Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Crossfield and O'Brien For Plaintiff. Attorney-General Avanceña For Defendant.
Crossfield and O'Brien For Plaintiff. Attorney-General Avanceña For Defendant.
SUPREME COURT upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern
Manila intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said
avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so
EN BANC that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance
and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916 reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without
having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff,
who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
there.
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that,
according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..
parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while
blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
TRENT, J.:
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city
grey matter and brain was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the
of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the
night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse
cause.
was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he
would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general the outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the would
damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.
complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two
months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666,
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed
instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature
that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and
finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes
General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the
Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to
a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of use his money for mathematical calculations.
the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of
P14,741.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's
mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows: having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had
undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the
income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands
efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his
ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building. motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth,
nineteen hundred and thirteen;
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as
a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to
engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and
calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties,
and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended
building." that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in
the courts against the Government, in order that said questions may be decided:
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that Now, therefore,
the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First
the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in
P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision,
the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to
the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, defendant said Government at the same.
because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period
of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not
prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee
or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held
of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable
that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the
for the damages resulting therefrom.
defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which
new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No.
provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can be 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an
adjudicated. act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of
the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of
refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who
the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management
maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the
of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be
damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the
conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its
evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal
agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph
of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's
mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law
father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to
touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and
answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the
employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only
through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the
the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
be presumed to lie with the state. meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance
of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set
forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs
parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the
branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the
the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating
its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely
to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the with the Legislature and not with the courts.
exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain
property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease. Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein
it acts through a special agent(and a special agent, in the sense in which these
words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to
any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who
on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle
laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage
case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a
special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to
the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing
the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second
class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
Republic of the Philippines Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property
SUPREME COURT in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90,
Manila was the private property of plaintiff and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Plaintiff
prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question
FIRST DIVISION consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion
posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that
G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987 defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an answer, raising by way of
vs. affirmative defenses lack of sufficient cause of action and prescription.
PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellants.
On August 29, 1970, the trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered a decision
declaring Lot No. 1, with an area of 701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of the
plaintiff, "being covered by a possessory information title in the name of his predecessor-
in-interest" and declaring said lot excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation. The
YAP, J.:
court declared the rest of the property claimed by plaintiff, i.e. Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted
to the public domain.
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated
April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch
A motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of August 29, 1970 was filed by
VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano
eighty-six (86) settlers, together with the barrio council of Pag-asay, alleging among other
for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-
things that intervenors had been in possession of the land in question for more than
suability of the State.
twenty (20) years under claim of ownership.
The background of the present controversy may be briefly summarized as follows:
On January 25, 1971, the court a quo reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and
directed the intervenors to file their corresponding pleadings and present their evidence;
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First
all evidence already presented were to remain but plaintiff, as well as the Republic of the
Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Philippines, could present additional evidence if they so desire. The plaintiff presented
Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land,
additional evidence on July 30, 1971, and the case was set for hearing for the reception of
consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the intervenors' evidence on August 30 and August 31, 1971.
Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Plaintiff alleged that he
bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated
On August 30, 1971, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for intervenors, the
May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola
latter did not appear but submitted a motion for postponement and resetting of the
had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title
hearing on the next day, August 31, 1971. The trial court denied the motion for
to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon plaintiff's
postponement and allowed plaintiff to offer his evidence "en ausencia," after which the
purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various
case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the following day, August 31, 1971,
improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was
Judge Sison rendered a decision reiterating his decision of August 29, 1970.
approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954; that on November 1, 1954,
President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement
purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation A motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the intervenors. But before this
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and motion was acted upon, plaintiff filed a motion for execution, dated November 18, 1971.
Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land On December 10, 1971, the lower court, this time through Judge Miguel Navarro, issued
an order denying the motion for execution and setting aside the order denying instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This
intervenors' motion for postponement. The case was reopened to allow intervenors to is a fatal defect, 3 and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
present their evidence. Unable to secure a reconsideration of Judge Navarro's order, the
plaintiff went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on a petition for certiorari. Said The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case
petition was, however, denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court, and petitioners was tried before the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now
brought the matter to this Court in G.R. No. 36163, which was denied on May 3, 1973 settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the
Consequently, the case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. proceedings." 4
On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the ground that Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the
the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation " subject to private rights, if any
cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by the plaintiff. there be. " We do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the language of the
Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by
On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued the questioned Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from
order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent moved for reconsideration, suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly.
while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition but must be construed in strictissimi juris. 5Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative
thereto, maintaining that the dismissal was proper on the ground of non-suability of the act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver
State and also on the ground that the existence and/or authenticity of the purported of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
possessory information title of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest had not been
demonstrated and that at any rate, the same is not evidence of title, or if it is, its efficacy Neither is there merit in respondent's submission, which the respondent appellate court
has been lost by prescription and laches. sustained, on the basis of our decision in the Begosa case, 6 that the present action is not
a suit against the State within the rule of State immunity from suit, because plaintiff does
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the Intermediate not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or its funds. It is contended that the
Appellate Court on petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1985, the respondent appellate complaint involves land not owned by the State, but private land belonging to the
court rendered its decision reversing the order of Judge Lising and remanding the case to plaintiff, hence the Government is not being divested of any of its properties. There is
the court a quo for further proceedings. Hence this petition. some sophistry involved in this argument, since the character of the land sought to be
recovered still remains to be established, and the plaintiff's action is directed against the
We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper State precisely to compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the
application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as property. In other words, the plaintiff is out to establish that he is the owner of the land
defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, in question based, incidentally, on an informacion posesoria of dubious value, and he
bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a seeks to establish his claim of ownership by suing the Republic of the Philippines in an
piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam.
