
respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONINE B.
same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian[93] where the Court SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY, accused-appellant.
DECISION That in or about the month of December, 1991, and sometime prior to or
subsequent thereto, at Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of
VITUG, J.: Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to defraud ADELINE TIANGGE y
The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal recruiters" MARCOS and by means of deceit through false representations and
who would even go to the extent of issuing forged tourist visas to aspiring pretenses made by her prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
overseas contract workers. These unsuspecting job applicants are made to fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said
pay exorbitant "placement" fees for nothing really since, almost invariably, ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS, by then and there representing herself as a
they find themselves unable to leave for their purported country of duly authorized or licensed recruiter for overseas employment, when in truth
employment or, if they are able to, soon find themselves unceremoniously and in fact she was not, thereby inducing the said ADELINE TIANGGE y
repatriated. This Court once described their plight in a local proverb as being MARCOS to give and deliver to her the total amount of EIGHTEEN
naghangad ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawala.[1] THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P18,500.00), Philippine Currency, for
placement abroad and after having received it, she appropriated and
In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of misappropriated the same for her own use and benefit and despite repeated
La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10,[2] appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie demands made upon (her) to return the same, she refused, failed, neglected,
B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty beyond reasonable and still refuses, fails and neglects to comply therewith, all to the damage
doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the Revised Penal Code and prejudice of ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS in the total sum aforesaid.
and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed
by the Labor Code. "Contrary to law.[4]
Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code, five
Article 315, paragraph 2(1), of the Revised Penal Code. The cases (naming separate informations were also instituted against appellant on various dates.
the complainants and stating the amounts therein involved) include: (1) These cases (with the names of the complainants) include: (1) Criminal Case
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397[3] (Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00); (2) No. 92-CR-1396 (Francisco T. Labadchan); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 (Victoria Asil P33,000.00); (3) Criminal Case 1413 (Cherry Pi-ay); (3) Criminal Case No. 92- CR-1416 (Victoria Asil); (4)
No. 92-CR-1415 (Cherry Pi-ay P18,000.00); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR- Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and (5) Criminal Case
1426 (Corazon del Rosario P40,000.00); (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 No. 92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan). The typical information in these indictments
(Arthur Juan P24,200.00); (6) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644 (Alfredo C. read:
Arcega P25,000.00); (7) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 (Brando B. Salbino
P25,000.00); (8) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647 (Mariano Damolog That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and subsequent thereto at
P25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 (Lorenzo Belino Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and
P25,000.00); (10) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651 (Peter Arcega P25,000.00) within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
and (11) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 (Adeline Tiangge P18,500.00). then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit one ARTHUR JUAN
for overseas employment, by then and there ably misrepresenting herself as
Except for the name of the offended party, the amount involved and the date a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully knew
of the commission of the crime, the following information in Criminal Case it to be false but by reason of her said misrepresentations which were
No. 93-CR-1652 typified the other informations for the crime of estafa: completely relied upon by Arthur Juan, she was able to obtain from the latter
the total amount of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
(P24,200.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of Arthur
Juan in the total sum aforesaid. Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy Base in Pacdal,
Baguio City, was introduced to appellant by Crispin Perez. In September
"Contrary to Law.[5] 1991, the two went to the house of Conchita Tagle at Kilometer 3, La
Trinidad, Benguet, who was known to be recruiting workers for abroad. After
The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in Labadchan had expressed interest in applying for a job in Korea, Tagle told
large scale under Article 38, paragraph 1, of Presidential Decree No. 442 Labadchan to prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was to be paid that
(Labor Code), as amended, filed on 16 April 1993, read: month and the balance of P15,000.00 before his departure for abroad.
Labadchan paid Tagle the amount of P30,000.00 on 23 September 1991.
That in or about the months of August and September, 1992, in the Appellant, in turn, received that amount when she went to La Trinidad to
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the "brief" him. She told Labadchan that his flight would be on the 9th of October
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and 1991 and that he should have paid by then the balance of P15,000.00 of the
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit the following: PETER fees. He paid Tagle the P15,000.00 balance on 05 October 1991. When he
ARCEGA, LORENZO BELINO, MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL OPDAS, requested her to make a receipt, Tagle included the amount in the old receipt
BRANDO B. SALBINO, DEMBER LEON and ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for for the P30,000.00 previously given. Appellant handed over to Labadchan
overseas employment, by then and there misrepresenting herself as a duly some papers to fill up and gave last-minute instructions before she boarded a
authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she was not and by green-colored aircraft.
reason of her said misrepresentation which was completely relied upon by
the said complainants whom she recruited, either individually or as a group On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to Manila and stayed, as
amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale causing economic sabotage, so instructed by Tagle, at the Prince Hotel near the terminal of the Dangwa
she was able to obtain and received from them the aggregate total amount of bus company in Dimasalang, Manila. There, he met other people, among
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P175,000.00), them, his co-complainant Arthur Juan. In the morning of 09 October 1991,
Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of the foregoing Labadchan and the others were told to go to the airport with Tagle, where
complainants in the total sum aforesaid. appellant was supposed to give the travel papers including passports and
plane tickets for Korea. At the airport, however, appellant told the group that
"Contrary to law.[6] their flight had been re-scheduled for 11 October 1991. Labadchan returned
to Baguio City.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and
estafa. The criminal cases filed were raffled off to two (2) branches of the On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport only to be told this
Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later, however, the cases were consolidated time, however, that his passport was still with the Department of Foreign
at the instance of the prosecution. Affairs. Appellant told her husband to accompany Labadchan to the Foreign
Affairs office. When Labadchan received the passport, he saw that while his
Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she was soon picture appeared on it, the passport was made out in the name of a person
arrested by agents of the Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS"). from Negros Occidental. Labadchan had to imitate the signature on the
passport just so he could get it. Back at the airport, he was allowed inside the
The Evidence for the Prosecution. - terminal but only to be later sent out because the ticket he had was one
intended for passage from Korea and not to Korea. Asserting that he and
company were mere "chance passengers," appellant sent them all home with evidence that payment. Appellant, however, failed to return the rest of the
a promise that another departure date would be set. She also took back the promised refund.[8]
show money of US$1,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415
Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but nothing tangible
came out of her assurances. Finally, Labadchan was able to get appellant to Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop, Tublay, Benguet, was
promise that the money he had given her would be refunded. When this visited once in March 1991 by appellant who encouraged Cherry to apply for
promise neither materialized, Labadchan finally reported the matter to the work in a textile or a plastic factory in Korea with a monthly salary of
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"). In that office, appellant executed a US$800.00. Appellant told Cherry that the moment she would pay the
promissory note stating that she would return the amount of P46,500.00, amount of P45,000.00, she could be deployed in Korea. Cherry prepared her
which included the amount of P1,500.00 allegedly used for getting a bio-data and gave it to appellant at the latter's residence during the first week
passport, to Labadchan.[7] of April 1991.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416 Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after having paid the
total amount of P45,000.00. Appellant told her that a certain Ramil would
Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village, Roxas Street, meet her at the airport in Korea. When she arrived, a Filipina, named Marlyn,
Baguio City, heard from her elder sister, Feling Derecto, that appellant was instead met her. Marlyn introduced herself as appellants friend and
recruiting workers for abroad. During the second week of January 1992, she, accompanied Cherry to a certain house owned by a Korean. There, Cherry
along with her husband Gabriel, went to appellants house in Buyagan, La met, among other compatriots, Corazon del Rosario and Jane Kipas. Cherry
Trinidad. Appellant assured her that she could have a job in a factory in soon realized that she was not going to have a job in the factory promised by
Korea. Appellant asked for an advance fee of P25,000.00 of the P40,000.00 appellant. Instead, she was made to work for the Korean applying rugby on
agreed fee. Victoria gave appellant the "advance fee" on 13 January 1992 at and folding leather jackets. About a month later, men from the Korean
her (Victorias) shop in Shoppers Lane, Baguio City which appellant Immigration accosted her and the others. Brought in for questioning by
acknowledged by issuing a receipt for the amount. She told Victoria to be at Immigration officials, Cherry and her companions were informed that they
appellant's house in Buyagan after three weeks. were illegal workers. After the investigation, Cherry and her group were
allowed to go but on 08 August 1991, all were deported.
When Victoria went to appellants house as so directed, appellant told her
that her flight had been postponed supposedly because prior applicants had Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by appellant that they
to be accommodated first. Victoria met appellant seven more times only to be would get a refund of their money. Cherry executed a sworn statement
ultimately told that the latter had been allegedly fooled by the main office in narrating her experience in Korea.[9]
Manila. Appellant, nevertheless, demanded an additional P5,000.00 from
Victoria so that she could leave on 18 April 1992. Victoria gave appellant the Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherrys "boyfriend" who later was to become her
amount of P5,000.00 at her shop on 31 March 1992 for which appellant gave husband, corroborated Cherrys testimony that appellant first received
a corresponding receipt. P18,000.00 from Cherry. Thereafter, appellant also received P27,000.00
from Cherry, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of which amount came
When on 18 April 1992 still nothing happened, Victoria demanded from from him. In both instances, appellant signed receipts for the payments. The
appellant a refund. Appellant gave her an advance of P15,000.00. An receipts were among Cherry's papers confiscated in Korea.[10]
acknowledgment receipt with appellants signature affixed thereon would
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 in April 1991, Corazon withdrew P25,000.00 from the bank which she
likewise paid to appellant.[12]
Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48 Happy Homes,
Baguio City, had known appellant, an acquaintance, since 1980. One day in In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428
December 1990, she happened to chance upon appellant at a PLDT
telephone booth in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio City. Appellant, Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay, Benguet, first met
representing herself to be an authorized recruiter, tried to persuade Corazon appellant in her house at Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet, when he, together
to work abroad. Corazon showed interest. From then on, appellant would with Maxima Gomez, Tirso Gomez and Francisco Labadchan, went to see
visit Corazon in her brothers house in Kilometer 4. Ultimately, appellant was appellant who was said to be recruiting workers for Korea. Juan promptly
able to convince Corazon that, for a fee of P40,000.00, she could be sent to submitted his bio-data form after being told that he could work in a factory in
Korea. Corazon gave appellant the amount of P15,000.00. She paid the Korea at US$400.00 a month. Appellant quoted a processing fee of
balance of P25,000.00 in May 1991. The payments were both made in the P40,000.00. Juan initially paid the amount of P6,500.00 in April 1991. On 09
presence of Cherry Pi-ay and Jane Kipas. Appellant issued the October 1991, the scheduled date of the flight, Juan went to the airport and
corresponding receipts for these amounts. gave appellant another P15,000.00; the final balance of the fees were, by
their agreement, to be remitted to appellant on a salary deduction basis.
Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991. Appellant had instructed Appellant then told Juan that he could not leave on that day (09 October
Corazon, upon landing in Korea, to call up a certain Ramil. At the airport, 1991) because the airplane was already full. Appellant took back Juans
Corazon, including her companions among them Jane Kipas, kept on dialing passport, telling Juan that he should be able to depart in a few days.
the number but each time only a Korean woman would answer the call. Appellant, however, kept on rescheduling the flight for about five more times
Later, that evening, a certain Marlyn, who introduced herself as appellants until it became clear to Juan that he had been deceived. Juan paid out a total
friend, took them to a hotel. There, Marlyn took their show money of amount of P24,200.00, including the US$100.00 that would have been his
US$1,000.00. The group stayed overnight in the hotel and the following pocket money, to appellant. The latter executed receipts for the amounts.
morning, a Korean took them to a house proximately two hours away by car
from the airport. For about a month, they did nothing but apply rugby on Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the unfortunate incident.[13]
leather jackets, for which they were not paid, until a policeman arrived and
took all ten of them to the airport. All that the immigration and airport In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
personnel would tell them was that they should be thankful they were only
being repatriated home. Immigration and airport authorities confiscated Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao, Buguias,
everything that they had. Benguet, learned that appellant was recruiting workers for abroad. Adeline,
accompanied by her sister, went to see appellant at her house in Buyagan
At home, appellant promised to return Corazons money. Not having received some time in December 1991. There were others, like her, who also went to
the promised refund, Corazon went to the CIS stationed at Camp Dangwa see appellant. When she produced the required identification pictures and
where, on 28 July 1992, she executed her sworn statement.[11] P1,500.00 for passport processing, appellant told Adeline that she could be a
factory worker in Korea with a monthly salary of US$350.00. Appellant
Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in whose house the latter agreed to be paid by Adeline the additional P35,000.00 balance by
would stay whenever she was in Baguio, corroborated the testimony of installment. The first installment of P17,000.00 was paid on 15 February
Corazon that she gave to appellant the amount of P15,000.00, ten thousand 1992, evidenced by a receipt signed by Antonine Saley, with the remaining
pesos of which amount Corazon borrowed from Avelina, and that some time P18,000.00 being payable before getting on her flight for abroad.
when he learned that appellant had pending cases for illegal recruitment, he
Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her departure. Adeline, together also filed his own complaint and executed an affidavit before Atty. Justinian
with some other applicants, thrice went to appellants office at the Shoppers Licnachan.[15]
Lane to check. She also went to Dimasalang, Manila, in front of the Dangwa
terminal, for a like purpose. Appellant informed her that she just had to wait Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646
for her flight. Adeline, exasperated, finally demanded a refund of the amount
she had paid but appellant merely gave her P100.00 for her fare back to Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill, Baguio City, used
Benguet.[14] to be a "forester" of the DENR. In July 1992, he met appellant at her
Buyagan residence after his brother-in-law, Fidel Opdas, had said that she
-0- was recruiting workers for abroad. Appellant told him that she could help him
get employed in Taiwan with a P12,000.00 monthly salary. Salbino submitted
The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal various documents required by appellant. On 11 August 1992, Salbino paid
recruitment in large scale had been submitted to likewise constitute the appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang "temporary office" so
evidence to establish the People's case, respectively, in - that, according to her, his travel papers could be processed. The payment
was receipted. On 30 September 1992, he paid her another P15,000.00, for
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644 which appellant again issued an acknowledgment receipt.
Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M. Subdivision, Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When she failed to show
Baguio City, heard from a former co-worker, Fidel Opdas, that appellant was up, he went to appellants house in Buyagan to verify. She was not there. The
recruiting workers for overseas employment. Interested, he, in the company following week, he went to Manila with Fidel Opdas hoping to see her.
of his nephew, Peter Arcega, went to appellants house in Buyagan, La Appellant's whereabouts could not be determined. Having failed to locate
Trinidad. There, he met job applicants Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog and her, Salbino and his companions went to the POEA office in Magsaysay,
Brando Salbino. Appellant assured the group that they could get employed in Baguio City. It was at the POEA office that they were to learn that appellant
Taiwan for a monthly salary of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00. She told them that was not in the list of licensed recruiters. He, along with the others, then
the processing and placement fees would amount to P40,000.00 each. executed an affidavit-complaint before Atty. Licnachan.[16]
Arcega and his companions agreed.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in Dimasalang,
Manila. Appellant issued a cash voucher for the amount. She told Arcega to Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos Street, Baguio
just wait for the results. On 30 September 1992, appellant asked Arcega for City, went to appellants residence in Buyagan in July 1992 when informed by
another P15,000.00 which amount he paid. With him at the time were his Fidel Opdas, his co-worker at the MIDO Restaurant, that appellant was
nephew Peter Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog, Lorenzo recruiting workers for Taiwan. Appellant herself later told Damolog that she
Belino and Brando Salbino. Appellant issued a receipt and affixed thereon was licensed to recruit workers. He forthwith applied for a position at a
her signature. Appellant told Arcega that with the payment, his employment factory in Taiwan with a salary of between US$400.00 and US$500.00 a
abroad was assured. She stressed, however, that the balance of P15,000.00 month. He, after being required to pay a processing fee, paid the amount of
should be paid before his departure for Taiwan. After following up the matter P10,000.00 to appellant at her Manila office. Appellant gave him a cash
with appellant in October 1992 and then in December 1992, he finally gave voucher. Damolog was then supposed to just wait in Baguio City for a
up. Arcega went to the POEA office in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, and telegram.
the group agreed, appellant made them fill up and sign a bio-data form.
When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog went to Manila to see Appellant also made them understand that they would each have to pay her
what had happened to his application. Appellant was again told to simply the total amount of P40,000.00, P10,000.00 of which was to be forthwith paid
stand by in Baguio City. After several days, Opdas, who had meanwhile gone and the balance to be paid as and when everything would have been
to Manila, told Damolog to see appellant in Manila. In Manila, appellant told arranged for their flight to Taiwan.
Damolog to sign a bio-data form for screening purposes. Like Peter Arcega,
Fred Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, he was also asked to pay On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at
another P15,000.00. The group went back to Baguio City to raise the amount her Dimasalang office. Appellant issued a cash voucher therefor. Belino
of P15,000.00 each. On 30 September 1992, he, together with Fred and returned to Baguio City. Five days later, Belino went down to Manila after
Peter Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, returned to Manila. appellant had sent word that he had to come to Manila. On 30 September
Damolog handed over his P15,000.00 to appellant who issued an 1992, Belino paid in Manila the amount of P15,000.00 demanded by
acknowledgment receipt, signed by Annie Saley which, according to appellant. Appellant signed her name as Annie Saley on the receipt.
appellant, was her name. Appellant assured him that he would be among the Appellant informed Belino that he should wait for her telephone call regarding
first to go to Taiwan by December 1992. the schedule of his flight. He waited but when no calls came, Belino and
Opdas decided to visit appellant in her house in Buyagan. Appellant asked to
December 1992 came but no word was received prompting Damolog and his be given until January to deploy them in Taiwan. February 1993 came, and
companions to repair to appellants house in Buyagan. She was not home. still there was no news from appellant. In March 1993, Belino and others,
Damolog proceeded to Manila where appellant told him to wait a few more namely, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo
days. When still nothing happened, Damolog and his companions went to the Arcega,[18] decided to file a complaint against appellant with the POEA in
POEA office where Atty. Licnachan issued a certification stating that Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, where their sworn statements were taken.
appellant was not authorized to recruit workers. Damolog and his
companions filed a joint affidavit-complaint executed before Atty. Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651
Licnachan[17] against appellant.
Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 City, also paid the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant for a promised job
overseas. A cash voucher was signed by appellant to acknowledge the
Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet, payment. Peter, subsequently, also paid the amount of P15,000.00 to
was in Manila in August 1992 looking for employment. Fidel Opdas, a appellant for which the latter issued a receipt signed by Annie Saley. He was
companion in his trip to Manila, mentioned that perhaps appellant could help. among those who signed the affidavit-complaint before the POEA.
Belino saw appellant who then told him about the prospect of getting
employed in Taiwan. Appellant invited him to see her on 20 September 1992 Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645,[19] as a corroborative witness,
in Buyagan. Dembert Leon, a 25-year-old unemployed from 52-F Tandang Sora Street,
Baguio City, said that he, desiring to get an employment abroad, likewise
On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog, Fidel Opdas, Brando went to see appellant at her residence in Buyagan. Accompanied by Fidel
Salbino, Dembert Leon, Alfredo Arcega and Peter Arcega already in Opdas, Leon was told by appellant to complete the necessary papers,
appellants residence in Buyagan. Appellant asked P10,000.00 from each of including his bio-data, barangay clearance, ID and NBI clearance. Leon
them if they wanted her to be responsible for representing them to get applied to be a factory worker in Taiwan. He was assured a monthly salary of
themselves employed in Taiwan with a monthly income of P15,000.00. When P12,000.00, but first, appellant told him, he should commit to pay a
placement fee of P40,000.00 of which amount P10,000.00 had to be paid Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry went to see her
forthwith. Leon paid and a cash voucher, dated 08 September 1992, was again, this time asking for assistance in getting an employment in Korea. She
issued by appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid appellant another accompanied Cherry to the Dynasty Travel and Tours in Manila that enabled
P15,000.00 for which another acknowledgment receipt was issued. The her to get a tourist visa to Korea. Appellant herself later gave Cherry her
remaining P15,000.00 was agreed to be paid at the airport before his flight to tourist visa. For Cherrys visa and plane ticket, appellant received from Cherry
Taiwan. No further word came from appellant. Finally, in December 1992, P15,000.00 and US$250.00. Appellant issued a receipt therefor and
when he and the others called her up, appellant informed them to wait until delivered the amounts to the Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, issued
January 1993. January came and still nothing happened. In March 1993, her a receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in Manila confiscated that
Leon and the others went to the POEA office to lodge a complaint against receipt. In August 1991, Cherry came back and asked her to look for another
appellant.[20] travel agency saying she did not like the work she had in Korea.[23]
Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional Station Unit in Baguio Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship Recruitment Agency,
City, received a request for verification on whether or not appellant was a introduced Corazon del Rosario to appellant. Since the agency had already
licensed recruiter. In response, he advised that appellant was not authorized been closed, appellant referred Corazon to Mannings International in Kalaw
to recruit in the City of Baguio and in the region from 1989 to the present. Street, Ermita, Manila. Corazon was able to leave for Abu Dhabi where she
Atty. Matias issued a certification to that effect. worked as a domestic helper. In 1991, Corazon again sought appellant's
assistance in getting an employment in Korea. Appellant introduced her to
-0- Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, helped Corazon get a tourist visa
for Korea. She did ask for P15,000.00 and US$250.00 from Corazon but
The Case for the Defense. - these amounts, being for Corazons ticket and hotel accommodation, were
turned over to Dynasty Travel and Tours. She also knew that Corazon was
The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the able to leave for Korea because she herself handed over to Corazon her
complainants in applying for overseas employment with duly accredited tourist visa and ticket. Appellant received P2,000.00 from Dynasty Travel and
travel agencies for and from which she derived a commission.[21] Tours by way of commission. She was also issued a receipt by that travel
agency showing that she had turned over to it the amounts received from
According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer of Corazon but the CIS men took the receipts and other documents from her.
the Friendship Recruitment Agency from 1983 to 1986. In that capacity, she When Corazon returned home in 1991 after going to Korea, she again
would submit to the POEA contracts for processing job orders for applicants sought appellants help in looking for a travel agency that could assist her in
and assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport. When the licensed going back to that country.[24]
agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio where she engaged in the
purchase and sale of vegetables and flowers. Even then, however, she Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable vendor named
would not hesitate extending help to applicants for overseas employment by Maxima Gomez. He asked her for help in securing a tourist visa. Appellant
recommending licensed agencies which could assist said applicants in going was able to assist him and others, like Francisco Labadchan, Tirso Gomez
abroad. She named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings and Romeo Balao, by referring them to the Dynasty Travel and Tours.
International as such licensed agencies. She had, in the process, been able Appellant asked from them the amounts of P15,000.00 and US$250.00
to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan and which she turned over to the travel agency. Again, she was issued a receipt
Francisco Labadchan to name some, sent abroad.[22] by that agency but that, too, was confiscated by the CIS agents who arrested
her. Of the men who sought her help in going abroad, seven "were able to
leave. The others had been re-scheduled to leave but they failed to arrive at
the airport. Fidel Opdas was appellants client at the Friendship Agency who was able to
leave for Saudi Arabia. He asked her if she could find a job for him in Taiwan.
Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week of January 1993. When appellant told him that she knew someone who could help, Opdas
She gave them back the plane ticket and the amount of US$250.00 so that brought along Mariano Damolog. Appellant introduced them to Marites Tapia
they could ask for a refund from the travel agency. The next time she saw and Carol Cornelio of Dynasty Travel and Tours who told Opdas and
Labadchan was at the NBI office when NBI Director Limmayog invited her for Damolog to submit the necessary documents for their application for work in
questioning. Appellant tried her best to look for a job for Labadchan but the Taiwan. In May 1993, Opdas returned with Brando Salbino who also talked
transaction she had with Fast International failed to push through.[25] to Marites and Carol. Opdas submitted to appellant the documents required
by Marites and Carol. Appellant, in turn, gave the papers to Marites and
Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The latters sister was a Carol. When, later, Opdas went to see appellant, he brought along Dembert
former client at the Friendship Recruitment Agency who was able to work in Leon and Lorenzo Belino. Appellant requested Opdas to accompany the two
Saudi Arabia in 1985. She introduced Victoria to the Dynasty Travel and to Marites and Carol with whom they discussed what would be necessary
Tours. Appellant asked Victoria to advance P15,000.00 and US$250.00 for "for their application for Taiwan. Still later when Opdas came back with Peter
her ticket and hotel accommodation. Victoria gave appellant the amount, and and Alfredo Arcega to see appellant, she again referred them to Marites and
the latter issued corresponding receipts. She turned over the amount to the Carol. The job applicants each gave appellant P10,000.00 which the latter
travel agency which, in turn, issued a receipt to appellant. The CIS, however, turned over to Marites and Carol. The two gave her receipts but these were
confiscated all the documents in her attache case.[26] Appellant was able to in the same attache case that was seized by the CIS agents and never
process Victorias visa for Korea but when someone informed the latter that returned. The group subsequently withdrew their applications although it was
she could have a visa for Taiwan, Victoria opted to change her destination. only Opdas who received a P15,000.00 refund.[29]
Appellant told Victoria that her visa and ticket for Korea had already been
obtained but Victoria insisted on a refund of her money. Appellant returned to In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away her attache case
her P15,000.00 that was supposed to be the amount to be exchanged into containing documents that could bail her out of the charges, appellant
dollars for her show money. Victoria issued a receipt for the amount but presented Danilo A. Deladia, one of the three policemen who arrested her.
appellant entrusted it to her former lawyer. Appellant handed over the plane Equipped with a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Luis Dictado of Branch 8,
ticket to Victoria.[27] the policemen went to the house of appellants cousin at 2320-B San Antonio,
Sampaloc, Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25 August 1993. According to Deladia,
Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to Adeline Tiangge. When however, they did not get anything from appellant because their mission was
Adeline said that she was interested in securing a tourist visa for Korea, only to arrest her. At the counter intelligence branch of the CIS, he did not
appellant took her to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked from even hear appellant requesting for the return of a brief case.[30] Apparently
Adeline the amount of P17,000.00 for her plane ticket. Appellant was able to because of what had turned out to be Deladias adverse testimony, the
buy a plane ticket and to get a passport for Adeline. The latter, however, later defense presented George Santiago who claimed to be at the boarding
said that she was no longer interested in going to Korea and that her house when appellant was arrested. Santiago said that he had allowed the
passport application should, instead, be diverted to Hongkong. In fact, CIS agents to enter the boarding house. Santiago did not see what might
Adeline was able to leave for Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against have happened in appellant's room but what he did see was that when the
appellant because when Adeline sought a refund from Dynasty Travel and agents all came out, they had with them an attache case. Santiago,
Tours, the agency only gave her P5,000.00 or just a half of the P10,000.00 accompanied by his cousin Atty. Lomboan, went to the CIS in Camp Crame
she wanted.[28] where one of the men asked P50,000.00 for the release of appellant.
Santiago did not see any brief case in the office but one of the men told them believe, the "self-serving" claim of appellant that her brief case, supposedly
that they would "produce" appellant and the attache case if they could containing receipts of her remittances to the travel agencies, was confiscated
"produce" the amount of P50,000.00.[31] by the CIS and remained unaccounted for. The trial court concluded:
On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that the P50,000.00 was In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had the
meant for bonding purposes and that they did not make a formal request for ability to send the complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby
the release of the brief case.[32] employing false pretenses to defraud them. This was despite her knowing
very well that she was not legally authorized. The complainants willingly
The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully, the responsibility parted with their money in the hope of overseas employment deceitfully
for the crime from appellant to Maritess and Carol. Presented at the witness promised them by the accused. What makes matters worse is that these
stand was Oscar Gaoyen, a 30-year-old farmer, who testified that appellant amounts given to the accused come from hard-earned money, or worse,
had failed to assist him in going to Korea to work because it was difficult. could have been borrowed from money lenders who have no qualms about
While following up his application in Manila, he met Marites and Carol in front collecting usurious interest rates. Complainants who faithfully relied on the
of the Dangwa station in Dimasalang and he was told that they knew accused did not hesitate to painstakingly raise or even beg or borrow money
someone who could "transfer his application to Taiwan." He said that even just so they could give a decent future to their families even to the extent of
after he had paid appellant P50,000.00, nothing happened constraining him leaving them for far-off lands. But now, all their dreams are gone, their hopes
to file charges against her. Appellant returned P15,000.00 of the money to shattered. Some may not have even been able to pay back what they
him.[33] borrowed nor recoup their losses. Now, more than ever, their future appears
bleaker. But this time, a glimmering light appears at the end of the tunnel as
Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its decision, a Motion the Court steps in to lay down the iron fist of the law so as to serve the
to Reopen Trial with an urgent motion to defer promulgation on the ground of accused a lesson, a bitter one, with the hope that those who are trekking or
newly discovered evidence.[34] In its order of 03 March 1995, the trial court, those who are about to trek the same pilfered path that the accused took will
noting that the newly discovered evidence consisted of affidavits of reconsider their pursuits before it would be too late, and in the end, this form
desistance of seven complainants, found no merit in the motion. It held that of fraud which invariably victimizes the poor will forever be stopped.[36]
presentation of the same does not give valid ground for possible amendment
of the decision as the private complainants had already testified. It agreed All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:
with the prosecutor that the affidavits of desistance only (had) the effect of
satisfying the civil liability.[35] WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned cases, the Court finds accused
Antonine B. Saley, also known as Annie B. Saley, GUILTY beyond
The Judgment of the Trial Court. - reasonable doubt of the corresponding crime as charged in the informations
and hereby sentences her in each case, except in Criminal Case NO. 93-CR-
On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant 1645 where an indeterminate sentence is not applicable, to suffer an
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It found implausible indeterminate sentence for the duration hereunder given, and to pay the
appellants claim that she was merely an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours costs, as well as the damages due the private complainants, to wit:
and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she claimed were true,
said the court, appellant could have presented her principals; instead, that "Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
failure exposed her to the adverse inference and legal presumption that
evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced. It also found hard to
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as
MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual "Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as
damages, plus costs. MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages,
plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426
"Imprisonment from Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and Twenty-One (21)
Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Seven (7) Years, Four (4) "Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months and Eleven (11) Days
Months and One (1) Day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years, Five (5) Months and
Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs. Eleven (11) Days of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del
Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as
MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus "Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as
costs. MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) "Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21)
Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months
and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay the
Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs. costs.
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) "Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21)
Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months
and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay
Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs. Alfredo C. Arcega P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as "To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred
MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
costs. insolvency, and to pay the costs. She shall also pay Twenty-Five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) each to Peter Arcega, Lorenzo Belino, Mariano
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425
Damolog, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega for actual "With respect to accused Conchita Tagle in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-CR-
damages, plus costs. 1396 and 92-CR-1397, let these cases be sent to the files without prejudice
to their revival as soon as she shall have been arrested and brought to the
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 jurisdiction of this Court.
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) "In order that Conchita Tagle may not escape the clutches of the law, let
Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months Alias Warrants of Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Chief of Police, La
and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Trinidad, Benguet and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila
Brando B. Salbino P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs. and in Baguio City. Further, the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID), Manila is ordered to include her name in the its Hold-Departure List.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
"SO ORDERED.[37]
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21)
Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that the
and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay trial court had erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining
Mariano Damolog P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs. witnesses and in finding her guilty of the crimes charged despite the "failure"
of the prosecution to fully establish the elements of the crimes beyond
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 reasonable doubt.[38] Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court, on 03
April 1995, denied a reconsideration of its decision.[39] The following day,
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) appellant filed a notice of appeal.[40] The trial court gave due course to the
Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months appeal on 17 April 1995.[41]
and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay
Lorenzo Belino P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs. The Instant Appeal. -
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651 Appellant continues to profess before this Court her innocence of the
accusation. She reiterates her assertion that the trial court has erred in giving
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her
Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the various offenses she has been
and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter charged with by the prosecution.[42] She avers that her transactions with the
Arcega P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs. complainants have been limited to her assisting them secure their respective
travel visa specifically for tourist and that her assistance to them (has been)
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 only to refer them to travel agencies such as the Dynasty Travel and Tours
and the Mannings International. She insists that she has remitted the
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) amounts solicited from the complainants to the travel agencies, or to
Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio, earning only the commissions for bringing
and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay in clients interested in getting tourist visas.[43]
Adeline Tiangge y Marcos P17,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal involves the conviction of promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
appellant not only for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale for which engaged in recruitment and placement.
the penalty of life imprisonment is imposed but also for other offenses for
which lesser penalties have been meted by the trial court upon appellant. Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals in criminal cases
directly from the Regional Trial Courts when the penalty imposed is reclusion 1) That the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to
perpetua or higher.[44] The Rules of Court, allows, however, the appeal of enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
criminal cases involving penalties lower than reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment under the circumstances stated in Section 3, Rule 122, of the 2) That the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus - recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34.[46]
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but involving Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of
offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same the Labor Code shall be liable under Article 38(a) thereof.[47] The proviso in
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of Article 13(b) lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in
death or life imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of appeal in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective
accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section. workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be
engaged in the act of recruitment and placement.[48] The article also
In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed by appellant, the trial court provides that recruitment includes the act of referral or the act of passing
has directed that the entire records of the seventeen cases should be along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of
forwarded to this Court.[45] It might be observed that this appeal, which has a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement
been assigned only one docket number, involves cases, although spawned officer or bureau.[49]
under different circumstances could be said to somehow be linked to the
incident giving rise to the case for illegal recruitment in large scale. The The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the law
cases have thus been correctly consolidated and heard jointly below. The against illegal recruitment.
appeal made directly to this Court of the seventeen cases, each of which
incidentally should have been assigned a separate docket number in this The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that appellant
Court, is properly taken. did represent herself as being in a position to get for the aspiring overseas
contract workers good-paying jobs abroad. Appellant was thus able to
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment activity demand and receive various amounts from the applicants. The latter would
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority. Recruitment is then be briefed by appellant on the requirements for employment overseas.
defined by Article 13, paragraph (b), of the same Code as referring - Appellant herself testified, thus:
x x x to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment Agency and
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, before you were put to jail did you have any occupation?
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or "A Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila for resale.
"Q Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in Manila did you have "A Mannings International is a licensed agency and Dynasty Travel and
any other source of income? Tours is licensed to issue tickets for applicants to go abroad.
"A Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested to go abroad and "Q You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for
asked if I know some agencies who can assist them to go abroad. applicants going abroad what do you mean by applicants going abroad?
"Q Were you able to assist some people to look for an agency to assist them "A Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who are ready to leave
to go abroad? for abroad and they are being issued tickets.
"A Yes, sir. "Q Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas worker-
applicants?
"Q Were you being paid when you assist these people applying for overseas
employment? "A Yes, sir.
"Q By whom? "A Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan, Francisco Labadchan and
others. (Underscoring supplied.)[50]
"A The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.
Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants only in
"Q What are the names of these agencies which you know? acquiring for them plane tickets and tourist visas. On cross-examination,
however, she admitted that she had made referrals of job applicants to
"A Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International. recruitment agencies.[51] She evidently knew all along that the persons she
was dealing with were applicants for employment abroad.
"x x x x x x x x x.
The law requires that the above activities of appellant should have first been
"Q Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings authorized by the POEA.[52] Rule II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and
International is duly licensed by the government to recruit applicants abroad? Regulations Governing Overseas Employment provides:
"A Yes, sir. "The approval may be issued upon submission of or compliance with the
following requirements:
"Q Where is that?
"a. Proposed appointment or special power of attorney;
"b. Clearances of the proposed representative or agent from NBI;
Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any
"c. A sworn or verified statement by the designating or appointing person or discernible shadow of doubt that appellant is indeed guilty of illegal
company assuming full responsibility for all acts of the agent or recruitment on various counts. Being neither a licensee nor a holder of
representative done in connection with the recruitment and placement of authority to recruit, appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor
workers. Code the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than
eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00
"Approval by the Administration of the appointment or designation does not or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. In imposing
authorize the agent or representative to establish a branch or extension the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application of
office of the licensed agency represented. the circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an accused
cannot be considered, these provisions being inapplicable to special
"Any revocation or amendment in the appointment should be communicated laws.[58]
to the Administration. Otherwise, the designation or appointment shall be
deemed as not revoked or amended. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[59] whenever the offense is
punishable by a special law, the court shall impose on the accused an
The claim that appellant did not categorically represent herself as a licensed indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
recruiter, or that she merely helped the complainants secure tourist visas, maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
could not make her less guilty of illegal recruitment,[53] it being enough that minimum term prescribed by the same."[60] Accordingly, in imposing the
he or she gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit workers penalty of four (4) years to six (6) years on appellant for each of the five
for deployment abroad.[54] cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court has acted correctly.
The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving Cherry Pi-ay and Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is perpetrated against three
Corazon del Rosario, only the complainant in each of the cases, have or more persons "individually or as a group." Its requisites are that: (1) the
testified against appellant in the illegal recruitment cases does not thereby person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities
make the case for the prosecution weak. The rule has always been that the as so defined by law, (2) the same person does not have a license or
testimony of witnesses is to be weighed, not that the witnesses be authority to do that, and (3) the questioned act is committed against three or
numbered, and it is not an uncommon experience to have a conclusion of more persons.[61] The prosecution has been able to successfully show that,
guilt reached on the basis of the testimony of a single witness.[55] for a fee, appellant, not being authorized to recruit workers for abroad, did so
Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 against seven complainants. For this
the suspicion that the witness has perjured himself or that his observations offense, Article 39(a) of the Labor Code imposes the penalty of life
have veered from the truth.[56] imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). This
penalty was thus likewise aptly meted out upon appellant by the trial court.
The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a criminal
case for illegal recruitment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the
it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause. As long as the punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum
prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
accused has involved himself in an act of illegal recruitment, a conviction for conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to
the offense can very well be justified.[57] warrant conviction.[62] Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a),[63] of the Revised
Penal Code, the elements of the offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the
has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum
offended party or third person.[64] Clearly, these elements have sufficiently penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
been shown in the cases under review. anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to
the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances
The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first to fourth are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
paragraphs, of the Revised Penal Code as follows: indeterminate sentence.
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision "The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with the rule
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. lower would then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months x x x."[66]
if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos; The Court reiterates the above rule; however, in fixing the maximum term,
the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum period to prision
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision mayor minimum period should be divided into "three equal portions of time,"
correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period; hence -
not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
Minimum Period Medium Period Maximum Period
"4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not
exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be From 4 years, 2 months From 5 years, 5 months From 6 years, 8 months
committed by any of the following means: x x x."
and 1 day to 5 years, and 11 days to 6 years, and 21 days to 8 years
In the case of People vs. Gabres,[65] the Court has had occasion to so state
that - 5 months and 10 days 8 months and 20 days -
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty in consonance with Article 65,[67] in relation to Article 64,[68] of the Revised
shall be `that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be Penal Code.
properly imposed' under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be
`within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed' for the offense.
When the amount involved in the offense exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty
prescribed in Article 315 of the Code "shall be imposed in its maximum In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant defrauded Corazon del
period," adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 although the total Rosario in the amount of P40,000.00, appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. The maximum penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
penalty should then be termed as prision mayor or reclusion temporal as the correccional medium to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
case may be. In fine, the one year period, whenever applicable, shall be (21) days of prision mayor minimum.
added to the maximum period of the principal penalty of anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant fraudulently solicited the
amount of P24,200.00 from Arthur Juan, appellant shall pay him actual
Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by the complainants damages in that amount and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from
who individually charged appellant with illegal recruitment, the applicable one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days (imposed by the
penalties would, respectively, be, as follows: court a quo) of prision correccional minimum period to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant defrauded Francisco T.
Labadchan in the amount of P45,000.00, two years for the additional amount In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant defrauded Adeline
of P23,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be Tiangge the amount of P18,500.00, appellant shall pay her the same amount
added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision as actual damages and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (or added to anywhere year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional
from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years). As such, aside from paying minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages, the Court correccional maximum.
deems it proper to sentence appellant to the indeterminate penalty of three
(3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has successfully
medium to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of established its case against appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale.
prision mayor medium. Evidently banking on her reputation in the community as a job recruiter,
appellant was able to make the seven complainants believe that they could
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded Victoria Asil in the land various jobs in Taiwan. Confident of her assurances, each complainant
amount of P15,000.00. Hence, aside from paying Victoria Asil the amount of parted with P25,000.00 for supposed processing and placement fees.
P15,000.00 by way of actual damages, appellant shall also suffer the
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in large
days of prision correccional medium to five (5) years, five (5) months and scale, only five[69] of them filed separate charges of estafa against appellant.
eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accordingly, appellant was only and could only be held liable for five counts
of estafa arising from the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant defrauded Cherry Pi-ay in appellant collected the amount of P25,000.00 from each of the five (5)
the amount of P18,000.00, appellant, besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that victims, she must be held subject to the penalty in its maximum period or
amount by way of actual damages, shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty prision mayor in its minimum period (not any higher on account of the fact
of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision that the amount in excess of P22,000.00 provided for by Article 315 of the
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days Revised Penal Code is less than P10,000.00).[70] Applying the
of prision correccional maximum. Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no attending circumstances,
appellant shall bear, the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) and one (1) day of prision correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium as seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor
minimum penalty to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days minimum period as MAXIMUM.
of prision mayor minimum as maximum penalty for each offense. In addition,
appellant should pay the five (5) victims the amount of P25,000.00 each as 5) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
actual damages. indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to diminution or years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
cancellation should it be shown that appellant had already paid the period as MAXIMUM.
complainants.
6) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications hereunder years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
specified, and only to the extent thereof, in the following cases: period as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by
way of actual damages.
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from three (3) years, six (6) months 7) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium period as indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
MINIMUM, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
prision mayor medium period as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages. period as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando Salbino the amount of P25,000.00
by way of actual damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one 8) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
way of actual damages. period as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog the amount of P25,000.00
by way of actual damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one 9) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
period as MAXIMUM. years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino the amount of P25,000.00
4) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426, accused-appellant is sentenced to an by way of actual damages.
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from two (2) years, four (4) months
10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) REGALADO, J.:
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November
way of actual damages. 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is sentenced to an 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge the amount of P17,000.00 laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.1
by way of actual damages.
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after
The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396, No. 92-CR- his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
1413, No. 92-CR-1416, No. 92-CR-1425, and No. 92-CR-1427, all for illegal Pampanga where he was temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He
recruitment, as well as No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale, voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference,3 after which trial on the
except for the award of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages to Dember merits ensued and was duly concluded.
Leon (no estafa case having been instituted), are DELETED, either because
similar awards have already been provided for by the trial court, or for I
insufficiency of proof, in the estafa cases aforenumbered.
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified
Costs against accused-appellant. as a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa"
SO ORDERED. at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante,
Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur. formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio
Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994 money from Bustamante, the team, together with their informant, proceeded
to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential
vs. informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent. appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the
affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags
and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant. Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon,
fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, appellant came back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-
who was the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal.8
then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas
on board a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts,
Pejoro as the investigator.4 claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching
television with the members of his family in their house when three persons,
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance
that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he that they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment,
was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to
appellant.5 Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route.
While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the other members, camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was
that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He did not boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then
actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented
his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise to him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves,
the one who conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro.
latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel.6 suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the
NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he
Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting therein the proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias,
confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted
Pejoro likewise informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana
the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined
P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put for three days.9
"two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction
since they were the ones who were personally and directly involved in the Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was
purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant.7 hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain
and vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn
5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and the results were Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital,
practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but
also did not find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant. The her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's
next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury,
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara abrasion or contusion on his body.11
discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and
rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the weight and is more entitled to credence.
penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to
pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the
ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.12 utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion
and abuse.19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not
lower court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team
not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" before the
(Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to
convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.13 them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed
their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the
evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea bags of findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over
marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been
subsequently from his possession,14 the latter not being in any way framed,22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it
connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered all, appellant was caught
four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited
presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have
bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate plausibly done so.
and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which
separate offense is not charged herein.16 When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the
then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist
and unmistakably established.17 To sell means to give, whether for money therein,23 confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the
or any other material consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and
beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.25
exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost,
parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea
engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do
prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of
two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the
creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his testimony was same.26
amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward,
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act
marijuana will not really matter since such is not an element of the offense punishes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
marijuana was confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even, assuming prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions."30 The
arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary
marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor technique for identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by
matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution other species of evidence.
evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty.27 Besides, there
was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any
that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of
appellant, but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not
the investigator of their unit. reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or police
authorities.31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a
confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of
to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in
satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows: flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the
obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting
such operation you do not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report
as to determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold of the prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension. Said Booking
object? Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for
selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves."
we are lacking that kind of material in our office since that item can be Below these remarks was affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner,
purchased only in Manila and only few are producing that, sir. the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by
appellant wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from
xxx xxx xxx him.33
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits
CIS, as well as the office of NICA? inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents are
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial
request for that powder because they, themselves, are using that in their own investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
work, sir.29 records to show that he was assisted by counsel.34 Although appellant
manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of
bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be
extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily
evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is
easily be concocted to implicate a suspect. that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had
been suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even corroborated
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48
cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his criminal
participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went
the consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens the moment to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention there.49
the buyer receives the drug from the seller.38 In the present case, and in Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file
light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity
peradventure of doubt. to do so50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to him.
Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana fabrication.
to a total stranger.39 We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the
doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were
place.40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a determined to arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's
total stranger,41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the arrest was only the culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from
buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and society and it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the
delivery of the marijuana leaves.42 While there may be instances where very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could
such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by
the accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience
exceptional particulars are not present in this case. necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails additional
questions of law which we shall now resolve.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental
torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape from Camp II
Olivas the night he was placed under custody.43 This he asserts to support
his explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier discussed The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication
were supposedly obtained by force and coercion. of the case at bar, are to this effect:
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No.
to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby
but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and amended to read as follows:
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.44
The evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of xxx xxx xxx
maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution45 and the other for the
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit
Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be of the Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by force of Article
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws.54 The
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses
transactions. since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of
the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or
xxx xxx xxx falsification.55
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary
follows: question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited
Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses under case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any . . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring
of the following quantities: the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons
accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice
xxx xxx xxx were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not
the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana prescription of the crime and the penalty.
xxx xxx xxx If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced
penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice,
penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the
upon the quantity. matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of
habeas corpus.56
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of
four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, 2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable
stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid
inquiry would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty craftsmanship.
provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now
further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable
transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the
Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each
more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed
the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the
depending upon the quantity. modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that
component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the
penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context
maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons
also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second
grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other paragraph be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or
prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty
such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law,57 we proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity
hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be
involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor;
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. and 500 to
This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all 749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a
doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused. conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at
grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but, again,
paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
shall be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug
involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a 4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question
Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them is whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to
being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of
maximum period.58 mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability
should be taken into account.
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating
Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and
shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases,
transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws
involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of
thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for
those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory
special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time
maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during the
aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the American regime.
period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal
of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given Code and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance,
supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter Commonwealth Act No. 30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and
were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code
to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by
where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the section one of this Act, shall prima facie be considered a fraud committed by
special law against, such supplementary application. such employer against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses
similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be
and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually punished in the same manner as therein provided.63
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein
of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved were specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and
speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto
later. mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the
correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion
64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or perpetua or death.
aggravating circumstance.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less
changes in the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, when
necessary. committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things;
not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the committed with violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon
United States but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal
things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of Revised Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein
the carnapped vehicle is killed. that —
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law
are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the
Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and
application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not
provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear
Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear. that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code,
with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised
Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable,
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the
Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties
other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving
stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act
No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation. . . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the where the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the
correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application of the
statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the provisions of the Code . . . .
Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains
1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application of the penalty
thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be guided by the rules
the statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application of
under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of experience in
absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold the administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.)66
otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an
integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs
could never have been the intendment of Congress. Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and
prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more
Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of
was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the all attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise,
the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained. appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the
lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent
applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
rational limits. correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than
determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to
of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. Congress.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more
ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the 6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses
mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him
penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not
64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as
penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The more
Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
contemplated by the legislature. ascertained.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence
penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is
paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of
If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, said that the "offense is punished" under that law.
however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must
each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate
public censure remain in the scale. sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary because of the
nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not
included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code,
hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related
therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the
provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in
examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
noted, this holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that
contemporanea expositio.69 prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming
ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. with laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.71
7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code
in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of
fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.72
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a
at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement.73 It does not
in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue
determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only
1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished the period when the convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact,
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the his release on parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof,
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be or his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly served the minimum sentence.
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should
the offense." (Emphasis ours.) be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto
mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the
Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1
Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with day of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve
regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the
"persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life judicial teapot.
imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is the penalty actually
imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law,70 and that reclusion ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of
perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin
imprisonment". Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should
be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision
under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have correccional, as the maximum thereof.
should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
SO ORDERED. which directs that:
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Mendoza, JJ., concur. Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
Bellosillo, J., is on leave. view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised
Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A.
No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as
punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate
Separate Opinions Sentence Law.
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The
reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised imposes a penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of
Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the
No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an
punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code.
Sentence Law.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses
Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that: related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised
Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of
than the minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied). penalties to principals, accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.),
complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into others. We cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent
account in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses posture which is extremely hard to justify.
punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other
laws (or special laws). I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of
the penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make an offense under the
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code.
penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of
PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the the Dangerous Drugs Act is prision correccional, then, applying the
Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on the
punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in accused should be that whose minimum should not be less than the
Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof. minimum prescribed by the special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not
lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.
II privileged mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised
Penal Code), or under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Penal Code. Yet, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor,
Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three regardless of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only
distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion be reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction
temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, each beyond prision correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is
should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next prision correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed.
as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that
under the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary
quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of because within the same second paragraph involving the same range of
exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68,
purpose of Section 20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the disallowance,
penalties shall be considered as a principal penalty depending on the viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is
quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended
circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper by R.A.
period of the component penalty shall then be fixed. No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by
providing quantity as basis for the determination of the proper penalty and
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is
grams) the proper principal penalty should be prision correccional, but there unfair because an accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE
is one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be dangerous
imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the drugs — say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be
majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares: imposed would be reclusion temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum because of
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even possession of only one (1) gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of be imposed is prision correccional — would not be entitled to a reduction
penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than thereof even if he has the same number of privileged mitigating
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in circumstances as the former has.
the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of
event be prision correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug the accused, then he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty as a matter of
offenses. right pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one
the drugs involved — by two degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of
two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
present (paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if there is a
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines,
exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping with one another,
by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the
committed. United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND
penalty next lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P9,075.55),
the proper period. payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that
they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way
to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another. of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation
of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored
Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur. for the reason that the account of the accused with the United Coconut
Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage
[G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005] and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[2]
respondent.
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and
DECISION 7070 are similarly worded, except for the allegations concerning the number,
date and amount of each check, that is:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,[1] dated May in the amount of P12,730.00;[3]
17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the
Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 (b) Criminal Case No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in
of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of the amount of P8,496.55.[4]
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26,
The factual background of the case is as follows: 1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.[5]
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam.
with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information He testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico[6] and Evangeline Ladonga
in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows: became his regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City,
Bohol;[7] sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55
loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check
No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;[8] 3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each
sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May of them and a fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check
1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, No. 106136;
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990
issued by Adronico;[9] between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses 4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and
obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of P15,000.00
Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;[10] the representing actual expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases;
three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason CLOSED P10,000.00 as attorneys fee; and the amount of P30,302.10 which is the total
ACCOUNT;[11] when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but without subsidiary
despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.[12] imprisonment in case of insolvency.
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there With Costs against the accused.
was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses
claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an SO ORDERED.[15]
agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature;[13]
and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation Adronico applied for probation which was granted.[16] On the other hand,
in the issuance thereof.[14] petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC
erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law;
spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
dispositive portion of which reads: issuance thereof.[17]
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond petitioner.[18] It held that the provisions of the penal code were made
reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court in People vs.
stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to Parel, [19] U.S. vs. Ponte, [20] and U.S. vs. Bruhez.[21] It noted that Article
imprisonment and fine, as follows: 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be
supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the
each of them, and a fine in the amount of P9,075.55, equivalent to the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal
amount of UCPB Check No. 284743; Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability
one (1) year and a fine of P12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every act
Check No. 284744; and, and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of Appeals
underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be
the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance
denied the same in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.[22] of checks.
Hence, the present petition. The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution: Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10,
are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the
OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO- provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTERS ACCOUNT COULD BE
HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
CONSPIRATOR.
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF
ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES: The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses
which in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. Offenses which the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary
are or in the future may be punished under special laws are not subject to the to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished.
OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that
PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY special legal provisions prevail over general ones.[24] Lex specialis derogant
CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could
B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.[23] have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the
article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and should specifically provide the contrary.
issuance of the three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact
proven by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,[25] U.S. vs.
gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the Ponte,[26] and U.S. vs. Bruhez[27] rests on a firm basis. These cases
RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the involved the suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code
principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article
situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing 22[28] of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with
reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. also did not describe the details of petitioners participation. He did not specify
U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 17[29] of the same Penal the nature of petitioners involvement in the commission of the crime, either
Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the commission of by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or
the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45[30] of the same Code, with would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt
reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act No. act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first
1461, the Opium Law. check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily conclusive evidence.[37] Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
People,[31] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary conspiracy.[38] Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
imprisonment under Article 39[32] of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22. cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent
any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is furtherance of the common design and purpose.[39]
analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in
U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs.
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the Mandao:[40]
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[33] To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or
accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside. specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any
element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing,
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.
decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[34] The overt act or acts of the a judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the
accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the prosecutions evidence. The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from
crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by which we quote:
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.[35]
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the latters criminal
any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant
lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely in the commission of the crime.
present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal
Case No. 7068.[36] With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be
predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 166502
weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to Petitioner,
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could
be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he Present:
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional - versus - CARPIO MORALES,
presumption of innocence.
TINGA,
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, VELASCO, JR., and
moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence
of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the BRION, JJ.
accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with
the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations
omitted)[41]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral
certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for Respondent.
conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioners
innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted. October 17, 2008
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the August 27,
2004 Decision[1] and November 30, 2004[2] Resolution of the Court of Agustin Mendegoria, the common-law husband of one of Lucias daughters,
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25253 entitled People of the Philippines v. witnessed the retrieval incident. He saw Ramon and petitioner bring out
Ramon Valdez, et al. The assailed decision affirmed the September 15, 2000 chairs, aparadors, mortars, a big frying pan, a wooden bench, and a bed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 67 in Bauang, La Union from Lucias house. Mendegoria immediately reported the matter to Lucia,
in Criminal Case No. 1214-BG, which found petitioner Francisco de Guzman who then went to the respective houses of Ramon and petitioner. She
guilty of the crime of robbery with force upon things, while the assailed discovered that her properties were brought to Ramons house, save for the
resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. wooden bench which was left just outside petitioners house. Lucia took
pictures of her personal belongings and then reported the matter to the
police.[5]
The Facts
Thereafter, Ramon and petitioner were charged with the crime of robbery
Private complainant Lucia Valdez married Agustin Valdez sometime in 1973, with force upon things in the following Information:
following the death of Agustins first wife, Presentacion. The relationship of
Lucia and Agustin, however, thereafter turned sour and the two separated.
Agustin went to the United States of America and Lucia remained in the
couples house in Sobredillo, Caba, La Union.[3] But after the July 16, 1990 That on or about the first week of September, 1990, in the Municipality of
earthquake, Lucia and her children temporarily moved out of their residence Caba, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
and stayed in an apartment in Paringao, Bauang, La Union.[4] Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, and with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the residential house of the private
complainant, LUCIA VALDEZ, by hammering down the hollow-blocks of the
During this time, Agustin learned that Lucia had been selling their personal house not intended for entrance or egress, at the northeastern portion of said
properties. Alarmed, he asked Ramon Valdez, his son with Presentacion, to house, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
retrieve whatever was left in their house as those properties belonged to carry away without the consent of the owner, personal properties worth
Ramons mother. Ramon, who was also residing within Sobredillo, Caba, La P20,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the complainant.[6]
Union, readily obeyed his father. Thus, sometime during the first week of
September 1990, Ramon went to Lucias house which was then closed and
uninhabited. Consequently, Ramon demolished the north eastern portion of
Lucias kitchen to gain entry. He then solicited his neighbors help in bringing
out the properties from Lucias house. Among those who assisted Ramon
Both petitioner and Ramon pleaded not guilty to the charge. In his defense,
Ramon admitted taking the properties but without intending to gain from his
act. After the earthquake in 1990, according to Ramon, he received SO ORDERED.[7]
instruction from his father to take the personal properties belonging to his
mother. He maintained that the properties taken were owned by his father
and mother, and not by Lucia.
On the other hand, petitioner denied taking the properties for gain. He
claimed that he merely helped Ramon bring out the properties belonging to
the latters father from Lucias house. He explained that since his house was The Ruling of the CA
relatively nearer to Lucias house, he acceded to Ramons request that the
wooden bench be temporarily placed in his house. But before Ramon could
transfer the bench to his own house, Lucia arrived and reported them to the
police. In a Decision dated August 27, 2004, the appellate court dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit. It held that Ramons acquittal cannot benefit
petitioner because the defense of Ramon is based on his personal
relationship with the private complainant. Further, it ruled that the prosecution
On September 15, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of established intent to gain when petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain how
which reads: he was able to gain possession of Lucias property.
The Issues
2) [A]ccused Francisco de Guzman is hereby convicted of the crime
charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of the indeterminate
penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its
minimum period of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to eight (8) Hence, petitioner comes to this Court with the following issues for our
years and to pay the amount of [PhP] 3,700.00. consideration:
1. Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner in the crime charged was In the present case, petitioner is imputed with intent to gain for his alleged
proved beyond reasonable doubt; failure to explain why Lucias wooden bench was in his possession. Animus
lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the the overt acts of the offender. The unlawful taking of anothers property gives
Affidavit executed by the private complainant although belated when it truly rise to the presumption that the act was committed with intent to gain. This
gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the petitioner.[8] presumption holds unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on
the part of the perpetrator.[12] The term gain is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may
be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use
In essence, the determinative issue revolves on the presence of the element of the thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.[13]
of intent to gain.
We are not convinced with moral certainty that petitioner had acted with
The Ruling of the Court intent to gain. Contrary to the findings of the trial and appellate courts, the
records bear out that it was Ramon, under a claim of ownership, who had
wanted the properties taken out from Lucias house.[14] And he had asked
his neighbors, petitioner among them, to assist him in recovering these
The appeal has merit. properties.[15] To be sure, petitioner, like the others who helped Ramon, was
an innocent person who merely acceded to a neighbors request.
The instant petition involves a review of the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts. As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a The only fact that perhaps raises doubt on petitioners innocence was the
petition for review on certiorari with this Court.[9] And we have always held presence of the wooden bench in his house. Petitioner, however, sufficiently
that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate explained that owing to the proximity of his house to that of Lucias, Ramon
court, are conclusive and binding on this Court; except when, as in this case, had asked that the bench be temporarily left in petitioners house until he
the judgment assailed is based on a misapprehension of facts.[10] could transfer it. Unfortunately, before Ramon could remove it, Lucia had
already filed a complaint against them.[16] Noticeably, petitioner did not
falsely claim ownership over the bench nor did he make any effort to conceal
that the bench was in his possession as it was placed outside his house. To
To constitute robbery, the following elements must be established: (1) the our mind, his acts were consistent with his assertion that he was merely
subject is personal property belonging to another; (2) there is unlawful taking helping Ramon, whom he honestly believed to be the owner, take out the
of that property; (3) the taking is with the intent to gain; and (4) there is properties from Lucias home.
violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon things.[11]
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
To stress, petitioner should not be held answerable for the act charged
absent a felonious intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. A crime is Chairperson
not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent.[17] [G.R. No. 123485. August 31, 1998]
PANGANIBAN, J.:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision dated Factual findings of trial courts which are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are,
August 27, 2004 and Resolution dated November 30, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR as a general rule, binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Alibi, on
No. 25253 are REVERSED. Petitioner Francisco de Guzman is ACQUITTED the other hand, cannot prevail over positive identification by credible
of the crime charged. No costs. witnesses. Furthermore, alleged violations of constitutional rights during
custodial investigation are relevant only when the conviction of the accused
by the trial court is based on the evidence obtained during such investigation.
These are the principles relied upon by the Court in resolving this appeal
from the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] Decision[2] dated September 28, 1995,
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. convicting Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga of murder and
frustrated murder. The convictions arose from a shooting incident on June 1,
Associate Justice 1985 in Talisay, Cebu, which resulted in the killing of two persons and the
wounding of three others, who were all riding in two vehicles which were
allegedly ambushed by appellants.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. 4) Criminal Case No. 9260 for frustrated murder:
2) Criminal Case No. 9258 for murder: That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 oclock in the evening, more or
less, at Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay,
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 oclock in the evening, more or Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
less at Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable helping one another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
helping one another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and assault and shoot ROGELIO PRESORES, who was riding in a car and who
treachery, did [then] and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries, to
assault and shoot ALFREDO NARDO, who was riding on a jeep and who wit:
gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter several gunshot
wounds, thereby causing his instantaneous death. gunshot wound, thru and thru right chest
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime
of [m]urder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
3) Crim Case No. CBU-9259 for frustrated murder: reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely
medical attendance.
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 oclock in the evening, more or
less, at Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually 5) Criminal Case No. 9261 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 oclock in the evening, more or In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art.
less, at Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, 248 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1)
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne (1)
helping one another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, deceased, Glenn Tiempo, the sum of P50,000.00;
assault and shoot NELSON TIEMPO, who was riding in a car and who gave
no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries, to wit: In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to
Gunshot wound neck penetrating wound perforating trachea (cricoid) thereby suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1)
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne (1)
[m]urder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely deceased, Alfredo Nardo, the sum of P50,000.00;
medical attendance.
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. penalized in Art. 248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of
Of the four indictees in the five Informations, Teodulo Alegarbes and Artemio prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8) months of
Timoteo Beronga were the first to be arraigned. Upon the arrest of the two, [re]clusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rey Bolo, the
the Informations were amended by the public prosecutor, with the conformity sum of P20,000.00;
of the defense counsel, by substituting the names of the two accused for the
John Does appearing in the original Informations. When arraigned, said In Crim. Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and
accused, assisted by their respective lawyers, pleaded not guilty to the five penalized in Art. 248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
Informations. sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight months of
Alegarbes died in the course of trial; thus, the cases against him were [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rogelio
dismissed. Accused Cabanero remained at large. Sabalones, on the other Presores, the sum of P20,000.00;
hand, was eventually arrested. Subsequently, he jumped bail but was
recaptured in 1988 and thereafter pleaded not guilty during his arraignment. In Crim. Case no. CBU-9261, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and
penalized in Art. 248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
The cases against Sabalones and Beronga were jointly tried. Thereafter, the sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of
lower court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8) months of
charged. The RTC disposed as follows: [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Nelson Tiempo,
the sum of P20,000.00; and
WHEREFORE, premises above-set forth, the Court finds accused
ROLUSAPE SABALONES and (ARTEMIO) TIMOTEO BERONGA, [g]uilty To pay the costs in all instances. The period of their preventive imprisonment
beyond reasonable doubt, as principals: shall be credited to each accused in full.
The solicitor general[7] quoted the following factual findings of the trial court:
SO ORDERED.[4]
Edwin Santos, a resident of Mambaling, Cebu City stated that on June 1,
Appellants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the 1985 at 6:00 oclock in the evening, he was at the residence of Inday
CA affirmed their conviction but sentenced them to reclusion perpetua for the Presores, sister of Rogelio Presores, located at Rizal Ave., Cebu City to
murders they were found guilty of. Accordingly, the appellate court, without attend a wedding. He stayed until 9:00 oclock in the evening and proceeded
entering judgment, certified the case to the Supreme Court in accordance to the house of Maj. Tiempo at Basak, Mambaling, Cebu City where a small
with Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the gathering was also taking place. (pp. 3-6, tsn, April 7, 1987)
CA Decision reads:
Arriving thereat, he saw Nelson and Glenn Tiempo as well as Rogelio
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellants Presores, Rogelio Oliveros, Junior Villoria, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo. (p.
Rolusa[p]e Sabalones and Artemio Timoteo Beronga for murder in Crim. 7, ibid.)
Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-9258, and [f]rustrated [m]urder in Crim.
Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-9260, and CBU-9261 is hereby AFFIRMED; At about 11:00 oclock in the evening, Stephen Lim, who was also at the
however, the penalties in the [f]rustrated [m]urder and [m]urder cases are party, called their group and requested them to push his car. When the
hereby MODIFIED, such that both accused-appellants are each sentenced to engine started, the former asked them to drive his car home. (pp. 7-11, ibid.)
imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of [p]rision [m]ayor medium as minimum
to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of [r]eclusion Together with Nelson Tiempo, who was at the wheel, Rogelio Presores,
[t]emporal medium as maximum in each of the three [f]rustrated [m]urder Rogelio Oliveros and Junior Villoria, they drove to the residence of Stephen
cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-9260 and CBU-9261); and are Lim at Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu. (p. 12, ibid.)
each sentenced to [r]eclusion [p]erpetua in each of the two [m]urder cases
(Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-9258). The indemnity to the victim in Glenn Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo also went with them riding in an
each [f]rustrated [m]urder case shall remain. In conformity with Rule 124, owner-type jeep, driven by the latter, in order to bring back the group [as]
Section 13 of the Rules of Court, however, this Court refrains from entering soon as the car of Mr. Lim was parked in his home. (p. 21, ibid.)
judgment, and hereby certifies the case and orders that the entire record
hereof be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.[5] The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the
car. When they arrived at the gate of the house of Stephen Lim, they were
After the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court, we required met with a sudden burst of gunfire. He looked at the direction where the
appellants to file supplemental briefs. Appellants failed to comply within the gunfire came, and saw [the] persons [who] fired at the jeep. He identified
prescribed period and were deemed to have waived their right to do so.[6] accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga as
Thus, in resolving this case, this Court will address primarily the arguments the persons who fired at the vehicle. Except for Teodulo Alegarbes, who was
raised by the appellants in their Brief before the Court of Appeals, which naked from [the] waist up, the gunmen wore clothes. (pp. 21-23; 13-16; 33,
assailed the RTC Decision. ibid.)
The Facts After firing at the jeep, the assailants shot the car they were riding[,] hitting
Nelson Tiempo on the throat and Rogelio Presores on the breast. Despite
Version of the Prosecution the injury he sustained, Nelson Tiempo was able to maneuver the car back to
their residence. (pp. 17-19, ibid.)
He issued the necessary Death Certificate, (Exh. D) and Necropsy Report,
He immediately informed Maj. Tiempo about the incident and the lat[t]er (Exh. F) and indicated therein that the victims cause of death was [c]ardio
brought the victims to the Cebu Doctors Hospital. (p. 20, ibid.) respiratory arrest due to [s]hock and [h]emorrhage [s]econdary to [g]unshot
wounds to the trunk. (p. 8, ibid.)
Rogelio Presores corroborated in substance the testimony of Edwin Santos,
being one of those who were in the car driven by Nelson Tiempo to the The victim sustained gunshot wounds in the right chest and left lumbar area.
residence of Stephen Lim. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Aug. 14, 1987) (pp. 10-11, ibid.)
He further testified that when the jeep driven by Alfredo Nardo with Rey Bolo He explained that in gunshot wound no. 1, the wound entrance[,] which [was]
and Glenn Tiempo as passengers arrived at the front gate of Lims residence characterized by invaginated edges and contusion collar[,] was located in the
and while their car was 3 meters from the rear end of the jeep, there was a right chest and the bullet went up to the left clavicle hitting a bone which
volley of gunfire. He glanced at the direction of the gunfire and saw the jeep incompletely fractured it causing the navigation of the bullet to the left and to
being fired at by four persons, who were standing behind a concrete wall, 42 the anterior side of the body. He recovered a slug, (Exh. G) below the
inches in height, and armed with long firearms. Thenceforth, he saw Alfredo muscles of the left clavicle. (p. 21, ibid.)
Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the ground. (pp. 6-7, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the assailant could have been [o]n the
He recognized accused, Rolusape Sabalones, as one of those who fired at right side of the victim or in front of the victim but [o]n a lower level than the
the jeep. He also identified in Court accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Timoteo latter.
Beronga and another person, whom he recognized only through his facial
appearance. (pp. 7-8, ibid.) In both gunshot wounds, he did not find any powder burns which would
indicate that the muzzle of the gun was beyond a distance of 12 inches from
When the shots were directed [at] their car[,] they were able to bend their the target. (p. 15, ibid.)
heads low. When the firing stopped, he directed Nelson Tiempo to back out
from the place. As the latter was maneuvering the car, the shooting At the time he conducted the autopsy, he noted that rigor mortis in its early
continued and he was hit in the breast while Nelson Tiempo, in the neck, and stage had already set in which denote[s] that death had occurred 5 to 6
the windshield of the vehicle was shattered. (p. 10, ibid.) hours earlier. (pp. 34-5, ibid.)
Arriving at the house of Maj. Tiempo, they were brought to Cebu Doctors Maj. Juan Tiempo, father of the victims, Glenn and Nelson Tiempo, testified
Hospital. He and Nelson Tiempo were operated on. He had incurred hospital that when he learned about the incident in question, he immediately
expenses in the sum of P5,412.69, (Exh. I, K). (pp. 11-12, ibid.) summoned military soldiers and together they proceeded to the scene. (pp.
4-6, tsn, Nov. 12, 1988)
Ladislao Diola, Jr., [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the PC Crime Laboratory,
Regional Unit 7 stationed at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City remembered Arriving thereat, he saw the lifeless body of his son, Glenn. He immediately
having performed a post-mortem examination on the dead body of Glenn carried him in his arms and rushed him to the hospital but the victim was
Tiempo on June 2, 1985 at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Cebu City. (p. pronounced Dead on Arrival. (pp. 6-7, ibid.)
7, tsn, Nov. 11, 1987)
They buried his son, who was then barely 14 years old, at Cebu Memorial
Park and had incurred funeral expenses (Exhs. K, L, O). (pp. 7-8, ibid.)
He prepared and issued th[e] Necropsy Report, (Exh. F) and Death
His other son, Nelson, then 21 years old and a graduate of [m]edical Certificate, (Exh. G) of Alfredo Nardo who was identified to him by the latters
[t]echology, was admitted at the Cebu Doctors Hospital for gunshot wound in daughter, Anita Nardo. (pp. 26-27, ibid.)
the neck. The latter survived but could hardly talk as a result of the injuries
he sustained. He had incurred medical and hospitalization expenses in the Rey Bolo, one of the victims, testified that when the jeep he was riding [in]
sum of P21,594.22, (Exh. H), (pp. 8-10, ibid.) together with Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, reached the gate of the
residence of Stephen Lim, they were suddenly fired upon. (pp. 5-8, tsn,
He had also incurred expenses in connection with the hospitalization of the March 6, 1989)
injured victims, Rogelio Presores and Rey Bolo in the amount[s] of
P5,412.69, (exh. I) and P9,431.10, (Exh. J), respectively. (p. 11, ibid.) He was hit in the right palm and left cheek. He jumped out of the vehicle and
ran towards the car which was behind them but he was again shot at [,] [and
He further stated that he [was] familiar with the accused, Roling Sabalones, hit] in the left scapular region. He was still able to reach the road despite the
because the latter had a criminal record in their office in connection with the injuries he sustained and tried to ask help from the people who were in the
kidnapping of a certain Zabate and Macaraya. (p. 16, ibid.) vicinity but nobody dared to help him, [they] simply disappeared from the
scene, instead. (pp. 8-9, ibid.)
xxxxxxxxx
He took a passenger jeepney to the city and had himself treated at the Cebu
Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the PC/INP, Cebu Doctors Hospital, and incurred medical expenses in the sum of P9,000.00.
Metrodiscom, had conducted an autopsy on the dead body of Alfredo Nardo, (p. 9, ibid.)
who sustained two (2) gunshot wounds in the lower lip and left intraclavicular
region, upon the request of the [c]hief of the Homicide Section of Cebu He was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh. N) by his attending physician.
Metrodiscom. He issued the victims Necropsy Report, (Exh. F) and Death
Certificate, (Exh. G). (pp. 5-8, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988) Dr. Miguel Mancao, a [p]hysician-[s]urgeon, recalled having attended [to] the
victims, Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores at the Cebu Doctors
He stated that the wound of entrance in gunshot wound no. 1 was located in Hospital on June 2, 1985. (pp. 7-8, 11, 14, tsn, May 30, 1989)
the lower lip, more or less[,] on the left side making an exit in the left
mandibular region. (pp. 9-11, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 6-8, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988) Nelson Tiempo sustained gunshot wound[s] in the neck and in the right chest
but the bullet did not penetrate the chest cavity but only the left axilla. He was
In gunshot wound no. 2, the wound of entrance was in the left intraclavicular not able to recover any slugs because the same disintegrated while the other
region exiting at the back as reflected in the sketch, (Exh. F-2). This wound was thru and thru. The wound could have proved fatal but the victim
was fatal and [could] almost cause an instantaneous death considering that miraculously survived. As a consequence of the injury he sustained, Nelson
the bullet penetrated the thoracic cavity, lacerating the lungs and perforating Tiempo permanently lost his voice because his trachea was shattered. His
the heart before making an exit. (pp. 11-13, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 13-15, tsn, only chance of recovery is by coaching and speech therapy. He issued his
Nov. 29, 1988) Medical Certificate. (Exh. O). (pp. 8-11, ibid.)
He found no tattooing around the wound of entrance in both gunshot With regard to the patient, Rey Bolo, the latter suffered multiple gunshot
wounds. (pp. 8-9, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988) wounds in the left shoulder penetrating the chest and fracturing the 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th ribs in the process, in the right hand fracturing the proximal right
thumb and in the mouth lacerating its soft tissues, per Medical Certificate, He ran away but the latter chased him and kicked the door of the house
(Exh. N) which he issued. (pp. 11-16, ibid.) where he hid. He was able to escape through the back door and took refuge
in Mandaue at the residence of Nito Seno, a driver of Gen. Emilio
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the gunman could have been in front of Narcissi.(Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-17, October 19, 1989)
the victim, when gunshot would no. 1 was inflicted. (p. 30, ibid.)
On February 27, 1987, upon the advi[c]e of his friend, they approached Gen.
With respect to the patient, Rogelio Presores, the latter suffered [a] gunshot Narcissi and informed him of the incident. The latter brought him to the
wound in the chest with the wound of entrance in the right anterior chest Provincial Command Headquarters in Lahug, Cebu City to confront Maj.
exiting at the back which was slightly lower than the wound of entrance. He Juan Tiempo.
issued the victims Medical Certificate, (Exh. M). (pp. 34-35, ibid.)
After several days, he was brought by Maj. Tiempo to the PC Headquarter[s]
Based on the location of the wound, the gunman could have been in front of in Jones Ave., Cebu City where he was provided with a lawyer to defend him
the victim but [o]n a slightly higher elevation than the latter. (pp. 35-36, but he was instructed that he should assent to whatever his lawyer would ask
ibid.)[8] of him.
Version of the Defense He was introduced to Atty. Marcelo Guinto, his lawyer, who made him sign
an Affidavit, (Exh. U) the contents of which, co[u]ched in the dialect, were
Appellants interposed denial and alibi. Their version of the facts is read to him.
summarized by the trial court[9] thus:
He also testified that before he was detained at the CPDRC, complainant
xxx Timoteo Beronga, a cristo or bet caller in the cockpit, testified that in the brought him inside the shop of a certain Den Ong, where he was again
afternoon of June 1, 1985, he was in the Talisay Sports Complex located at mauled after he denied having any knowledge of the whereabouts of Roling
Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu to attend a cock-derby. Sabalones and the carbine.
At about 7:00 oclock in the evening, he was fetched by his wife and they left At the instance of Col. Medija, he was physically examined at the Southern
taking a taxicab going to their residence in Lapulapu City. After passing by Islands Hospital, Cebu City and was issued a [M]edical Certificate. (Tsn-
the market place, they took a tricycle and arrived home at 8:00 oclock in the Formentera, pp. 3-36, Jan. 18, 1990).
evening.
Justiniano Cuizon, [a]ccount [o]fficer of the Visayan Electric Company
After taking his supper with his family, he went home to sleep at 10:30 in the (VECO) South Extension Office, who is in charge of the billing, disconnection
evening. The following morning, after preparing breakfast, he went back to and reconnection of electric current, testified that based on the entries in their
sleep until 11:00 in the morning. logbook, (Exh. 3) made by their checker, Remigio Villaver, the electrical
supply at the Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu, particularly the
On February 24, 1987, while he was playing mahjong at the corner of R.R. Mansueto Homeowners covered by Account No. 465-293000-0, (Exh. 4-B)
Landon and D. Jakosalem Sts., Cebu City, complainant, Maj. Juan Tiempo was disconnected on January 10, 1985, (Exh. 3-A) for non-payment of
with some companions, arrived and after knowing that he [was] Timmy, electric bills from March 1984 to January 1985 and was reconnected only on
[which was] his nickname, the former immediately held him by the neck. June 17, 1985 (Exh. 4, 4-A). (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 22-27, Jan. 31, 1990).
Remigio Villaver, a checker of VECO, whose area of responsibility cover[ed]
the towns of Talisay and San Fernando, Cebu had kept the record of Upon examination, he found out that the patient sustained linear abrasion,
disconnection of electrical supply of Mansueto Subdivision in Bulacao, linear laceration and hematoma in the different parts of the body. Except for
Talisay, Cebu and the same showed that on January 10, 1985, (Exh. 3-A), a the linear laceration which he believed to have been inflicted two or three
service order was issued by their office to the Mansueto Homeowners for the days prior to [the] date of examination, all the other injuries were already
permanent disconnection of their electric lights due to non-payment of their healed indicating that the same were inflicted 10 to 12 days earlier.
electric bills from March 1984 until January 1985. The actual disconnection
took place on December 29, 1984. He issued the corresponding Medical Certificate (Exh. 2) to the patient. (Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 9-13, May 21, 1990).
Witness Fredo Canete made efforts to corroborate their testimony. (Tsn-
Formentera, pp.3-5, Apr. 20, 1990). Atty. Jesus Pono, counsel for accused Beronga, mounted the witness stand
and averred that he [was] a resident of Mansueto Compound, Bulacao,
Vicente Cabanero, a resident of Mansueto Compound in Talisay, Cebu since Talisay, Cebu. As shown in the pictures, (Exhs. 3, 4 & 5 with submarkings)
1957 until the present, remembered that on June 1, 1985, between 10:00 his house is enclosed by a concrete fence about 5 feet 6 inches tall. It is
oclock and 11:00 oclock in the evening, he heard a burst of gunfire about 15 situated 6 meters from the residence of accused, Roling Sabalones, which
to 20 armslength [sic] from his residence. was then being rented by Stephen Lim. Outside the fence [are] shrubs and at
the left side is a lamp post provided with 200 watts fluorescent bulb.
He did not bother to verify because he was scared since the whole place was
in total darkness. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 18-23, Feb. 22, 1990).
On June 1, 1985 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, he saw Roling
Marilyn Boc, another witness for the accused, stated that on the date and Sabalones, whom he personally [knew] because they used to be neighbors
time of the incident in question, while she was at the wake of Junior in Talisay, Cebu, at the wake of his brother, Federico Sabalones, Jr. or
Sabalones, younger brother of Roling Sabalones, who died on May 26, 1985, Junior Sabalones, as mentioned repeatedly hereabout. They even had a talk
a sudden burst of gunfire occurred more or less 60 meters away. and he noticed accused to be physically indisposed being gravely affected by
the loss of his only brother, who met a violent death in the hands of an
Frightened, she went inside a room to hide and saw accused, Roling unknown hitman on May 26, 1985.
Sabalones, sound asleep.
He went home after he saw accused [lie] down on a bamboo bench to rest.
She came to know accused, Timoteo Beronga, only during one of the
hearings of this case and during the entire period that the body of the late At about 12:00 oclock midnight, he was awakened by a rapid burst of gunfire
Junior Sabalones [lay] in state at his residence, she never saw said accused. which emanated near his house. He did not attempt to go down or look
outside. He [was] in no position to tell whether or not the street light was
She was requested to testify in this case by Thelma Beronga, wife of Timoteo lighted.
Beronga. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 9-13, February 28, 1990).
When he verified the following morning, he noticed bloodstains on the ground
Dr. Daniel Medina, while then the [r]esident [p]hysician of Southern Islands as well as inside the jeep which was parked 2 to 3 meters from his fence and
Hospital, Cebu City had treated the patient, Timoteo Beronga on March 18, 50 to 70 meters from the house where Junior Sabalones [lay] in state. He
1987.
observed that the jeep was riddled with bullets and its windshield shattered.
(Tsn-Abangan, pp. 3-16, June 6, 1990). As part of their intelligence tradition, an undercover agent is not allowed to
carry his real name. In the case of his nephew and accused, Rolusape
He admitted that he used to be a counsel of accused, Roling Sabalones, in Sabalones, the latter chose the name Paciano Laput which name was
several cases, among which involved the death of a certain Garces and recorded in their code of names.
Macaraya, which cases were however, dismissed by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Cebu. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 2-3, June 13, 1990). When he retired in 1968, the accused ceased to be an agent and xxx
likewise ceased to have the authority to use the name Paciano Laput. (Tsn-
Doroteo Ejares, a relative of accused, testified that when he attended the Abangan, p. 12, July 23, 1990).
wake of Junior Sabalones on June 1, 1985 at 8:00 oclock in the evening, he
saw accused lying on a bamboo bench in the yard of the house of the Alfonso Allere, a distant relative of the accused, remembered having
deceased. received a call from Roling Sabalones, one morning after the burial of the
latters brother, asking for his advise because of the threats [to] his life which
At past 10:00 oclock in the evening, accused excused himself as he was not he received thru telephone from the group of Nabing Velez and the group of
feeling well and entered a room to rest while he remained by the door and the military.
slept.
After he had advised accused to lie low, he had not heard of him, since then.
At almost 12:00 oclock midnight, he was awakened by a burst of gunfire
which took place more or less 20 meters away and saw the people Godofredo Mainegro of the Public Assistance and Complaint Action Office of
scamper[ing] for safety. He hid inside the room where accused was sleeping the Regional Unified Command 7, received a complaint from one Inocencia
and peeped thru the door. Not long after, Marilyn Boc entered and in a low Sabalones on March 13, 1986.
voice talked about the incident.
He recorded the complaint in their Complaint Sheet, (Exh. 6) and let
They decided to wake up the accused to inform him of what was happening, complainant affix her signature.
but the latter merely opened his eyes and realizing that accused was too
weak, they allowed him to go back to sleep. After the document was subscribed and sworn to before him, (Exh. 6-C), he
indorsed it to their [c]ommanding [o]fficer, Apolinario Castano. (Tsn-
When he went home at past 5:00 oclock in the morning of June 2, 1985, he Formentera, pp. 3-10, July 24, 1990).
saw a jeep outside of the compound. He did not bother to investigate or
inquire about the incident as he was in a hurry to go home and prepare for Ret. Col. Apolinario Castano, recalled that while he was then with the
the burial of Junior Sabalones. Regional Unified Command 7, his niece, Racquel Sabalones together with
her husband Roling Sabalones, came to him for advi[c]e because the latter
He was requested to testify in this case by his aunt and mother of accused was afraid of his life brought about by the rampant killings of which his
Rolusape Sabalones. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 10-15, June 13, 1990). brother and the son of Maj. Tiempo were victims.
Russo Sabalones, uncle of accused, Sabalones, averred that the latter was Considering that accuseds problem was a police matter, they approached
once, one of his undercover agents while he was then the [c]hief of the Gen. Ecarma, the then [c]ommander of the PC/INP, Recom 7, and the latter
Intelligence Service of the PC from 1966 until 1968. referred them to his [c]hief of [s]taff, Col. Roger Denia, who informed them
that there was no case filed against the accused. Nevertheless, the latter
was advised to be careful and consult a lawyer. Few minutes later, she heard a burst of gunfire outside their gate. She
immediately gathered her children and instructed Marlyn Sabarita to use the
Inocencia Sabalones, mother of accused, Roling Sabalones, narrated that on phone situated at the third door apartment and call the police.
March 12, 1986 at past 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was roused from
sleep by a shout of a man demanding for Roling Sabalones. After the lull of gunfire, she went to the terrace and saw people in civilian and
in fatigue uniforms with firearms, gathered around the place. One of these
Upon hearing the name of her son, she immediately stood up and peeped men even asked her about the whereabouts of her husband, whom she left
through the door of her store and saw men in fatigue uniforms carrying long sleeping in the house of the deceased.
firearms. Thenceforth, these men boarded a vehicle and left.
At 8:30 in the morning of June 2, 1985, during the burial of Junior Sabalones,
On the following morning, she was again awakened by the persistent shouts they were informed by Pedro Cabanero that Roling Sabalones was a suspect
and pushing of the gate. When she verified, the man who introduced himself for the death of Nabing Velez and the son of Maj. Tiempo.
to her as Maj. Tiempo, ordered her to open the gate. Once opened, the men
of Maj. Tiempo entered the house and proceeded to search for Roling She believed that the reason why her husband was implicated in the killing of
Sabalones, whom Maj. Tiempo suspected to have killed his son and shot Nabing Velez was because of the slapping incident involving her father-in-
another to near death. When she demanded for a search warrant, she was law, Federico Sabalones, Sr. and Nabing Velez which took place prior to the
only shown a piece of paper but was not given the chance to read its death of Junior Sabalones.
contents.
After the funeral, she began to receive mysterious calls at their residence in
Racquel Sabalones, wife of accused, Rolusape Sabalones, maintained that Sikatuna St., Cebu City where they began staying since 1978. She also
on June 1, 1985 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, she was at the wake of her noticed cars with tinted windows strangely parked in front of their residence.
brother-in-law, Junior Sabalones, at his residence in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
Frightened and cowed, they decided to seek the advice of Col. Apolinario
At 11:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, together with her 3 Castano, who after relating to him their fears, advised her husband to lie low
daughters as well as Marlyn Sabarita, Rose Lapasaran and Gloria Mondejar, and to consult a lawyer.
left the place in order to sleep in an unoccupied apartment situated 30
meters away from the house where her deceased, brother-in-law, Junior, To allay their apprehension, accused, Roling Sabalones, left Cebu City for
was lying in state, as shown in the Sketch, (Exh. 7 and submarkings) Iligan, Manila and other cities to avoid those who were after him. When she
prepared by her. They brought with them a flashlight because the whole learned about the threat made by Maj. Tiempo on her husband, she
place was in total darkness. forewarned the latter not to return to Cebu.
As they were about to enter the gate leading to her apartment she noticed a Marlyn Sabarita, an illegitimate daughter of Rolusape Sabalones, stated that
sedan car coming towards them. She waited for the car to come nearer as in the night in question, she was at the wake of Junior Sabalones and saw
she thought that the same belong[ed] to her friend, but the vehicle instead her Papa Roling, the herein accused, lying on the lawn of the house of the
stopped at the corner of the road, (Exh. 7-F) and then proceeded to the end deceased.
portion of Mansueto Compound, (Exh. 7-G). As it moved slowly towards the
highway, she rushed inside the apartment.
She was already in the apartment with her Mama Racquel when she heard a
burst of gunfire. Upon instructions of the latter, she went out to call the police With the help of Maj. delos Santos, who advised her to always stay close [to]
thru the phone located [in] the third apartment occupied by a certain Jet. the accused, she was able to board the same vessel. She saw the latter clad
(Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 3-15, Oct. 15, 1990). in green T-shirt, (Exh. 14) and pants, handcuffed and guarded.
Edward Gutang, [a]sst. lay-out [e]ditor and [a]sst. [s]ports [e]ditor of Sun-Star Reaching Cebu City, they took a taxicab and as the vehicle went around the
Daily, while then a military and police reporter had covered the shooting city, she was instructed by Maj. Tiempo to place the towel, (Exh. 15) which
incident which took place on June 1, 1985 at the Mansueto Compound, she found inside her bag, on the head of the accused. They stopped at the
Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu. Reclamation Area and Maj. Tiempo pulled them out of the vehicle but she
held on tightly to Ondo, ripping his shirt. This pulling incident happened for
At past 1:00 oclock dawn, together with their newspaper photographer, several times but complainant failed to let them out of the vehicle.
Almario Bitang, they went to the crime scene boarding the vehicle of the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes. Arriving thereat, they decided not to proceed The accused was finally brought to the Provincial Jail while she stayed in the
inside the compound because of fear. The place was then in complete residence of the accused. She returned to Butuan after a week. (Tsn-
darkness. Formentera, pp. 5-33, Jan. 22, 1991).
Upon being informed that the victims were brought to Cebu City Medical Accused, Rolusape Sabalones, alias Roling, in his defense, with ancillary
Center, they rushed to the place and met Maj. Tiempo hugging the dead incidental narrations, testified , that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 oclock in the
body of his 14-year old son. His photographer took a picture of that pathetic evening, he was at the wake of his only brother, Junior Sabalones, who was
scene. (Exh. 8-B). killed on May 26, 1985.
Samson Sabalones, a retired [a]mbassador and uncle of Rolusape He had no idea as to who was responsible for the killing of his brother
Sabalones, posted a bail bond for his nephew with Eastern Insurance inasmuch as the latter had plenty of enemies. He also did not exert effort to
Company, when a warrant for his arrest was issued by the Municipal Court, look into the case and to place it under police authority since he had lost faith
on March 12, 1986 because he was bothered by the fact that the latter was in the capabilities of the police. The matter was however reported by his
being unreasonably hunted by several groups. He even advised the accused uncle, Ambassador Sabalones, to the authorities.
to appear in [c]ourt to clarify the nature of the case filed against him.
He stayed at the wake until 10:00 oclock in the evening because he was not
Virgincita Pajigal, a resident of Butuan City, met accused, Rolusape feeling well. He retired in a small room adjacent to the sala of the house of
Sabalones, who introduced himself to her as Paciano Laput nicknamed, the deceased. Not long after, he felt somebody waking him up but he merely
Ondo, in a massage clinic where she was working. opened his eyes and went back to sleep as he was really exhausted.
For less than a year, they lived together as husband and wife without the At 6:30 the following morning, he was roused by his wife so he could prepare
benefit of marriage because according to her the accused was married but for the burial. He came to know about the burst of gunfire which took place
separated from his wife, whose name was never mentioned to her. For such the previous night upon the information of his wife. He did not take the news
a short span of time being together, her love for the accused developed to seriously as he was busy preparing for the burial of his deceased brother,
the extent that whatever happen[ed] to him, she [would] always be there to Jun.
defend him.
The funeral started at past 8:00 oclock in the morning and he noticed the Together with his wife, they decided to see Col. Apolinario Castao to seek his
presence of Maj. Eddie Ricardo and his men, who were sent by Col. Castano advise. The latter verified from the Cebu Metrodiscom and learned that there
purposely to provide the burial with military security, upon the request of his was no case filed against him.
wife.
In the evening of June 6, 1985, he left for Iligan and after a month, he
He had a conversation with Maj. Ricardo who inquired about the shooting transferred to Ozamis and then to Pagadian. He likewise went to Manila
incident which resulted in the death of the son of Maj. Tiempo and others in especially when he learned that his uncle, Samson Sabalones, had arrived
his company. Also in the course of their conversation, he came to know that from abroad. The latter posted a bond for his temporary liberty immediately
Nabing Velez was killed earlier on that same night in Labangon, Cebu [C]ity. after being informed that a case was filed against him, before the Municipal
Court of Talisay.
On the same occasion, Pedro Cabanero also notified him that he was a
suspect in the killing of Nabing Velez, a radio commentator of ferocious Despite xxx the bond put up by his uncle, he did not return to Cebu City
character, who was engaged in a protection racket with several under his because it came to his knowledge that Maj. Tiempo inquired from the
control. bonding company as to his address.
He remembered that a month prior to the death of Nabing Velez, his father, He also stayed in Marikina in the house of his friend and during his stay in
Federico Sabalones, Sr. and the deceased while matching their fighting the said place, he registered as a voter and was issued a Voters Affidavit,
cocks at the Talisay Sports Complex, had an altercation and the latter (Exh. 19; Exh. R for the prosecution) which bore the name Paciano Mendoza
slapped his paralytic father and challenged him to ask one of his sons to Laput which [was] his baptismal name. He explained that the name[s]
avenge what he had done to him. He came to know about the incident only Mendoza and Laput [were] the middle name and surname, respectively of his
after a week. mother. The name Rolusape was given to him by his father and the same
[was] not his registered name because during the old days, priests would not
He did not deny the fact that he was hurt by the actuation of the deceased for allow parents to name their children with names not found in the Almanac;
humiliating his father but it did not occur to him to file a case or take any thus, Paciano [was] his chosen name and the same appeared in his
action against the deceased because he was too busy with his business and Baptismal Certificate, (Exh. 20) issued by the Parish of the Blessed Trinity of
with his work as a bet caller in the cockpit. Talibon, Bohol. In his Birth Certificate, it [was] the name Rolusape which
appeared based upon the data supplied by his father.
He advised his father to stay in Bohol to avoid further trouble because he
knew that the latter would frequent the cockpit[,] being a cockfight aficionado. He had used the name Paciano during the time when he [was] still a secret
agent under his uncle, Gen. Russo Sabalones, when the latter was still the
Likewise, during the burial, he was informed by a PC soldier, Roger [c]hief of the C-2 in 1966 until 1967 and as such, he was issued a firearm. He
Capuyan, that he was also a suspect in the killing of the son of Maj. Tiempo likewise used said name at the time he was employed at the Governors
and even advised him to leave the place. Office in Agusan and when he registered in the Civil Service Commission to
conceal his identity to protect himself from those who were after him.
On the following days after the burial, his wife started to notice cars
suspiciously parked in front of their house and [she] also received mysterious From Marikina he proceeded to Davao and then to Butuan City where he
calls. was made to campaign for the candidacy of Gov. Eddie Rama. When the
latter won in the election, he was given a job at the Provincial Capitol and Formentera, pp. 5-23, Feb. 26, 1991; Tsn-Abangan, pp. 3-33, Feb. 27, 1991;
later became an agent of the PC in Butuan using the name, Paciano Laput. Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-18, Apr. 10, 1991).
During his stay in Butuan, he met Virgie Pajigal, a manicurist who became As surrebuttal witness, accused Rolusape Sabalones denied that he bribed a
his live-in partner. certain soldier because at the time he was arrested, his wallet as well as his
wristwatch and ring worth P2,000.00 each were confiscated and his hands
On October 23, 1988 while he was at the Octagon Cockpit in Butuan with tied behind his back.
Sgt. Tambok, he was arrested by Capt. Ochate and was brought to the PC
Headquarter[s] in Libertad, Butuan City and was detained. Among the papers He also denied the allegation of Maj. Tiempo that he offered the latter the
confiscated from him was his Identification Card No. 028-88, (Exh. 21) issued amount of P1,000.000.00 to drop the case against him, the truth being that
by the PC Command bearing the name Paciano Laput. while they were on board a vessel bound for Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo
compelled him to tell [who] the real killers of his son [were] because he knew
On October 26, 1988 he was taken from the City Jail by Capt. Ochate and that he (Rolusape Sabalones) was not responsible. The former also inquired
some soldiers, one of whom was Maj. Tiempo whom he met for the first time. from him as to the whereabouts of the carbine.
On their way to Nasipit to board a vessel bound for Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo He also rebutted complainants testimony that upon their arrival here in Cebu
made him lie flat on his belly and stepped on his back and handcuffed him. City and while on board a taxicab, he directed the former [to] first go around
He cried in pain because of his sprained shoulder. A certain soldier also took the city to locate a certain Romeo Cabaero, whom he did not know
his watch and ring. personally.[10]
Arriving in Cebu at 7:00 oclock in the morning, he and Virgie Pajigal, who Ruling of the Court of Appeals
followed him in the boat, were made to board a taxicab. Maj. Tiempo alighted
in certain place and talked to a certain guy. Thereafter, they were brought to Giving full credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the Court of Appeals
the Reclamation Area and were forced to go down from the vehicle but Virgie affirmed the trial courts Decision convicting appellants of two counts of
Pajigal held him tightly. They were again pulled out of the taxi but they murder and three counts of frustrated murder. Like the trial court, it
resisted. appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery and rejected appellants
defense of alibi.
From the Capitol Building, they proceeded to CPDRC and on their way
thereto, Maj. Tiempo sat beside him inside the taxi and boxed him on the The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the penalties imposed by the trial
right cheek below the ear and pulled his cuffed hands apart. court were erroneous. Hence, for each count of murder, it sentenced
appellants to reclusion perpetua. For each count of frustrated murder, it
At the Provincial Jail, he was physically examined by its resident physician, imposed the following penalty: ten years (10) of prision mayor (medium), as
Dr. Dionisio Sadaya, and was also fingerprinted and photographed, (Exh. minimum, to seventeen years (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
21). He was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh. 22). temporal (medium), as maximum. Sustaining the trial court, the Court of
Appeals awarded indemnity of P20,000 to each of the victims of frustrated
He further stated that he [was] acquainted with his co-accused Timoteo murder. However, it was silent on the indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the
Beronga, known to him as Timmy being also a bet caller in the cockpit. (Tsn- trial court to the heirs of each of the two deceased.
Having imposed reclusion perpetua on the appellants, the Court of Appeals, V
as earlier noted, refrained from entering judgment and certified the case to
the Supreme Court for review, in conformity with Section 13, Rule 124 of the The court a quo erred in not finding that the evidence of the prosecution has
Rules of Court. not overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.
Hence, this appeal before this Court.[11]
VI
The Issues
The court a quo erred in not acquitting the accused on ground of reasonable
In his Brief,[12] Appellant Sabalones raised the following errors allegedly doubt.
committed by the trial court:
In a Manifestation dated December 20, 1995, Appellant Beronga, through
I counsel, adopted as his own the Brief of Sabalones.[13]
The court a quo erred in finding that accused Sabalones and his friends left The foregoing assignment of errors shall be reformulated by the Court into
the house where his brother Sabalones Junior was lying in state and went to these three issues or topics: (1) credibility of the witnesses and sufficiency of
their grisly destination amidst the dark and positioned themselves in defense the prosecution evidence, (2) defense of denial and alibi, and (3)
of his turf against the invasion of a revengeful gang of the supporters of characterization of the crimes committed and the penalty therefor.
Nabing Velez.
The Courts Ruling
II
The appeal is devoid of merit.
The court a quo erred in finding that accused Sabalones and his two co-
accused were identified as among the four gunmen who fired at the victims. First Issue:
The court a quo erred in overlooking or disregarding physical evidence that Well-entrenched is the tenet that this Court will not interfere with the trial
would have contradicted the testimony of prosecution witnesses Edwin courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, absent any indication or
Santos and Rogelio Presores that the gunmen were shooting at them from a showing that the trial court has overlooked some material facts or gravely
standing position. abused its discretion,[14] especially where, as in this case, such assessment
is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. As this Court has reiterated often
IV enough, the matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand is
best and most competently performed or carried out by a trial judge who,
The court a quo erred in holding that the instant case is one of aberratio unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the
ictus, which is not a defense, and that the defense of alibi interposed by the accuseds behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial.[15] Giving
accused may not be considered. credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court
concluded:
A Near the foot of the electric post and close to the cemented wall.
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, this Court, given the evidence, finds that
there is more realism in the conclusion based on a keener and realistic Q This electric post, was that lighted at that moment?
appraisal of events, circumstances and evidentiary facts on record, that the
gun slaying and violent deaths of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and the A Yes, sir, it was lighted.
near fatal injuries of Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores,
resulted from the felonious and wanton acts of the herein accused for Q How far were these persons firing, to the place where you were?
mistaking said victims for the persons [who were] objects of their wrath.[16]
A From here to there (The witness indicating the distance by pointing to a
We stress that factual findings of the lower courts, the trial court and the place inside the courtroom, indicating a distance of about 6 to 7 meters,
Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive upon the making the witness stand as the point of reference).
Supreme Court.[17] We find nothing in the instant case to justify a reversal or
modification of the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Q Were you able to know how many persons fired towards you?
appellants committed two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated
murder. A I only saw 3 to 4 persons.
Edwin Santos, a survivor of the assault, positively pointed to and identified Q How long did these persons fire the guns at you?
the appellants as the authors of the crime. His categorical and
straightforward testimony is quoted hereunder:[18] A Until we went home. The persons were still firing, until we went home.
COURT: Q You stated that you saw these persons who were firing at you. Do you
know these persons?
Q You stated there was a gun fired. What happened next?
A I can identify [them] when I [see] them.
WITNESS:
Q Try to look around this courtroom, if these persons you saw who were
A There was a rapid fire in succession. firing at you are present in the courtroom[.]
Q When you heard this rapid firing, what did you do? A Yes, sir.
A I tried to look from where the firing came from. Q Can you point to these persons?
Q Where were these persons situated when they were firing towards you? COURT INTERPRETER:
The Court directed the witness to go down from the witness stand and [point]
at them, Beronga and Alegarbes. Q While the car was following the jeep at that distance of 3 to 4 meters, what
happened?
FISCAL GABIANA:
A All of a sudden, we heard the burst of gunfire.
I would like to make it of record that on the bench of prisoner, only the two
accused were seated. Q From what direction was the gunfire?
Make it of record that only two prisoners were present. Q After hearing the gunfire, what happened?
Q Now, Mr. Santos, aside from these two accused you identified as among A We looked at the jeep.
those who fired [at] you on that evening, were there other persons that you
saw on that particular occasion who fired at you? Q What did you see?
A Yes, sir, there were[;] if I can see them, I can identify them. A We saw Alfredo Nardo and Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the
ground. There were only 3.
Corroborating the foregoing, Rogelio Presores, another survivor, also pointed
to Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes and Roling Sabalones as the Q Who was driving the jeep at that time?
perpetrators of the crime. His testimony proceeded in this manner:[19]
A Alfredo Nardo.
Q When you arrived at the residence of Stephen Lim, can you remember of
any unusual incident that took place? Q What happened after that?
A Yes, sir. A So, I looked, whence the burst of gunfire came from.
Q What was that? Q What did you see from that gunfire?
A When the jeep arrived, the car was following. A I saw 4 persons standing at the back of the fence.
Q What happened next? Q What were those 4 persons doing when they were standing at the back of
the fence?
A When the jeep was near the gate, the car was following.
A They were bringing long firearms.
Q The car was following the jeep, at what distance?
Q Did you recognize these persons?
A 3 to 4 meters.
A I can clearly recognize one and the 3 persons[.] I can identify them, if I can Indeed, we have carefully waded through the voluminous records of this case
see them again. and the testimonies of all the fifty-nine witnesses, and we find that the
prosecution has presented the required quantum of proof to establish that
Q If you are shown these persons, can you recognize them? Can you name appellants are indeed guilty as charged. Appellants arguments, as we shall
these persons? now discuss, fail to rebut this conclusion.
Q What about the 3 persons? Appellants allege that the two witnesses could not have properly identified
the appellants because, after the first burst of shooting, they both crouched
A Thats why the 3 persons, I do not know them. I can recognize only their down, such that they could not have seen the faces of their assailants. This
facial appearance. contention does not persuade. Both eyewitnesses testified that the firing was
not continuous; thus, during a lull in the firing, they raised their heads and
Q What about one person? managed a peek at the perpetrators. Edwin Santos testified as follows:
Q What is the name of the person? Q You mean to say that when you bent you heard the successive shots,
[and] you again raised your head. Is that correct?
A Roling Sabalones.
A There were times that the shots were not in succession and continuous
Q If Roling Sabalones is inside the courtroom, can you recognize Roling and that was the time I raised my head again.[20]
Sabalones?
Like Santos, Rogelio Presores also stooped down when the firing started, but
A Yes, sir, he is around. he raised his head during a break in the gunfire:
A Yes, he is there (The witness pointing to the person who answered the Q So, what did you do when you first heard that one shot?
name of Roling Sabalones).
A So, after the first shot, we looked towards the direction we were facing and
Q I would like [you] again to please look around and see, if those persons when we heard the second shot, that was the time we stooped down.[21]
whom you know through their faces, if they are here around?
He further testified:
A The two of them (The witness pointing to the 2 persons, who, when asked,
answered that his name [was] Teofilo Beronga and the other [was] Atty. Acido: [Counsel for Appellant Sabalones]
Alegarbes).
Q And you said you stooped down inside the car when you heard the first being no light in the lampposts at the time. To prove that the service wire to
firing to the jeep. Is that what you want the Court to understand[?] the street lamps at the Mansueto Compound was disconnected as early as
December 1984 and reconnected only on June 27, 1985, they presented the
Presores: testimonies of Vicente Cabanero,[26] Remigio Villaver,[27] Fredo
Canete[28]and Edward Gutang.[29] The trial court, however, did not lend
A Yes, sir. weight to said testimonies, preferring to believe the statement of other
prosecution witnesses that the place was lighted during that time.
Q So, you never saw who fired the successive shots to the car as you said
you stooped down inside the car? The Court of Appeals sustained said findings by citing the testimonies of
defense witnesses. Fredo Canete of the Visayan Electric Company (VECO),
A The bursts of gunfire stopped for a while and that was the time I reared of for instance, admitted that it was so easy to connect and disconnect the
[sic] my head. lights. He testified thus:
Q And that was the first time you saw them? Atty. Kintanar:
A Yes, sir.[22] Q Now, as a cutter, what instruments do you usually use in cutting the
electrical connection of a certain place?
