1st Cases
1st Cases
(1) Entry No. 10984: Kind — Sale; Executed in (1) Entry No. 7967/NT-15162: Kind — Partition:
favor of — Isidro M. Mercado & Trinidad Isidro; Executed in favor of — Felisa Belmonte, et al.;
Conditions--Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of Conditions — By virtue of a deed of partition, the
Seven and One-Half (7-½) hectares of the share of the deceased Ines de Guzman and
property described in this title for the sum of Isidro Belmonte has been adjudicated in favor of
P5,500.00 (D-126: P-90: B-11: S-1948, Herminio the heirs of said deceased. (D-891: P-77: B-V:
E. Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. — June 28, S-1948, Manuel E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of
1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register the Inst. — March 31, 1948: Date of the
of Deeds. Inscription — Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m. (Sgd.)
F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 10985/0-3484: Kind — Sale with
right of repurchase: Executed in favor of — (2) Entry No. 7968/NT-15162: Kind —
Federico Aquino; Conditions — Pilar Belmonte Agreement: Executed in favor of — Felisa
Belmonte, et al; Conditions — By virtue of an S-1954, H. V. Garcia, Cab. City) Date of the Inst.
agreement of the parties concerned in the — Aug. 31, 1954: Date of the Inscription —
partition, Lots Nos. 1-D and 1-J, with an area of Sept. 2, 1954 at 8:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON,
300,000 sq. m. and 80,000 sq.m., more or less, Register of Deeds.
respectively in the subdivision plan Psd-36340,
a portion of lot 1 described on plan Psu-14371, (7) Entry No. 12512/NT-16546: Kind — Sale;
of this title, have been adjudicated in favor of Executed in favor of — Patricia Driz: Conditions
Felisa Belmonte and Lot 1-G with an area of — Pilar Belmonte sold Lots Nos. 1-H and 1-I of
75,000 sq.m., more or less, of the same the subdivision plan Psd-30340 of the property
subdivision, has been adjudicated in favor of described in this title for the sum of P850.00.
Isidoro Mercado, See TCT No. 15162 and See TCT No. NT-16524, Vol. 83. (D-167: P-35:
15163, Vol. No. 76. (D-211: P-44: B-IV: S-1952, B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of
P. Bautista, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Jan. the Inst. — Sept. 9, 1954; Date of the Inscription
22, 1952: Date of the Inscription — Feb. 18, — Sept. 9, 1954 at 11:50 a.m. (Sgd.) F. C.
1954 at 10:18 a.m.(Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
of Deeds.
(8) Entry No. 12569/NT-16546: Kind — Sale;
(3) Entry No. 9715/NT-15746: Kind — Sale; Executed favor of — Patricia Driz; Conditions —
Executed in favor of — Sp. Zacarias Belmonte Pilar Belmonte sold Lot I-E of the subdivision
and Teresita Flores; Conditions — Dominador plan Psd-30340 of the property described in this
Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil sold all their title, with an area of 79,848 sq.m., more or less
rights and interest in this title consisting of seven the subdivision plan of this title, was sold for the
hectares for the sum of P6,000.00. (D-177: P- sum of P2,000.00. See TCT No. NT-16546, Vol.
37: B-IV: S-1952; R. S. Pengson, N.E.) Date of 83. (D-172: P-36: BS-1954, Adolfo San Juan,
the Inst. — Feb. 4, 1952; Date of Inscription — Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Sept. 11, 1954;
May 13, 1954 at 10:08 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. Date of the Inscription — Sept. 13, 1954 at 8:20
CUIZON, Register of Deeds. am. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(Exhibit A, pp. 4-5.)
(4) Entry No. 12168/NT-15162: Kind — Project
of Partition — Executed in favor of Pilar On 22 September 1954, a few days after the last
Belmonte; Conditions — By virtue of a project of transactions mentioned above, the Court of Appeals
partition re-estate of the late Ines de Guzman, a passed a resolution granting the prayer of
portion of 13.2775 hectares of the land defendant-appellant Leon C. Viardo that the children
described in this title has been adjudicated in and only heirs, namely, Artemio, Patricia, Mario,
favor of Pilar Belmonte. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S- Domingo, Joaquina and Catalina, surnamed Driz,
1948, Manuel E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of the who were all of age, be substituted for the deceased
Inst. — March 31, 1948: Date of the Inscription appellee Bartolome Driz (the husband of Pilar
— Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. Belmonte). (Exhibit H-1).
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.1äwphï1.ñët
On 25 September 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered
(5) Entry No. 12169/NT-16440: Kind — Sale; judgment awarding damages prayed for in the
Executed in favor of — Joaquin Driz: Conditions counterclaim of Leon V. Viardo. The judgment made the
— Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-B of the subdivision following findings and conclusions:
plan of this title Psd-36340 a portion taken from
her undivided 13.2775 hectares with an area of . . . The area of the contested property is 15
52,775 sq.m., more or less, for the sum of hectares. By computation, this is capable of
P800.00. See TCT NT-16440, Vol. No. 83. (D- producing 750 cavans of palay a year. On the
160: P-33: B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. basis of 70-30, defendant is entitled to 225
City) Date of the Inst. — Aug. 23, 1954; Date of cavans of palay a year. Therefore, plaintiffs are
the Inscription — Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. under obligation to deliver to defendant this
(Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds. quantity of palay every agricultural year from the
filing of defendant's answer on August 5, 1946,
(6) Entry No. 12370/NT-16488: Kind — Sale; up to the time he vacates said land, or pay the
Executed in favor of — Patricia Driz: Conditions equivalent value thereof at P12.00 a cavan.
— Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-A of the subdivision
plan Psd-36340 being a portion of Lot 1 Having been declared owner of the land in
described in plan Psu-14371, G.L.R.O. Cad. dispute, defendant is entitled to its possession.
Record No. 17910, of this title for the sum of Inasmuch as the court below did not order
P1,000.00 with an area of 80,000 sq.m., with plaintiffs to restore the possession of the land in
respect to her share of 13.2775 hectares. See question, we hereby order them to vacate the
TCT No. NT-16488, Vol. 83. (D-440: P-90: B-V:
same and restore possession thereof to derived therefrom. The defendants filed their answers.
defendant. (Exhibit H.) After trial,1 on 24 August 1956 the trial court rendered
judgment in civil cases Nos. 1718 and 2004, the
This judgment of the Court of Appeals became final and dispositive part of which reads as follows:
executory and the records were remanded to the lower
court. On 16 December 1954 the Court of First Instance IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
of Nueva Ecija issued a writ of execution (Exhibit W). CONSIDERATIONS, in Civil Case 2004, Leon C.
The return made by Chief of Police of the Municipality of Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte
Zaragoza on 14 February 1955 states that Leon C. and Patricia Driz are hereby declared CO-
Viardo had been placed in possession of the parcel of OWNERS PRO-INDIVISO of lots 1-A PSD-
land referred to in the writ and that levy was made on a 16864, which is the ¼ share of Pilar Belmonte in
total of 86 cavans and 74 kilos of palay, and that the Lot 1, PSU 14371, OCT No. 3484 in the
same were deposited in a warehouse (Exhibit X). following proportions: ONE-HALF for LEON C.
VIARDO; 7½ hectares for Isidoro M. Mercado; 7
On or about 4 January 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed a hectares for Zacarias Belmonte, and the
third party claim with the Provincial Sheriff of Nueva remainder for Patricia Driz, it being understood
Ecija (Exhibit Y). The affidavit attached to the claim that whatever is adjudicated to Patricia Driz in
states that Isidoro M. Mercado and his wife purchased the partition shall be subject to the mortgage in
from Pilar Belmonte on 28 June 1948 seven and one- favor of the Philippine National Bank; the deeds
half hectares of her undivided share in the land of sale executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of
described in original certificate of title No. 3484, that on Patricia Driz, Exhibits R and S are declared
the same day the deed of sale was registered, that a NULL AND VOID; the deeds of partition Exhibits
transfer certificate of title was issued in their names, and L and N, are set aside, and the certificates of
that since 1948 up to the time of the levy on execution title issued in favor of Zacarias Belmonte, Isidoro
he had been in actual possession of the parcel of land, M. Mercado and Patricia Driz, Exhibits P, Q, R-1
paying the corresponding taxes thereon and had and S-1 are ordered cancelled. And in civil case
exclusively benefited from the harvests therein, (Exhibit 1718 Isidoro M. Mercado is hereby declared to
Y-1). The sheriff was requested not to continue with the be entitled to the products which had been
levy on the harvest in the parcel of land they were levied upon by the Provincial Sheriff. No
claiming. damages are awarded. The parties in civil case
2004 shall come to an amicable settlement with
respect to the partition. Upon their failure to
On 2 February 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed in the
arrive at an amicable settlement, commissioner
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint
shall be appointed by this Court in accordance
docketed as civil case No. 1718, against Leon C. Viardo
with a law to make the partition.
and the Provincial Sheriff. The complaint alleged that
improper levy had been made on the harvest in plaintiff's
parcel of land and prayed that judgment be rendered With costs against the defendants in both cases.
ordering the defendants to return the palay levied upon,
together with damages. Only Leon C. Viardo, plaintiff in civil case No. 2004 and
defendant in civil case No. 1718, appealed to the Court
On 26 February 1955 the defendants answered that of Appeals. On 21 May 1958 the latter certified and
plaintiffs' purchase of the parcel of land in question from forwarded the appeals to this Court because the facts
Pilar Belmonte was subject to whatever judgment the are not in dispute and "the questions raised by appellant
courts might render in civil case No. 161 between Pilar in his brief are purely legal in nature."
