Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987: Preterition
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987: Preterition
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the
PARAS, J.: oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of
tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the
Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' trial judge.
(petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows: respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner,
Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
(Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and
to costs. ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio
Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows: His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present
petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p.
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain
and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p.
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio 153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157);
Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will
allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner
without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on
burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. (A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and
Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy
property, the will provided: under the premises;
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. (B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring
house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it
Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted
Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C to probate;
1
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia
admitted to probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by
New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603,
direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are not known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person
compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
institution of heirs; the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were
be the law; not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that
suggests that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese
definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v.
expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions
violable. which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they
should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and
standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
of the will of Nemesio Acain and entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for
therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual. inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having
been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the
pretirited. "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin,
74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: above, be respected.
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
valid insofar as they are not; inofficious. who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee
there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At
institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article
representation. 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a
will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect
of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be
SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as dismissed.
the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the
otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v.
even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573
2
[1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed
prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright.
Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court
case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v.
Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]). Nuguid, supra).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21,
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to
proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the
provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA
206 [1985]). For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case
to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an
pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed
absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of
question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private
considerations. The Court said: respondents.
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang
case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
solution. questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985
and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by
the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute SO ORDERED.
the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing
held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of
dismissal. G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967
3
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs;
surnamed Reyes y Barretto,plaintiffs-appellants, and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of
vs. Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee. rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud
Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria
Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant. Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee. Court, which affirmed the same.1
REYES, J.B.L., J.: Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate
heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the
deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo.
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Civil Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
Case No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the
same to deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, the
properties receivea by his deceasea wife under the terms of the will of the late This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not
Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered
at more than P200,000. to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate
of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of
partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title
barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the
Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the share of defendant, who was then a minor.'
plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow of
plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors."
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared
the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be
they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto,
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano
31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337. Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the
basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his
share of these properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so,
Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa has been included, shall be null and void.
Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew anä nieces® The usufruct oæ the
fishponä situateä iî barrio Saî Roque¬ Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned,
however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo® Iî the meantime¬ Maria The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since
Gerardo was appointeä administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of Bibiano Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil
partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at
Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only
Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and the true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the
delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's
Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the
original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name. Philippines establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its
acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this
opinion, the Court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in to return the properties received under the project of partition previously mentioned as
the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied
1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first
4
defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the estate
defendant. of the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by
Salud Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been of the minor Milagros Barretto), and since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the
misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud heirs, nor were any findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have
Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and no greater validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being
testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them in the nature of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata,
could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really 92 Phil. 426, is invoked in support of the proposition. That case is authority for the
being one, and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article proposition that a judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of
1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs(without distinction mistake or fraud, upon petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed
between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to before the compromise agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p.
be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly 436). In the case before us, however, the agreement of partition was not only ratified
named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion by the court's decree of distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the
of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in
impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a favor of the heirs, long before the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto. does not apply.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that
her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact,
no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 even without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in conformity with the
Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all applicable, that case involving an instance probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the provisions whereof no objection had
of preterition or omission of children of the testator's former marriage. been made. In fact it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force in
1939, provided: .
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil
status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. — When a will is thus allowed, the
erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such estate, after the
Barretto, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of
the testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates
the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate. in these Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country. (Emphasis supplied)
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is
merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed
is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without
persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing upon a like issue, this Court
Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp. 741 and 742:
of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the
distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally
testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it intervene, still they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not
had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as well. As this
properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The proceeding for
probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by
estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein is binding
partition becomes irrelevant. against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final
order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the
land of the estate in the distributees". (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of
5
Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no reason why, by analogy, these Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old
salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings. (Exhibit 24), she became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of
action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree distributing her
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a father's estate and the four-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left (Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or facts in 1946 (Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly,
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to therefore, the action was already barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her
secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's
reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if estate.
successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to
throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that
properties long ago distributed and disposed of. appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to
reconvey the properties received by his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable
It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes vs. evidence of the alleged promise, which rests exclusively on the oral assertions of
Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that: Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court made no mention of such
promise in the decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise
was made, the same can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the real parties in interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of
partition, and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and void as
The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor. (Secs. to them unless duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro,
3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere statement in the project of 55 Phil. 136, 142).
partion that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros
Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean that the guardian had not
yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in
been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by
appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been already the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void
appointed when she signed the project of partition. There is, therefore, no for being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that
irregularity or defect or error in the project of partition, apparent on the Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred
record of the testate proceedings, which shows that Maria Gerardo had no by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a
power or authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of the minor possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the properties
Lucia Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention that inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the
the order approving the project of partition is absolutely null and void and plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have
may be attacked collaterally in these proceedings. been given due course.
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is
party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee
her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted in said decision, and the same is
First Instance which settled her father's estate. affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the records
be returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action for
partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo) the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits
could not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said thereof, as prayed for in the complaint No costs.
widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud on appellees
rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place, there is no evidence that when the
estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants' Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and
predecessor, Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so Castro, JJ., concur.
that if fraud was committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely
responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held
liable therefor. In the second placegranting that there was such fraud, relief therefrom
can only be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
period had elapsed long ago.