The records clearly show that two vehicles proceeded to the house of
Stephen Lim on that fateful day. The first was the jeep where Alfredo Nardo, Canete:
Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo were riding. About three to four meters behind
was the second car carrying Nelson Tiempo, Guillermo Viloria, Rogelio A Pliers and screw driver.
Oliveros and the two prosecution witnesses -- Edwin Santos and Rogelio
Presores.[23] As stated earlier, said witnesses attested to the fact that after Q Does it need xxx very sophisticated instruments to disconnect the lights?
the first volley of shots directed at the jeep, they both looked at the direction
where the shots were coming from, and they saw their friends in the jeep A No, these are the only instruments we use.
falling to the ground, as well as the faces of the perpetrators.[24] It was only
then that a rapid succession of gunshots were directed at them, upon which Q Ordinary pliers and ordinary screw driver?
they started crouching to avoid being hit.
A Yes, sir.
Hence, they were able to see and identify the appellants, having had a good
look at them after the initial burst of shots. We stress that the normal reaction Q And does [one] need to be an expert in electronic [sic] in order to conduct
of a person is to direct his sights towards the source of a startling shout or the disconnection?
occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar,[25] the most natural reaction for
victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of their A No, sir.
assailants and to observe the manner in which the crime is committed.
Q In other words, Mr. Canete, any ordinary electrician can cut it?
In bolstering their claim that it was impossible for the witnesses to have
identified them, appellants further aver that the crime scene was dark, there A That is if they are connected with the Visayan Electric Company.
and not long after we heard gunshots and because of that we ran towards
Q What I mean is that, can the cutting be done by any ordinary electrician? the house where the wake was. But before the gun-shots, I heard Pedring
Sabalones father of Roling saying: You clarify, [t]hat you watch out for
A Yes, sir.[30] mistake[n] in identity, and after that shout, gunshots followed. [sic] Then after
the gun-shots Roling went back inside still carrying the carbine and shouted:
Said witness even admitted that he could not recall if he did in fact cut the GATHER THE EMPTY SHELLS AND MEO[,] YOU BRING A FLASHLIGHT,
electrical connection of the Mansueto Compound.[31] The Court of Appeals and then I was called by Meo to help him gather the empty shells of the
further noted that none of the above witnesses were at the crime scene at or carbine and also our third companion to gather the empty shells.
about the exact time that the ambush occurred. Thus, none was in a position
to state with absolute certainty that there was allegedly no light to illuminate These arguments have no merit. In the first place, it is well to stress that
the gunmen when they rained bullets on the victims.[32] appellants were convicted based primarily on the positive identification of the
two survivors, Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores, and not only on the
Even assuming arguendo that the lampposts were not functioning at the extrajudicial statement, which merely corroborates the eyewitness
time, the headlights of the jeep and the car were more than sufficient to testimonies. Thus, said arguments have no relevance to this case. As the
illuminate the crime scene.[33] The Court has previously held that the light Court held in People vs. Tidula:[35] Any allegation of violation of rights during
from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can give custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
ample illumination to enable a person to identify or recognize another.[34] In extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes
the same vein, the headlights of a car or a jeep are sufficient to enable the basis of their conviction.
eyewitnesses to identify appellants at the distance of 4 to 10 meters.
In any case, we sustain the trial courts holding, as affirmed by the Court of
Extrajudicial Statement of Beronga Appeals, that the extrajudicial statement of Beronga was executed in
compliance with the constitutional requirements.[36] Extrajudicial
Appellants insist that Berongas extrajudicial statement was obtained through confessions, especially those which are adverse to the declarants interests
violence and intimidation. Citing the res inter alios acta rule, they also argue are presumed voluntary, and in the absence of conclusive evidence showing
that the said statement is inadmissible against Sabalones. Specifically, they that the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such
challenge the trial courts reliance on the following portions of Berongas confession shall be upheld.[37]
statement:
The exhaustive testimony of Sgt. Miasco, who undertook the investigation,
Q After Roling knew that Na[b]ing Velez was killed, have you observed [if] shows that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain
Roling and his companions prepared themselves for any eventuality? silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.[38]
Said witness also stated that Beronga was assisted by Atty. Marcelo Guinto
A It did not take long after we knew that Na[b]ing was killed, somebody called during the custodial investigation.[39] In fact, Atty. Guinto also took the
up by telephone looking for Roling, and this was answered by Roling but we witness stand and confirmed that Appellant Beronga was informed of his
did not know what they were conversing about and then Roling went back to rights, and that the investigation was proper, legal and not objectionable.
the house of Junior after answering the phone. And after more than two Indeed, other than appellants bare allegations, there was no showing that
hours, we heard the sound of engines of vehicles arriving, and then Meo, the Berongas statement was obtained by force or duress.[40]
man who was told by Roling to guard, shouted saying: They are already
here[;] after that, Roling came out carrying a carbine accompanied by Tsupe,
Equally unavailing is appellants reliance on the res inter alios acta rule under A I heard over the radio at the Sabalones Family that a certain Nabing Velez
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: was shot.
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during Q That [a] certain Nabing Velez was shot? What else xxx transpired?
its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. A I observed that their reactions were so queer, - as if they were running.
Appellants assert that the admission referred to in the above provision is xxxxxxxxx
considered to be against a co-conspirator only when it is given during the
existence of the conspiracy. They argue that Berongas statement was made Q In that evening of June 1, 1985, when you went there at the house of Jun
after the termination of the conspiracy; thus, it should not be admitted and Sabalones, have you seen an armalite?
used against Sabalones.
A Yes, sir.
The well-settled rule is that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is
binding only upon himself and is not admissible as evidence against his co- Q Where did you see this armalite?
accused, it being mere hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned.[41] But this rule admits of exception. It does not apply when the A At the table where they were conversing.
confession, as in this case, is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation of the co-accused in the killing of the victims[42] or Q How many armalites or guns [did you see] that evening in that place?
when the confession of the co-accused is corroborated by other
evidence.[43] A Two (2).
A They were gathered in one table and they were conversing with each ATTY. KINTANAR:
other.
Q When you looked xxx through the window and saw there were two
xxxxxxxxx vehicles and there were bursts of gunfire, what happened after that?
Q On that same date, time and place, at about 10:00 [i]n the evening, can A I did not proceed to look xxx through the window because I stooped down.
you remember if there was unusual incident that took place?
Q When you stooped down, what happened?
A After the burst of gunfire, I again opened the window. radio. Hence, the observation of the trial court that they went to their grisly
destination amidst the dark and positioned themselves in defense of his turf
Q And when again you opened the window, what happened? against the invasion of a revengeful gang of supporters of the recently slain
Nabing Velez.[45]
A I saw two persons going towards the jeep.
Alleged Inconsistencies
Q What transpired next after [you saw] those 2 persons?
Appellants also allege that the prosecution account had inconsistencies
A When they arrived there, they nodded their head[s]. relating to the number of shots heard, the interval between gunshots and the
victims positions when they were killed. These, however, are minor and
Q After that, what happened? inconsequential flaws which strengthen, rather than impair, the credibility of
said eyewitnesses. Such harmless errors are indicative of truth, not
A So, they went back to the direction where they came from, going to the falsehood, and do not cast serious doubt on the veracity and reliability of
house of Sabalones. complainants testimony.[46]
Q While they were going to the direction of the house of Sabalones, what Appellants further claim that the relative positions of the gunmen, as testified
transpired? to by the eyewitnesses, were incompatible with the wounds sustained by the
victims. They cite the testimony of Dr. Ladislao Diola, who conducted the
A I saw 5 to 6 persons coming from the highway and looking to the jeep, and autopsy on Glenn Tiempo. He declared that the victim must necessarily be
before they reached the jeep, somebody shouted that its ours. on a higher level than the assailant, in the light of the path of the bullet from
the entrance wound to where the slug was extracted. This finding, according
Q Who shouted? to appellant, negates the prosecutions account that the appellants were
standing side by side behind a wall when they fired at the victims. If standing,
A The voice was very familiar to me. appellants must have been on a level higher than that of the occupants of the
vehicles; if beside each other, they could not have inflicted wounds which
Q Whose voice? were supposed to have come from opposite angles.
A The voice of Roling Sabalones. We are not persuaded. The defense presumes that the victims were sitting
still when they were fired upon, and that they froze in the same position
Q What else have you noticed during the commotion [when] wives were during and after the shooting. This has no testimonial foundation. On the
advising their husbands to go home? contrary, it was shown that the victims ducked and hid themselves, albeit in
vain, when the firing began. After the first volley, they crouched and tried to
A They were really in chaos.[44] take cover from the hail of bullets. It would have been unnatural for them to
remain upright and still in their seats. Hence, it is not difficult to imagine that
A careful reading of her testimony buttresses the finding of the trial court that the trajectories of the bullet wounds varied as the victims shifted their
Rolusape Sabalones and his friends were gathered at one table, conversing positions. We agree with the following explanation of the Court of Appeals:
in whispers with each other, that there were two rifles on top of the table, and
that they became panicky after hearing of the death of Nabing Velez on the
The locations of the entry wounds can readily be explained. xxx Glenn this does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
Tiempo, after looking in the direction of the explosion, turned his body and sustained by this Court in the discussion above, that the guilt of the
around; and since the ambushers were between the jeep and the car, he appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
received a bullet in his right chest (wound no. 1) which traveled to the left. As
to wound No. 2, it can be explained by the spot where Major Tiempo found In any event, the trial court was not engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The
his fallen son. conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the appellants
killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial statement of
Atty. Kintanar: Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of
evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected
Q: Upon being informed by these occupants who were ambushed and [you] of having killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his
were able to return the car, what did you do? group to retaliate against them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims
vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the avenging men of Nabing
Major Tiempo: Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken
does not diminish their culpability. The Court has held that mistake in the
A: I immediately got soldiers and we immediately proceeded to the area or to identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in
the place where my fallen son was located and when we reached x x x the on his intended victim.[48]
place, I saw my fallen son [in] a kneeling position where both knees [were]
touching the ground and the toes also and the forehead was touching Be that as it may, the observation of the solicitor general on this point is well-
towards the ground. (TSN, Feb. 12, 1988, p. 6) taken. The case is better characterized as error in personae or mistake in the
identity of the victims, rather than aberratio ictus which means mistake in the
In such position, the second bullet necessarily traveled upwards in relation to blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision
the body, and thus the entry wound should be lower than the exit wound. in the blow.
There is no showing that both wounds were inflicted at the same time.[47]
Second Issue:
In any event, the witnesses saw that the appellants were the gunmen who
were standing side by side firing at them. They could have been in a different Denial and Alibi
position and in another hiding place when they first fired, but this is not
important. They were present at the crime scene, and they were shooting Appellants decry the lower courts disregard of their defense of alibi. We
their rifles at the victims. disagree. As constantly enunciated by this Court, the established doctrine
requires the accused to prove not only that he was at some other place at the
Aberratio Ictus time of the commission of the crime, but that it was physically impossible for
him at the time to have been present at the locus criminis or its immediate
Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of engaging in conjecture in ruling vicinity.[49] This the appellants miserably failed to do.
that there was aberratio ictus in this case. This allegation does not advance
the cause of the appellants. It must be stressed that the trial court relied on Appellant Beronga testified that, at the time of the incident, he was in his
the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the appellants staged the residence in Lapulapu City, which was not shown to be so remote and
ambush, not to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even inaccessible that it precluded his presence in Mansueto Subdivision. The
assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the motive of the appellants, alibi of Sabalones is even more unworthy of belief; he sought to establish
that he was a mere 20-25 meters away from the scene of the crime. He was Crime and Punishment
allegedly in the house of his brother who was lying in state, which was so
near the ambush site that some of the defense witnesses even testified that We agree with the appellate court that accused-appellants are guilty of
they were terrified by the gunfire. Clearly, appellants failed to establish the murder for the deaths of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo. The allegation of
requisites of alibi. treachery as charged in the Information was duly proven by the prosecution.
Treachery is committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means,
Furthermore, the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no
of the appellants.[50] As aptly held by this Court in People v. Nescio:[51] opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and that such means, methods
and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance from accused without danger to his person.[54] These requisites were evidently
the scene of the crime. The defense of alibi is further offset by the positive present when the accused, swiftly and unexpectedly, fired at the victims who
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Alibi, to reiterate a well- were inside their vehicles and were in no position and without any means to
settled doctrine, is accepted only upon the clearest proof that the accused- defend themselves.
appellant was not or could not have been at the crime scene when it was
committed. The appellate court also correctly convicted them of frustrated murder for the
injuries sustained by Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. As
Flight evidenced by the medical certificates and the testimony of Dr. Miguel
Mancao who attended to the victims, Nelson Tiempo sustained a neck
Appellants further object to the finding that Sabalones, after the incident, wound which completely shattered his trachea and rendered him voiceless,
made himself scarce from the place of commission. He left for Manila, thence as well as a wound on the right chest which penetrated his axilla but not his
Mindanao on the supposition that he want[ed] to escape from the wrath of chest cavity.[55] Rey Bolo sustained three injuries which affected his clavicle,
Maj. Tiempo and his men for the death of Glenn Tiempo and the near fatal ribs and lungs.[56] Rogelio Presores, on the other hand, sustained an injury
shooting of the other son or from the supporters of Nabing Velez. x x x On to his lungs from a bullet wound which entered his right chest and exited
his supposedly borrowed freedom, he jumped bail and hid himself deeper through his back.[57]
into Mindanao, under a cloak of an assumed name. Why, did his conscience
bother him for comfort?[52] The wounds sustained by these survivors would have caused their death had
it not been for the timely medical intervention. Hence, we sustain the ruling of
Appellants rationalized that Sabalones was forced to jump bail in order to the Court of Appeals that appellants are guilty of three counts of frustrated
escape two groups, who were allegedly out to get him, one of Nabing Velez murder.
and the other of Major Tiempo. Their ratiocination is futile. It is well-
established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his We also uphold the Court of Appeals modification of the penalty for murder,
guilt, and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an but not its computation of the sentence for frustrated murder.
inference of guilt may be drawn.[53] It must be stressed, nonetheless, that
appellants were not convicted based on legal inference alone but on the For each of the two counts of murder, the trial court imposed the penalty of
overwhelming evidence presented against them. fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
(medium), as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
Third Issue: day of reclusion temporal (maximum), as maximum. This is incorrect. Under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal, in its maximum period, to death. There being no aggravating or Rogelio Presores, who was likewise treated for gunshot wound in the same
mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, hospital, presented a statement of account amounting to P5,412.69 for his
the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. hospitalization.[62] Hence, he is likewise entitled to indemnity in the said
amount.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred in computing the penalty for each of
the three counts of frustrated murder. It sentenced appellants to Rey Bolo, on the other hand, incurred an expense of P9,431.10 for the
imprisonment of ten years of prision mayor (medium) as minimum to treatment of his gunshot wounds, as evidenced by a statement of account
seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal (medium) as from the same hospital.[63] This amount should be awarded to him as
maximum. It modified the trial courts computation of eight (8) years of prision indemnity.
mayor (minimum), as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED. However, the penalties are hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a frustrated
felony is the next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the 1) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, the accused-appellants are
consummated felony x x x. The imposable penalty for frustrated murder, each hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and
therefore, is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its severally, the heirs of the deceased, Glenn Tiempo, in the sum of P50,000;
medium period.[58] Because there are no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance as the Court of Appeals itself held,[59] the penalty prescribed 2) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, the accused-appellants are
by law should be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the each hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty for frustrated murder should be 8 severally, the heirs of the deceased, Alfredo Nardo, in the sum of P50,000;
years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of
reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum. 3) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-
appellants are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of
Although the Court of Appeals was silent on this point, the trial court correctly prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
ordered the payment of P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of each of the two temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and severally pay the victim,
murdered victims. In light of current jurisprudence, this amount is awarded Rey Bolo, in the sum of P9,431.10 as actual damages;
without need of proof other than the fact of the victims death.[60] The trial
court and the CA, however, erred in awarding indemnity of P20,000 each to 4) In Crim Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-
Nelson Tiempo, Rogelio Presores and Rey Bolo. There is no basis, statutory appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision
or jurisprudential, for the award of a fixed amount to victims of frustrated mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
murder. Hence, they are entitled only to the amounts of actual expenses duly temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and severally indemnify the
proven during the trial. victim, Rogelio Presores, in the sum of P5,412.69 for actual damages;
Thus, Nelson Tiempo, who was treated for a gunshot wound on the neck 5) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261 for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-
which shattered his trachea, should be awarded indemnity of P21,594.22 for appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision
his medical expenses. This is evidenced by a statement of account from mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
Cebu Doctors Hospital.[61] temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and severally indemnify the
victim, Nelson Tiempo, in the sum of P21,594.22 as actual damages.
named accused, armed with a bottle, with intent to kill, with evident
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Interior and Local premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
Government and the Secretary of Justice so that Accused Eufemio Cabanero feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting
may be brought to justice. upon the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.
SO ORDERED. Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
G.R. No. 171951 August 28, 2009
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr.
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner, and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie
vs. Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as the noise from the videoke
machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time that the
DECISION group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner was
heard to have said in the Ilocano vernacular, "Dayta a Manny napangas
QUISUMBING, J.: makaala caniac dayta." (This Manny is arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)6
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2005 of the On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision2 dated Ador Tacuboy not far from Chy’s apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the
July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, group to stop singing lest they be told off again. This further infuriated
which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of petitioner who remarked, "Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan ko a
homicide. Contested as well is the appellate court’s Resolution3 dated March pagbayagen daytoy," meaning, "This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let
13, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4 him live long."7
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened
that alleges as follows: at the house of Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon
mused over the drinking session on the 26th and 28th of September and the
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @ confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory, petitioner blurted out
Manding of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article [248] of "Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny is
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed really arrogant, I will finish him off today.)8 Later that afternoon, the group
as follows: headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner
proposed that they move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province by the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and there, decided to have
of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, SO ORDERED.10
was coming out of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter
approached petitioner who suddenly punched him in the face. Chy cried out, On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated
"Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman [inaano]?" (Why did you box me[?] December 20, 2005, thus:
I’m not doing anything to you.)9 But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz
attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the
continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with July 2, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch
it, struck the lower back portion of Chy’s head. Then, Foz shoved Chy [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
causing the latter to fall.
SO ORDERED.11
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and
phoned his wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a
mauling and complained of difficulty in breathing. Upon reaching Chy’s Resolution dated March 13, 2006.
house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody answered. Josefina
arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious on Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
the kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the
hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction. I.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR
portion of the RTC decision reads: INFLICTING THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE
DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
II.
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
HOMICIDE defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE
and after applying in his favor the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence TRIAL COURT FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of TEN MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH IS
(10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT RELATED CAUSE OF
YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum; DEATH.
2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY III.
THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (₱200,000.00) PESOS, representing expenses for the wake THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE
and burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱300,000.00) PESOS, as TRIAL COURT WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART FAILURE OF
moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO "FRIGHT OR SHOCK CAUSED BY THE
(₱332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit. MALTREATMENT."
issues, save where the factual findings of the trial court do not find support in
IV. the evidence on record or where the judgment appealed from was based on
a misapprehension of facts.16 Neither exception applies in the instant case
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN as would justify a departure from the established rule.
NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.12 Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-
interference with the determination of the credibility of witnesses. He points
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of out that the judge who penned the decision is not the judge who received the
Manuel Chy. evidence and heard the witnesses. But while the situation obtains in this
case, the exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado F.
In his undated Memorandum,13 petitioner insists on a review of the factual Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon motion of no less than the
findings of the trial court because the judge who penned the decision was not petitioner himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot seek protection from the
the same judge who heard the prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court alleged adverse consequence his own doing might have caused. For us to
of Appeals had wrongly inferred from, misread and overlooked certain allow petitioner relief based on this argument would be to sanction a travesty
relevant and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered, would justify a of the Rules which was designed to further, rather than subdue, the ends of
different conclusion.14 justice.
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact
implicates Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s injuries. Corollarily, he that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided
challenges the credibility of Armando’s brother, Fidel, who testified over the trial. It does not follow that the judge who was not present during the
concerning his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner disowns responsibility for trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot render a valid and just decision.17 Here,
Chy’s demise since the latter was found to have died of myocardial infarction. Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after Judge Manauis recused
In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio15 that Chy’s himself from the proceedings. Even so, Judge Cipriano not only heard the
medical condition could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner asserts evidence for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas
that, at most, he could be held liable for slight physical injuries because none Antonio who was recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth
of the blows he inflicted on Chy was fatal. mentioning, too, is the fact that Judge Cipriano presided during the taking of
the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua on rebuttal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial court’s assessment of
the witnesses and its conclusion that the beating of Chy was the proximate In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety
cause of his death. to decide it on the basis of the records on hand.18 He can rely on the
transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate the testimonies of witnesses
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and
well as the defense in this case, we are unable to consider the petitioner’s observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and
appeal with favor. procedural due process of law.19
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, yet, The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following
petitioner raises questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate that this injuries:
Court is not the proper forum from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated
Memorandum, however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased,
Body embalmed, well preserved. albeit, limited his liability to slight physical injuries. He argues that the
superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his death.21 Quite the
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds. opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of the records would acquaint us
with the causal connection between the death of the victim and the mauling
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the left ear; 4.0 x that preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of
2.8 cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., Chy’s myocardial infarction:
lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms., dorsum of left hand.
ATTY. TUMARU:
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper lip on the
right side. Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is
because there was an occlusion in the artery that prevented the flowing of
No fractures noted. blood into the heart?
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the
noted. hyperemic changes [in] the heart muscle were the one[s] that made us [think]
or gave strong conclusion that it was myocardial infarction, and most likely
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections the cause is occlusion of the blood vessels itself. (Emphasis supplied.)22
show a reddish brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the whole
posterior wall, the lower portion of the anterior wall and the inferior portion of By definition, coronary occlusion23 is the complete obstruction of an artery of
the septum. Coronary arteries, gritty, with the caliber of the lumen reduced by the heart, usually from progressive arteriosclerosis24 or the thickening and
approximately thirty (30%) percent. Histopathological findings show mild loss of elasticity of the arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in
fibrosis of the myocardium. a person with an existing arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not
occur.25 Dr. Jessica Romero testified on direct examination relative to this
Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark point:
purple. Cut sections show a gray periphery with reddish brown central portion
with fluid oozing on pressure with some reddish frothy materials noted. ATTY. CALASAN:
Histopathological examinations show pulmonary edema and hemorrhages.
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show congestion.
Histopathological examinations show mild lymphocytic infiltration.1avvphi1 A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering
that the patient [does] not have any previous [illness] of hypertension, no
Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other previous history of myocardial [ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or
partially digested food particles. hardening of the arteries, then excitement [cannot] cause myocardial
infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)26
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)20
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died
myocardium27 caused by a previous heart attack. Said fibrosis28 or because of the blow that was inflicted, it triggered the death of the deceased,
formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle and thickest do you agree with his findings, Doctor?
layer of the victim’s heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary occlusion
from sudden emotion. This causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr. A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Antonio:
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?
ATTY. CALASAN:
A: It could be, sir.
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of the
victim, Doctor? Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the
and[/]or hitting on the nape by a bottle? emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and
led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial
A: Yes, sir. infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional
crisis, Doctor? Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be
incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
A: Yes, sir. act done be different from that which he intended." The essential requisites
for the application of this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b)
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so much the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver
so, that there was less oxygen being pumped by the heart? wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.31lawph!l
A: Yes, sir. In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and
hit him with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a
Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor? heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s liability for his death. Ingrained in our
jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in the case of United States v.
A: Yes, sir, it could be.29 Brobst32 that:
In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows: x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal
violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the
ATTY. CALASAN: injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor
of criminal responsibility.33
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez34 enunciates that: Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the the
victim at the annual net income which time of this death) would have been
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal received
malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was
hastened, beyond peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the by the heirs for support.43
cause for such acceleration as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully
inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)35 Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary which
Manuel Chy was receiving as a sheriff of the court. At the time of his death,
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the Chy was 51 years old and was earning a gross monthly income of ₱10,600
natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act or a gross annual income of ₱127,200. But, in view of the victim’s delicate
performed is different from the one he intended;36 "el que es causa de la condition, the trial court reduced his life expectancy to 10 years. It also
causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the deducted ₱7,000 from Chy’s salary as reasonable living expense. However,
cause of the evil caused).37 Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not the records are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted evidence to
intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from substantiate actual living expenses. And in the absence of proof of living
criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, expenses, jurisprudence44 approximates net income to be 50% of the gross
said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3)38 of income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs of Manuel Chy should
the Revised Penal Code.39 Nevertheless, we must appreciate as mitigating be awarded ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity, computed as follows:
circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he
inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-51) x [₱127,200 - 1/2 (₱127,200)]
actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart was in good condition. = 2/3 x (29) x ₱63,600
= 19 1/3 x ₱63,600
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of = ₱1,229,600
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed without any We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of ₱200,000 as
aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be in the stipulated by the parties45 and civil indemnity of ₱50,000.46 Anent moral
minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period,40or damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without
anywhere from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen years (14) need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.47 However, in
years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,41 the obedience to the controlling case law, the amount of moral damages should
trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten be reduced to ₱50,000.
(10) years of prisión mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution
dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 are
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral damages is
for his loss of earning capacity in the amount of ₱332,000. In fixing the reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
indemnity, the victim’s actual income at the time of death and probable life Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; ₱200,000, representing expenses
expectancy are taken into account. For this purpose, the Court adopts the for the wake and burial; and ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
formula used in People v. Malinao:42
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
Associate Justice PHILIPPINES, respondents.
WE CONCUR:
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of
ARTURO D. BRION Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO doubt of the crime of homicide.
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD The records disclose the following facts of the case.
Associate Justice
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno
ATTESTATION Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan
located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the
Court’s Division. elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw
Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he
Associate Justice was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his
Chairperson soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo
(about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier
CERTIFICATION hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo
hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented
of the opinion of the Court’s Division. him from hacking Javier.
REYNATO S. PUNO Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought
Chief Justice Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened.
Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988 finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead.
Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police
station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore
Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead
suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3,
available medicine. 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the
presence of barangay captain Soliven.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to
Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the
which reads: hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing
wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years
of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The
October 23, 1980 and found the following: medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser Date Diagnosis
palmar prominence, right.
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound
was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already adm. at DX TETANUS
treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to
settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical #35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by
Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable 11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit
A), to wit: tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis
and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno
Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
tives. (p. 100, Original Records) That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the
canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching
the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, mudfishes;
Third Judicial District.
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, companions;
to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of
P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said
pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his
penalty. The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to
P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant. The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
(Annex "A") which states: responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas,
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, 56 SCRA 631).
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position in
the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982; The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who
used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the
swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and
town of said province; that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was
dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was
controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
regulated and reduced;
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the
from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which following definition of proximate cause:
covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True,
that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his xxx xxx xxx
death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
ultimately caused his death. 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their
brief. It is as follows:
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the
victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. ... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal
proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418). predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound
had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient
reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo) intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of
Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found We look into the nature of tetanus-
no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after
two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at
the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
clear from the record. complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients
often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The
intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
muscle groups affected. incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the
onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at
interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound
by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering
increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
central nervous system damage and death. proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation
remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote
include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions,
trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which
convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v.
pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied) Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote
body depends on the incubation period of the disease. cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion
by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125) to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the
civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting
slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate
respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other,
under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while
2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16). the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The
two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon
cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of
not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well- the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that,
settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity
No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said: the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be
xxx xxx xxx proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be criminal law?
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment "For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an
a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the
exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559). innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by
that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based
proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case,
liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of
Commission as follows: the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
homicide. Costs de oficio.
Chairperson,
SO ORDERED.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.
VELASCO, JR.,
PERALTA, JJ.
GEMMA T. JACINTO,
Respondent.
Present:
July 13, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
- versus -
DECISION
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
PERALTA, J.:
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. more credible, reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.
Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's
conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution[2] dated March
5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby
Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649
postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was
payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was
Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
(RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing,
allegedly committed as follows: merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and Petitioner, who was then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said
instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's
Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push
into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the
matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioners house, where she
met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided
that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was only
sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam.[4] petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded
Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca
called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced.[5] alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending
Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually
subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had brought out from the premises was the P10,000.00 marked money previously
already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning
for the dishonored check.[6] to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching
the whole time.
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the
subject BDO check in his bank account, but explained that the check came
into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house around
the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic
his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the Chemist found fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both
identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked
that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didnt know where to money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and
find the woman who rediscounted the check. one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of
Generoso Capitle.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until
she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect
payments from customers. According to her, on the morning of August 21,
1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED,
accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims in that:
that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination
that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to
said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep
of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When (a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for
her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, (b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months
Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, What is this? Then, the arresto mayor medium.
NBI agents arrested them.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999,
the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: SO ORDERED.
she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain this is presumed from
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check was
only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done
Resolution dated March 5, 2004. without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact that she had received the
check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to
the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things the check was
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a
assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of
petition are as follows: confidence petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments
from customers.
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the
the information; Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the theft must have
some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen.
This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the
penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and stolen.
xxxx
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense
is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would
because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the not amount to a crime.
person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the
execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by xxxx
reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are
essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having
in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked
money, which she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored
check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People[12] that x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is
under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, there is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x [13]
only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking
of personal property of another. Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that
petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner
already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another without receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored
the latters consent. check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of
qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as
replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been
dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing
xxxx offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was
caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
WE CONCUR:
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored
check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent
scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by
the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on
the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another
possible source of criminal liability. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated Chairperson
March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found
GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
ATTESTATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Chief Justice
Courts Division.
DECISION
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Associate Justice
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia,
Third Division, Chairperson a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who
was also about eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac,
Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the
mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing
with them inside the drainage culvert.[1] Wilson assented. When Garcia saw
that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two
meters from the entrance of the drainage system.[2] Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Laryngo tracheal lumina congested and edematous containing muddy
Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert particles with bloody path.
about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep.[3] After a
while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the Lungs hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains
drainage system and left[4] without saying a word. Respondent Andres also bloody froth.
came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson
who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body down Brain autolyzed and liquefied.
in the grassy area.[5] Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from
the scene.[6] For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Stomach partly autolyzed.
Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died.
Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries,
followed her.[7] contributory.[9]
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres
conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal and Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable
complaint against the respondents for Wilsons death. cause for homicide by dolo against the two.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac,
Investigation (NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Tarlac, charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion
Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto.[8] Respondent Pacheco alleged that reads:
he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with respondent
Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already dead when That at around 8 oclock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the
he passed by the drainage system while riding on his carabao. Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Dante Andres and
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and
Aguda of the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
submitted his autopsy report containing the following postmortem findings: attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were
fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with
white long sleeves and dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who
niche-apartment style. testified on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victims
head and the abrasion on the latters left forearm could have been caused by
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region. a strong force coming from a blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the
larynx and trachea also indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on
muddy particles were also found on the lumina of the larynx and trachea December 21, 2001. It ruled as follows:
(Nakahigop ng putik). Dr. Aguda stated that such injury could be caused
when a person is put under water by pressure or by force.[11] On cross- The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather
examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalp was on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts
caused by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence,
from a blunt instrument. He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars
that the occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object. the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that
the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)[15]
Wilsons head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was
thrown in a body of water, the boy could have died by drowning. The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following
issues:
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared
that the 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilsons face could have I
also been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by
contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL
of mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.[12] LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR
CIVIL LIABILITY.
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had
admitted the pictures showing the drainage system including the inside II
portions thereof,[13] the prosecution rested its case.
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON
the ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. QUINTO.[16]
It also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because
of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilsons The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities,
death. surmises and speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he
could have fallen, his head hitting the stones in the drainage system since
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by a snake which
civil aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit hard on the top
of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to some ailment,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that the trial court erred in ruling
THAT NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED- that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the
APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that respondent Andres
QUINTO.[14] even informed her of Wilsons death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico- injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries accused.[22] While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
sustained by the victim which caused his death; as well as the locus criminis. beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the
The petitioner insists that the behavior of the respondents after the cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for damages
commission of the crime betrayed their guilt, considering that respondent and/or restitution.
Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring out Wilsons
cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the drainage system only The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his friend Wilson to civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
come out. extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the
act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.[23]
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to
show that either or both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural
such, are jointly and severally liable therefor. and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.[24] Natural refers to an occurrence
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the in the ordinary course of human life or events, while logical means that there
prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting
crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the
and civilly liable for the latters death. resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces
The petition has no merit. the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[17] The civil immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
Revised Penal Code includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, its immediate predecessor.[25]
and indemnification for consequential damages.[18] When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the felonious
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless act of the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it victim. The cause and effect relationship is not altered or changed because
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.[19] With the of the pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim
implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are (las condiciones patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended
merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the physical condition of the offended
predominating the civil.[20] party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent
conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to para sister al herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as
deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.[26]
him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order.[21] The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti
the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely which consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants
foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delicti
includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.[27] crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is
burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and
life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that
does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of
the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or
to the death of the victim.[28] A different doctrine would tend to give immunity circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other
to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in
safeguard.[29] This Court has emphasized that: the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors
Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim
upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively
cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and presumed.[34]
thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime
might escape conviction and punishment. [30] Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the
private complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or
In People v. Quianzon,[31] the Supreme Court held: superior weight of evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is
stronger than that presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case judgment if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The
similar to the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
consequences of his act and in this case, the physical condition and weakness of that of the defendants.[35]
temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness
whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how
the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted preponderance of evidence is determined:
upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death, without his
being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in question Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the
should be qualified as homicide, etc.[32] party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. In evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
People v. Delim,[33] the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their
prove the guilt of the accused for homicide or murder: intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of
their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The
court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance A Yes, Sir.
is not necessarily with the greater number.[36]
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would
which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a indicate that the victim was still alive when he was placed under water.[37]
cause of action against the respondents for damages.
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victims
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective face could have been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or
testimonies of Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda. pavement:
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be
Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on caused by the face rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?
the scalp. But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was
equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough
been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the surface.
deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object:
Q Rough surface?
COURT:
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court would ask questions.
Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is the hematoma, caused on the back that the victim was strangled?
of the head might be due to the victims falling on his back and his head
hitting a pavement? A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.[38]
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the
strong enough and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, deceased might have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head
then it is possible. on the pavement, thus:
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when
head hit the pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping? the victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt
object and might have been inflicted as a result of falling down?
A It is also possible.
A - If the fall if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also
Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible.[39]
possible that he might have taken in some mud or what?
The trial court took into account the following facts: It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious
crimes for no reason at all.[42] However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no
there were stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit D to D-3). The stones could violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the
have caused the victim to slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either
was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join
slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres used
and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in some amount of water and to go to their house and play with her son before the latters death:
drown.[40]
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its
conclusion based on the said findings. A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going
from her mother who is gambling, Sir.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the
findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
evidence of the parties, and its conclusion anchored on such findings,
affirmed no less by the CA, are given conclusive effect by this Court, unless A Yes, Sir.
the trial court ignored, misapplied or misconstrued cogent facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case. Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?
The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a reversal of the
findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts. A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)[43]
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even When the petitioners son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent
Garcia testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was Andres who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her
so afraid that he refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside.[41] sons death. Even after informing the petitioner of the death of her son,
Respondent Andres had no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one. respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area
where the deceased was:
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the
abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?
whether the abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were made
ante mortem or post mortem. A He went with me, Sir.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres
both the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, was with you?
consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might have been used by
any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased. A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at
the culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just followed,
Sir.
premeditation, with intent to kill and while armed with a knife, did then and
Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith
Andres also came or arrived? one Elsa Villon Rodriguez thereby inflicting upon the latter stabbed (sic)
wound on the chest, which was the immediate cause of her death.
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.[44]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a
cause of action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the In Criminal Case No.9401, for attempted murder:
Information.
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Bgy.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
merit. No costs. Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premiditation (sic) and while armed with a knife, did then and there
SO ORDERED. willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one
Ricardo Maglalang thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries on the
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. different parts of his body, thus commencing the commission of the crime of
murder directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution
[G.R. No. 129291. July 3, 2002] which would produce the felony by reason of some causes or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance that is, by the timely and able medical
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENRICO A. assistance rendered to said Ricardo Maglalang which prevented his death.
VALLEDOR, accused-appellant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
DECISION
In Criminal Case No.9489, for frustrated murder:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991 at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9359, 9401, and the above-named accused, with intent to kill with treachery and evidence
9489, convicting accused-appellant of the crimes of murder, attempted (sic) premeditation and while armed with a butcher knife, did then and there
murder and frustrated murder, respectively. willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith on (sic)
Roger Cabiguen, hitting him on his right forearm, thus performing all the acts
The informations filed against accused-appellant read: of execution which produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will,
In Criminal Case No. 9359, for murder: that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to him which
saved his life.
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Barangay
Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with treachery and evident
After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at the National Accused-appellants defense of insanity was anchored on the following facts:
Center for Mental Health. Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993
wherein he pleaded not guilty.[5] Thereafter, the cases were archived until Accused-appellant, then 30 years of age, was a resident of Barangay
November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, and employed as provincial jail guard at the
withstand trial.[6] This time, accused-appellant admitted commission of the Palawan Provincial Jail. Sometime in January 1990, Pacita Valledor, his
crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumstance of insanity. The mother noticed that accused-appellant was behaving abnormally. For days
lower court thus conducted reverse and joint trial, at which the following facts he was restless and unable to sleep. He likewise complained that their
were established: neighbors were spreading rumors that he was a rapist and a thief. This
prompted Pacita to bring his son to Dr. Deriomedes de Guzman, a medical
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was in practitioner. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de Guzman that insanity runs in their
his house at Burgos Street, Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He family. After examining accused-appellant, Dr. de Guzman diagnosed him as
was working on a lettering job inside his bedroom together with his first suffering from psychosis with schizophrenia.[12] He prescribed a depressant
cousin, then 25-year old Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen known as Thoracin, which kept accused-appellant sane for a period two
and Antonio Magbanua. Roger was working at his table and seated on his months.[13]
bed while Elsa was across the table. Antonio was on the left side, while
Simplicio was seated near the door, on the right side of Roger.[7] On March 4, 1991, Pacita noticed that accused-appellant was again acting
strangely. She left to buy Thoracin but when she returned he was nowhere to
All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the room; uttered Rogers be found.[14]
nickname (Jer) and immediately attacked him with a knife, but Roger was
able to parry the thrust and was stabbed instead on the right forearm. On March 6, 1991, at around 6:00 in the morning, accused-appellant was
Accused-appellant then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and said, Ako seen swimming across the river of Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan.
akabales den, Elsa. (I had my revenge, Elsa). Thereafter, accused-appellant Barangay Captain Rufino Nuez and Barangay Councilman Antonio Sibunga
fled, leaving the stunned Simplicio and Antonio unharmed.[8] took accused-appellant out of the water and took him on board a pump boat.
Inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the
Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On their way out, effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that accused-appellant was
Antonio noticed a commotion and saw that Ricardo Maglalang, a neighbor of mentally ill, Barangay Captain Nuez, asked Councilman Sibunga to
the victim, was wounded. Antonio learned from the by-standers that Ricardo accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded
was likewise stabbed by accused-appellant.[9] and thereafter took a jeepney with accused-appellant at Barangay Bahile. At
about 1:00 in the afternoon, they reached Junction I at the intersection of the
Upon reaching the hospital, Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the National Highway and Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa City. Suddenly,
other hand was treated for the 5-centimeter wound sustained by him on his accused-appellant jumped off the jeepney. Sibunga tried but failed to chase
right forearm.[10] accused-appellant, who immediately boarded a tricycle. Later that day, he
learned that accused-appellant killed and harmed somebody.[15]
Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testified that sometime in 1980,
accused-appellant suspected him of killing his pet dog. In 1989, accused- Meanwhile, at around 2:00 in the afternoon of March 6, 1991, Pacita Valledor
appellant courted Elsa but she jilted him. On one occasion, Elsa spat on and was awakened by her daughter who told her that accused-appellant has
slapped accused-appellant.[11] returned. She rushed out of the house and saw him standing in the middle of
the road, dusty and dirty. She asked him where he came from but his answer
was Pinatay niya kayong lahat. Pacita dragged him inside the house and
later learned that he killed and wounded their neighbors. Thirty minutes later, Dr. Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical Service of the
accused-appellant was arrested and detained at the city jail.[16] PNP, Puerto Princesa City was likewise presented by the defense to interpret
the aforecited findings of Dr. Melendres.[19]
On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City Health Officer I of Puerto
Princesa City interviewed accused-appellant and thereafter made the On February 28, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of
following conclusions and recommendation, to wit: conviction. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
In People v. Estrada,[23] it was held that: Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one
who was in a state of a complete absence of the power to discern. Judging
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware and in control of what he
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two
will not exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be other people were also inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door
incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason where accused-appellant emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His
and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence obvious motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by calling out
of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. their names and uttering the words, I had my revenge after stabbing them.
Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence
as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. thereof.
And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. Accused-appellants acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying;
swimming in the river with his clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental not sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the time of the
faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has commission of the crime. As consistently held by this Court, A man may act
no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his acts. crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally
Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly so.[25] Then, too, the medical findings showing that accused-appellant was
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no
person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct consistent bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of
with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving
as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held
outward acts, by means of which we read thoughts, motives and emotions of liable for his felonious acts.
a person, and through which we determine whether the acts conform to the
practice of people of sound mind.[24]
In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be held liable only for murder is sufficient justification for said award.[29] The heirs of the deceased
attempted murder and not frustrated murder. The wound sustained by Roger are likewise entitled to the amount of P29,250.00 representing actual
Cabiguen on his right forearm was not fatal. The settled rule is that where the damages[30] based on the agreement of the parties.[31]
wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is
only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
execution that would have brought about death.[26] Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, is MODIFIED as
follows:
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed
upon the principal of an attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than 1. In Criminal Case No. 9359, accused-appellant Enrico A. Valledor is hereby
that prescribed for the consummated felony. Before its amendment by R.A. found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is
No. 7659, Article 248 provided that the penalty for murder was reclusion sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the
temporal in its maximum period to death. Under Article 61(3), the penalty two heirs of the deceased Elsa Rodriguez the following amounts: P50,000.00 as
degrees lower would be prision correccional maximum to prision mayor civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P29,250.00 as actual
medium. As there is no modifying circumstance, the medium period of the damages;
penalty, which is prision mayor minimum, should be imposed. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is entitled to a minimum 2. In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correcional in its reasonable doubt only of the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to
medium period, the penalty next lower than the penalty for attempted an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
murder.[27] correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum;
and to indemnify Roger Cabiguen in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of
For the murder of Elsa Rodriguez, in Criminal Case No. 9359, the trial court temperate damages;
correctly imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven by 3. In Criminal Case No. 9401, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond
the prosecution. reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
Accused-appellants civil liability must be modified. Not being substantiated correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
by evidence, the award of P14,000.00 as actual damages, and P15,000.00
for loss of income, to Roger Cabiguen in Criminal Case No. 9489, should be SO ORDERED.
deleted. However, in lieu thereof, temperate damages under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code may be recovered, as it has been shown that Roger Cabiguen Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ.,
suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with concur.
certainty. For this reason, an award of P10,000.00 by way of temperate
damages should suffice.[28] G.R. No. L-2189 November 3, 1906
In addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity which was properly THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET
awarded by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 9359, the heirs of Elsa AL.,Defendants-Appellants.
Rodriguez are entitled to another P50,000.00 as moral damages which
needs no proof since the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee. that the conspirators did in fact take the field and offered armed resistance to
the constituted authorities in the Philippines, only failing in their design of
CARSON, J.: overthrowing the Government because of their failure to combat successfully
with the officers of the law who were sent against them and of the failure of
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of the people to rise en masse in response to their
Manila of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by propaganda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the
Government of the Philippine Islands, as defined and penalized in section 4 It further appears from the evidence that the appellant Francisco Bautista, a
of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary resident of the city of Manila, was an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that
chanrobles virtual law library Ricarte wrote and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to aid
him in his journey, Bautista forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, the arrival of Ricarte, Bautista was present, taking part in several of the
with hard labor, and $3,000 fine, and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon, above-mentioned meetings whereat the plans of the conspirators were
and each of them, to three years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and a fine of discussed and perfected, and that at one of these meetings Bautista, in
$2,000, and all and each of the said appellants to pay their proportionate answer to a question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparations
share of the costs of the trial and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in the had been made and that he "held the people in readiness." chanrobles virtual
event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective law library
fines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with the
The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during the latter part of conspirators through the agency of one Jose R. Muñoz, who was proven to
the year 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a have been a prime leader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of
number of Filipinos, resident in the city of Hongkong, for the purpose of Ricarte, and by him authorized to distribute bonds and nominate and appoint
overthrowing the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands certain officials, including a brigadier-general of the signal corps of the
by force of arms and establishing in its stead a government to be known as proposed revolutionary forces; that at the time when the conspiracy was
the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina; that one Prim Ruiz was being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held several conferences
recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as with the said Muñoz whereat plans were made for the coming insurrection;
chief of the military forces to the organized in the Philippines in the that at one of these conferences Muñoz offered Puzon a commission as
furtherance of the plans of the conspirators; that toward the end of brigadier-general of the signal corps and undertook to do his part in
December, 1903 the said Ricarte came to Manila from Hongkong in hidding organizing the troops; and that at a later conference he assured the said
on board the steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the Philippines he Muñoz that he had things in readiness, meaning thereby that he had duly
held a number of meetings in the city of Manila and the adjoining provinces organized in accordance with the terms of his
whereat was perfected the above-mentioned conspiracy hatched in commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Hongkong that at these meetings new members were taken into the
conspiracy and plans made for the enlistment of an army of revolution and Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself with the
the raising of money by national and private loans to carry on the campaign; conspirators; that he had accepted the appointment as brigadier-general of
that to this end bonds were issued and commissions as officers in the the signal corps of the revolutionary forces with no intention of ever taking
revolutionary army were granted to a number of conspirators, empowering any further action in the matter, and merely because he did not wish to vex
the officers thus appointed to raise troops and take command thereof; and his friend Muñoz by refusing to do so, and that when Muñoz offered him the
appointment as brigadier-general he did so in "a joking tone," and that he, asking me to accept employment as brigadier-general, chief of signal corps,
Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila organizing the conspiracy at to which I, on account of his request and in view of the fact that the said
that time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Muñoz is a friend of mine from my youth, acceded; nevertheless I have
organized absolutely nothing in respect to this
These statements, however (except in so far as they corroborate the matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
testimony of Muñoz as to the fact that he had several interviews with Puzon
at which plans were entered into for the advancement of the cause of the Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you any
conspirators), can not be accepted as true in the light of a written statement commission for it? - A. Yes, sir; I accepted said employment and although
signed by Puzon himself at the time when he was first arrested, part of which they gave me an order to organize in my brigade I did not do it, because I
is as follows: had neither the confidence nor the will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence, and
occupation? - A. My name is Tomas Puzon; born in Binondo in the Province Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor the will to carry
of Manila; 37 years of age; married; by profession a teacher of primary and out what was intrusted to you, why did you accept employment as general of
secondary schools, and residing in Calle Concepcion, No. 195, district of the brigade? - A. I accepted it on account of friendship and not to vex a
Quiapo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library friend, but I never have the intention of fulfilling the obligations.
Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? - A. Personally I do not know him, but Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that he made this
by name, yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library statement, but he attempted to explain it away by saying that when he made
it he was so exited that he did not know just what he was saying. He does
Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in these Islands and not allege that improper means were taken to procure the confession, and it
with what object he came here? And if you know it to be true, through whom was proven at the trial that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the
did you get such information? - A. In the first place I had notice of his coming result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or promise of reward or
to the Islands as well as his object by reading the newspapers of Manila, and leniency. The accused appears to be an intelligent man and was for eighteen
secondly because J. R. Muñoz told me the same on one occasion when I years a school-teacher and later a telegraph operator under the Spanish
was in his house to visit him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law Government, and during the insurrection he held a commission as an officer
library in the signal corps of the revolutionary army. His confession is clear and
intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that he was so excited as not
Q. Did you acquire this information through any other person? - A. No, to know what he was saying when he made it, and its truth and accuracy in
sir; I have no more information than that which I have so far it inculpates him is sustained by other evidence of record in this
mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by Ricarte? - A. It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an
Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library officer of the military forces of the conspiracy should not be considered as
evidence against him in the light of the decisions of this court in the cases of
Q. What is the employment ( empleo) which you have in this the United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 364), United
organization, and who is it who invited you to join it? - A. J. R. Muñoz, who is States vs. Silverio Nuñez et al. 2 (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United States vs.
general of division of this new organization, spoke to me with much instance, Eusebio de la Serna et al. 3 (3 Off. Gaz., 528), and United States vs.
Bernardo Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is to be Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record was "the fact that a so-
distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that the record clearly called appointment of sergeant was found at his house."chanrobles virtual
disclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the apppointment law library
in question and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such
acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of conspiracy, and the In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. there was
fact that the accused accepted the appointment is taken into consideration testimony that four appointments of officials in a revolutionary army were
merely as evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators. In the first found in a trunk in the house of one Valentin Colorado, and the court in said
of these cases - the United States vs. De los Reyes - the accused was case reaffirmed the doctrine that "the mere possession of the documents of
charged with treason, and the court found that the mere acceptance of a this kind is not sufficient to convict," and held, furthermore, that there was
commission by the defendant, nothing else being done either by himself or "evidence in the case that at the time these papers were received by the
by his companions, was not an "overt act" of treason within the meaning of appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of the assistant councilmen of
the law, but the court further expressly held that - the barrio in which lived, a witness for the Government, showed him the
envelope, and stated to him he had received these papers; that he didn't
That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the playing of the game know what they were and requested this councilman to open them. The
of government like children, the secretaries, colonels, and captains, the coucilman did not wish to do that but took the envelope and sent it to the
pictures of flags and seals and commission, all on proper, for the purpose of councilman Jose Millora. We are satisfied that this envelope contained the
duping and misleading the ignorant and the visionary . . . should not be appointments in question and that the appellant did not act under the
dignified by the name of treason. appointment but immediately reported the receipt of them to the authorities."
chanrobles virtual law library
In the second case - the United States vs. Nuñez et al. -- wherein the
accused were charged with brigandage, the court held that, aside from the It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in
possession of commissions in an insurgent band, there was no evidence to no wise connected with them to some high office in the conspiracy, in the
show that it they had committed the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared hope that such person would afterwards accept the commission and thus
that they had never united with any party of brigands and never had been in unite himself with them, and it is even possible that such an appointment
any way connected with such parties unless the physical possession of these might be forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the
appointments proved such relation," and that it appeared that each one of possession of the person thus nominated, and that such appointment might
the defendants "were separately approached at different times by armed be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the person in whose
men while working in the field and were virtually compelled to accept the possession the appointment was found might be entirely innocent of all
commissions." chanrobles virtual law library intention to join the conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators to
use his name in this manner nor to send such a commission to him. Indeed,
In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it was contended that cases are not unknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions wherein it has
de la Serna had confessed that "he was one of the members of the been proven that such appointments have been concealed in the baggage or
pulajanes, with a commission as colonel," but the court was of opinion that among the papers of the accused persons, so that when later discovered by
the evidence did not sustain a finding that such confession had in fact been the officers of the law they might be used as evidence against the accused.
made, hence the doctrine laid down in that decision, "that the mere But where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case,
possession of such an appointment, when it is not shown that the possessor and it is proven that the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment as an
executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does not constitute officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly be taken into
sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant," applies only the case of Enrique
consideration as evidence of his relations with the
conspirators.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, when the
record will be returned to the trial court for execution. So
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in
open court, to support a conviction for the crime of treason should be applied Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.
in this case, but this court has always held, in conformance with the Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur as to the penalty imposed upon Bautista and
decisions of the Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of dissent as to that imposed upon Puzon.
conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the
crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is not applicable in G.R. No. L-31657 January 31, 1984
such cases. ( In re Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs. Mitchell, 2 Dall.,
348.)chanrobles virtual law library THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de EDGARDO VENGCO Y DAVID alias "Edwin", ROGELIO ENCARNACION Y
Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest substantially upon his acceptance of a DE LOS SANTOS alias "Roger Pusa", ROMEO SOLIBA Y REDOBLA alias
number of bonds from one of the conspirators, such bonds having been "Romy", CONSTANTINO LENESES Y MARILLANO alias Alexander
prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of raising funds for carrying out Remonte y Marillano alias "Alex Remonte", and LEON DAVID alias "Junior",
the plans of the conspiracy, but it does not affirmatively appear that he knew defendants, CONSTANTINO LENESES Y MARILLANO alias "ALEXANDER
anything of the existence of the conspiracy or that, when he received the REMONTE Y MARILLANO" alias ALEX REMONTE, defendant-appellant.
bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the bundle was,
nor that ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these G.R. No. L-32264 January 31, 1984
bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the bundle and discovered
the nature of the contents he destroyed them with fire, and that he never had THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
any dealings with the conspirators in relation to the conspiracy or the object vs.
for which it was organized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law EDGARDO VENGCO Y DAVID alias "Edwin", ROGELIO ENCARNACION Y
library DE LOS SANTOS alias "Roger Pusa", ROMEO SOLIBA Y REDOBLA alias
"Romy", CONSTANTINO LENESES MARILLANO alias Alexander Remonte
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence before us, in so y Marillano alias "Alex Remonte", and LEON DAVID alias "Junior",
far as it affects the said Aniceto de Guzman, should be reversed, with his defendants, LEON DAVID alias "Junior", defendant-appellant.
proportionate share of the costs of both instances de oficio, and that the said
Anecito de Guzman should be acquitted of the crime with which he is The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
charged and set a liberty forthwith, and that the judgment and sentence of
the trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco Bautista and Tomas Puzon, Tagalo, Gozar & Associates and Ricafort, Laxamana & Nacpil Law Office for
should be, and is hereby, affirmed, except so far as it imposes subsidiary defendants-appellants.
imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective
fines, and, there being no authority in law of such provision, so much of the
sentence as undertakes to impose subsidiary imprisonment is hereby RELOVA, J.:
reversed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
hese appeals are interposed by Constantino Leneses alias "Alex Remonte" of Corrigidor Street, Tondo, Manila, when a taxicab came and stopped at the
and Leon David alias "Junior" who, together with three others, were charged place where they were. Charlie Celadeña alighted from the taxicab.
in Criminal Case No. 87918, for the murder of Charlie Celadeña y Lim in the Thereafter, at about 30 meters away, a group of five persons, among whom
then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XX. The lower court adjudged were Edwin Vengco and Leon David came towards them. As there was an
them guilty thereof, and sentenced both of them to reclusion perpetua, with incident between Charlie Celadeña and Edwin Vengco three or four nights
the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the before, when the latter chased the former and threw bottles at him, Quiane
deceased in the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs. invited Charlie Celadeña to go with him inside the apartment where he and
his brother were living, to avoid the group. Celadeña would not go with them
The information filed against said appellants recites: and so Quiane and his brother went inside their apartment. They then heard
Charlie Celadeña knocking at the door of, and calling his sister at, the latter's
That on or about the 24th day of August 1967, in the City of Manila, house across the street. After a while Quiane heard the voice of a girl Calling
Philippines, the said accused, at night time, and with the use of superior for help. Quiane opened the door of the apartment and saw Charlie
strength to insure and afford impunity, conspiring and confederating together Celadeña lying down on the ground bleeding.