action in personam. 1 It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any
judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the The inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish
private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented Mortgage Law was a means provided by the law then in force in the Philippines prior to
by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844. the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States of America, to record a
claimant's actual possession of a piece of land, established through an ex
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the parte proceeding conducted in accordance with prescribed rules. 7 Such inscription
State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that merely furnishes, at best, prima facieevidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding
the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a claim of right as set forth in
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.2 There is no such showing in the his application. 8 The possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership after
the lapse of 20 years (later reduced to 10 years), upon the fulfillment of the requisites
prescribed in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion posesoria held by the
respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. Such possessory information,
therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession. Using this
possessory information, the respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land Act, which is an action in rem. However, having
failed to do so, it is rather late for him to pursue this avenue at this time. Respondent
must also contend, as the records disclose, with the fact admitted by him and stated in
the decision of the Court a quo that settlers have been occupying and cultivating the land
in question since even before the outbreak of the war, which puts in grave doubt his own
claim of possession.
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion
posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September
23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the
duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the
submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof
was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. 10 These
circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion
posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said Republic of the Philippines
document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only 100 SUPREME COURT
hectares," 11 whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 Manila
hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting
"possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as EN BANC
proof of alleged ownership of lands.
G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the appealed
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 30, 1985, and affirming the
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
order of the court a quo, dated August 21, 1980, dismissing the complaint filed by
vs.
respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines. No costs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
SO ORDERED.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch
jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced
a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never received any
jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or report to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not covered between
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the said office, which
breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As is charged with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the
blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the
pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended to, either by
Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel
the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing
the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has
infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to
injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of
private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00. catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete
cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were
Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for damages available.
against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and
chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the
the Court of Appeals, aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing the
amended complaint, without costs.
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a
businessman and a professor at the University of the East. He held responsible On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except
positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the
Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
Packing Corporation. He was also associated with several civic organizations such
as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of
Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days.
Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property
Because of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city
business associates and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance,
under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to
prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila,
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of,
received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P.
or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made,
supervision. for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the
Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration
Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines. thereof.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would
arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under
other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following
cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any legislative powers:
person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other xxx xxx xxx
words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of
the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in (x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues,
road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to
provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in
the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and
Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith. repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same
and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales
the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of
amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for
which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts
complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and
constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public places,
manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other
been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the
as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to
Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel
any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or
changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part
thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and
to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under
their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property
shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and
Republic of the Philippines
Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs
SUPREME COURT
the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces,
Manila
chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their
respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of
said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway EN BANC
funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of
national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985
accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the
supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or GOHIER, petitioners,
special appropriation Acts." vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in
connection with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law for petitioners.
Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not
subject to our review. Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perias & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the City of Manila. It is so ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur. This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge
from trying Civil Case No. 779M of the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between
the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following
projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines. twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain
perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline the trial court.
revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay,
Philippines. The petition is highly impressed with merit.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International
complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the
had accepted its bids because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary
30.) The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
trial stage.] imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States,
the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)
Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific,
Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. The The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said
letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: " A distinction should be
of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at made between a strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its private,
the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the proprietary or non- governmental acts (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also
projects had been awarded to third parties. In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of
the company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the
complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with
projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the approval, viz.:
defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a
parties for work on the projects. contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory
that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. ...
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the xxx xxx xxx
individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign
sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United
action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.) States government, through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a
contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an services within the Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability
the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved
that that political entity may assume under the contract. The trial court, 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United
therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case ... (Rollo, pp. 20-21.) States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover
possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired. They
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.
reasons:
The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff brought suit in the the suit for lack of jurisdiction in the part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila
Court of First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of money on account of a granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs went
contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of
the action. The court granted the motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and
over the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Government of
exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was the United States of America; that any judgment for back or Increased
elevated to this Court for review. rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and
Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U.S. Government.
In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said: On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited,
and on what we have already stated, the present action must be
It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the considered as one against the U.S. Government. It is clear hat the
procedure laid down in Article XXI of the contract regarding the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have
prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or, no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The
stated differently, it has failed to first exhaust its administrative question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very
remedies against said Government, the lower court acted properly in beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not , given its
dismissing this case.(At p. 598.) consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though
not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit
against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from
citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said
suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative
government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
authority.
jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind
this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. (At p. 323.)
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of
In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts
an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis.
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, * Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez,
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part. Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Salazar, for appellant.
Ernesto Zaragoza for appellee.
Hilarion U. Jarencio for the intervenor.
