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Koppel Vs Makati Rotary Club Case Digest
Koppel Vs Makati Rotary Club Case Digest
FACTS:
Fedders Koppel. Incorporated (FKI), an air-conditioning manufacturer, owned a parcel of land located in Paranaque City
which housed buildings and improvements dedicated to the business of FKI.
In 1975 – FKI left the land to Makati Rotary Club Foundation (MRCF) by way of a conditional donation; MRCF accepted
all the conditions.
On May 26, 1975, FKI and MRCF executed a deed of donation evidencing their consensus.
Respondent would lease the land back to FKI under the terms of donation
- Period of lease is for 25 years or until May 25, 2000; renewable for another 25 years upon mutual agreement
- Rent paid by FKI for the 1st 25 years is P 40, 126 per annum.
- Rental for the 2nd 25 years shall be the subject of mutual agreement; if cannot agree , then it be submitted to a
panel of 3 arbitrators in accordance to arbitration law in the Philippines.
- Fair market value should not exceed beyond 25% of the original value
- Rental for the 2nd 25 years shall not exceed 3% of the fair market value of the land
In October 1976, FKI and MRCF executed an amended deed of donation that reiterated the provisions of the deed of
donation.
By virtue of the lease agreement as stipulated in the deed of donation and the amended one, FKI continued to possess and
use the land.
2 days prior to the expiration of the deed of donation and the amended one, FKI and MRCF executed another contract of
lease.
- FKI faithfully complied and paid rentals and the donations for 3 years in the 2005 lease contract, but in June
2008 FKI sold its rights and properties to Koppel, Inc. (Koppel).
- FKI and MRCF executed an assignment and assumption of lease and donation where FKI formally assigned
all of it interest and obligations in favor of Koppel.
- The following year Koppel refused to pay rent and donation under the 2005 lease contract because it violated
the material conditions of the donation of the land in the deed of donation and amended deed of donation;
clearly the rents in 2000 & 2005 lease contract were exhorbitant
o The two 25 years were the only material conditions of the donation of the subject land
o While the lease for the 2nd 25 years was not fixed in the deed of donation and the amended one, both
deeds nevertheless prescribed rules and limitations which should be complied with- what is referred here
is the 3% maximum increase of rental based on the fair market value of the land
Demand Letters
- June 1, 2009 MRCF sent the 1st demand letter notifying petitioner of its default and the demand for its
settlement (8.394 million), failure to comply would mean the termination of the 2005 contract; the letter was
received on the next day.
- Sept 22, 2009 Koppel sent a reply expressing disagreement over the rental stipulations since they were
excessive and against the mandated deed of donation and the amended one; they offered to pay
onlyP80,502.79
- September 25, 2009 MRCF sent the 2nd demand letter which reiterated the demand to pay obligations, added
that the failure to do so within 7 days, Koppel is demanded to vacate the premises less MRCF take legal steps.
- September 30, 2009, Koppel refused to comply with the demand and instead filed a case before the RTC of
Paranaque a complaint for the rescission or cancellation of the deed of donation and amended deed of
donation against the respondent.
- October 5, 2009, MRCF filed an unlawful detainer case against Koppel before the MeTC of Paranaque.
- November 4, 2009, Koppel filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim and reiterated its objection to
the stipulations in the 2005 contract for being violative of material conditions of the deed of donation and
amended deed of donation
Used the defense that MeTC had no jurisdiction because the 1st demand letter had no demand to
vacate the premises and therefore refusal to comply does not give rise to an action for unlawful
detainer
Even if the MeTC was able to acquire jurisdiction, it may not exercise the same until the
disagreement between the parties is 1st referred to arbitration
Furthermore, there can be no ejectment since the 2005 lease contract is void. The donations as
part of rentals were simulated as donations contemplated to evade taxes for being a non-stock
and non-profit corporation.
MeTC
-Reversed the decisions of the MeTC and ordered the eviction of Koppel from the land, pay P9,362,436, penalties and net
of 5% withholding tax, atty’s fees and costs of suit-
Ratio:
Respondent has complied with the requirement of demand, in essence the 1st demand also deemed that they had
to vacate since failure to comply would mean the termination of the 2005 lease contract which meant they had to
lease; either way the 2nd demand letter has complied with the requirement of demand.