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and The testimony of Rolando Quiane was corroborated by Go Hong and Purita
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one, CHARLIE Delgado who declared that about midnight of August 24, 1967 while she was
CELADEÑA Y LIM, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed and sleeping in the house of "Ate During" the sister of Charlie Celadeña, along
pointed instruments which they were then armed, hitting him on the different Bagac Street, Ate During woke her up and she heard a commotion outside
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said CHARLIE CELADEÑA Y LIM the house. When she peeped through the opening of the window, she saw
mortal and fatal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his her "Kuya Charlie" leaning against the wall of the house being held by two
death moments thereafter. (p. 2, Rollo of L-31657 & L-32264) men, one of whom was appellant Leon David, on his hands. Thereafter,
another person approached the one being held by the two and stabbed him,
The version of the prosecution was unfolded by prosecution witnesses Go followed by two more men who also stabbed him. There were several thrusts
Hong, Rolando Quiane, Purita Delgado, and Dr. Mariano de Lara, Chief of with pointed instruments hurled at Charlie until one of them ran away,
the Medico-Legal Division, Manila Police Department. followed by three others, leaving the tall one who continued stabbing Charlie,
then already prostrate on the ground.
Go Hong testified that in the evening of August 24, 1967 he was in his house
at 2815-A Bagac Street, Tondo, Manila when he heard a commotion outside. Dr. Mariano de Lara conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased and
Looking out of the window he saw Charlie Celadeña being stabbed by Edwin his post-mortem findings show that the deceased sustained eleven (11) stab
Vengco while three others, one of whom he recognized as appellant wounds mostly located in the chest and abdomen and one in the back. Five
Constantino Leneses, were moving away from the victim, all of them armed (5) of the stab wounds were fatal.
with a dagger, an ice pick and a weapon with pointed blade. He went out of
the house and lifted Celadeña from the ground when he noticed that the The defense of Constantino Leneses alias "Alex Remonte", is denial and
latter was bloody in all parts of his body. The victim was brought to the Jose alibi. He contends that earlier in the afternoon of August 24, 1967, he was at
Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead upon arrival. the tailor shop near Jose Abad Santos Boulevard waiting for a pair of pants
the tailor was making for him. While waiting there, Edgardo Vengco, Rogelio
Rolando Quiane testified that about midnight on August 24, 1967 he and his Encarnacion, Romeo Soliba and Leon David arrived and invited him to go
brother were conversing on a sidewalk along Bagac Street, near the corner with them. They went to the house of Leon David where they had a drinking
spree. He became dead drunk that he was taken to his house in Balintawak The trial court committed no error in finding appellants Constantino Leneses
where he stayed the whole evening unconscious and regained and Leon David guilty of the crime charged.
consciousness only the following morning.
1. WE have consistently held that when there is no showing of improper
Appellant Leon David denied participation in the crime committed, motive on the part of witnesses for testifying against an accused, the fact that
contending that only Edwin Vengco, Roger, Romeo and Alex attacked and they are neighbors, friends or relatives of the victim does not render their
killed Charlie Celadeña. He testified that about 10:30 in the evening of clear and positive testimony less worthy of full faith and credit. Purita
August 24, 1967 he went home to turn over the proceeds of the sale of Delgado saw her "Kuya Charlie" leaning on the wall by the window of the
cigarettes to his mother. He then proceeded to the house of Edwin Vengco house of her Ate During about a meter away, being ganged up by appellants
and joined the group, namely: Vengco, Romy, Roger and Alex in a drinking and their companions, when she peeped through the window. The place was
spree. Vengco even asked money from him for the jeepney fares of the bright because of the two mercury lamps in front of the house. Go Hong,
three. Knowing Vengco to be a tough guy and a "siga-siga", he gave the husband of Ate During, immediately went to the assistance of the victim after
latter money. After about five minutes, he separated from them and the assailants had ran away.
proceeded to go home. On the way, he saw at a distance of about eight
meters a person being ganged up by Edwin Vengco and his companions. 2. As found by the lower court, a circumstance highly indicative of the
Vengco and Alex were stabbing the person with bladed weapons, while guilt is the fact that soon after the commission of the crime, Leon David left
Roger and Romy were holding the hands of the victim. He shouted at them Manila for Cavitewhere he hid himself until he was arrested on February 2,
not to do it and then left the place because he was afraid that he might be 1970. His explanation for hiding that he was afraid of Edwin Vengco does not
implicated. impress Us because if he was really innocent, as he claimed to be, he would
not have gone into hiding and would even tell the authorities what transpired
Further, Leon David denied the truth of the testimony of Purita Delgado who that evening. The truth is, he would have no reason to be afraid of anyone,
Identified him as one of the persons who held the victim by his hands when including Edwin Vengco who has no reason to go after him, he having done
the latter was being stabbed by Edwin Vengco and his companions. nothing wrong against him. On the contrary, he was not afraid to shout at
However, on cross examination, he could not say what reason or motive Vengco and his companions not to assault the victim and later to testify in
could have induced Purita Delgado to testify falsely against him. court with respect to their participation in the incident.
The defense also presented Melquiades Nuque, a taxi driver, who declared 3. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses have not been shown to
that he was about 20 meters from the place of the incident which occurred in suffer from any inconsistency and/or contradiction. In fact, the testimony of
the evening of August 24, 1967. He saw Vengco, Alex and the others only one witness, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court beyond
assaulting the victim, but appellant Leon David was not one of them, reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. (People vs. Argana, 10 SCRA 311).
Alibi, which is the defense of Constantino Leneses, is weak since it is easy to
Appellants put squarely in issue the credibility of Go Hong, Rolando Quiane concoct. Courts view it with caution and accept it only when proved by
and Purita Delgado averring that the lower court erred (1) in relying purely on positive, clear and convincing evidence. The positive Identification of
the testimony of these three witnesses; (2) in not considering the individual appellant Leneses as one of the perpetrators of the crime dwindles the
participation of each of the accused there being no proof of conspiracy; and defense of alibi.
(3) in not holding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient
to convict him. The crime committed is murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. The
People's evidence relative to the commission of the crime, the manner of its
perpetration and the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is not
disputed. Appellant Leon David and his witness, the taxi driver, confirmed
these facts. The conspiracy among therein appellants and their companions FELICIANO, J.:
is easily discernible from their conduct. The way in which they assaulted
Charlie Celadeña and their conduct sometime before and immediately after This case is before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional
the stabbing, clearly show that they had agreed to kill him. The rule is that "if Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union,
it is proven that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the convicting the accused-appellants Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio of the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their crime of murder and sentencing each of them to death.
acts, although apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence The accused Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio were charged in an
of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among information which read as follows:
them is proven (Underhill, Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed. by Niblack, pp. 1402-3;
People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868, 875). (Cited in People vs. Velez, 58 SCRA That on or about the 7th day of June, 1977, in the Municipality of Santol,
21, 31). Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
WE agree with the trial court that "no generic aggravating circumstance was mutually aiding one another, armed with a fire arm, with treachery and
sufficiently proved by the prosecution, the elements of nighttime, evident evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there
premeditation and treachery, not having been established by its evidence. willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shoot Eleno Maquiling inflicting upon him
On the other hand, no mitigating circumstance was shown by the evidence of a gunshot wound which caused the victim's instantaneous death.
the defense. The medium of the penalty prescribed for the offense should be
imposed on the accused. The penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua, it That the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was present in the
being the medium of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period commission of the crime. Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
to death for murder."
After arraignment and trial, the trial court rendered in due course, on 27 June
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the 1986, a decision finding both of the accused guilty of murder. The dispositive
modification that appellants pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the portion of the decision states:
deceased in the sum of P30,000.00. (People vs. de la Fuente, G.R. Nos. L-
63251-52, Dec. 29, 1983) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias 'Kamlon' guilty beyond reasonable doubt
SO ORDERED. of the crime of murder and judgment is hereby rendered imposing upon each
of them the Capital penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of Eleno
Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Maquiling the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the expenses in the sum of
P3,000.00 to said heirs, and to pay the costs.
G.R. No. L-75390 March 25, 1988
The bail bonds posted by the accused for their provisional liberty are hereby
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, cancelled and their immediate arrest ordered.
vs.
DANILO VALDEZ and SINIPLICIO ORODIO alias "Kamlon", appellants.
The accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in the following pants and carrying a long firearm, while the other accused Simplicio was
respects: running along side the former. Dionisio Maquiling, brother of the victim, also
testified that he too had seen Danilo with a gun and Simplicio both running
1) That the evidence of the prosecution does not establish the guilt of the away in a westernly direction. Danilo stated that he was then about seven (7)
accused beyond reasonable doubt; and meters away from the accused-appellants. 2 Danilo Valdez was a neighbor
and a relative of the Maquilings, while Simplicio Orodio was their old
2) That the evidence of the prosecution is based simply on suspicion. accquaintance residing in Sitio Village, Barangay Corooy of the same town;
thus, both were well-known to Esmenia and Dionisio Maquiling.
We will address these arguments together.
On 8 June 1977, the Municipal Health Officer of Balaoan, Dr. Monico O.
From the record, the facts of the case may be collated as follows: Morales, conducted an autopsy which showed that the victim Eleno had
sustained eight (8) gunshot (pellet) wounds on his back:
The house of the Maquiling family stands on the slope of a mountain in
Barangay Ambagat, Santol, La Union. At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 1. Wound, gunshot, ½; inch longest dia., 1 cm. below base of neck,
7 June 1977, the victim Eleno Maquiling, his sisters Leticia and Thelma, his medial, pellet plowed slightly upward and found its exist at the lower 3rd of
mother Esmenia, and his father Juanito were an in the yard of their house. neck, left, measuring 3/4 inch longest diameter. (Thru and thru).
Esmenia and Juanito were under the awning of their house facing north,
engaged in stringing together tobacco leaves. The victim's brother Dionisio 2. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia medial, 1 inch lateral to
was eating his dinner in the wall-less kitchen located on the ground floor of vertebral column, right, pellet plowed upward and found its exit at the base of
the house. The victim Eleno was seated with his back toward the north and neck, left, measuring ¾ longest diameter. (Thru and thru).
plucking a guitar. The place and its surroundings were lighted by a 300
candle power petromax lamp hanging under the northern end of the awning 3. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia level of 4th intercostal space,
of the house. 1 back, right, penetrating the chest cavity, pellet was recovered at the upper
lobe of right lung.
While the Maquilings were thus seated in their yard, a relative of the family,
one Carolina, arrived and asked Esmenia to accompany her to a prayer 4. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia 1 inch above armpit, back, right,
meeting. Esmenia demurred and instead asked Eleno to accompany pellet plowed slightly upwards and to left. Pellet was not recovered.
Carolina. The victim was then just about two (2) meters away from his
parents and about to stand up when suddenly a very loud gun shot rang out 5. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia 8th intercostal space, back,
from the northern side of the yard and Eleno fell to the ground, crying out to right, 1 inch lateral to the vertebral column, pellet penetrated check cavity
his father for help. Juanita rushed to his fallen son and carried him into their hitting lower lobe of lungs, right. Pellet was not recovered.
house; Eleno, however, died immediately thereafter.
6. Wound, gunshot ½ inch longest dia medial, back, left, level of 8th
The victim's mother Esmenia was about to succour Eleno when she intercostal space, hitting the lower lobe, lung, left. Pellet was not recovered.
instinctively looked toward the direction from whence the gunshot came and
saw the two (2) accused, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio, running down 7. Wound, gunshot. ½ inch longest dia chest, back medial, left, (Level
the hill away from the bamboo groves on the northern side of the house. of 9th interspace), penetrating chest cavity hitting lower lobe, lung, left. Pellet
According to Esmenia, the accused Danilo was wearing a blue shirt and dark was not recovered.
A. We immediately rushed to his side and we found him on the ground,
8. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia postero-lateral, back, I inch sir.
below lowest rib of chest, right. Pellet was recovered at the abdominal wall,
hypochondic region, front, right. Two (2) pellets were given to Chief of Police, Q. From what direction did you hear the gunshot?
Segundo Tuvera. 3
A. North of our yard, sir.
The morning after the shooting, on 8 June 1977, Sgt. Segundo Tuvera of the
Integrated National Police, Santol, La Union, went to the house of the Q. When you went to the succour of your son, what else did you do?
Maquilings to investigate the death of Eleno. 4 He saw a petromax lamp
hanging from the awning of the northern end of the house, as well as A. When I went, to give succour to my son, I turned and I saw these
footprints near the bamboo groves near the northern side of the house. two, sir,
During his investigation, neither Esmenia nor Dionisio informed Sgt. Tuvera
of what they had seen. Q. Where did you see the two accused?
On 10 June 1977, Juanito Maquiling, the victim's father, executed a sworn A. North of our yard, sir.
statement before the police in the Santol Police Substation. Juanita admitted
in his statement that he had not seen the accused-appellants on the night of Q. How far were they from you when you saw them?
the shooting. He did relate, however, that three (3) days prior to the shooting
of Eleno, Eleno had informed him that in case something untoward happened A. Witness indicating a distance of more or less five meters.
to him (Eleno), the accused-appellants Danio Valdez and Simplicio Orodio
should be held responsible, since he (Eleno) had quarrelled with them Q. When you saw the two accused, did you see anything in their
concerning their stealing and robbing. 5 Juanita further, stated that the possession?
accused Danilo has had a personal grudge against Eleno; Danilo had
mortgaged to Eleno's brother a stolen spading fork, a circumstance that A. They have, sir, (Witness indicating a length of about a foot), and it
Eleno discovered when the real owner of the spading fork came to talk to was Danilo Valdez who was holding that object.
him. Esmenia, Eleno's mother, gave no sworn statement on that day. Ten
(10) days later, on 20 June 1977, however, she made a sworn statement to Q. Were you able to recognize that object which Danilo Valdez was
the Philippine Constabulary in San Fernando, La Union. Shortly thereafter, then holding?
on 23 June 1977, Dionisio Maquiling, Eleno's brother, gave his own separate
sworn statement also to the Philippine Constabulary. Both Esmenia and A. It was a gun, sir.
Dionisio Identified Danilo Orodio as Eleno's killers. 6
Q. When you saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio north of your
At the trial, Esmenia Maquiling was firm and categorical in Identifying the yard, what were they doing?
appellants as the men she saw running from the bamboo groves immediately
after the shooting — A. I saw Danilo Valdez holding the gun while Simplicio Orodio ran
downhill and then Danilo Valdez followed, sir.
Q. When you heard that gunshot, what did you do?
Q. You Id that you saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio north of A. None, sir.
your yard. In relation to the place where you heard the gunshot, where were
they? Q. That petromax lamp which you said was hanging under the awning
of your house, how high is the petromax light from the ground level?
A. Near the bamboo grove which is located north of our house, sir?
A. The height is 12 feet, sir.
Q. In relation to that bamboo grove where you heard the gunshot,
where were Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio at the time you saw them? Q. How big was the petromax light?
A. They were east of the bamboo grove, sir. A. About two feet, sir. 7
Q. How far were they from that bamboo grove? Esmenia's testimony was corroborated by the equally definite testimony of
Dionisio Maquiling, who declared that:
A. Witness referring to a distance of about 6 to 6-½ meters away.
Q. Where were you at the time your brother was shot to death?
COURT:
A. I was in our kitchen eating.
Q. How far were you from the accused when you recognized them?
Q. Where was your brother then at the time he was shot in relation to
A. Less than a meter away when I recognized them, sir. your house?
Q. You Id that the distance between you and the two accused at the Q. In what particular part of your house, inside or outside?
time you saw them was five meters more or less. Upon questioning of the
court, you Id that the distance is less than a meter. Which is true? A. Outside of our house.
A. Witness pointing to a distance of more or less five meters. Q. What time was your brother shot to death?
Q. How were you able to recognize the two accused at that distance of A. More or less 8 o'clock in the evening.
five meters from you considering that it was nighttime?
Q. You said you were in the kitchen of your house eating and you
A. There was a light from the petromax lamp which was hanging [from] Pointed to Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias "Kamlon" as the persons
the awning of our house, sir. who shot your brother. How were you able to see Simplicio Orodio and
Danilo Valdez shoot your brother?
Q. That part of the house where this awning is located, is there a wall
surrounding the awning? A. I saw them.
Q. Will you relate how were you able to see Danilo Valdez and Simplicio the several accused who were still at large has been considered as a justified
Orodio alias Kamlon shoot your brother Eleno Maquiling? reason for the witnesses' delay in coming forward with their testimony'
(People vs. Sampang, 16 SCRA 531; People vs. Equal, 14 SCRA 89). 11
A. When I was eating facing westward I heard a gunshot and when I
looked through the north I saw Danilo Valdez running being followed by This explanation does not appear incredible in itself and certainly such a
Simplicio Orodio. delay of thirteen(13)days, under the circumstances of this case, does not
warrant a conclusion that her testimony as to the Identities of the killers of
Q. When you looked northward and you saw Danilo Valdez and her son was false. In People v. Martinez, 12 the Court held that the failure of
Simplicio Orodio running, did you see anything in their possession? a witness to reveal immediately the Identities of the accused does not militate
against his credibility.
A. A gun. (Witness showing a length of about half a meter).
Both Esmenia Maquiling and Dionisio Maquiling did not testify that they had
Q. Who of the two, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio was hiding the actually seen either Danilo Valdez or Simplicio Orodio shooting at the
gun? deceased victim. The principal evidence against the accused is, therefore,
circumstantial in character. The trial court recognized this and was careful to
A. Danilo Valdez. 8 analyze the chain of circumstantial evidence on the basis of which the trial
court concluded that the two (2) accused had killed Eleno Maquiling:
The trial court found the testimony of witnesses Esmenia and Dionisio as
positive, credible and reliable. We find no reason to disagree with the finding While the prosecution failed to present an eye witness to the actual shooting
of the trial court. It is commonplace that "the findings of the trial court as to by the accused of deceased Eleno, the chain of circumstances, prior and
the credibility of the witnesses are to be given great weight and a high subsequent to the killing, leaves no room for doubt that accused are the
degree of respect by the appellate court". 9 There is nothing in the record to guilty persons. The rule is that before conviction upon circumstantial
show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any improper motive to evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain
accuse falsely the accused-appellant — one a relative and the other an old which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as
acquaintance — of so grave a crime as murder. the authors of the crime. (People vs. Pamintuan, 127 SCRA 820). In this
case, this requisite has been fully met.
The circumstance that Esmenia waited for thirteen (13) days after her son's
assassination before reporting the Identities of the accused to the authorities, Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
was not unnatural in itself. She explained the delay by saying that she was
afraid to talk about the killing and that she had seen the accused loitering CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHEN SUFFICIENT. — Circumstantial
frequently around the Maquilings' house, carrying a gun, after the burial of evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
her son.10 The trial court observed that Esmenia's fear —
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
was not imaginary because the night that she reported the Identities of the
accused their house was stoned by unidentified persons. The delay was (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
satisfactorily explained. In People vs. Martinez, 127 SCRA 260, it was held
that delay of witness for several months, because of fear, in reporting the (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
incident to the police does not affect credibility. "Fear of likely retaliation by conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
a shotgun, at approximately 8:00 o'clock in the evening, immediately after the
Tested by the rule stated above, and considering that Eleno was killed by a fatal shooting, just outside the Maquilings house where he had no business
shot in the back and suffered eight (8) pellet wounds from one gunshot only; being if he were not acting in concert with Danilo Valdez, the accused-
that the accused were immediately seen running down-hill away from the appellant who carried the shotgun. He was a close friend (barkada) of the
scene after the gunshot report with accused Danilo v. Valdez carrying a long accused Danilo Valdez, both of whom the deceased victim had Identified as
firearm; that three (3) days before the incident there was already bad blood probably responsible should any untoward event befall the victim. Simplicio
between the victim and accused Danilo Valdez as the victim confided to his Orodio completely failed to explain what he was doing with Danilo Valdez the
father Juanito Maquiling that if ever he would be shot accused Danilo Valdez night of the killing, on the one hand. Upon the other, both Danilo Valdez and
is the one to be blamed; 13 that when the place where the clime was Simplicio Orodio pleaded the same alibi. Valdez and Orodio both testified
committed is an isolated place and it is highly probable that some other that they were in Cervantes, Ilocos Sur, when Eleno was shot to death. Their
malefactors could have been present; and that footprints were seen by the common alibi remained uncorroborated for both failed to present either the
police investigators behind the bamboo grove where the accused were seen mother of accused Danilo Valdez who was supposed to have come to
to come from immediately after the shooting that Esmenia Maquiling even Cervantes Ilocos Sur, to inform them that Eleno Maquiling had been shot to
described the clothing of accused Danilo Valdez; that the two accused are death, or any other witness for that matter. The trial court found the accused
well known to the victim's family thereby precluding the possibility of common defense of alibi as non-credible "as it was not impossible for the
mistaken Identity; all these proven facts afford sufficient or a reasonable accused to be present at the scene of the crime. 16
inference that the two accused were indeed the killers of the victim. 14
We hold that the prosecution's evidence was more than adequate to sustain
In his brief, the Solicitor General took the position that accused-appellant the finding of the trial court of a conspiracy between Danilo Valdez and
Simplicio Orodio should be acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain Simplicio Orodio. Conspiracy being present, it does not matter that the
this conviction either as a principal or an accomplice. The Solicitor General prosecution had failed to show who as between the two actually pulled the
said: trigger of the shotgun that killed Eleno Maquiling. 17 Both Danilo Valdez and
Simplicio Orodio are liable as co-conspirators since any act of a co-
In the case at bar, the information charged Orodio as having allegedly conspirator becomes the act of the other regardless of the precise degree of
conspired with Valdez in killing Eleno. The prosecution did not however participation in the act. 18
adduce any evidence establishing the aforesaid alleged conspiracy between
Valdez and Orodio to commit the crime charged. The only fact that the The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of treachery and evident
prosecution was able to successfully prove was the presence of Orodio at premeditation. The accused had purposely sought nocturnity and hid
the crime scene when he was seen running together with Valdez by Dionisio themselves behind the bamboo groves located close by the victim's house
and Esmenia after Eleno was gunned down and that he was a barkada of and had fired at Eleno Maquiling suddenly, without any warning, from behind
Eleno. It is submitted that in the light of the aforecited ruling in the Madera obviously to ensure the success of their deadly purpose without any risk to
case, there exist no factual and legal basis to sustain the conviction of Orodio themselves and without any possibility of retaliation. Three (3) days before
either as a principal or accomplice in this case. 15 his assassination, Eleno was already apprehensive for his life when he
disclosed to his father, Juanito Maquiling, his quarrel with Danilo Valdez and
We are unable to agree with the Solicitor General, whose view appears to be Simplicio Orodio over the latter's thievery and robbery. Clearly, the accused
too drastic a simplification of the evidence that was in fact before the trial had planned to kill Eleno some days before the fateful night of 7 June 1977;
court. Orodio was present with Valdez at the time Eleno Maquiling was killed the shotgun blast at the back of Eleno was not the result of a spur of the
by a shotgun blast at his back. He was in the company of a man running with moment decision.
FERNAN, J.:
Since both treachery and evident premeditation were present, and only one
(1) qualifying circumstance is necessary to constitute homicide into murder, These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by Judge
evident premeditation may be considered as a generic aggravating Oscar Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of
circumstance. 19 The circumstance of nighttime is, however, absorbed by Quezon City, Branch XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y
treachery. 20 A second aggravating circumstance — that the victim who had Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable
given no provocation was slain in his dwelling — was also found by the trial doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the
court. 21 supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the
victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 for each of the victims and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court finding moral damages of P200,000.00 G.R. No. 69564 is the automatic review of
Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the the death sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition for review on certiorari
crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED. In view of the abolition of capital of said decision, the recourse taken by accused-appellant Juan Escober 'to
punishment under the 1987 Constitution, and in view of the presence of two cut short that long period of wait for a final resolution of his fate." 1
(2) aggravating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the
applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John
Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime of
SO ORDERED. Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in an
Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty" with
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on
March 2, 1983.
G.R. No. L-69564 January 29, 1988
On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too,
vs. pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had
RICHARD DOE, PETER DOE AND JUAN DOE, accused. JUAN ESCOBER replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan Escober.
y GERALDE and MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, accused-
appellants. A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence,
summarized by the Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as follows:
G.R. No. L-69658 January 29, 1988
One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner, Alorte, * was formerly a co-security guard of appellant Juan Escober at the
vs. Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family corporation owned by the couple
HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It is located inside a walled compound about
BRANCH XCVII, QUEZON CITY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 50 meters away from the residence of its owner, at 24 Joy Street, Grace
respondents. Village, Balintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the incident,
Abuyen was relieved by Domingo Rocero for being always absent and found
sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14, sofa while her (sic) daughter Tiffany was lying on the floor, both mortally
1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22, 1983). wounded. Beside her (sic) daughter, he saw a scissor blade [Exhibit 'E' fun of
blood. He also observed that everything was scattered in his office, with all
At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of duty was Ms drawers opened. Later, he found out that the P5,000.00 cash he kept in
from 7:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left his post at about 7:30 one of the drawers was lost [pp. 1314, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
P.M. that evening after he was relieved by appellant Juan Escober. On his
way home, he passed by Barangay Balingasa in Balintawak, where he saw Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to bring out the
Amadeo Abuyen in the store of Colonel Samson drinking beer with three car as their children was (sic) stabbed and bleeding. Forthwith, she got one
companions, one of whom he later Identified as the appellant Macario car, while her eldest son drove a second one. After Vicente Chua had
Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 4-11, tsn, April 22, 19831. brought the two wounded children inside the two cars, they were brought to
the Chinese General Hospital where they were pronounced dead upon
After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his office at the arrival. [pp. 22-26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
Bee Seng Electrical Supply as he usually does after office hours,
accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-year old daughter Tiffany On It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when Police
their way, he saw appellant Escober at his post. At the office, the two Investigator Oscar Francisco was dispatched to investigate the incident. And,
children watched a television program, as their father proceeded to the since the victims were already brought to the Chinese General Hospital, he
bathroom to take a bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983]. was instructed to proceed thereto. When he arrived at the hospital at past
9.00 o'clock P.M., he found the victims already dead. Whereupon, he
Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and proceeded conducted a cursory examination of the victim and indicated on two separate
to the Bee Seng Electrical Supply. Upon alighting thereat, Abuyen knocked sketches (Exhibits "C" and "D"), the 12 and 11 stab wounds sustained by
at the little door of the gate. Appellant Escober, peeped thru the hole and Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From there, he proceeded to the
opened the door. Then after Abuyen had talked with Escober, the former scene of the crime, where he met Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera and a police
asked Punzalan to wait outside, while he (Abuyen) and his two other photographer, who arrived to assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July
companions went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9, 1983]. 5, 1983].
At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their residence to Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a scissor
join her husband and two children. On her way, she noticed that the (Exhibit "E") which the former said was found beside the pool of blood inside
pedestrian gate was wide open with the appellant Punzalan standing there. the room where the incident happened. In the course of his investigation,
She shouted why the gate was opened, but nobody answered. Suddenly, Francisco noticed that the drawers inside the office of Vicente Chua were
she heard of shot coming from the direction of the garage; and when she forcibly opened with its (sic) contents scattered. Upon subsequent interview
looked thereat, she saw Abuyen and the appellant Escober walking towards with Vicente, he likewise learned that cash amounting to P5,000.00 was
the gate. So, she rushed back inside the house to contact her husband taken by the culprits in one of said drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].
through the intercom. But since the intercom was out of order, she hurriedly
went outside and met appellant Escober who volunteered the information Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police Headquarters
"that he was not hit." [pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983]. appellant Escober, the security guard on duty then at the Bee Seng Electrical
Supply, who voluntarily gave his version of the incident (Exhibit "F"). Aside
Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom, when he heard from that of Escober, the written statements of the victims' parents, Vicente
the gunshot. He hurriedly went out and saw her (sic) son Irvin lying on the Chua and Lina B. Chua, were also taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively).
Thereafter, Francisco referred on December 8, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "I") the not like to see the guardhouse dirty and also because after the security guard
result of his investigation to the City Fiscal who wrote at the left hand margin leaves, the security guard on duty must clean it. There was a janitor but the
thereon the following notations: "Detained the accused all prima facie case security guards used to clean the guardhouse. As security guard, he had a
exist(s) and that accused is probably guilty thereof. No bail recommended. gun but on this occasion he left it in the locker because he was cleaning the
[pp. 13-23, Ibid]. guardhouse. Then when he was to throw the garbage, Alorte arrived and
talked to him because he, Alorte alias Abuyen, wanted to, and two men [also
Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police accused named Does as they are also still at large] entered and one man
apprehended the appellant Punzalan, who in a police line-up was readily [co-accused Punzalan] was left at the gate. Escober was not able to talk to
Identified by the victims' mother, Una Chua, as one of those she saw Alorte alias Abuyen because when Alorte came, one of his companions
standing at the open gate of their compound during the night of the incident aimed a gun at Escober and also a knife and they said they would kill him.
on December 2 (sic), 1982. Another statement (Exhibit "F") was, therefore, He does not know the man who aimed a gun at him. He only knows Alorte
taken on December 10, 1982 from the victims' mother to supplement the because he Alorte used to be his co-guard at Vising Electrical Supply. They
previous statement she gave on December 8, 1982. Also taken on even date then asked Escober to get into (climbed) the pick- up car inside the garage
were the statements of Security Guard Jesus Zaragosa (Exhibit "K") and that and the other man was pointing a gun at Escober. Alorte and his companion
of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of one of the suspects who claimed that went up the Vising Electrical Supply. Escober does not know the real name
her son, Amadeo Abuyen, mentioned to her his four [4] companions, of Alorte; all the (sic) knows is Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the
including the herein two appellants, in the commission of the crime. Even man who was left near the gate but he knows him by face and he was then in
appellant Punzalan waived his constitutional rights under custodial the courtroom and he pointed to the person who answered by the name of
investigation and voluntarily and willingly gave his statement (Exhibit "M") Macario Punzalan, Jr., his co- accused. Escober did not see what Punzalan
wherein he did not only admit his participation in the commission of the was doing because he, Escober, was made to climb the vehicle (pick-up). At
crime, but also implicated appellant Juan Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, this point, his gun was in the locker. He was not able to get that gun when
tsn, July 6, 1983]. these four men entered because a gun was already pointed at him. Alorte
took Escober's gun from the locker because he was formerly a security guard
Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "J") to the at Vising Electrical Supply for 3 or 4 months. He does not know why Alorte
Fiscal, Police Investigator Francisco named the five [5] accused as: Juan did not continue his work there. After 5 minutes, after the two men went up
Escober y Geralde, Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y the office, they came down and talked to the man guarding Escober and
Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias Dodong and a certain Peter Doe, albeit, only Alorte fired at him. He was not hit for he was able to avoid it and after that,
the herein two appellants were apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6, 1983]. 2 the four men suddenly left. Escober went down from the pickup and he heard
Vicente Chua calling him and he responded. Chua asked him to call Mrs.
Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify Chua at the house because, according to Chua, their children were stabbed.
in his defense. His testimony is deed in his Brief, thus: So Escober went to the house and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr. Chua called
him, Alorte and his companions were no longer at the place for, after firing,
Escober was then a Security guard and belonged to the Western Private they hurriedly left. Escober was able to call Mrs. Chua and she and he,
Detective Security since January 1, 1982 and was assigned at Vising together, returned to Vising Electrical Supply and upon reaching the place,
Electrical Supply at Joyce St. Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City,owned Mr. Chua was shouting and he could not understand him because he was
by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. On December 3, 1982, at 7 p.m. he speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back and got the car, parked it and
reported for work. When his companion left and he arrived (to take over) he returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the office, he was bringing
cleaned the guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr. and Mrs. Chua did his son and placed him at the parked car of the office. When Chua returned
to the office (after he called Escober) and came back out, Escober saw him they boarded a tricycle; and the group stopped 'at a place with a high gate'
with his son and placed him at the balcony. The two children who were because ABUYEN/ ALORTE wanted 'to drop by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11,
stabbed were carried in two cars because there were only two cars at the November 9, 1983). ABUYEN/ALORTE knocked at the little door and the
driveway. Escober opened the gate. He does not know to what hospital they security guard (PUNZALAN Identified accused Escober as the security
went. After that, he called Jeffrey one of the sons of the Chuas, so he could guard) opened the door and they greeted each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE
help him (Escober) call the police. Jeffrey was not able to call the police then instructed PUNZALAN "to wait for him outside;" and thereafter
because when Jeffrey gave him a directory and asked him (Escober) to look ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions entered the compound (TSN,
for the telephone number of the police but he told Jeffrey to look it up himself pp. 11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).
because his eyes were blurred. After 15 minutes, the police came and after
that, the owner of the security agency arrived. Other policemen not in uniform PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for the group; that
also arrived. They interviewed Escober and forced him to go with them to the while waiting he heard the mourn (sic) of a child that he was then about to
police precinct. He refused because the owner of the agency had not then enter the premises but he met ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions
arrived. When owner arrived, he called another security guard to guard the and saw them with blood stains in their arms;' that ABUYEN/ALORTE and
Vising Electrical Supply. The police and the owner of the security brought his companions started running and he followed them; that in response to his
Escober to the precinct to get his statement and there the police was forcing query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE stated that he stabbed the two [2] children'; and
him to adroit he was the one who robbed and killed the children of the Chuas that they boarded a taxi and he was brought back to our place where we are
and he told them do not know everything. The testimony of Mrs. Chua that selling apples' (TSN pp. 14- 18, Nov. 9, 1983)
she saw him together with Abuyen Alorte inside the garage is not true
because he was the one who told Mrs. Chua that their children were being PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of 10 December 1982 at the
stabbed. When Alorte and his companions left, Mrs. Chua was finding (sic) to Monuments market. No lawyer assisted him during his custodial investigation
call him (Escober). When he was brought to the precinct, the investigator despite the fact that he informed the police officers that he has a lawyer by
was typing something. Escober could recall/remember only his signature. He the name of Atty. Valdez nor was he informed of his constitutional rights to
Identified his statement, Exhibit I for the defense, Exh. F for the prosecution. remain silent and to counsel. Nevertheless, the police investigator proceeded
He narrated it there exactly. The signature there are his. He knows the police to interrogate him. He disclosed that he was invited by Amadeo Abuyen for a
who investigated him but he does not know the person. Escober was at the drink; and that they drank beer 'in a place near Abonce Beer House.
precinct when he signed his statement. He was there up (sic) October 3, "PUNZALAN asserted that, when Exh. M was presented for his signature he
1983, the date he testified in court (tsn, 2-13). 3 refused to sign (Exh. "M") because 'many statements thereon are not correct
that he nevertheless signed Exh. "M" because he was already tired and was
Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense. forced to sign it after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected me to water
The gist of his testimony is found in his Brief as follows: therapy and he could not endure the pain, when they gave (him) the electric
shock treatment;" and that the portions of Exh. "M" which are incorrect are
PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is found in TSN, those Identified as Exhs.'11-A and 11-B (TSN, pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ). 4
pp. 2-35, Nov. 9, 1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at "the market of
Monumento." In the afternoon of 3 December 1982, according to On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On
PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of fugitive ABUYEN/ALORTE for a February 8, 1984, despite his manifestation in open court immediately after
drink, in a place near Abonce Beer House; ABUYEN/ALORTE was with two the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing the same to this
companions whom he introduced all his relatives; after several drinks, he Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by
was requested to join the group to proceed to another place for which reason the prosecution.
Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-Appellant
on August 7, 1984 as counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, Juan Escober filed in G.R. No. 69564.
he filed another motion for reconsideration for the said accused, which was
likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of pleadings On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the
between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order following grounds:
dated November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence. the petition in G.R.
No. 69658 and the automatic review. PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS
CONVICTION SHOULD BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT
In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that: PUNZALAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO RE MAIN SILENT AND TO
COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE THREE OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO- INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY IN- INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE
PAGE DECISION IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE MERITS;
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING PETITIONER ...; THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MAT TER OF LAW,
PUNZALAN IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT
PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCI PAL MOTIVE
THREE OTHERS ACTED "AS PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE FOR THE CRIME WAS ROBBERY;
COOPERATION" CONSIDERING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST:
(THE) UNLIKELY GARBAGE THROWING REASON OF ACCUSED THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN FACT
ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE COMPOUND COMMITTED;
IN QUESTION, AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS CO-ACCUSED
MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR. OF KNOCKING ON THEIR PART; SECOND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON THE
THE RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF FIRING A GUN JUST GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT;
BEFORE THE EXIT OF THE CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING
THAT HE WAS NOT HIT': AND THIRD: '(T)HE VERSION OF JUAN THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME WAS
ESCOBER 'PETITIONER) REGARDING HIS ACTUATION DURING THE COMMITTED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN
HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS REPLETE WITH RULING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED
CONTRADICTIONS. WITH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY,
NIGHTTIME, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH,
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVICTING TREACHERY AND IN BAND. 6
PETITIONER TO DEATH AS SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL
LAW ON CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY. We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the objection
interposed to the form and substance of the decision under review. Accused-
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION appellant Escober asserts that said decision is null and void for it does not
FOR RECONSIDERATION ... OF SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10, 1984. conform with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution
5
and that it was rendered even before all the stenographic notes of the the gate of the compound in question, against the testimony of his co-
proceedings had been transcribed. accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of knocking on their part; the ritual in
avoidance of suspicion of firing a gun just before the exit of the co-
We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of conspirators of Juan Escober, and volunteering the information that he was
1-1/2 pages, typed single-space, with a number of handwritten notations and not hit. The version of Juan Escober regarding his actuation during the half-
insertions. It reads: hour robbery homicide was replete with contradictions. Macario Punzalan
admitted being fetched by, going with and talking to, immediately prior to
The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named accused of taking a tricycle to the said compound, and later acting as lookout for, his co-
Robbery with Homicide defined in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It conspirators. The Court finds further that the group took some drinks, not to
alleged, among others, that on or about December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, get drunk admittedly, and therefore to strengthen their resolve better to
said accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, commit the crime planned.
with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation again persons
robbed Vicente Chua y Ching by entering the premises of No. 24 Joy St. WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario
Grace Village, Quezon City and taking therein P5,000.00 and (sic) by reason Punzalan, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
or on the occasion of said robbery employed personal violence upon minors amended information, this Court holding firmly that when a hired security
Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany Chua y Saw, stabbing them and inflicting guard opens the compound under his protection to four men who turn out to
thereby multiple serious mortal wounds directly causing their immediate be robbers and murderers or when a former security guard accompanies and
deaths, to the damage of their heirs. meets with said malefactors immediately before the commission of the
offense and stands guard at the gate and flees with said malefactors then the
Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente Chua, Mrs. burden of proof is shifted to him to exculpate and excuse himself by clear,
Lina Chua, Domingo Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V. Ramos, Teodoro satisfactory and convincing evidence, which the named accused failed to do,
Ibuan Abelardo V. Lucero and Dr. Josefina Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z" with but succeeded only in insulting this Forum of Truth with their rediculous (sic)
sub-exhibits; while Defense evidence consisted of the testimonies of the two justifications for the brutal and merciless killing of innocent and helpless
named accused above and some exhibits, contained in Pages 1 to 454 of the children on the occasion of that robbery in question, of being held-up at
Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3. gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of throwing garbage and being
fired at but not getting hit but not knowing so many vital details a truthful
In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the memoranda of both witness would certainly not forget, among others, thus that this court after a
parties, the arguments and authorities cited therein, this Court finds that the total appreciation of all the evidence on record is convinced that there being
material allegations of the above information are facts, and that accused apple (sic) circumstances present that could only possibly point to the guilt of
Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty of said accused for the most heinous (sic) crime that deserves the highest
the charges of Robbery with Double Homicide, as principals by indispensable penalty, Hereby sentences the said accused Juan Escober y Geralde and
cooperation as defined in article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating circumstances, Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the legal punishment provided by Article 294,
and attended by aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure the Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which is DEATH
commission of the crime, taking advantage of number and superior strength, and orders the said accused further to pay the heirs of their victims
treachery, in band, among others, and that the defenses and excuses of the compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each, jointly and severally, and moral
accused are unnatural, incredible, contradictory and uncorroborated. The damages of P200,000.00 to the said heirs, jointly and severally.
circumstances pointing to the (sic) this fact, among others, are the following:
The unlikely garbage throwing reason of accused Juan Escober in opening SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984. 7
As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult.
Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts Without a particularization of the evidence, testimonial or documentary, upon
and the law on which it is based ... which the findings of facts are based, it is practically impossible for the
appellate court to determine whether or not such findings were sufficiently
The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy and logically supported by the evidence relied upon by the trial court.
stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to
form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts
deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended shown by respondent-judge to administer justice in this case in the most
Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or speedy and expeditious manner. He obviously took to heart our admonition
exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused- that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of stenographic notes
appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes of the proceedings
without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" personally taken by them. For this is what respondent judge did. The records
Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime show that he took copious notes of the testimonies of the witnesses on which
to have been attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, he apparently based this decision, as the transcript of the stenographic notes
nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others," but did not were not yet complete at the time of the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the
particularly state the factual bases for such findings. review of the case suffered some delay due to the failure of stenographer
Eduardo Bober to submit to this Court the transcript of stenographic notes of
As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA some hearings.
480, reiterating Montelibano v. Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan v.
Insular Government 15 Phil. 168; City of Manila v. Insular Government, 9 Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of
Phil. 71; Enriquez v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v. Millora, 3 Phil. 458: courts and judges. More than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness
which is the primordial objective of the courts. Respondent judge lamentably
Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of the facts disregarded the latter for the former.
alleged and proved at the trial, it is not possible to pass upon and determine
the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch as when the facts held to be proved The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by
are not set forth in a judicial controversy, it is impossible to administer justice, another trial court in the case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding
to apply the law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant which We said:
who has the law on his side.
At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently indifferent
It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account the facts attitude displayed by the trial court towards a murder case it has tried as
brought out in an action suit, the circumstances of each question raised, and shown by the rendition of a decision, the body of which contains only 63 lines
the nature and condition of the proofs furnished by the parties. He must also spread out over less than three typewritten pages, double-spaced and wide-
set out in his decision the facts alleged by the contending parties which he margined. While brevity should characterize a court's decision and length is
finds to have been proven. The conclusions deduced therefrom and the not necessarily determinative of its quality, the lower court in deciding this
opinion he has formed on the issues raised; then only can be intelligently set murder case nonetheless should have outlined in greater and more
forth the legal grounds and considerations proper in his opinion for the due satisfactory detail the evidence presented by both prosecution and the
determination of the case. defense, the facts as found by the trial judge based on the evidence on
record and the jurisprudence and the authorities supporting the court's would not constitute sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had
decision. knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse that could be attributed to him is
lack of better judgment or laxity in the performance of his duties as a security
This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of authority in the guard in having failed to exercise the minimum precaution dictated by his
decision. The issues raised by the appellant include allegations of concocted occupation to exclude from the premises being guarded persons who have
testimony, the nature of a dying declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, not demonstrated any legitimate reason for getting in. For it must be
treachery and superior strength. The issues raised are quite serious and they remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew Abuyen/Alorte.
deserved better treatment. [Emphasis supplied]. It was therefore not surprising that he should open the gate for him. In fact,
even Domingo Rocero, the security guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte and
With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to who was not as familiar with Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement
the requirements of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the compound thus:
should have been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new
judgment. However, since the records of the case, including all evidence 20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply, ilang beses
necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused- mo ng nakita si Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa iyong pinagguaguardiayahan?
appellants are now before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this
case in order to accord the accused-appellants their right to a speedy S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon, una noong
disposition of their cases. 8 buwan ng Septyembre at pangalawa noong buwan November 1982.
The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by indispensable 21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?
cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide. In support thereof, it tried
to prove that Escober's actuations during the incident in question were done S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang kasamang
with the knowledge of and pursuant to said nefahous plan. These acts babae at hindi ko na siya pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng Electrical Supply.
consist of- [1] his alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co- 9
conspirators; [2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind
Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermined, after the gunshot; and [3] his The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that
having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. The the gun-firing incident was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We share
prosecution further attempted to show that the gun-firing was a mere ritual in the keen observation of counsel for Escober that "... it is not a common
avoidance of suspicion and that Escober's version of the incident is too experience that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He would be the
replete with contradictions to merit belief. stupidest person on earth if he allows that ... to avoid suspicion that he was
in cahoots [sic] with malefactors The least or perhaps the safest way for that
After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan evil purpose is to allow himself to be rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic]
Escober has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. him up, mauling him or wounding him so he would live if he were a
conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a gun is too risky a ritual for he might
The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent get killed. 10
gesture. One who imputes an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove his
allegations convincingly. In the case at bar, even if the version of Macario Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10
Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at the knock of the alleged minutes, not half an hour as found by the trial court, a time too short to
mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed, the same enable Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a ritual or scenario, or if
it were a pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it
considering the unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua at the scene and the FISCAL: Bakit?
need for immediate escape.
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at
Escober, the same could have been done to scare Lina Chua away from the FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.
scene of the crime rather than to divert suspicion from Escober.
PUNZALAN: Hindi po.
That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the
criminal plan are further bolstered by the statement made by Macario FISCAL: Bakit?
Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and extra-judicial statement of
the alleged mastermind Abuyen /Alorte dated April 16, 1986, submitted by PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi
the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial of said Abuyen/Alorte. po ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak
The pertinent portion of Macario Punzalan's statement reads: eh. 11
FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay matagal ng On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in part:
magkakilala?
... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa bahay ni
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati yung Mr. Chua ng bandana alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng Desiyembre.
Alorte. Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok ako at binuksan naman ako ng guwardia
dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna siya kong paano ang buhay-buhay
FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober] niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking
baril sinabi ko sa kanya na pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko ngayon kay
PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon. [duty] DON-DON iyong baril na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito. Pagkatapos ay sabay
pumasok si DON-DON at si REY sa opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako naman ay
FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa? Kung pumuesto sa labas ng opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang nakapuesto
mayroon pa? na ako sa pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si Escober na hindi an
pala ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay binaril ko siya pero hindi
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir. siya tinamaan. Noong matapos kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya ko na
sila at tumakbo na kami ... 12
FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?
These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co-
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir. conspirators and therefore may ordinarily be considered "polluted," deserve
credence. Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is not even responsive
FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober nakita mong umakyat? to the question being asked. The spontaneous and candid manner by which
it was given lends credence to his statement, that Abuyen/Alorte wanted
PUNZALAN: Hind ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni Escober killed. This statement, together with the statement of Abuyen/ Alorte
Abuyen ni Alorte. that he himself fired at E scober although the latter was not hit, unwittingly
corroborates Escober's version that the gun was aimed at him. That Escober Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the shooting, he called his
was not thereby hit should not be taken as conclusive proof that the gun- companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's testimony
firing was a mere ritual because the same could be easily occasioned by a was of the same tenor, i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions started
poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of its execution. running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This was precisely the moment
when the malefactors were fleeing from the scene of the crime, and at which
On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve point Escober could have felt safe enough to emerge from the pick-up where
Escober of any complicity in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual he was held captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua claims to have seen Escober about a
practice is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and pass on the blame to a meter behind Abuyen/ Alorte, who was not walking, but running away from
co-conspirator, particularly in a case such as this where the crime charged is the scene of the crime.
indeed very grave and serious. However undesirable a person may seem,
there may be left in him a sense of justice and fairness. Without passing Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she
judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was this sense of justice and described having seen. She was then in an agitated condition on seeing the
fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in his extrajudicial confession. pedestrian gate of the compound open, which was Escober's duty to keep
closed. Moreover, from the relative positions of Mrs. Chua, Abuyen/Alorte
Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was such that it would be difficult
prove either that he was a co-conspirator. It was but natural that he would for her to determine for certain the distance between Abuyen/Alorte and
want to inform and assure his superior who is presumed to be concerned Escober and whether the latter was merely walking behind the former or in
with his safety and well-being. The motivation attached to said act by the fact chasing him.
prosecution is therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass the test of
logic and reason. Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of
Abuyen/Alorte, she declared that 'they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and
The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of Escober] were walking towards the gate; they were nagmamadali [in a
Escober's complicity is the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a hurry]." 13 This description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the
shot, she looked at the garage where the shot sounded to have come from impression gathered from her previous statement of seeing Escober walking
and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element of speed injected into the 'walking" by
behind. the descriptive term 'nagmamadali" corroborates Abuyen/ Alorte's declaration
that after firing the gun, he ran away from the scene of the crime, and tills
We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement. We can be interpreted to mean that Escober was indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.
observe that Mrs. Lina Chua was the last among the prosecution witnesses
to give her statement to the police. She gave her statement on December 8, The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the time of its
1983 when none of the accused had been apprehended. So, soon after the commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To hold
violent incident her appreciation of what she saw may have been faulty when the accused guilty as co-principal in the crime charged, the existence of
she attributed the blame on Escober whose lack of better judgment and laxity conspiracy between the accused and the actual killers, must be shown, and
in the performance of his job resulted in the tragic event. the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to
support a finding of the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to
Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. 14
quoted above, Mrs. Chua's narration of the situation would suffer from
inaccuracy, aside from being susceptible to other interpretations.
The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove 2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang
beyond reasonable doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal abogado na iyong mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng abogado, at
design and [2] that his acts during the commission of the crime, such as the nais mong magkaroon ng paglilingkod nito maglalaan ng isa para sa iyo ang
opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the gunshot, were hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang bayaran ang paglilingkod nito.
performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the case, the
prosecution's reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's testimony 3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang pahayag
regarding his actuations during the incident at bar can not improve its case. na maaaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.
To convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional right of the accused
to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved 15 and its corollary rule 4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng anomang uring karahasan o
that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on pamilit para ikaw ay magbigay ng salaysay.
the weakness of the defense. 16
Tanong — Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa iyo at
Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of the mapagpaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas
crime and his having opened the gate to persons who turned out to be ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob
robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. A less discerning mind could ng salaysay?
have been blinded by these suspicions and compassion for the two hapless
victims. But convictions can never rest on mere suspicions, however, grave Sagot — Opo.
and serious.