6
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
vs. legacy therein.1
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant. whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees. the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court
SANCHEZ, J.: below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a
nullity?
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single,
without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability
Nuguid. exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion
below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate will and the applicable statute.
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the
probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are Reproduced hereunder is the will:
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally
preterited and that in consequence the institution is void. Nov. 17, 1951
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of
the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name
dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete (Sgd.) Illegible
nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs. T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part,
appeal. provides:
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the
court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on
7
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The
814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus — one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more.
No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death Manresa:
of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and
betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ... En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de
existir, en todo o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero
a necessity. On this point Manresa comments: en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues,
entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como
especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le
nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya
heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —
los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que
muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa. comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo
universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion
se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814,
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion
Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el de heredero." ... 11
testamento.
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul: results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of
universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will
tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our
opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to
nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to
nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. ... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7 institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no
effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha
283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8 realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado
llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en
ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia,
And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una
Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario
8
a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different
acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we
sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will
contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance
constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better
establecer. 12 stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which
the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one
notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el
inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el
expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that caso. 23
the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would
give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. 5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to
There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the
bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that
preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in
(in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:
disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts
it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14 But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor
of the children by the second marriage should be treated
as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs
succession ensues. may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing
the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely
rather than one of preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining
854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious
distinction between pretention and disinheritance. legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be
absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure
turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the
expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed
se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and
that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not
presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but
be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20 because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by
universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity".
Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir".
9
Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent
petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil
null. Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is not originate from petitioners’ familial line and were not originally owned by Placido
hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered. and Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and
Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only
Exequiel who was in possession of the properties.6
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. petitioners’ claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva
Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4,
RESERVA TRONCAL 2002, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:
G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013 1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels of
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of land subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint
DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of the property
REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA described in the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
MENDOZA, Petitioners, 2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of Julia
vs. Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey the
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and
DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. 3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney’s fees and damages and costs.
DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE SO ORDERED.7
JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA
SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA, Respondents. Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:
DECISION WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional
REYES, J.: Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the SO ORDERED.8
inheriting ascendant.1 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per
The Facts Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that
Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, Placido and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even
with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be
Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos 5 subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor
(respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.11
but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings. A.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
(Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO
Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, B.
Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentin’s children. Petitioners alleged THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject of PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT
an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that
her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They the properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva
claimed that after Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated troncal. They also claim the properties in representation of their own predecessors,
unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers of Exequiel.13
10
Ruling of the Court determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The predeceased Exequiel.
general rule in this regard is that it should raise only questions of law. There are, The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the CA’s findings are (1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
contrary to those of the trial court.14 This being the case in the petition at hand, the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
Court must now look into the differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA (2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
on the two issues that arise – one, whether the properties in dispute are reservable (3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
properties and two, whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these prepositus by operation of law; and
properties. (4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code: property should be reserved by the reservor.16
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the
from which said property came. (Emphasis ours) property.17 It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What
by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom
ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the
transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A
degree from which the property came.15 transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
The lineal character of the anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this
reservable property is reckoned case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
from the ascendant from whom the death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
prepositus received the property by Ascendants, descendants and
gratuitous title collateral relatives under Article
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not 964 of the Civil Code
applicable. Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an
ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus.
Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral
relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants
and descendants, and those who are not ascendants and descendants but come
from a common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.1âwphi1 A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are
not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
(Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents,
great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s descendants, if she had
one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being
Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral
relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the
common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that
made. In the case of Julia’s collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made
Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence,
from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor,
it sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga,
11
that is, Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, reason of relationship by the whole blood.
her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative within the third Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper
degree and not her ascendant. distribution of Gregoria’s estate at this point as the cause of action relied upon by
First cousins of the petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on reserva troncal.
descendant/prepositus are fourth Further, any determination would necessarily entail reception of evidence on
degree relatives and cannot be Gregoria’s entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in
considered reservees/reservatarios an action filed specifically for that purpose.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not A reservista acquires ownership of
relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The the reservable property until the
person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the reservation takes place or is
one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property extinguished
last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC’s disposition of
degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the
degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.20 reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as names. What the RTC should have done, assuming for argument’s sake that reserva
Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered on
degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is respondent’s titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to
in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent annotate the reservable character of the property on the title.24 In reserva troncal, the
their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish or by operation
and relatives within the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated: of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively. 25
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional
the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belong to ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of the
the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the reservees predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives, within the third It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished, 27 that a reservatario
degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. 28 In any event,
of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled
since the law does not recognize them as such. to a reservation of the properties in dispute.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and
within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694
person from whom the reservable property came. x x x. 23 (Emphasis and insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are
underscoring ours) AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are Gregoria
reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the ownership of the properties in question.
purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not SO ORDERED.
Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA’s disposition that the
complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at
all, what should apply in the distribution of Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003 and
1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
12