Petitioner cannot invoke the arbitration clause and at the same time question the validity of the contract.
2005 lease contract must be sustained since there was no evidence submitted to prove its invalidity.
SC – Appeal by Koppel
- Sept. 25, 2011 SC issued a TRO staying the immediate implementation of the decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
RESOLUTION:
Yes, all of the arguments are bereft of merit for they have erred in overlooking the significance of the arbitration clause
incorporated in the 2005 lease contract.
The arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract stipulates that “any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or
execution of the 2005 Lease Contract ought to be submitted to arbitration.”
To the mind of this Court, such stipulation is clear and is comprehensive enough so as to include virtually any kind of
conflict or dispute that may arise from the 2005 Lease Contract including the one that presently besets petitioner and
respondent.
The application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract in this case carries with it certain legal effects.
However, before discussing what these legal effects are, we shall first deal with the challenges posed against the application
of such arbitration clause.
FIRST. While the validity of the contract may still be in question, the 2005 lease agreement would not be rendered non-
arbitrable.
The quotation from Gonzales vs. Climax Mining, Ltd. that was used to justify the contrary position was taken out of
context. SC held that "the validity of contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings "as such questions
are" legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily
a judicial function."
The question was whether the complaint for arbitration raises arbitrable issues that the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines
and Geosciences Bureau (PA-MGB) can take cognizance of under the Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 7942). This Court
pointed out to the provisions of the Mining Act of 1995 which granted the PA-MGB with exclusive original jurisdiction
only over mining disputes, i.e., disputes involving " rights to mining areas," "mineral agreements or permits," and " surface
owners, occupants, claim holders or concessionaires" requiring the technical knowledge and experience of mining
authorities in order to be resolved. Accordingly, since the complaint for arbitration in Gonzales did not raise mining
disputes as contemplated under R.A. No. 7942 but only issues relating to the validity of certain mining related agreements,
this Court held that such complaint could not be arbitrated before the PA-MGB. It is in this context that we made the
pronouncement now in discussion:
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to some
provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge
and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or
validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract
cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters
within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law.
These questions are legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and and jurisprudence
which is necessarily a judicial function.
SECOND. Petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract notwithstanding the fact that it
assails the validity of such contract.
This is due to the doctrine of separability. Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as
independent of the main contract. Being a separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be invoked
regardless of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract.
THIRD. The operation of the arbitration clause in this case is not at all defeated by the failure of the Petitioner to file a
formal request or application therefor with the MeTC. SC finds that the filing of a request pursuant to section 24 of RA
NO. 9285 is not the sole means by which an arbitration clause may be validly invoked in a pending suit.
SEC. 24. Referral to Arbitration. - A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject
matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one party so requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or
upon the request of both parties thereafter, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
The request referred to in the above provisions is, in turn, implemented by Rules 4.1 to 4.3 A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC or the
Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules):
Rule 4.1. Who makes the request. - A party to a pending action filed in violation of the arbitration agreement,
whether contained in an arbitration clause or in a submission agreement, may request the court to refer the
parties to arbitration in accordance with such agreement.
(A) Where the arbitration agreement exists before the action is filed. – The request for referral shall be made not
later than the pre-trial conference. After the pre-trial conference, the court will only act upon the request for
referral if it is made with the agreement of all parties to the case.
(B) Submission agreement. – If there is no existing arbitration agreement at the time the case is filed but the
parties subsequently enter into an arbitration agreement, they may request the court to refer their dispute to
arbitration at any time during the proceedings.
Rule 4.3. Contents of request. – The request for referral shall be in the form of a motion, which shall state that the
dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement.
Apart from other submissions, the movant shall attach to his motion an authentic copy of the arbitration
agreement.
The request shall contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties specifying the date and time when it would be
heard. The party making the request shall serve it upon the respondent to give him the opportunity to file a
comment or opposition as provided in the immediately succeeding Rule before the hearing.