Tanong — Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang abogado
We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied na sumusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat?
his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation,
the preliminary investigation and the trial on the merits. Sagot— Opo.
Punzalan's extra-judicial statement 17 is prefaced by the for lowing: Tanog— Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring pilitin
or gamitan ng anomang uri ng karahasan upang maging saksi laban sa iyong
PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG BATAS NG sarili?
PILIPINAS.
Sagot— Opo.
Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng pulisya
hinggil sa isang usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang PAGNANAKAW NA Tanong— Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo
MAY KASAMANG PAGPATAY. Bago ka tanungin ng anoman, ipinauunawa magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng salaysay?
ko muna sa iyo at pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim
ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod: Sagot— Opo.
1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag magsalita o Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr.
magbigay ng salaysay kung hindi mo nais.
Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's
extra-judicial statement, 18 the latter carried the same quoted prefatory
statement. This, to our mind, indicates the lack of zeal and initiative on the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The right to a preliminary
part of the investigating officers to fully and truly inform Punzalan of his rights investigation, being waivable does not argue against the validity of the
to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation. The proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case
Identical manner by which the police sought to inform Escober and Punzalan in order that such investigation could be conducted.
of their constitutional rights shows a blatant disregard for individual
comprehensive ability arising from differences in intelligence level, ... the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should
educational background and personal experiences. No effort was exerted to be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not
see to it that Punzalan really understood what was being told, considering his wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the
low educational attainment of Grade 2 Elementary level. The so-called jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It
"informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing more than a could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to
superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the be inquired into by the trial courts, not an appellate court. 21
objectives of the fundamental law as to give a semblance of compliance
thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by the police respecting the While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the trial
appointment of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was misleading. It gives the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the counsel de
impression that the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by parte of his co-accused Escober, such failure did not constitute prejudicial
Punzalan only during the court proceedings, not during the custodial error to warrant nullification of the proceedings taken against Punzalan.
investigation. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of Escober to the
prejudice of Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano defended both
Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the waiver accused with equal zeal and vigor and that Punzalan was able to present his
appearing in Punzalan's extrajudicial statement cannot be considered defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of having knocked that the
intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact that it was done trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might
without the assistance of counsel, said waiver is not valid. 19 Needless to have suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to cross-examine Escober on
say, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. 20 the latter's testimony regarding Punzalan's presence at the scene of the
crime. 22 Escober's testimony, however, was merely corroborative of the
With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel during the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the
preliminary investigation, suffice it to say that such irregularity which amounts prosecution who were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano. 23
to an absence of preliminary investigation, should have been raised before
the trial court, Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and consistent in ruling Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the fact
that: of robbery and we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan
knew of such plan. It is incredible that his three companions would fetch him
The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring him along to the scene of crime,
inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking thereby risking another eyewitness to the perpetration thereof. Punzalan's
through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called flight from the scene of the crime with his companions and his failure, if he
upon 'not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and were truly innocent, to report to the police what he knew about the crime after
conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As reading it in the newspapers further demonstrate his knowledge of the plan.
stressed in People vs. Casiano, I SCRA 478 (1 961), this is the proper
procedure since the 'absence of such investigation did not impair the validity While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime was
of the Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the to act as a look-out, and as such, he did not participate in the killing of the
two helpless victims, he cannot evade responsibility therefor. Well- conclusions finding them guilty had been based falls short of the
established is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has been constitutional requirement that every decision of a court of justice clearly and
committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based; (b) acquitting the
who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are also guilty accused Juan Escober of the crime of robbery with homicide on the ground
as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (c ) finding
they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that the other accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 24 principal in the complex crime of robbery with homicide and imposing upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. Q- penalty under the 1987 Constitution.
22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Juan Escober y Geralde is hereby ACQUITTED of the a) This brief concurrence is just to restate that the whole Court en banc
crime of Robbery with Homicide and his immediate release from confinement is unanimous as to the utter failure of the trial judge's 1-1/2 page decision to
is ordered, unless detained for some other crimes. Accused- appellant conform to the mandatory constitutional requirement that a decision must
Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Normally, in such
doubt as principal in the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and is cases, the case would have to be remanded to the court a quo for the
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to rendition of a new judgment that does conform to the constitutional mandate
indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000,00, but the Court, since all the briefs have been filed, opted to review the record
and the evidence and to render judgment accordingly in order to avoid further
SO ORDERED. delay in the disposition of the case on the merits;
Yap, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. b) The whole Court en banc is likewise unanimous in its judgment
finding the accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide, even as it reaffirms the settled doctrine in
Criminal Law that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as
conspirators in the commission of the crime of robbery are also guilty as
principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although
they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that
Separate Opinions they endeavored to prevent the homicide under the basic principle that once
a conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown, then the actual mode
of participation in a crime of any of the accused, whether he be a lookout
posted outside the scene of the robbery, is of no moment, since the act of
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: one conspirator is the act of all. This has been the consistent doctrine of the
Court applied since the early 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalag and most
I concur in toto with the judgment of the Court (a) holding that the 1-1/2 page, recently affirmed in the 1987 case of People vs. Pecato as traced by Mr.
single-spaced, decision of the trial court presided by Judge Oscar Leviste, Justice Feliciano in Ms scholarly separate opinion; and
sentencing the accused at bar to the supreme penalty of death without
specification of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, upon which his
c) The ten-to-four division among the members of the Court is confined I would also like to make some observations about the Court's apparently
to the case of accused Juan Escober with ten members voting to acquit him unqualified adherence to the precedent in the 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalad
and four members dissenting from his acquittal. On my part, I have given him (9 Phil. 1) and the list of decisions from 1926 to 1927 cited in the separate
the benefit of the doubt and voted for his acquittal. The superior and opinion of Justice Feliciano. A conspirator should not necessarily or
immutable rule is that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond automatically be found guilty of everything that happens while the crime,
reasonable doubt by virtue of the constitutional presumption of his object of the conspiracy, is being committed.
innocence, which presumption must prevail unless overturned by clear,
competent and credible proof. Here, as discussed in the extensive main It would seem that unless a conspirator endeavors to prevent the other crime
opinion of the Court ably penned by Mr. Justice Fernan, the evidence as to committed on the occasion of the principal crime, object of the conspiracy, he
the existence of a conspiracy between the accused Juan Escober and the would be guilty as a principal in the complex crime or other crime even if he
robbers-killers and as to his participation in the crime of robbery appears to had absolutely no part in it. I may have no statistics to prove it but I believe
be inadequate and therefore failed to produce the required moral certainty of that conspiracy improperly handled could send more innocent persons to jail
his guilt. than any other principle in criminal law.For instance, many accused persons
protesting they had nothing to do with a crime have been convicted of
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion: malversation or estafa simply because the documents evidencing the crime
somehow passed their hands. A person who is in a stupor or is simply not
While acknowledging the impeccable logic behind the concurring and paying any attention during a drinking party where the details of a robbery,
dissenting opinion of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, I regret I cannot join him car-napping, or murder are planned could, in the hands of a brilliant
completely. prosecutor, be convicted of the resulting crime and all its consequences.
I entertain reasonable if not grave doubt as to the complicity of Juan Escober I believe that appellant Punzalan in this case is guilty of robbery with
in the robbery and in the killing of two children while the robbery was homicide. My observations are simply aimed at an unqualified adherence to
underway. It is an easy task after a crime has been consummated for us to the principle that the accused must always endeavor to prevent the other
surmise how the mind of an accused should have operated during crucial crime to be freed from complicity in a crime he knew nothing about. Or that
moments and to state how an accused should have behaved to avoid the he must run away and leave his companions before the second crime is
possibility of his being implicated as a co-principal and conspirator. committed. Every case must be judged on its separate facts and
Unfortunately, things do not always work logically and according to notwithstanding conspiracy in the planned crime, a person may still be
predictable patterns of behaviour in real life. The minds of ordinary persons acquitted of the other crime about which he had no knowledge at all For
(and I see nothing special, extraordinary, or superior about the accused instance, if the innocent victims of the vicious killing in this case had been the
security guard), seldom behave in predictable ways. Seemingly negligent or children of Punzalan, certainly he cannot be held guilty of parricide. Or if a
even inexplicable behaviour is not necessarily a badge of guilt. Not every band of robbers rape a woman inside a house not knowing he is the wife of
security guard who opens a gate when he should keep it closed can be their look-out, the rule on all conspirators being equally responsible for all the
accused of complicity in a crime even if evil persons choose that particular consequences or happenings during the commission of the planned crime
moment of indiscretion to barge into the premises. I agree with Justice should not apply. The precedents from Macalalad are impressively cited by
Fernan that from the records of this case, the guilt of Juan Escober has not my teamed colleague, but I believe all judges should still be cautioned to look
been proved with the degree of certainty required under our penal laws. beyond the unqualified rule and ascertain carefully whether the lookout or
anybody else similarly situated should be automatically convicted for
something about which he was completely ignorant. The consequences of
sending an innocent person to j ail for a crime where he had no participation mind, however, that Escober was a security guard; that he had seen and
are too horrible to be left simply to the operation of an unqualified rule. recognized Abuyen through the peephole in the pedestrians' gate before
opening that gate; and surely the least that can be expected of a security
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting : guard, who is on guard duty at night time, is that he must exclude from the
premises being guarded persons who have not demonstrated any lawful
With regret, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion written by Mr. Justice reason for wanting to enter such premises. If one assumes that Escober had
Fernan to the extent that it would acquit Juan Escober. I would, upon the not joined the criminal conspiracy, it was at the very least utterly reckless for
other hand, like to add somewhat to the reference made in the majority him to have opened the gate under the circumstance in this case. The fact
opinion to the rule on the basis of which Punzalan is correctly held liable for that Escober was acquainted with Abuyen was no justification for letting
robbery with homicide. Abuyen and his gang come in. Upon the other hand, the circumstance that
Escober knew Abuyen suggests at least the probability that Escober was
We consider first the proposed acquittal of Juan Escober. indeed part of the criminal conspiracy if Escober was totally unacquainted
with Abuyen, that probability would not of course exist It must further be
The prosecution theory, as found by the majority opinion, was that Juan noted that Escober himself, who had thoughtfully left his gun in a locker
Escober was a principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery before opening the gate of the compound, 1 did not claim that he had been
with homicide. According to the majority opinion, the prosecution sought to coerced by Abuyen and his companions into opening the gate of the
prove that Escober joined in the community of design, a conspiracy, which compound.2 If he had in fact been forced into opening the gate by Abuyen
was shown in respect of the other accused, by referring to the following and company, it would have been the simplest and most natural thing in the
particular acts of Escober: world for him to have said so. Abuyen, the brains of the conspiracy, however,
conveniently explained later that he had pointed his gun at Escober, almost
[1] [Escober's] alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co- apologetically, after Escober had opened the small gate and let Abuyen and
conspirators; the other malefactors into the compound.
[2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Abuyen, the alleged Mrs. Lina Chua testified that upon hearing a shot, and thereupon turning to
mastermind, after the gun shot; and the garage from whence the sound of the shot came, she saw Abuyen
walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter behind. 3 It must not
[3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. escape notice there was no suggestion by any witness that Escober was
then chasing and trying to capture Abuyen, which a security guard faithful to
The prosecution further urged that the firing of a hand gun by Abuyen was a his duties might be expected at least to try to do. The majority opinion does
mere ritual designed to avoid or deflect suspicion from Escober and that try to suggest that because Mrs. Lina Chua, in the separate trial of Abuyen,
Escober's version of the incident [was] too replete with contradictions "to had said that Abuyen and Escober were warning towards the gate; they were
merit belief" in a hurry (nagmamadali)," Escober could be regarded as 'indeed chasing
Abuyen/Alorte Escober himself had not claimed that he had somehow
The opening of the gate of the Chua compound to the malefactors by summoned his courage and sought to capture Abuyen immediately after
Escober was absolutely indispensable for the commission of the crime of Abuyen had, according to Escober, fired a shot at him but had missed. Thus,
robbery and for the killing of the two (2) children of Mr. and Mrs. Vicente the suggested interpretation would seem unreal and excessively generous to
Chua in the course thereof. In abstracto, the act of opening a gate upon Escober. There was also no evidence that Escober was trying to flee or hide
hearing a knock is, of course, an innocent gesture. It is important to bear in himself from Abuyen. The net effect, if the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua is to
be believed at all, was that Escober was acting in concert with Abuyen, counsel that Escober would be the "stupidest person on earth" if he allowed
presumably to facilitate the escape of Abuyen and his companions. himself "to be shot by a gun—to avoid suspicion that he was in cahoots with
the malefactors." Escober was in fact not wounded at all. No bullet hole was
Clearly, the testimony of Mrs. Chua was critical for the prosecution. The found in the van where Escober claimed to have been crouching when
majority opinion, however, rejects totally the testimony of Mrs. Chua as Abuyen shot at him. 6 Upon the other hand, a shot fired in the air can only be
suffer[ing] from inaccuracy and as being susceptible to other interpretations" regarded as a cheap method for supporting a profession of innocence on the
in the premises, when "taken in conjunction with the extrajudicial confession part of Escober. Escober's counsel was simply begging the question.
of Abuyen." It must be observed, with respect, that the majority opinion so
discarded Mrs. Chua's testimony upon the totally speculative ground that it is In the majority opinion, reliance is placed upon statements made by co-
not contrary to human psychology and experience," that Mrs. Lina Chua accused Macario Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and upon an
having lost two (2) of her children to the robbers, would in seeking extrajudicial statement of Abuyen (accused in a separate criminal case) to
vengeance deliberately and baselessly implicate Escober in the robbery and support the position that the gun play was not mere play-acting and that
the killings as a "sacrificial lamb." There appears no basis for this speculation Escober was not part of the criminal conspiracy. The statements coming from
at all. Moreover, the rejection of Mrs. Chua's testimony runs counter to the Punzalan and Abuyen must, however, be taken with great caution. For it
prevailing jurisprudence which has been summed up in the following terms in must be recalled that the testimony of accomplices—principals confederates
People v. Roxas: or conspirators — while admissible and competent, comes from a "polluted
source." Consequently, as Mr. Justice Malcolm cautioned, such testimony
... Neither is the relationship of Victorino and Paterno to the deceased must be "scrutinized with care. It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If not
sufficient to render their testimony doubtful nor enough to discredit their corroborated,credibility is affected." 7 It should also be pointed out that the
credibility. The credibility of witnesses cannot be assailed as prejudiced statement of Punzalan adduced in this connection in the majority opinion,
simply because of their close relation to the victim. For it is not to be lightly appears disjointed and totally unrelated to the question in response to which
supposed that the relatives of the deceased would callously violate their it was given. The statement of Punzalan, in other words, would appear, not
conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons spontaneous and candid" (as suggested in the majority opinion) but rather to
whom they know to be innocent. 4 have been deliberately thrown in for the purpose of exculpating Escober.
Thus:
It was part of the prosecution theory that Abuyen had fired a shot,
presumably in the air, in order to create the impression that Escober was not FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?
part of the conspiracy. Escober claimed that the shot had been fired at him
while he was inside the van in the garage, and advised Mrs. Chua that he PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.
had not been hit by the shot. 5 The first point that may be noted in this
connection is that if the robbers had really wanted to kill Escober in order to FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober] nakita mong umakyat?
prevent Escober's later Identifying them, there was absolutely nothing to
prevent them from doing so. The two (2) young children of Mrs. Chua had PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni
been stabbed to death brutally to prevent them from Identifying the robbers; Abuyen ni Alorte.
yet, if E scober is to be believed, the robbers made no more than a token,
half hearted, effort to insure that Escober, an adult male and a security FISCAL: Bakit?
guard, would not Identify them. Escober was not even tied up and blind-
folded. It is hence difficult to appreciate the "keen observation" of Escober's PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.
stabbing of the two (2) innocent children of Vicente and Lina Chua. Even so,
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay. the majority opinion, stressing that Punzalan's participation in the conspiracy
to commit robbery was conclusively shown, rightly held him responsible for
PUNZALAN: Hindi po. robbery with double homicide.
FISCAL: Bakit? Because the above rule on this matter and its underlying ratio have not
always been well understood and because a handful of decisions of this
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi po Court contain language or have reached results which, at first glance, may
ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak eh. seem at variance with the rule above referred to, it should be useful to
(Emphasis supplied) examine in some detail the development of that rule and to mark out its
present scope and shape.
To accept and to accord full credence to statements of proven conspirators
to all appearances designed to avoid suspicion from settling on Escober, who The rule correctly applied by the Court was unanimously reaffirmed by the
had made the robbery and double homicide possible to begin with, while Court en banc most recently in People v. Pecato (G.R. No. L-41008, 18 June
rejecting as biased the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua solely because she was 1987) in the following terms:
the mother of the slain children, must seem a strange situation indeed. If one
must, without requiring proof, impute a 'sense of justice and fairness' to The crime committed by the accused is Robbery with Homicide as defined
Abuyen from whose mind the conspiracy sprang and whose hands and arms and penalized under Article 294 (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Felix Larong
were splattered with the blood of the two (2) young children of Mrs. Lina was shot to death during the robbery. We have repeatedly held that: (A)s
Chua, one ought not, it is submitted, to assume casually that Mrs. Lina Chua long as homicide resulted during or because of the robbery, even if the killing
was bereft of that same 'sense of justice and fairness." is by mere accident, robbery with homicide is committed; it is only the result
obtained, without reference or distincttion as to the circumstances, causes,
While each of the acts of Escober cited by the prosecution might not, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be
considered in isolation from the others, be sufficient to show participation in taken into consideration. (People vs. Guiapar, No. L-35465, May
the common criminal design, it is submitted that where those acts are 31,1984,129 SCRA 539, 553554 [1984].) Further, whenever a homicide has
considered together, and viewed in the light of what Abuyen, Punzalan and been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all
their other two companions did, and did not do, they constitute more than those who took part as principals in the commission of the crime are also
adequate basis for not overturning the conclusion of the trial court that guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
Escober was guilty. After all, it was not this Court but the trial judge who although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly
examined all the evidence and listened to all the testimony, and his appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. (Id., 554, citing:
conclusion, even if too cryptically set down on paper, must be given great People vs. Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [19261; and U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil 1
weight. [1907].) In this instance, the evidence on record is bereft of any showing that
any of the accused tried to prevent the killing of Felix Larong. What is shown
We turn to Macario Punzalan whom the majority opinion finds guilty of instead is that they merely stood watching and did nothing when one of their
robbery with homicide. There is no question that Punzalan participated in the companions shot the victim. (T.s.n. session of October 21, 1974, 29;
common design to commit robbery. He acted as lookout for the gang of Deposition, Id., 3, 5.) Additionally, the term 'homicide' in robbery with
robbers. He did not go upstairs to the house which was ransacked and where homicide should be understood as a generic term and includes murder.
the victims were slain; unlike Abuyen, he did not take part in the actual (People vs. Revotoc, No. L-37425, July 25, 1981, 106 SCRA 22 [1981]. )
The rule in Macalalad was consistently followed until 1925 when U.S. v.
xxx xxx xxx Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 (1925) was decided. In Basisten, Mr. Justice
Romualdez wrote, for the Court:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The liability of the other appellants Andres Pasquin Placido Heusca Vicente
The rule so reiterated in Pecato was first elaborated upon as long ago as 8 Caballero and Alejandro Picate, consist in having conspired and taken part in
October 1907 in U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1. Mr. Justice Carson, speaking the robbery. They must not be held responsible for the homicide which was
for the Supreme Court, said: not the subject matter of their conspiracy and in which they did not have any
intervention, for it was performed by Emilio Huesca alone. The proper
... While it does not appear that this defendant [Fructizoso Esguerra] himself punishment, therefore, for them is the penalty for robbery in band within the
struck the fatal blow which caused the death of Rufino Calderon he must be limits of which the trial court has imposed upon them. 9
adjudged guilty as principal of the complex crime of robbery with homicide
with which he is charged, it having been proved that he was present, ad.ded, But in 1926, barely one year after Basisten had deviated from Macalalad, the
abetted, and took part therein. The testimony of the witnesses for the Supreme Court went back to the Macalalad rule. In People vs. Bautista, the
prosecution fully establishes the guilt of the defendant as a principal in the Court, through Mr. Justice Johnson, invoked and applied the Macalalad rule
commission of the robbery, and, even were we to disregard his confession, without even mentioning the deviation in Basisten:
which he repudiated at the trial of' the case, and wherein he admitted he was
present at the killing of Rufino Calderon, we would, nevertheless, be xxx xxx xxx
compelled to find him guilty of the crime of robo con homicide (robbery with
homicide). The supreme court of Spain, interpreting the provisions of the In the first place it may be said that the evidence adduced during the trial of
Penal Code touching the complex crime of robo con homicidio has frequently the cause clearly shows that the appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery
decided that, where the complex crime has been committed, all those who with homicide and must therefore be punished in accordance with the
look part as principals in the commission of the robbery are guilty as provisions of paragraph 1 of article 503 of the Penal Code. It is clearly
principals in the commission of the crime of robo con homicidio, unless it established that the appellants, together with an armed band of more than
appears that the endeavored to prevent the unlawful killing. (Decisions of the four persons, committed a robbery and that on the occasion of such robbery
supreme court of Spain, April 30 and February 23, 1872, and June 19, 1890. a homicide was committed. The crime which they committed therefore falls
See also Viada, vol. 3, pp. 347, 354, and 356). clearly within the provisions of said article. (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, July 13, 1871; 3 Viada, Commentaries on the Penal Code, p. 347.)
Accepting as true the exculpatory statements of the accused in his Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the
repudiated confession, it does not appear therefrom that he made any occasion of a robbery, all principals in the commission of the robbery will also
genuine effort to prevent the murder of Rufino Calderon. be held guilty as principals in the complex crime of robbery with homicide,
although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly
xxx xxx xxx 8 appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 10
(Emphasis supplied.) From 1926 to 1967, the Macalalad doctrine was applied and re-applied many
times by the Court. The following list does not purport to be exhaustive:
Pancho Pelagio and five (5) others conspired to rob a particular house in G. Clearly, Pelagio, having fled from the scene of the robbery, had abandoned
Villanueva St., Pasay City. Only Pelagio and three (3) others actually carried the conspiracy and dissociated himself from his co-conspirators even while
out the robbery as planned. Pelagio acted as the lookout and posted himself the robbery was still in process and certainly before the unfortunate
at the gate of the house; two (2) others actually entered the victim's policeman arrived on the scene as the robbers were about to escape in a
premises; the fourth was ordered to hail and hold a taxi in readiness for the taxi. Because of such abandonment and dissociation, the conspiracy,
getaway. The robbery was carried out as planned. But, when the two (2) whatever may have been the subject thereof, was over and done with, so far
robbers who had gone up the house came down and out into the street, they as concerned Pelagio. Abandonment and dissociation are clear equivalents
failed to find Pelagio at the gate. The two (2) robbers hurried to the next of efforts to prevent the homicide which, under Macalalad, would exculpate
block where they found the fourth conspirator waiting for them inside a taxi. one from liability for the homicide but not for the robbery.
The two (2) robbers boarded the taxi. As the taxi was about to leave,
however, a jeepney arrived from the opposite direction and blocked the taxi's It may be observed that very soon after Pelagic, the Supreme Court resumed
way. A man alighted from the jeepney and started towards the taxi. One of application and reiteration of the Macalalad rule. Thus, e.g.:
the robbers recognized the man as a police officer and ordered his
companions to shoot which they did, killing the police officer. Pelagio later (1) People v. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88 (1968);
(2) People v..Pujinio, 27SCRA1186(1969); In Abalos, the accused Abalos and Mendiola, after a long drinking bout with
two (2) other comrades got into a taxi and directed the driver to take all four
(3) People v. Puno, 56 SCRA 659 (1974); of them to the Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Bulacan, in the early hours of
the morning. Abalos was seated beside the driver; the other three (3) were in
(4) People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 448 (1976); the back seat. Two (2) of the four (4) comrades got off before reaching the
subdivision, Abalos and Mendiola then directed the driver to enter the
(5) People v. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70 (1977); subdivision. Abalos signalled Mendiola that he would hold up the driver.
Abalos drew out a knife and held it at the driver's neck. Mendiola at the same
(6) People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348 (1977); time demanded the driver's earnings and boxed him three (3) times on the
back. The driver refused to surrender his earnings and apparently tried to
(7) People v. Berberino, 79 SCRA 694 (1977); fight back. Abalos, infuriated by the driver's resistance, plunged his seven
and a half inch blade through the driver's right cheek. Unnerved by the
(8) People v. Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71 (1979); sudden, profuse bleeding of the, wounded driver, Abalos and Mendiola
hastily left the taxicab, forgetting all about the driver's earnings, and fled. The
(9) People v. Umbao, 103 SCRA 233 (1981); taxi driver suffered a massive hemorrhage which brought on death. Abalos
and Mendiola were convicted by the trial court of attempted robbery with
(10) People v. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173 (1982); homicide. The Supreme Court through then Mr. Justice Aquino upheld the
conviction of Abalos but found Mendiola guilty only of attempted robbery,
(11) People v. Tabian, 120 SCRA 571 (1982); citing in this connection U.S. v. Basisten. The reference to Basisten in this
case, however, appears quite unnecessary for the Court had explicitly found
(12) People Lot Solis, 128 SCRA 217 (1984); a few pages that there in fact was no conspiracy at all, whether for robbery
(holdup) or for homicide. Mr. Justice Aquino wrote:
(13) People v. Guiapar, 129 SCRA 539 (1984); and
As already noted [Abalos] said in his confession that he was intoxicated
(14) People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178 (1986). when he stabbed the cab driver, he and his companions had been ng
continuously sometimes before the crime was prepetrated. Intoxication
Clearly, the Court did not abandon the Macalalad rule by promulgating mitigates his liability. It was not habitual nor intentional (Article 15, Revised
Pelagio, as Mr. Justice Antonio had mistakenly supposed in his concurring Penal Code). The holdup was not the offspring of planning and deliberation.
opinion in People v. Adriano. 12 Examination of the cases listed above will It was a fatal improvisation dictated by an impromptu impulse. 16 (Emphasis
show, further, that the Macalalad rule, while it originated in a case involving a supplied).
band (en cuadrilla), has in fact not been limited by the Court to situations
where a band was present. Indeed, the great majority of the above cases are Since there was neither conspiracy the presence of a band, there was in
conspiracy cases where the technical elements of a band 13 were absent. point of fact no occasion for application of the doctrine of Macalalad nor of
the Basisten case. Both Abalos and Mendiola were simply principals by
We turn to People v. Abalos, 14 and People v. Adriano, 15 which also need direct participation in the attempted robbery.
to be considered. A close examination of the facts will show that Abalos and
Adriano do not represent true departures from the 1907 Macalalad rule.
People v. Adriano involved the horrifying slaughter of five (5) security guards The Court, however, finds Leonardo Bernardo seemingly unaware of the
of the Rice and Corn Administration. The security guards were hacked with intention to kill the guards. The Idea of killing them arose only when Mariano
an ax, one by one, as they lay hogtied on the floor. The malefactors Domingo called the attention of Apolonio Adriano to his being known by the
numbered about eleven (11) in all. The trial court found four (4) guilty of the guards, being one of them. By that time the robbery had been consummated,
crime of robbery with homicide. The precise question before the Court was the jeep driven by him (Leonardo Bernardo) with Plate No. J-14362, was
whether the decision of the trial court holding four (4) persons, including one already loaded with bags and carton boxes containing the stolen money...
Leonardo Bernardo, guilty of robbery with homicide and sentencing them to
death should be affirmed or whether Leonardo Bernardo should be held ... It was clearly only at the spur of the moment, so to speak, that Mariano
guilty of robbery merely. A majority of six (6) justices plus one (1) concurring Domingo and Apolonio Adriano, joined by Mariano San Diego and Pedro
justice held that Leonardo Bernardo was guilty of simple robbery. Six (6) Miranda, thought of having to kill the guards, entirely without the knowledge
other members of the Court voted for affirmance in toto of the trial court's of Leonardo Bernardo... 19 (Emphasis supplied.)
judgment. 17 The facts in Adriano as found by the Court showed that there
were two (2) conspiracies: one for the commission of robbery, which included Because Leonardo Bernardo was not part of the smaller and later conspiracy
Leonardo Bernardo and all the other malefactors; 18 another, smaller, one (to kill the five guards) within the larger conspiracy (to rob the treasury of the
for the commission of the multiple murder, which did not include Leonardo Rice and Corn Administration), he was found guilty of robbery only and his
Bernardo. The per curiam decision read, in relevant part: sentence reduced from death to reclusion perpetua. Thus, the result reached
in Adriano is compatible with the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine.
... The awareness that just one of them being known and arrested would lead
to the apprehension of the other participants in the robbery, the common What may be stressed, in resume is that the result reached by the Court in
design of liquidating the possible witnesses to avoid the grim possibility of respect of the accused Punzalan is in line with the rule first elaborated in
their being all brought before the bar of justice entered the minds of those U.S. v. Macalalad (1907) and most recently reaffirmed in People v. Pecato
specifically named above, and moved to act accordingly. Quite obviously (1987,). U.S. v. Basisten, a case whose rule was over-turned the very next
Mariano Domingo did nothing to prevent the killing which he himself hinted at year after it was promulgated, was in fact an aberration. That the Court has
as the next practical move to take following the consummation of the today affirmed once more the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine evidences its
robbery. The conspiracy Lo hill, born of the exigency of the situation, discriminating regard for settled rules.
therefore clearly involved Apolonio Adriano, Mario San Diego, Mariano
Domingo and possibly Pedro Miranda who is yet to be apprehended. Their That the Court has reaffirmed Macalalad-Pecato is important for another
respective acts clearly were directed to the same object and for the same reason. To have disregarded Macalalad-Pecato would have come too close
purpose. Once the conspiracy is established, which may be done by mere to discarding the basic rule on conspiracy, that is, once a conspiracy or
circumstantial evidence, as direct evidence is not so easily obtainable community of criminal design is shown, then the concrete modality of
(People vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285; participation in a crime becomes secondary for determination of liability —
People vs. Mejia, 55 SCRA 453; People vs. Carino, 55 SCRA 516; People "the act of one is the act of all." To require affirmative proof that the subject of
vs. Cadag, 2 SC RA 388), the conspirators are all liable as co-principals, the conspiracy in this case embraced not just robbery but also the double
regardless of the extent and character of their respective participation in the homicide, is to lose sight of the fact that conspiracy, in the nature of things, is
commission of the crime (People vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People vs. almost always only indirectly or circumstantially shown, by proof of concerted
Phones, 84 SCRA 167). acts rather than by e.g., a written plan of action. To require such affirmative
proof would also be to impose a very heavy (and quite unnecessary) burden
on our law enforcement agencies, a burden which under present
circumstances of rampant violent crime and severely limited governmental
resources, may well be an insupportable one. Our law on conspiracy is
infused, in important degree, with the objective of deterring conspiracies to Separate Opinions
commit crimes and the implementation of such conspiracies. A man's
capacity for inflicting harm is magnified when he joins a conspiracy to commit TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
crime (whether or not a band, in the technical sense of Article 296, Revised
Penal Code, materializes). The threat to society posed by a criminal group is I concur in toto with the judgment of the Court (a) holding that the 1-1/2 page,
greater than the sum total of the particular acts of the individual members of single-spaced, decision of the trial court presided by Judge Oscar Leviste,
the group. The result here reached by the Court in respect of Punzalan may sentencing the accused at bar to the supreme penalty of death without
be seen to reinforce the capability of our law to achieve that objective of specification of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, upon which his
deterrence. conclusions finding them guilty had been based falls short of the
constitutional requirement that every decision of a court of justice clearly and
Finally, there appears nothing unfair or illiberal about holding a man, who distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based; (b) acquitting the
knowingly joins a conspiracy to commit a crime, responsible for all the crimes accused Juan Escober of the crime of robbery with homicide on the ground
which are causally connected with the conspiracy. 20 No one complains that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (c ) finding
about the same rule in tort law. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect the other accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co- conspirators; he merges his principal in the complex crime of robbery with homicide and imposing upon
will into the common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal him the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death
conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot with his fellow conspirators penalty under the 1987 Constitution.
and to have taken his chances that a co-conspirator may get rattled, that a
victim may unexpectedly decide to resist and fight back, or that something a) This brief concurrence is just to restate that the whole Court en banc
else may go awry, and third persons may get killed or injured in the course of is unanimous as to the utter failure of the trial judge's 1-1/2 page decision to
implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself from such liability, conform to the mandatory constitutional requirement that a decision must
the law requires some overt act on the part of the conspirator, to seek to clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Normally, in such
prevent commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or cases, the case would have to be remanded to the court a quo for the
dissociate himself from the conspiracy. rendition of a new judgment that does conform to the constitutional mandate
but the Court, since all the briefs have been filed, opted to review the record
I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court that both Juan Escober and and the evidence and to render judgment accordingly in order to avoid further
Macario Punzalan, Jr. are guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the delay in the disposition of the case on the merits;
crime of robbery with homicide and that accordingly, both should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to Idemnify the b) The whole Court en banc is likewise unanimous in its judgment
heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000.00 and to pay moral damages finding the accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
to such heirs in the amount of P200,000.00. the crime of robbery with homicide, even as it reaffirms the settled doctrine in
Criminal Law that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
Melencio-Herrrera, Sarmiento, and Padilla, concur and dissent: consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as
conspirators in the commission of the crime of robbery are also guilty as
principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although
they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that
they endeavored to prevent the homicide under the basic principle that once security guard), seldom behave in predictable ways. Seemingly negligent or
a conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown, then the actual mode even inexplicable behaviour is not necessarily a badge of guilt. Not every
of participation in a crime of any of the accused, whether he be a lookout security guard who opens a gate when he should keep it closed can be
posted outside the scene of the robbery, is of no moment, since the act of accused of complicity in a crime even if evil persons choose that particular
one conspirator is the act of all. This has been the consistent doctrine of the moment of indiscretion to barge into the premises. I agree with Justice
Court applied since the early 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalag and most Fernan that from the records of this case, the guilt of Juan Escober has not
recently affirmed in the 1987 case of People vs. Pecato as traced by Mr. been proved with the degree of certainty required under our penal laws.
Justice Feliciano in Ms scholarly separate opinion; and
I would also like to make some observations about the Court's apparently
c) The ten-to-four division among the members of the Court is confined unqualified adherence to the precedent in the 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalad
to the case of accused Juan Escober with ten members voting to acquit him (9 Phil. 1) and the list of decisions from 1926 to 1927 cited in the separate
and four members dissenting from his acquittal. On my part, I have given him opinion of Justice Feliciano. A conspirator should not necessarily or
the benefit of the doubt and voted for his acquittal. The superior and automatically be found guilty of everything that happens while the crime,
immutable rule is that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond object of the conspiracy, is being committed.
reasonable doubt by virtue of the constitutional presumption of his
innocence, which presumption must prevail unless overturned by clear, It would seem that unless a conspirator endeavors to prevent the other crime
competent and credible proof. Here, as discussed in the extensive main committed on the occasion of the principal crime, object of the conspiracy, he
opinion of the Court ably penned by Mr. Justice Fernan, the evidence as to would be guilty as a principal in the complex crime or other crime even if he
the existence of a conspiracy between the accused Juan Escober and the had absolutely no part in it. I may have no statistics to prove it but I believe
robbers-killers and as to his participation in the crime of robbery appears to that conspiracy improperly handled could send more innocent persons to jail
be inadequate and therefore failed to produce the required moral certainty of than any other principle in criminal law.For instance, many accused persons
his guilt. protesting they had nothing to do with a crime have been convicted of
malversation or estafa simply because the documents evidencing the crime
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion: somehow passed their hands. A person who is in a stupor or is simply not
paying any attention during a drinking party where the details of a robbery,
While acknowledging the impeccable logic behind the concurring and car-napping, or murder are planned could, in the hands of a brilliant
dissenting opinion of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, I regret I cannot join him prosecutor, be convicted of the resulting crime and all its consequences.
completely.
I believe that appellant Punzalan in this case is guilty of robbery with
I entertain reasonable if not grave doubt as to the complicity of Juan Escober homicide. My observations are simply aimed at an unqualified adherence to
in the robbery and in the killing of two children while the robbery was the principle that the accused must always endeavor to prevent the other
underway. It is an easy task after a crime has been consummated for us to crime to be freed from complicity in a crime he knew nothing about. Or that
surmise how the mind of an accused should have operated during crucial he must run away and leave his companions before the second crime is
moments and to state how an accused should have behaved to avoid the committed. Every case must be judged on its separate facts and
possibility of his being implicated as a co-principal and conspirator. notwithstanding conspiracy in the planned crime, a person may still be
Unfortunately, things do not always work logically and according to acquitted of the other crime about which he had no knowledge at all For
predictable patterns of behaviour in real life. The minds of ordinary persons instance, if the innocent victims of the vicious killing in this case had been the
(and I see nothing special, extraordinary, or superior about the accused children of Punzalan, certainly he cannot be held guilty of parricide. Or if a
band of robbers rape a woman inside a house not knowing he is the wife of Escober's version of the incident [was] too replete with contradictions "to
their look-out, the rule on all conspirators being equally responsible for all the merit belief"
consequences or happenings during the commission of the planned crime
should not apply. The precedents from Macalalad are impressively cited by The opening of the gate of the Chua compound to the malefactors by
my teamed colleague, but I believe all judges should still be cautioned to look Escober was absolutely indispensable for the commission of the crime of
beyond the unqualified rule and ascertain carefully whether the lookout or robbery and for the killing of the two (2) children of Mr. and Mrs. Vicente
anybody else similarly situated should be automatically convicted for Chua in the course thereof. In abstracto, the act of opening a gate upon
something about which he was completely ignorant. The consequences of hearing a knock is, of course, an innocent gesture. It is important to bear in
sending an innocent person to j ail for a crime where he had no participation mind, however, that Escober was a security guard; that he had seen and
are too horrible to be left simply to the operation of an unqualified rule. recognized Abuyen through the peephole in the pedestrians' gate before
opening that gate; and surely the least that can be expected of a security
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting : guard, who is on guard duty at night time, is that he must exclude from the
premises being guarded persons who have not demonstrated any lawful
With regret, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion written by Mr. Justice reason for wanting to enter such premises. If one assumes that Escober had
Fernan to the extent that it would acquit Juan Escober. I would, upon the not joined the criminal conspiracy, it was at the very least utterly reckless for
other hand, like to add somewhat to the reference made in the majority him to have opened the gate under the circumstance in this case. The fact
opinion to the rule on the basis of which Punzalan is correctly held liable for that Escober was acquainted with Abuyen was no justification for letting
robbery with homicide. Abuyen and his gang come in. Upon the other hand, the circumstance that
Escober knew Abuyen suggests at least the probability that Escober was
We consider first the proposed acquittal of Juan Escober. indeed part of the criminal conspiracy if Escober was totally unacquainted
with Abuyen, that probability would not of course exist It must further be
The prosecution theory, as found by the majority opinion, was that Juan noted that Escober himself, who had thoughtfully left his gun in a locker
Escober was a principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery before opening the gate of the compound, 1 did not claim that he had been
with homicide. According to the majority opinion, the prosecution sought to coerced by Abuyen and his companions into opening the gate of the
prove that Escober joined in the community of design, a conspiracy, which compound.2 If he had in fact been forced into opening the gate by Abuyen
was shown in respect of the other accused, by referring to the following and company, it would have been the simplest and most natural thing in the
particular acts of Escober: world for him to have said so. Abuyen, the brains of the conspiracy, however,
conveniently explained later that he had pointed his gun at Escober, almost
[1] [Escober's] alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co- apologetically, after Escober had opened the small gate and let Abuyen and
conspirators; the other malefactors into the compound.
[2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Abuyen, the alleged Mrs. Lina Chua testified that upon hearing a shot, and thereupon turning to
mastermind, after the gun shot; and the garage from whence the sound of the shot came, she saw Abuyen
walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter behind. 3 It must not
[3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. escape notice there was no suggestion by any witness that Escober was
then chasing and trying to capture Abuyen, which a security guard faithful to
The prosecution further urged that the firing of a hand gun by Abuyen was a his duties might be expected at least to try to do. The majority opinion does
mere ritual designed to avoid or deflect suspicion from Escober and that try to suggest that because Mrs. Lina Chua, in the separate trial of Abuyen,
had said that Abuyen and Escober were warning towards the gate; they were connection is that if the robbers had really wanted to kill Escober in order to
in a hurry (nagmamadali)," Escober could be regarded as 'indeed chasing prevent Escober's later Identifying them, there was absolutely nothing to
Abuyen/Alorte Escober himself had not claimed that he had somehow prevent them from doing so. The two (2) young children of Mrs. Chua had
summoned his courage and sought to capture Abuyen immediately after been stabbed to death brutally to prevent them from Identifying the robbers;
Abuyen had, according to Escober, fired a shot at him but had missed. Thus, yet, if E scober is to be believed, the robbers made no more than a token,
the suggested interpretation would seem unreal and excessively generous to half hearted, effort to insure that Escober, an adult male and a security
Escober. There was also no evidence that Escober was trying to flee or hide guard, would not Identify them. Escober was not even tied up and blind-
himself from Abuyen. The net effect, if the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua is to folded. It is hence difficult to appreciate the "keen observation" of Escober's
be believed at all, was that Escober was acting in concert with Abuyen, counsel that Escober would be the "stupidest person on earth" if he allowed
presumably to facilitate the escape of Abuyen and his companions. himself "to be shot by a gun—to avoid suspicion that he was in cahoots with
the malefactors." Escober was in fact not wounded at all. No bullet hole was
Clearly, the testimony of Mrs. Chua was critical for the prosecution. The found in the van where Escober claimed to have been crouching when
majority opinion, however, rejects totally the testimony of Mrs. Chua as Abuyen shot at him. 6 Upon the other hand, a shot fired in the air can only be
suffer[ing] from inaccuracy and as being susceptible to other interpretations" regarded as a cheap method for supporting a profession of innocence on the
in the premises, when "taken in conjunction with the extrajudicial confession part of Escober. Escober's counsel was simply begging the question.
of Abuyen." It must be observed, with respect, that the majority opinion so
discarded Mrs. Chua's testimony upon the totally speculative ground that it is In the majority opinion, reliance is placed upon statements made by co-
not contrary to human psychology and experience," that Mrs. Lina Chua accused Macario Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and upon an
having lost two (2) of her children to the robbers, would in seeking extrajudicial statement of Abuyen (accused in a separate criminal case) to
vengeance deliberately and baselessly implicate Escober in the robbery and support the position that the gun play was not mere play-acting and that
the killings as a "sacrificial lamb." There appears no basis for this speculation Escober was not part of the criminal conspiracy. The statements coming from
at all. Moreover, the rejection of Mrs. Chua's testimony runs counter to the Punzalan and Abuyen must, however, be taken with great caution. For it
prevailing jurisprudence which has been summed up in the following terms in must be recalled that the testimony of accomplices—principals confederates
People v. Roxas: or conspirators — while admissible and competent, comes from a "polluted
source." Consequently, as Mr. Justice Malcolm cautioned, such testimony
... Neither is the relationship of Victorino and Paterno to the deceased must be "scrutinized with care. It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If not
sufficient to render their testimony doubtful nor enough to discredit their corroborated,credibility is affected." 7 It should also be pointed out that the
credibility. The credibility of witnesses cannot be assailed as prejudiced statement of Punzalan adduced in this connection in the majority opinion,
simply because of their close relation to the victim. For it is not to be lightly appears disjointed and totally unrelated to the question in response to which
supposed that the relatives of the deceased would callously violate their it was given. The statement of Punzalan, in other words, would appear, not
conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons spontaneous and candid" (as suggested in the majority opinion) but rather to
whom they know to be innocent. 4 have been deliberately thrown in for the purpose of exculpating Escober.
Thus:
It was part of the prosecution theory that Abuyen had fired a shot,
presumably in the air, in order to create the impression that Escober was not FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?
part of the conspiracy. Escober claimed that the shot had been fired at him
while he was inside the van in the garage, and advised Mrs. Chua that he PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.
had not been hit by the shot. 5 The first point that may be noted in this
FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober] nakita mong umakyat? conclusion, even if too cryptically set down on paper, must be given great
weight.
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni
Abuyen ni Alorte. We turn to Macario Punzalan whom the majority opinion finds guilty of
robbery with homicide. There is no question that Punzalan participated in the
FISCAL: Bakit? common design to commit robbery. He acted as lookout for the gang of
robbers. He did not go upstairs to the house which was ransacked and where
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan. the victims were slain; unlike Abuyen, he did not take part in the actual
stabbing of the two (2) innocent children of Vicente and Lina Chua. Even so,
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay. the majority opinion, stressing that Punzalan's participation in the conspiracy
to commit robbery was conclusively shown, rightly held him responsible for
PUNZALAN: Hindi po. robbery with double homicide.
FISCAL: Bakit? Because the above rule on this matter and its underlying ratio have not
always been well understood and because a handful of decisions of this
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi po Court contain language or have reached results which, at first glance, may
ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak eh. seem at variance with the rule above referred to, it should be useful to
(Emphasis supplied) examine in some detail the development of that rule and to mark out its
present scope and shape.
To accept and to accord full credence to statements of proven conspirators
to all appearances designed to avoid suspicion from settling on Escober, who The rule correctly applied by the Court was unanimously reaffirmed by the
had made the robbery and double homicide possible to begin with, while Court en banc most recently in People v. Pecato (G.R. No. L-41008, 18 June
rejecting as biased the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua solely because she was 1987) in the following terms:
the mother of the slain children, must seem a strange situation indeed. If one
must, without requiring proof, impute a 'sense of justice and fairness' to The crime committed by the accused is Robbery with Homicide as defined
Abuyen from whose mind the conspiracy sprang and whose hands and arms and penalized under Article 294 (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Felix Larong
were splattered with the blood of the two (2) young children of Mrs. Lina was shot to death during the robbery. We have repeatedly held that: (A)s
Chua, one ought not, it is submitted, to assume casually that Mrs. Lina Chua long as homicide resulted during or because of the robbery, even if the killing
was bereft of that same 'sense of justice and fairness." is by mere accident, robbery with homicide is committed; it is only the result
obtained, without reference or distincttion as to the circumstances, causes,
While each of the acts of Escober cited by the prosecution might not, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be
considered in isolation from the others, be sufficient to show participation in taken into consideration. (People vs. Guiapar, No. L-35465, May
the common criminal design, it is submitted that where those acts are 31,1984,129 SCRA 539, 553554 [1984].) Further, whenever a homicide has
considered together, and viewed in the light of what Abuyen, Punzalan and been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all
their other two companions did, and did not do, they constitute more than those who took part as principals in the commission of the crime are also
adequate basis for not overturning the conclusion of the trial court that guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
Escober was guilty. After all, it was not this Court but the trial judge who although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly
examined all the evidence and listened to all the testimony, and his appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. (Id., 554, citing:
People vs. Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [19261; and U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil 1 Accepting as true the exculpatory statements of the accused in his
[1907].) In this instance, the evidence on record is bereft of any showing that repudiated confession, it does not appear therefrom that he made any
any of the accused tried to prevent the killing of Felix Larong. What is shown genuine effort to prevent the murder of Rufino Calderon.
instead is that they merely stood watching and did nothing when one of their
companions shot the victim. (T.s.n. session of October 21, 1974, 29; xxx xxx xxx 8
Deposition, Id., 3, 5.) Additionally, the term 'homicide' in robbery with
homicide should be understood as a generic term and includes murder. (Emphasis supplied.)
(People vs. Revotoc, No. L-37425, July 25, 1981, 106 SCRA 22 [1981]. )
The rule in Macalalad was consistently followed until 1925 when U.S. v.
xxx xxx xxx Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 (1925) was decided. In Basisten, Mr. Justice
Romualdez wrote, for the Court:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The liability of the other appellants Andres Pasquin Placido Heusca Vicente
The rule so reiterated in Pecato was first elaborated upon as long ago as 8 Caballero and Alejandro Picate, consist in having conspired and taken part in
October 1907 in U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1. Mr. Justice Carson, speaking the robbery. They must not be held responsible for the homicide which was
for the Supreme Court, said: not the subject matter of their conspiracy and in which they did not have any
intervention, for it was performed by Emilio Huesca alone. The proper
... While it does not appear that this defendant [Fructizoso Esguerra] himself punishment, therefore, for them is the penalty for robbery in band within the
struck the fatal blow which caused the death of Rufino Calderon he must be limits of which the trial court has imposed upon them. 9
adjudged guilty as principal of the complex crime of robbery with homicide
with which he is charged, it having been proved that he was present, ad.ded, But in 1926, barely one year after Basisten had deviated from Macalalad, the
abetted, and took part therein. The testimony of the witnesses for the Supreme Court went back to the Macalalad rule. In People vs. Bautista, the
prosecution fully establishes the guilt of the defendant as a principal in the Court, through Mr. Justice Johnson, invoked and applied the Macalalad rule
commission of the robbery, and, even were we to disregard his confession, without even mentioning the deviation in Basisten:
which he repudiated at the trial of' the case, and wherein he admitted he was
present at the killing of Rufino Calderon, we would, nevertheless, be xxx xxx xxx
compelled to find him guilty of the crime of robo con homicide (robbery with
homicide). The supreme court of Spain, interpreting the provisions of the In the first place it may be said that the evidence adduced during the trial of
Penal Code touching the complex crime of robo con homicidio has frequently the cause clearly shows that the appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery
decided that, where the complex crime has been committed, all those who with homicide and must therefore be punished in accordance with the
look part as principals in the commission of the robbery are guilty as provisions of paragraph 1 of article 503 of the Penal Code. It is clearly
principals in the commission of the crime of robo con homicidio, unless it established that the appellants, together with an armed band of more than
appears that the endeavored to prevent the unlawful killing. (Decisions of the four persons, committed a robbery and that on the occasion of such robbery
supreme court of Spain, April 30 and February 23, 1872, and June 19, 1890. a homicide was committed. The crime which they committed therefore falls
See also Viada, vol. 3, pp. 347, 354, and 356). clearly within the provisions of said article. (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, July 13, 1871; 3 Viada, Commentaries on the Penal Code, p. 347.)
Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the
occasion of a robbery, all principals in the commission of the robbery will also
be held guilty as principals in the complex crime of robbery with homicide, robbers who had gone up the house came down and out into the street, they
although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly failed to find Pelagio at the gate. The two (2) robbers hurried to the next
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 10 block where they found the fourth conspirator waiting for them inside a taxi.
The two (2) robbers boarded the taxi. As the taxi was about to leave,
From 1926 to 1967, the Macalalad doctrine was applied and re-applied many however, a jeepney arrived from the opposite direction and blocked the taxi's
times by the Court. The following list does not purport to be exhaustive: way. A man alighted from the jeepney and started towards the taxi. One of
the robbers recognized the man as a police officer and ordered his
1. People v. Morados, 70 Phil. 558 (1940); companions to shoot which they did, killing the police officer. Pelagio later
explained to his associates that he had fled before the two (2) robbers had
2. People v. de la Rosa, 90 Phil. 365 (1952); completed their job because he, Pelagic, had seen someone slip out of the
house being robbed apparently to summon the police. In a per curiam
3. People v. Libre, 93 Phil. 5 (1953); decision, the Supreme Court modified the conviction of Pelagio from robbery
with homicide to simple robbery. The Court said:
4. People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5 (1955);
Even the decision under appeal recites that when Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar
5. People v. Mangulabnan, G.R. No. L-8919,28 September 1956; 52 O.G. Caymo hurried out of the victim's house after the robbery, Pancho Pelagio
6532 (1956); had evidently fled from his lookout post because the pair, Balmeo and
Caymo, failed to locate him at the gate where the was supposed to have
6. People v. Gardon, 104 Phil. 371 (1958); stationed himself. To be sure, the said decision itself renders the account
that it was only Balmeo and Caymo who walked together from the said house
7. People v. Carunungan, 109 Phil. 534 (1960); to the corner of Villanueva and F. Fernando Streets where then they saw
Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi and that it was only when these
8. People v. Flores de Garcia, 111 Phil. 393 (1961); and three had taken to the said taxi, and the cab was about to leave, that the
shooting of Pat. Trinidad happened. When the homicide was committed,
9. People v. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807 (1962). therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not have had the least intervention or
participation as might justify penalizing him likewise for the said killing. So far
In 1967, People v. Pelagic, 11 was decided. Here, U.S. v. Basisten, was as the records disclose, the conspirators were agreed only on the
indeed cited by the Court. A close scrutiny of the facts in Pelagio will, commission of robbery; there is no evidence that homicide besides was
however, show that the result there reached does not really represent a determined by them when they plotted the crime. All these warrant the
departure from the Macalalad rule which, as noted above, had been exclusion of Pancho Pelagio from any responsibility for the said killing.
reiterated many times since the 1925 Basisten case. (People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil. 493) ...