Belmonte and Leon C. Viardo. On 17 October 1955 the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija entered an order In his first assignment of error the appellant contends
suspending the trial of the case, in view of the that the trial court "erred in not annulling the sale
information by counsel for the defendant that his client executed by Pilar Belmonte to Isidoro M. Mercado,
Leon C. Viardo would file a complaint against all persons marked as Exhibit I, and to Dominador Asuncion and
claiming ownership of or interest in the parcel of land Teresita Bansil (Exhibit J) and the sale by Dominador
covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 (Record Asuncion to Zacarias Belmonte and Teresita Flores in a
on Appeal, pp. 2-11). Deed of Sale marked Exhibit M." In support thereof he
argues that the three sales took place and were
On 5 December 1955 civil case No. 2004 was filed by registered after he had become the absolute owner of an
Leon V. Viardo against Pilar Belmonte, Patricia Driz, undivided one-half interest in the parcel of land owned
Joaquina Driz, Isidoro Mercado, Trinidad Isidro, Zacarias by Pilar Belmonte and after notice of lis pendens had
Belmonte, Teresita Flores, Philippine American General been recorded on the title of Pilar Belmonte.
Insurance Co., Inc. and the Philippine National Bank, as
parties claiming some right, participation, share or The argument is without merit. It is true that the
interest in the parcel of land covered by original appellant became the absolute owner of an undivided
certificate of title No. 3484 or by trader certificates of title one-half interest in the undivided one-fourth interest
owned by Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land described Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court in civil
in original certificate of title No. 3484; that before Pilar case No. 161 by awarding damages to him. There is no
Belmonte sold parts of her undivided share in the parcel merit, therefore, in the second assignment of error.
of land to Isidoro M. Mercado and Dominador Asuncion
and the last in turn sold his part to Zacarias Belmonte, In the third assignment of error the appellant contends
there was notice of lis pendens recorded on the that the trial court "erred in declaring that the "product
certificate of title; and that this notice is binding upon all raised in the portion under the occupancy of Isidoro
who should acquire an interest in the property Mercado, therefore, pertains to him and was not subject
subsequent to the record of the lis pendens. The notice to the levy or execution in favor of Leon C. Viardo in Civil
of lis pendens (Exhibit A), however, was limited to one- Case No. 161." In support of this assignment the
half interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo from Pilar appellant again harps on the fact that the time Isidoro
Belmonte. The other one-half undivided interest of the Mercado acquired an interest in the property, there was
latter was not in litigation and therefore the trial court notice of lis pendens, and therefore Isidoro Mercado "is
correctly held that Pilar Belmonte, as the owner of this not a purchaser in good faith."
undivided one-half interest, had a right to sell it and
could convey absolute title thereto or to parts thereof. Of This contention has been overruled in the first
course, the deeds of sale executed by Pilar Belmonte assignment of error when the notice of lis
appears to convey definite or segregated parts of her pendens (Exhibits A and F) was held to refer not to the
remaining interest in the parcel of land described in remaining one-eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte in the
original certificate of title No. 3484, which she could not parcel of land described in original certificate of title No.
do, because this one-fourth in interest had not yet been 3484, but to the one-eighth interest which Leon C.
subdivided to show the interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo had acquired from Pilar Belmonte, and which the
Viardo, amounting to one-half of the said one-fourth latter was trying to recover from him in civil case No.
interest. This defect, however, does not result in the 161. It was Pilar Belmonte who caused the notice of lis
nullity of the deeds of sale she had executed relating to pendens to be recorded to subject "all the rights,
her remaining interest of one-eighth. The sales were interests and participation of Leon C. Viardo in this Title"
valid, subject only to the condition that the interests to the result of the litigation in the aforesaid civil case
acquired by the vendees were limited to the parts which No. 161. Pilar Belmonte did not thereby subject her
might be assigned to them in the division upon the remaining one-eighth interest to the result of civil case
termination of the co-ownership (Article 493, Civil Code). No. 161 which she had filed against Leon C. Viardo. If
the latter wanted to subject the remaining one-eighth
In the second assignment of error the appellant interest of Pilar Belmonte to the outcome of his
contends that the trial court "erred in not annulling the counterclaim in civil case No. 161, he should have asked
sales executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of her for it.
daughters Joaquina and Patricia Driz of lots 1-B and 1-
A, Exhibits U and V of Plan PSD 36340." The view held by this Court in passing upon the third
assignment of error renders it unnecessary for the Court
Lots 1-B and 1-A of Plan PSD-36340 are taken, not from to discuss the respective rights and liabilities of co-
the original one-fourth interest of Pilar Belmonte in the owners when one co-owner, without the knowledge
parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. and/or consent of the other co-owners, plants or builds
3484, which interest was levied upon and thereafter on the property owned in common.
acquired by Leon C. Viardo to the extent of one-half, but
from another one-fourth interest in the same parcel of The appellant further contends that the trial court erred
land, which belonged originally to Ines de Guzman, the "in concluding that the heirs of Bartolome Driz could not
mother of Pilar Belmonte. This one-fourth interest be held personally liable for the judgment rendered
subsequently devolved upon Pilar Belmonte and her two against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 161 and therefore
sisters. The three sisters partitioned this one-fourth Lots 1-A and 1-B cannot be subject to the payment of
interest among themselves and lots 1-A and 1-B were the judgment in favor of Leon C. Viardo."
assigned to Pilar Belmonte who, in turn, sold them to her
daughters. These sales, the appellant contends, are
fictitious and in fraud of his rights as creditor. The only ground of appellant for this contention is that
the present owners of these lots are the children of the
spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the
The only evidence adduced by the appellant in support plaintiffs in civil case No. 161, and that, upon the death
of this contention is that the sales were made by the of Bartolome Driz during the pendency of the appeal in
mother to her daughters. This is not enough evidence to civil case No. 161, these children were substituted as
hold the sale fictitious and fraudulent. There is no parties. This assignment of error is without merit. The
evidence whatsoever that Pilar Belmonte, at the time substitution of parties was made obviously because the
she sold the lots, had outstanding debts or was in an children of Bartolome Driz are his legal heirs and
otherwise embarrasing financial position. Even the credit therefore could properly represent and protect whatever
of Leon C. Viardo, the appellant, was established only interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a
after the sales were executed, when the Court of substitution did not and cannot have the effect of making
these substituted parties personally liable for whatever Plan PSD-36340, containing an area of 20,000 and
judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their 55,152 sq. meters, respectively, dated 9 September
deceased father. Article 774 of the Civil Code 1954, Exhibits R and A; and (5) sale in favor of her
provides: daughter Patricia Driz of lot 1-E; Plan PSD-36340,
containing an area of 79,848 sq. meters, dated 11
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of September 1954, Exhibits S and A.
which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a It will thus be seen that on 9 March 1949, after Pilar
person are transmitted through his death to Belmonte had sold seven hectares to Dominador
another or others either by his will or by Asuncion, she had only one-half hectare left to dispose
operation of law. (Emphasis supplied.) of, since out of her original thirty hectares (Lot 1-A, PSD-
16864) the appellant Leon C. Viardo had acquired one-
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy half or fifteen hectares, Isidoro Mercado, seven and one-
of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor, was to proceed against half hectares, and Dominador Asuncion, seven hectares.
the estate of Bartolome Driz.
Fully aware that one-half hectare remained her only
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome property, Pilar Belmonte nevertheless proceeded to sell
Driz was only a formal party to civil case No. 161, the to her daughter Patricia Driz three lots containing a
real party in interest being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The combined area of more than fifteen hectares. It is
subject matter in litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest obvious, therefore, that the sales to Patricia Driz cannot
in the parcel of land described in original certificate of be sustained, regardless of whether Pilar Belmonte was
title No. 3484, which appears to be paraphernal aware or suspected that she would be held liable for
property. damages to Leon C. Viardo in civil case No. 161, as in
fact she was held liable by the Court of Appeals about
two weeks after she had executed the sales in favor of
The appellant's fifth and last assignment of error is that
her daughter. The sales above referred to stand on a
"the trial court erred in not awarding damages to the
different footing from the sales made in favor of Isidoro
plaintiff Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 2004."
Mercado and Dominador Asuncion, because in the latter
Obviously the appellant refers to the prayer in his
sales Pilar Belmonte still had something to sell, namely,
complaint that P5,000 be awarded to him against Pilar
her remaining fifteen hectares. But after she had
Belmonte for attorney's fees. He maintains that appellee
disposed of fourteen and one-half hectares to Mercado
Pilar Belmonte had disposed of all her property with the
and Asuncion she had only one-half hectare left and
intent of avoiding payment of her liability or debt to him.
therefore could not sell another fifteen hectares.
