Felicidad Tan vs. Atty.

Galileo Trocio
Facts:
Complainant, Felicidad Tan is the owner and directress of a vocational school in Lanao del
Norte while respondent, Atty. Galileo Trocio is the legal counsel for the said school.
Complainant declares that on April 1971 at 8:30 pm after classes were dismissed, respondent
overpowered her and against her will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. As a result,
she begot a son, on Feb. 5, 1972 whom she named and registered as Jewel Tan.
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent on the ground of immorality and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer.
Complainant avers that:(1) the respondent used to support Jewel but subsequently lost interest
in doing so,(2) the respondent threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband if she
complained to the authorities (3) that she was married with 8 children and school directress at
the time of the assault & thus making her desist from the filing that complaint.
After 8 years of soul searching, complainant filed an administrative complaint against
respondent.
Respondent denies the complainants allegations. He argues that:(1) her motivation in filing the
charge was because he declined her request to commit a “breach of trust” in an inheritance
case he handled for her family, (2) she only used the claims to escape indebtedness to him
representing his services as legal counsel, (3) the past 8 years he had been actively involved as
legal counsel in several cases involving family matters of the complainant
OSG: recommended the disbarment of respondent for gross immoral conduct.
Issue: WON, respondent had in fact, sexually assaulted the complainant, and as consequence
thuslater siring her child. (thus warranting the disbarment for immoral conduct)
WON, the child of complainant is presumed to be that of the respondent.
Held: (1) No. The complainant alleges that the assault took place in 1971 yet no criminal charge
was filed until 8 years after. The court doubted the facts presented by the complainant as she
continued to secure therespondent’s services for both business and family reasons. The court
ruled that the subsequent dealings are far from the normal action of a woman who has been
wronged.
(2) No. Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of complainant and her husband and the
presumption is in favor of the legitimacy of the child.From the evidence presented, the
presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, the child was
registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the complainant and her lawful
husband.
The testimonies of the complainant’s maids stating that there was an “unusual closeness”
between respondent and Jewel is not convincing enough to prove paternity. Furthermore,
pictures presented of Jewel and the respondent showing alleged “physical likeness” to each
other is not decisive proof that the respondent is the father. The court likewise found it strange
to name an unwanted son as “Jewel”
VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE ARBOLARIO, EXALTACION
ARBOLARIO, CARLOS ARBOLARIO, and Spouses ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ and CARLITO
SALHAY, petitioners, vs . COURT OF APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO, RUTH COLINCO,
ORPHA COLINCO and GOLDELINA COLINCO, respondents.

Facts:
The late sisters Agueda Colinco and Catalina Baloyo are the children of the original
owners of the controverted lot.
Catalina Baloyo, married Juan Arbolario, had one child, Purificacion, who, however, died
in 1985.
Agueda Colinco, on the other hand, is the predecessor of private respondents. Believing
themselves to be the only inheritors of the land in issue, private respondents executed a
Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement.
Thereafter, respondents filed a case against the spouses Salhay (petitioners) to recover
possession of part of the land. The Salhays alleged, however, that they had previously
purchased the same from Purificacion.
Meanwhile, petitioners, the heirs of Juan Arbolario (2nd wife Francisaca Malvas) and the
Salhays, filed a case for cancellation of Title with Damages against the respondent Colincos
stating that the partition agreement was voidable as they were excluded therein.

The RTC rendered judgment in the consolidated cases in favor of the (P) Arbolarios and
against the (R) Colincos. The trial court held that the Arbolarios were the half brothers and the
sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her cousins and nieces.
Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos could not inherit from her, because she
had half-brothers and half-sisters. Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement
was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the existence of, and their relationship with,
the Arbolarios.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court stating that no evidence
was ever presented showing that the conjugal union between Juan Arbolario and Catalina had
been judicially annulled or lawfully ended before that year. Because it was also in 1951 when
Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, their union was presumably extramarital.

Consequently, their children are presumed illegitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of

Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and Catalina. Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of
the Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or
mother. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Won the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in questioning
the filiation of the Arbolarios by considering them illegitimate children thus, disqualifying them to
inherit from their half-sister Purificacion Arbolario.