PARAS, C.J.:
The factual antecedents of this case are sufficiently recited in the brief filed by the
intervenor-appellee as follows:
G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954 3. On March 1, 1951, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying the right
of Froilan to the possession of the said vessel; it alleged that the action of the
FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellee, Cabinet on August 25, 1950, restoring Froilan to his rights under his original
vs. contract with the Shipping Commission was null and void; that, in any event,
PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., defendant-appellant, Froilan had not complied with the conditions precedent imposed by the Cabinet
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee. for the restoration of his rights to the vessel under the original contract; that it
suffered damages in the amount of P22,764.59 for wrongful replevin in the
month of February, 1951, and the sum of P17,651.84 a month as damages the Republic of the Philippines. The Board of Liquidators issued an official report
suffered for wrongful replevin from March 1, 1951; it alleged that it had incurred therefor stating that it was a 'deposit pending the issuance of an order of the
necessary and useful expenses on the vessel amounting to P127,057.31 and Court of First Instance of Manila' (Rec. on App. pp. 92-93).
claimed the right to retain said vessel until its useful and necessary expenses had
been reimbursed (Rec. on App. pp. 8-53). 7. On December 7, 1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
brought the matter of said payment and the circumstance surrounding it to the
4. On November 10, 1951, after the leave of the lower court had been obtained, attention of the lower court "in order that they may be taken into account by
the intervenor-appellee, Government of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a this Honorable Court in connection with the questions that are not pending
complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping before it for determination" (Rec. on App. pp. 82-86).
Commission (which name was later changed to Shipping Administration) the
balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in question, the interest 8. On February 3, 1952, the lower court held that the payment by Froilan of the
thereon, and its advances on insurance premium totalling P162,142.95, amount of P162,576.96 on November 29, 1951, to the Board of Liquidators
excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the Pan Oriental constituted a payment and a discharge of Froilan's obligation to the Government
Shipping Co.; that intervenor was entitled to the possession of the said vessel of the Republic of the Philippines and ordered the dismissal of the latter's
either under the terms of the original contract as supplemented by Froilan's complaint in intervention. In the same order, the lower court made it very clear
letter dated January 28, 1949, or in order that it may cause the extrajudicial sale that said order did not pre-judge the question involved between Froilan and the
thereof under the Chattel Mortgage Law. It, therefore, prayed that Froilan be Oriental Shipping Co. which was also pending determination in said court (Rec.
ordered to deliver the vessel in question to its authorized representative, the on App. pp. 92-93). This order dismissing the complaint in intervention, but
Board of Liquidators; that Froilan be declared to be without any rights on said reserving for future adjudication the controversy between Froilan and the Pan
vessel and the amounts he paid thereon forfeited or alternately, that the said Oriental Shipping Co. has already become final since neither the Government of
vessel be delivered to the Board of Liquidators in order that the intervenor may the Republic of the Philippines nor the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had appealed
have its chattel mortgage extrajudicially foreclosed in accordance with the therefrom.
provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law; and that pending the hearing on the
merits, the said vessel be delivered to it (Rec. on App. pp. 54-66). 9. On May 10, 1952, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a
motion to dismiss the counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on
5. On November 29, 1951, the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to the the ground that the purpose of said counterclaim was to compel the
complaint in intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to deliver the vessel to it (Pan
Philippines was obligated to deliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a Oriental Shipping Co.) in the event that the Government of the Republic of the
contract of bare-boat charter with option to purchase executed on June 16, Philippines recovers the vessel in question from Froilan. In view, however, of the
1949, by the latter in favor of the former; it also alleged that it had made order of the lower court dated February 3, holding that the payment made by
necessary and useful expenses on the vessel and claimed the right of retention Froilan to the Board of Liquidators constituted full payment of Froilan's
of the vessel. It, therefore, prayed that, if the Republic of the Philippines obligation to the Shipping Administration, which order had already become final,
succeeded in obtaining possession of the said vessel, to comply with its the claim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against the Republic of the Philippines
obligations of delivering to it (Pan Oriental Shipping co.) or causing its delivery by was no longer feasible, said counterclaim was barred by prior judgment and
recovering it from Froilan (Rec. on App. pp. 69-81). stated no cause of action. It was also alleged that movant was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court in connection with the counterclaim. (Rec. on App. pp.
6. On November 29, 1951, Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators, which 94-97). This motion was opposed by the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. in its written
was liquidating the affairs of the Shipping Administration, a check in the amount opposition dated June 4, 1952 (Rec. on app. pp. 19-104).
of P162,576.96 in payment of his obligation to the Shipping Administration for
the said vessel as claimed in the complaint in intervention of the Government of
10. In an order dated July 1, 1952, the lower court dismissed the counterclaim of "WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully prays that judgment be rendered
the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. as prayed for by the Republic of the Philippines ordering the intervenor Republic of the Philippines alternatively to deliver to the
(Rec. on App. pp. 104-106). defendants the possession of the said vessel, or to comply with its obligation to
the defendant or causing the delivery to the latter of the said vessel by
11. It if from this order of the lower court dismissing its counterclaim against the recovering the same from plaintiff, with costs.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines that Pan Oriental Shipping Co. has
perfected the present appeal (Rec. on App. p. 107). "The defendant prays for such other remedy as the Court may
deem just and equitable in the premises."
The order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the counterclaim of the
defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Co., from which the latter has appealed, reads as The ground of the motion to dismiss are (a) That the cause of action is barred by
follows: prior judgment; (b) That the counterclaim states no cause of action; and (c) That
this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the intervenor government of the
This is a motion to dismiss the counterclaim interposed by the defendant in its Republic of the Philippines in connection with the counterclaim of the defendant
answer to the complaint in intervention. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
"The counterclaim states as follows: The intervenor contends that the complaint in intervention having been
dismissed and no appeal having been taken, the dismissal of said complaint is
"COUNTERCLAIM tantamount to a judgment.
"As counterclaim against the intervenor Republic of the Philippines, the The complaint in intervention did not contain any claim whatsoever against the
defendant alleges: defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Co.; hence, the counterclaim has no
foundation.
