29-Antonio v. Reyes
29-Antonio v. Reyes
SUPREME COURT that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
Manila occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
THIRD DIVISION (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from
other sources after their marriage.11
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs. (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent. kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
DECISION (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology,
TINGA, J.: when she was neither.13
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed
matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even
certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more. presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by
the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court. million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote
and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He
likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
Antecedent Facts
imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.18
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip
married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a
to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public
subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro
market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She
Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991,
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other
who sadly died five (5) months later.
people on false pretexts.20
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation
essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at
but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21
the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), (6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and (7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
persistent and constant lying
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32
was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist,
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23 to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the
series of tests conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening procedures and
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus: neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that
might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband.25 In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted
by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS
such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26 which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27 respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of
health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established.
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She petitioner and respondent null and void.
claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village
Hotel on 8 December 1979.28 Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37During the pendency of the appeal
writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with
resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29 modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead
that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman
Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at
Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological
to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied. marriage.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are
to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
respondent’s psychological incapacity. marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as
marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was
principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted
the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a
testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of
guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43 initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the
Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind. 58
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative
facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent,
Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr.
one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code
that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36. that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy
afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by
concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to
guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration comply would not be
of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper
circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance. makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus]
should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time,
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36 Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning that of the trial court.72
with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards,
marriage."65 taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and
even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in
further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each
psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68 nullity under Article 36.
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of
from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological
incapacitated to comply incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It
was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly
church tribunals which, although not binding on the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the
concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed,
Canon Law."70 while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial
courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding
on lower courts.76
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of
the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too
a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably
case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that
or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity
"[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly,
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage. of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the "protected"’ by the state.
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences
it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition. or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
the general rules. They warrant citation in full: his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage. We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses
from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence.
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires
the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that
requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence others.81
is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical
declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner
trial court is extant from the records of this case. presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had
headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, follows:
owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the
WITNESS: to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she
persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a
couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically
One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x A- Yes, Ma’am.83
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological
incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage? loves to fabricate about herself."84
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case
of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the
endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be
tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by
as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs.
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity
hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity
obligations of the marriage? drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
xxx Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its
finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has
for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling
officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness? and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore
not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that
tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As
there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a
concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal
woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal.
and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything
that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied
the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her
she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship
of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable. Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the
fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring
a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina,
the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and given great respect by our courts.
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. 90Such decree of nullity was
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota
of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological
condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to pronounced:
even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered
the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part
much credence. Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance
a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and and implications of the marriage vows.
Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the
the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its provision of the Family Code.
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction
pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then the
of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94 opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal
definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and
court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a)
drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the
allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference
and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings
of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came
significant recognition by this Court. out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological
incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the
It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding
the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case
was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95 was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument
returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a
respondent’s condition is incurable. law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet we
approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in
grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there
Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was
incurable. not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there
would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and
point. their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of
incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article
36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to
mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the
parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the
time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of
the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to
the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of
Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital
bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite
her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis
on respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court
decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under
Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.