A review of the record lends credence to the appellant's
The trial court, however, did not completely annul the
claim. Appellee Pilar Belmonte had one-fourth interest in
sales made by Pilar Belmonte in favor of her daughter. It
a parcel of land containing an area of 119.2775
merely reduced the sale of fifteen hectares to a sale of
hectares. On 12 May 1943 Leon C. Viardo acquired one-
one-half hectare, obviously in the belief that the sales
half interest of Pilar Belmonte's one-fourth interest. In a
should be sustained to the extent of Pilar Belmonte's
partition, where the appellant did not participate but
remaining interest. The record shows that both Pilar
which he does not impugn, Pilar Belmonte's original one-
Belmonte and her daughter Patricia Driz knew that one-
fourth interest was segregated and delimited. She was
half hectare only remained as the former's property, but
assigned in that partition and subdivision, Lot 1-A of Plan
they nevertheless proceeded to sell and purchase more
PSD-16864, containing an area of 30 hectares (Exhibit
than fifteen hectares. When it is considered further that
K). Upon the death of her mother, she acquired another
the final judgment in civil case No. 161 awarded
13.2775 hectares. These 13.2775 hectares she sold to
damages to Leon C. Viardo amounting to 225 cavans of
her two daughters and the validity of the sales has been
palay from 1946 (Exhibit H) and that when this judgment
upheld by this Court. With the original 30 hectares,
was executed in 1954 no property of Pilar Belmonte
however, Pilar Belmonte did not act in good faith when
could be found to satisfy the damages (p. 11, t.s.n.), it is
she sold more than 15 hectares to her daughter Patricia
evident that Pilar Belmonte and her daughter Patricia
Driz. Knowing that one-half of said 30 hectares or a total
Driz had conspired to dispose of all the property of Pilar
of 15 hectares belonged to the appellant Leon C. Viardo,
Belmonte in order to frustrate any award of damages the
she nevertheless proceeded to enter into the following
Court of Appeals might make in favor of Leon C. Viardo
transactions: (1) sale of seven and one-half hectares to
and that this conspiracy must have taken place at the
Isidoro Mercado, dated 28 June 1948, Exhibit A; (2) sale
latest on 9 September 1954 when Pilar Belmonte
of seven hectares to Dominador Asuncion, who later
proceeded to sell to her daughter Patricia Driz parcels of
sold the same parcel or interest to Zacarias Belmonte,
land which no longer belonged to her.
dated 9 March 1949, Exhibit A; (3) subdivision and
partition of her lot 1-A, PSD-16864, into lots 1-E, 1-F, 1-
G, 1-H and 1-I, without the knowledge of her co-owner The judgment appealed from is modified by holding and
Leon C. Viardo, Plan PSD-36340, Exhibit O; (4) sale in declaring that (1) Leon C. Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado,
favor of her daughter Patricia Driz of lots 1-H and 1-I, Zacarias Belmonte and Pilar Belmonte (not Patricia Driz)
are the co-owners pro-indiviso of lot 1-A, Plan PSD- Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as
16864, which is the one-fourth share of Pilar Belmonte in his heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario,
lot 1, PSD-14371, original certificate of title No. 3484, in Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto.
the following proportion: one-half or fifteen hectares
owned by Leon C. Viardo, seven and one-half hectares Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938
by Isidoro M. Mercado, seven hectares by Zacarias leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria Tuiza.
Belmonte, and one-half hectares by Pilar Belmonte,
subject to the rights of Leon C. Viardo to the balance of La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving
his judgment credit against Pilar Belmonte; and (2) Leon the following heirs, namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo,
C. Viardo is awarded damages of P1,000 against Pilar Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.
Belmonte. In all other respects, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with costs against appellees Pilar
Belmonte and Patricia Driz. Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as
his heir herein plaintiff Josefina Moreto.
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in
PAMPLONA and APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners, Calamba, Laguna.
vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO
MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the
ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto,
MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased
VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal
MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents. partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected,
executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to
defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale
E.P. Caguioa for petitioners. (Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed
of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495
Benjamin C. Yatco for respondents. as having an area of 781 square meters and covered by
transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name
of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega,
although the lot was acquired during their marriage. As a
GUERRERO, J.: result of the sale, the said certificate of title was
cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title No. T-
5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the
married to Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-
R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-Appellees vs.
Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of (Exh. "1"), the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Laguna, Branch I at Biñan. Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern
part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the
sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show
Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael
that:
Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona
and Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot.
and wife. During their marriage, they acquired adjacent The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano
lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781
Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing square meters which was the subject matter of their sale
781-544 and 1,021 square meters respectively and transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears
covered by certificates of title issued in the name of to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1")
"Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega." although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of
by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega
begot during their marriage six (6) children, namely, From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona
Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all and Apolonio Onte enlarged their house and they even
surnamed Moreto. constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said
house about one and one-half meters from the eastern defendants are declared lawful owners
boundary of lot 1496. and entitled to its possession.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In After proper survey segregating the
1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to eastern one-half portion with an area of
vacate the premises where they had their house and 390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the
piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right defendants shall be entitled to a
to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as certificate of title covering said portion
the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843
and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead of the office of the Register of Deeds of
when the sale was executed without the consent of the Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly
plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses and new titles issued to the plaintiffs and
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to to the defendants covering their
vacate the premises occupied by them and hence, this respective portions.
suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega
seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of
sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as regards one- the office of the Register of Deeds of
half of the property subject matter of said deed; to Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and
declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other registered in the name of Cornelio
half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one- Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, is
half portion thereof sold to the defendants. "After by virtue of this decision ordered
payment of the other half of the purchase price"; to order cancelled. The defendants are ordered
the defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; to surrender to the office of the Register
to order the defendants to pay actual and moral of Deeds of Laguna the owner's
damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order the duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title
defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August No. 5671 within thirty (30) days after this
1958 until they have vacated the premises occupied by decision shall have become final for
them for the use and occupancy of the same. cancellation in accordance with this
decision.
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano
Moreto in their favor is valid as the lot sold is registered Let copy of this decision be furnished
in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers the Register of Deeds for the province of
believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole Laguna for his information and
owner of the lot sold. guidance.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by With costs against the defendants. 2
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or
obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on or
sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena wit:
Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years
1985 up to the filing of the complaint (1985) as For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
demands for compliance. before December of crop year 1988-89;
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the before December of crop year 1989-90;
property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
of sugar per crop year to herein private HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
respondent. before December of crop year 1990-91; and
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the before December of crop year 1991-92."5
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a
new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid
of the late Aleja Belleza. Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery
of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop
year 1988 -1989.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were
declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of
Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out
Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly. with a decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing
as follows:
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings,
the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as no
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose
respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-
herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and performance of the command as mandated exaction
acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at from them simply because they are the children of Jorge
an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question,
of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The
piculs of sugar, to the following effect: remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the
category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to
Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to
later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit: give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the
Codicil.
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then
existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint
Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.
crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is
considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and SO ORDERED."6
in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in
the next succeeding crop years.
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court;
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, ratiocinating and ordering thus:
1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash
equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein
and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into "Therefore, the evidence on record having established
plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar
annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants- The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to
appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from
heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the
amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants- dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity
appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The
since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a
both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition
1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that
case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper the private respondent had a legally demandable right
to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on
the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance
Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute with law.
separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate,
secure the appointment of an administrator, and It is a general rule under the law on succession that
distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called
to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children
of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies. and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents,
and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. 11 Thus,
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory
and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of
1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate further proceedings, and the successional rights were
of Aleja Belleza. transmitted to them from the moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
SO ORDERED."7
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
Appeals, petitioner found his way to this Court via the person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of
erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 the time of his death. And since obligations not
of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code. Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee. The relationship between the children of the first
marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant. several court suits and counter-suits; including the three
cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending
determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa
L-28611
Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter
of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations,
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee. a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de
defendant-appellant. Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and
conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal
by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special AGREEMENT
administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de
Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by THIS AGREEMENT made and entered
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its into by and between
Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate
of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator". The heir and son of Francisco de Borja
by his first marriage, namely, Jose de
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja personally and as administrator of
Borja from the disapproval of the same compromise the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, AND
"Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda.
de de Borja, Special Administratrix". The heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of First Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, Panaguiton Jr.
declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the
main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as WITNESSETH
the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco
de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the
his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda
parties herein terminate and settle, with
pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under
finality, the various court litigations,
administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court
controversies, claims, counterclaims,
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
etc., between them in connection with
the administration, settlement, partition,
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death adjudication and distribution of the
of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a assets as well as liabilities of the estates
petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2
Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de 3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja. Borja hereby assumes payment of that
particular obligation incurred by the late
THAT with this end in view, the parties Francisco de Borja in favor of the
herein have agreed voluntarily and Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
without any reservations to enter into Development Bank of the Philippines,
and execute this agreement under the amounting to approximately P30,000.00
following terms and conditions: and also assumes payment of her 1/5
share of the Estate and Inheritance
taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco
1. That the parties agree to sell the
de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more
Poblacion portion of the Jalajala
or less, which shall be deducted by the
properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal,
buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the
presently under administration in the
payment to be made to Tasiana
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp.
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under
Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically
paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid
described as follows:
directly to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs-children of
Linda al Norte con el Francisco de Borja.
Rio Puwang que la
separa de la jurisdiccion
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala
del Municipio de Pililla
"Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay
de la Provincia de Rizal,
directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
y con el pico del Monte
de Borja the balance of the payment
Zambrano; al Oeste con
due her under paragraph 2 of this
Laguna de Bay; por el
Agreement (approximately
Sur con los herederos
P766,500.00) and issue in the name of
de Marcelo de Borja; y
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
por el Este con los
corresponding certified checks/treasury
terrenos de la Familia
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the
Maronilla
corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
with a segregated area of approximately
5. In consideration of above payment to
1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
per square meter.
Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco
obligates himself to pay Tasiana Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total their heirs, successors, executors,
amount of Eight Hundred Thousand administrators, and assigns, hereby
Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, forever mutually renounce, withdraw,
in cash, which represent P200,000 as waive, remise, release and discharge
his share in the payment and P600,000 any and all manner of action or actions,
as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, cause or causes of action, suits, debts,
Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de sum or sums of money, accounts,
Borja and this shall be considered as full damages, claims and demands
and complete payment and settlement whatsoever, in law or in equity, which
of her hereditary share in the estate of they ever had, or now have or may have
the late Francisco de Borja as well as against each other, more specifically Sp.
the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-
No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva
7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva
properties bequeathed or devised in her Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI,
favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Rizal, as well as the case filed against
Last Will and Testament or by Donation Manuel Quijal for perjury with the
Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention
purportedly conveyed to her for being to completely, absolutely and
consideration or otherwise. The funds finally release each other, their heirs,
for this payment shall be taken from and successors, and assigns, from any and
shall depend upon the receipt of full all liability, arising wholly or partially,
payment of the proceeds of the sale of directly or indirectly, from the
Jalajala, "Poblacion." administration, settlement, and
distribution of the assets as well as In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October
liabilities of the estates of Francisco de 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of
Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs.
Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly the view that the presentation of a will for probate is
and specifically renounce absolutely her mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an
rights as heir over any hereditary share estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a
in the estate of Francisco de Borja. will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise
pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions
Borja, upon receipt of the payment the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's
under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that
to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs
titles and documents belonging to are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
Francisco de Borja which are in her judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of
possession and said heir Jose de Borja Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva
shall issue in turn the corresponding Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963
receive thereof. agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued,
bar the validity of the agreement.
7. That this agreement shall take effect
only upon the fulfillment of the sale of Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the
the properties mentioned under compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at
paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the
receipt of the total and full payment of governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the
the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the
property "Poblacion", otherwise, the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased
non-fulfillment of the said sale will person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He
render this instrument NULL AND VOID also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran,
AND WITHOUT EFFECT in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was
THEREAFTER. expressed the view that if the parties have already
divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will,
the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties
have divided the estate in a different manner, the
hereto have her unto set their hands in
probate of the will is worse than useless.
the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th
of October, 1963.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not
applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court
examination of the terms of the agreement between
approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court
Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of
of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-
said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of
7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First
P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —
Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832.
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both
instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise shall be considered as full — complete
agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void payment — settlement of her hereditary
and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana share in the estate of the late Francisco
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L- Tangco, ... and to any properties
28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the bequeathed or devised in her favor by
order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. and Testament or by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly
conveyed to her for consideration or
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised
otherwise.
agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its
validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco
on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in
kind of agreement without first probating the will of the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar.
Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the
compromise on the validity of the marriage between estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto
Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that before the probate of his will. The clear object of the
even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana
effect. Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de resolutory period of 60 days for its
Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to effectiveness. In support of such
any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a contention, it is averred that such a limit
hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or was expressly stipulated in an
vested immediately from the moment of the death of agreement in similar terms entered into
such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of by said Ongsingco with the brothers and
the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto,
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de
of her or his hereditary share immediately after such Borja, except that the consideration was
death, even if the actual extent of such share is not fixed at P600,000 (Opposition,
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39-
estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be 46) and which contained the following
deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the clause:
vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the
contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; III. That this agreement shall take effect
neither does the coetaneous agreement that the only upon the consummation of the sale
numerous litigations between the parties (the approving of the property mentioned herein and
order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, upon receipt of the total and full
Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and payment of the proceeds of the sale by
should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted the herein owner heirs-children of
by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto,
compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de
only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said
property mentioned herein is
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the consummated, or the non-receipt of the
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana purchase price thereof by the said
Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et owners within the period of sixty (60)
seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring days from the date hereof, this
unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional agreement will become null and void
interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last and of no further effect.
will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is
probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this
analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja. not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the
day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered while signed by the parties, it was not notarized,
into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the
the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A),
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco,
transaction was binding on both in their individual P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs
capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja"
without previous authority of the Court to enter into the which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000
same. The only difference between an extrajudicial recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that
compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja
the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to
proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the absorb and supersede the separate unformalize
point: agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the
60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply
the parties the effect and authority of res to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is
judicata; but there shall be no execution moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the
except in compliance with a judicial Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days
compromise. from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-
heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as
improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that
(Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to
while the agreement Annex A expressed
be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the
no definite period for its performance,
estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until
the same was intended to have a
authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of
compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed amicable
finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying settlement "had failed to materialize".
out by the parties for the terms of the contract.
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance settlement referred to in the order and motion above-
of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13
with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana October 1963, which already had been formally signed
Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What
Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she the record discloses is that some time after its
was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to
object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of back out from the compromise agreement, pleading
First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's
irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840,
was only her eventual share in the estate of her late page 23): that the same was invalid because of the
husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60
that eventual share she owned from the time of days and because the contract was not preceded by the
Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this
bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A"
share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as
whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which
recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the objections have been already discussed. It was natural
present Civil Code: that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should
attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell agreement before seeking judicial sanction and
his hereditary rights to a stranger before enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy.
may be subrogated to the rights of the That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is
purchaser by reimbursing him for the apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose
price of the sale, provided they do so de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant
within the period of one month from the Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than
time they were notified in writing of the probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the
sale of the vendor. motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the
parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But
the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger,
the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act
then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be
of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its
forbidden.
approval and enforcement from the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described,
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed
Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under
a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late appeal.
Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the
very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in
Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and
accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should be
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is
Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is
nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that
this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time
spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in
consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights. that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of
P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala
property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as
receiving the payment of the agreed price for her
by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order
hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to
of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832
nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally
(Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that
entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney
the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex
Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our
"A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that,
currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-
after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva
24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would
Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared
never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with
that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the
every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and
and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption
the present case. established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code
(reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889), to
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is the effect that:
whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his Art. 160. All property of the marriage is
marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the presumed to belong to the conjugal
husband's private property (as contended by his second partnership, unless it be proved that it
spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. the wife.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio
Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for
evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well
conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil as for attorney's fees.
Code.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge
We are of the opinion that this question as between Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced
Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and
and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this declared the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the
Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja,
upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja,
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja
Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the then appealed to this Court.
accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the
parties. But as the question may affect the rights of The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits,
possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still that the character of the Hacienda in question as owned
imperative. by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was
solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that,
4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired jointly by as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa
Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of
Borja and their title thereto was duly registered in their the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953
names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of
of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De the same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid
Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de
Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa
Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7
section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property
proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja among the "Conjugal Properties of the Spouses
(V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932). Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more,
Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as — Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she
Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal
Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja
Laguna de Bay; containing an area of and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the
13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased
assessed at P297,410. (Record on Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the
Appeal, pages 7 and 105) Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de fact that they are plain admissions against interest made
Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his
of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal
his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal
(Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the
Hacienda above described declared exclusive private Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala
property of Francisco, while in his answer defendant (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the private
(now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did
so on the strength of the following evidences: (a) the the statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de
sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951 Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In
(Exhibit "F") that — addition, the statement itself is improbable, since there
was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain
He tomado possession del pedazo de to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had
terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of
parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of
terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion Gregorio's testimony.
de Jalajala, Rizal).
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly
Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo
bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the
amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4)
and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala
subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m.,
realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of
Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de
be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the
proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In
the back taxes and said that the amount would represent addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi
Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and
The witness further testified that — not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
Marcelo de Borja said that that money It may be true that the inventories relied upon by
was entrusted to him by Francisco de defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are
Borja when he was still a bachelor and not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property
which he derived from his business in question; but as already noted, they are clear
transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, admissions against the pecuniary interest of the
t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied) declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow,
Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater
probative weight than the self-serving statement of
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's
Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in
sworn statement overweighed the admissions in the
favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de
inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de
Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been
Borja since probate courts can not finally determine
rebutted but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the
questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that
appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de
the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that
Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal
Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original
partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that
share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership
property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant No error having been assigned against the ruling of the
to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article lower court that claims for damages should be ventilated
148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines. in the corresponding special proceedings for the
settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same
requires no pro announcement from this Court.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040
xxx xxx xxx
is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-
28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs
(4) That which is purchased with against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja
exclusive money of the wife or of the in all three (3) cases.
husband.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May Vito Borromeo
28, 1960, after due trial, the probate court held that the
document presented as the will of the deceased was a
forgery. Paulo Borromeo
On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court Anecita Borromeo
disallowing the probate of the will was affirmed
in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et Quirino Borromeo and
al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656).
Julian Borromeo
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate
proceedings. Several parties came before the court filing 2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952,
claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the without any issue, and all his brothers and sisters
intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. predeceased him.
The following petitions or claims were filed: 3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the
following children:
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma.
Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed a petition a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939
for declaration of heirs and determination of
heirship. There was no opposition filed against b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955,
said petition. or 3 years after the death of Vito Borromeo. He
was married to Remedios Cuenco Borromeo,
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo who died on March 28, 1968. He had an only
also filed a petition for declaration as heir. The
son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of the dd. Jose Borromeo
petitioners herein.
ee. Consuelo Borromeo
c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.
ff. Pilar Borromeo
4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died
ahead of him and left an only daughter, Aurora B. gg. Salud Borromeo
Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the
following children: hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and
1959, leaving the following children:
9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
aa. Federico Borromeo
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate
bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9
Rec. p. 85) groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares
among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.
cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr.
