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Special People Inc Foundation V Nestor Canda
Special People Inc Foundation V Nestor Canda
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy
relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.
Antecedents
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in Barangay
Jimilia-an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water
from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six
other municipalities. The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 on the following
justifications, to wit:
1) The whole project simply involves tapping of water from the Loboc River, filtering and
purifying it, and distributing the same to the consumers in the covered towns;
2) From the source to the filtration plant, then to the purifier stations, then finally to the
consumers’ households, water flows through steel pipes;
4) No waste is generated, as the electrocatalytic process dissolves all impurities in the water;
5) The project involves no destruction [n]or harm to the environment. On the other hand, it is
environment friendly.1
Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project, respondent
Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings in a letter dated December 4,
2001, as follows:
1) The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental Examination is
required.
2) The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social acceptability should
be established. Proper indorsement from the Protected Area Management Bureau or PAMB
should be secured.2 (Emphasis supplied)
On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Canda’s findings to respondent EMB Region 7
Director Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because
the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) that had recently been issued a CNC.3
On April 3, 2002, RD Lipayon notified the petitioner that its documents substantially complied with
the procedural aspects of the EMB’s review, and that the application was assigned EMB-DENR-7
Control No. CNC-02-080 for easy reference in case of follow-up and submission of additional
requirements.4
Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial Environmental Examination document
was required for the project due to its significant impact in the area.5
On August 26, 2002, RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit the following documents to enable
the EMB to determine whether the project was within an environmentally critical area or not, to wit:
1. Certification from DENR, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
that it is not within areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife
preservation area, sanctuaries and not within the purview of Republic Act No. 7586 or the
National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act, and other issuances including
international commitments and declarations;
2. Certification from the DENR Regional Office/ PENRO [that] the areas within the project do
not constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species or indigenous wildlife
(Flora and Fauna).
3.2. Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) that the area
was not subjected to an earthquake of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale
or its equivalent and hit by tsunamis during the period of 1638 until the year 2001.
3.3. PHIVOLCS that the area was not subjected to earthquakes of at least intensity
VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or its equivalent during the period of 1949 until the year
2001.
3.5. Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7 (MGB 7) that the area is not located
along fault lines or within fault zones and not located in critical slope.
3.6. City Mayor and/or City Engineers Office that the area is not flood prone.
3.7. Network of Protected Areas for Agriculture (NPAA) of the Bureau of Soils and
Water Management (BSWM) that the area is not classified as Prime Agricultural
Land.
4. Certification from the Provincial Tourism Office or its equivalent office that areas in your
project are not set-aside as aesthetic potential tourist spot.
5. Certification from the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) that areas within your
project are not recharged areas of aquifer.
Projects that are covered by P.D. 1586 or the Environmental Impact System (EIS) Law should not
start unless the Project Proponent should secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC),
otherwise penalties shall be imposed.6 (Emphases supplied)
On January 28, 2003, the petitioner submitted eight certifications,7 including the certification issued
by the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), as follows:
That the project area, Loboc, Bohol was subjected to an earthquake of Intensity VII in the adapted
Rossi-Forel scale of I-IX last February 8, 1990. The magnitude of the earthquake is 6.8 and the
highest intensity reported was VIII, based on the Rossi-Forel Intensity Scale. During the said
earthquake, the PMI Academy Building collapsed while minor cracks were sustained by the
municipal hall, public school, town church and some other houses in the town. There were reports
that immediately after the earthquake, the force of the incoming waves from the sea caused Alijuan
River in the town of Duero to flow inland. The report also states that the waves affected 10-50
meters of the coastal beach of the towns of Jagna, Duero, Guindulman, Garcia Hernandez and
Valencia.8 (Emphases supplied)
The petitioner failed to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (RO-MGB) to the effect that the project area was not located along a fault line/fault zone or a
critical slope because RO-MGB did not have the data and expertise to render such finding, and thus
had to forward the petitioner’s request to the MGB Central Office.9
Upon the MGB’s advice, the petitioner sought and obtained the required certification from
PHIVOLCS, but the certification did not state whether the project area was within a critical slope.
Instead, the certification stated that the project site was approximately 18 kilometers west of the East
Bohol Fault.10
Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayon’s letter dated February 4, 2003
declared that the project was within an environmentally critical area, and that the petitioner was not
entitled to the CNC, viz:
After thorough review of your submitted certifications, it was found out that the area was subjected to
an earthquake of Intensity VII in the adapted Rossi-Forel scale wherein the magnitude of the
earthquake is 6.8 with the highest intensity reported of VIII and you fail to support certification that
the project area is not within critical slope. And based on the Water Usage and Classification per
Department Order (DAO) 34 Series of 1990, subject river system was officially classified as Class B
intended for swimming and bathing purposes. Moreover, one component of your project involves
opening of roadway connected to the barangay road.
Therefore, we reiterate our previous stand that your project is covered by the EIS System pursuant
to P.D. 1586, the Environmental Impact Statement Law.11
On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Loay, Bohol,12 alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after
having complied with the certification requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to
the DPWH for a similar waterworks project in the same area.