Ruling:
No. The Court of Appeals did not err in their decision. There is no solid basis for the
argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolario's marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid,
supposedly because the original wife, Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born.

It does not follow that just because his wife has died, a man is already conclusively
married to the woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted
proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.

Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established.
It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate. Petitioners, however, failed
to prove the fact of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas;
hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor. Petitioner’s failed to
adduce evidence that they were born during the marriage of Juan Arbolario and his Second
spouse.

As it is, we have to follow the settled rule that the CA's factual findings cannot be set
aside, because they are supported by the evidence on record. As held by the appellate court,
without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan is presumed to have continued.
Even where there is actual severance of the filial companionship between spouses, their
marriage subsists, and either spouse's cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed to
be between "husband and wife." Thus, petitioners consequently failed to establish any right to
partition of the said property.
Cabatania v CA
GR No. 124814
October 21, 2004

Facts:
Florencia filed a petition for recognition and support on behalf of her son Regodos.

She alleged that after separating from her husband in 1981, she worked at Camelo’s house as a
maid in 1982.

She and Camelo had several sexual encounters and she claims that Camelo is the father of her
child Regodos. In support of this, she presents Regodo’s birth and baptismal certificates, both
prepared without the knowledge and consent of Camelo.

(R) Camelo on that contends that Florencia that was already pregnant when they had sex.

RTC: Decided in favor of Florencia stating that the personal appearance of the child gave no
doubt that the child is that of petitioner and respondent.

CA: Affirmed RTC

Issue: Won the court compel petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge Regodos as his
illegitimate son and to give support to the latter?

APPLICABLE LAW:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.

RULING:

NO.

The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. (Article 167 of the Family Code)
• A certificate of Live Birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence
of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of
said certificate.

• The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person.

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

Wherefore, petition granted. CA decision granting recognition is dismissed.

Gerardo Concepcion VS Court of Appeals

Facts: Gerardo Concepcion herein petitioner married private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte
and gave birth to Jose Gerardo. However, spouses relationship was short-lived when
petitioner discovered that his wife had married a certain Mario Gopiao 9 years prior their
marriage. Petitioner filed a motion to annul his marriage with Ma. Theresa on the ground of
bigamy.

RTC: granted the petition and therefore declared the 2nd marriage as void. A decree of
annulment was granted and declared Jose Gerardo as an illegitimate child. Custody of the
child was awarded to the mother while petitioner was granted visitation rights.

Feeling humiliated, private respondent then filed a MR insofar ONLY as the portion of the
decision granting petitioner visitation rights to their son contending that the law is silent as to the
visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child and that their son's surname
be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name.

Petitioner opposed the motion and insisted his visitation rights and the retention of the child's
surname as is.

RTC denied the MR saying that the minor needs a father especially that he is a boy who must
have a father figure to recognize – something the mother alone cannot give.

Respondent elevated to the CA.

CA: ruled that Respondent was married to Mario when Jose Gerado was born and thus the child
is presumed to be the legitimate child of the subsisting marriage.

Issue: WON the presumption of legitimacy would apply in this case and thus making Jose
Gerardo the legitimate child from the subsisting marriage of respondent.

Held:

Yes. FC states that a child is considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law and only the law
can determine the legitimacy of a child and not what a parent says it is.

The SC stated saying that sexual union between spouses in marriage is assumed. In this case,
not only that both Mario (1st marriage) and Ma. Theresa reside in the same city, there was also
no evidence presented by the petitioner to disprove personal access between them. (both
living in Quezon City)

Petitioner, solely relied on Ma. Theresa's statement that she never lived with Mario and claims
that the admission amounts to an assumption that there was never any sexual relation between
her and Mario and that the child was born to them. The court found the argument without merit.

The presumption of legitimacy holds and may be refuted only by evidence to the contrary in
which case there was none provided. The birth certificate of the child and the admission of both
parties that Jose Gerardo was born to them is immaterial. If the court were to validate that
stipulation, then it would tantamount to allowing the mother to disown her child and these are
the very acts which the law seeks to prevent.
Furthermore, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child as this is a strictly personal right
of the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs. (Art. 166) Since the 2nd marriage was void,
Gerardo has no legal standing.