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on
exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement July 7, 1975.
of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito
Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and
order of August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial set aside the trial court's order dated December 24,
court ordered the administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, Jr., 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled
to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo and the July 7,
manner they are divided and partitioned in the said 1975 order, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40% of
the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be The petitioner argues that the trial court had no
segregated. All attorney's fees shall be taken and paid jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of respondent
from this segregated portion. Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim
against the decedent but a claim for properties, real and
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in
who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged will, the decedent's estate, heirs who allegedly waived their
filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be rights in his favor. The claim of the private respondent
declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito under the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner,
Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which is
deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by improper. He alleges that the claim of the private
the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law respondent under the waiver agreement was filed
making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime beyond the time allowed for filing of claims as it was filed
like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged only sometime in 1973, after there had been a
illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of
legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime partition (April 30, 1969), the approval of the agreement
of an acknowledged natural child. of partition and an order directing the administrator to
partition the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was memorandum, the existence of the waiver agreement
already barred by the order of the court dated April 12, was brought out.
1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal
heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court It is further argued by the petitioner that the document
dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973. entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights" executed on July
31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato
the memorandum he submitted to support his motion for Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and
reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his effect because there can be no effective waiver of
claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and hereditary rights before there has been a valid
incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer.
31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make
Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the
Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, person must be certain of the death of the one from
Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance.
Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of
Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs their right to the inheritance until they were declared
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view,
estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article
trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees,
to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation
Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the within thirty days after the court has issued an order for
waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as the distribution of the estate.
it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the
same is void having been executed before the Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand,
distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there
the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before
for lack of subject matter. he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is
required is that he must first be certain of the death of
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court the person from whom he is to inherit and that he must
concluding that the five declared heirs who signed the be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out
waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to that at the time of the signing of the waiver document on
Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document
the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as
Borromeo.
well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the properties, personal and real, including all cash and
waiver document itself. sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator,
as of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court them in any action then pending in the Court of First
to pass upon the validity of the waiver of hereditary Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and
rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that since the concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this
waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that
after the court assumed jurisdiction over the properties the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver
of the estate it partakes of the nature of a partition of the document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
properties of the estate needing approval of the court entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the
because it was executed in the course of the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be
proceedings. lie further maintains that the probate court what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent
loses jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of been otherwise, there would not be any reason for
all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate is Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the
distributed to those entitled to the same. heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to
concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2)
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary
heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they
rights is that "the properties included in an existing
inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third
was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3)
persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed
continue the personality of the former. Nor do such
a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to
properties have the character of future property, because
transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and
the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment
Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B.
of the death of the deceased, by principle established in
Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an
article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code,
intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito
according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by
Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment
the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse
was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968,
from the moment of the death of the deceased until the
the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees
heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property,
in the aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn
but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment
executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the
of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil
heirs-assignors named in the same deed of assignment.
Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion."
Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of
(Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil.,
Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and
531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary
Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato
rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was
Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969.
issued only in 1969.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable
contend that without any formal pleading filed by the settlement conceding to all the eight (8) intestate heirs
lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of the various properties in consideration for the heirs giving to
waiver agreement and without notice to the parties the respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the
concerned, two things which are necessary so that the fourteen (14) contested lots was filed inspite of the fact
lower court would be vested with authority and that on July 31, 1967, some of the heirs had allegedly
jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said waiver already waived or sold their hereditary rights to the
agreement, nevertheless, the lower court set the hearing respondent.
on September 25, 1973 and without asking for the
requisite pleading. This resulted in the issuance of the The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed,
appealed order of December 24, 1974, which approved the June 29, 1968 deed of assignment, the deed of
the validity of the waiver agreement. The appellants reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation of the
contend that this constitutes an error in the exercise of deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue
jurisdiction. against the purported waiver of hereditary rights.
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already
waiving their hereditary rights in favor of Fortunato stated in G.R. No. 41171 that the trial court acquired
Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document tacitly jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver
and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by virtue of agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction extends
the same act, they lost their rights because the rights to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
from that moment on became vested in Fortunato recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
Borromeo. estate.
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be
declared as heir first before he can accept or repudiate G.R. No. 62895
an inheritance. What is required is that he is certain of
the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M.
of his right to the inheritance. At the time of the signing of Sesbreno, representative of some of the heirs-
the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to distributees, praying for the immediate closure of Special
the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion dated May 29,
was already dead and they were also certain of their 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions
right to the inheritance as shown by the waiver were grounded on the fact that there was nothing more
document itself. to be done after the payment of all the obligations of the
estate since the order of partition and distribution had 2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring
long become final. Fortunato Borromeo as beneficiary of the 5/9 of
the estate because of the waiver agreement
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos signed by the heirs representing the 5/9 group
failed or refused to resolve the aforesaid motions, which is still pending resolution by this Court
petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a petition for (G.R. No. 4117 1);
mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the
respondent judge to terminate and close Special 3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco
Proceedings No. 916-R. Borromeo to render his accounting; and
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was 4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the
due to pending motions to compel the petitioner, as co- estate causing annotations of notices of lis
administrator, to submit an inventory of the real pendens on the different titles of the properties
properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash in of the estate.
his hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and that
mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of a Since there are still real properties of the estate that
discretionary function, the appellate court denied the were not vet distributed to some of the declared heirs,
petition on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the pending
reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court in its
Hence, this petition. resolution of June 15, 1983, required the judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, to expedite
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R and
respondent judge on the motion filed on April 28, 1972 ordered the co-administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to
for the closure of the administration proceeding cannot submit an inventory of real properties of the estate and
be justified by the filing of the motion for inventory and to render an accounting of cash and bank deposits
accounting because the latter motion was filed only on realized from rents of several properties.
March 2, 1979. He claimed that under the then
Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R.
decide or resolve a case or matter within three months No. 65995.
from the date of its submission.
Considering the pronouncements stated in:
The respondents contend that the motion to close the
administration had already been resolved when the 1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting
respondent judge cancelled all settings of all incidents aside the Order of the trial court dated
previously set in his court in an order dated June 4, December 24, 1974;
1979, pursuant to the resolution and restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining him to maintain
status quo on the case. 2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for
review seeking to modify the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P.
the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate
Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the of Vito Borromeo and ordering the remand of the
properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was case to the Executive,Judge of the Regional trial
approved by the trial court, in its order dated August 15, Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and
1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the
administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the
properties of the deceased in the way and manner they 3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to
are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of restrain the respondents from further acting on
Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market any and all incidents in Special proceedings No.
value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be 916-11 because of the affirmation of the decision
segregated and reserved for attorney's fees. of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No.
63818.
According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco
Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197, Rollo, G. R. No. the trial court may now terminate and close Special
41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine (9) Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an
declared heirs the properties due to the following inventory of the real properties of the estate and an
circumstances: accounting of the call and bank deposits of the petitioner,
as co-administrator of the estate, if he has not vet done
so, as required by this Court in its Resolution dated June
1. The court's determination of the market value 15, 1983. This must be effected with all deliberate
of the estate in order to segregate the 40% speed.
reserved for attorney's fees;
G.R. No. 63818 a pattern of harassment has become apparent
against the herein movants, especially Jose
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo Cuenco Borromeo. Among the harassments
and Petra 0. Borromeo filed a motion for inhibition in the employed by Atty Antigua et al. are the pending
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, presided motions for the removal of administrator Jose
over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge Cuenco Borromeo, the subpoena duces
from further acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. tecum issued to the bank which seeks to invade
'The movants alleged, among others, the following: into the privacy of the personal account of Jose
Cuenco Borromeo, and the other matters
mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More
xxx xxx xxx
harassment motions are expected until the
herein movants shall finally yield to the proposed
6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. sale. In such a situation, the herein movants beg
Antigua filed a motion for the production of the for an entirely independent and impartial judge
certificates of title and to deposit the same with to pass upon the merits of said incidents.
the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for the
ready inspection of interested buyers. Said
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to
motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its
sit and take cognizance of this proceeding,
order of October 2, 1978 which, however,
including the incidents above-mentioned, he is
became the subject of various motions for
liable to be misunderstood as being biased in
reconsideration from heirs-distributees who
favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced
contended that as owners they cannot be
against the herein movants. Incidents which may
deprived of their titles for the flimsy reasons
create this impression need not be enumerated
advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the
herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)
motions for reconsideration, Atty Antigua
ultimately withdraw his motions for production of
titles. The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco
P. Burgos. Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the private respondents filed a petition for
7. The incident concerning the production of
certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction
titles triggered another incident involving Atty.