"1. That the defendant reproduces herein all the pertinent allegations of the
foregoing answer to the complaint in intervention The question as to whether the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with
regard to the counterclaim, the Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction
over said intervenor.
"2. That, as shown by the allegations of the foregoing answer to the complaint in
intervention, the defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Company is entitled to the
possession of the vessel and the intervenor Republic of the Philippines is bound It appearing, therefore, that the grounds of the motion to dismiss are well taken,
under the contract of charter with option to purchase it entered into with the the counterclaim of the defendant is dismissed, without pronouncement as to
defendant to deliver that possession to the defendant — whether it actually has costs.
the said possession or it does not have that possession from the plaintiff
Fernando A. Froilan and deliver the same to the defendant; The defendant's appeal is predicated upon the following assignments of error:
"3. That, notwithstanding demand, the intervenor Republic of the Philippines has I. The lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground of prior
not to date complied with its obligation of delivering or causing the delivery of judgment.
the vessel to the defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Company.1âwphïl.nêt
II. The lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that the
"RELIEF counterclaim had no foundation because made to a complaint in intervention
that contained no claim against the defendant.
III. The lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground of alleged calls for specific performance on the part of the intervenor. As to whether this
lack of jurisdiction over the intervenor Republic of the Philippines. counterclaim is meritorious is another question which is not now before us.
We agree with appellant's contention that its counterclaim is not barred by prior The other ground for dismissing the defendant's counterclaim is that the State is immune
judgment (order of February 8, 1952, dismissing the complaint in intervention), first, from suit. This is untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention the
because said counterclaim was filed on November 29, 1951, before the issuance of the Government in effect waived its right of nonsuability.
order invoked; and, secondly, because in said order of February 8, the court dismissed the
complaint in intervention, "without, of course, precluding the determination of the right The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
of the defendant in the instant case," and subject to the condition that the "release and private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the
cancellation of the chattel mortgage does not, however, prejudge the question involved different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the
between the plaintiff and the defendant which is still the subject of determination in this initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged
case." It is to be noted that the first condition referred to the right of the defendant, as position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically
distinguished from the second condition that expressly specified the controversy between acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
the plaintiff and the defendant. That the first condition reserved the right of the defenses he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus
defendant as against the intervenor, is clearly to be deduced from the fact that the order explains:
of February 8 mentioned the circumstance that "the question of the expenses of
drydocking incurred by the defendant has been included in its counterclaim against the "No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when
plaintiff," apparently as one of the grounds for granting the motion to dismiss the an action is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands
complaint in intervention. of a party who has a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid
principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of
The defendant's failure to appeal from the order of February 8 cannot, therefore, be held justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress." (Sinco,
as barring the defendant from proceeding with its counterclaim, since, as already stated, Philippine Political Law, Tenth Ed., pp. 36-37, citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8
said order preserved its right as against the intervenor. Indeed, the maintenance of said Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899.)
right is in consonance with Rule 30, section 2, of the Rules of Court providing that "if a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's favor of the plaintiff against whom the complaint in intervention was directed. This
objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in intervention was in a sense in
the court." derogation of the defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel in question.
The lower court also erred in holding that, as the intervenor had not made any claim Wherefore, the appealed order is hereby reversed and set aside and the case remanded
against the defendant, the latter's counterclaim had no foundation. The complaint in to the lower court for further proceedings. So ordered, without costs.
intervention sought to recover possession of the vessel in question from the plaintiff, and
this claim is logically adverse to the position assumed by the defendant that it has a
Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes,
better right to said possession than the plaintiff who alleges in his complaint that he is
J.B.L., JJ., concur.
entitled to recover the vessel from the defendant. At any rate a counterclaim should be
judged by its own allegations, and not by the averments of the adverse party. It should be
recalled that the defendant's theory is that the plaintiff had already lost his rights under
the contract with the Shipping Administration and that, on the other hand, the defendant
is relying on the charter contract executed in its favor by the intervenor which is bound to
protect the defendant in its possession of the vessel. In other words, the counterclaim
Republic of the Philippines those covered and described under TCT No. T-1831 of the Register of
SUPREME COURT Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of San
Manila Miguel Bulacan,
Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the Municipality of San (a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or
Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and personal, not otherwise exempt from execution, or only on such part of
San Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from execution for the the property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost, if
satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B. he has more than sufficient property for the purpose;
Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason (b) By selling the property levied upon;
for this was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that
they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the
(c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will
satisfy the judgment and accruing costs; and
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge, dated July 27,
1982, granting issuance of a writ of execution; the alias writ of execution, dated July 27,
1982; and the order of respondent judge, dated September 13, 1982, directing the
Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan to
comply with the money judgments, are SET ASIDE; and respondents are hereby enjoined
from implementing the writ of execution.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not disputed by Republic of the Philippines
petitioner. No appeal was taken therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed SUPREME COURT
possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to Manila
comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from
its possession of the property since the same has been the site of Makati West High EN BANC
School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant
refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that, within the context of the State's inherent
power of eminent domain,
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV.
DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO,
. . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct determination of
CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M.
the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of
REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna
the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D.,
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property
HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya,
owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E.
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A.
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss
GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
[Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August
vs.
15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also Provincial Government of
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his
Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037, August 27, 1987, 153
capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in
SCRA 291].
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F.
DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary,
and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the Department of National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of
compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy
property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO
had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation. RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA,
Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine
immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount of Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.