In the decision dated November 18, 2003,13 the RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus upon the
following considerations, namely: (1) PHIVOLCS certified that the project site had been subjected to
an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990; (2) the CNC issued by the EMB to a similar waterworks project
of the DPWH in the same area was only for the construction of a unit spring box intake and pump
house, and the DENR issued a cease and desist order relative to the DPWH’s additional project to
put up a water filtration plant therein; (3) the determination of whether an area was environmentally
critical was a task that pertained to the EMB; (4) the assignment of a control number by the EMB to
the petitioner’s application did not mean that the application was as good as approved; (5) the RTC
would not interfere with the primary prerogative of the EMB to review the merits of the petitioner’s
application for the CNC; and (6) there was already a pending appeal lodged with the DENR
Secretary.
Hence, this appeal brought directly to the Court via petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner insists that RD Lipayon already exercised his discretion by finding that the application
substantially complied with the procedural aspects for review and by assigning Control No. CNC-02-
080 to its application; that after the petitioner complied with the requirements enumerated in the
August 26, 2002 letter of RD Lipayon, the EMB became duty-bound to issue the CNC to the
petitioner; that the EMB issued a CNC to a similar project of the DPWH in the same area; that it filed
an appeal with the DENR Secretary, but the appeal remained unresolved; and that it brought the
petition for mandamus precisely as a speedier recourse.
In their comment, RD Lipayon and Canda aver that the act complained of against them involved an
exercise of discretion that could not be compelled by mandamus; that the petitioner’s proposed
project was located within an environmentally critical area, and the activities to be done were so
significant that they would create massive earth movement and environmental degradation; that the
petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping; and that the petitioner had no cause of action
against them for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
On his part, the DENR Secretary, through the Solicitor General, contends that the petition raises
questions of fact that are not proper in a petition for review; that the petitioner should have appealed
to the CA under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; that the grant or denial of a CNC application is
discretionary and cannot be compelled by mandamus; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the Court is called upon to resolve, firstly, whether the appeal directly to this Court from
the RTC was proper, and, secondly, whether the petition for mandamus was the correct recourse.
Ruling
1.
This appeal by certiorari is being taken under Rule 45, Rules of Court, whose Section 1 expressly
requires that the petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Yet, the
petitioner hereby raises a question of fact whose resolution is decisive in this appeal. That issue of
fact concerns whether or not the petitioner established that its project was not located in an
environmentally critical area. For this reason, the Court is constrained to deny due course to the
petition for review.
It is a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case. The Court relies on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals or
of the trial court, and accepts such findings as conclusive and binding unless any of the following
exceptions obtains, namely: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals or
the trial court went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals or the trial court
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.15 However, none of the aforementioned exceptions
applies herein.
2.
We dismiss the present recourse because the petitioner failed to exhaust the available
administrative remedies, and because it failed to show that it was legally entitled to demand the
performance of the act by the respondents.
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an
administrative concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative
processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the
opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deliberation.16 The court of law must allow the
administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the
specialized areas of its competence.17 This rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a
better position to resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed
by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so.18
The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. At the
time RD Lipayon denied the petitioner’s application for the CNC, Administrative Order No. 42 dated
November 2, 200219 had just vested the authority to grant or deny applications for the ECC in the
Director and Regional Directors of the EMB. Notwithstanding the lack of a specific implementing
guideline to what office the ruling of the EMB Regional Director was to be appealed, the petitioner
could have been easily guided in that regard by the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides
that the Director of a line bureau, such as the EMB,20 shall have supervision and control over all
division and other units, including regional offices, under the bureau.21 Verily, supervision and control
include the power to "review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials
or units."22 Accordingly, the petitioner should have appealed the EMB Regional Director’s decision to
the EMB Director, who exercised supervision and control over the former.
It is relevant to mention that the DENR later promulgated Administrative Order No. 2003-3023 in
order to define where appeals should be taken, providing as follows:
Section 6. Appeal
Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the ECC/CNC applications may, within 15 days from
receipt of such decision, file an appeal on the following grounds:
The DENR may adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a means to settle
grievances between proponents and aggrieved parties to avert unnecessary legal action. Frivolous
appeals shall not be countenanced.
Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it had a pending appeal with the DENR
Secretary. However, the records reveal that the subject of the appeal of the petitioner was an
1âw phi 1
undated resolution of the DENR Regional Director, Region VII, denying its application for the
CNC,24 not the decision of RD Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the pending appeal with
the DENR Secretary had related to RD Lipayon’s decision, the petitioner should still have waited for
the DENR Secretary to resolve the appeal in line with the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Its failure to do so rendered its resort to mandamus in the RTC premature. The omission
is fatal, because mandamus is a remedy only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.25
Another reason for denying due course to this review is that the petitioner did not establish that the
grant of its application for the CNC was a purely ministerial in nature on the part of RD Lipayon.