Attention must be paid, however, to the salient wordings of Rule 4.1. It reads: “(a) party to a pending action filed in
violation of the arbitration agreement xxx May request the court to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with such
agreement.”
In using the word may to qualify the act of filing a “request” under section 24 of RA No. 9285, the special ADR Rules
clearly did not intend to limit the invocation of an arbitration agreement in a pending suit solely via such request. After all,
non-compliance with an arbitration agreement is a valid defense to any offending suit and, as such, may even be
raised in an answer as provided in our ordinary rules of procedure.
In this case, it is conceded that petitioner was not able to file a separate request of arbitration before the MeTC. However,
it is equally conceded that the Petitioner, as early as in its Answer with Counterclaim, had already apprised the MeTC of
the existence of the arbitration clause in the 2005 Lease Contract and, more significantly, of its desire to have the same
enforced in this case. This act of petitioner is enough valid invocation of his right to arbitrate.
FOURTH. The fact that the Petitioner and Respondent already underwent through Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)
proceedings before the RTC, will not make the subsequent conduct of arbitration between the parties unnecessary or
circuitous. The JDR system is substantially different from arbitration proceedings.
The JDR framework is based on the processes of mediation, conciliation or early neutral evaluation which entails the
submission of a dispute before a JDR judge who shall merely “facilitate settlement” between the parties in conflict or
make a “non-binding evaluation or assessment of the chances of each party’s case.”
Thus in JDR, the JDR judge lacks the authority to render a resolution of the dispute that is binding upon the parties in
conflict. In arbitration, on the other hand, the dispute is submitted to an arbitrator/s – a neutral third person or a group of
thereof - who shall have the authority to render a resolution binding upon the parties.
Clearly, the mere submission of a dispute to JDR proceedings would not necessarily render the subsequent conduct of
arbitration a mere surplusage. The failure of the parties in conflict to reach an amicable settlement before the JDR may, in
fact, be supplemented by their resort to arbitration where a binding resolution to the dispute could finally be achieved.
This situation precisely finds application to the case at bench.
FIFTH. Neither would the summary nature of ejectment cases be a valid reason to disregard the enforcement of the
arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. Notwithstanding the summary nature of ejectment cases, arbitration still
remains relevant as it aims not only to afford the parties an expeditious method of resolving their dispute.
A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution is that it is, first and foremost, a product of
party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to “make their own arrangements to resolve their own disputes.” Arbitration
agreements manifest not only the desire of the parties in conflict for an expeditious resolution of their dispute. They also
represent, if not more so, the parties mutual aspiration to achieve such resolution outside of judicial auspices, in a more
informal and less antagonistic environment under the terms of their choosing. Needless to state, this critical feature can
never be satisfied in an ejectment case no matter how summary it may be.
Since there really are no legal impediments to the application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Contract of Lease in this
case, we find that the instant unlawful detainer action was instituted in violation of such clause. The Law, therefore, should
have governed the fate of the parties and this suit:
RA No 876
Section 7. Stay of civil action. - If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an issue arising out of an agreement
providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in which such suit or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the action or proceeding
until an arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement: Provided, that the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
RA No. 9285
SEC. 24. Referral to Arbitration. - A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject
matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one party so requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or
upon the request of both parties thereafter, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
It is clear that under the law, the instant unlawful detainer action should have been stayed: the Petitioner and the
Respondent should have been referred to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. The
MeTC, however, did not do so in violation of the law - which violation was, in turn, affirmed by the RTC and Court of
Appeals on appeal.
The violation by the MeTC of the clear directives under RA No. 876 and 9285 renders invalid all proceedings it
undertook in the ejectment case after the filing by Petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim – the point when
the petitioner and the Respondent should have been referred to arbitration. This case must, therefore, be remanded to the
MeTC and be suspended at said point. Inevitably, the decisions of the MeTC , RTC, and the Court of Appeals must all be
vacated and set aside.
The petitioner and the Respondent must then be referred to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005
Lease Contract.