P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this Court a report of its
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.: law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which
shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance
of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8- The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for
violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at
military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs. the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on
Factual Background January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
language which means "long reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been
and Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Palawan.1
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. regret for the incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines
306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February
Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs
heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity. Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate
compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the US
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the coral reef.
Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high
diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of
habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited their respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet
Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important and significant natural habitat unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of
for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing significant on- the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian
going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013
aesthetic importance.2 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and (Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment
conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in
and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant),
and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major
strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine respondents."
including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS 2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to orders of the Court;
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate 3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without
their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive limitation:
from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive
grounding incident. portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with the United States
representatives for the appropriate agreement on [environmental guidelines and
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V[]
R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees of the VFA ... "
(Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef
(Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative,
petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they civil, and criminal proceedings against erring officers and individuals to the full
want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional. extent of the law, and to make such proceedings public;
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal
wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the jurisdiction over erring U.S. personnel under the circumstances of this case;
Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the
particular,
settlement of all meritorious claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef
on terms and conditions no less severe than those applicable to other States,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;
all operations over the Guardian grounding incident;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and delivery
additional buffer zone; of objects connected with the offenses related to the grounding of the Guardian;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each
because of the absence of clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for other of the disposition of all cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of
breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to assume responsibility for the Guardian;
prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental damage
under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair,
salvage or post salvage plan or plans, including cleanup plans covering the
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement approved by the
recreation, and limited commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous Honorable Court;
communities near or around the TRNP but away from the damaged site and an
additional buffer zone;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in
accordance with the Local Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment8 to the petition, petitioners
the TRNP Trust Fund defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide also filed a motion for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US
gesture towards full reparations; respondents.9
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected Respondents' Consolidated Comment
by the grounding of the Guardian in light of Respondents' experience in the Port
Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar grounding incidents; In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular
inspection and production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage
of transparency and accountability such environmental damage assessment, operations on the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in
valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages of negotiation; form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the
technical support to the TPAMB; damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, The Court's Ruling
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to review the
Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider whether As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the
their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a balanced and present petition.
healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any violation of those
rights; Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question."10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and
of protecting the damaged areas of TRNP; "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
Article VI of the Visiting Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
protection and/or for violating the preemptory norm of nondiscrimination significance to society, or of paramount public interest.12
incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2, Article II, of the
Philippine Constitution; In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of
citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures; history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed,
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
respects; and inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.14
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such
other reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring
supplied.) On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI,
generations. Thus: Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II,
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet Section 2. x x x.
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of
of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, with these principles in its relations with other states.
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well as future given by Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against the authority which
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There
that rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot
right for the generations to come.15 (Emphasis supplied.) assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and B. 171]
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen
suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
of nature."16 performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question the same,. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
of whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not
pleading or manifestation in this case. been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the
state may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
non-suability of the State,17is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution
which states: Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment
which reads:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
immunity from suit, as follows: another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the immunity of This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the
foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows: courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a
restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil")
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule
rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive
a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a affairs.24
foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity
immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of principle, thus:
a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded
for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such
par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by
jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc.,
against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy et al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts
the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for
been formally impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.) the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of
the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights
ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which
jurisdiction.22 he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that
the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases therein doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed xxxx
from his employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a
complaint for damages filed by the said employee against the military officers, the latter The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against the US Government immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is
which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment
complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the
US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged
act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises
was committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. 32
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the
US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that Article 30
the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within
the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea
cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State immediately.
regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
Article 31
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary
in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal
State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid
for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the
concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention
exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law,
or other rules of international law.
regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is
a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego
Article 32
Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
purposes
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing
sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare
in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships
liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary
operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign warship's
principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in
unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is
varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2)
one situation in which the above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship
territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It
is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where
the vessel is located.31
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS,
but despite this the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes
the U.S. delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns stable maritime zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies
over deep seabed mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works
remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal nations from expanding their own
states cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ
The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part XI government aircraft.
implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted
UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and xxxx
consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and
an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by
required for the President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS. enhancing the ability of the US to assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of
the largest continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea Convention
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th that first established the concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200
and 110th Congresses, its progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of nautical miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the
political ambivalence over U.S. participation in international institutions. Most recently, natural resources in this Zone.35
111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full
Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not
action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress.34 mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
March 10, 1983 that the US will "recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-
off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to
freedom of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the
coastal states", and President Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we
consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to
of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to
expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Article 197
Sea in this case." Cooperation on a global or regional basis
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly
the UN CLOS was centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
customary international rules on navigation." taking into account characteristic regional features.
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute.
endorses the ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of
its official website: Coastal States while navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required
to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance
Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
they invoke federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily kalikasan.
waived their immunity to any action. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners
asseverate that the US respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance. The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
We are not persuaded. (a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts
or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the
US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of (b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person
military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.36 The invocation of US (c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person
federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters
in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private
person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment;
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and
and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and
case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration
separately:
of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ
of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become
actions.
moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had
already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible icture and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned,
for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of
petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US
whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the
grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy
allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing
No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
charging the same violation of an environmental law.37
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to
As can be gleaned from the following provisions, mediation and settlement are available compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before
for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute resolution methods are rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
encouraged by the court, to wit:
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser,
RULE3 the USS Port Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway
and remained stuck for four days. After spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the
xxxx US government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement
over coral reef damage caused by the grounding.38
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall
inquire from the parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for
immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the the damage caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the has announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate
court shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation. discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation
options in Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation options, in coordination with
receipt of notice of referral to mediation. the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government entities, non-
governmental organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities." 39
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the
30-day period. A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is
also a major relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit
under the Rules, viz:
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance
of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case
to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for the following purposes: RULES
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement; SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff
proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the
environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation
xxxx
expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their
contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the
counsels under oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
court.1âwphi1
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
dispute. The judge may issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of
parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and public policy to protect the right
these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
security interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations
of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the
xxxx political" --departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to
order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, 41 the VFA was
duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the
United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the
Republic of the Philippines
United States government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are
SUPREME COURT
required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.42 The
Manila
present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of
its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of
Kalikasan is hereby DENIED. THIRD DIVISION
No pronouncement as to costs.
The pivotal issue in this petition centers on the extent of the "immunity from suit" of the
officials of a United States Naval Base inside Philippine territory.
In February, 1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while
petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in
Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the
office of the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard.
M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station
supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was published daily by
the US Naval Base station. The POD featured important announcements, necessary
precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of the regular
features of the POD was the "action line inquiry." On February 3, 1978, the POD
published, under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" the following:
Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control 1. Defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the
inspector/inspectress are (sic) consuming for their own benefit things performance of their official functions as officers of the United States
they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The observation is even Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit;
more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes
and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to mention "Auring" who is in 2. The United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US
herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost government which cannot be sued without its consent; and
Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of
the Merchandise Control Division is aware of this malpractice? 3. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as the
parties in this case. (Record on Appeal, pp. 133-134)
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are
prohibited from appropriating confiscated items for their own The motion was, however, denied.
consumption or use. Two locked containers are installed at the Main
Gate area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM evidence
In their answer, the defendants reiterated the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
custodian controls access to these containers.
case.
The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
Provost Marshal. That the private respondent was the same "Auring" referred to in the
against the defendants jointly and severally, as follows:
POD was conclusively proven when on February 7, 1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her
a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication. The private respondent then
1) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams to pay
commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Zambales (now
the plaintiff Aurora Rarang the sum of one hundred thousand
Regional Trial Court) against
(P100,000.00) pesos by way of moral and exemplary damages;
M. H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the U. S. Naval Base. She alleged that the article
constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her
honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and 2) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams to pay
that the libel was published and circulated in the English language and read by almost all the plaintiff the sum of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos by way of
the U. S. Naval Base personnel. She prayed that she be awarded P300,000.00 as moral attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
damages; exemplary damages which the court may find proper; and P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees. 3) To pay the costs of this suit.
In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss anchored on three Counterclaims are dismissed.
grounds:
Likewise, the suit against the U.S. Naval Base is ordered dismissed. xxx xxx xxx
(Record on Appeal, p. 154)
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
On appeal, the petitioners reiterated their stance that they are immune from suit since accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of
the subject publication was made in their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy. incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of
They also maintained that they did not intentionally and maliciously cause the questioned states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every
publication. civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is
The private respondent, not satisfied with the amount of damages awarded to her, also automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations
appealed the trial court's decision. with other states.
Acting on these appeals, the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on
modified the trial court's decision, to wit: the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal
right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court below is modified so that the depends." (Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349) There are other
defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the
sum of P175,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P60,000.00 as foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added
exemplary damages. The rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium.
affirmed in toto. Costs against the defendants-appellants. (Rollo, p. 44) All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated
case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." (Da Haber v. Queen of
The appellate court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171)
Hence, this petition.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
In a resolution dated March 9, 1987, we gave due course to the petition.
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
The petitioners persist that they made the questioned publication in the performance of officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
their official functions as administrative assistant, in the case of M. H. Wylie, and satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
commanding officer, in the case of Capt. James Williams of the US Navy assigned to the U. pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
S. Naval Station, Subic Bay, Olongapo City and were, therefore, immune from suit for their against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.
official actions. (Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120) In such a situation, the state may
move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed
In the case of United States of America v. Guinto (182 SCRA 644 [1990]), we discussed the without its consent.
principle of the state immunity from suit as follows:
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any
expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is
the generally accepted principles of international law that we have hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the
doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, (57 SCRA 1) along with
under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state several other decisions, to support their position that they are not
may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may suable in the cases below, the United States not having waived its
be sued if it consents. sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court
held:
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit
special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract it of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate.