before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of
herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and
Amelinda B. Talam In connection with said In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged,
incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which among others, the following:
the tion. presiding, Judge Considered direct
contempt because among others, Atty. Sesbreno xxx xxx xxx
insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands
to receive "fat commission" from the sale of the 16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the
entire property. Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno was necessity of having to state herein that
seriously in danger of being declared in respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown
contempt of court with the dim prospect of undue interest in pursing the sale initiated by
suspension from the practice of his profession. Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al. Significantly, a
But obviously to extricate himself from the brother of respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos
prospect of contempt and suspension. Atty. is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
Sesbreno chose rapproachment and ultimately
joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et al., who, 17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire
together, continued to harass administrator properties of the estate cannot be legally done
without the conformity of the heirs-distributees
xxx xxx xxx because the certificates of title are already
registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of the
9. The herein movants are informed and so they agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P.
allege, that a brother of the Hon. Presiding Burgos urged the heirs-distributees to sell the
Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. entire property based on the rationale that
Antigua. proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn
interest more than the present income of the so
10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween called estate. Most of the heirs-distributees,
Atty. Antigua, et al. who are agitating for the sale however. have been petitioner timid to say their
of the entire estate or to buy out the individual piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose
heirs, on the one hand, and the herein movants, Cuenco Borromeo have had the courage to
on the other, who are not willing to sell their stand up and refuse the proposal to sell clearly
distributive shares under the terms and favored by respondent Hon. Francisco P.
conditions presently proposed. In this tug of war, Burgos.
xxx xxx xxx to retire from the Regional Trial Court of Cebu sometime
before the latest reorganization of the judiciary. However,
20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein we decide the petition on its merits for the guidance of
the merits of the shotgun motion of Atty. the judge to whom this case will be reassigned and
Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents others concerned.
now pending in the court below which smack of
harassment against the herein petitioners. For, The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco
regardless of the merits of said incidents, Borromeo has been harassed. They contend that Judge
petitioners respectfully contend that it is highly Burgos has benn shown unusual interest in the
improper for respondent Hon. Francisco P. proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in
Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No. favor of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that this
916-R by reason of the following circumstances: disinterest is shown by the judge's order of March 2,
1979 assessing the property of the estate at
(a) He has shown undue interest in the P15,000,000.00. They add that he only ordered the
sale of the properties as initiated by Atty. administrator to sell so much of the properties of the
Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is estate to pay the attorney's fees of the lawyers-
married to a brother of respondent. claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos would
have been unreasonable because his orders against the
failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to
(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally
give an accounting and inventory of the estate were all
done without the conformity of the heirs-
affirmed by the appellate court. They claim that the
distributees, and petitioners have openly
respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice
refused the sale, to the great
of the resolution of this Court directing the said judge to
disappointment of respondent.
"expedite the settlement and adjudication of the case" in
G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the
(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further the
and similar incidents are clearly closing of the administration proceeding as he is the only
intended to harass and embarrass judge who is conversant with the 47 volumes of the
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo in records of the case.
order to pressure him into acceding to
the proposed sale.
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he
had been harassed. countered that Judge Burgos
(d) Respondent has shown bias and appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator of the
prejudice against petitioners by failing to estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled
resolve the claim for attorney's fees filed out to make an accounting of what t he was supposed to
by Jose Cuenco Borromeo and the late have received as rentals for the land upon which the
Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims by the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to
other lawyers were resolved by February 1982, inclusive, without mentioning the
respondent after petitioners refused the withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In
proposed sale. (pp. 41-43, Rollo) order to bolster the agitation to sell as proposed by
Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its Barredo, Jr., to a series of conferences from February 26
decision granting the petition for certiorari and/or to 28, 1979. During the conferences, Atty. Antonio
prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P. Burgos Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the shares of the heirs-
from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings distributees presumably to cover up the projected sale
No. 916-R. The court also ordered the transmission of initiated by Atty. Antigua.
the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling. On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a
motion was filed by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be required to file
by the appellate court on April 11, 1983. Hence, the an inventory when he has already filed one to account
present petition for review seeking to modify the decision for cash, a report on which the administrators had
of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it already rendered: and to appear and be examined under
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge Burgos lt was
further hearing the case of Intestate Estate of Vito also prayed that subpoena duces tecum be issued for
Borromeo and orders the remand of the case to the the appearance of the Manager of the Consolidated
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for Bank and Trust Co., bringing all the bank records in the
re-raffling. name of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his wife as
well as the appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda
The principal issue in this case has become moot and Borromeo Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana
academic because Judge Francisco P. Burgos decided Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of
Domingo Antigua, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request from sitting in a litigation, but when
for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to the circumstances appear that will induce doubt to
Manager of Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; his honest actuations and probity in favor or of
Register of Deeds of Cebu City; Register of Deeds for either partly or incite such state of mind, he
the Province of Cebu and another subpoena duces should conduct a careful self-examination. He
tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo. should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a impaired, "The better course for the Judge under
subpoena duces tecum to the Managert of the bank, the such circumstances is to disqualify himself "That
Register of deeds for the City of Cebu, the Register of way he avoids being misunderstood, his
Deeds for the Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco reputation for probity and objectivity is preserve
Borromeo. ed. what is more important, the Ideal of impartial
administration of justice is lived up to.
On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v.
Villagonzalo in behalf of the heirs of Marcial Borromeo In this case, the fervent distrust of the private
who had a common cause with Atty Barredo, Jr., joined respondents is based on sound reasons. As Earlier
petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for relief stated, however, the petition for review seeking to modify
of the administrator. the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar
as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos
from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for
Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case to
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to private
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court for re-
respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and
raffling should be DENIED for the decision is not only
produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the court
valid but the issue itself has become moot and
presided order by Judge Burgos.
academic.
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a
G.R. No. 65995
subpoena duces tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco
Borromeo to bring and produce the titles in court.
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from
further acting on any and all incidents in Special
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7,
Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this
1979 but on June 14, 1979, before the date of the
petition and No. 63818. They also pray that all acts of
hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying the
the respondents related to the said special proceedings
private respondents' motion for reconsideration and the
after March 1, 1983 when the respondent Judge was
motion to quash the subpoena.1avvphi1
disqualified by the appellate court be declared null and
void and without force and effect whatsoever.
It was further argued by the private respondents that if
,judge Francisco P. Burgos is not inhibited or disqualified
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set
from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there would be a
for hearing all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-
miscarriage of justice Because for the past twelve years,
R, including the reversion from the heirs-distributees to
he had not done anything towards the closure of the
the estate, of the distributed properties already titled in
estate proceedings except to sell the properties of the
their names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the
heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner Domingo L.
pending inhibition case elevated before this Court which
Antigua at 6.7 million pesos while the Intestate Court
is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
had already evaluated it at 15 million pesos.
WHEREFORE, —
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal
the lower court’s doorstep for not hearing petitioners’ standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate
affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for during the pendency of administration proceedings has
recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as three exceptions, the third being when there is no
heirs to bring the suit. appointed administrator such as in this case.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in
heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in upholding the order of the lower court, recourse to this
behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with Court is not warranted.
the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that
(t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The
moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
rights and obligations to the extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death SO ORDERED.
to another or others by his will or by operation of law. 25
The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an Nelson Loyola for Private Respondent.
executor or administrator to represent or to bring
suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit
the heirs from representing the SYLLABUS
deceased. These rules are easily applicable
to cases in which an administrator has
already been appointed. But no rule 1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME;
categorically addresses the situation in PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN,
which special proceedings for the settlement DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR MOTHER.
of an estate have already been instituted, yet — The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
no administrator has been appointed. In such legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of
instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
for the appointment of an administrator; then different from and adverse to that of their mother.
wait further to see if the administrator appointed Petitioners became co-owners of the property not
would care enough to file a suit to protect the because of their mother but through their own right as
rights and the interests of the deceased; and in children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners
the meantime do nothing while the rights and the are not barred in any way from instituting the action to
properties of the decedent are violated or annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
dissipated.
The undisputed facts of the case are as On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No.
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 51203 an Ex-Parte Motion to Dismiss complaint for
failure to prosecute. This was granted by Branch 155
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father through an Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding
died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of petitioner’s pending motion for the issuance of alias
several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila summons to be served upon the other defendants in the
has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, said case. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was
petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty later denied.
Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission
of contract and for damages, and were ordered by On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil
Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order directing Teofista
Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to
herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from
about P70,000 as damages. 1 removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to
surrender to private respondents the owner’s duplicate
The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.
Realty Corporation having become final and executory,
five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals
(worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on a petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of Branch 151
execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986 issued in
respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739.
P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a
certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a
August 1, 1983. Motion for reconsideration of the Order 5 dated
September 24, 1986. In an Order dated June 10, 1987, 6
On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the Branch 155 lifted its previous order of dismissal and
redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory directed the issuance of alias summons.chanrobles law
action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial library : red
Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No.
51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and the Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals
recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of seeking to annul the orders dated February 25, 1985, 7
property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being May 19, 1989 8 and February 26, 1990 9 issued in Civil
strangers to the case decided against their mother, they Case No. 51203 and further ordering respondent Judge
cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The appellate court
parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither rendered its decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive
be levied nor sold on execution. portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to "WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
private respondents a final deed of sale 3 over the granted and the questioned orders dated February 25,
properties. 1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in
Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled, further
On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No.
petitioners filed with Branch 151 a Motion for 51203." 11
Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated October 10, 1984,
claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them Hence, this appeal.
and further informing the Court the filing and pendency
of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil Case No. Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised
51203), which motion however, was by both petitioner and private respondents and the
denied.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint,
We cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction trial court.
ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, Petitioner,
It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on vs.
the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA
selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To COMANDANTE and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO
start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should PANGAN and ELIZABETH PANGAN, Respondents.
have been the subject of the auction sale.