SC added that the birth certificate was not offered as evidence in the lower court, thus should
not be recognized and if it were to recognize it, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence
and may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. Between the certificate of birth which is
only prima facie evidence and the quasi-conclusive presumption of the law (rebuttable only by
proof beyond reasonable doubt), the latter shall prevail. Not only it does bear more weight but it
is also conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the
law which is to prioritize the best interest of the child.

The law required every reasonable presumption in favor of legitimacy.

Wherefore, petition is denied, child is assumed as legitimate child of first marriage.

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG vs Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her
Mother and Guardian, JINKY C. DIAZ
FACTS:
1. Jinky Diaz was already married to a Japanese national when she got acquainted and fell in
love with Rogelio Ong. Despite of this, the two cohabited for more than four years and bore a
child. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor
Joanne’s needs, recognizing the child as his own. On September 1998, Rogelio abandoned
them and stopped giving support, alleging that the child is not his.
2. Due to continued refusal to support the child, minor Joanne Diaz represented by her mother
and guardian, Jinky Diaz filed a complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support
against Rogelio before the RTC.
3. RTC: declared that the minor respondent is the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky
Diaz. Although the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the Jinky and his Japanese
national husband. It was turned down by the RTC because the legitimacy of a child may be
impugned by the ground provided in Art. 166, FC that husband and wife were living separately
in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible. Also, Ong admitted to shouldering the
hospital bills and expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff is an evidence of admission
that he is the real father of Joanne.
4. Rogelio appealed to the CA but died during its pendency. CA granted the appeal and
remanded the case to RTC for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of Joanne.
Petitioners, the heirs of Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
WoN CA erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer
feasible due to Rogelio's death.
RULING:
NO, the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as
long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
Biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in
inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body
fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
In People vs Umanito, citing Tecson vs COMELEC, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted. Thus, the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing.
Petition DENIED. CA's decision is affirmed.

Four significant procedural aspects of traditional paternity action which parties have to face: (1)
prima facie case, (2) affirmative defenses, (3) presumption of legitimacy, (4) physical
resemblance between putative father and child

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate as to
protect the status of legitimacy of the child. The child is still presumed to be legitimate even if
the wife denies this or is declared as an adulteress.
De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Dizon

FACTS:

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was during this
marriage that herein petitioners Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus were
born.

In a notarized document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died
intestate in March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with Inventory and Accounting”
of the Dizon estate with the RTC.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan de Jesus,
sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being
one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being
the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

RTC: denied for lack of merit

CA: affired RTC and remanded to RTC for further proceedings

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to
inherit from him (based on the strength of the notarized document)

RULING: No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the valid
marriage of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth also identified Danilo de
Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in law that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity
of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are
living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of
the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. (Art. 170)

Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
proper cases Article 171,of the Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by
the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. (prescription expired)

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, petitioners, in effect,
would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. This
step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or
in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Liyao Jr. vs. Liyao
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased Willaim Liyao, as represented by her
mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and
Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased
and to be entitled to all successional rights.
Petitioner’s contention is that Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by
the decedent during his lifetime. Petitioner claims that the decedent had supported Billy, paying
for his food, clothing and school expenses, and also openly recognized him in a public
gathering.
Respondents on the other hand claim that it was their family that was living with the decedent
and that the petitioner cannot claim illegitimacy with the decedent because she had a subsisting
marriage with Ramon Yulo.
RTC: granted petition – convinced by preponderance of evidence that the deceased sired Liyao
JR.
CA: Reversed RTC. The law favors legitimacy rather than illegitimacy. In this case, the
decedent did not have participation of acquiring the child’s birth cert & neither was his signature
on it. In this case, petitioner Corazon had a subsisting marriage and the child is thus presumed
to be legitimate.
Petitioner and respondent aimed to present evidence to prove filiation but the main issue of the
actual case is:
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the
deceased.
HELD:
No.
Under the civil code, a child born during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. While
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the
grounds for impugning legitimacy, Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly
personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was
the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced
and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the
moral and economic interest involved.
Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
In this case, the petition cannot prosper because (1) petitioner Corazon is not the proper party
to file case (prescription has passed), (2) child cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband,
presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the
child is fixed, and the he/she cannot choose to be the child of the mother’s alleged paramour.
Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental
Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a
vehicular accident in 2002, in West Java Indonesia.
During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and
introduced themselves as the wife and son of Pablo.
Cristina (P) made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from the
Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick
having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by
virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married in 1998.
Cristina and her children (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of
Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil
Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account
of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioner prayed for the:

1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of
the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;

2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;

3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for
this purpose, the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry,
the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over
an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order
Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, and that the controversy should be ventilated in an
ordinary adversarial action.
Issue:
May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar?
Held:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.
The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action
are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a
Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity
of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed
before the court a quo.