itself commences litigation. More specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is
concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a
xxx xxx xxx 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition
for the release of petitioners confined by American
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected army authorities, Justice Hilado, speaking for the
only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted Court, cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was
statute. (Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470) We have held that not all explicitly declared: "It is well settled that a foreign
contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its army, permitted to march through a friendly country
non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and or to be stationed in it, by permission of its
proprietary acts. (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487) As for government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and
the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only criminal jurisdiction of the place." Two years later,
where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on the
defendant. (Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345) (at pp. 652-655) ruling in Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support
thereof excerpts from the works of the following
authoritative writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall,
In the same case we had opportunity to discuss extensively the nature and extent of
Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, and McNair
immunity from suit of United States personnel who are assigned and stationed in
and Lauterpacht. Accuracy demands the clarification
Philippine territory, to wit:
that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American
Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provisions
In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of
should control on such matter, the assumption being
international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity
that there was a manifestation of the submission to
in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows:
jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power
whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as lessors sued the
the rights, power and authority within the bases Commanding General of the United States Army in
which are necessary for the establishment, use, the Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the
operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the apartment buildings they owned leased to the United
control thereof and all the rights, power and States armed forces station in the Manila area. A
authority within the limits of the territorial waters motion to dismiss on the ground of non-suability was
and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the filed and upheld by respondent Judge. The matter
bases which are necessary to provide access to them was taken to this Court in a mandamus proceeding. It
or appropriate for their control. failed. It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted
correctly considering that the "action must be
considered as one against the U.S. Government." The The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from
opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: "It is clear being sued in the courts of another State without its
that the courts of the Philippines including the consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over consequence of the principles of independence and
the present case for unlawful detainer. The question equality of States. However, the rules of International
of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government and evolving. And because the activities of states
has not given its consent to the filing of this suit have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
which is essentially against her, though not in name. them –– between sovereign and governmental acts
Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary
suit against his own Government without the latter's acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity
consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive
foreign government without said government's application of State immunity is now the rule in the
consent, which renders more obvious the lack of United States, the United Kingdom and other states in
jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles Western Europe.
of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such
general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to xxx xxx xxx
cite authorities in support thereof."
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
xxx xxx xxx only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a
confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts State may be said to have descended to the level of
done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the business contracts. It does not apply where the
discharge of their official functions. contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has both the United States and the Philippines,
entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only indisputably a function of the government of the
when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated
no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in United States of to commercial or business purposes.
America v. Ruiz, (136 SCRA 487) where the transaction in question dealt
with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in
Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held that the the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the
contract did not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges
immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos: against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion
that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has
not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to
be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is The question, therefore, arises –– are American naval officers who commit a crime or
not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state
judgment. (At pp. 655-658) immunity from suit? Pursuing the question further, does the grant of rights, power, and
authority to the United States under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers
In the light of these precedents, we proceed to resolve the present case. from crimes and torts? Our answer is No.
The POD was published under the direction and authority of the commanding officer, U.S. Killing a person in cold blood while on patrol duty, running over a child while driving with
Naval Station Subic Bay. The administrative assistant, among his other duties, is tasked to reckless imprudence on an official trip, or slandering a person during office hours could
prepare and distribute the POD. On February 3, 1978, when the questioned article was not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement. Our laws and, we presume, those of
published in the POD, petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer while the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty.
petitioner M.H. Wylie was the administrative assistant of the US Naval Station at Subic
bay. The case of Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991] gives the law on immunity
from suit of public officials:
The NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY is a regular feature of the POD. It is a telephone
answering device in the office of the Administrative Assistant. The Action Line is intended The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel should be accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection
brought to his attention for correction or investigation. The matter of inquiry may be with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is
phoned in or mailed to the POD. (TSN, September 9, 1980, pp. 12-13, Jerry Poblon) showing of bad faith.
According to
M. H. Wylie, the action line naming "Auring" was received about three (3) weeks prior to xxx xxx xxx
its being published in the POD on February 3, 1978. It was forwarded to Rarang's office of
employment, the Provost Marshal, for comment. The Provost Marshal office's Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under
response ". . . included a short note stating that if the article was published, to remove the Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-
name." (Exhibit 8-A, p. 5) The Provost Marshal's response was then forwarded to the taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
executive officer and to the commanding officer for approval. The approval of the facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
Commanding officer was forwarded to the office of the Administrative Assistant for
inclusion in the POD. A certain Mrs. Dologmodin, a clerk typist in the office of the
In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government
Administrative Assistant prepared the smooth copy of the POD. Finally, M. H. Wylie, the
v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988] then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
administrative assistant signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to notice the
added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under
reference to "Auring" in the action line inquiry. (Exh. 8-A, pp. 4-5, Questions Nos. 14-15).
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:
There is no question, therefore, that the two (2) petitioners actively participated in
With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr.
screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the
Justice Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just wish to
rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit,
point out two things: First, the main opinion does not
then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned
claim absolute immunity for the members of the
publication.
Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No.
1 provides the Commission's members immunity
It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the
their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. Commission or any member thereof for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this order." No absolute immunity had been the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the
like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for performance of her duties.
himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is
understood that the immunity granted the members It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the naval base is
of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be
magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.
and the State's exercise of police power was This may be true as a general rule. In this particular case, however, the records show that
immunity from liability for damages in the official the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he
discharge of the task granted the members of the approved it. The factual findings of the two courts below are based on the records. The
Commission much in the same manner that judges petitioners have shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for the findings of
are immune from suit in the official discharge of the the trial court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular case and
functions of their office. why their decisions should be reversed.
. . . (at pp. 581-582)
Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person's
xxx xxx xxx act or omission constituting fault or negligence, to wit:
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non- Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another,
accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done.
official of the Republic. (id., at page 586) Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in provisions of this Chapter.
bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously
conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent "Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent." (Andamo v.
the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990]).
be no question that a complaint for damages does not confer a license
to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be
Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. In effect, the
taken against public officers or private citizens alike. . . . (pp. 289-291) offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party moral
damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary
We apply the same ruling to this case. damages. (Occena v. Icamina, 181 SCRA 328 [1990]). In another case, Heirs of Basilisa
Justiva v. Gustilo, 7 SCRA 72 [1963], we ruled that the allegation of forgery of documents
The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions a certain could be a defamation, which in the light of Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code could by
"Auring" as ". . a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal." The analogy be ground for payment of moral damages, considering the wounded feelings and
same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming and appropriating for herself besmirched reputation of the defendants.