Hence, mandamus was not a proper remedy.
The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not covered by the
Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS System) and that the project proponent is not required
to secure an ECC.26 The EIS System was established by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586
pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that required all entities to
submit an EIS for projects that would have a significant effect on the environment, thus:
Section 4. Environmental Impact Statements. – Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and
goals, all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and
include in every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the
environment a detailed statement on–
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are
consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same;
and
xxxx
P.D. No. 1586 exempted from the requirement of an EIS the projects and areas not declared by the
President of the Philippines as environmentally critical,27 thus:
Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. - All other projects, undertakings and areas not
declared by the Presidents as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall
not be required to submit an environmental impact statement. The National Environmental
Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however require non-critical projects
and undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards as it may deem necessary.
On December 14, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2146 declaring areas and types of
projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EIS System, as follows:
I. Heavy Industries
a. Non-ferrous metal industries
d. Smelting plants
b. Forestry projects
1. Logging
4. Forest occupancy
6. Grazing
c. Fishery Projects
a. Major dams
1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves
and sanctuaries;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of
indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and fauna);
d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and storm
floods;
12. Coral reef, characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:
Projects not included in the foregoing enumeration were considered non-critical to the environment
and were entitled to the CNC.
The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is not
an act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that involves the exercise of judgment and
discretion by the EMB Director or Regional Director, who must determine whether the project or
project area is classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to be submitted by
the applicant.
The petitioner maintains that RD Lipayon already exercised his discretion in its case when he made
his finding that the application substantially complied with the procedural requirements for review. As
such, he was then obliged to issue the CNC once the petitioner had submitted the required
certifications.
Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC application
when he made his finding. It is clear that his finding referred to the "procedural requirements for
review" only. He had still to decide on the substantive aspect of the application, that is, whether the
project and the project area were considered critical to the environment. In fact, this was the reason
why RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit certifications from the various government
agencies concerned. Surely, the required certifications were not mere formalities, because they
would serve as the bases for his decision on whether to grant or deny the application.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the
requirement to submit the needed certifications. For one, it submitted no certification to the effect
that the project site was not within a critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCS’s certification showed that
the project site had experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that sufficed to place the
site in the category of "areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the
petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal right to be issued the CNC applied for, warranting
the denial of its application.
It is not amiss for us to observe, therefore, that the petitioner grossly misunderstood the nature of the
remedy of mandamus. To avoid similar misunderstanding of the remedy hereafter, a short exposition
on the nature and office of the remedy is now appropriate.
The writ of mandamus is of very ancient and obscure origin. It is believed that the writ was originally
part of the class of writs or mandates issued by the English sovereign to direct his subjects to
perform a particular act or duty.28 The earliest writs were in the form of letters missive, and were
mere personal commands. The command was a law in itself, from which there was no appeal. The
writ of mandamus was not only declaratory of a duty under an existing law, but was a law in itself
that imposed the duty, the performance of which it commanded.29 The King was considered as the
fountain and source of justice, and when the law did not afford a remedy by the regular forms of
proceedings, the prerogative powers of the sovereign were invoked in aid of the ordinary powers of
the courts.30
A judicial writ of mandamus, issued in the King’s name out of the court of King’s Bench that had a
general supervisory power over all inferior jurisdictions and officers, gradually supplanted the old
personal command of the sovereign.31 The court of King’s Bench, acting as the general guardian of
public rights and in the exercise of its authority to grant the writ, rendered the writ of mandamus the
suppletory means of substantial justice in every case where there was no other specific legal remedy
for a legal right, and ensured that all official duties were fulfilled whenever the subject-matter was
properly within its control.32 Early on, the writ of mandamus was particularly used to compel public
authorities to return the petitioners to public offices from which they had been unlawfully removed.33
Mandamus was, therefore, originally a purely prerogative writ emanating from the King himself,
superintending the police and preserving the peace within the realm.34 It was allowed only in cases
affecting the sovereign, or the interest of the public at large.35 The writ of mandamus grew out of the
necessity to compel the inferior courts to exercise judicial and ministerial powers invested in them by
restraining their excesses, preventing their negligence and restraining their denial of justice.36
Over time, the writ of mandamus has been stripped of its highly prerogative features and has been
assimilated to the nature of an ordinary remedy. Nonetheless, the writ has remained to be an
extraordinary remedy in the sense that it is only issued in extraordinary cases and where the usual
and ordinary modes of proceeding and forms of remedy are powerless to afford redress to a party
aggrieved, and where without its aid there would be a failure of justice.37
The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature that sets it apart from the other
remedial writs, i.e., that it is used merely to compel action and to coerce the performance of a pre-
existing duty.38 In fact, a doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue
only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act sought to be compelled
and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same.39 The petitioner bears the burden to
show that there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding
compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act.40
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary
remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that
are discretionary.41 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The
duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.42
The petitioner's disregard of the foregoing fundamental requisites for mandamus rendered its petition
in the RTC untenable and devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
BERSAMIN.