Validity of marriages and legitimacy of filiation can only be questioned in a direct action, by the
proper party, and not through collateral attacks as such in this case.
Therefore, petitioners should file the case directly in a Family Court.
ROSALINA ECETA VS MA. THERESA ECETA
Facts:
1. Rosalina Vda de Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta in 1926. They had a son named
Vicente. The husband (Isaac) died in 1967 leaving Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory
heirs. However, the deceased, during his lifetime, had an illegitimate daughter named Maria
Theresa whose grandmother was Rosalina, the petitioner.

2. Maria Theresa filed a case before the RTC, for "Partition and Accounting with Damages"
against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir
and co-owner of the subject Cubao property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the
property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.

3. During the pre-trial conference, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts wherein they
both admitted their relationship to one another, i.e., that Rosalina is Maria Theresa’s
grandmother.

4. RTC granted the partition which affirmed by the CA with modification

ISSUE:
WON the admission made by Rosalina that Theresa was her granddaughter is enough to prove
the filiation with the deceased. – (2) WON the certified Xerox copy of Maria Theresa’s
certificate of live birth is evidence to prove that she is an illegitimate daughter of her alleged
father. YES
HELD:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
However, what was tried before the trial court and CA was for partition and accounting of
damages only. The filiation or compulsory recognition by Vicente of Theresa was never put in
issue. In fact both agreed in the trial court’s pre trial order that Theresa was Rosalina’s
granddaughter. The deceased establishing acknowledgement of his paternity over Theresa
nevertheless signed the duly authenticated birth certificate shown by the latter. Hence, the
Court granted 1/8 share of the land to Theresa.
JOVITA QUISMUNDO, FOR & IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, PACIENCIA &
VIRGINIA, BOTH SURNAMED VENTA, vs. WCC
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
1. Paciencia and Virginia Venta were minors when their mother, Jovita Quismundo, filed on
their behalf a claim for benefits due to the death of Francisco Venta. They alleged that
the deceased was their natural father.

2. Paciencia and Virginia, represented by their mother entered into an “Extra-Judicial

Settlement and Release” with the decedent’s company on October 17, 1967, wherein
they received the sum of P1,500.00 as death benefits presumably on account of the
Disability, Death and Retirement Plan of said entity.

3. Paciencia and Virginia filed a claim for death benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation. However, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission denied the claim
as they failed to show that they had been acknowledged by him as his illegitimate
children.

4. The petition prays that Paciencia and Virginia be adjudged as having been
acknowledged and, therefore, entitled to be paid benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Law.

5. Citing Article 278 of the Civil Code, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission held that
the deceased had not recognized the two claimants absent recognition in a record of
birth, in a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic documents. The
petitioners agree but cite instead Art. 283 of the same Code which provides, inter alia,
that:
“Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural
child:
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the
direct acts of the latter or of his family;
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners can be acknowledged as legal dependents citing Art 283 of the Civil
Code.

RULING:
The possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a
ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent. There was no appropriate
action to compel such paternity recognition. Therefore the petition was dismissed for lack of
merit. (should have filed a petition for recognition within the lifetime of parent)
The reliance by the petitioners on Art. 283 of the Civil Code is misplaced. This provision
contemplates compulsory recognition as distinguished from voluntary recognition provided in
Art. 278. The possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it
is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent. The provision provides
the grounds for compulsory recognition in an action which may be brought by the child. Neither
the proceedings before the Commission nor in this Court can be regarded as the appropriate
action to compel recognition.
SOLINAP vs LOCSIN
FACTS:
1. “Jhonny” Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990

2. Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a “Petition for Letters of Administration” praying
that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged
that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin and that he is the
only surviving legal heir of the decedent.