DECISION
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law
applicable at the time of the institution of the case. DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent."cralaw virtua1aw The basic questions to be resolved in this case are: Is a
library waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed
by a future heir while the parents are still living valid? Is
Article 888 further provides:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual an adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on
law library the basis of such waiver likewise valid and effective as to
bind the subsequent owners and hold them liable to the
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants claimant?
consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father
and of the mother. This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assails the December 12, 2003
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the No. 70888.3 Said Decision modified the June 14, 2001
surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw Summary Judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
virtua1aw library of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 by holding
respondents Spouses Bienvenido and Elizabeth Pangan
Article 892 par. 2 likewise (the Pangans) not solidarily liable with the other
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph respondents, Spouses Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the
Diazes) and Reina Comandante (Comandante), to
"If there are two or more legitimate children or petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer). Likewise
descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a assailed is the CA Resolution5 dated September 10,
portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate 2004 which denied petitioner’s as well as respondents
children or descendants."cralaw virtua1aw library Spouses Diaz and Comandante’s respective motions for
reconsideration.
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving
spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The parties’ respective versions of the factual
antecedents are as follows:
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and
auctioned property is different from and adverse to that Version of the Petitioner
of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the
property not because of their mother but through their
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original
own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore,
Complaint6 that on May 7, 1999, the Diazes, as
petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the
represented by their daughter Comandante, through a
action to annul the auction sale to protect their own
Special Power of Attorney (SPA), 7 obtained from him a
interest.
loan of ₱1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage Contract8 by way of second mortgage
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-6604 9 and
dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August
a Promissory Note10 payable within six months or up to
28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and
November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to
Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that
petitioner postdated checks to secure payment of said
portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the
loan.
sale with regard to said portion.chanrobles law library
1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of We note at the outset that the validity of petitioner’s
compulsory heir’s share over an undivided adverse claim should have been determined by the trial
certain parcel of land together with all the court after the petition for cancellation of petitioner’s
improvements found therein x x x as evidenced adverse claim filed by Comandante was consolidated
by Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876.35 This is in consonance
Over A Real Property, executed by REINA D. with Section 70 of PD 1529 which provides:
COMANDANTE (a compulsory/legitimate heir of
Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz), x x x. Section 70. Adverse Claim. – Whoever claims any part
or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
2. That in order to protect my interest over said owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
property as a Recipient/Benefactor, for the registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
registered owners/parents might dispose (of) Decree for registering the same, make a statement in
and/or encumber the same in a fraudulent writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and
manner without my knowledge and consent, for how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number
the owner’s duplicate title was not surrendered of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name
to me, it is petitioned that this Affidavit of of the registered owner, and a description of the land in
Adverse Claim be ANNOTATED at the back of which the right or interest is claimed.
the said title particularly on the original copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
PR-18887 which is on file with the Register of state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at
Deeds of Quezon City. which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall
attest (to) the truth of the foregoing facts and to be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
petition the Honorable Registrar of Deeds, registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation
Quezon City, to annotate this Affidavit of Adverse of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a
Claim at the back of the said title particularly the verified petition therefor by the party in
original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. interest: Provided, however, That after cancellation, no
RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with second adverse claim based on the same ground shall
the said office, so that my interest as be registered by the same claimant.
Recipient/Benefactor of the said property will be
protected especially the registered Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in
owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner might interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance
dispose (of) and/or encumber the same without where the land is situated for the cancellation of the
my knowledge and consent. (Emphasis ours) adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy
hearing upon the question of validity of such adverse
Clearly, petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
solely on the waiver of hereditary interest executed by equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid,
Comandante. This fact cannot be any clearer especially the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in
so when the inscription of his adverse claim at the back any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find
of TCT No. RT-6604 reads as follows: that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it
may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF
its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the
ADVERSE CLAIM - - Executed under oath by PEDRO
claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with
M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming
the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
among others that they have a claim, the interest
(Emphasis ours)
over said property as Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue
Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted We agree with the respondents.
provision, it has been held that the validity or
efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the
determined by the Court upon petition by an interested Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a
party, in which event, the Court shall order the future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized
immediate hearing thereof and make the proper by law. For the inheritance to be considered "future", the
adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is succession must not have been opened at the time of
only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract
registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled.36 upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second
paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites
As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is concur:
bereft of any showing that the trial court conducted any
hearing on the matter. Instead, what the trial court did (1) That the succession has not yet been
was to include this material issue among those for which opened.
it has rendered its summary judgment as shown by the
following portion of the judgment: (2) That the object of the contract forms part of
the inheritance; and,
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim
annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the
RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887, and carried over to object, an expectancy of a right which is purely
defendants-Sps. Pangan’s Title No. N-20909, is not hereditary in nature.38
merely anchored on defendant Reina Comandante’s
"Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property" but also on her being the Attorney-In-Fact of In this case, there is no question that at the time of
the previous registered owners/parents/defendants Sps. execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights
Alfredo and Imelda Diaz about the Real Estate Mortgage and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided),
Contract for a loan of ₱1,118,228.00 which is a blood succession to either of her parent’s properties has not
money of the plaintiff. Moreover, subject Adverse Claim yet been opened since both of them are still living. With
in LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise
invalid and consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue of present considering that the property subject matter of
Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (now Section Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the
70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529). 37 (Emphasis ours) properties that she expect to inherit from her parents
upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as
shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in
It does not escape our attention that the trial court nature.
merely echoed the claim of petitioner that his adverse
claim subject of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not
frivolous, invalid and is consequently registrable. We From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and
likewise lament the apparent lack of effort on the part of petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s
said court to make even a short ratiocination as to how it future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of
came up with said conclusion. In fact, what followed the Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still
above-quoted portion of the summary judgment are Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor.
mere recitals of the arguments raised by petitioner in his
motion for summary judgment. And in the dispositive In Tañedo v. Court of Appeals,39 we invalidated the
portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that contract of sale between Lazaro Tañedo and therein
petitioner’s adverse claim be inscribed at the back of the private respondents since the subject matter thereof was
title of the Pangans. What is worse is that despite this a "one hectare of whatever share the former shall have
glaring defect, the CA manifestly overlooked the matter over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province
even if respondents vigorously raised the same before it. of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac." It constitutes a part of Tañedo’s future
Be that as it may, respondents’ efforts of pointing out this inheritance from his parents, which cannot be the source
flaw, which we find significant, have not gone to naught of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the
as will be hereinafter discussed. parties.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still this case that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed
being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and
petitioner’s adverse claim which was based upon such that same cannot be the source of any right or create
waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any obligation between them for being violative of the
any right or interest over the property. second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioner’s adverse Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary
claim, it is provided in Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is judgment, the pertinent provisions of which are the
necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the following:
registered land adverse to the registered owner and that
it must arise subsequent to registration. Here, as no right Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party
or interest on the subject property flows from seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
Comandante’s invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration after the pleading in answer thereto has been served,
of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioner’s adverse move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
claim is without any basis and must consequently be admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be or any part thereof.
cancelled.
Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim
petitioner, we shall not stop here as the Diazes and is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
Comandante in their Comment40 call our attention to the time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
failure of the CA to pass upon the issue of the propriety admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all
of the issuance by the trial court of the Summary or any part thereof.
Judgment in favor of petitioner despite the fact that they
have raised this issue before the appellate court. They Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion
argue that summary judgment is proper only when there shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time
is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve
action. Thus, where the defendant presented defenses opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least
tendering factual issue which call for presentation of three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the
evidence, as when he specifically denies the material judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
allegations in the complaint, summary judgment cannot pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
be rendered. admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
genuine issues in the case which they claim should have as a matter of law.
precluded the trial court from issuing a summary
judgment in petitioner’s favor. First, the execution of the As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary
SPA in favor of Comandante referred to by petitioner in judgment is a procedural devise resorted to in order to
his complaint was never admitted by the Diazes. They avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.
assert that as such fact is disputed, trial should have When the pleadings on file show that there are no
been conducted to determine the truth of the matter, genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court
same being a genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of
merely took the word of the plaintiff and assumed that summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not in
said document was indeed executed by them. Second, dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case
although Comandante acknowledges that she has a summarily by applying the law to the material facts.
personal obligation with petitioner, she nevertheless, did Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue,
not admit that it was in the amount of ₱1,118,228.00. summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is
Instead, she claims only the amount of ₱500,000.00 or such fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
₱600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
Moreover, the Diazes deny borrowing any money from claim.41
petitioner and neither did the Pangans owe him a single
centavo. Thus, the true amount of the obligation due the
petitioner and how each of the respondents are Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which
responsible for such amount are genuine issues which removes the case from the coverage of summary
need formal presentation of evidence. Lastly, they aver judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties
that the trial court ignored factual and material issues in their pleadings is evident.
such as the lack of probative value of Comandante’s
waiver of hereditary rights as well as of the SPA; the fact Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money
that Comandante signed the mortgage contract and and/or judicial foreclosure on the alleged real estate
promissory note in her personal capacity; and, that all mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered
such documents were prepared by petitioner who acted into by Comandante in behalf of her parents to secure
as a lawyer and the creditor of Comandante at the same payment of a loan amounting to ₱1,118,228.00. To
time. support this claim, petitioner attached to his complaint
(1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by the
Diazes; (2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract pertaining
to the amount of ₱1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory
Note.
