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029 - The One Who Decides Must Hear (423-433)
029 - The One Who Decides Must Hear (423-433)
V. S. DESHPANDE*
was dealing in the Gullapalli case, the power was entrusted not to any
particular officer as in the Morgan case b u t to the State Government
before whom the objections were to be filed and who after hearing,
was to approve or modify the scheme. T h e main argument accepted
by the United States Supreme Court in the first Morgan case was that
the Secretary m a d e the order without having heard the evidence or
arguments and only on the opinion derived from the consultation
with the employees of the Department. T h e United States Supreme
Court pointed out that the question was not merely of delegation of
authority by the Secretary to his subordinates to hear and decide the
case. T h e Assistant Secretary heard the argument b u t did not
make the decision. Congress required the Secretary to determine the
rates. If, therefore, the Secretary h a d not considered the evidence or
the arguments, it was manifest that the hearing h a d not been given.
But even in this case the United States Supreme Court conceded
that the rule of personal decision did not preclude obtaining aid or
assistance in the Department. Assistants m a y prosecute inquiries.
Evidence m a y b e taken by a n examiner. Evidence thus taken
m a y be sifted and analysed by competent subordinates.
But a personal hearing by the agency head resulting in a
personal decision by him was obviously not always practicable. T h e
Morgan decision was, therefore, extensively criticised. It was said that
"if the Secretary of Agriculture was to give to every order which he signs
t h e consideration which the Morgan case requires, he would probably
have to devote all his time to the conduct of matters which must be
considered petty from a national point of view. 1 3 Professor K.C.
Davis in his Administrative Law1* observerl that the Morgan rule was
" a statement of an ideal t h a t probably goes beyond what is practi-
cable." T h e Attorney-General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure which reported in 1941 recommended that the officers
who heard the administrative proceeding should be qualified and
independently selected and that they should have a role in the decision-
making process equivalent to that of a trial j u d g e . T h e Adminis-
trative Procedure Act which was passed in 1946 on those recommen-
dations assimilates the roles of the hearing and the deciding officers
within the administrative agency to those of trial and appellate
courts. U n d e r section 8(a) thereof the hearing officer makes an
initial decision of the case which, in the absence of an appeal to or
13. Feller *'Prospectus for the further study of Federal Administration Law"
47 Tale Law Journal 647 at 662.
14. (1951) p. 364.
for instance, that the officer who has heard the case places the record
of the hearing along with his own tentative conclusions or recom-
mendations before the deciding authority. In the language of
section 8(a) of the American Administrative Procedure Act this may
be called an initial decision by the hearing officer which becomes
final unless the ultimate deciding authority varies it by way of an
appeal or a review. This practice approximates to the procedure laid
down by the American Administrative Procedure Act, 1946, and the
U.K. Report on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries, 1957, by the
Franks Committee and is based on the principle of natural justice
and fundamental judicial procedure. It would be a deviation from
this salutary practice, if, for instance, the deciding authority were to
give the final decision without having the evidence and the arguments
heard by the hearing officer and his recommendations. Against all
such lapses the decision would be a standing signal.