3. Petitioners, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin,Manuel Locsin and
Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondent’s petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a
child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime
never affixed “Sr.” in his name.

4. Another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria
Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of
the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent’s claim as a natural child is barred by
prescription or the statute of limitations

5. The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr., (brother of the deceased) also entered
its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. Followed by
an appearance and opposition by Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C.
Locsin) likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and
the deceased.

6. (R) To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
respondent submitted a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth found Local Clerk Registrar
of Iloilo City.
7. It contains the information that respondent’s father is Juan C. Locsin stated therein as
evidenced by his signatures.

ISSUE: Whether or not Juan C. Locsin Jr is an interested party and is qualified to be granted
letters of Administration.
HELD: No. The FC states that primary evidence of filiation may be proven by the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In this case, there were varying records between the Local civil registry (where respondent got
his certificate of live birth) and the Civil registry general (where the petitioners sought to
authenticate the certificate of live birth of (R).
Respondent’s cert was recorded using a 1958 registry form even though he was born in 1956.
Furthermore, the cert presented by (R) does not indicate important particulars about the alleged
father’s information (religion, race, occupation, business etc.) The space which calls for an entry
of legitimacy of the child was also left blank.
The court held that, the document sent to the Civil Registrar general should be identical in
substance and form. Wherefore, the evidentiary worth of the birth cert presented by ® cannot
be sustained because of the conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
Wherefore, respondent Juan C. Locsin is not an interested person to the issuance of letters
of administration since he failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin,Sr., (Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 is spurious).

GERONIMO VS. SANTOS

Facts:
1) Petitioner, Santos claimed to be the only child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. She filed a complaint for annulment of document (Pagmamana
sa Labas ng Hukuman) and recovery of a parcel of land against the respondents
who were the brothers of Rufino (dad)
2) (P) alleged that the said document declared the defendants as the sole heirs of her
parents. Also, upon the death of her parents, all their propertied should be passed
down to her and not to the (R)
3) The ® denied the allegations and said that Santos was an adopted child of the
spouses and was actually daughter of caridad’s sister. They also presented the birth
certificate of the plaintiff and contended the irregularity of the document due to
tampered markings.
RTC: Ruled in favor of the (P) Santos. The court declared the document null and void and
ordered the return of the land to Santos, who was declared as legitimate child of the spouses
based on the birth certificate presented and the open and continuous possession of the status
as legitimate child which established her filiation.
CA: AFFIRMED RTC’s Decision
ISSUE:
WON the filiation of the plaintiff was duly established based on the grounds provided by law.
HELD:
NO. The SC disagrees with both courts and rule that the circumstances and proof presented in
this case do not lead to the conclusion that the respondent is a child of the deceased.
Both courts misapprehended the facts: The RTC relying on the questionable BC and
the appellate court affirming the trial court’s decision based on the continuous possession of
status by Santos did not adequately established the filiation of plaintiff. (tampered)
It was evident that the BC was tampered with questionable markings. A representative from
NSO confirmed this and the fact that Santos did not even offer evidence to explain such
irregularity was sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy.
The secondary evidence did not sufficiently established that the plaintiff was indeed the child of
the spouse. In a similar jurisprudence, the court ruled that the presence of a similar set of
circumstances — which were relied upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at
bar — does not establish that one is a child of the putative parents. The mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption,
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child…
Petition GRANTED.
TOLENTINO VS. CA
1. Private respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino in 1931.

2. The marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943 pursuant to the law during the
Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and
abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years.

3. Arturo Tolentino then married Pilar Adorable but she died soon after the marriage.

4. After that, Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they had 3
children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino.

5. Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to
the time that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was
authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters).

6. RTC, Constancia Tolentino (legal wife of Arturo) filed a petition to bar Consuelo David
from the usage of the surname of Tolentino.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner’s cause of action has already prescribed
2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her
former husband from whom she was divorced.

HELD:
1. Yes
In Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.

Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues.
The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil
Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was still
using the surname Tolentino in 1951.

She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was still
using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she
obtained knowledge.

2. No
Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of
her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law.
Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to
absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce was more
akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as “Mrs.
of the husband” even if he has remarried.