confiscated items like cigarettes and foodstuffs. There is no question that the Auring
alluded to in the Article was the private respondent as she was the only Auring in the Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a
Office of the Provost Marshal. Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondent defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner
was investigated by her supervisor. Before the article came out, the private respondent Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended
the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however,
were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting
the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It
was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. As a result of the petitioners'
act, the private respondent, according to the record, suffered besmirched reputation,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article
was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for
the damages they caused the private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution
of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 February 15, 2011 designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is
SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners,
vs. (2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS President’s power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine
FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,Respondents. Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major
RESOLUTION river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to
the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas)
VELASCO, JR., J.: Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually
On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering
discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to
petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities.
determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic
The fallo reads:
tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If
none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-
establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a
G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes
Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent
from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under
developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now
pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
read:
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install,
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-
operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities
government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and
in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving,
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in
and other forms of contact recreation.
coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain
sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection,
In particular:
treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275,
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the
improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of
the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on
in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in pollution.
the Manila Bay.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275,
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic
in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal
apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the
designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay. companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set
up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for sanitation clearance.
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt
such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA
and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
docked at ports and apprehend the violators. management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula
of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them,
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and
for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Philippine archipelago.
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle
and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General
or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig- Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to attain economic growth
esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our
and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more marine waters.
particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination
with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other (12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH,
concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this
applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the
Manila Bay. SO ORDERED.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the Decision
landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of became final in January 2009.
this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with
the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008 Sec. 7. Judgment.––If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of
Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the
quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting
with said decision and to monitor the execution phase. from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the
respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate
frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its
encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the comments or observations on the execution of the judgment.
President of the Philippines.
Sec. 8. Return of the writ.––The periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing
This view is misplaced. compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full
satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court by the
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the
power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever
questioned the power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus
has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over executive functions. issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with
the Court’s orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, execution of the judgment.
data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a
final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads: There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now
proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.––The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.2 An
final order, may be as follows: evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are voluminous
quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not
xxxx have a uniform manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation
activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by petitioner DENR as to
petitioner-agencies’ timeframe for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest, that
been a change in leadership in both the national and local levels; and (5) some agencies
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
have encountered difficulties in complying with the Court’s directives.
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be issued by
the Court to address the said concerns.
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court hereby
judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment. resolves to ORDER the following:
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in the On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila shall
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and
the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy. Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within
their respective jurisdictions.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila Bay
waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011. (3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in
Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater treatment
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their
companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that plans and projects for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the
generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011. aforesaid areas and the completion period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond
2037.
(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two concessionaires
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in their respective areas of
provinces to inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private homes along the operation as of December 31, 2010.
banks of the major river systems––such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the National Capital Region (Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the Navotas- (4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before September
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation
the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna De Bay––and other facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for said works, which shall be
minor rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into fully implemented by December 31, 2020.
the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater treatment
facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and (5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials are given up to September 30, 2011 Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in
to finish the inspection of said establishments and houses. Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has
extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to ensure Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report shall
compliance by non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall
with said law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or installment of submit its five-year plan to restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks. activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period
for said undertakings.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before
December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which will contain the names and The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline data as of
addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories, commercial September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into the Manila Bay system from agricultural
establishments and private homes, copy furnished the concerned environmental agency, and livestock sources.
be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to
intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial include in its report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports.
establishments, and private homes. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to
undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of open and
MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such measures. controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after February 21,
2006,3 pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of these open
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that collects and and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later than December 31, 2012. Also, on or
disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes, which shall state before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as Chairperson of the National Solid Waste
the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the Management Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report on the location of all open and
present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days the ship was at controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew per trip, the volume of solid,
liquid and other wastes collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC Chairperson,
disposal site for said wastes. shall submit a report on whether or not the following landfills strictly comply with Secs.
41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:
(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before June
30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities it intends to undertake National Capital Region
to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code
of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution 1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City
in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year
plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the Region III
violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA
9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations
3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan
to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of
violators.
4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on
5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila
who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and
other encroachments established or built along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the 6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros, in violation of RA 7279 and other 7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special Economic Zone
applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the
removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures, Region IV-A
constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities,
which shall be fully implemented not later than December 31, 2015. 8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt of 9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna
this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for Metro Manila in
compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management 10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna
Act.
11. Morong, Rizal
12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal (ISWIMS) (10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before May 31,
2011 a report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, waste management,
13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC) environmental protection, environmental laws and the like that it has integrated into the
school curricula in all levels for the school year 2011-2012.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila are
ordered to jointly submit a report on the average amount of garbage collected monthly On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure
per district in all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to December 31, 2010 compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the
vis-à-vis the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented by June
its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010 and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the 30, 2012.
apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws
on pollution for the said period. (11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically using the
forms below. The agencies may add other key performance indicators that they have
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, identified.
Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the informal settlers in
their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses, structures, SO ORDERED.
constructions, and other encroachments built along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
and other rivers, connecting waterways and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Associate Justice
Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011,
the DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said
informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and
encroachments, as well as the completion dates for such activities which shall be
implemented not later than December 31, 2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011
the names and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge companies including those
that do not have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation Clearances
and shall require companies to procure a license to operate from the DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic and
hazardous waste management system by June 30, 2011 which will implement segregation
of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing with municipal solid waste.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said
companies have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of
compliance.1avvphi1