Pancho Pelagio and five (5) others conspired to rob a particular house in G. Clearly, Pelagio, having fled from the scene of the robbery, had abandoned
Villanueva St., Pasay City. Only Pelagio and three (3) others actually carried the conspiracy and dissociated himself from his co-conspirators even while
out the robbery as planned. Pelagio acted as the lookout and posted himself the robbery was still in process and certainly before the unfortunate
at the gate of the house; two (2) others actually entered the victim's policeman arrived on the scene as the robbers were about to escape in a
premises; the fourth was ordered to hail and hold a taxi in readiness for the taxi. Because of such abandonment and dissociation, the conspiracy,
getaway. The robbery was carried out as planned. But, when the two (2) whatever may have been the subject thereof, was over and done with, so far
as concerned Pelagio. Abandonment and dissociation are clear equivalents show, further, that the Macalalad rule, while it originated in a case involving a
of efforts to prevent the homicide which, under Macalalad, would exculpate band (en cuadrilla), has in fact not been limited by the Court to situations
one from liability for the homicide but not for the robbery. where a band was present. Indeed, the great majority of the above cases are
conspiracy cases where the technical elements of a band 13 were absent.
It may be observed that very soon after Pelagic, the Supreme Court resumed
application and reiteration of the Macalalad rule. Thus, e.g.: We turn to People v. Abalos, 14 and People v. Adriano, 15 which also need
to be considered. A close examination of the facts will show that Abalos and
(1) People v. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88 (1968); Adriano do not represent true departures from the 1907 Macalalad rule.
(2) People v..Pujinio, 27SCRA1186(1969); In Abalos, the accused Abalos and Mendiola, after a long drinking bout with
two (2) other comrades got into a taxi and directed the driver to take all four
(3) People v. Puno, 56 SCRA 659 (1974); of them to the Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Bulacan, in the early hours of
the morning. Abalos was seated beside the driver; the other three (3) were in
(4) People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 448 (1976); the back seat. Two (2) of the four (4) comrades got off before reaching the
subdivision, Abalos and Mendiola then directed the driver to enter the
(5) People v. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70 (1977); subdivision. Abalos signalled Mendiola that he would hold up the driver.
Abalos drew out a knife and held it at the driver's neck. Mendiola at the same
(6) People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348 (1977); time demanded the driver's earnings and boxed him three (3) times on the
back. The driver refused to surrender his earnings and apparently tried to
(7) People v. Berberino, 79 SCRA 694 (1977); fight back. Abalos, infuriated by the driver's resistance, plunged his seven
and a half inch blade through the driver's right cheek. Unnerved by the
(8) People v. Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71 (1979); sudden, profuse bleeding of the, wounded driver, Abalos and Mendiola
hastily left the taxicab, forgetting all about the driver's earnings, and fled. The
(9) People v. Umbao, 103 SCRA 233 (1981); taxi driver suffered a massive hemorrhage which brought on death. Abalos
and Mendiola were convicted by the trial court of attempted robbery with
(10) People v. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173 (1982); homicide. The Supreme Court through then Mr. Justice Aquino upheld the
conviction of Abalos but found Mendiola guilty only of attempted robbery,
(11) People v. Tabian, 120 SCRA 571 (1982); citing in this connection U.S. v. Basisten. The reference to Basisten in this
case, however, appears quite unnecessary for the Court had explicitly found
(12) People Lot Solis, 128 SCRA 217 (1984); a few pages that there in fact was no conspiracy at all, whether for robbery
(holdup) or for homicide. Mr. Justice Aquino wrote:
(13) People v. Guiapar, 129 SCRA 539 (1984); and
As already noted [Abalos] said in his confession that he was intoxicated
(14) People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178 (1986). when he stabbed the cab driver, he and his companions had been ng
continuously sometimes before the crime was prepetrated. Intoxication
Clearly, the Court did not abandon the Macalalad rule by promulgating mitigates his liability. It was not habitual nor intentional (Article 15, Revised
Pelagio, as Mr. Justice Antonio had mistakenly supposed in his concurring Penal Code). The holdup was not the offspring of planning and deliberation.
opinion in People v. Adriano. 12 Examination of the cases listed above will
It was a fatal improvisation dictated by an impromptu impulse. 16 (Emphasis (People vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285;
supplied). People vs. Mejia, 55 SCRA 453; People vs. Carino, 55 SCRA 516; People
vs. Cadag, 2 SC RA 388), the conspirators are all liable as co-principals,
Since there was neither conspiracy the presence of a band, there was in regardless of the extent and character of their respective participation in the
point of fact no occasion for application of the doctrine of Macalalad nor of commission of the crime (People vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People vs.
the Basisten case. Both Abalos and Mendiola were simply principals by Phones, 84 SCRA 167).
direct participation in the attempted robbery.
The Court, however, finds Leonardo Bernardo seemingly unaware of the
People v. Adriano involved the horrifying slaughter of five (5) security guards intention to kill the guards. The Idea of killing them arose only when Mariano
of the Rice and Corn Administration. The security guards were hacked with Domingo called the attention of Apolonio Adriano to his being known by the
an ax, one by one, as they lay hogtied on the floor. The malefactors guards, being one of them. By that time the robbery had been consummated,
numbered about eleven (11) in all. The trial court found four (4) guilty of the the jeep driven by him (Leonardo Bernardo) with Plate No. J-14362, was
crime of robbery with homicide. The precise question before the Court was already loaded with bags and carton boxes containing the stolen money...
whether the decision of the trial court holding four (4) persons, including one
Leonardo Bernardo, guilty of robbery with homicide and sentencing them to ... It was clearly only at the spur of the moment, so to speak, that Mariano
death should be affirmed or whether Leonardo Bernardo should be held Domingo and Apolonio Adriano, joined by Mariano San Diego and Pedro
guilty of robbery merely. A majority of six (6) justices plus one (1) concurring Miranda, thought of having to kill the guards, entirely without the knowledge
justice held that Leonardo Bernardo was guilty of simple robbery. Six (6) of Leonardo Bernardo... 19 (Emphasis supplied.)
other members of the Court voted for affirmance in toto of the trial court's
judgment. 17 The facts in Adriano as found by the Court showed that there Because Leonardo Bernardo was not part of the smaller and later conspiracy
were two (2) conspiracies: one for the commission of robbery, which included (to kill the five guards) within the larger conspiracy (to rob the treasury of the
Leonardo Bernardo and all the other malefactors; 18 another, smaller, one Rice and Corn Administration), he was found guilty of robbery only and his
for the commission of the multiple murder, which did not include Leonardo sentence reduced from death to reclusion perpetua. Thus, the result reached
Bernardo. The per curiam decision read, in relevant part: in Adriano is compatible with the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine.
... The awareness that just one of them being known and arrested would lead What may be stressed, in resume is that the result reached by the Court in
to the apprehension of the other participants in the robbery, the common respect of the accused Punzalan is in line with the rule first elaborated in
design of liquidating the possible witnesses to avoid the grim possibility of U.S. v. Macalalad (1907) and most recently reaffirmed in People v. Pecato
their being all brought before the bar of justice entered the minds of those (1987,). U.S. v. Basisten, a case whose rule was over-turned the very next
specifically named above, and moved to act accordingly. Quite obviously year after it was promulgated, was in fact an aberration. That the Court has
Mariano Domingo did nothing to prevent the killing which he himself hinted at today affirmed once more the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine evidences its
as the next practical move to take following the consummation of the discriminating regard for settled rules.
robbery. The conspiracy Lo hill, born of the exigency of the situation,
therefore clearly involved Apolonio Adriano, Mario San Diego, Mariano That the Court has reaffirmed Macalalad-Pecato is important for another
Domingo and possibly Pedro Miranda who is yet to be apprehended. Their reason. To have disregarded Macalalad-Pecato would have come too close
respective acts clearly were directed to the same object and for the same to discarding the basic rule on conspiracy, that is, once a conspiracy or
purpose. Once the conspiracy is established, which may be done by mere community of criminal design is shown, then the concrete modality of
circumstantial evidence, as direct evidence is not so easily obtainable participation in a crime becomes secondary for determination of liability —
"the act of one is the act of all." To require affirmative proof that the subject of heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000.00 and to pay moral damages
the conspiracy in this case embraced not just robbery but also the double to such heirs in the amount of P200,000.00.
homicide, is to lose sight of the fact that conspiracy, in the nature of things, is
almost always only indirectly or circumstantially shown, by proof of concerted [G.R. No. 126531. April 21, 1999]
acts rather than by e.g., a written plan of action. To require such affirmative
proof would also be to impose a very heavy (and quite unnecessary) burden PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GILBERT ELIJORDE
on our law enforcement agencies, a burden which under present y DE LA CRUZ and REYNALDO PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS alias KIRAT,
circumstances of rampant violent crime and severely limited governmental accused-appellants.
resources, may well be an insupportable one. Our law on conspiracy is
infused, in important degree, with the objective of deterring conspiracies to DECISION
commit crimes and the implementation of such conspiracies. A man's
capacity for inflicting harm is magnified when he joins a conspiracy to commit BELLOSILLO, J.:
crime (whether or not a band, in the technical sense of Article 296, Revised
Penal Code, materializes). The threat to society posed by a criminal group is GILBERT ELIJORDE Y DE LA CRUZ and REYNALDO PUNZALAN Y
greater than the sum total of the particular acts of the individual members of ZACARIAS alias Kirat were convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court
the group. The result here reached by the Court in respect of Punzalan may of Bulacan for the killing of Eric Hierro. Both accused were sentenced to
be seen to reinforce the capability of our law to achieve that objective of death and ordered jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs of Eric Hierro
deterrence. P50,000.00 plus P35,000.00 for actual damages, P100,000.00 for moral
damages and P25,000.00 for exemplary damages. The case is now with us
Finally, there appears nothing unfair or illiberal about holding a man, who on automatic review.
knowingly joins a conspiracy to commit a crime, responsible for all the crimes
which are causally connected with the conspiracy. 20 No one complains The records show that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 21 May 1995
about the same rule in tort law. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect Eric Hierro, Benjamin Visbal and Rodel Contemplado were drinking in the
adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co- conspirators; he merges his house of the latter. Sometime later, Hierro and Visbal went out to buy mango
will into the common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal at a nearby sari-sari store. Accused Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and
conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot with his fellow conspirators a certain Edwin Menes were at the time in front of the store. As Menes
and to have taken his chances that a co-conspirator may get rattled, that a approached Hierro the latter warned Menes, Dont touch me, my clothes will
victim may unexpectedly decide to resist and fight back, or that something get dirty. Suddenly Menes punched Hierro on the face, followed by Elijorde
else may go awry, and third persons may get killed or injured in the course of who also boxed Hierro on the face, and Punzalan who kicked Hierro at the
implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself from such liability, back. Hierro and Visbal ran for their lives. They sought shelter at
the law requires some overt act on the part of the conspirator, to seek to Contemplados house. After some three (3) minutes, Hierro went out of the
prevent commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or house to go home together with Visbal and the latters wife.
dissociate himself from the conspiracy.
As they walked home, Visbal noticed the accused Elijorde, Punzalan and
I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court that both Juan Escober and Menes waiting for them. As Hierro and company drew near, Punzalan kicked
Macario Punzalan, Jr. are guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the Hierro at the back for the second time. Visbal tried to retaliate by punching
crime of robbery with homicide and that accordingly, both should be Punzalan on the face but was held back by his wife. Hierro ran away pursued
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to Idemnify the by Elijorde. They were followed by Visbal. Elijorde stabbed Hierro at the
back. When Hierro fell down, Elijorde placed himself on top of Hierro who conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance
was now raising his arms defensively and pleading, Maawa na kayo, huwag or furtherance of the complicity.[4] Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation
ninyo akong patayin, wala akong kasalanan sa inyo. Despite the pleas of where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions
Hierro for mercy, Elijorde stabbed him with a knife on the chest and then fled. impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring
Visbal and his wife brought Hierro to the hospital where he died soon after. about the death of the victim.[5] In a great majority of cases, complicity was
established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the
Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan, conducted a reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common
post-mortem examination of Eric Hierro, and reported that the cause of his intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the
death was shock resulting from multiple stab wounds in the thorax particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably
penetrating the aorta and vena cava.[1] yield that inference.[6]
A: Yes, Your Honor. Q; What did Edwin do during the second incident?
Q: You mean to say they were three at that time? A: He did nothing.
Q: Now, after that Eric Hierro went home? A: He kicked Eric Hierro at the back.
Q: How long did Eric Hierro stayed (sic) at that place? A: I cant (sic) do anything, Your Honor, because I was being held by my wife.
A: For about three (3) minutes, Your Honor. Q: How about Eric Hierro what did he do?
Q: When Eric Hierro went out you went with him together with Eric Hierro? A: He ran away x x x x
A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: While Eric Hierro was running did you see that Gilbert stab Eric at the
back?
Q: Together with your wife?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: That was the first stab that was made by Gilbert is that correct?
Q: When the three of you went out what happened?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: While we were walking home this Kirat (Reynaldo Punzalan) suddenly
kicked Eric Hierro at the back. Q: What happened to Eric when he was stabbed at the back?
Q: Do you mean to say aside from the first incident Kirat kicked Eric Hierro, A: He continued running, Your Honor.
(during) the second incident Kirat kicked Eric Hierro?
Q: And how about Gilbert what did Gilbert do?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: He continued chasing, Your Honor.
Q: When you were approaching, how many of them were there waiting for
Eric Hierro? Q: How about your wife where was your wife?
assault which was committed in a place far from where he was. The mere
A: At my back, Your Honor. kicking does not necessarily prove intention to kill. The evidence does not
show that Punzalan knew that Elijorde had a knife and that he intended to
Q: When you met Eric Hierro at a certain point what did you actually see? use it to stab the victim.[8] Neither can Punzalan be considered an
accomplice in the crime of murder. In order that a person may be considered
A: That was when I saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro right on the chest. an accomplice in the commission of the offense, the following requisites must
concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the
Q: And when Eric Hierro was already lying (facing?) up? principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b)
he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
A: Yes, Your Honor. acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal
and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. The cooperation
Q: And Gilbert was on top of Eric Hierro? that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered
which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended
A: Yes, Your Honor. to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a
principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused
Q: And you saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro? must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.
There is nothing on record to show that accused Punzalan knew that Elijorde
A: Yes, Your Honor. was going to stab Hierro, thus creating serious doubt on Punzalans criminal
intent.[9]
Q: How many times?
In the absence of a previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the
A: Only once, Your Honor. criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the
same person is individual and not collective, and that each of the participants
Q: During those incidents where was Kirat? is liable only for his own acts.[10] Consequently, accused Punzalan must be
absolved from all responsibility for the killing of Hierro. It may be emphasized
A: He did not run after Eric Hierro. He remained in front of the house of my that at the time accused Elijorde intervened in the assault, Punzalan had
cousin Rodel. already desisted from his own acts of aggression. He did nothing in fact to
assist Elijorde in the immediate commission of the murder. Moreover, the act
On the basis of the above testimony, the only involvement of Punzalan was of kicking by Punzalan prior to the actual stabbing by Elijorde was evidently
kicking Hierro at the back before the latter was pursued and stabbed by done without knowledge of the criminal design on the part of the latter as that
accused Elijorde. After kicking the victim, Punzalan remained where he was design had not yet been revealed prior to the killing of Hierro.
and did not cooperate with Elijorde in pursuing Hierro to ensure that the latter
would be killed. There is no other evidence to show unity of purpose and As regards the kicking of the victim by Punzalan, which the latter admits,
design between Punzalan and Elijorde in the execution of the killing, which is there is nothing on record to show that the kicking resulted in any injury on
essential to establish conspiracy. His act of kicking Hierro prior to the actual any part of the body of Hierro. Neither is there any evidence that the victim
stabbing by Elijorde does not of itself demonstrate concurrence of wills or was hit at all when Punzalan kicked him. Of what then can Punzalan be held
unity of purpose and action. For it is possible that the accused Punzalan had liable?
no knowledge of the common design, if there was any, nor of the intended
With regard to the principal accused Gilbert Elijorde, the trial court correctly minutes between the first and the second assault on Hierro is too brief to
ruled that treachery attended the killing of Hierro thus qualifying the crime to have enabled Elijorde to ponder over what he intended to do with Hierro. The
murder. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery; hence, it
against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof cannot be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance when
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to treachery is already present.[15]
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The
fact that a verbal confrontation accompanied by physical assault by the group The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
of Elijorde preceded the actual killing did not negate the treacherous amended by RA 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. As regards the accused
character of the stabbing which resulted in the death of Hierro. After the first Gilbert Elijorde, the killing although qualified by treachery was not attended
physical assault which sent Hierro retreating and seeking shelter in the by any generic modifying circumstance; consequently, the penalty to be
house of a friend, the victim did not expect that the accused would persist in imposed upon him must be the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.[16]
inflicting harm upon him who, unaware of the impending danger, proceeded With respect to the accused Reynaldo Punzalan, he should be acquitted of
home with his friends. Unfortunately, however, Elijorde was waiting for the the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
deceased and pursued him to his end. After stabbing Hierro at the back, and
if only to ensure the success of his criminal design, accused Elijorde Although not objected to by the accused, we modify the award of damages
persistently chased his unarmed quarry until he finally overpowered his adjudged by the court a quo in favor of the heirs of the victim, particularly
victim and delivered the fatal stab on his chest. In one case, treachery was with regard to the moral and exemplary damages. The award of P100,000.00
present where the accused stabbed the victim with a bladed weapon even as for moral damages may seem excessive considering the purpose of the
his hands were raised and he was pleading for mercy.[11] In another case award which is not to enrich the heirs but to compensate them for injuries to
where the accused who was armed with a revolver had an altercation with their feelings.[17] For this reason, an award of P50,000.00 may be adequate
the victim, fired at him, pursued him, and when cornered he (victim) threw and reasonable.[18] The exemplary damages awarded by the trial court may
himself on the floor, raised his hands and begged the defendant not to shoot be deleted since they are granted only when the crime is committed with one
him as he was already wounded, but the malefactor just the same shot him (1) or more aggravating circumstances. In the instant case, treachery may no
thrice, we held that there was treachery in the killing.[12] longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance since it was already
taken as a qualifying circumstance in the murder, and abuse of superior
We likewise agree with the trial court when it disregarded the aggravating strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages
circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength was already absorbed in the treachery.[19] But the indemnity for death fixed
alleged in the Information. No sufficient evidence exists to show that the at P50,000.00 and the actual damages representing uncontested funeral
requisites of evident premeditation were present, to wit: (a) the time when the expenses of P35,000.00 should be affirmed.
offender decided to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he
had clung to his determination to commit it; and, (c) a sufficient lapse of time On the part of accused Reynaldo Punzalan as there is no finding of criminal
between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the responsibility against him, only accused Gilbert Elijorde should bear the
consequences of his act and for his conscience to overcome the resolution of liability for such civil indemnity as well as the actual and moral damages.
his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings.[13] Where there is no
showing that the accused Elijorde prior to the night of the commission of the WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Accused
crime resolved to kill the victim nor proof that such killing was the result of GILBERT ELIJORDE y DE LA CRUZ is found GUILTY of MURDER and is
meditation, calculation or resolution on his part, evident premeditation cannot accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Accused REYNALDO
be appreciated against him.[14] Moreover, the time interval of three (3) PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is
ordered RELEASED FROM CUSTODY IMMEDIATELY unless legally held
for another cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report These doctrines are applied by the Court in deciding this appeal from the
to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72,[2] in
Accused ELIJORDE is solely held responsible for the payment to the heirs of Crim. Case No. 364-87, finding the accused guilty of murder and sentencing
the victim Eric Hierro the amounts of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, them to reclusin perpetua.
P35,000.00 for actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages.
In an Information dated June 11, 1987, Second Assistant Fiscal of Olongapo
SO ORDERED. City, Jesus P. Duranto, charged Nicomedes Fabro, Francisco Dimalanta,
Amado Alcala, William Hoge and a certain John Doe with murder committed
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, as follows:
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. "That on or about the twelfth (12th) day of April 1987, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
[G.R. No. 95089. August 11, 1997] above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, accused Nicomedes Fabro armed with a gun, with
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICOMEDES intent to kill and with treachery, evident premeditation and in consideration of
FABRO, FRANCISCO DIMALANTA, AMADO ALCALA, WILLIAM HOGE and promise of reward, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
JOHN DOE, accused, NICOMEDES FABRO, accused-appellant. assault, attack and shot (sic) therewith one Dionisio Joaquin and as a result
thereof, the latter suffered shock and Hemmorhage Massive, Secondary to
DECISION Gun Shot Wound which directly caused his death shortly thereafter.
The version of the defense as testified to by Nicomedes Fabro was that at Anthony Beck who was asleep side by side with the deceased was
two o'clock in the morning of April 12, 1987, he stopped ferrying passengers awakened by a shot and even heard the kalansing of the bullet, chased the
and slept on a sofa at the Whiskey River Club, located on a terrace of said person whom he saw running away after the shot was fired. He testified that
club. When he laid down and rested at the sofa, there was also another when he was chasing the man he did not yet know his name but he could
person who was seated on the sofa and was more or less one arm's length identify him. Beck made the identification when accused Fabro was mixed
away from him. The man was then asleep but (Fabro) only knew his face but with other people getting clearance at 164th PC Company Office. Beck
not his name. While sleeping, he was awakened by the shout of one of his positively identified the accused when he testified in Court.
companion saying may binaril, may binaril. The shout was very loud and after
shouting the man ran towards Olongapo City. Accused according to him was xxx xxx xxx
standing and looking at the bloodied person who was more or less two arms
length away from him. The bloodied person was at the balcony of the Beck testified that Dionisio Joaquin was an organizer of a labor organization
Whiskey River Club. and that the latter invited the former to support the strikers.
Accused was surrendered to the CIS by his sister on April 13, 1987. Sgt. Bolina thru his investigation learned the identity of the man who was
Nicomedes Fabro claimed that he was made to sign a document without running away from the scene of the crime as Nicomedes Fabro. Upon
allowing him to read the contents. According to accused Fabro, investigator learning the identity of the suspect, Bolina went to the parents of Fabro
Santiago told him that if he will not sign the document something will happen whom he knew personally and requested that Fabro be surrendered to him.
to him. Atty. Isagani Jungco was present when he signed his name, however, Bolina learned later that the suspect was surrendered to the CIS. After the
the document was already prepared and ready for signature." CIS investigation, Nicomedes Fabro gave his confession in the presence of
Atty. Isagani Jungco who was called to assist the suspect. In his confession,
Trial Courts Findings Fabro implicated Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala.
In its Decision, the trial court leaned towards the version of the From reliable information received by Sgt. Bolina and the other policemen,
prosecution:[10] they learned the identity of two other suspects, namely: Francisco Dimalanta
and Amado Alcala. From unconfirmed reports these two Dimalanta and
From the evidence presented by the prosecution, both testimonial and Alcala participated in the killing of Dionisio Joaquin. The confession of Fabro
documentary, the Court finds these facts to be indubitable. That in the early confirmed that indeed Dimalanta and Alcala were his co-conspirator.
morning of April 12, 1987, between 5:00 and 5:30, the deceased Dionisio
Joaquin who was sleeping side by side with Anthony Beck on the terrace of xxx xxx xxx
the Whiskey Bar, opposite Casa Blanca, Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City, was
shot in the head at close range by accused Nicomedes Fabro. The deceased xxxx (Sgt.) Lappay testified that he was present during the investigation of
was bleeding with blood oozing from the forehead when found by some Fabro. Fabro in his presence admitted his participation and pointed to
Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala and one Ernesto de Guzman. It was Assignment of Errors
in early morning of April 14, 1987 that de Guzman and Dimalanta were
apprehended along Rizal Extension, they being neighbors. Alcala was Appellant interposes the present appeal, faulting the trial court:
arrested at above street.
I
After analyzing and weighing all the pieces of testimonial and documentary
evidence, the trial court declined to give credence to the uncorroborated For not considering the defense of alibi when there is doubt as to the identity
claim of appellant that he was asleep at the terrace of the Whiskey Club at of the suspect.
the time of the incident. The court a quo also rejected his contention that he
was coerced into signing a confession, since the solitary verbal threat II
allegedly made by the investigator was vague and not backed up by the use
of actual physical force. After considering the presence of the counsel (Atty. For not considering the admissions and confessions as inadmissible as
Jungco) who assisted the appellant (and his co-accused) during the custodial violative of the Constitution.
investigation as well as in the execution of their respective sworn statements,
the lower court admitted in evidence their extrajudicial confessions. III
The confession of Appellant Fabro was summarized by the lower court, thus: For not considering the statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses
as hearsay.
In the confession of Nicomedes Fabro he narrated how Francisco Dimalanta
offered him P10,000.00 to kill a man, how the gun was given him and how IV
they observed the movements of the victim to the time of the killing. While
Nicomedes Fabro did the actual shooting, accused Alcala and Dimalanta For presuming that conspiracy exists.
were present awaiting the outcome of the shooting.
The Courts Ruling
The confession of Dimalanta coincided in all material points with the
confession of Fabro. Dimalanta narrated how he was promised the amount The appeal is not meritorious. In view of the incriminatory nature of
P10,000 by a certain Bill Hoge and how he was paid of P5,000.00 as initial appellants confession, the Court will tackle the second assigned error ahead
payment and the balance to be paid after the killing is accomplished. The of the first.
P5,000.00 initial payment was shared by the three accused.
First Issue: Admissibility of Appellants Confession
From the foregoing, the trial court established the existence of conspiracy
among the three accused. The trial court further found the testimony of Beck A confession is defined in jurisprudence as a declaration made voluntarily
unbiased, truthful and credible. and without compulsion or inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging
that he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime.[11] But
Finally, the court below held that the commission of the crime was attended before it can be admitted in evidence, several requirements have to be
by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and satisfied.
consideration of price or reward.
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which came into effect on perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.[16] When all
February 2, 1987, requires that: these requirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the
burden of proof that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall rests upon the accused.[17]
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the Admittedly, the case of the prosecution hinges on appellants confession. The
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. defense maintains that the same is inadmissible for the following reasons: (1)
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of appellants confession was extracted under threat and intimidation; (2) the
counsel. lawyer's (Atty. Jungcos) participation was only as a witness during the
signing of the prepared confession and not during the investigation or
xxx xxx xxx interrogation itself; and (3) appellant was made to sign the confession without
having read it and without the presence of counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As proof thereof, the defense quotes appellants statements during direct
examination:[18]
Moreover, Article III, Section 17 of the Constitution guaranteeing the right of
the accused against self-incrimination, provides: "Q. And what did (CIS Investigator) Santiago tell you if he told you anything?
SEC.17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. A. Santiago told me that if I will not sign it, something will happen to me.
In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is Q. But you will admit before this Court that before you affixed your signature,
given: the document was shown to you by Santiago, did he not?
1. Freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery;[12] A. No more, I was just made to sign.
2. Knowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under Q. Do you want to impress the Court that you just affixed your signature
custodial investigation of his constitutional rights;[13] and without you being allowed to read the documents or the investigator Santiago
did not even read unto you the contents of the documents?
3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of
its consequences.[14] A. No sir."
Once admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the Such uncorroborated and anemic allegations are insufficient to render
normal experience of mankind can accept as being within the realm of appellants confession inadmissible. Rather, they appear to be a mere
probability.[15] subterfuge designed to impute constitutional infirmity to the conduct of the
custodial interrogation.
A confession meeting all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a
high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of The more credible evidence is the rebuttal testimony of Atty. Jungco showing
normal mind will knowingly, freely and deliberately confess that he is the adherence to the constitutional requirements. Atty. Jungco testified that after
he apprised appellant of his constitutional rights to be silent and to have Q. Now, it is the waiver of the accused to counsel, will you please tell the
counsel during the investigation, the latter waived them in his (Atty. Jungcos) Court if you advised him of his rights and effect of such waiver?
presence. Thus:[19]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DE DIOS:
A. Before he signed this waiver, I apprised him of his rights under the
Q. Atty. Jungco, I would like to bring your attention to April 13, 1987, do you Constitution, that is, the right to be silent, the right to counsel and that any
remember having been called to assist an accused detained at the CIS statement that he will make in any investigation may be used for or against
Office, Camp Maquinaya, Olongapo City? him in any court of law and after that, I asked him if despite his right to have
counsel present during the taking of his testimony, he still waives that right to
A. Yes, I was then the President of the IBP of Zambales-Olongapo Chapter counsel and he said Yes and he signed that statement there. As a matter of
and the CIS people approached me if I will help them in the waiver, to be fact, in this Pagpapatunay, the last sentence Pumirma ako x x x x sa harapan
present when waiver will be signed by the person before the CIS, ni Atty. Isagani Jungco, IBP President. (Sgd) Nicomedes Fabro.
Q. Waiver of what? Q. Atty. Jungco, was that advice given in Tagalog or in English?
A. Waiver of the right to counsel and the presence of counsel during the A. It was given in Tagalog and in English.
taking of his investigation.
Q. Did he understand your admonition or your reminders concerning his
xxx xxx xxx right?
Q. To refresh your memory, Atty. Jungco, I am showing you a statement A. He understood because he said Yes.
which has been marked as Exhibit F for the prosecution, please go over this
before I ask my question. xxx xxx xxx
A. (Witness going over the document handed to him) I recognize this Q. Thank you. Atty. Jungco, at the last page and this is the end of his
statement. confession, there is a signature of Nicomedes Fabro, were you present when
he signed the last page of his testimony?
xxx xxx xxx
A. At the time that he signed this, I was there present because I was talking
Q. Can you explain what is this Pagpapatunay wherein you are a witness to then with their Chief there which is I think Capt. Flores and before I left, this
that? statement was completed.
A. I was present when Nicomedes Fabro during the time that I was there ATTY. DE DIOS:
signed his waiver of the right to have counsel at the time of the taking of his
testimony. Q. Thank you. Atty. Jungco, when you signed this first page and when
Nicomedes Fabro signed this waiver, do you remember whether or not there
was already a statement prepared?
appellant, by his uncorroborated, puerile and matter-of-fact claim, failed to
xxx xxx xxx overcome the presumption that Atty. Jungco regularly performed his official
duty as an officer of the court in giving assistance to persons undergoing
A. At the time that he signed this, the investigation has not yet began custodial interrogation.[24] Upon the other hand, the overwhelming evidence
because precisely, I was asked to be present because of the waiver. And is that he did perform such duty faithfully.
after he signed his waiver and I signed it also in his presence, I was talking
with Capt. Flores and they were taking his testimony at that time. After the prosecution has shown that the confession was obtained in
accordance with the aforesaid constitutional guarantee, the burden of proving
Then, afterwards, before I left." that undue pressure or duress was used to obtain it rests on the accused.[25]
In Antillon vs. Barcelon,[26] the Court imposed a high degree of proof to
This adherence to the Constitution is further confirmed by the confession overthrow the presumption of truth in the recitals contained in a public
itself. It starts off with a Pasubali[20] wherein appellant was informed of his instrument executed with all the legal formalities.
constitutional rights and a Pagpapatunay which confirmed that he understood
said rights. Both parts also serve as a written proof of appellants waiver in In People vs. Pia,[27] the Court held that where the accused failed to present
fulfillment of the requirements of the Constitution. credible evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons, e.g.,
where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths;
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the testimony of Atty. Jungco was where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their
replete with details as to how he informed and warned appellant of the alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks
consequences of the waiver of his right to counsel. Thus, he argues that of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves
there is no room for doubt that appellant was indeed assisted by counsel examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, their confession
when he waived his right to counsel during the time that his statement was should be considered voluntary.[28]
taken, and not only at the time he signed it as claimed by appellant.
Appellant has miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove
The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he the use of force or intimidation on his person to secure his confession. The
cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the records show that appellants confession was sworn and subscribed to before
police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of Fiscal Jesus Dorante, to whom he could have and should have voiced his
the accused. Atty. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration. Nor is objection, if any. Quite the contrary, Fiscal Dorante certified that he
there any evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the personally examined appellant and was convinced that the latter gave his
accused.[21] The indelible fact is that he was president of the Zambales statement freely and voluntarily and that he understood the contents of his
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and not a lackey of the confession. Appellants failure to voice out his complaints is tantamount to a
lawmen. manifestation that indeed he waived his right to counsel in the presence of
Atty. Jungco in accordance with the Constitution.[29] His assertion on appeal
Doubts that Atty. Jungcos assistance to appellant was not independent since that he was intimidated into giving said confession rings hollow and too
he was engaged by the CIS Investigators are further dispelled by the fact that late.[30]
he was sent[22] to the CIS Office by Sgt. Bolina who personally knew
appellants parents and was a friend of his brother-in-law.[23] He took the This claim is further belied by appellants lack of complaint, or even any
trouble to ensure that a lawyer was present during the taking of appellants mention thereof, to his sister and relatives who visited him at Camp
statement, even though he (Bolina) would not be there. Ineluctably,
Maquinaya where he was detained for one year.[31] This reinforces the trial Q. And after cleaning the car of Capt. Flores, what was your next chore or
courts ruling. activity?
Perhaps the most telling indication that appellants confession was voluntary A. I cooked food for them.
is the fact that said confession contained exculpatory claims[32] (Question
Nos. 5, 7, 8 and 9) and facts that only the appellant could have known Q. And these activities became routinary and ordinary for how many days?
(Question Nos. 5,6,7,8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 20 and 29).[33]
A. I stayed there for a year and that was the routinary work I did. (TSN, July
Thus, we can only affirm the following findings of the trial court: 18, 1989, p. 23)
"Neither can the Court accept that accused Nicomedes Fabro was only The only alleged threat to him was that Santiago told me that if I will not sign
forced into giving a confession. The Court cannot even for a while believe it something will happen to me. (TSN, July 18, 1989, p. 26). Nothing was
that he was only forced to give his statement when the accused himself mentioned about actual physical force used on accused.[34] x x x
stated that he was not even once hurt by any of the CIS investigators. In
(fact), he was even told to rest. We hold that appellants confession was properly admitted by the trial court
as part of the prosecution evidence.
Atty. Alinea:
Second Issue: Defense of Alibi vs. Positive Identification
Q. And immediately after your sister left, your interrogation by the CIS agents
started, that is correct or it is not? The defense argues that, although alibi is the weakest defense, easily
fabricated and concocted, nevertheless it gains strength when there is doubt
A. No, sir I was asked to clean. as to the identity of the suspect. Although appellant admitted that he was
sleeping next to the victim when the latter was shot, he claims that Witness
Q. What portion or portions of the CIS headquarters were you ordered to Beck could not have seen the face of the person running away from the
clean? crime scene since it was still dark at that time. Beck had just awakened, so it
would have taken some time before his eyes could have adjusted. Thus, the
A. The ceilings. defense speculates that the identification of appellant by Beck was "coached
and suggested" by the investigators who fetched him and prepared his
Q. And after cleaning the ceiling of the CIS headquarters, what was the next second statement.
order to you?
These arguments do not inspire belief. Beck claimed that he saw appellant
A. They asked me to rest. running away from the scene of the shooting. In answer to the trial judges
clarificatory questions during the cross-examination, the witness replied that,
(TSN, July 18, 1989, pp. 15-16.) when he opened his eyes after hearing the gun report, he saw a person who
immediately ran away.[35] Beck testified that he saw appellants face while
xxx xxx xxx chasing the latter, although he did not catch up with appellant.[36] Therefore,
from the time he was awakened until he lost the appellant during the chase,
Beck saw appellants face. Subsequently, in open court, he pointed to
appellant as the man he had chased. This fact was not lost on the defense; awakened only by the shouting of people and not by the sound of the
thus, the defense claimed that, considering the time of the incident (5:00 to gunshot; (4) and finally, that he stayed at the scene of the crime for about 30
5:30 a.m. in mid-April), there would have been insufficient daylight to permit minutes without anybody noticing that he was there at all.[38]
clear and positive identification of the culprit by the witness.
Third Issue: Alleged Hearsay Evidence
The defense claims that this weak identification by Beck strengthened
appellants alibi, which is actually and more accurately a denial in view of The defense claims that the identification of appellant was hearsay because
appellants admission that he was at the scene of the crime. However, giving appellants name was allegedly given to Witness Beck by a certain Eduardo
it a different name does not increase its probative value. A denial, like other Ragonton who, however, was not presented as a witness. We cannot sustain
defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which this. The fact remains that Witness Beck was able to identify appellant in
is independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution open court because he had seen the latters face that fateful night.[39] While
convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of the Beck may not have known the name of the appellant, he was certain about
denial is negligible. Otherwise, credibility of testimonies and their evidentiary the latters identity. Indeed, appellants name which was supplied by another
weight come into play. The well-settled rule is that the assessment by the person to Witness Beck may be considered hearsay; but appellants identity
trial court of credibility and weight of evidence is accorded the highest which the said witness personally knew is not.
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some Fourth Issue: Existence of Conspiracy
facts or circumstances of substance which would have affected the result of
the case. The defense raises this issue without elaborating further or offering any
evidence in support thereof.
Becks testimony that appellant was the man he chased contravenes the
contention that appellant was sleeping one arms length away from the victim; We are not persuaded. In fact, the conspiracy between appellant and his co-
that appellant was only awakened by shouts that somebody was shot; and accused appears indubitable. The decision of the trial court states that:
that he stayed at the crime scene for a time during the investigation.
Moreover, the denial is directly contravened by his confession that he shot From reliable information received by Sgt. Bolina and other policemen, they
the victim. learned the identity of two other suspects, namely: Francisco Dimalanta and
Amado Alcala. From unconfirmed reports these two (,) Dimalanta and
In light of this confession, the denial is actually a belated retraction of said Alcala(,) participated in the killing of Dionisio Joaquin. The confession of
confession. The rule in this jurisdiction is that repudiation and recantation of Fabro confirmed that indeed Dimalanta and Alcala were his co-conspirators.
confessions which have been obtained in accordance with the Constitution
are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable.[37] They have negligible xxx xxx xxx
probative weight.
In the confession of Nicomedes Fabro he narrated how Francisco Dimalanta
Thus, we agree with the trial court that appellants denial is totally offered him P10,000.00 to kill a man, how the gun was given him and how
unconvincing. Appellants uncorroborated testimony is: (1) that he just they observed the movements of the victim to the time of the killing. While
happened to be asleep at the terrace of the Whiskey Bar; (2) that appellant Nicomedes Fabro did the actual shooting, accused Alcala and Dimalanta
who resided nearby, for no explainable reason, elected to sleep on the same were present awaiting the outcome of the shooting.[40]
veranda during the very same night that the victim was shot; (3) that he was
The said decision further elaborates: evident premeditation is manifest from the fact that on April 10, 1987,
appellant was approached and hired by Dimalanta to kill the victim; that the
The confession of Dimalanta coincided in all material points with the appellant clung to his determination to kill the victim even after an
confession of Fabro. Dimalanta narrated how he was promised the amount of unsuccessful first attempt on April 11, 1987 at the D & E Fast Food
P10,000.00 by a certain Bill Hoge and how he was paid P5,000.00 initial Restaurant; and that a sufficient lapse of time had passed giving the
payment was shared by the three accused."[41] appellant a chance to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
The acts of the accused show that they were animated by the same purpose In U.S. vs. Manalinde,[45] the Court held that the aggravating circumstances
and were united in their execution. When, by their acts, two or more persons of evident premeditation and offer of money, reward or promise are not
proceed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object -- each incompatible and may be appreciated together, one being independent of the
doing a part so that their acts though apparently independent were in fact other.
connected, indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of
sentiment -- conspiracy may be inferred.[42] Treachery is shown by the fact that appellant, after several days of observing
the movements of the victim, shot the latter while he was asleep.[46] The
From appellants confession, it is clear that Dimalanta offered him money to means of execution (1) gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
kill Joaquin; that, together with Alcala, they observed the movements of the himself or to retaliate; and (2) showed that such method was deliberately or
victim; that prior to the shooting, they had attempted to kill the victim at the D consciously adopted.[47]
& E Fast Food Restaurant; and that at the time of the shooting, on April 12,
1987, Dimalanta and Alcala were at or near the scene of the crime, acting as Although all three circumstances (price, premeditation and treachery) were
lookouts and awaiting the outcome of the killing.[43] proven, only one will be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder and the
two others can be used only as generic aggravating circumstances.
Aggravating Circumstances
However, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should also be
The trial court held that the following circumstances attended the killing: appreciated in appellants favor, as he surrendered to the CIS in Camp
Maquinaya on April 13, 1987, thus, offsetting one generic aggravating
1. The crime was committed in consideration of a price. Dimalanta was circumstance. Accordingly, the proper penalty is reclusin perpetua.
promised P10,000.00 by Hoge to look for a killer. P5,000.00 was actually
paid. In turn Dimalanta secured the services of the triggerman, Fabro in WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with slight
exchange for money. Alcala was paid for his participation in the plan. modification, i.e., the indemnity is INCREASED to P50,000.00 in line with
current jurisprudence.[48]
2. With evident premeditation, the accused directly aiming the gun at a (sic)
close range; and SO ORDERED.
3. Treachery, by shooting the helpless victim while asleep to insure its Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
execution without risk to the killer.[44]
G.R. No. L-18792 February 28, 1964
That the crime was committed in consideration of a price has been
satisfactorily shown by appellants confession. From the confession also, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. apparently was then in financial straits induced Alicia Cervantes to accept an
GUILLERMO BELLO, defendant-appellant. employment as entertainer in a bar and restaurant establishment known as
Maring's Place situated the corner of Aguinaldo and Bonifacio Streets,
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Gumaca, Quezon (4) that Alicia Cervantes entered the service of Maring's
Ferdinand E. Marcos for defendant-appellant. Place on that day as a public hostess; (5) that the accused being infatuated
with his young bride used to watch her movements in Maring's Place
REYES, J.B.L., J.: everyday; (6) that on May 16 he saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater in
Gumaca with a man whom the accused found later was caressing his
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in its common-law wife inside the movie house; (7) that being in love with her he
Criminal Case No. 592-G, for murder. took her out from the movie and warned her to be more discreet in her
personal conduct in Gumaca; (8) that Alicia Cervantes continued to serve at
The information filed against the accused alleged four (4) aggravating Maring's Place as a public hostess; (9) that on May 20, 1958, at 3:00 p.m.
circumstances, namely: treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime, and the accused went to Maring's Place to ask for some money from Alicia; (10)
superior strength. The trial court made a finding of "treachery, evident that Maring, the owner of the place, and Alicia refused to give money, Maring
premeditation and in cold blood and without any provocation"; however, the telling him to forget Alicia completely because he was already an old man, an
dispositive portion of the appealed decision states as follows: invalid besides and should stop bothering Alicia; (11) that having failed to
obtain financial assistance from his paramour, accused left the place
... the Court finds the accused Guillermo Bello guilty beyond reasonable somewhat despondent and went home passing Bonifacio Street; (12) that on
doubt of the crime of murder defined an punished by Article 248 of the his way home he met the brothers Justo Marasigan and Luis Marasigan who
Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of (1) nighttime, (2) greeted the accused, Luis saying to his brother Justo the following: "So this
abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, (3) superior strength offset is the man whose wife is being used by Maring for white slave trade"; (13)
only by his surrender to the authorities and hereby sentence him to DIE by that these remarks of Luis Marasigan naturally brought grief to the accused,
electrocution in the manner provided by law ordering his heirs, after his to drown which he sought Paty's place in Gumaca where he drank 5 glasses
death, to indemnify the heirs o the deceased Alicia Cervantes in the sum of of tuba; (14) that from Paty's place he went to Realistic Studio which is in
P3,000.00, wit costs. front of Maring's Place and from there watched the movements of Alicia; (15)
that at about 9:00 o'clock that night he entered Maring's Place and without
The record bears out, the Office of the Solicitor General does not challenge, much ado held Alicia from behind with his left hand in the manner of a boa
and the counsel de oficio agree with, and adopts, the following findings of strangulating its prey and with his right hand stabbed Alicia several times
fact of the trial court: with a balisong; (16) that seeing Alicia fallen on the ground and believing her
to be mortally wounded, he fled and went to the municipal building and there
From the evidence adduced at the hearing of the case, it has been surrendered himself to the police of Gumaca.
established to the satisfaction of the Court (1) that on September 17, 1954,
the accused Guillermo Bello, a widower who at that time was about 54 years Both the prosecution and the defense also agree that the crime committed is
of age, took a young peasant lady named Alicia Cervantes, about 24 years not murder but only homicide, but they disagree in the qualifying or
old his common-law wife; (2) that from that day they lived together apparently aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The prosecution holds that the
in blissful harmony as man and wife without the benefit of marriage bearing, crime is homicide, aggravated by abuse of superior strength, but offset by
however, no child, ...; (3) that on May 15, 1958, the accused who had no voluntary surrender. On the other hand, the defense maintains that the
means of substantial livelihood except that of making "kaingin" and who
accused is entitled to the additional mitigating circumstance of passion and ungratefulness. There is nothing to show that the assailant and his common-
obfuscation. The trial court held a different conclusion, as earlier stated. law wife reposed in one another any special confidence that could be
abused, or any gratitude owed by one to the other that ought to be
While it cannot be denied that Alicia was stabbed at the back, the wound was respected, and which would bear any relation, or connection, with the crime
but a part and continuation of the aggression. The four (4) stab wounds (the committed. None is inferable from the fact that the accused was much older
3 others were in the breast, hypogastric region, and in the left wrist as shown than his victim, or that he was penniless while she was able to earn a living
in the certificate of the Municipal Health Officer) were inflicted and occasionally gave him money, since both lived together as husband and
indiscriminately, without regard as to which portion of her body was the wife. Neither is it shown that the accused took advantage of any such special
subject of attack. The trial court itself found that the stab in the back was confidence in order to carry out the crime.
inflicted as Alicia was running away. For this reason, treachery cannot be
imputed (People v. Cañete, 44 Phil. 478). Since the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
and abuse of superior strength, which could have qualified the crime as
Evident premeditation was, likewise, not established. The accused had been murder, were not present, and since the generic aggravating circumstances
carrying a balisong with him for a long time as a precaution against of nighttime and abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness have not
drunkards, and without any present plan or intent to use it against his been established, the accused can only be liable for homicide.
common-law wife. That he watched her movements daily manifest his
jealous character, but there is no evidence that from this jealousy sprouted a Both defense and prosecution agree that the accused-appellant is entitled to
plan to snuff out her life.1äwphï1.ñët the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the
authorities. The remaining area of conflict is reduced to whether the accused
The evidence does not show, either, any superior strength on the part of the may lay claim to a second mitigating circumstance, that of having acted on a
accused, and, not possessing it, he could not take advantage of it. True that provocation sufficiently strong to cause passion and obfuscation. The
he was armed with a balisong, but he was old and baldado (invalid), while defense submits that accused is so entitled, because the deceased's flat
Alicia was in the prime of her youth, and not infirm. The facts are not rejection of petitioner's entreaties for her to quit her calling as a hostess and
sufficient to draw a comparison of their relative strength. Possession of a return to their former relation, aggravated by her sneering statement that the
balisong gives an aggressor a formidable advantage over the unarmed accused was penniless and invalid (baldado), provoked the appellant, as he
victim, but the physique of the aggressor ought also to be considered. At any testified, into losing his head and stabbing the deceased. The state disputes
rate, taking into account the emotional excitement of the accused, it is not the claim primarily on the strength of the rule that passion and obfuscation
clearly shown that there was "intencion deliberada de prevalerse de la can not be considered when "arising from vicious, unworthy, and immoral
superioridad o aprovecharse intencionadamente de la misma" (Sent. TS. 5 passions" (U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217).
Oct. 1906), i.e., deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength.
We are inclined to agree with the defense, having due regard to the
The crime was committed at nighttime, but the accused did not seek or take circumstances disclosed by the record. It will be recalled that the lower court
advantage of it the better to accomplish his purpose. In fact, Maring's Place found that the accused had previously reproved the deceased for allowing
was bright and well-lighted; hence, the circumstance did not aggravate the herself to be caressed by a stranger. Her loose conduct was forcibly driven
crime. (U.S. vs. Ramos, et al., 2 Phil. 434; U.S. vs. Bonete, 40 Phil. 958.) home to the accused by Marasigan's remark on the very day of the crime
that the accused was the husband "whose wife was being used by Maring for
We can not understand how the trial court came to couple the crime with the purposes of prostitution," a remark that so deeply wounded the appellant's
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and obvious feelings that he was driven to consume a large amount of wine (tuba) before
visiting Alicia (the deceased) to plead with her to leave her work. Alicia's
insulting refusal to renew her liaison with the accused, therefore, was not
motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life henceforth, but showed her CORTES, J.:
determination to pursue a lucrative profession that permitted her to distribute
her favors indiscriminately. We can not see how the accused's insistence Appellants were accused of the crime of murder on the basis of the following
that she live with him again, and his rage at her rejection of the proposal, can information:
be properly qualified as arising from immoral and unworthy passions. Even
without benefit of wedlock, a monogamous liaison appears morally of a That on or about the 16th day of April, 1973, at night, in Barrio San Vicente,
higher level than gainful promiscuity. municipality of Umingan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Isabelo
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision should be, and hereby is, modified. Trinidad, alias "Pedro Diplat and Romeo Condaya, alias "Romy," and
This Court finds the accused-appellant, Guillermo Bello, guilty beyond Bonifacio Palding, alias "Pacio," and Wilfredo Mitrado, alias "Edo," who were
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, attended by two (2) mitigating discharged in the municipal court for insufficiency of evidence, conspiring
circumstances: (a) passion and obfuscation, and (b) voluntary surrender, together and mutually helping one another, armed with a shotgun and with
and, therefore, imposes upon him an indeterminate sentence ranging from a intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there,
minimum of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to a maximum of wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Cristita Balancio
ten (10) years of prision mayor; orders him also to personally indemnify the Vda. de Angel inflicting upon her fatal gunshot wounds which caused her
heirs of Alicia Cervantes in the amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. death as a consequence.
So ordered.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. [Rollo, p. 4].
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Upon arraignment, both accused-appellants, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded "Not Guilty."
People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714 , G.R. No. L-38930 June 28, 1988
In a decision dated May 27, 1974, the Court of First Instance rendered
G.R. No. L-38930 June 28, 1988 judgment convicting accused-appellants of murder and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to jointly and severally indemnify the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, heirs of the deceased Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel in the amount of
vs. P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. The shotgun and the cartridges used in the
ISABELO TRINIDAD, alias "Pedro Diplat," and ROMEO CONDAYA, alias commission of the crime were ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of
"Romy," accused-appellants. the government.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Not agreeing with the decision of the trial court accused-appellants appealed
to this Court.
Domingo V. Pascua for accused-appellant Isabelo Trinidad.
In his brief, accused-appellant Trinidad assigned the following errors:
Emiliano S. Micu for accused-appellant Romeo Condaya.
I. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY WHEN IT REFUSED RESORTED TO BY THE POLICE AUTHORITIES TO EXACT ADMISSION
TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION AND DECEIT FROM THE
ACCUSED WAS IRRELEVANT DESPITE THAT ITS MATERIALITY AND
II. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY RELEVANCE TO THE CASE IS VERY CLEAR.
WHEN IT CONCLUDED WITHOUT GROUNDS THAT:
II
1. It is undeniable that the initial holder of the gun was Isabelo Trinidad.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INITIAL
2. Isabelo Trinidad made sufficient steps in trying to escape suspicion by INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT ISABELO TRINIDAD, ROMEO
giving the gun for safekeeping to Romeo Condaya. CONDAYA, BONIFACIO PALDING AND WILFREDO MITRADO
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE, BURST OF GUNFIRE WAS HEARD, WERE
3. It is inconceivable for the police authorities to exactly know where the gun SEEN A FEW METERS FROM THE HOUSE OF THE VICTIM CRISTITA
and the cartridges were hidden if not for the information furnished them by BALANCIO VDA. DE ANGEL HURRIEDLY WALKING TOWARDS THE
Romeo Condaya. NORTH AND THAT ROMEO CONDAYA WAS HOLDING A GUN, DESPITE
THE CLEARLY IMPROBABLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF
4. Isabelo Trinidad's presence at the scene of the crime was established by THE WITNESSES WHO TESTIFIED ON THIS (SIC) POINTS.
even the evidence in his behalf [as) his house is a few meters away from the
victim's house. III
5. Such startling occurrence could have roused Isabelo Trinidad from his THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROMEO CONDAYA LED
sleep. In fine, when Isabelo Trinidad, after the burst of gunfire returned to the THE AUTHORITIES TO THE COLIBANGBANG" TREE AND THE BAMBOO
victim's house it was only to shield himself from responsibility for the crime GROVES WHERE THE SHOTGUN (EXH. C) AND THE CARTRIDGES
which he concocted. (EXHS. D, D-1, D-2 AND D-3) WERE ALLEGEDLY RESPECTIVELY
RETRIEVED DESPITE THE UNRELIABLE AND THE INADMISSIBILITY OF
6. that the evidence clearly establish that Isabelo Trinidad conveniently THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
evaded direct confrontation with the police authorities at the initial stage of
the police investigation. IV
III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED SO GRAVELY WHEN IT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ROMEO CONDAYA
CONVICTED THE ACCUSED (YOUR APPELLANT) OF THE CRIME WAS THE GUN WIELDER AND THAT HE DID SO UPON THE ACTIVE
CHARGED CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. INDUCEMENT OF HIS CO-ACCUSED ISABELO TRINIDAD, DESPITE THE
TOTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.