The court held that the appeal would be granted only if there was a usurpation of the
petitioner’s name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the interests of the owner of the
name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity. The elements of usurpation
were: 1. Actual use of another’s name, 2. Use is unauthorized, 3. Use of another’s name is to
designate personality or identity of a person.
None of these elements were present in the case because public knowledge referred
to Constancia as the legal wife of Arturo, and Consuelo did represent herself after the divorce
as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino. Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the case is not
applicable. In Silva, it was not mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendant’s
representation that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva, there was usurpation of the status of the
wife.

AGUILAR VS SIASAT
Facts:

1. Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died,
intestate and without debts: included in their estate are two parcels of land.

2. Petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC for mandatory injunction with damages
against respondent Edna G. Siasat alleging that:
a. petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses;
b. that he (petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he
suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same. ®

3. Respondent claimed that:

a. petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a
mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and
kindness of heart;
b. that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses;
c. that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the
latter inherited the conjugal share of the former and thus herein respondents
inherited their estate without any issue.
d. that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.

4. By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary

damages, and attorney’s fees.

Issue:
WON, the petitioner can prove filiation to the Spouse Aguilar using Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form
E-1 (public document), wherein he swore that (P) Rodolfo was his son.
Ruling:
Yes.

Firstly, it must be concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the
marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective
deaths (presumptive legitimacy) and has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate child of the
Aguilar spouses.

Furthermore, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for
proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code;
by itself, said document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Lastly, Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the
records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were
destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence – particularly
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS to prove filiation.

It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an
express recognition in a public instrument.
AGUSTIN VS. CA

FACTS:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.

1. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered
into an intimate relationship.

2. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s insistence on
abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin.

3. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests
for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have
the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

4. On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf
and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting
Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and
Martin then sued Arnel for support.

5. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action.

RTC: denied the motion and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of
unreasonable search

HELD:

No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right
must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his
right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
ANN BRIGITT LEONARDO, et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 125329, 10 September 2003

When there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there is no right, there is no remedy as
every remedial right is based on a substantive right.

Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo (Brigitt) is an illegitemate child of common-law-spouses Eddie B.

Fernandez and Gloria C. Leonardo.

Wanting Brigitt to carry his surname, Eddie executed an affidavit and a letter which was
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar asking for the change of her surname.

The Local Civil Registrar of Manila denied said request on the ground that under the family
code, illegitimate children should carry their mother‘s surname. It likewise held that it does not
have the authority to effect such change.

Brigitt then appealed to the Civil Registrar General which also denied the request on the
ground the same ground.

Undaunted, Leonardo (mother) filed a Petition for Review upon the Court of Appeals. The CA
declared that an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code can use the
surname of the father but the power to effect the change lies in the Court and not with Local and
Civil Registrar. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code can use the
surname of the father

HELD:

Ubi jus, ibi remedium. When there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there is no right,
there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on a substantive right.

Article 176 of the Family Code provides that ―an illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. The rule applies even if petitioner‘s father admits paternity.‖

The Court declared in Mossesgeld the Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of
Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both
parents the right to use the surname of the father.

Since Brigitt was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took effect, she has no right to
use her father’s surname.
IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WONG:

1. Anna Lisa Wang petitioned for the change of name and/or correction/cancellation of
entry in the Civil Registry of her son, a minor, Julian Lin Carulasan Wang before the
RTC of Cebu City.

2. Julian was the son of Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. They were not yet married
to each other when Julian was born. Subsequently, when Julian’s parents got married,
the latter executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

a. Since the family plans to stay in Singapore and, since in Singapore middle names or
the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, lest, Julian will
be discriminated because he carries a middle name.

b. Also, the spouses’ daughter and Julian might get confused if they are really brothers
and sisters because they have different surnames.

c. Lastly, Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not
have the letter “R” but if there is, they pronounce it as “L”. It is for these reasons why
the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin
Wang.

Issues:

Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped in the instant case because it is a
common practice in Singapore to omit said surname? -NO

Held:
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.