Comandante, in her Answer to petitioner’s Amended 2. ) G.R. No. 179859 August 9, 2010
Complaint, assailed the validity and due execution of the
abovementioned documents. She asserted that the IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND
same were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO,
her and that it was petitioner who prepared all of them.
Also, although she admitted owing petitioner, same was MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE
not an absolute admission as she limited herself to an SANTIAGO, Petitioners,
obligation amounting only to ₱600,000.00 inclusive of vs.
charges and interests. She likewise claimed that such ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-
obligation is her personal obligation and not of her RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
parents. CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS
SANTIAGO, Respondents.
The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO,
the SPA authorizing their daughter to mortgage their URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF
property to petitioner as well as having any obligation to CONSOLACION SOCO, Oppositors.
the latter.
DECISION
Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which
require the presentation of evidence. For one, it is CARPIO MORALES, J.:
necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the validity and
due execution of the SPA, the Real Estate Mortgage and
the Promissory Notes because the determination of the Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages—
following equally significant questions depends on them, the first to Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago,
to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner or is the and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife
obligation a purely personal obligation of Comandante? bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of
and, (2) Is the sum of ₱1,118,228.00 as shown in the herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion,
Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Note, the Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
amount which is really due the petitioner?
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas,
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and
summary judgments and may do so only when there is petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago.
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When
the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia
contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed
take the place of trial.42 From the foregoing, it is apparent Santiago.1
that the trial court should have refrained from issuing the
summary judgment but instead proceeded to conduct a After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his
full blown trial of the case. In view of this, the present daughter by the second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar
case should be remanded to the trial court for further filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan 2 a
proceedings and proper disposition according to the petition for the probate of Basilio’s will, docketed as SP
rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch
an abbreviated termination of the case by summary 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
judgment.
The will contained the following provisions, among
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed others:
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 12,
2003 insofar as it excluded the respondents Spouses 4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay
Bienvenido Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan from among INIWAN, IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at
those solidarily liable to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer, IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga nasabing
is AFFIRMED. The inscription of the adverse claim of tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:
petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer on T.C.T. No. N-209049
is hereby ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as its other
xxxx
aspects are concerned, the assailed Decision is SET
ASIDE and VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 for c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. magpapalakad at mamamahala ng balutan na
nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na
nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);
SO ORDERED
e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-
nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay Intervention8 with the probate court, alleging that
sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi Basilio’s second wife was not Irene but a certain Maria
bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilio’s
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at will violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code.9
nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng
apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-
may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Intervention, citing its previous approval of the "Final
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x. Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in Accordance
with the Will."10
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng
pagkain ng hayop ay ipinamamana ko sa aking The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed
asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Zoilo, a complaint for completion of legitime before the Bulacan
Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 562-M-90,11 against the
Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare- heirs of the second and third marriages.
pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20)
taon mula sa araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage
nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni essentially maintained that they were partially preterited
Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping by Basilio’s will because their legitime was
kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang reduced.12 They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory
magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita and appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be
ng mga iyon matapos na ang gugol na conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be required
kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, to submit a fresh accounting of all the incomes of the
pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais properties from the time of Basilio’s death up to the time
ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at of the filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-90.13
pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod
sa yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at
kabutihan. RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for
completion of legitime) in favor of the oppositors-heirs of
the first marriage.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupa’t bahay sa
Lunsod ng Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking
nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court
na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, of Appeals, by Decision of January 25, 2002, 14 annulled
Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang the decision of RTC-Branch 17, holding that the RTC
pare-pareho. Datapwa’t, gaya din ng mga Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in
bigasan, makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng SP No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978 Order approving
hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng the probate of the will constitute res judicata with respect
dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking to Civil Case No. 562-M-90.15 Thus the appellate court
pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar disposed:
at Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita
o ani ng nasabing mga pag-aari matapos WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is
bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga hereby GRANTED. The Decision in Civil Case No. 562-
gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang M-90 is hereby ANNULLED on the ground of res
hahawak ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito. judicata. Let the Decree of Distribution of the Estate of
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)3 Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio SO ORDERED.16 (emphasis in the original; underscoring
and his first wife, were, on their motion, allowed to supplied)
intervene.4
Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the
appellate court’s decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by
petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 155606, which 2) To peacefully surrender possession and
this Court denied.17 The denial became final and administration of subject properties, including
executory on April 9, 2003.18 any and all improvements thereon, to said
legatees.
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-
heirs of the second marriage filed before the probate 3) To render an accounting of their
court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for Termination of administration of said properties and other
Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles properties of the testator under their
in the Names of the Legatees.19 Citing the earlier quoted administration, from death of testator Basilio
portions of Basilio’s will, they alleged that: Santiago on September 16, 1973 up to the
present and until possession and administration
x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject thereof is transferred to said legatees.21
properties should be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar
Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired on September Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the
16, 1993. approval of the Final Accounting, Partition and
Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with the
Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the
Santiago should have ceased as such administrator[s] properties involved, the case had long since been closed
way back on September 16, 1993 and they should have and terminated.22
transferred the above said titles to the named legatees in
the Last Will and Testament of the testator by then. Said The probate court, finding that the properties in question
named legatees in the Last Will and Testament are would be transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and
no[ne] other than the following: Clemente for purposes of administration only, granted
the motion, by Order of September 5, 2003, 23 disposing
xxxx as follows:
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
have also rendered an accounting of their administration Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for
from such death of the testator up to the present or until Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees dated
transfer of said properties and its administration to the October 3, 2000 filed by some heirs of the testator
said legatees. Basilio Santiago xxx is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the administratrix [sic] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Mr.
Clemente Santiago are hereby DIRECTED, as follows:
x x x x20
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that C. IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE
subject properties cannot actually be partitioned until COURT OF APPEALS HELD THAT THERE
after 20 years from the death of the testator Basilio WAS RES JUDICATA; IN C.A.-G.R. CV NO.
Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that something 83094, THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA.
more has to be done after the approval of said Final
Accounting, Partition, and Distribution. The testator II.
Basilio Santiago died on September 16, 1973, hence,
the present action can only be filed after September 16,
1993. Movant’s cause of action accrues only from the "GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
said date and for which no prescription of action has set ALL THE COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION TO
in. REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S ORDER TO
TRANSFER THE MANILA PROPERTY COVERED BY
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the TCT NO. 131004 TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA
present probate proceeding which is continuing in LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA. PILAR, RICARDO,
character, and terminates only after and until the final CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND
distribution or settlement of the whole estate of the CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED
deceased in accordance with the provision of the will of SANTIAGO."29 (emphasis in the original)
the testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978 refers
only to the accounting, partition, and distribution of the
estate of the deceased for the period covering from the The petition lacks merit.
date of the filing of the petition for probate on December
27, 1973 up to August 14, 1978. And in the said August Petitioners’ argument that the decision of the appellate
14, 1978 order it does not terminate the appointment of court in the earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this
Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res judicata to the after 20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the
subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent
present petition for review) fails. would be lifted.
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house
Sections 47 (b) and 47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of and lot in Manila, covered by TCT No. 131044, among
Civil Procedure.30 The first, known as "bar by prior those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs as it would
judgment," proscribes the prosecution of a second action contravene the testator’s intent that no one is to own the
upon the same claim, demand or cause of action already same.1avvphi1
settled in a prior action.31 The second, known as
"conclusiveness of judgment," ordains that issues The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilio’s will
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be
again be raised in any future case between the same transferred in petitioners’ names for administration
parties involving a different cause of action.32 purposes only, and that the property be owned by the
heirs in common, thus:
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find
application in the present case. The final judgment e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na
regarding oppositors’ complaint on the reduction of their nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay
legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi
present petition, which solely tackles the propriety of the bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
termination of administration, accounting and transfer of pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at
titles in the names of the legatees-heirs of the second nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng
and third marriages. There is clearly no similarity of apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay
claim, demand or cause of action between the present may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
petition and G.R. No. 155606. Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling
salita, ang bahay at lupang ito’y walang
While as between the two cases there is identity of magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang
parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" cannot likewise be panahon ng sinomang magnanais sa aking
invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa
only serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on paaralan sa Maynila at katabing mga lunsod x x
oppositors’ supposed preterition and reduction of x x33(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
legitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at the very
least even invoked, in the present petition. But the condition set by the decedent on the property’s
indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. On this
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate
insofar as the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned court, viz:
against the oppositors only. The records reveal,
however, that the oppositors did not appeal the decision For this Court to sustain without qualification,
of the appellate court in this case and were only [petitioners]’s contention, is to go against the provisions
impleaded pro forma parties. of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the
Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20)
appellate court in CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of years x x x x
distribution of the estate of Basilio should remain
undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of
prohibit the interference of the oppositors in the the indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it
distribution of Basilio’s estate and does not pertain to would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-
respondents’ supervening right to demand the ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the
termination of administration, accounting and transfer of Civil Code x x x x34
titles in their names.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate
court granting respondents’ Motion for Termination of Costs against petitioners.
Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles
in the Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary
continuation of the August 14, 1978 Order that approved SO ORDERED.
the accounting, partition and distribution of Basilio’s
estate. As did the appellate court, the Court notes that
the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to become final
pending the whole settlement of the estate. And final
settlement of the estate, in this case, would culminate