On his part, accused-appellant Condaya assigned the following errors:
V
I
AND, FINALLY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION WAS PROVED AND THAT
PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE TO PROVE THE IRREGULARITY BOTH THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY THEREOF DESPITE THE TOTAL
LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND Umingan, Pangasinan. Then, they proceeded to the scene of the incident in
REASONABLE DOUBT. order to investigate.
Ultimately, however, as pointed out by accused-appellant Condaya, the issue Arriving at the premises, they saw Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel, already
boils down to whether or not the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable dead as a result of gunshot wounds suffered at the back of her neck. This
doubt that accused-appellants Trinidad and Condaya were the persons investigation again revealed the information that Isabelo Trinidad, Romeo
responsible for the death of the victim. Condaya, Bonifacio Palding, and Wilfredo Mitrado, were seen within the
vicinity immediately after the gunfire. As Isabelo Trinidad was then on the
To support its judgment of conviction, the trial court relied on the following premises, he was apprehended and brought to the Municipal Building of
findings: Umingan, Pangasinan. On the way, Isabelo Trinidad revealed that he had
caused the death of Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel, as in fact he offered to
The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that in the evening of pay Romeo Condaya the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) to do the
April 16, 1973, one Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel was asleep by the job. However, the intended victim was Juan Angel, because of Isabelo
balcony of her house situated at Barrio San Vicente, Umingan, Pangasinan. Trinidad's carabao.
With her at that time were her son, Juan Angel, her daughter-in- law and two
(2) grandchildren. Suddenly, there was a burst of gunfire, rousing Juan Angel Accordingly, Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Dominador Barwel on April 17, 1973 took
and his wife from their sleep. Juan Angel then peeped out from the window to steps to apprehend Romeo Condaya, Wilfredo Mitrado and Bonifacio
find out what happened as his carabao was tied just below the said window. Palding, at Sta. Rosa, Umingan, Pangasinan. Wilfredo Mitrado was
As Juan Angel peeped, he saw Isabelo Trinidad, Romeo Condaya, Wilfredo apprehended on April 18,1973 while Romeo Condaya was apprehended
Mitrado and Bonifacio Palding, about five (5) to six (6) meters away hurriedly sometime on April 20, 1973 at Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, after being turned
walking towards the North. over by the Sto. Tomas police authorities. On the way to Umingan,
Pangasinan, Romeo Condaya was verbally interrogated inside the jeep.
Shortly, as Juan Angel's wife shouted. Romeo Condaya who was then Here, Condaya was asked if he had anything to do with the killing of Cristita
holding a gun, Isabelo Trinidad, Bonifacio Palding, and Wilfredo Mitrado ran Balancio Vda. de Angel. Readily, Romeo Condaya admitted the shooting as
farther towards the North. Isabelo Trinidad promised to pay him (Condaya) the amount of Five Hundred
Pesos (P500.00). However, this amount remained unpaid. On the same
It turned out that Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel was hit by her neck which occasion, Romeo Condaya informed Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Barwel that the gun
caused her death. (Exhibits "A" and "A-1"). So, Juan Angel proceeded to call used in the killing was hidden somewhere atop a "Colibangbang" tree at Sta.
for help. He asked somebody to fetch Ignacio Dopale, the Barrio Captain of Rosa, Umingan, Pangasinan.
San Vicente, Umingan, Pangasinan, who immediately responded to Juan
Angel's call for help. Initial inquiries from Juan Angel, revealed the At Sta. Rosa, Umingan, Pangasinan, and upon Condaya's instructions, the
information that Immediately after the burst of gunfire, Romeo Condaya, 12 gauge locally made buck-shot was recovered. (Exhibit "C"). Thereafter,
Wilfredo Mitrado, Isabelo Trinidad and Bonifacio Palding, were seen hurriedly Romeo Condaya pointed to the bamboo grove where he hid the cartridges.
walking towards the North. So that, Barrio Captain Ignacio Dopale proceeded (Exhibits "D", "D-1', "D-2" and "D-3").
to the Umingan Municipal Building in Order to report the matter.
After their apprehension, Romeo Condaya, Isabelo Trinidad, Bonifacio
Corporal Dominador Barwel of the Umingan Police Force to whom the case Palding, and Wilfredo Mitrado were made to execute sworn statements
was referred first fetched Sergeant Casio of the Philippine Constabulary at
which, however, they refused to affirm before the Municipal Judge of reason given, namely, that they were not subscribed and sworn to before the
Umingan, Pangasinan. [CFI Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 21-23]. proper authorities, but, rather, because the requirements of the Constitution
were disregarded.
In their testimonies, accused-appellants Trinidad and Condaya denied their
participation in the crime and asserted that after their apprehension they The 1973 Constitution, then in force and effect when the confessions were
were tortured and maltreated until they signed documents which they later taken, provided in words that left no room for doubt:
found out to be their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, their refusal to affirm
their written confessions before the municipal judge. Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
To prove his innocence, Trinidad emphasized the undisputed facts that he right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
was even among those who went to Umingan to fetch Sgt. Casio and Cpl. force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
Barwel and that he even remained at the scene of the crime while, they were free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
conducting their investigation and provided refreshments for the this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. [Article IV].
investigators.
The rule is that when an accused testifies that he signed his confession
The trial court dismissed accused-appellants defense with the following because he was maltreated, the prosecution must present evidence to rebut
observation: this claim, otherwise the confession will be considered illegally procured
[People v. Inguito, L-53497, October 18, 1982, 117 SCRA 641.] The
Before anything else, this Court notes with muffled amusement the manner presumption of regularity of performance of official duty does not apply to
at which the accused presented their side of the case. For aware as they incustody confessions. The prosecution must prove compliance with the
were that the alleged statements taken from them by the authorities of constitutional requirements [People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. L-50103,
Umingan, Pangasinan when offered by the prosecution was denied November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 597.]In the instant case, accused-appellants'
admission, they persisted at presenting evidence along this line. There really allegations of torture and maltreatment were refuted by Dr. Soriano's
was no need for the accused to do what they did. As far as this Court is testimony and medical certificate.
concerned, the supposed irregularity at securing these admissions was
irrelevant. For so it is that these statements were not even subscribed and However, since there is no proof that when they made their confessions they
sworn to before any competent authority. So that, when the accused were informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel and that they
persistently harped at this alleged violence upon their persons, this Court knowingly and intelligently waived these rights, such confessions are
was furnished a sufficient basis at attributing a semblance of meaning to inadmissible in evidence [People v. Duero, G.R. No. L-52016, May 13, 1981,
these statements. But conformably with our settled constitutional demands of 104 SCRA 379.] Likewise, the absence of counsel at the time of custodial
due process, this Court considers these averments of violence extraneous to investigation when the extrajudicial confession was taken renders it
this case, although the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Eddie Soriano's medical inadmissible [People v. Burgos, G.R. No. L-68955, September 4, 1986, 144
certificates had shown a contrary finding. (Exhibits "H", "H-1", "H-2", "I", "I-1", SCRA 1.] It is not enough that the suspect is asked if he needs a lawyer, he
"I-2" and "I- 3"). [Rollo, pp. 31-32]. must be informed that if he is an indigent a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him during custodial interrogation [People v. Tolentino, supra].
At the outset, it must be stated that the trial court correctly denied the
admissibility as evidence of the written extrajudicial confessions of the It is not only the oral confessions made to the apprehending officers, Sgt.
accused-appellants. Such denial, however, should not have been for the Casio and Cpl. Barwel, that are tainted but also the written confessions made
and signed a few days after their arrest. Thus, the testimonies of the police The Solicitor General, in his brief [pp. 13-15], enumerated several
officers on the matters allegedly confessed to them by accused-appellants circumstances in support of a finding that accused-appellants were guilty
and the written extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence. beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel,
which may be summarize as follows:
2. As the extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible, the Court is tasked with
determining whether there remains sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of 1. Before April 16, 1973, accused-appellant, Isabelo Trinidad, bore a grudge
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. against Juan Angel. Trinidad suspected Juan Angel of having burned the
rope of his (Trinidad's) carabao.
It must be emphasized that no direct evidence was adduced to prove
accused-appellants' commission of the crime charged. 2. Trinidad had warned Juan Angel on April 15, 1973, that he (Trinidad) could
have Juan Angel killed at anytime, even inside the latter's house.
To sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court wove
together several pieces of circumstantial evidence. 3. In the evening of April 16, 1973, Bonifacio Palding, saw Trinidad and
Condaya (in the course of a drinking session with Palding, and Wilfredo
The Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for a Mitrado) converse secretly some six (6) meters away from Palding and
conviction if: Mitrado. After this conversation, Trinidad gave Condaya a homemade
shotgun and then Trinidad and Condaya, followed by Palding, and Mitrado,
(1) there is more than one circumstance; proceeded to the house of Juan Angel.
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 4. While Palding, was some four (4) meters behind Trinidad and Condaya he
(Palding) heard a gunshot and saw a flash of light near the door of Juan
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a Angel's house.
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. [Sec. 5, Rule 133].
5. A few seconds later, Palding, saw Trinidad and Condaya running away
Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of from the house. Palding and Mitrado also ran away in the direction taken by
circumstantial evidence sufficient for a conviction, the established Trinidad and Condaya.
requirement is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the 6. Juan Angel saw Trinidad, Condaya, Palding, and Mitrado running away
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty from the house as he peeped through a window after he heard the gunshot.
[People v. Ludday, 61 Phil. 216; People v. Contante, G.R. No. L-14639,
December 28,1964,12 SCRA 653.] 7. When Palding, and Mitrado caught up with Trinidad and Condaya in a
certain field, Palding heard Trinidad instruct Condaya to take the shotgun to
Thus, using the requirements of the Rules of Court and established Sta. Rosa, Umingan, Pangasinan and hide it.
jurisprudence as yardsticks, this Court is called upon, in this appeal, to
ultimately determine whether the circumstantial evidence adduced during the 8. After the apprehension of Condaya on April 20 or 21, 1973, the home-
trial are sufficient for a conviction. made shotgun was recovered on top of a "colibangbang" tree behind the
house of Condaya's parents, together with three (3) live cartridges hidden in
a bamboo grove nearby.
circumstances showing the presence of conspiracy [People v. Cabiltes, G.R.
To this enumeration may be added three (3) more circumstances: (1) that the No. L-18010, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 112].
victim was found dead near the door inside her son Juan Angel's house; (2)
that the victim died of hemorrhage caused by gunshot wounds; and (3) that The crime committed was murder with the qualifying circumstance of
two pellets were recovered from her body. treachery, as characterized by the fact that the victim was shot at close range
while she was asleep, thus ensuring the commission of the crime without risk
All of these circumstances, eleven (11) in all, have been proven by direct to the assailants [People v. Dequina, 60 Phil. 279 (1934)]. That Juan Angel,
evidence. Together, these circumstances lead to the conclusion that and not his mother, was apparently the intended victim is not incompatible
accused-appellants Trinidad and Condaya were guilty beyond reasonable with the existence of treachery. Treachery may be taken into account even if
doubt for the shooting of Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel. the victim of the attack was not the person whom the accused intended to
kill. However, evident premeditation may not be considered as a qualifying
Even if the eighth circumstance cited by the Solicitor General — that the circumstance as it cannot be said that the assailants premeditated on the
shotgun and the ammunition were recovered in the vicinity of the house of killing of the actual victim [People v. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967 (1926); People v.
Condaya's parents — is disregarded on the ground that the recovery was the Guillen, 85 Phil. 307 (1950)]. Thus, evident premeditation, although alleged
fruit of the tainted confession, the result would be the same because of the in the information, may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance.
overwhelming circumstantial evidence.
With the abolition of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution, murder is
Two (2) of the circumstances also manifest a community of purpose now penalized by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
indicative of a conspiracy between Trinidad and Condaya, which would make perpetua. Absent any modifying circumstances, the penalty is imposable in
both of them equally guilty of the crime [People v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. L- its medium period, or from eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
26105, February 18, 1986, 141 SCRA 336], although only one of them may day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
have pulled the trigger and actually fired the fatal shot. Where a conspiracy range of the penalty is lowered by one degree to prision mayor in its
has been proven, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from ten (10)
required. [People v. Tala, G.R. Nos. L-69153-54, January 30, 1986,141 years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
SCRA 240].
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED and the Court,
in the exercise of its discretion, sentences accused-appellants to suffer the
The rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial indeterminate penalty of from fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of
evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
[People v. Vicente, G.R. No. L-26241, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 247]. In the as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
instant case, the third circumstance cited by the Solicitor General (that P30,000.00.
Trinidad pulled Condaya away from Palding and Mitrado to converse secretly
and then gave him the shotgun before they all went to Juan Angel's house), SO ORDERED.
coupled with the seventh (that Trinidad told Condaya to hide the shotgun as
they were running away from Juan Angel's house), sufficiently proves the Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
conspiracy between Trinidad and Condaya. The conduct of accused-
appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime are [G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a conviction for
BELLO, accused. consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the female
organ was considered synonymous with mere touching of the external
DECISION genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora, etc.,[4] the crucial doctrinal bottom
line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or as
BELLOSILLO, J.: an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just mere
touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita[1] finally did away with frustrated to the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration,
rape[2] and allowed only attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the
our statute books. The instant case lurks at the threshold of another lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed
emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering almost every amounts merely to attempted rape.
attempt at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the
contrary view were to be adopted. The danger there is that that concept may Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape
send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity has been committed either in its attempted or in its consummated stage;
bares itself, to better intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between the two, despite the
after all any attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably
and punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then spells the difference between life and death for the accused - a reclusive life
be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd. that is not even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate
extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender bar cannot be deemed attempted but consummated rape, what then would
had carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his objective. All constitute attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus limited only to
the elements of the offense were already present and nothing more was left consummated rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted rape would
for the offender to do, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the no longer be possible in light of the view of those who disagree with this
crime and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not ponencia?
essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however
slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or lips of On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape
the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the and sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme penalty of death,[5] hence
vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape. We this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there was no Code as amended by RA 7659.[6]
penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were
performed as the offender merely commenced the commission of a felony As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4
directly by overt acts.[3] The inference that may be derived therefrom is that oclock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year
complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for rape to be old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to
consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she
crime to its consummated stage. met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water
to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy
entry into the labia or lips of the female organ, even if there be no rupture of preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"[7]
prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to the
inside her childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
"jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were
down to his knees. Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27
May 1997 found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina. penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral
Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He
pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma.
out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should not be given any
who were living within their compound, to chase the accused.[8] Seconds weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible statements and
later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He claims
help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that
advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining Crysthels younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just
him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as
results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode happened within the
medico-legal officer on Crysthels body as her hymen was intact and its orifice family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and
was only 0.5 cm. in diameter. responded to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the
crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable
maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as a mere scheme of that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact
Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged
run an errand for her.[9] He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that
mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of
causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position Crysthels private parts more than bolsters his innocence.
that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped
him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony
from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for of Corazon that she saw Primo with his short pants down to his knees
help from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor. kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly
"already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthels
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and vagina." The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge
accosted Primo. Vicente punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the
hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of Conrado Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually
Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to explain molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetua to death, to the
as he reasoned out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party
instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised being below seven (7) years old. We have said often enough that in
his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal
orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen
necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable labia minora.[15] Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be
of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal entered for rape to be consummated,[16] and not merely for the penis to
knowledge.[10] But the act of touching should be understood here as stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the
inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum. constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum
In People v. De la Pea[11] we clarified that the decisions finding a case for by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
rape even if the attackers penis merely touched the external portions of the attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of an
erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-
an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could quoted "touching of the female organ,"[17] but has also progressed into
not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the
consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused pudendum,"[18] or "the bombardment of the drawbridge."[19] But, to our
repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all mind, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic
likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion."
the lips of her vulva,[12] or that the penis of the accused touched the middle
part of her vagina.[13] Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to
simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight discharge its onus of proving that Primos penis was able to penetrate
brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or Crysthels vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon
the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously
proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she saw upon entering her childrens
convicted of consummated rape.[14] As the labias, which are required to be room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on
"touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to
mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact
some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and
touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon
consummated rape. described thus:
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia
minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused
rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible is pinning down the victim, while his right hand is holding his penis and his
within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the left hand is spreading the legs of the victim).
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface.
The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primos kneeling
pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage
hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the point from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided
Corazon an unobstructed view of Primos penis supposedly reaching
Crysthels external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
etc., since the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden his movements
from Corazons sight, not to discount the fact that Primos right hand was A: No, sir.[20]
allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from Corazons view. It is the
burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen the This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds
sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of the question of whether rape in this case was consummated. It has
credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was done to her foreclosed the possibility of Primos penis penetrating her vagina, however
daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration,[21]
belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we cannot conclude obviously induced by a question propounded to her who could not have been
without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all aware of the finer distinctions between touching and penetration.
achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a four (4)-
prosecution but to run roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped as her sex and
to be presumed innocent. whose language is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation that
because the penis of the accused touched her organ there was sexual entry.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's organ the penis
intention despite her timely appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to of the accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the
fully witness his beastly act. labia of her pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that
Primo made efforts to penetrate Crysthel.[22] Corazon did not say, nay, not
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with mans instinct of self- even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an
preservation to remain where he is and persist in satisfying his lust even erection.[23] On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold
when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already been his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an
discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the erection to be able to penetrate his victim.
normal behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazons presence
would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught literally with his Antithetically, the possibility of Primos penis having breached Crysthels
pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more than vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she resisted Primos
enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal his advances by putting her legs close together;[24] consequently, she did not
evil design. feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her.[25]
Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored its
answer to the question of the court - conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's
testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ? inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness,
or the hymenal tags were no longer visible.[26] None was shown in this case.
A: Yes, sir. Although a child's testimony must be received with due consideration on
account of her tender age, the Court endeavors at the same time to harness
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily only what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of the equally
said, "No." Thus - guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on
the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is
liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death. prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case
that there were no external signs of physical injuries on complaining witness WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO
body to conclude from a medical perspective that penetration had taken "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him
place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence of complete to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of
penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight
clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as
contact between the accused and the victim.[27] minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate,
both should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the SO ORDERED.
testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the
medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing,
results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon,
accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to Jr., JJ., concur.
accurately conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line
that separates attempted rape from consummated rape will significantly Panganiban, J., in the result.
disappear.
[G.R. No. 122099. July 5, 2000]
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGAPITO LISTERIO
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should y PRADO and SAMSON DELA TORRE y ESQUELA, accused,
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO, accused-appellant.
his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape - and DECISION
only of attempted rape - are present in the instant case, hence, the accused YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
should be punished only for it.
For the deadly assault on the brothers Jeonito Araque and Marlon Araque,
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable Agapito Listerio y Prado, Samson dela Torre y Esquela, Marlon dela Torre,
penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor George dela Torre, Bonifacio Bancaya and several others who are still at
below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the large were charged in two (2) separate Amended Informations with Murder
range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. and Frustrated Murder.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be In Criminal Case No. 91-5842 the Amended Information[1] for Murder alleges
imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) That on or about the 11th day of August 1991 in the Municipality of
months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating WHEREFORE, finding Accused AGAPITO LISTERIO guilty beyond
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, all armed with bladed reasonable doubt, he is sentenced:
weapons and GI lead pipes, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation with abuse of superior strength did then and there willfully, 1. For the death of Jeonito Araque y Daniel in Criminal Case NO. 91-5842,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Jeonito Araque y RECLUSION PERPETUA;
Daniel at the back of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which directly caused his death. 2. For the attempt to kill Marlon Araque y Daniel, in Criminal Case No. 91-
5843, he is sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day as minimum, to four
CONTRARY TO LAW. (4) years as maximum;
In Criminal Case No. 91-5843, the Amended Information[2] for Frustrated 3. As civil indemnity, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jeonito Araque y
Homicide charges: Daniel the sum[s] of :
That on or about the 14th day of May 1991 in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, P54,200.66 as actual damages;
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together, mutually helping P50,000.00 as moral damages;
and aiding one another, with intent to kill did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab and hit with a lead pipe and bladed weapon P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
one Marlon Araque y Daniel on the vital portions of his body, thereby
inflicting serious and mortal wounds which would have cause[d] the death of 4. And for the damages sustained by Marlon Araque y Daniel, he is required
the said victim thus performing all the acts of execution which should have to pay Marlon Araque y Daniel, the sum[s] of :
produce[d] the crime of Homicide as a consequence but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is by timely and P5,000.00 as actual damages;
able medical attendance rendered to said Marlon Araque y Daniel which
prevented his death. P5,000.00 as moral damages; and
Upon arraignment, accused Agapito Listerio y Prado and Samson dela Torre SO ORDERED.[4]
y Esquela pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Their other co-accused
have remained at large. Dissatisfied, accused Agapito Listerio interposed this appeal alleging that
Trial thereafter ensued after which the court a quo rendered judgment only I
against accused Agapito Listerio because his co-accused Samson dela Torre
escaped during the presentation of the prosecutions evidence and he was THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF
not tried in absentia. The dispositive portion of the decision[3] reads: THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
shoulder were caused by a sharp object like a knife while the rest were
THE COURT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER caused by a blunt instrument such as a lead pipe.[25]
AND ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE DESPITE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF
CONSPIRACY AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. Dr. Bievenido Munoz, NBI Medico Legal Officer conducted an autopsy on the
cadaver of Jeonito Araque[26] and prepared an Autopsy Report[27] of his
The version of the prosecution of what transpired on that fateful day of findings. The report which contains a detailed description of the injuries
August 14, 1991 culled from the eyewitness account of Marlon Araque inflicted on the victim shows that the deceased sustained three (3) stab
discloses that at around 5:00 p.m. of August 14, 1991, he and his brother wounds all of them inflicted from behind by a sharp, pointed and single-
Jeonito were in Purok 4, Alabang, Muntinlupa to collect a sum of money from bladed instrument like a kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument.[28]
a certain Tino.[5] Having failed to collect anything from Tino, Marlon and The first stab wound, measuring 1.7 centimeters with an approximate depth
Jeonito then turned back.[6] On their way back while they were passing of 11.0 centimeters, perforated the lower lobe of the left lung and the thoracic
Tramo near Tinos place,[7] a group composed of Agapito Listerio, Samson aorta.[29] Considering the involvement of a vital organ and a major blood
dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya[8] vessel, the wound was considered fatal.[30] The second wound, measuring
blocked their path[9] and attacked them with lead pipes and bladed 2.4 centimeters, affected the skin and underlying soft tissues and did not
weapons.[10] penetrate the body cavity.[31] The third wound measuring 2.7 centimeters
was like the second and involved only the soft tissues.[32] Unlike the first, the
Agapito Listerio, Marlon dela Torre and George dela Torre, who were armed second and third wounds were non-fatal.[33] Dr. Munoz averred that of the
with bladed weapons, stabbed Jeonito Araque from behind.[11] Jeonito three, the first and second wounds were inflicted by knife thrusts delivered
sustained three (3) stab wounds on the upper right portion of his back, starting below going upward by assailants who were standing behind the
another on the lower right portion and the third on the middle portion of the victim.[34]
left side of his back[12] causing him to fall down.[13] Marlon Araque was hit
on the head by Samson dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya with lead pipes On the other hand, accused-appellants version of the incident is summed
and momentarily lost consciousness.[14] When he regained his senses three thus in his brief:
(3) minutes later, he saw that Jeonito was already dead.[15] Their assailants
then fled after the incident.[16] Marlon Araque who sustained injuries in the 1. Accused-appellant is 39 years old, married, side walk vendor and a
arm and back,[17] was thereafter brought to a hospital for treatment.[18] resident of Purok 4, Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He earns a living by
selling vegetables.[35]
Marlon Araque was examined by Dr. Salvador Manimtim, head of the Medico
Legal Division of the UP-PGH, [19] who thereafter issued a Medical 2. At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of August 14, 1991, Accused-
Certificate[20] indicating that Marlon Araque sustained two (2) lacerated Appellant was in the store of Nimfa Agustin having a little fun with Edgar
wounds, one measuring 5 centimeters in length located in the center (mid- Demolador and Andres Gininao drinking beer. At around 2:00 oclock
parietal area) of the ear.[21] The second lacerated wound measuring 2 Accused-appellant went to his house and slept.[36]
centimeters in length is located at the mid-frontal area commonly known as
the forehead.[22] A third lacerated wound measuring 1.5 centimeters long is 3. While asleep, at about 5 oclock, Edgar Remolador and Andres Gininao
located at the forearm[23] and a fourth which is a stab wound measuring 3 woke him up and told him there was a quarrel near the railroad track.[37]
centimeters is located at the right shoulder at the collar.[24] Elaborating on
the nature of Marlon Araques injuries, Dr. Manimtim explained in detail 4. At around 6:00 oclock two (2) policemen passed by going to the house of
during cross-examination that the two (2) wounds on the forearm and the Samson de la Torre while Accused-appellant was chatting with Edgar
Remolador and Andres Gininao. These two (2) policemen together with co- courts findings save only in cases where arbitrariness has set in and
accused Samson de la Torre came back and invited Accused-appellant for disregard for the facts important to the case have been overlooked.[42]
questioning at the Muntinlupa Police Headquarters together with Edgar
Demolador and Andres Gininao. Subsequently, Edgar Demolador and The account of Marlon Araque as to how they were assaulted by the group of
Andres Gininao were sent home.[38] accused-appellant was given in a categorical, convincing and straightforward
manner:
5. At the Police Station, Accused-Appellant was handed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed by Marlon Araque, implicating him for the death of Q Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Jeonito Araque y Daniel?
Jeonito Araque and the frustrated murder of Marlon Araque. Accused-
Appellant confronted Marlon Araque as to why he was being included in the A Yes, sir.
case. Marlon Araque answered because you eject[ed] us from your
house.[39] Q And why do you know him?
Q Now, at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of August 14, 1991, do you Q Now, what particular place [where] you were waylaid, if you recall?
recall where were you?
A In Tramo, near Tinos place.
A Yes, sir.
Q And who were the persons that were waylaid (sic)?
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court where were you at that time?
A Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre and Bonifacio.
A Im in Alabang at Purok 4 and Im collecting.
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court how will (sic) you waylaid by
Q Do you have any companion at that time? these persons?
A Yes, sir. A We were walking then suddenly they stabbed us with knife (sic) and ran
afterwards.
Q What are you doing at that time in [that] particular date?
Q Who were the persons that waylaid you?
A Im collecting from a certain Tino.
A Agapito Listerio, George and Marlon.
Q Were you able to collect?
Q How about your brother, what happened to him?
A No, sir.
A He fall (sic) down.
Q If you said that there were no collections, what did you do?
Q And after he fall (sic) down, do you know what happened?
A We went back.
A I was hit by a lead pipe thats why I painted (sic).
In what particular part of his body was stabbed wound (sic)?
Q Do you know the reason why your brother fall (sic) down?
A Witness pointing to his back upper right portion of the back, another on the
A I cannot recall, sir. Because I already painted (sic). lower right portion and another on the middle portion of the left side at the
back.
Q Do you know the reason why your brother fall (sic) before you painted
(sic)? COURT
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court why your brother fall (sic) Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court why you are (sic) lost
down? consciousness?
xxx xxx xxx A I was hit by [a] lead pipe by Samson and Bonifacio.
A Yes, sir, because he was stabbed. Q And when did you regain consciousness?
Q What particular place of his body was [he] stabbed if you know? A After three minutes.
A At the back of his body. Q And when you gain[ed] consciousness, what happened to your brother?
Q Do you know the person or persons who was (sic) stabbed him? A He was already dead.
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court who was that persons was A I go (sic) to the Hospital.
stabbed him?
Q How about the accused, the persons who way laid, what happened to
A Agapito, Marlon and George. them?
How many stabbed [him], if you know? Persistent efforts by defense counsel to establish that the attack was
provoked, by eliciting from Marlon Araque an admission that he and the
A Three (3), sir. deceased had a drinking spree with their attackers prior to the incident,
proved futile as Marlon steadfastly maintained on cross examination that he
COURT and his brother never drank liquor on that fateful day:
Q After your work, was there an occasion when you drink something with COURT
your borther (sic)?
Ask another question.
A No, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, will you please tell the Honorable Court where this George
Q And you stand to your testimony that you never drink (sic) on August 14, dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and a certain Bonifacio were?
1991?
Atty. Agoot
A Yes, sir.
Witness is incompetent.
Q Were (sic) there no occasion on August 14, 1991 when you visited Sonny
Sari-Sari Store at 4:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991? Q Mr. Witness, you testified that it was your brother the deceased who
invited you to Purok 4?
A No, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you not have a drinking spree with George dela Torre?
Atty. Lumakang
A No, sir.
That will be all for the witness, your Honor.[44]
Q Marlon dela Torre?
That Marlon was able to recognize the assailants can hardly be doubted
A No, sir. because relatives of the victim have a natural knack for remembering the
faces of the attackers and they, more than anybody else, would be
Q Bonifacio? concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by the felons being brought to
the face of the law.[45] Indeed, family members who have witnessed the
A With your borther (sic)? killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the
assailants.[46] Marlons credibility cannot be doubted in this case because as
Q So you want to tell this Honorable Court that there was no point in time on a victim himself and an eyewitness to the incident, it can be clearly gleaned
August 14, 1991 at 4:00 p.m. that you did not take a sip of wine? from the foregoing excerpts of his testimony that he remembered with a high
degree of reliability the identity of the malefactors.[47]
A No, sir.
Likewise, there is no showing that he was motivated by any ill-feeling or bad
Q Neither your brother? blood to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Being a victim himself, he
is expected to seek justice. It is settled that if the accused had nothing to do
Atty. Agoot with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events to falsely
impute charges of wrongdoing upon him.[48] Accused-appellant likewise
Objection, Your Honor, the question is vague. insists on the absence of conspiracy and treachery in the attack on the
victims.
moral assistance to his con-conspirators by being present at the commission
We remain unconvinced. of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators.[55]
It must be remembered that direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found for
criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots.[49] Conspiracy Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional
may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a design and purpose.[56] Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement
joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.[50] Indeed for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.[57] From the legal
standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense,
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[58] In
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To establish this case, the presence of accused-appellant and his colleagues, all of them
the existence of a conspiracy, direct proof is not essential since it may be armed with deadly weapons at the locus criminis, indubitably shows their
shown by facts and circumstances from which may be logically inferred the criminal design to kill the victims.
existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense
charged, or it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the Nowhere is it more evident than in this case where accused-appellant and
offense was perpetrated.[51] his cohorts blocked the path of the victims and as a group attacked them with
lead pipes and bladed weapons. Accused-appellant and his companions
More explicitly acted in concert during the assault on the victims. Each member of the group
performed specific and coordinated acts as to indicate beyond doubt a
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but common criminal design or purpose.[59] Thus, even assuming arguendo that
may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions the prosecution eyewitness may have been unclear as to who delivered the
and circumstances, which vary according to the purpose accomplished. fatal blow on the victim, accused-appellant as a conspirator is equally liable
Previous agreement to commit a crime is not essential to establish a for the crime as it is unnecessary to determine who inflicted the fatal wound
conspiracy, it being sufficient that the condition attending to its commission because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.[60]
and the acts executed may be indicative of a common design to accomplish
a criminal purpose and objective. If there is a chain of circumstances to that As to the qualifying circumstances here present, the treacherous manner in
effect, conspiracy can be established.[52] which accused-appellant and his group perpetrated the crime is shown not
only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting and
Thus, the rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or apparently unarmed victims but also by the deliberate manner in which the
circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself.[53] In assault was perpetrated. In this case, the accused-appellant and his
the absence of direct proof thereof, as in the present case, it may be companions, all of them armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, blocked
deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was (hinarang) the path of the victims effectively cutting off their escape.[61] In
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such the ensuing attack, the deceased was stabbed three (3) times from behind by
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of a sharp, pointed and single-bladed instrument like a kitchen knife, balisong or
interest.[54] Hence, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed similar instrument[62] while Marlon Araque sustained lacerated wounds in
some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the the head caused by blows inflicted by lead pipes as well as stab wounds on
crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active the shoulder and forearm which were caused by a sharp object like a
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of knife.[63]
of his house to the place of the incident makes him physically possible to be
It must be noted in this regard that the manner in which the stab wounds a participant in the killing [of Jeonito] and [the] wounding of Marlon.[71]
were inflicted on the deceased were clearly meant to kill without posing any
danger to the malefactors considering their locations and the fact that they All told, an overall scrutiny of the records of this case leads us to no other
were caused by knife thrusts starting below going upward by assailants who conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty as charged for Murder in
were standing behind the victim.[64] Treachery is present when the offender Criminal Case No. 91-5842.
commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its In Criminal Case No. 91-5843, wherein accused-appellant was indicted for
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended Frustrated Homicide, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of Attempted
party might make.[65] That circumstance qualifies the crime into murder. Homicide only on the basis of Dr. Manimtims testimony that none of the
wounds sustained by Marlon Araque were fatal.
The commission of the crime was also attended by abuse of superior
strength on account of the fact that accused-appellant and his companions The reasoning of the lower court on this point is flawed because it is not the
were not only numerically superior to the victims but also because all of gravity of the wounds inflicted which determines whether a felony is
them, armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, purposely used force out attempted or frustrated but whether or not the subjective phase in the
of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked. commission of an offense has been passed. By subjective phase is meant
However, this aggravating circumstance is already absorbed in treachery.[66] [t]hat portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
Furthermore, although alleged in the information, evident premeditation was which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
not proved by the prosecution. In the light of the finding of conspiracy, offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime.
evident premeditation need not be further appreciated, absent concrete proof From that time forward, the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that
as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control that
before it was carried out.[67] period between the point where he begins and the point where he voluntarily
desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any
In stark contrast to the evidence pointing to him as one of the assailants of cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not
the victims, accused-appellant proffers the defense of alibi. At the risk of been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until
sounding trite, it must be remembered that alibi is generally considered with he performs the last act, it is frustrated.[72]
suspicion and always received with caution because it can be easily
fabricated.[68] For alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, the accused must It must be remembered that a felony is frustrated when: 1.] the offender has
establish that: a.] he was present at another place at the time of the performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; 2.] the
perpetration of the offense; and b.] it would thus be physically impossible for felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrators will.[73]
him to have been at the scene of the crime.[69] On the other hand, in an attempted felony: 1.] the offender commits overt
acts to commence the perpetration of the crime; 2.] he is not able to perform
Suffice it to state that accused-appellant failed to discharge this burden. The all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; and 3.] his failure
positive identification of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime to perform all the acts of execution was due to some cause or accident other
by the prosecution eyewitness, absent any showing of ill-motive, must prevail than his spontaneous desistance.[74] The distinction between an attempted
over the weak and obviously fabricated alibi of accused-appellant.[70] and frustrated felony was lucidly differentiated thus in the leading case of
Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by the trial court [t]he place where the U.S. v. Eduave:[75]
accused was at the time of the killing is only 100 meters away. The distance
A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the crime is a frustrated felony not an attempted offense considering that
the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by after being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of which he lost
some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the consciousness and fell, Marlons attackers apparently thought he was already
crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender dead and fled.
must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels
him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review[78]
should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
perform. If he has performed all the acts which should result in the appealed judgement[79] or even reverse the trial courts decision on the basis
consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it of grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.[80] With the
cannot be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted foregoing in mind, we now address the question of the proper penalties to be
from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign imposed.
or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of
crime and the moment when all the acts have been performed which should With regard to the frustrated felony, Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code
result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such provides that
intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of
the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by ART. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. The courts,
some cause apart from his voluntary desistance. in view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the
frustrated crime of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in
To put it another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the the preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which should
subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by be imposed under the provisions of article 50.[81]
the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.
The courts, considering the facts of the case, may likewise reduce by one
On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is degree the penalty which under article 51 should be imposed for an attempt
completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted to commit any of such crimes.
the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes The penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal[82] thus, the penalty one
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to degree lower would be prision mayor.[83] With the presence of the
commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and no mitigating
something beyond his control. circumstances, the penalty is to be imposed in its maximum period.[84]
Prision mayor in its maximum period ranges from ten (10) years and one (1)
In relation to the foregoing, it bears stressing that intent to kill determines day to twelve (12) years. Applying further the Indeterminate Sentence
whether the infliction of injuries should be punished as attempted or Law,[85] the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be within the range of
frustrated murder, homicide, parricide or consummated physical injuries.[76] the penalty next lower in degree, i.e. prision correccional in its maximum
Homicidal intent must be evidenced by acts which at the time of their period which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
execution are unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim by
adequate means.[77] Suffice it to state that the intent to kill of the malefactors What now remains to be determined is the propriety of the awards made by
herein who were armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes can hardly be the trial court with regard to the civil aspect of the case for the death of
doubted given the prevailing facts of the case. It also can not be denied that Jeonito Araque and the injuries sustained by Marlon Araque.
the Civil Code, such damages may be imposed when the crime is committed
Anent actual or compensatory damages, it bears stressing that only with one or more aggravating circumstances.[98]
substantiated and proven expenses or those which appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim Finally, this Court has observed that the trial court did not render judgment
will be recognized by the courts.[86] In this case, the expenses incurred for against accused Samson dela Torre, notwithstanding that he was arraigned
the wake, funeral and burial of the deceased are substantiated by and pleaded not guilty to both charges. Under the circumstances, he should
receipts.[87] The trial courts award for actual damages for the death of be deemed to have been tried in absentia and, considering the evidence
Jeonito Araque should therefore be affirmed. presented by the prosecution against him, convicted of the crime charged
together with appellant Agapito Listerio.
In line with current jurisprudence,[88] the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto must also be sustained as it requires no proof other than WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the following
the fact of death of the victim and the assailants responsibility therefor.[89] MODIFICATIONS:
The award for moral damages for the pain and sorrow suffered by the victims
family in connection with his untimely death must likewise be affirmed. The 1.] the award of P5,000.00 to Marlon Araque by way of moral damages in
award is adequate, reasonable and with sufficient basis taking into Criminal Case No. 91-5843 is DELETED;
consideration the anguish and suffering of the deceaseds family particularly
his mother who relied solely upon him for support.[90] The award of 2.] Accused-Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
exemplary damages should likewise be affirmed considering that an Case No. 91-5843 of Frustrated Homicide and is sentenced to suffer an
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime.[91] indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of Prision Correccional, as minimum to
Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
The trial court, however, correctly ignored the claim for loss of income or
earning capacity of the deceased for lack of factual basis. The estimate given After finality of this Decision, the records shall be remanded to the Regional
by the deceaseds sister on his alleged income as a pre-cast businessman is Trial Court of Makati City, which is directed to render judgment based on the
not supported by competent evidence like income tax returns or receipts. It evidence against Samson dela Torre y Esquela.
bears emphasizing in this regard that compensation for lost income is in the
nature of damages[92] and as such requires due proof thereof.[93] In short, SO ORDERED.
there must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income.[94] In this
case, the victims sister merely gave an oral, self-serving and hence Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
unreliable statement of her deceased brothers income.
G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014
As for the awards given to Marlon Araque, the award for actual damages
must be affirmed as the same is supported by documentary evidence.[95] NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
With regard to moral and exemplary damages, the same being distinct from vs.
each other require separate determination.[96] The award for moral damages PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
must be struck down as the victim himself did not testify as to the moral
suffering he sustained as a result of the assault on his person. For lack of DECISION
competent proof such an award is improper.[97] The award for exemplary
damages must, however, be retained considering that under Article 2230 of BERSAMIN, J.:
carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the
between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said
rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only offended party.
the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female.
However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute CONTRARY TO LAW.3
attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to
penetrate the female's vagina. Criminal Case No. 2389
Acts of Lasciviousness
The Case
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 o’clock in the
This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004,1 whereby morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2,
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for attempted rape of the Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
petitioner by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd
(RTC), and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touch the
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten vagina of [BBB]4 against the latter’s will and with no other purpose but to
(10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordering him to pay moral satisfy his lascivious desire to the damage and prejudice of said offended
damages of ₱20,000.00 to AAA,2 the victim. party.
The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of Version of the Prosecution
lasciviousness involving different victims. At arraignment, he pleaded not
guiltyto the respective informations, to wit: Criminal Case No. 2388 The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows:6
Attempted Rape x x x [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were
engaged in the selling of plastic wares and glass wares in different
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the municipalities around the country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto and
morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in
Municipality of Bangar,Province of La Union, Philippines and within the Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. From Libsong East,
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation passenger jeepney owned by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied
commenced the commission ofrape directly byovert acts, to wit: While private by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the name
complainant AAA, an unmarried woman, fifteen (15) yearsold, was sleeping of "Jess".
inside the tentalong Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused remove her panty
and underwear and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching her Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December
vagina and breast with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of 20, 1993, they parked in front of Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the
force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have goods and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that they will have
a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get and worked for them until December 30, 1994, after which they were sent
more goods to be sold. back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, AAA and BBB On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed
went to sleep. Less thanan hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that their respective sworn statements against Norberto.
somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching
her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that Version of the Defense
she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she’ll be killed.
AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was
pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice. presented in the assailed decision of the CA,7 as follows:
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different
money and told her not totell the incident to her mother otherwise, she will be version of the story. The accused maintains that it was not possible for him to
killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date of the alleged incident,
she failed to wake him up. there were many people around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi".
Considering the location of the tents, which were near the road and the
Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto municipal hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open,
touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen
hands wereshaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went in the municipal hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why the
outside. complainants filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose of
extorting money from him.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place
that early morning. Later still, while they were on their way to fetch water, Judgment of the RTC
AAA and BBB asked the people around where they can find the municipal
building. An old woman pointed to them the place. After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment
on April 6, 2000 finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of lasciviousness in
municipal hall where they met a policeman by the name of "Sabas". Criminal Case No. 2389,8 to wit:
They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders
was summoned to the police station where he personally confronted his judgment declaring the accused NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME guilty
accusers. When Norberto’s wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS
argument ensued between them. OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized in Article 335 in relation
with (sic) Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 o’clock in the morning, the police respectively. With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court
investigator ordered the complainants to return at6:00 o’clock in the morning. hereby sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and BBB home with them imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS PRISION MAYOR as
Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty
victim AAA the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages. shall be the medium period of prision mayorin the absence of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance and the minimum shall be within the range of
With regard to the crime ofACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby the penalty nextlower to that prescribed for the offense which in this case is
sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment prision correccionalin any of its periods.
from FOUR (4) MONTHS ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Maximum We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of ₱20,000.00
and the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the victim by way of moral damages against the accused-appellant. In a rape case,
BBBthe amount of ₱10,000.00 as moral damages. moral damages may be awarded without the need of proof or pleading since
it is assumed that the private complainant suffered moral injuries, more so,
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two when the victim is aged 13 to 19.
cases is counted in his favor.
Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the
SO ORDERED.9 accused argues that there is not enough evidence to support such
accusation. BBB did not testify and neither her sworn statement was formally
Decision of the CA offered in evidence to support the charge for acts of lasciviousness.
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting In this case, the evidence adducedby the prosecution is insufficient to
him of attempted rape despite the dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of substantiate the charge of acts of lasciviousness against the
lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not testify. accusedappellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the
sworn statement of BBB to the effectthat the accused-appellant likewise
On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of molested her by mashing her breast and touching her private part. However,
the petitioner for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting she was not presented to testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw
him of the acts of lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the accused touching the private parts of BBB, there was no testimony to the
the insufficiency of the evidence,10 holding thusly: effect that suchlascivious acts were without the consent or against the will of
BBB.11
In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and
inconsequential as to dent, even slightly, the overall integrity and probative Issues
value of the prosecution's evidence insofar as AAA is concerned.
In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CA’s decision was not in accord
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted with law or with jurisprudence, particularly:
felony is the "penalty lower by two (2) degrees" prescribed by law for the
consummated felony. In this case, the penalty for rape if it had been I. In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the
consummated would have been reclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of alleged victim; and
the Revised Penalty Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The
penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetuais prision mayor. II. In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the
AAA. He argues that AAA still continued working for him and his wife until question of law of whether or not the petitioner’s climbing on top of the
December 30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted rape in the early morning undressed AAA such thatthey faced each other, with him mashing her
of December 21, 1994, thereby belying his commission of the crime against breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted
her; that he could not have undressed her without rousing her if she had rape, the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted and punished him.
gone to sleep only an hour before, because her bra was locked at her back; Based on the information, supra, he committed such acts "with intent of
that her testimony about his having been on top of her for nearly an hour having carnal knowledge ofher by means of force, and if the accused did not
while they struggled was also inconceivable unless she either consented to accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it
his act and yielded to his lust, or the incident did not happen at all, being the was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended
product only of her fertileimagination; that the record does not indicate if he party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the
himself was also naked, or that his penis was poised to penetrate her; and damage and prejudice of said offended party."
that she and her mother demanded from him ₱80,000.00 as settlement,
under threat that she would file a case against him.12 There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when
the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
testimony of AAA that cast doubt on her veracity. felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous
desistance. In People v. Lamahang,14 the Court, speaking through the
Ruling of the Court eminent Justice Claro M.Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt acts
would constitute anattempted felony, to wit:
The appeal is partly meritorious.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code
In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,13 the Court reviews only punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense;
questions of law. No review of the findings of fact by the CA is involved. As a that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of
consequence of thisrule, the Court accords the highest respect for the factual the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The
findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in
the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from its relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the
factual findings, particularly when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial standpoint of the Penal Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of
experience has shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in the best position to imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere
decideissues of credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard and seen beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable
the witnesses and observed firsthand their demeanor and deportment and connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect,
the manner of testifying under exacting examination. As such, the with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the
contentionsof the petitioner on the credibility of AAA as a witness for the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
State cannot beentertained. He thereby raises questions of fact that are beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its
outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, he thereby proposes to have the natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
Court, which is not a trier of facts, review the entire evidence adduced by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
Prosecution and the Defense. into a concrete offense. x x x x.
"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not
consummated, as the material damage iswanting, the nature of the action xxxx
intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be
inferred from the nature of the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female.
necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to Carnal knowledge isdefined simply as "theact of a man having sexual bodily
which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the connections with a woman,"16 which explains why the slightest penetration
same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is
doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible consummated once the peniscapable of consummating the sexual act
of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and touches the external genitalia of the female.17 In People v. Campuhan,18
which show an innocent aswell as a punishable act, must not and cannot the Court has defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in rape in the
furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The following terms:
relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense
of which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention [T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
must be ascertainedfrom the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of
avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in
from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis
must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an indeedtouched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely
attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be such consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" bythe
that, withoutthe intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless."15 penis, are by their natural situsor location beneath the mons pubisor the
vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the
attempted rape, we have to determine the law on rape in effect on December labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated
21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the crime he was convicted of. That rape.
law was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as
follows: The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that
are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora,
Article335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the rounded
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the
circumstances: surface. The next layer is the labia majoraor the outer lips of the female
organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin
1. By using force or intimidation; of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented,
while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has
2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majorais the labia
minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majoramust be entered for rape
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be female organ. xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or
present. touching the mons pubisof the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendumby the penis, subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute
not acts of lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied] the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the
attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of
It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita,19 the Court clarified that the ruling in Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the
People v. Eriñia20 whereby the offender was declared guilty of frustrated offense. (Bold emphasis supplied)
rapebecause of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital
organ of the offended party, was a stray decisionfor not having been In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender
reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands, does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the
therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in
that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the
Codeare that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which felony directly by overt actswithout the offender performing all the acts of
would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt
causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the offender attains acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to
his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with
from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of
accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him.21 criminal law,23 that showing must be through his overt acts directly
connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape
Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the withoutsuch overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In
character of the overt actsfor purposes of the attempted stage has been short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts,
explained in People v. Lizada:22 should his criminalintent be carried to its complete termination without being
thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape,24 for, as succinctly
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.:25 "The gauge in determining whether the
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor the interruption."
by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etrefor the law The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching
requiring a direct overtact is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the her genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is such circumstances thatrape, and no other,was his intended felony would be
that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs
one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or
crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been "susceptible of double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v.
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is.It is the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would
necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the not exclusively be rapehad he been allowed by her to continue, and to have
sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of
should employ deceit to have her yield to him)26 could also be ultimate age.32 In that regard, lewdis defined as obscene, lustful, indecent,
felony. lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral
impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.33
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have
produced attempted rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and
former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina
intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection and breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and
with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of
acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony.27 His lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her
preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack
being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her
assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with
buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal
Codefor as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner,
because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts
perpetrator’s intent really was.28 directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in People v.
Bugarin,34 where the accused was charged with attempted rape through an
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, "did then
constitute acts of lasciviousness? and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of
the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay
acts of lasciviousness is the offender’sintent to lie with the female. In rape, on top of her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of
intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required execution which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some
in acts of lasciviousness.29 Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned
the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to complainant push[ed] him away." The accused was held liable only for acts
penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia actdescribed," and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not
of the female.30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that
lasciviousness is committed.31 the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual
intercourse."35
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of
lasciviousness is consummated whenthe following essential elements Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being
concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished with prision correccional. In the
lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of absence of modifying circumstances, prision correccional is imposed in its
lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or medium period, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived ofreason or is day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should come from arresto mayor,
the penalty next lower than prision correccionalwhich ranges from one (1) WE CONCUR:
month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the indeterminate
sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the maximum. Chief Justice
This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law
jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively concedes having performed the felonious Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the
acts imputed against him, but instead insists that as a result, he should be cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting.
adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its consummated Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded
stage of which he was convicted. The proposition rests on a common theory the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi
expounded in two well-known decisions[1] rendered decades ago by the as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a
Court of Appeals, upholding the existence of frustrated theft of which the receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on
accused in both cases were found guilty. However, the rationale behind the foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the
rulings has never been affirmed by this Court. incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the
stolen merchandise recovered.[8] The filched items seized from the duo were
As far as can be told,[2] the last time this Court extensively considered four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three
whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or consummated theft was in (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of
1918, in People v. Adiao.[3] A more cursory P12,090.00.[9]
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before
treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People v. Sobrevilla,[4] they were transferred on the same day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine
and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC.[5] This petition now gives occasion for us to National Police, Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the police
finally and fully measure if or how frustrated theft is susceptible to investigation records that apart from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other
commission under the Revised Penal Code. persons were apprehended by the security guards at the scene and
delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the
I. incident. However, after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon
City Prosecutor, only petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day
Information[6] charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy after the incident.[10]
Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30
p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon
supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by both claimed having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super
Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the Sale Club on the afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago
open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing and his fellow security guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler
an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), PNP Station. Calderon alleged that on the afternoon of the incident, he was
hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known Tide brand. at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by
Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada.[11] As the queue for the ATM was long,
was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. It
was while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by Lago,
leading them to head out of the building to check what was Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively
conceded both his felonious intent and his actual participation in the theft of
several cases of detergent with a total value of P12,090.00 of which he was
charged.[25] As such, there is no cause for the Court to consider a factual
transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly grabbed by a security scenario other than that presented by the prosecution, as affirmed by the
guard, thus commencing their detention.[12] Meanwhile, petitioner testified RTC and the Court of Appeals. The only question to consider is whether
during trial that he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela,[13] had been at under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as consummated or
the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride merely frustrated.
a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a
shot. The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start II.
running, at which point he was apprehended by Lago and brought to the
security office. Petitioner claimed he was detained at the security office until In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner
around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought to the Baler cites[26] two decisions rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals:
Police Station. At the station, petitioner denied having stolen the cartons of People v. Dio[27] and People v. Flores.[28] Both decisions elicit the interest
detergent, but he was detained overnight, and eventually brought to the of this Court, as they modified trial court convictions from consummated to
prosecutors office where he was charged with theft.[14] During petitioners frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present
cross-examination, he admitted that he had been employed as a bundler of case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of
GMS Marketing, assigned at the supermarket though not at SM.[15] Appeals, yet the appellate court did not expressly consider the import of the
rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
In a Decision[16] promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and Calderon of It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to the
the crime of consummated theft. They were sentenced to an indeterminate Dio and Flores rulings since they have not yet been expressly adopted as
prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) precedents by this Court. For whatever reasons,
years of prision mayor as maximum.[17] The RTC found credible the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on
the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime. the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to
pass before us. Yet despite the silence on our part, Dio and Flores have
Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal,[18] but only petitioner attained a level of renown reached by very few other appellate court rulings.
filed a brief[19] with the Court of Appeals, causing the appellate court to They are comprehensively discussed in the most popular of our criminal law
deem Calderons appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed. Before annotations,[29] and studied in criminal law classes as textbook examples of
the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft.
frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed
in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.[20] However, in its More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful
Decision dated 19 June 2003,[21] the Court of Appeals rejected this scenarios that populate criminal law exams more than they actually occur in
contention and affirmed petitioners conviction.[22] Hence the present Petition real life. Indeed, if we finally say that Dio and Flores are doctrinal, such
for Review,[23] which expressly seeks that petitioners conviction be modified conclusion could profoundly influence a multitude of routine theft
to only of Frustrated Theft.[24] prosecutions, including commonplace shoplifting. Any scenario that involves
the thief having to exit with the stolen property through a supervised egress,
such as a supermarket checkout counter or a parking area pay booth, may Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies
easily call for the application of Dio and Flores. The fact that lower courts on one hand, and attempted felonies on the other. So long as the offender
have not hesitated to lay down convictions for frustrated theft further fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the
validates that Dio and Flores and the theories offered therein on frustrated commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage.
theft have borne some weight in our jurisprudential system. The time is thus Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime under the Revised
ripe for us to examine whether those theories are correct and should Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of
continue to influence prosecutors and judges in the future. ascertaining whether a crime is attempted only would need to compare the
acts actually performed by the accused as against the acts that constitute the
felony under the Revised Penal Code.