Grounds: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of
his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition
for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may
not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the
same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA,
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner

Facts:

1. Petitioner filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie’s mother was Gemma Astorga Garcia, and that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname. Now that petitioner
is a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent, he prayed that Stephanie’s middle
name “Astroga”, be changed to “Garcia”, her mother’s surname, and that her surname
“Garcia”, be changed to “Catindig”, his surname.

2. The trial court granted the adoption and that the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG. Petitioner filed a motion for clarification/reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA), as
her middle name.

3. RTC denied the motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted
child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name?

Ruling:

The OSG agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name,
the surname of her natural mother arguing that (1) it is necessary to preserve and maintain
Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother as she remains to be an intestate heir; (2) there is
no law expressly prohibiting her to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name;
and (3) it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname
of the mother.

SC finds merit in the petition.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The surname identifies the family to which the child belongs and is fixed by law.
And as correctly submitted by both parties, there is not law regulating the use of a middle name.
Law is notably likewise silent as to what the middle name an adoptee may use. The law only
provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters”.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

In order to avoid an injustice, in case of doubt in the interpretation of the law, it is

necessary to tip the scales in favor of right and justice. Hence, since there is no law
prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mother’s surname, the court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS VS ALCORAN

FACTS:

1. Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaqina Arado producing a son called Nicolas.

2. Nicolas later married Florencia but had no offspring. He had an extramarital affair with
Francisa and begot a son, Anacleto,

3. Anacleto is the husband of Elenette (herein respondents). The petitioners herein are the
sister, nephew and niece of Joaqina.

4. Raymundo and Nicolas died. Joaqina later died leaving a will bequeathing the subject
properties to Anacleto, but the will was yet to be probated.

5. The petitioners filed a claim for recovery of properties against respondents claiming that
they are the rightful owners as Anacleto was not recognized by Nicolas as his legitimate
son.

6. Respondents countered that Anacleto can inherit the subject properties since he was
recognized by Nicolas as his illegitimate son as evidenced by his birth certificate,
baptismal, school records and a picture.

7. RTC and CA dismissed the complaint of the petitioners and said that Anacleto
established that he was really the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Anacleto has been acknowledged as the illegitimate son of Nicolas and is thus
entitled to the subject properties.

RULING:

None of the parties herein can lay claim over any of the subject proeprties without the showing
that the respective estates of Raymundo (governed by the Spanish Civil Code), Nicolas (Civil
Code) and Joaqina had been previously partitioned.

Anacleto was able to establish his illegitimate filiation (as evidenced by his birth certificate)
during his lifetime. ART 172.

Only the birth certificate fully warranted the evidence of paternity.

Anacleto has the right to inherit from Nicolas, but not from Joaqina. Art 992 of the Civil Code: an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the
legitimate child. Neither can he inherit for Joaqina by virtue of her will since Art 838 of the Civil
Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the same is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
BBB vs AAA

FACTS:

1. BBB and AAA allege that they started to date seriously only in 1996. AAA was then a
medical student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, named
CCC, a boy.

2. During their relationship (A&B), AAA bore two more children namely, DDD and EEE

3. BBB and AAA married in civil rights to legalize their relationship.

4. The birth certificates of the children, including CCC’s, was amended to change their civil
status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.

5. Later on, their relationship turn sour and they decided to live separately.

6. AAA filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request
to make the same permanent after due hearing citing economic and psych abuse
caused by BBB.

7. RTC issued a TPO. CA affirmed; but remanded the case to determine custody

8. BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a MOA alleging
that he and AAA had entered into a compromise regarding the custody, exercise of
parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE: that BBB shall have the custody
over both children.

9. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC
is not entitled to receive support from him.

ISSUE: Whether or not CCC is entitled to receive support and the same rights as those of a
legitimate child for being legitimated under BBB’s name.

HELD: YES.

Article 177 of the FC provides that "[o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated." Article 178 states that "[l]egitimation shall
take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents."

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC's biological father.
Hence, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA's
marriage. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New
Civil Code pertinently provides: Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.

BBB is estopped from asserting contrary to his previous representations. He should not be
allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the
effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB's son, and pursuant to Article 179 of
the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including
the receipt of his father's support.
There is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper court the issue of CCC's
status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this Court
now. Hence, BBB's claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral issue, which this Court
has no authority to resolve now.