Dio thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of
the items stolen at the time of apprehension is determinative as to whether Synthesis of the Dio and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative
the theft is consummated or frustrated. This theory was applied again by the characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability of
Court of Appeals some 15 years later, in Flores, a case which according to the actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only
the division of the court that decided it, bore no substantial variance between momentary. Such conclusion was drawn from an 1888 decision of the
the circumstances [herein] and in [Dio].[64] Such conclusion is borne out by Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in determining whether
the facts in Flores. The accused therein, a checker employed by the Luzon theft had been consummated, es preciso que so haga en circunstancias
Stevedoring Company, issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea van to the tales que permitan al sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos
truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto his truck at momentaneamente. The qualifier siquiera sea mas o menos
the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver proceeded to show momentaneamente proves another important consideration, as it implies that
the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal. However, if the actor was in a capacity to freely dispose of the stolen items before
the guards insisted on inspecting the van, and discovered that the empty sea apprehension, then the theft could be deemed consummated. Such
van had actually contained other merchandise as well.[65] The accused was circumstance was not present in either Dio or Flores, as the stolen items in
both cases were retrieved from the actor before they could be physically
extracted from the guarded compounds from which the items were filched. In People v. Espiritu,[75] the accused had removed nine pieces of hospital
However, as implied in Flores, the character of the item stolen could lead to a linen from a supply depot and loaded them onto a truck. However, as the
different conclusion as to whether there could have been free disposition, as truck passed through the checkpoint, the stolen items were discovered by the
in the case where the chattel involved was of much less bulk and more Military Police running the checkpoint. Even though those facts clearly admit
common x x x, [such] as money x x x.[68] to similarity with those in Dio, the Court of Appeals held that the accused
were guilty of consummated theft, as the accused were able to take or get
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that was frustrated, which
observation on the import of the Dio ruling: does not constitute any element of theft, is the use or benefit that the thieves
expected from the commission of the offense.[76]
In pointing out the distinction between Dio and Espiritu, Reyes wryly
observes that [w]hen the meaning of an element of a felony is controversial,
There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated when the there is bound to arise different rulings as to the stage of execution of that
thief is able to freely dispose of the stolen articles even if it were more or less felony.[77] Indeed, we can discern from this survey of jurisprudence that the
momentary. Or as stated in another case[[69]], theft is consummated upon state of the law insofar as frustrated theft is concerned is muddled. It fact,
the voluntary and malicious taking of property belonging to another which is given the disputed foundational basis of the concept of frustrated theft itself,
realized by the material occupation of the thing whereby the thief places it the question can even be asked whether there is really such a crime in the
under his control and in such a situation that he could dispose of it at once. first place.
This ruling seems to have been based on Viadas opinion that in order the
theft may be consummated, es preciso que se haga en circumstancias x x x
[[70]][71] IV.
In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao and The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of
other cases, also states that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated frustrated, and not consummated, theft. As we undertake this inquiry, we
after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to have to reckon with the import of this Courts 1984 decision in Empelis v.
appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was IAC.[78]
frustrated.[72]
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4)
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming persons in the premises of his plantation, in the act of gathering and tying
variance with the Dio and Flores rulings. People v. Batoon[73] involved an some coconuts. The accused were surprised by the owner within the
accused who filled a container with gasoline from a petrol pump within view plantation as they were carrying with them the coconuts they had gathered.
of a police detective, who followed the accused onto a passenger truck The accused fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized, and
where the arrest was made. While the trial court found the accused guilty of were subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to the
frustrated qualified theft, the Court of Appeals held that the accused was police. After trial, the accused were convicted of qualified theft, and the issue
guilty of consummated qualified theft, finding that [t]he facts of the cases of they raised on appeal was that they were guilty only of simple theft. The
U.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v. Sobrevilla x x x indicate that actual taking Court affirmed that the theft was qualified, following Article 310 of the
with intent to gain is enough to consummate the crime of theft.[74]
Revised Penal Code,[79] but further held that the accused were guilty only of relevant legal or jurisprudential thought. Instead, the passage is offered as if
frustrated qualified theft. it were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so settled it required no
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the further explication.
theft was consummated or frustrated was raised by any of the parties. What
does appear, though, is that the disposition of that issue was contained in Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited
only two sentences, which we reproduce in full: as authority on theft. Indeed, we cannot see how Empelis can contribute to
our present debate, except for the bare fact that it proves that the Court had
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because once deliberately found an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Even if Empelis
petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should were considered as a precedent for frustrated theft, its doctrinal value is
have produced the felony as a consequence. They were not able to carry the extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that inform it, and
coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner.[80] also by the fact that it has not been entrenched by subsequent reliance.
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether Dio,
Flores or the Spanish authorities who may have bolstered the conclusion.
There are indeed evident problems with this formulation in Empelis.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors were not frustrated theft is viable in this jurisdiction. Considering the flawed reasoning
able to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the behind its conclusion of frustrated theft, it cannot present any efficacious
felon as a consequence.[81] However, per Article 6 of the Revised Penal argument to persuade us in this case. Insofar as Empelis may imply that
Code, the crime is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this jurisdiction, that
execution, though not producing the felony as a result. If the offender was not decision is subject to reassessment.
able to perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted, provided that
the non-performance was by reason of some cause or accident other than V.
spontaneous desistance. Empelis concludes that the crime was
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the 1870 Codigo
Penal de Espaa was then in place. The definition of the crime of theft, as
provided then, read as follows:
frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the
timely arrival of the owner. However, following Article 6 of the Revised Penal Son reos de hurto:
Code, these facts should elicit the conclusion that the crime was only
attempted, especially given that the acts were not performed because of the 1. Los que con nimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o intimidacin en las personas
timely arrival of the owner, and not because of spontaneous desistance by ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su
the offenders. dueo.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the 2. Los que encontrndose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quin es su dueo se
present petition. Even if the two sentences we had cited actually aligned with la apropriaren co intencin de lucro.
the definitions provided in Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, such passage
bears no reflection that it is the product of the considered evaluation of the
3. Los daadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del dao
causado, salvo los casos previstos en los artίculos 606, nm. 1.0; 607, nms, Hay frustracin cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por las guardias cuando
1.0, 2.0 y 3.0; 608, nm. 1.0; 611; 613; Segundo prrafo del 617 y 618. llevaban los sacos de harino del carro que los conducia a otro que tenan
preparado, 22 febrero 1913; cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto por la
It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish intervencin de la policia situada en el local donde se realiz la sustraccin que
Supreme Court decisions were handed down. However, the said code would impidi pudieran los reos disponer de lo sustrado, 30 de octubre 1950. Hay
be revised again in 1932, and several times thereafter. In fact, under the "por lo menos" frustracin, si existe apoderamiento, pero el culpale no llega a
Codigo Penal Espaol de 1995, the crime of theft is now simply defined as [e]l disponer de la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay frustracin "muy prxima" cuando el
que, con nimo de lucro, culpable es detenido por el perjudicado acto seguido de cometer la
sustraccin, 28 febrero 1931. Algunos fallos han considerado la existencia de
frustracin cuando, perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento de
tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueo ser llevar los efectos hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889, 22 febrero 1913,
castigado[82] 11 marzo 1921; esta doctrina no es admissible, stos, conforme a lo antes
expuesto, son hurtos consumados.[86]
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code of Spain,
la libre disposicion of the property is not an element or a statutory Ultimately, Cuello Caln attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually
characteristic of the crime. It does appear that the principle originated and possible:
perhaps was fostered in the realm of Spanish jurisprudence.
La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el hurto se
The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926 consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la disposicin del agente. Con
commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal de Espaa. Therein, he raised at este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada ltimamente porla jurisprudencia
least three questions for the reader whether the crime of frustrated or espaola que generalmente considera consumado el hurto cuando el culpable
consummated theft had occurred. The passage cited in Dio was actually coge o aprehende la cosa y sta quede por tiempo ms o menos duradero bajo
utilized by Viada to answer the question whether frustrated or consummated su poder. El hecho de que ste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es
theft was committed [e]l que en el momento mismo de apoderarse de la cosa indiferente. El delito no pierde su carcter de consumado aunque la cosa
ajena, vindose sorprendido, la arroja al suelo.[83] Even as the answer was hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o fuere recuperada. No se concibe la
as stated in Dio, and was indeed derived from the 1888 decision of the frustracin, pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la
Supreme Court of Spain, that decisions factual predicate occasioning the consumacin del hurto no lo consume efectivamente, los raros casos que
statement was apparently very different from Dio, for it appears that the 1888 nuestra jurisprudencia, muy vacilante, declara hurtos frustrados son
decision involved an accused who was surprised by the employees of a verdaderos delitos consumados.[87] (Emphasis supplied)
haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of clothing off a mannequin, and
who then proceeded to throw away the garment as he fled.[84]
Cuello Calns submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft, and content with replicating the Spanish Supreme Court decisions on the matter,
willingly recites decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain that have held to Cuello Caln actually set forth his own thought that questioned whether theft
that effect.[85] A few decades later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Caln could truly be frustrated, since pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es
pointed out the inconsistent application by the Spanish Supreme Court with necesario para la consumacin del hurto no lo consume efectivamente.
respect to frustrated theft. Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee how the execution of all the acts
necessary for the completion of the crime would not produce the effect of With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Dio/Flores dictum. The
theft. ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a
constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in
This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no weighted Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the
force in scholarly thought that obliges us to accept frustrated theft, as mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this Court has
proposed in Dio and Flores. A final ruling by the Court that there is no crime repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article
of frustrated theft in this jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic pariah, for such 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal
a submission is hardly heretical in light of Cuello Calns position. property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
at the question from a fresh perspective, as we are not bound by the opinions against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[90]
of the respected Spanish commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept
that theft is capable of commission in its frustrated stage. Further, if we ask Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the
the question whether there is a mandate of statute or precedent that must taking, with intent to gain, of personal property of another without the latters
compel us to adopt the Dio and Flores doctrines, the answer has to be in the consent. While the Dio/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the
negative. If we did so, it would arise not out of obeisance to an inexorably offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of
higher command, but from the exercise of the function of statutory intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of
interpretation that comes as part and parcel of judicial review, and a function property on the part of the victim.
that allows breathing room for a variety of theorems in competition until one
is ultimately adopted by this Court. For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in
V. the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft
produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft
The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking
in the province of the legislature, through statute, to define what constitutes a by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to
particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as representatives of the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts
the sovereign people, which determines which acts or combination of acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen
are criminal in nature. Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such
with what was the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquinos
language of the law as it defines the crime. It is Congress, not the courts, commentaries, as earlier cited, that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is
which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.[88] The courts cannot consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with
arrogate the power to introduce a new element of a crime which was intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing
unintended by the legislature, or redefine a crime in a manner that does not was frustrated.[91]
hew to the statutory language. Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in
defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the
interpretation of penal laws where a narrow interpretation is appropriate. The property stolen delves into the concept of taking itself, in that there could be
Court must take heed of language, legislative history and purpose, in order to no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen
strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids.[89] item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the
crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all
the acts of execution have not been completed, the taking not having been stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been
accomplished. Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.
discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of
frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule that the inability
question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property frustrates the theft
case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the would introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect
petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired any legislated intent,[95] since the Court would have carved a viable means
physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do
period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, not admit of easy classification. It is difficult to formulate definite standards as
and long enough to load these onto a taxicab. to when a stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would this
depend on the psychological belief of the offender at the time of the
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is commission of the crime, as implied in Dio?
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.[92] And long
ago, we asserted in People v. Avila:[93]
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances
thing to be appropriated into the physical power of the thief, which idea is such as the size and weight of the property, the location of the property, the
qualified by other conditions, such as that the taking must be effected animo number and identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the number
lucrandi and without the consent of the owner; and it will be here noted that and identity of people whom the offender is expected to encounter upon
the definition does not require that the taking should be effected against the fleeing with the stolen property, the manner in which the stolen item had
will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a distinction been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more. Even the
of no slight importance.[94] fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into account, relevant as
that would be on whether such property is capable of free disposal at any
Insofar as we consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material stage, even after the taking has been consummated.
in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal
property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the
At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense colorful detail, the owner was indeed deprived of property by one who
could only be attempted theft, if at all. intended to produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will
remain the presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the the acts of execution, including the taking, have been completed. If the facts
Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar
attempted or consummated. circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted
stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been performed. But once all
Neither Dio nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that these acts have been executed, the taking has been completed, causing the
once the offenders therein obtained possession over the stolen items, the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the consummation of the
effect of the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of theft.
property. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the
Maybe the Dio/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common Chief Justice
sense. Yet they do not align with the legislated framework of the crime of
theft. The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006
such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. Again, there is no language in
Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the free disposition of the RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,
items stolen is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has vs.
been produced. Dio itself did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
bolster its conclusion, and the later Flores was ultimately content in relying
on Dio alone for legal support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare DECISION
decisis, and even if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our law on theft
leave them susceptible to reversal. The same holds true of Empilis, a GARCIA, J.:
regrettably stray decision which has not since found favor from this Court.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of and seeks the reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision1 of the Court of
frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999
acceptance of the Dio and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these
years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court
Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner
It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.3
that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference to Viada yields to the
higher reverence for legislative intent. The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991
charging petitioner with attempted rape reads as follow:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991
SO ORDERED. in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano
with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of rape
DANTE O. TINGA by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but
Associate Justice was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being
WE CONCUR: committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
REYNATO S. PUNO
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her
them were private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her room going through
classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one
Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the decision without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5,
of the CA, established the following facts: 1993, p.6).
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", xxx xxx xxx
…) along A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room
307 with her maid, Marvilou Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her
University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991. classmate …, was friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided
his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 22) and she rejected him. …. (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept
on a folding bed. Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at
the Building at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of white t-shirt with “‘…a marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek
chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not letter (sic) ΣΦ’ and below the quoted letters the word ‘1946’ ‘UST Medicine
move. Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She and Surgery’” (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the brand
wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet name “Adidas” (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go
with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU up to Room 306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time
continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa
got free. With this …the opportunity presented itself when she was able to was in the room.
grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] …. S/G
roused Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may Ferolin made the following entry in the security guard’s logbook …:
pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did
not, however, know. The only thing she had made out during their struggle "0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a
was the feel of her attacker’s clothes and weight. His upper garment was of Request letter from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter
cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, (sic) for the reason that he will be our tenant this coming summer break as
p. 17). He … was wearing a t-shirt and shorts … Original Records, p. 355). he said so I let him sign it here
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard (Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then
proceeded to seek help. xxx. (Exhibit "A-2")
It was then when MALOU saw her bed … topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was
stained with blue … (TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ….
to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking with the
xxx xxx xxx authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside
to search the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o’clock in the evening of "Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they
December 12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITO’s knocking on the door woke him did not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When
up, …. He was able to fix the time of CHITO’s arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO
he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he was awakened by the (Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school inside the
knock at the door …. classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T- In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among
shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in. …. It was at around 3 o’clock in others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black
the morning of December 13, 1991 when he woke up again later to the Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear,
sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista (Bernard), …. and socks (Ibid).
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU’s room and thereat was Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants
shown by Bernard the open window through which the intruder supposedly (Exhibit "D-5"), and the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITO’s because
passed. CHITO had lent the very same one to him …. The t-shirt with CHITO’s
fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the handkerchief
xxx xxx xxx he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13,
finally able to talk to CHITO …. He mentioned to the latter that something 1991, was what consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadan’s testimony.
had happened and that they were not being allowed to get out of the building.
Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310. xxx xxx xxx.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4
bag. xxx. None was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another feet and appeared to be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it
classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to see if the others were there. then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went
xxx. back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 o’clock that afternoon along with some
CIS agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom where
People from the CIS came by before 8 o’clock that same morning …. They Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 o’clock in
likewise invited CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where Camp Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
the two (2) were questioned ….
xxx xxx xxx.
An occupant of Room 310 … Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court
that in the afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police
roommates, Bernard Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, having acted in response to the written
Building and were asked by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M. Managuelod dated December 13,
1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.) conducted laboratory Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in bracket
examination on the specimen collated and submitted…. Her Chemistry added)
Report No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: himself. He denied committing the crime imputed to him or making at any
time amorous advances on Malou. Unfolding a different version of the
xxx xxx xxx: incident, the defense sought to establish the following, as culled from the
same decision of the appellate court:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked ‘UNIMART’ with the following:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of … (UST). With
xxx xxx xxx Robert Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau
Sigma Phi Fraternity …. MALOU, …, was known to him being also a medical
Exh ‘C’ – One (1) night dress colored salmon pink. student at the UST at the time.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked ‘JONAS’ with the following: From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building …, CHITO, wearing the
prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their
Exh. ‘D’ – One (1) printed handkerchief. Fraternity house located at … Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7
o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was included in the
Exh. ‘E’ – One (1) white T-shirt marked ‘TMZI’. entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas
gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at
Exh. ‘F’ – One (1) black short (sic) marked ‘ADIDAS’. No. 3 John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION: The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool …. Soon
after, … the four (4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included,
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic were being dunked one by one into the pool. xxx.
poison on the above stated specimens.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn … and was thus wearing his t-shirt and
FINDINGS: long pants when he was dunked. Perla Duran, …, offered each … dry
clothes to change into and CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the Fraternity’s
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave symbol and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
the following results:
Again riding on Alberto’s car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ – POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison. with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and
shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party with Robert Chan
Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ are insufficient for further analysis. and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December 13, 1991 and
proceeded to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p.
CONCLUSION: 19). He had left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando,
underwear, socks, and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the Baleros, CHITO presented himself. Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father
afternoon of the previous day …. of MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room 306….
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and …, S/G Ferolin, looking at xxx xxx xxx
his watch, approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch
and saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was
CHITO entry …. xxx. told to dress up and the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to
Camp Crame.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 …. xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in,
already about ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. When they arrived at Camp Crame …, Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside
25). his room and talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to
ask his side.
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the
opened jalousie window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door xxx xxx xxx
until Rommel Montes, … approached him and even commented: "Okey ang
suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later
open the door of Unit 306 … but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then instructed them to undergo physical examination at the Camp Crame
decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door. Hospital ….. At the hospital, … CHITO and Joseph were physically examined
by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip ….
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, …, at
last answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph xxx xxx xxx
immediately turned his back on CHITO and went inside the bedroom. CHITO
, …changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still had on the same short CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped
pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. short pants lent to him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p.
20). 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7 o’clock in the morning of
December 13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was between 8 to 9 P.M.
At 6 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up …. He when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One
was already in his school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to of the CIS agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his presence
the room not yet dressed up. He asked the latter why this was so and, but the contents of the bag were already laid out on the table of Fiscal
without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had happened and Abesamis who, however, made no effort to ask CHITO if the items thereat
to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did. were his.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied
MALOU was not able to identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to putting in his gray bag which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of
rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx. December 12, 1991 before going to the fraternity house. He likewise
disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray bag when he
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the returned to the apartment at past 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of
Building …. When two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at
about 6 o’clock in the morning to go to school and brought his gray bag to Attorney’s fees of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December 13, 1991, he was not insolvency, and to pay the costs.
aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid).
He only found out for the first time that the black Adidas short pants was SO ORDERED.
alluded to be among the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon, when
he was in Camp Crame. Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioner’s fraternity
brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated
CHITO in the December 12, 1991 party held in Dr. Duran’s place at January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, to wit:
Greenhills, riding on the same car going to and coming from the party and
dropping the petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings
were one in saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
inside, with short pants and leather shoes at the time they parted after the Costs against appellant.
party.7 Rommel Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also
testified seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of SO ORDERED.11
December 13, 1991 trying to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark
short pants and white barong tagalog. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in
its equally assailed resolution of March 31, 1999.12
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of
short pants with stripes after the dunking party held in her father’s house.8 Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -
Presented as defense expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic
chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in open court showed that 1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the
chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing attempted rape imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent and convincing
nor staining the cloth on which it is applied.9 evidence to prove the offense charged.
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision10 convicting 2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of
petitioner of attempted rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus: circumstantial evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the
requisites for conviction based thereon.
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the
Court finds the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond 3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape as principal and as charged are unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
in the information and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment
ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of 4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as
Maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for the 5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the
accused to pay the offended party Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of award was improper and unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages, plus reasonable
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of
innocence and that moral certainty has not been met, hence, he should be a) There is more than one circumstance;
acquitted on the ground that the offense charged against him has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of
applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioner’s evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable
acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no direct evidence pointing to conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in question.
him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who pinned Malou down
on the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991. We quote with approval the CA’s finding of the circumstantial evidence that
led to the identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to
that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had
are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or access to the room of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over
accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission had a window which allowed ingress and egress to Room 306 where MALOU
of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard
instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and
very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the morning of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle,
latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim MALOU had made out the feel of her intruder’s apparel to be something
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial bottom.
evidence.13 In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to
adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually From CHITO’s bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where
committed in secret and under condition where concealment is highly witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most
probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the incriminating evidence: the handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some
prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short pants; and a white fraternity T-
secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.14 shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time, Christian Alcala,
identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads: MALOU during the incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOU’s
night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient – Circumstantial evidence is degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face
sufficient for conviction if – where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a
petitioner for the crime of attempted rape. chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of
rape.1avvphil.net
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malou’s face
the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
weight of his own, had commenced the performance of an act indicative of indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
an intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that petitioner’s actuation planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
thus described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can not following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
be any other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ravish Malou after he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor ripen into a concrete offense.19
General, echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioner’s intention was
otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim.15 Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too
strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will
who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not
following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch
relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant
when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would
crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court
spontaneous desistance.16 even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the
victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru
Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to
which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim
particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated woman already
the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory
and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her guard
natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.20
offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice
commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere
standpoint of the Penal Code.18 speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to
establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.21
information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino,
crime of attempted rape, pointing out that: there is no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for
unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to
produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical
must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.25 The
of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous paramount question is whether the offender’s act causes annoyance,
desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed. irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom
it is directed.26 That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating
xxx xxx xxx to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that
she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was
Petitioner’s act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her
sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of
constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from ₱5.00 to
commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual organ. xxx. ₱200.00 or both.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
xxx, appellant was merely holding complainant’s feet when his Tito Onio and a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the
arrived at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light
extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that mere holding of the feet is coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to
attempted rape. pay a fine of ₱200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the
costs.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent,
under the premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed SO ORDERED.
against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face
of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou CANCIO C. GARCIA
testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth Associate Justice
and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down.
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine WE CONCUR:
attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation
punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the REYNATO S. PUNO
Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring Associate Justice
an accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the Chairperson
accusation,24 it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the
inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the G.R. No. L-26298 January 20, 1927
the hymen and the defendant was found guilty of the consummated crime
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, rape.
vs.
JULIAN ERINIA Y VINOLLA, defendant-appellant. There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
offended party, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and can
Hermogenes Caluag for appellant. only be found guilty of frustrated rape, but in view of the fact that he was
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. living in the house of the parents of the child as their guest, the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence existed and the penalty must therefore
OSTRAND, J.: be imposed in its maximum degree.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila The judgment appealed from is modified and the defendant-appellant is
finding the defendant guilty of the crime of consummated rape and hereby found guilty of the crime of frustrated rape and is sentenced to suffer
sentencing him to suffer seventeen years, four months and one day of twelve years of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay law, and with the costs in both instances. So ordered.
the costs.
Johnson, Street, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old and the
evidence is conclusive that the defendant endeavored to have carnal
intercourse with her, but there may be some doubt whether he succeeded in Separate Opinions
penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the timely intervention of
the mother and the sister of the child. The physician who examined the MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
genital organ of the child a few hours after the commission of the crime found
a slight inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, indicating that an In my opinion, the accused is guilty of raping a child 3 years and 11 months
effort had been made to enter the vagina, but in testifying before the court he of age. It is consummated rape according to the evidence of record, the
expressed doubts as to whether the entry had been effected. The mother of findings of the trial judge, and our decisions. (People vs. Hernandez [1925],
the child testified that she found its genital organ covered with a sticky 49 Phil., 980; People vs. Oscar [1925], 48 Phil., 527.) The instant case is on
substance, but that cannot be considered conclusive evidence of penetration. all fours with the case of Kenney vs. State (65 L. R. A., 316), cited in the
majority decision. In the Kenny case, the penalty was death, and here for this
It has been suggested that the child was of such tender age that penetration horrible crime, should be placed in the maximum degree or seventeen years,
was impossible; that the crime of rape consequently was impossible of four months, and one day imprisonment, as imposed by the trial court.
consummation; and that, therefore, the offense committed should be treated Accordingly, my vote is for affirmance of the judgment.
only as abusos deshonestos. We do not think so. It is probably true that a
complete penetration was impossible, but such penetration is not essential to G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
the commission of the crime; it is sufficient if there is a penetration of the
labia. In the case of Kenny vs. State ([Tex. Crim. App.], 79 S. W., 817; 65 L. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
R. A., 316) where the offended party was a child of the age of 3 years and 8 represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
months the testimony of several physicians was to the effect that her labia of vs.
the privates of a child of that age can be entered by a man's male organ to
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department
Respondents. of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ
then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
DECISION which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders and detained him.
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent
Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
(1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning
denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the validity of the Order of Arrest.
the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented
by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges
that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision the Order of Arrest void.
in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on
The facts are: certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals be reversed.
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition
Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private
respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China
and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733,
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to opposed by petitioner.
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997
and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting
charge. bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further
hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed
by respondent judge. grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to
post bail, thus: In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right
to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following deprivation of one’s liberty.
conditions:
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused not be impaired, thus:
hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government; be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court; privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of
filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
extradition proceeding; and Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to
resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,
week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice
with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional
be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. only in criminal proceedings," thus:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando
Court of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57, convicting suddenly grabbed Eugene towards the compound. Eugene resisted.
appellants Armando Caballero, Ricardo Caballero and Marciano Caballero, Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined Armando and
Jr. of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 and RTC-1218 and meting assaulted Eugene. Armando took the wooden pole supporting the clothesline
on each of them the supreme penalty of death and ordering them to pay and hit Eugene with it. The latter tried to parry the blows of the Caballero
damages; and of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. RTC-1219 and brothers, to no avail. In the process, Eugene was stabbed three times. As
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Eugene was being assaulted, Myrna returned to the window of her house
and saw the Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene. She shouted for help for
The Antecedents her hapless brother. Wilma, who witnessed the whole incident, was shocked
to immobility at the sudden turn of events.
Teresito (Dodong) Mondragon and his family lived in a compound
surrounded by a barbed-wire fence at New Sumakwel, Broce Street, San From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the commotion and rushed to
Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Living in the same compound were Ricardo the scene to pacify the protagonists. Arnold told the Caballero brothers: Bay,
Caballero and his family; and Myrna Bawin, the sister of Eugene Tayactac, what is the trouble between you and Eugene? However, Ricardo accosted
and her family. Beside the compound was the house of Leonilo Broce, a Arnold and stabbed the latter on the left side of his body. Forthwith, Robito,
nephew of Wilma Broce. Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of them stabbed
Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under the house of a
neighbor.
= Stab wound (R) posterior chest level 7th ICS 2 cm. long directed anteriorly.
For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the commotion was. He
was, however, met by Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe Hemorrhage secondary to Multiple Stab wounds
Leonilo retreated and pleaded to his uncle Lucio Broce for help: Tio, help me with Massive Hemothorax (L) and Hemopneumothorax (R).[2]
because I am hit. The commotion stopped only upon the arrival of Teresito
Mondragon who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all returned He testified that the stab wounds could have been caused by a sharp-edged
to the compound. single-bladed or double-bladed instrument, or by three instruments.[3]
In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo brought the injured Dr. Jose Carlos L. Villarante performed an autopsy on the cadaver of
Eugene, Leonilo and Arnold to the Planters Hospital for medical treatment. Leonilo. He signed a postmortem report containing the following findings:
Eugene and Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they sustained.
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION
Dr. Filped A. Maisog performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Eugene. He
signed a postmortem report containing the following findings: Name: Leonilo Broce, 22 years old, male, married
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Name: Eugenio Tayactac, 22 years old, male, single Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ. Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ. Date & Time of Incident: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital Date & Time Examined: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:45 P.M.
Date & Time of Incident: August 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M. Post-mortem findings:
Date & Time Examined: August 3, 1994 @ 10:40 P.M. = Stab wound, (R) post chest, about the level of the 6th and 7th RICS, post.
axillary line.
Post-Mortem Findings:
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ
= Stab wound (L) anterior chest 2 cm. 5th ICS MCL directed postero laterally, injury.[4]
lacerating (L) auricle of the heart, and the (L) pulmonary artery and the left
middle lobe of the lungs; Dr. Edgardo B. Quisumbing attended to and operated on Arnold Barcuma.
He signed a medical certificate stating that Arnold sustained the following
= Stab wound (R) anterior chest 2 cm. long 5th ICS parasternal line directed injuries:
posteriorly;
= Lacerated wound 2 cm. (R) forearm middle 3rd
They were also charged with the same crime for the death of Eugene
= Incised wound 2 inches (L) forearm middle 3rd Tayactac in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, which
reads:
= Stabbed wound, 2 inches in length (L) chest, anterior axillary line at the
level of the 7th intercostal space, penetrating thoracic cavity and abdominal That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San
cavity. Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping
... [5] one another, armed with pieces of wood and hunting knives, and with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully,
On the witness stand, Dr. Quisumbing testified that the wounds sustained by unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons, attack, assault and
Arnold could have been caused by three different sharp-pointed use personal violence upon the person of one EUGENE TAYACTAC, by
instruments.[6] He further testified that Arnold would have died because of striking the latter with use of pieces of wood and stabbing him thereby
the stab wound on his chest, were it not for the timely medical intervention. inflicting upon said Eugene Tayactac physical injuries which resulted to the
death of the latter.
On August 5, 1994, Armando, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito, were
charged with Murder for the death of Leonilo Broce. The Information, That an aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength is attendant
docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC 1217 reads: in the commission of the offense.
That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping Another Information was filed against the Caballero brothers for frustrated
one another, armed with pieces of wood and hunting knives, and with intent murder for the injuries of Arnold Barcuma. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, RTC-1219, it reads:
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of one LEONILO BROCE, by striking That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San
the latter with the use of pieces of wood and stabbing him, thereby inflicting Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
upon said Leonilo Broce physical injury described as follows: Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping
one another, armed with pieces of wood and hunting knives, with intent to
= Stabbed wound (R) chest penetrating thoracic cavity. kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
and which injury caused massive hemorrhage which resulted to the death of person of one ARNOLD BARCUMA, by striking him with the use of pieces of
Leonilo Broce. wood and stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries
which would have resulted to the death of said Arnold Barcuma, thus
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant performing all the acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of
in the commission of the offense. Murder, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused that is, the timely medical
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7] assistance rendered to said Arnold Barcuma.
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant
in the commission of the offense.[9] After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment on May 7, 2001
finding all the three accused, now appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr., assisted by counsel, were arraigned on as principals of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which reads:
September 15, 1994. They pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Robito
Caballero remained at-large. WHEREFORE, accused Armando Caballero, alias Baby, Ricardo Caballero,
alias Ricky and Marciano Caballero, Jr., alias Jun, having been found
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged them as
They adduced evidence that Ricardo was employed as electrician in the principals, are hereby sentenced to suffer:
Office of the City Engineer of San Carlos City. Armando was a motor cab
driver. Robito resided in H.C. Rigor Street, San Carlos City while Marciano, 1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217 for the murder of Leonilo Broce, there
Jr. was a resident of Don Juan Subdivision, San Carlos City and was being no mitigating circumstance present, with the attendant aggravating
employed with the Victorias Milling Corporation. circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, the maximum
penalty of death and to pay the heirs of Leonilo Broce the sum of P75,000.00
On August 3, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., Robito left San Carlos City and went to as indemnity;
Bacolod City. Armando went to the house of his brother Ricardo to help in
the construction of the latters house and to take care of Ricardos fighting 2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, for the murder of Eugene or Eugenio
cocks while he was in his office. Ricardo arrived home at 8:00 p.m. and had Tayactac, there being no mitigating circumstance present, with the attendant
dinner with his family and Armando. Momentarily, their sister Mila and their aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, the
younger brother Marciano, Jr. arrived in the house of Ricardo. Marciano, Jr. maximum penalty of death; and to pay the heirs of Eugene Tayactac the sum
allegedly was mauled by a group of men and sustained an abrasion, a of P75,000.00 as indemnity; and
contusion and swelling of the left side of his face. Ricardo and Armando
brought their brother Marciano, Jr. to the hospital for treatment. On August 4, 3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for Frustrated Murder, for having
1994, Marciano, Jr. was treated for: seriously inflicted injuries upon the person of Arnold Barcuma which nearly
resulted to his death, there being no mitigating circumstance present, an
= Linear abrasion (L) scapula region; imprisonment of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day, with no award as to damages, no evidence
= Contusion (R) lower lip lateral side; having been introduced to establish, the same; and
= Swelling left face. 4. To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. denied killing Eugene and assaulting In convicting the accused, the trial court found that all of them conspired to
Arnold. They also denied having any altercation with the victims. They also kill Eugene and Leonilo and cause injuries to Arnold. While the trial court
denied stabbing Leonilo. They had no idea why Wilma, Arnold and Myrna stated that it was only appellant Armando who stabbed Eugene, and only the
would implicate them for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the accused Robito who stabbed Leonilo, however, it concluded that all of them
injuries of Arnold.
were equally liable for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the injuries and for the injuries sustained by Arnold. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code
of Arnold. provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit
a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always predominantly mental
In their Brief, the accused, now appellants assail the decision of the trial court in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and
contending that: intent.[13] Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as
the crime itself, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[14] However,
I direct proof is not required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. Conspiracy may be proved through the collective acts of the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED- accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused
APPELLANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 1217-1219 DESPITE THE FACT aiming at the same object, one performing one part and another performing
THAT THEIR GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. another for the attainment of the same objective, their acts though apparently
independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
II personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.[15]
The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal
SUPERIOR STRENGTH ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED plan.[16] Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit a crime is not
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS KILLED THE VICTIMS. necessary. It is enough that at the time of the commission of a crime, all the
malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their execution.[17]
III Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of participation of each of them for in contemplation
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH of the law, the act of one is the act of all.[18]
PENALTY UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
INDEED THEY KILLED THE VICTIMS.[12]
Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on facts, not on mere
The Court will delve into and resolve the first two assignments of errors. inferences, conjectures and presumptions.[19] Mere knowledge,
acquiescence to or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the
doubt their respective guilt for the deaths of Eugene and Leonilo and for the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the
injuries sustained by Arnold. They assert that the trial court committed common objective and purpose.[20] Moreover, one is not criminally liable for
reversible error in rejecting their defenses of denial and alibi. They claim that his act done outside the contemplation of the conspirators. Co-conspirators
at the time of the incident they were in the San Carlos Hospital for the are criminally liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiring on how and
treatment of the injuries of appellant Marciano, Jr. what are the necessary and logic consequence of the intended crime.[21]
The appellants are partly correct. In this case, when appellant Armando asked Eugene at the store of Wilma
whether the latter was going to buy something from the store, Eugene was
The trial court correctly found that all the appellants conspired to kill Eugene peeved and remonstrated that he and Armando had no quarrel between
and assault Arnold; hence, they are criminally liable for the death of Eugene them. Appellant Armando was likewise irked at the reaction of Eugene
because from the store, appellant Armando stationed himself by the gate of A Leonilo Broce came out of his house.
the Mondragon Compound near the sari-sari store of Wilma. Appellants
Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined their brother, appellant Armando at Q Where is the house of Leonilo Broce?
the gate. Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with knives.
When Eugene passed by the gate to the compound, appellant Armando A Still located at Sumakwel.
pulled Eugene to the gate but when the latter resisted, all the appellants
ganged up on Eugene. Appellant Armando took the wooden support of the Q In that case, the very house where Eugene Tayaktak leaned on when he
clothesline and hit Eugene with it. Eugene was stabbed three times on his was ganged up by the four?
chest even as he tried to parry the thrusts. When Arnold rushed to the situs
criminis to pacify the appellants and accused Robito, appellant Ricardo A Yes.
stabbed him on the left side of his body. The other appellants and accused
Robito joined appellant Ricardo and ganged up on Arnold. They stabbed Q What happened after that?
Arnold anew twice on his forearm. Teresito Mondragon, the father-in-law of
appellant Ricardo intervened and forthwith, all the appellants, including A When he came out from the house and saw that it was Eugene Tayaktak,
accused Robito returned to the Mondragon Compound. Patently, all the he proceeded to approach them but he was not able to approach them
appellants by their simultaneous collective acts before and after the because he was met by Robit Bebot Caballero and stabbed by Robito
commission of the crimes were united in one common objective, to kill Caballero.
Eugene, and cause injuries to Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent
bloodshed. Hence, all the appellants are criminally liable for the death of Q Was LeoniloBroce (sic) hit when he was stabbed by Robito Caballero?
Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the
appellants stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of one is A Yes. He immediately ran back and said: Tio, help me because I am hit.
the act of the others.
INTERPRETERS (observation)
However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the appellants are
not criminally liable. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the Witness demonstrating by holding her left armpit.
appellants and the accused Robito conspired to kill Leonilo. The appellants
did not actually see Leonilo rushing out from his house to the situs criminis. Q Was Eugene Tayaktak able to escape from the attach (sic) of the
They had no foreknowledge that the accused Robito would stab Leonilo. Caballero brothers?
There was no evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that all the
appellants assisted the accused Robito in killing Leonilo. It must be recalled A Not (sic).
that Leonilo rushed out of his house when he saw the commotion, with the
intention of aiding the victim or pacifying the protagonists. He was, however, Q Now what happened to Eugene Tayaktak?
stopped by accused Robito who suddenly stabbed him on the chest. Leonilo
retreated and asked for help. Wilma Broce testified that only the accused A He appeared very weak and he was staggering.
Robito stabbed Leonilo:
Q Do you know where Eugene Tayaktak now?
Q After that, what happened next?
A Already dead.
Crimes Committed by Appellants
Q What happened to Leonilo Broce, where is he now?
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are guilty as co-principals by
A The two of them were (sic) already dead. direct participation of murder, qualified by treachery. In order that treachery
may be considered as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened
Q Now, when did the trouble stop if it stopped? to prove that:
A It stopped when Dodong Mondragon arrived. .... (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of
Q What did the accused do after the trouble was stopped? execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.[24]
A They went inside the compound of his (sic) father. Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and the victim is unarmed.
The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed
Q What happened next? victim.[25]
A Nothing happened. Both of them were brought to the hospital.[22] In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no inkling that he would be
waylaid as he sauntered on his way to his girlfriend Susanas house. On the
In sum, the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the appellants other hand, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole while
of murder for the death of Leonilo. As this Court held in People v. Flora:[23] appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with knives. The attack
on the hapless Eugene was swift and unannounced. Undeniably, the
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of appellants killed Eugene with treachery.
Emerita Roma and the injury of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows
conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts done outside the In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are guilty of frustrated
contemplation of the conspirators only the actual perpetrators are liable. In murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the
People v. De la Cerna, 21 SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held: Revised Penal Code which reads:
... And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender
contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
liable. Here, only Serapio killed (sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not independent of the will of the perpetrator.
even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of
the murder of Ireneo Gallarte. He has no liability for the death of Emerita Elements:
Roma nor the injuries of Flor Espinas caused by his co-accused
Hermogenes Flora. 1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence; murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to
kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
3. But the felony is not produced; weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.[26] (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him
on the victim.
In the leading case of United States v. Eduave,[27] Justice Moreland,
speaking for the Court, distinguished an attempted from frustrated felony. He In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole. Appellant
said that to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be Ricardo and accused Robito used knives. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended to
thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to and operated on Arnold, testified that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on
stop prior to the moment when he has performed all the acts which should the left side of his body was mortal and could have caused his death were it
produce the crime as a consequence, which act it is his intention to perform. not for the timely and effective medical intervention:
The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion of the acts Q And how about the size and the depth of the wounds and how big is each
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission wound and how deep.
of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts,
should result in the consummated crime. Thereafter, the phase is objective. A The first wound is 2 cm. and the 2nd is about 2 inches and the 3rd is 2
inches in the left, penetrating the chest near the thorax along the lateral line.
In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective
phase in the commission of the crime. The offender does not arrive at the Q So, aside from the 3rd wound there are wounds which are not really very
point of performing all of the acts of execution which should produce the serious?
crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance. A As I said before, the most serious is the 3rd wound.
On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all Q So even without the other wounds the 3rd wound - - it could be the cause
the acts of execution which should result in the consummation of the crime. of the death of the victim?
The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission of the
crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender A Yes, Sir.[29]
while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is necessary to
consummate the crime. However, the crime is not consummated by reason It cannot be denied that the appellants had the intention to kill Arnold. The
of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In appellants performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not
homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of consummated because of the timely medical intervention.
execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the
death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance.[28] Treachery attended the stabbing of Arnold because he was unarmed and the
attack on him was swift and sudden. He had no means and there was no
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime time for him to defend himself. In sum, the appellants are guilty of frustrated
committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no murder.
intention to kill the victim or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated
The appellants denial of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. RTC- In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for frustrated murder, the Solicitor General
1218 and RTC-1219 cannot prevail over Wilmas and Arnolds positive and contends that the indeterminate penalty of from 12 years of reclusion
straightforward testimonies that the appellants killed Eugene and stabbed temporal as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
Arnold. Moreover, Wilma and Arnold had no motive to falsely implicate the as maximum, imposed on the appellants is not correct. The Court agrees
appellants for the said crimes; hence, their testimony must be accorded full with the Solicitor General. The penalty for frustrated murder is one degree
probative weight.[30] lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal.[33] The
latter penalty has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. The maximum
Equally barren of merit is appellants defense of alibi. Alibi as a defense is of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from reclusion temporal, the
inherently weak for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. To merit penalty for the crime taking into account any modifying circumstances in the
approbation, the appellants were burdened to prove with clear and commission of the crime. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
convincing evidence that at the time the crimes were committed, they were in taken from the full range of prision mayor which is one degree lower than
a place other than the situs of the crimes such that it was physically reclusion temporal. Since there is no modifying circumstance in the
impossible for them to have committed said crimes.[31] The appellants commission of frustrated murder, the appellants should be meted an
dismally failed in this respect. They testified that they were at the house of indeterminate penalty of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
appellant Ricardo, which was conveniently near the place where Eugene was mayor in its medium period as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
killed and Arnold was assaulted. Moreover, the records show that Marciano, months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Jr. was treated for his superficial injuries on August 4, 1996, a day after the
incident. This belies the claim of appellants Ricardo and Armando that they Civil Liabilities of Appellants
were allegedly in the hospital at the time of the incident.
The trial court ordered the appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 to pay
Penalties Imposable on Appellants in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac, the amount of P75,000
by way of indemnity. The trial court did not award moral damages to said
The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellants in Criminal Case No. heirs. This is erroneous. Since the penalty imposed on the appellants is
RTC-1218 on its finding that treachery and abuse of superior strength were reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity should be only P50,000. The heirs of
attendant in the killing of Eugene. The Solicitor General does not agree with the victim should also be awarded the amount of P50,000 as moral
the trial court and contends that abuse of superior strength was absorbed by damages.[34]
treachery; hence, should not be considered as a separate aggravating
circumstance in the imposition of the penalty on the appellants. The Court In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the trial court did not award moral damages
agrees with the Solicitor General. Abuse of superior strength, concurring with to the victim Arnold Barcuma on its finding that the prosecution failed to
treachery is absorbed by treachery.[32] adduce any evidence to prove said damages. The Court disagrees with the
trial court. The victim Arnold Barcuma himself testified on his injuries.[35] He
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P25,000.[36] Having suffered
amended by Republic Act 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since aside injuries and undergone medical treatment he is, as well entitled to actual
from the qualified circumstance of treachery, no other modifying damages, which in the absence of evidence would, nevertheless, entitle him
circumstance was attendant in the commission of the crime, the proper to an award of temperate or moderate damages, herein fixed at P10,000.
penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Verdict of the Court
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial vs.
Court of San Carlos City (Negros Occidental), Branch 57, in Criminal Cases TOMAS ADIAO, defendant-appellant.
Nos. RTC-1217 up to RTC-1219 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: Victoriano Yamzon for appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217, the Court, finding the appellants not guilty
of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, REVERSES the judgment of the trial court and ACQUITS MALCOLM, J.:
them of the said charge.
The defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of the city of Manila with
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are found guilty beyond the crime of theft. He was found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft.
reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, He appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and again he
qualified by treachery, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion was found guilty of the crime of frustrated theft, and was sentenced to pay a
perpetua and ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
Tayactac, the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral the costs.
damages.
The sole error assigned on appeal is that the lower court erred in holding that
3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are found guilty beyond the defendant was guilty of the crime of theft as dis closed by the facts
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article appearing of record. We have examined the evidence carefully and from our
6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code and are hereby sentenced to study are unable to say that the proof is contrary to the findings of the lower
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of court. Stated in one sentence, the defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs
prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and inspector, abstracted a leather belt valued at P0.80, from the baggage of a
four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The Japanese named T. Murakami, and secreted the belt in his desk in the
appellants are hereby ordered to pay in solidum to the victim Arnold Barcuma Custom House, where it was found by other customs employees.
the amount of P25,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as temperate or
moderate damages. Based on these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the crime can not
properly be classified as frustrated, as this word is defined in article 3 of the
Costs de oficio. Penal Code, but that since the offender performed all of the acts of execution
necessary for the accomplishment crime of theft. The fact that the defendant
SO ORDERED. was under observation during the entire transaction and that he was unable
to get the merchandise out of the Custom House, is not decisive; all the
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, elements of the completed crime of theft are present. The following decisions
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, of the supreme court of Spain are in point:
Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of
G.R. No. L-13785 October 8, 1918 another. As he was in the act of taking the fruit he was seen by a policeman,
yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, sometime later. The court said: ". . . The trial court did not err . . . in
considering the crime as that of consummated theft instead of frustrated theft him. The merchandise in question, attached to the record as Exhibit A, shall
inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen who be returned to the lawful owner, T. Murakami. So ordered.
saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land arrested him in the act
and thus prevented him from taking full possession of the thing stolen and Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.
even its utilization by him for an interval of time. (Decision of the supreme
court of Spain, October 14, 1898.) G.R. No. L-23916 October 14, 1925
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
hearing mass in a church. The latter on account of the solemnity of the act, vs.
although noticing the theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, defendant-appellant.
however, while the defendant was still inside the church, the offended party
got back the money from the defendant. The court said that the defendant Cirilo B. Santos for appellant.
had performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appllees
consummated. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a OSTRAND, J.:
key opened up a case, and from the case took a small box, which was also
opened with a key, from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales The defendant is accused of the crime of rape, the information alleging "that
and 20 centimos, and then placed the money over the cover of the case; just on or about the 26th day of February, 1925, in the City of Manila, Philippine
at this moment he was caught by two guards who were stationed in another Islands, the said accused wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of
room near-by. The court considered this as consummated robbery, and said: force and by intimidating one Conrada Jocson with killing her with a knife
" . . . The accused . . . having materially taken possession of the money from which said accused held in his hand should she not accede to his wish, did
the moment he took it from the place where it had been, and having taken it then and there lie with and have carnal knowledge of said Conrada Jocson, a
with his hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the acts girl under 12 years of age. That in the commission of the crime the following
necessary to constitute the crime which was thereby produced; only the act aggravating circumstances existed to wit: (1) The accused is the husband of
of making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not the grandmother of said Conrada Jocson and (2) the crime was committed
go to make the elements of the consummated crime. (Decision of the with grave abuse of confidence, inasmuch as the offended and the accused
supreme court of Spain, June 13, 1882.) living in the same house."
There exists the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken by the The defendant is a man 70 years of age and the offended party is a child of 9
offender of his public position. Wherefore, in view of the provisions of articles years, the granddaughter of the defendant's wife. There can be no question
517 and 518, No. 5, of the Penal Code, and there being present one as to the defendant's guilt. The evidence shows that he and the offended
aggravating circumstance compensated by no mitigating circumstances, the party were living in the same house and that taking advantage of the
penalty must be imposed in the maximum degree.1awph!l.net absence of the other inhabitants of the house, he had intercourse with the
child by force and violence. He admits that he did so, but maintains that he
Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant is sentenced to three was intoxicated at the time and did not know what he was doing. The
months and one day of arresto mayor, with the costs of all instances against testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is, however, to the effect that
he did not show any signs of intoxication at the time of the commission of the In the present case the physician who examined the offended party
crime or immediately afterwards. immediately after the commission of the crime found the labia and the
opening of the vagina inflamed together with an abundance of semen,
The court below found the defendant guilty of frustrated rape and sentenced though the hymen was intact. It also appears from the evidence that the
him to suffer ten years and one day of prision mayor. In holding that the defendant lay on top of the child for over fifteen minutes and continued his
crime was frustrated, the court seems to have been of the opinion that there efforts of penetration during that period; the child testifies that the defendant
can be no consummated rape without a complete penetration of the hymen. succeeded in a partial penetration and that she felt intense pain. In these
This view is not accordance with the weight of authority; in fact, it is contrary circumstances, the crime must be regarded as consummated.
to practically all modern authorities. In State vs. Johnson (91 Mo., 439), the
court held that "finding the hymen intact is not always proof that no rape has The judgment appealed from is therefore modified by finding the defendant
been committed, nor virginity; for the case are not rare where the hymen had guilty of the consummated crime of rape and, in view of the aggravating
to be removed after impregnation and in order to permit delivery." circumstances mentioned in the information, the penalty imposed upon the
defendant is hereby increased to seventeen years, four months and one day
In the same case, the court further said: of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. In all
other respects the judgment is affirmed with the costs against the appellant.
Any penetration whether reaching to the hymen or not is sufficient to So ordered.
constitute the crime; for as Lord Meadowbank said in case in Scotland.
"Scientific and anatomical distinctions as to where the vagina commences Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-
are worthless in a case of rape; it is enough if the woman's body is entered; Real, JJ., concur.
and it is not necessary to show to what extent penetration of the parts has
taken place; whether it has gone past the hymen, into what is anatomically
called the hymen, or even so far as to touch the hymen." (Stewart on Legal
Medicine, p. 137.)1awph!l.net
The law may now indeed be considered as settled that while the rupturing of
the hymen is not indispensable to a conviction, there must be proof of some
degree of entrance of the male organ "within the labia of Pudendum."
In the following cases it has been held that entry of the labia or lips of the
female organ, merely, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina, is sufficient to warrant conviction of the consummated crime of rape.
(Kenny vs. State [Tex. Crim. App.]; 65 L. R. A., 316; 79 S. W., 817 [1903].
See [Eng.] Reg. vs. Lines, 1 Car. & K., 393 [1844]; 44 N. W., 571 [1890];
[Tex.] Rodgers vs. State, 30 Tex. App., 510; 17 S. W., 1077 [1891]; [Wis.]
Brauer vs. State, 25 Wis., 413 [1870].)